CV32

That was a deep hole to have to come out of, Tony. Next game is critical, to state the obvious.

Not petty at all, but I will remind everyone that space in the Loadouts annex is extremely limited. Adding new loadouts for existing aircraft is very tough. I am trying to keep the few remaining loadouts available for new aircraft. What I will do, though, is examine existing Loadouts to see if there is any room to accommodate at least some of these requests, because they are good ones. (And Tony will of course support them, being the Turkey fan he is. )

A new version of the HCDA database, the Harpoon Commander's Edition (HCE) 'Americas' Database (HCDA-080416), is now available. It is available in the Downloads section of this website. New additions (or overhauls of existing entries) include: Aircraft: CC-177 Globemaster III - Canada Ships/MLUs: Exocet Coastal Bty - Argentina SAM NOAH Hawk Bty - Norway SAM Roland Bty - Intl SAM Starstreak Team - Intl SAM Stinger FIM-92A Team - Intl SAM Stinger FIM-92B Team - Intl SAM Tigercat Bty - Intl SS-27 Topol M Bty - Russia Uruguay (Joao Belo) FF - Uruguay Enjoy.

Yes, there's an altitude limitation in the code for weapons and platforms, so they don't climb past their ceilings, but its not really a "launch parameter" as such, since SAMs invariably launch from the surface. So, Nite92, your AGM-84E SLAM (for example) will always immediately go to Vlow regardless of whether you launch it from High or Vlow.

Habs 1 Bruins 0 ... oy, could they make it any more nerve wracking?

They are the altitude parameters for the weapon itself, as there are no launch parameters in HCE.

Thanks for bringing this one to our attention, Pete. Quotable quote: "Then came the product that the gaming community had really awaited. The full title is Larry Bond's Harpoon - Commander's Edition."

And, as if to emphasize the point that these two continue to 'love' each other from afar... From Jerusalem Post Iran threatens to eliminate Israel JPost.com Staff , THE JERUSALEM POST Apr. 15, 2008 Iran will destroy Israel if Israel attacks Teheran, Iranian Deputy Chief of Staff Mohammad Reza Ashtiani warned Tuesday in response to a threat issued last week by National Infrastructure Minister Binyamin Ben-Eliezer. "We are not worried by the recent Israeli maneuvers, but if Israel wants to take any action against the Islamic republic, we will eliminate Israel from the universe," the Iranian Mehr agency quoted Ashtiani as saying. Ben-Eliezer had warned that "Iran will be wiped off the face of the earth if it dares to fire any missile at us." Later in the week, Ben-Eliezer would not retract his statement: "I do not regret the threats I directed at Iran and its leaders. I am sick of receiving threats to Israel's existence on a daily basis."

From Defence Talk Israel says will connect to US missile early warning system Agence France-Presse | Apr 15, 2008 Jerusalem: The United States has agreed to connect Israel to its ballistic missile early warning system to warn of any missile attack from archfoe Iran, a senior Israeli defence official said on Monday. "Israel asked the US to connect to its ballistic missile early warning system as part of its efforts to defend itself from missile attacks, first of all from Iran," the official told AFP on condition of anonymity. "The US has agreed to the request," he said. Israel first benefited from the worldwide radar system, which was built in the 1959, during the 1991 Gulf War when Iraq fired dozens of missiles at the Jewish state. It was put in action again during the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq. Israel claims that Iran's controversial nuclear programme and its recent ballistic missile test firing are aimed at developing an atomic weapon, a claim denied by Tehran. The Jewish state considers Iran's Islamic regime an existential threat after President Mahmoud Ahamdinejad's repeated call for Israel's destruction. Defence Ministry Director General Pinkhas Bukhris and top ministry adviser Amos Gilad have been in Washington twice in recent months to discuss military cooperation between Israel and its chief ally. The US embassy in Israel did not immediately comment on the report.

I have Avery in my hockey pool, cuz he scores goals and makes plays, but I do think he's a bit of an 'aggravator' (to put it mildly).

I know there aren't too many hockey fans around these parts, but I thought I'd plug em anyway. How about those Habs? I know Tony is rooting for the Wild, of course .. and well, I must say, I think they'll go far this year.

Thanks a bunch, very helpful.

That makes sense, i.e. no firing on the move. Though when playing against Red 120mm SP mortars in solitaire, they seemed to have that ability. Is there a direct fire option? I also have questions about 'splitting' company markers into their component units. Is there any way to do so without disgorging infantry squads from their respective vehicles?

Please make all your Harpoon Commander's Edition (HCE) Americas Database (HCDA) requests for new platforms, changes to existing platforms, fixes and updates in this thread. It is much easier for me to track requests and changes if they are in one place. To recap HCDA design philosophy: The platforms (ships, submarines, aircraft, installations, and weapon systems) contained in the HCDA will cover (generally speaking) the 1980-2015 era, but this is not a hard and fast rule, and there are some exceptions. Like any database, the HCDA is always a "work in progress". There will be always be errors, typographical or otherwise, to some degree, so please be patient and keep in mind that we might not always agree. Requests for new platforms are always welcome, and stand a good chance of inclusion if (1) they adhere to the design philosophy described above, and/or (2) they are required for upcoming new scenarios, and (3) if you provide links to reliable source information regarding them. What constitutes "reliable source information"? In most cases, Harpoon 4.1 paper rules data is king. Not just because those folks who put together the data are well known for their ability to locate and confirm the kind of minutia a database relies upon, but because that information is then easily translated into a format that a HCE database can utilise. Most other sources can be considered reliable if they are readily confirmed by one or more similar sources. More the better.

Thanks, I do try. Good one. Consider it done. Does anyone know if the Argies had any radars operating in association with these ad hoc coastal batteries? Already in the HCDA. Same as ship groups.

You're going to have to provide sources for your info. My H4.1 SAW2 annex says 20 aircraft (10 FRS.1, 9 Sea King, 1 Lynx). Simple error fixed. Will appear in next release version.

Though I do not enjoy being pummeled mercilessly, there is some "experience" value in it. I don't think this map presented me (as Red) with any alternative except to transit through, or at least pass by, Glossen. And, conversely, Blue had to know that, and immediately seized Glossen as the lynchpin. Starting just a kilometer east of that town certainly gave Blue plenty of time to do just that. I had expected the Blue forces to start much further east. I tried to goad Blue into moving southwest toward Schilte by feigning an advance from that area, using a few of my "paper mache" BMP-2s. Smokescreens were dropped along that route as part of the ruse. And, while this did attract the attention of some non-effectual Blue arty barrages, I should have known that Blue still had no reason to leave Glossen. Any Red force coming out of Schilte would still have to pass through Glossen. Having determined that Blue had indeed seized positions in and around Glossen, I tried to concentrate my artillery fire there to soften it up. Unfortunately, I had no clue what I was doing with respect to the TRP's and my arty fire was usually off by as much as 500 meters. A couple of 220mm MRL barrages and numerous 152mm ICM salvoes were wasted in the effort, as they were landing nowhere near where I wanted them. My small recon force (BMP and BRDM) was able to skirt through Rommerbach, but it was also quickly spotted by Blue forces around Glossen and lost some units in the process. They escaped north and were able to skirt around toward the objective, but to me it seemed like their movement was obvious. I felt that if I attempted to take that route with the main body, they would be observed and brought under fire by Blue forces at Glossen from the flank (together with whatever else Blue had lurking out there). That route would also require me to move off road, cross country, and through a narrow strip at the north edge of the map where I believed I would be extremely vulnerable to concentrated arty and direct fire. In the end I decided to try and drive the main body directly through Glossen, relying on my artillery and my rather feeble attempt to draw off Blue units to the north and south. As Pete has described, it didn't turn out so well. Blue had a serious visibility advantage from his stationary positions around Glossen. TOW and 25mm Chain Gun engagements were being made at 1,000 to 1,500 meters, while it seemed I couldn't spot anything further than 250 meters. Blue also dropped some brutally effective 155mm ICM directly on my advancing armor, decimating my "paper mache" bimps. My T-72M's skirted slightly south to try and avoid the arty, and although they reached the edges of Glossen, 105mm tank fire from M60's somewhere in the town (I think I had one very short engagement with them) blasted them. Strangely, my 120mm SP mortars never moved up with the arty, although they had orders to do so. And my infantry units were left behind in the dust west of Rommerbach. It was probably just as well. Lessons learned: * Learn how to use artillery TRP's; they could save your life or at least make your demise somewhat more palatable. * Direct attacks in the face of TOW and 25mm Chain Gun, where the opposing has the advantage of defense, terrain and superior visibility, is akin to playing Russian roulette with all chambers loaded. * Sometimes the terrain and your objective make for unpleasant bedfellows. * Did I mention TOW was mean?

I will certainly take a look at accommodating all of these requests. The objective of any database is to get scenarios made for it, so stand by. Btw, to make changes to the database on your own, extract the database to your HCE directory and then use "Import" in the Platform Editor. Any changes you make, of course, may be overwritten in the next version of the database that I release, unless they match.

From Air Force Link Langley officials fight to keep F-22s from being damaged by Tech. Sgt. Russell Wicke Air Combat Command Public Affairs 4/9/2008 - LANGLEY AIR FORCE BASE, Va. (AFPN) -- The Air Force's newest and most technologically advanced fighter, the F-22 Raptor, is under attack here. Free-falling clams dropped by in-flight birds are regular air threats to the F-22 as gulls drop fist-sized mollusks on the Langley Air Force Base runway to break open the shell-fish appetizer. The birds' shelling device just happens to be a convenient launch pad for the F-22. Although the gulls remove half their mess -- slurping up tender meat from the runway -- they leave behind hard, brittle sea shells for an F-22 to suck up through its engine intake that can cause severe damage. Although the Air Force is wildlife friendly, Lt. Col. Lawrence Spinetta, the 1st Fighter Wing Safety Office chief, isn't willing to let a $10.2 million jet engine go to the birds -- or the clams. Langley AFB officials run an aggressive flight-safety program to mitigate the Bird and Wildlife Aircraft Strike Hazard, also called BASH. "BASH is particularly important for Raptors because they are so expensive," Colonel Spinetta said. "If we lose one aircraft, it costs the Air Force and taxpayers $135 million. Most wildlife threats to aircraft are birds, although deer, coyotes, turtles and even clams are also foreign-object-debris threats, said Tom Olexa, a wildlife biologist from the U.S. Department of Agriculture at Langley AFB. "A key component of BASH is to ensure the safety for our pilots and aircraft," Mr. Olexa said. "But we also want to protect (wildlife) from being struck by our aircraft. There's a conservation here that we're all responsible for." All people, not just Air Force officials, are obligated stewards of the environment, he said. But "aircraft conservation" is a priority for Air Combat Command officials, because Air Force "birds" belong to taxpayers, Colonel Spinetta said. "A little sparrow may not seem like it's a threat to a 60,000-pound aircraft, but it is, particularly if it gets sucked down the intake," he said. Even if a bird strike doesn't cause a crash, damages soar into the millions. Federal Aviation Administration officials claimed birds cost the civil aviation industry about $600 million per year. Air Force officials coughed up approximately $16 million in 2007 from bird-strike damages. Only a few types of birds account for the majority of the damage. Certain species in particular do more than peck at the Air Force wallet. For example, the turkey vulture alone accounts for nearly 800 strikes and more than $51 million in Air Force flying history, said Dan Sullivan, the Air Force BASH deputy chief and wildlife scientist. It ranks No. 1 in Air Force bird strikes. However, the most expensive bird is the American white pelican. In only 18 strikes, this bird accounts for more than $257 million in damages. Mr. Sullivan said this cost is attributed to the size and weight of the bird -- a whopping 20 pounds -- compared to an average 5 pounds for the turkey vulture. "The black vulture and turkey vulture are the greatest threat to Air Force aircraft overall because they are somewhat large and soar at high altitudes -- about 3,000 feet," Mr. Sullivan said. "During the day as the air warms up, they ride a rising thermal draft. Their high altitude makes them hard to detect from the ground." These vultures, among other avian species, are increasing in population because of U.S. conservation efforts, he said. Other threatening birds at high altitudes include all raptor species. Mr. Sullivan said these birds are also increasing in numbers because the U.S. stopped using dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane, a pesticide known as DDT. The cessation of DDT use was necessary, he said, because it threatened the once-endangered bald eagle. But an offshoot of this action means the Air Force shares more of its airspace. And sharing airspace with birds is a moderate concern to Air Force pilots. "I think it would be a life-changing event to have a 5-pound Canadian Goose smash through your windshield at 400 knots," said Colonel Spinetta, who is also an F-15 Eagle pilot. No pilot wants to share the cockpit with fowl, but avoiding birds in midair isn't an option. "It's very difficult (to dodge a bird) at the speeds we're going, (350 to 400 mph at low altitude)," said Capt. Ray Thaler, an F-22 pilot and chief of flight safety. "(With) birds being very small, you never usually see them until the last half-second." The problem is, he said, a single bird can take out an entire engine, could break through a canopy and hit you in the cockpit. This becomes more serious in single-engine aircraft like the F-16 Fighting Falcon. Although there is no pilot training for bird strikes as a specific hazard, Captain Thaler said they train for many procedures, including low-altitude engine loss, which would apply to bird strikes. Almost nothing can be done, short term, to avoid high-altitude strikes. But the Langley AFB BASH team is heading up a project to track the migration of the osprey, the fifth most-dangerous bird species to aircraft, Colonel Spinetta said. There are more than 72 osprey nests within a 20-mile radius of Langley AFB. To mitigate the growing threat, officials from the 1st FW, NASA and USDA came up with a unique way to track the osprey. "Captured birds were fitted with Global Positioning Systems-capable transmitters ... (that) transmit the altitude, speed and direction of travel of each bird every two hours," Colonel Spinetta said in an editorial for the Flight Safety Magazine. "As a result, Langley AFB has been able to pinpoint nests and focus its reduction, suppression and prevention efforts to eliminate many osprey hazards." The nests are usually relocated to safer areas by USDA members. Other more traditional techniques for eliminating hazards involve harassing birds on the airfield, Mr. Olexa said. The most common tool is simply a combination of pyrotechnics and artificial bird distress calls, called bioacoustics. This, he said, is especially useful for birds like gulls that drop their food on the runway. Other long-term techniques take a bit more forethought, called habitat manipulation. "The trick is to make the airfield less attractive to wildlife," Mr. Sullivan said. One way is by planting certain grass species that cause an upset stomach to geese. Another example is to avoid planting fruit/nut producing trees. The Langley AFB BASH team also covered tall airfield objects with spiny metal strips, or cone shaped devices, to deny perching to birds. One technique, which is considered a last resort, is called depredation, or lethal action. But Mr. Sullivan said the purpose of lethal action is to remind other birds there's an actual threat, not to terminate the flock. "Most of what the Air Force does in its BASH program is non-lethal," he said. "We move the birds away from the threat of aircraft." The lethal action Air Force officials take is a response to birds becoming accustomed to non-lethal methods. Lethal action on a few birds prevents the majority from settling in an area where they would be more endangered from aircraft strikes. Birds are smart; they begin to understand when there's a real threat, or just harassment, Mr. Sullivan said. The techniques used by USDA and BASH teams have earned credibility with Air Force commanders. From 1995 to 2000, Langley AFB officials spent more than $1.6 million in aircraft damage from wildlife strikes. Since they employed the services of USDA in 2001, there was a 98 percent reduction in cost. From 2001 to 2006 wildlife strikes accounted for a mere $31,000. "Pocket change," Colonel Spinetta said, compared to the previous five years' cost. This kind of savings is exactly what BASH teams are designed to accomplish. "We're flying multimillion dollar aircraft that belong to our taxpayers," Mr. Sullivan said. "It's our responsibility to mitigate loss of life and equipment." But the effort goes much further than a dollar figure. Human life and wildlife are on the line, he said. And that's why BASH and USDA Wildlife services are partnered up to save aircraft, pilots, birds and maybe even a few clams.

Still being a Tacops noob, I tried a couple of the boxed Task Force Craig scenarios au solitaire this week. IIRC, without having the scen description in front of me, the player controls a USMC battalion (lots of LAV-25, a handful of LAV-AT (with the venerable TOW ATGM), and LAV 81mm mortar carrier) attempting to conduct a delaying action against an advancing Soviet motor rifle regiment (T-80s, BMP-2s, BTR-80s, with lotsa AT-4/5/7 ATGW, 120mm SP mortar and 122mm SP arty). Both sides have offmap heavy tube artillery (the Soviets have the dreaded 220mm MRL ) and limited fixed wing air support. The objective is to prevent 80% of the Soviet forces from passing through the sector. I lost Craig 1. Tried to implement a forward defense, catching the Soviets as they massed at the eastern edge of the map (around the outskirts of an urban area). I killed lots, especially with arty delivered ICM and air strikes, but it wasn't enough. I didn't have enough depth and they broke through with enough forces to leave me behind in the dirt. Craig 2, I held back in the middle of the map, staggered my limited forces and tried to funnel Soviet formations into a 'pocket' of sorts at the center, exploiting terrain and fields of fire to bring fire down on them from three sides. It worked. The map center was a charnel house of destroyed Soviet vehicles, looking like the road out of Basra in 1991. This is a neat little game. A nice ground combat compatriot to Harpoon.

From Aviation Week's ARES Blog Annual Expenditure Nineteen Nineteen Six, Result Happiness Posted by Bill Sweetman at 4/9/2008 7:01 AM CDT Lockheed Martin and the Pentagon had been mulling the latest Selected Acquisition Report numbers in advance of their public release late Monday afternoon, and responded Tuesday with a press conference and news release. For JSF, the big good news was that there was no big bad news. The fighter dodged the incoming Nunn-McCurdy missile that everyone had predicted, and in fact the overall program cost declined by $981 million, which is a lot of money even though it is only 0.3 per cent of the total. The program managers took the opportunity to slap the Government Accountability Office around a bit, since the GAO's last report on JSF had projected big cost overruns and delays. Now, let's take our eyes off the top line for a moment and look at the first level of detail in the SAR. This, as Ian Dury and the Blockheads would put it, is what we find: The small relative shift in the total cost is the sum of two larger changes: $11 billion in increases, more than offset by $12 billion in savings. But there is a difference between the two numbers. The savings are mostly in the medium-to-far future while the increases are here and now. About $6.6 billion in overrun is in system development and demonstration (SDD) cost. $2.8 billion is attributable to added costs in propulsion, due to the problems with the F135 engine and increased cost with the lift fan. Another $3.8 billion goes to "SDD flight article costs" - that is, building the prototypes. (Program boss Maj, Gen. C.R. Davis alluded to this in February.) These two alone add up to a 15 per cent jump in SDD, based on the $45.9 billion SDD bill (in 2008 dollars) quoted by the GAO. In fact, those increases are not far off what the much maligned GAO predicted in March. So there. (But wait, there's more! The SAR numbers, based on the 2008 budget, take credit for the cancellation of the F136 engine, which Pentagon acquisition chief John Young said in March would cost another $3.5 billion in SDD and procurement. That would make SDD 20 per cent up.) The savings as listed by the SAR are in procurement and support. They include $7.5 billion in support costs and lowered estimates for labor rates, materials and escalation. Some of these represent the clawing-back of increases in prior-year SARs, and some are attributable to good management, for which congratulations are in order if they are achieved. However, there is a big wrinkle in a small footnote, which notes that $9.15 billion in JSF money has been shifted from support to non-recurring procurement costs. (Most of this has to do with bringing low rate initial production airplanes to the initial service standard, and installing state-of-the-art electronic components to replace pieces which, by then, will be obsolete.) Without that switch, support costs would have been up and non-recurring procurement would have been down. What emerges, therefore, is that savings in procurement are projected to offset the increases in SDD. If the savings are realized it is important news for non-US customers. They have typically planned to take all their aircraft in a few years. They want to know that the JSF unit cost is under control, because it would otherwise blow out their national budgets in those years. These numbers say that is the case: and actually that's more important for the JSF than the top-line number. But there's a big difference between SDD dollars and procurement dollars. If the schedule holds we are more than half-way through SDD (started November 2001, with operational testing of Block 3 due to end in late 2013). Procurement started in May 2006 with the award of the first long-lead contract for low-rate initial production (LRIP) aircraft: we're two years into a 30-year effort. The crunch for procurement is ahead of us, where the A380 and 787 ran into trouble: as LRIP rates accelerate rapidly year to year while adapting to lessons learned from SDD. So the picture is not as simple as the press release suggests and (like the title) reflects the sunny optimism of Mr Wilkins Micawber. But it also brings to mind the observations of Mr Dury, a Londoner like Dickens, on the hope that springs eternal, and where it springs next.

Thats certainly a possibility, Ralf. It seems stable enough on my end, but obviously I'm not the one who is gonna be playing it. Thank you very much for your efforts. Maybe I'll try and pare the scenario down a bit and see what happens.

From Defense Aerospace U.S. Government Report Shows Decreased Costs for F-35 Program (Source: Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Company; issued April 8, 2008) FORT WORTH, Texas --- A newly released report from the U.S. Department of Defense shows that estimated acquisition costs dropped by nearly $1 billion from 2006 to 2007 for the Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II program. The Selected Acquisition Reports estimate that F-35 program costs over the aircraft's three-decade production run decreased by $981 million (-0.3 percent), from $299.8 billion to $298.8 billion. The F-35 cost reduction was attributed in part to lower material costs related to agreements made by Lockheed Martin and its subcontractors, and revised estimates of support costs. "The F-35 program is intensely focused on affordability, and these numbers demonstrate that hard work on the part of government and contractor teams is achieving the desired result," said Dan Crowley, Lockheed Martin executive vice president and F-35 program general manager. "The F-35 team is committed to protecting the program's affordability," said Maj. Gen. C.R. Davis, F-35 Program Executive Officer. "The team has placed the highest priority on cost management while building the world's most advanced multi-role fighter." Selected Acquisition Reports summarize the latest estimates of cost, schedule and technical status. The reports are prepared annually in conjunction with the president's budget. The total program cost estimates provided in the SARs include research and development, procurement, military construction and acquisition-related operation and maintenance. Total program costs reflect actual costs to date as well as future anticipated costs. All estimates include anticipated inflation allowances. The F-35 program is on schedule to deliver aircraft to the U.S. military services beginning in 2010. The first test aircraft has completed 40 flights and has exceeded performance and reliability expectations. The inaugural flight of the first short takeoff/vertical landing F-35B is on schedule for mid-2008. All 19 test aircraft are in production flow or on the flightline, and assembly has begun on the first two production F-35s. The F-35 is a supersonic, multi-role, 5th generation stealth fighter. Three F-35 variants derived from a common design, developed together and using the same sustainment infrastructure worldwide will replace at least 13 types of aircraft for 11 nations initially, making the Lightning II the most economical fighter program in history. Lockheed Martin is developing the F-35 with its principal industrial partners, Northrop Grumman and BAE Systems. Two separate, interchangeable F-35 engines are under development: the Pratt & Whitney F135 and the GE Rolls-Royce Fighter Engine Team F136. Headquartered in Bethesda, Md., Lockheed Martin employs about 140,000 people worldwide and is principally engaged in the research, design, development, manufacture, integration and sustainment of advanced technology systems, products and services. The Corporation reported 2007 sales of $41.9 billion. (ends) (EDITOR’S NOTE: Also read “Pentagon Plays Fast and Loose with JSF Costs,” posted today in our Feature Stories section.) *** Buuuuuuuttttt .... *** Analysis: Pentagon Plays Fast and Loose with JSF Costs (Source: defense-aerospace.com; published April 9, 2008) By Giovanni de Briganti PARIS --- As audit agencies continue to predict substantial increases in the cost of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program, the Pentagon pulled off a remarkable accounting coup by claiming, in its latest Selected Acquisition Report, that the program’s costs in fact declined during the second half of 2007. In its April 7 report, the Pentagon said JSF costs dropped by $981.3 million (-0.3 percent), from $299,824.1 million to $298,842.8 million, during the six months ending December 2007. During this same period outside observers, including the Government Accountability Office, expected JSF costs to rise and breach Nunn-McCurdy unit cost ceilings, thereby triggering an automatic report to Congress and a temporary funding freeze, and requiring certification by the Secretary of Defense. The Pentagon acknowledged that some costs had increased because of “higher estimates for elements of procurement nonrecurring costs (+$4,369.0 million), an adjustment to reflect manufacturing actuals for the System Demonstration and Development (SDD) flight test articles (+$3,849.9 million), a revised propulsion estimate to include additional hardware and increased lift fan cost (+$2,769.1 million),” for a total of $10.9 billion. This would have pushed total program cost to over $310 billion – an increase of over 3% in six months – had the Pentagon not miraculously generated savings of $11.9 billion by revising downwards its own estimates for several other cost categories. These include lower escalation indices (-$1,955.8 million), lower material estimates because of prime contractor’s material agreements (-$1,650.6 million), incorporation of revised prime/subcontractor labor rates (-$879.4 million), and “revised estimate of support costs” (-$7,445.0 million). As these $11.9 billion “savings” exceed the $10.9 billion in cost increases, the Pentagon was able to claim that the overall program cost decreased by $981 million. And, in case anyone missed the point, the Pentagon remarked that “overall, it should be noted that the Nunn-McCurdy unit costs are stable relative to the current and original baseline estimates.” It is certainly a bad idea for a major program to breach its Nunn-McCurdy unit cost ceiling. But avoiding a breach by conjuring savings of $11.9 billion out of thin air is not only creative bookkeeping of the highest order; it is also an cynical challenge to the financial watchdogs which have long tracked the JSF’s rising costs and, ultimately, an insult to the taxpayers who will ultimately have to pay for the program. Skepticism about the Pentagon’s JSF cost estimates is already widespread. In its latest annual report on the program, released March 11, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) concluded that “on the basis of the evidence we do have and our analysis, we fully expect future cost estimates to be substantially higher than the program estimates in this report.” By claiming to have discovered new savings at the 11th hour, the Pentagon has not improved its credibility. There are many other reasons for doubting the Pentagon’s figures. In its report, GAO noted that the JSF Program Office itself admits that costs have increased by $23 billion in the past year, while three other DoD agencies also predict much higher costs than admitted by the SAR: -- DoD’s Cost Analysis Improvement Group (CAIG) estimates $5.1 billion more for development, over $33 billion more for procurement; -- the US Naval Air Systems Command (Navair) estimates an additional $8 billion to $13 billion additional development costs or trade-offs adding to procurement costs; and -- The Defense Contract Management Agency estimates $4.9 billion in additional cost to complete the Lockheed Martin development contract alone. This, and its other findings, led GAO to conclude that “we believe that the current JSF cost and schedule reported to Congress are not reliable for decision making,” an understatement of generous proportions. The JSF’s financial shipwreck could get even worse because of the US dollar’s devaluation. On average, since 2006, the dollar’s value has declined by 10% to 20% compared to the currencies of the partner countries where JSF part production is to be outsourced. This means, perforce, that the cost to Lockheed Martin of JSF parts produced overseas will increase by a similar margin, leading to further increases in unit prices. And, if prices do not increase because of stringent contractual terms, it is questionable whether foreign suppliers will be able or willing to lose 10-20% of their own money on their JSF production contracts. Whichever way one looks at the problem, it is clear that the JSF’s costs will inevitably rise substantially over current levels. This will lead to a blow-out in unit costs, which (based on December 2006 cost data) GAO already estimates at between $104 million (average procurement cost) and $122 million (program acquisition cost), well over twice as much as the $47 million unit cost that Lockheed continues to quote to foreign governments. Unsurprisingly, Lockheed hailed the SAR’s findings, and issued a press release claiming that “these numbers demonstrate that hard work on the part of government and contractor teams is achieving the desired result." Given the parlous financial situation of the JSF program, it is understandable that the Pentagon was desperate to find some good news to include in its SAR. Not even the most hardened of Pentagon critics, however, could have anticipated such a transparently inventive maneuver.

I must say I enjoyed it too. Looking forward to mixing it up on the battlefield again, but please keep those 220mm MRL's far, far away.

From Air Force Times More Russian bombers flying off Alaska coast 16 intercepts by U.S., Canadian jets since July By Erik Holmes - Staff writer Posted : Monday Apr 7, 2008 7:29:40 EDT More and more American and Canadian fighter jets are scrambling and intercepting Russian bombers flying off the Alaskan coast, exacerbating tensions between the former Cold War foes. There have been 16 such intercepts since July, Pacific Air Forces Commander Gen. Howie Chandler told the Anchorage Daily News on March 27. That compares with just one in 2005, and none in the previous 10 years, Chandler said. The Air Force and North American Aerospace Defense Command would not grant an interview and were unable to confirm those numbers by press time. The most recent incident occurred March 25, when two F-15s from Elmendorf Air Force Base, Alaska, scrambled to intercept two Russian Tu-95 Bear heavy bombers. None of the Russian bombers has entered American airspace, which extends 12 miles out from U.S. soil, said Maj. Allen Herritage, a spokesman for NORAD’s Alaska region. Rather, the bombers have been intercepted after entering the Alaska Air Defense Identification Zone, a buffer that extends even further out. The intercept sorties have most often been flown by F-15s, though on at least one occasion, in November, two F-22 Raptors greeted the Russians. There also has been no indication that the bombers were carrying weapons or opened their bomb bay doors, Herritage said. Russia experts interviewed by Air Force Times said the close encounters undoubtedly increase tensions between the two nations but do not indicate a return to the climate of the Cold War. Ariel Cohen, a senior research fellow at the Heritage Foundation, said the bomber patrols are part of a broader pattern of Russia flexing its military muscle since February 2007, when President Vladimir Putin gave a speech in Munich, Germany, signaling a more aggressive posture toward the West. Putin followed the speech by announcing in August that Russia would resume long-range bomber patrols that were suspended in 1992. The U.S. and Russia have also been engaged in high-profile disputes about issues such as the U.S. plan to place portions of its missile defense system in Eastern Europe and allowing the former Soviet states of Georgia and Ukraine to join NATO. Since Putin’s speech, Cohen said, the Russian military has increased bomber patrols throughout the Pacific —including near Alaska and Guam — held naval exercises off the coast of France and refurbished its Mediterranean naval bases in Syria. Such moves are intended to demonstrate that the Russians are rebounding from their problems of the 1990s, a decade that saw Russia’s military deteriorate and its international standing plummet, said Mark Conversino, who teaches courses on Russia and Ukraine at the Air War College at Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala. Russian military has problems Russia has embarked on a long-term military modernization effort estimated at between $200 billion and $1 trillion, Cohen said, but its military still has serious problems. Its Bear bombers are prop-driven aircraft developed in the 1950s that are inferior to the American B-52, Cohen said, and Russia is believed to have lost the capability to manufacture spare parts for the Tu-160 Blackjack, a supersonic bomber comparable to the B-1. Russia’s military also faces significant problems with recruiting and training, he said. Still, Conversino said, Russia’s vast nuclear arsenal — which the Center for Defense Information estimates at about 10,000 warheads — makes it the only nation capable of destroying the United States. And that makes its bomber patrols worth paying close attention to. “Even if … this is just their way of poking a finger in our chest, for us not to react I think would be not in our best interest,” Conversino said. “If nothing else, I think it does heighten the fact that … continental defense and the NORAD mission is one that we can’t ignore.” The bomber patrols also raise the possibility that a routine encounter between Russian bombers and American fighters could escalate beyond the intentions of either side, Conversino said. “Things like this run the risk of an accident or some other unintentional event,” he said. “There’s certainly a risk there.” But the flip side is that the bomber patrols encourage the U.S. military to be more vigilant, Cohen said. “It puts us on a higher level of alert. It makes us less complacent. And whether we’re thinking about … speedboats in the Persian Gulf … or Bear [bombers] or Chinese activities, our Navy and the Air Force have to be … shipshape and [on] as great a state of alert as they can be.”