CV32

New DB is up, Ralf. Knowing you were chomping at the bit to do some scen testing certainly does provide impetus to get it done. Thanks a bunch.

HCDB-080319 Aircraft: Su-25SM Frogfoot C - Russia Ships: Svalbard OPV - Norway

A new version of the official Harpoon Commander's Edition (HCE) Database (HCDB-080319) is now available. This is a small update, necessary for a new scenario I've been working on and now undergoing testing. Get the new DB in the Download section. New additions (or overhauls of existing entries) include: Aircraft: Su-25SM Frogfoot C - Russia Ships: Svalbard OPV - Norway Enjoy.

No problems here either, fwiw.

Electronic Counter Measures (ECM) is a very broad term, but lets put it this way, simply: The only "jammers" that would affect "passive" IR homing missiles would be systems like the ALQ-144, which attempt to confuse IR seekers by creating alternative sources of heat radiation, or a directional missile countermeasures system (DIRCM), like the AAQ-24, which attempt to jam by actually focusing a laser on the IR seeker head. So there, in effect, ECM "jammers" for use against both active radar homing (ARH) and IRH missiles. And, there are "decoys" for both missile seeker types, as well.

You can find the text of Boeing's GAO protest here (in PDF format).

From Aviation Week USAF On The KC-X Defensive A Year Ago Mar 19, 2008 Amy Butler/Aerospace Daily & Defense Report Fire-walling procedures to fence off data in a modeling tool used in selecting a Northrop Grumman/EADS refueling tanker design for the U.S. Air Force prevented any unfair advantage for the winner, even though the tool used to assess the bidders was designed by eventual winner Northrop Grumman, according to the Air Force. Boeing raised concerns about this and other issues, including changes to the assumptions for operational scenarios used in the modeling tool, in a March 7, 2007, letter to Sandra Palmatier, a contracting officer for the KC-X program office at Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio. These factors gave an advantage to Northrop Grumman/EADS’s A330-based tanker, which is larger than the 767-based Boeing design, officials on the losing team contend. The Government Accountability Office is reviewing a March 11 protest of the Air Force’s Feb. 29 decision to award the $35 billion contract to Northrop Grumman/EADS. Aviation Week & Space Technology obtained a copy of the March 7 letter and the U.S. Air Force’s March 29 response. This correspondence was taking place privately between Boeing and the Air Force. Although both competitors said publicly that the competition was expected to be fair, the letters show that concern over how the competition was proceeding began setting in far earlier at Boeing, once thought to be the shoo-in, than its executives had let on publicly. The correspondence also shines light on the internal workings of a process that forced the Air Force to walk a fine line. The service was trying to craft a competition between two dissimilar commercially derived products, and establishing requirements for the duel proved to be a complex balancing act between the opposing contractors -- both of which considered dropping out. The Combined Mating and Ranging Planning System (Cmarps) was designed for the Strategic Air Command in the 1980s and is now used by planners in Air Mobility Command. It helps operators assess how many tankers are required for a variety of missions, where they can be based and how many receivers -- fighters and intelligence aircraft, for example -- can be serviced by the available refuelers. It is one of various modeling systems used by the Air Force. Boeing points out in its March 7, 2007, letter that Cmarps was designed by, and has been used by, Northrop Grumman, giving its competitor an advantage due to its experience using the system. Boeing complained of “problems we have experienced in Cmarps, including difficulties operating the model, the need for manuals and the need for training on the Cmarps tool.” One industry official not affiliated with either Boeing or Northrop Grumman says that Cmarps is known to be manpower-intensive and demands a learning curve before operating successfully. The Air Force tried to assuage Boeing’s concerns. Dedicated computers were purchased to “ensure no inadvertent electronic transfers occur” between analysts at the system program office evaluating the proposals and Northrop Grumman, says a March 29, 2007, letter from Joseph Leising, another contracting officer in Ohio, to Boeing. During the early part of 2007, USAF also made changes to some of the operational assumptions used to gauge the performance of the offerings from Northrop Grumman/EADS. These changes form a large part of the basis for Boeing’s protest of the decision. Two “major combat operations” scenarios were tweaked to add additional ramp space in the Cmarps model that doesn’t actually exist. This allowed for the KC-30 to gain enough access at a “priority base,” according to Boeing officials, that it otherwise would have been too large to achieve. Limited ramp space can make operations with larger aircraft more difficult, because of tight parking and ground maneuver space. Though company and Air Force officials didn’t identify that location -- the operational scenarios are actually classified -- it could be Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar. According to an earlier Air Force analysis of various tanker models, only four A330-based tankers can operate from that base assuming 30 ft. of space between rows of parked aircraft and interior taxi ways as well as a standard 50 ft. wingtip-to-wingtip distance between for aircraft parking. Space between parked aircraft, however, was another change made by the Air Force during the competition, Boeing says. The service cut the space between parked tankers in half, to 25 ft., according to Boeing. The company says this change doesn’t accurately reflect operations in the field as articulated in the Mobility Capability Study 2005, a classified assessment of mobility needs by the Pentagon. The Air Force countered in its March 29 letter, saying that the shift to 25 ft. separation between parked aircraft “accurately reflects contingency operations at constrained employment bases.” Another Air Force shift in evaluating the criteria was the use of a “standard planning ground time,” which reflects the time needed to service a refueler on the ground, load it up with more gas and send it out for another mission. Boeing says that in November 2006, the Air Force asked the competitors to calculate ground turnaround time based on a fixed number (capturing the time to switch out crews and check the aircraft for problems) plus the amount of time to fill the tanker on the ground with more gas. Boeing naturally saw this as a strength for its proposal, since a smaller tanker would take less time to refuel on the ground. The Air Force, however, switched that metric, implementing a standard turnaround time of 4 hrs. and 15 mins. for both proposals, Boeing officials say. In its March 29, 2007, letter to Boeing, USAF defended the switch. The original factor for ground turnaround time depended on time for fuel upload, the service says. “Upon review of current operations, the Air Force determined that there are many factors that impact turn time and overshadow differences in ground fuel servicing times, including, for example, combat tasking ground crew and spare parts availability [and] local constraints,” the service says. “As these examples indicate, these factors have little or no relationship to the aircraft characteristics. Because of these variables, the Air Force must use a standard planning ground time for its tanker fleet.” These changes were made during a time when Northrop Grumman/EADS threatened not to propose a design, which would have left the Air Force with only one option. This was not palatable, as Congress was pushing for a competition after the 2002 tanker lease with Boeing imploded under scandal. Senior Air Force officials have told Congress they stand by their decision to choose the Northrop Grumman/EADS design, adding that it is more capable for a variety of missions.

From Aviation Week Northrop Grumman Defends Its KC-45 Turf Mar 19, 2008 Amy Butler/Aerospace Daily & Defense Report Citing a proliferation of “confusing and misleading statements” about its $35 billion win of a competition to build refueling tankers for the U.S. Air Force, Northrop Grumman officials say the contested decision was fairly conducted. Boeing argues in a March 11 protest of the award that the Air Force changed elements of the evaluation criteria, unfairly steering the competition in the favor of a Northrop Grumman/EADS North America team pitching a European design for the program. The win unseated Boeing, with its 767-based proposal, as the sole-provider of widebodies to the Pentagon. The Air Force issued a stop-work order March 14, in accordance with protest rules. Paul Meyer, vice president of air mobility systems for Northrop Grumman says the company halted its parts supplies. The probability of overturning the decision with a protest is “low,” Meyer says. He acknowledged on a teleconference March 18 with reporters that on the surface the competition did seem to be “close,” but that the winner clearly dominated in four out of five factors of the Air Force’s evaluation. Boeing argues that the two companies were neck-in-neck, and that criteria were not clearly established to determine how to score capabilities of the aircraft that went beyond the threshold requirements. The one factor in which Northrop Grumman/EADS’s bid didn’t outstrip, but rather tied with Boeing’s, was cost. Both were in the $108 billion range for most probable life cycle cost. Meyer also calls a foul with Boeing’s complaints, which came after the company’s stunning loss. Once the request for proposals was final, “We had equal opportunities to formally [propose] changes or demand changes, and neither of us did,” he says. Northrop Grumman actually demanded changes to the draft request for proposals in late 2006, only formally deciding to compete in early February 2007. Boeing lodged complaints about changes to an assessment of refueling capabilities in various classified operational scenarios in two letters to the U.S. Air Force – one dated Feb. 21, 2007, and another March 7, 2007. Boeing says that the Air Force didn’t adequately address the concerns in those letters. The Government Accountability Office has 100 days to review the protest.

From Aviation Week USN Hornet Shortfall Poised To Triple Mar 18, 2008 By David A. Fulghum The U.S. Navy's most recent estimate of a 69 F/A-18 Hornet and Super Hornet shortage is getting ready to leap by about 300 percent. "The 69 minimum assumes that the Joint Strike Fighter F-35C is operational in 2015 as currently planned, that they buy them at 50 per year and that the [older] F/A-18A -Ds are going to last 10,000 hrs," says a senior aerospace industry official with insight into the program. "All those are very optimistic assumptions, and the Navy's characterization of the shortage [as 69 aircraft] is the most optimistic [extrapolation of that] scenario." The data on the F/A-18A-Ds is starting to come in and there are a significant number of hot spots requiring maintenance or structural repair like any aging aircraft, say Navy and aerospace officials polled on the problem. In June, the Navy will finish its full analysis of what has to be done to extend the life of Hornets. The majority of the repairs have to be done before the aircraft reach 8,000 flying hrs. The total needing the 8,000 hr. inspection and the associated repairs will quickly climb to 60-70 aircraft per year, specialists contend. The first problem will be handling the volume of inspections and the second will be planning and conducting the changes to handle problems found in the aircraft. "If the inventory shortfall climbs from 69 to the more reasonable number of around 200, then you have four aircraft carriers worth of jets not available before JSF production can ramp up," the aerospace official says. "The [budget programming] for 2010 requires a decision on whether to add [super Hornet replacements for the older Hornets] in 2013 or not. If you don't then you start shutting down the [production] line in September 2010." No one doubts the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) will get into production, but many Navy and industry acquisition officials attending the Navy League's Washington convention this week say that they don't think the Navy's version of the stealthy fighter is likely to stay on schedule. That would translate into a shortage of combat aircraft, accelerated flying time for those left in service, and finally, a faster end to their operational lives. A new Government Accountability Office review also doubts the program can meet its cost and schedule targets (Aerospace DAILY, March 14). Congressional budgets plus-ups have shown a pronounced interest in the newest, two-seat, Block 2 F/A-18F Super Hornets that carry a weapon systems officer allowing it to conduct two missions simultaneously such as air-to-air combat and precision attack of multiple ground targets, either fixed or moving. However, civilian acquisition officials have battled against the two-seater in favor of the cheaper, single-seat F/A-18E. Boeing officials a few weeks ago proposed that customers could buy even more advanced versions of the Super Hornet (which unofficially is attributed with forward stealth) and fly them until 6th generation strike aircraft with broader spectrum stealth are available - thereby skipping the 5th generation F-22 and F-35 (Aerospace DAILY, Jan. 30). Lockheed Martin officials are livid at the suggestion and contend that Boeing's planning for the advanced design is too underdeveloped to make the claim that a generation jump is affordable or technically realistic. [CV32: Even though me and the Bug/Superbug are on fairly decent terms, even I can see the outlook in this article is pretty grim].

From Jane's Australian government commits to Super Hornet acquisition By Julian Kerr 18 March 2008 The Australian government has confirmed the purchase of 24 Boeing F/A-18F Block II Super Hornet fighters. This is despite accusing the previous administration, which originally ordered the aircraft, of having failed to make sound, long-term air combat capability decisions during its decade in power. The decision followed the release of Part A of an Air Combat Capability Review ordered by the new government in January. This focused on the feasibility of retaining the Royal Australian Air Force's ageing F-111 strike aircraft beyond 2010 and the status of Australia's plans to acquire the Super Hornet. Defence Minister Joel Fitzgibbon said in a statement on 17 March that cancelling the Super Hornet would bring significant financial penalties and create tension between the United States and Australian governments. In February, defence officials said cancelling the Super Hornet contract under the US Foreign Military Sales programme would cost between AUD400 million and AUD600 million (USD375 million to USD563 million).

From Aviation Week Australia Eyes E/A-18Gs, Confirms F/A-18Fs Mar 17, 2008 Bradley Perrett Australia will consider buying Boeing E/A-18G Growler electronic warfare aircraft following confirmation of its order for 24 of the standard two-seat version of the Super Hornet, the F/A-18F. In a review of air combat requirements, the Labor government now endorses the Super Hornet as “an excellent aircraft capable of meeting any known threat in the region,” even though Defense Minister Joel Fitzgibbon has spent months criticizing the hasty process in which the former Liberal National administration decided to buy it last year. Fitzgibbon has implied, but never specifically said, that the Super Hornet was a bad choice to fill the gap to be left by the 2010 retirement of Australia’s General Dynamics F-111 strike bombers. It isn’t clear whether the E/A-18Gs would be bought in addition to the 24 F/A-18Fs on order or instead of some of them. Releasing the review, Fitzgibbon says: “The analysis also highlighted additional capabilities such as specialist electronic warfare variants (the F/A-18G) that will be considered as part of the Super Hornet acquisition. “These additional capabilities will be more fully considered under the second stage of the Air Combat Capability Review” after the responsible panel reports to the government in late April, Fitzgibbon says. The reference to the “F/A-18G” is evidently a typo, since the Growler is designated E/A-18G. The first-stage review also endorses the controversial retirement of the F-111s in two years, but only on the grounds that it is now too late to reverse the decision. The service life of the F-111 has been one of the most debated issues in Australian defense policy for a decade or more. At one time the aircraft was intended to serve as late as 2020, and some of its supporters have called for an even longer operational life. The F-111’s backers say that no replacement can offer so great a payload-radius. Its critics, noting that the U.S. Air Force retired its last F-111 in 1996, say Australia cannot afford to maintain the small fleet of old and very complicated aircraft. There have been worries about safety, too, with some military officials pointing to the likelihood of cracks in the strong but brittle D6ac steel of the wing carry-through structure. Fitzgibbon’s Labor government was elected in November. It has been particularly keen to criticize its predecessor’s equipment orders because former defense minister Brendan Nelson is now the opposition leader, and the man whose name it most wants to blacken. The new minister still characterizes the Super Hornet decision as having been forced on the country because of the former government’s unwarranted trust in the timing of the U.S. F-35 Joint Strike Fighter project. “The former government’s decision to leave Australia’s air defenses in the hands of the Joint Strike Fighter project was a flawed leap of faith in scheduling terms, and combined with the quick decision to retire the F-111 early, allowed an air combat capability gap to emerge,” Fitzgibbon says, adding that the Super Hornet was therefore unavoidable (but still “excellent”). Cancelling the Super Hornet order would result in financial penalties, he adds. Also, the cost of buying the Super Hornet and operating it until 2020 will be lower than the A$6 billion (US$5.5 billion) previously budgeted. Savings of A$300 million have been found in departmental and industry support costs. The second part of the air combat review will consider requirements as far out as 2045. Fitzgibbon has asked the United States to clear the Lockheed Martin F-22 for sale to Australia so that Canberra can consider it as an alternative to the F-35. Defending the Super Hornet order last year, Nelson pointed to Aviation Week reports on the capabilities of its Raytheon APG-79 radar. Australian general media have paid little attention to the all-important electronic aspects of the design, however.

This scenario, 'The Origin of Storms', is for play by BLUE in the EC2003 GIUK Battleset. The original intention of the scenario was to examine in part which new fighter aircraft would be best for Norway, the F-16, F-35 JSF or Eurofighter Typhoon. It subsequently evolved into something more than that. You will need the latest version of the HCDB, which I hope to upload in a few days. When I do, please take this scenario for a spin and let me know if you have problems, issues, thoughts, opinions, whatever. The scenario is NOT ready for release, so please do not distribute it. Updated scenario (following initial testing) has been uploaded here. Origin.zip

How long is a piece of string? I'm afraid your question is impossible to answer (and any answer would be subject to considerable debate) without more variables. Does the fictional nation have an unlimited defense budget? What is its shipbuilding capacity? What kind of ships does it hope to build? etc etc etc

Yes, right now we are modeling airborne electronic warfare (EW) equipment in the Loadout, i.e. carrying an ECM or countermeasures pod, or equipped with a built-in EW suite. The ECM fields in the Aircraft annex are not being used. The AAMs adopt the ratings found in the Harpoon 4.1/High Tide paper rules. There is a wide variation in performance among missiles of various types, but the predominant missile that has a very high rating is the AIM-120 AMRAAM. Was this the one you were using? The introduction of EW modeling into the Ships annex is something new to HCE. They're not hard coded, so have to be created in the Mounts/Weapons annexes and then added to each Ship.

Yep, that'd be about right, except both the Typhoon and MLG27 are weapons platforms. The Typhoon can use any number of different cannons, while the MLG27 uses the BK27 revolver cannon exclusively.

Ok, thanks, Herman. I'd be interested in hearing if anyone else has problems with the VC's triggering early or strangely, especially if you're running the patched GE.

An interesting and timely story, particularly in light of today's elections (see BBC News link), though in many ways the outcome has already been decided by the Guardian Council ... From Jane's Evidence emerges of Iran's continued nuclear weapons research By Mark Harrington 14 March 2008 Documents shown exclusively to Jane's indicate that Iran is continuing its pursuit of the advanced technologies necessary to develop a nuclear weapon, regardless of Tehran's claims that its nuclear programme is purely peaceful. Jane's was shown the information by a source connected to a Western intelligence service, and the documents were verified by a number of reliable independent sources in Vienna. The picture the papers paint starkly contradicts the US National Intelligence Estimate released in December 2007, which said Tehran had frozen its military nuclear programme in 2003. It also comes against a backdrop of the UN's 4 March approval of a third round of trade and economic sanctions against Iran (under Security Council Resolution 1803) for its refusal to suspend uranium enrichment and heavy-water-related projects. Iran continues to officially deny any connection between the Iranian ministry of defence (MoD) and nuclear research and development in its dealings with the Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), but the documents seen by Jane's show that Iran has made great strides with one of the key non-nuclear technologies needed for a working nuclear weapon: the implosion system. The papers shown to Jane's state that an organisation within the Iranian MoD has actively pursued the development of a nuclear weapon system based on relatively advanced multipoint initiation (MPI) nuclear implosion detonation technology for some years, in parallel with developments within the Atomic Energy Authority of Iran.

Runs fine here. What version GE are you using?

As with Oubliette, this one was sorta on the backburner while other things were in full swing. Released today.

File Name: Serhiy's Decision File Submitter: CV32 File Submitted: 13 Mar 2008 File Category: MEDC DB Used: HCDB Authors: Brad Leyte Battleset-MEDC: .sco - EC2003 - EC2003 Serhiy's Decision A Harpoon Commander's Edition scenario for the EC2003 Battle for the Mediterranean Battleset. This scenario is designed for play by the BLUE side. Although formally established by presidential decree on a warm summer day in August 1992, the slow and painful partition of the Soviet Black Sea Fleet between Ukraine and the newly independent Russian Federation took several more years. Arguably, the first ship of the Ukrainian Navy came into being on 26 January 1992 and in considerably less peaceful fashion. The collapse of the USSR in December 1991 caused the crew of the Project 159A (NATO Petya II) class light frigate SKR-112, most of them Ukrainian by nationality, to make a fateful decision. That morning in January, captain-lieutenant Serhiy Nastenko raised the state flag of Ukraine aboard his ship and together, he and his crew took an oath of allegiance to their new motherland. Black Sea Fleet Command was outraged, compelling Nastenko and his crew to eventually flee from the Russian naval base at Donuzlav, hoping to seek refuge in Odessa. Ships and aircraft of the Black Sea Fleet still loyal to Moscow set out in pursuit of the mutineer. Click here to download this file

Just haven't had time, really, with database work and such. Uploaded the release version today.

File Name: Oubliette File Submitter: CV32 File Submitted: 13 Mar 2008 File Category: WestPac DB Used: HCDB Authors: Brad Leyte Battleset-WPac: .scq - WPac - WestPac Oubliette A Harpoon Commander's Edition scenario for the Westpac Battleset. This scenario is designed for play by the BLUE side. The war in Central Europe is bogging down, and although NATO has suffered horrendous losses, the Soviet armored thrust has lost its momentum. There are rumours of growing dissension and unrest among the upper echelons of military command in Moscow. The risk of the Soviets resorting to the use of nuclear weapons in desperation has climbed considerably in the past few days. US Navy ballistic missile submarines, already deployed and at sea, have been directed to their patrol stations in case things go south. Several of these boomers, including the USS Tennessee, have been ordered to take up positions where they could potentially exploit depressed trajectory launches of their missile load, reducing warning time substantially. Click here to download this file

From Defense Aerospace Nighthawk Pilots Reflect on F-117's Legacy (Source: US Air Force; issued March 12, 2008) WRIGHT-PATTERSON AIR FORCE BASE, Ohio --- Like most Americans, Col. Tom Bell experienced the spectacular display of American airpower during the opening of Operation Desert Storm while watching CNN on television. Colonel Bell was then attending the U.S. Army's Command and General Staff College at Ft. Leavenworth, Kan. An Air Force pilot, he was immersed in learning about Army doctrine and missions from Army officers, and sharing his Airman's perspective on aerospace power with them. Saddam Hussein's August 1990 invasion of Kuwait and the U.S.-led coalition's response in January 1991 had transformed academic discussions on strategy and tactics into lively critiques as the war unfolded live on television. He extolled to fellow classmates how a single-seat fighter airplane could be employed for strategic effects, or a bomber employed tactically. Precision F-117 Nighthawk attacks on a key communications node to take down Iraqi command and control was a good example of the former. Today, as commander of the Air Force ROTC Northeast Region at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, the former F-111 Aardvark, F-117 and B-1Lancer pilot can offer to future officers another example -- using B-52 Stratofortresses or B-1s in a close-air-support role to strike insurgents fighting in close proximity to friendly ground forces. Into the heart of the storm Brig. Gen. Greg Feest, then a major, saw Desert Storm from a slightly different perspective. Flying the lead F-117 stealth fighter, his mission was to drop a two-thousand pound laser-guided bomb onto an Iraqi interceptor operations center. The weapon impacted on time, on target, marking the opening of the air campaign. He then headed to strike his second target, a sector operations center. With the target in his jet's crosshairs, he watched as it recorded a direct hit. The F-117, at the time already 10 years old, and its "game changing" combination of stealth and precision was being tested in what was then the world's most densely concentrated network of air defenses. "It was like flying into the biggest fireworks demonstration you have ever seen," General Feest said reflecting on that first night over Iraq. "Realize, we were in the heart of it. Because of the delivery system we had at the time, we had to be down low. We couldn't fly over the AAA (anti-aircraft artillery), we had to fly into the heart of it." Before taking off that night, nearly all of the F-117 pilots were leery of how well its stealth characteristics would protect them from radars that would direct thousands of Iraqi guns and surface-to-air missiles. Since the Nighthawk's targets, including many in downtown Baghdad, were highly defended, wing leaders had privately prepared themselves for F-117 losses as high as 50 percent on the first night. "We didn't know if it was going to work," General Feest said of the black jet's stealth. "The engineers all assured us that it would." Coming off their targets to return to their operating base on the Arabian Peninsula, General Feest listened in as the F-117 attack fleet began checking in to refuel with an airborne tanker. Carrying a list with call signs for each pilot, he started checking off names. "At the end I was amazed to see I had a checkmark next to every call sign and every pilot's name, knowing we were all coming home." After landing, every jet was inspected by maintainers for evidence of battle damage. No F-117 had been hit. The amazing milestone was repeated again the next night. "After about the fourth night we realized this stealth technology really worked and we were begging to get back up into the air and fly as many missions as we could," General Feest said. After 1270-plus Desert Storm sorties, not one F-117 ever received battle damage, he said. Secret beginnings From its inception in the late 1970s until it was publicly acknowledged in 1988, the very existence of the F-117 was known only to those directly involved with the program. The first Nighthawk pilots were assigned to Nellis Air Force Base, Nev., and would leave their families on Monday flying aboard contract airlift to Tonopah Airfield, Nev. There they flew only at night in a secret world, returning to Las Vegas typically midday on Friday to spend the weekend with their families. "We didn't want to acknowledge the existence of the stealth fighter to any of our adversaries, so we kept it in the black world," General Feest said. By the time Colonel Bell joined the program in 1991 to fly the F-117, the cloak of secrecy was off. Families knew exactly where their military members were going and that it was to fly and maintain the F-117. "My family didn't have to go through that great unknown of 'where are you,' 'what are you doing,' and 'why can't you tell me what you're doing,'" Colonel Bell said. "I have tremendous respect for the families that went through that." There were some advantages to the Tonopah arrangement. Airmen were home every weekend, they couldn't run into the office or bring work home. So weekend time was truly family time. Flying all week at night and spending weekends presented unique challenges for military members as well. They were essentially changing 10 time zones, twice a week. Eventually cost, the need to begin flying during daylight, and the requirement to train and fully integrate the F-117 with the rest of the Air Force's combat pilots demanded the program be publicly acknowledged. A few years later, the F-117s left Tonopah to join the 49 Fighter Wing at Holloman Air Force Base, N.M. New capabilities, difficult decisions Officials at Aeronautical Systems Center here oversaw a number of changes to enhance F-117 capabilities throughout its life, including software modifications in laser-guided weapons and avionics-enabled employment from higher altitudes. The aircraft was certified to carry satellite-guided and hard-target penetrating bombs. Since its unveiling, the Nighthawk has flown in every U.S. armed conflict. Lessons learned working with the F-117's low-observable materials have been incorporated in development of the stealthy B-2 Spirit, F-22 Raptor and F-35 Lightning. Eventually, cost of operating and maintaining the jet came under scrutiny. The Air Force imperative to modernize was a key factor in accelerating the retirement of the F-117 fleet, so savings generated could be applied to buy new aircraft. The last jet is scheduled to depart Holloman April 21 and go into recallable storage at Tonopah. Philosophically, Colonel Bell said he'll remember the F-117 as the airplane that "tipped the scales" from the era that measured the number of aircraft needed to destroy a particular target to the number of targets that could be taken out by one aircraft. "Every fighter pilot looks forward to flying a single-seat fighter, and the F-117 was my opportunity to do that," Colonel Bell said. "It was at the leading edge of technology when I flew it and it met a great mission need. "The work that Lockheed and the Skunk Works did in putting this airplane together will be heralded for many years to come," he added. Both pilots said the unsung heroes of the F-117 program were Air Force maintainers, who spent countless hours ensuring stealth systems and coatings were kept pristine. General Feest, now deputy director for force applications on the Pentagon's Joint Staff, agreed that the F-117 program was remarkable in essentially going from plans to first flight in only 31 months and that it was successfully kept in the black world for so long. "I think the taxpayer got their money's worth out of the stealth fighter," General Feest said. "I'm sad to see it retire. However, it's based on older, 1970's technology, and we possess much better capabilities today." A new crop of pilots, new directions for the Air Force When Maj. Charles Cosnowski entered the U.S. Air Force Academy in 1991, the F-117 had already proven its mettle in Desert Storm. It was the fighter he wanted to fly. He would get the chance, flying the F-117 for nearly seven years at Holloman Air Force Base in Alamogordo, N.M. Looking back on its impending retirement, Major Cosnowski said he will fondly remember the F-117 as a persuasive instrument of foreign policy. "Adversary countries knew we meant business when the F-117 was being sent and would typically quit rattling their sabers while we were in town," he said. Today, the remaining F-117 pilots and maintainers are being reassigned to other weapon systems. As for Major Cosnowski, the Fighter Weapons School graduate and instructor is currently attending the Air Force Institute of Technology and will graduate in June with a Master of Science degree in Cyberwarfare.