CV32

A new version of the Harpoon Commander's Edition World Wars Database (HCWW-091016) is now available. Get it in the Downloads section of the HarpGamer website. New units include: Ships/MLUs: Ariadne CLAA - Germany Bari (1940) CL - Italy Draug TB - Norway Kjell TB - Norway Leone DL - Italy Niobe CLAA - Germany Norge BM - Norway Nymphe (1942) CLAA - Germany Premuda (1941) DD - Italy Soldati (Grp1/40) DD - Italy Soldati (Grp2/42) DD - Italy Soldati (1943) DD - Italy TA.32 (1943) DD - Germany Taranto (1937) CL - Italy Teist TB - Norway Tordenskjold BM - Norway Trygg TB - Norway Undine CLAA - Germany Submarines: A Class SS - Norway Enjoy.

SPOILER ALERT . . . . . Achieved Minimum Victory with 4:14:50 to go. Probably got lucky. Managed to slip the Sturgeon class attack sub USS Hammerhead through the Sovs' outer screen and cozy up next to the main body before releasing my Mk 48s. Scored a kill on the Minsk and the Ivan Rogov, and a damage on each of the Kalinin, another Kiev and a Sverdlov. Hammerhead evaded the first enemy torpedo - probably delivered via SS-N-14 - but a second claimed her. Lost eight Phantoms of various flavours (USAF and RAF) while fighting off the Flankers, but managed to down all incoming bomber raids without taking a hit. I will play through toward Total Victory (hopefully). Fun scenario!

A very interesting (and long sought after) feature. Should be a great scenario!

Thanks again for sharing your creations, Ralf.

The victory conditions in Oubliette are nowhere near as onerous as requiring you to be at a specific set of coordinates. The general area is quite sufficient.

I guess I should have qualified my statement to refer specifically to NATO or Western nations, but in any event, Topol-M and Bulava are both ballistic missiles. The Chinese are in a whole other category. They come up with new stuff - whether stolen ... cough, borrowed, technology or adaptations of existing systems. Sorta goes without saying.

The French are somewhat unique in introducing a new nuclear weapon, especially an air launched type, in this day and age.

Can't say I ever used em, too much clutter.

The colors have no relationship to actual water depth. (Just as they have no relationship with the height of terrain). You can determine the water depth in any given area by clicking on that point. See the status bar at the bottom of your display.

No, and I think this is where the display function could perhaps use some improvement, by displaying IFR capability (or lack thereof). Unfortunately, this is no method currently to link the DB flag to the in-game display. Pretty sure that's what Tony was intimating above. They're not. See my comment to that effect earlier in this thread. I can only speak for Oubliette, since I wrote it. I can see why the presence of the KC-135 would perhaps confuse you. I included them when I had some other aircraft (other than P-3s) in the scenario. I removed them but not the tankers. The P-3s are capable of reaching the Kuriles, but only when operating out of Naha, and even then they are near the limit of their endurance. This is intentional. They do have a very good radar and also ESM capability, so they are useful even if they cannot stay on station long. To offer more than that would be to compromise the scenario. It is, after all, about submarines. I could be wrong, but I do not think the P-3 was capable of IFR in HCG, and if it was, it was a mistake. These scenarios were not built with HCG in any event, so the point is moot.

Sometimes the 'sinking' icon doesn't disappear from the display, for whatever reason. As far as I can tell, it has no effect on gameplay, and either serves as a pleasant memory of a successful kill or an unpleasant reminder of failure. I have whacked a lot of submarines lately with Harpoon, after they have been forced to the surface by damage. Fun.

The P-3 Orion is not capable of in-flight refueling (IFR).

A new version of the Harpoon Commander's Edition World Wars Database (HCWW-091009) is now available. Get it in the Downloads section of the HarpGamer website. New units include: Aircraft: Bf.110C-1 Zerstorer - Germany Bf.110C-4 Zerstorer - Germany Bf.110C-5 - Germany Bf.110D-1 - Germany Bf.110D-2 - Germany Bf.110E-1/U1 - Germany Bf.110E-1/R2 - Germany Bf.110F-1 - Germany Bf.110F-4 - Germany Bf.110G-1 - Germany Bf.110G-2 - Germany Bf.110G-4c/R7 - Germany Ships/MLUs: San Giorgio (1940) CA - Italy Cadorna (1940) CL - Italy Cadorna (1943) CL - Italy Capitani Romani (1942) CL - Italy Duca d'Aosta (1940) CL - Italy Duca d'Aosta (1943) CL - Italy Etna CL - Italy Giussano (1940) CL - Italy Montecuccoli (1940) CL - Italy Montecuccoli (Sep 42) CL - Italy Montecuccoli (1943) CL - Italy Savoia (Sep 42) CL - Italy Savoia (1943) CL - Italy Submarines: Adua SS - Italy Adua (mod/40-41) SS - Italy Ambra (Perla/42) SS - Italy Archimede SS - Italy Argo SS - Italy Argonauta SS - Italy Balilla SS - Italy Bandiera (1940) SS - Italy Bragadin SS - Italy Brin (1940) SS - Italy Brin (1942) SS - Italy Calvi SS - Italy Fieramosca SS - Italy Foca (1940) SS - Italy Glauco SS - Italy Iride (Perla/40) SS - Italy Liuzzi SS - Italy Mameli (1940) SS - Italy Marcello SS - Italy Marconi (1940) SS - Italy Marconi (1942) SS - Italy Perla SS - Italy Pietro Micca SS - Italy Pisani SS - Italy Settembrini SS - Italy Sirena SS - Italy Squalo SS - Italy Installations: Bridge Small - Intl Bridge Medium - Intl Bridge Large - Intl Bunker Small - Intl Bunker Medium - Intl Bunker Large - Intl Factory - Intl Refinery - Intl Enjoy.

As I've heard a couple of folks say today ... "... they nominated him for the award even before he did nothing." and "I want a Pulitzer [now] for the great story I'm going to publish next year." There was a window of opportunity there for Obama to graciously decline acceptance of the prize, on the basis that he had not yet accomplished much of anything in the way of the things he has the 'audacity to hope' to achieve. I think he would have garnered a great deal more respect if that had happened, but unfortunately, it did not.

NESOP, the pics have never been a priority for me. Too much work for too little gain, as there are a myriad of better quality images available on the Interwebz (far more than you could ever put into a DB); there are copyright issues; and it just adds to the size of the download. But, as Tony points out, it certainly can be done.

Ammo case HTPC mod http://l33tgamer.blogspot.com/2009/09/ammo...e-htpc-mod.html Would I butcher a precious ammo can to make a comp case? No. Does it look cool when someone else does? Yes.

The Bf.110C-4/B JaBo fighter-bomber is already there, but other variants will come eventually.

From Stratfor Two Leaks and the Deepening Iran Crisis By George Friedman | October 5, 2009 Two major leaks occurred this weekend over the Iran matter. In the first, The New York Times published an article reporting that staff at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the U.N. nuclear oversight group, had published an unreleased report saying that Iran was much more advanced in its nuclear program than the IAEA had thought previously. According to the report, Iran now has all the data needed to design a nuclear weapon. The article added that U.S. intelligence was re-examining the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) of 2007, which had stated that Iran was not actively pursuing a nuclear weapon. The second leak occurred in the British daily The Times, which reported that the purpose of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s highly publicized secret visit to Moscow on Sept. 7 was to provide the Russians with a list of Russian scientists and engineers working on Iran’s nuclear weapons program. The second revelation was directly tied to the first. There were many, including STRATFOR, who felt that Iran did not have the non-nuclear disciplines needed for rapid progress toward a nuclear device. Putting the two pieces together, the presence of Russian personnel in Iran would mean that the Iranians had obtained the needed expertise from the Russians. It would also mean that the Russians were not merely a factor in whether there would be effective sanctions, but over whether and when the Iranians would obtain a nuclear weapon. We would guess that the leak to The New York Times came from U.S. government sources, because that seems to be a prime vector of leaks from the Obama administration and because the article contained information on the NIE review. Given that National Security Adviser James Jones tended to dismiss the report on Sunday television, we would guess the report leaked from elsewhere in the administration. The Sunday Times leak could have come from multiple sources, but we have noted a tendency of the Israelis to leak through the British daily on national security issues. (The article contained substantial details on the visit and appeared written from the Israeli point of view.) Neither leak can be taken at face value, of course. But it is clear that these were deliberate leaks — people rarely risk felony charges leaking such highly classified material — and even if they were not coordinated, they delivered the same message, true or not. The Iranian Time Frame and the Russian Role The message was twofold. First, previous assumptions on time frames on Iran are no longer valid, and worst-case assumptions must now be assumed. The Iranians are in fact moving rapidly toward a weapon; have been extremely effective at deceiving U.S. intelligence (read, they deceived the Bush administration, but the Obama administration has figured it out); and therefore, we are moving toward a decisive moment with Iran. Second, this situation is the direct responsibility of Russian nuclear expertise. Whether this expertise came from former employees of the Russian nuclear establishment now looking for work, Russian officials assigned to Iran or unemployed scientists sent to Iran by the Russians is immaterial. The Israelis — and the Obama administration — must hold the Russians responsible for the current state of Iran’s weapons program, and by extension, Moscow bears responsibility for any actions that Israel or the United States might take to solve the problem. We would suspect that the leaks were coordinated. From the Israeli point of view, having said publicly that they are prepared to follow the American lead and allow this phase of diplomacy to play out, there clearly had to be more going on than just last week’s Geneva talks. From the American point of view, while the Russians have indicated that participating in sanctions on gasoline imports by Iran is not out of the question, Russian President Dmitri Medvedev did not clearly state that Russia would cooperate, nor has anything been heard from Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin on the subject. The Russian leadership appears to be playing “good cop, bad cop” on the matter, and the credibility of anything they say on Iran has little weight in Washington. It would seem to us that the United States and Israel decided to up the ante fairly dramatically in the wake of the Oct. 1 meeting with Iran in Geneva. As IAEA head Mohamed ElBaradei visits Iran, massive new urgency has now been added to the issue. But we must remember that Iran knows whether it has had help from Russian scientists; that is something that can’t be bluffed. Given that this specific charge has been made — and as of Monday not challenged by Iran or Russia — indicates to us more is going on than an attempt to bluff the Iranians into concessions. Unless the two leaks together are completely bogus, and we doubt that, the United States and Israel are leaking information already well known to the Iranians. They are telling Tehran that its deception campaign has been penetrated, and by extension are telling it that it faces military action — particularly if massive sanctions are impractical because of more Russian obstruction. If Netanyahu went to Moscow to deliver this intelligence to the Russians, the only surprise would have been the degree to which the Israelis had penetrated the program, not that the Russians were there. The Russian intelligence services are superbly competent, and keep track of stray nuclear scientists carefully. They would not be surprised by the charge, only by Israel’s knowledge of it. This, of course leaves open an enormous question. Certainly, the Russians appear to have worked with the Iranians on some security issues and have played with the idea of providing the Iranians more substantial military equipment. But deliberately aiding Iran in building a nuclear device seems beyond Russia’s interests in two ways. First, while Russia wants to goad the United States, it does not itself really want a nuclear Iran. Second, in goading the United States, the Russians know not to go too far; helping Iran build a nuclear weapon would clearly cross a redline, triggering reactions. A number of possible explanations present themselves. The leak to The Sunday Times might be wrong. But The Sunday Times is not a careless newspaper: It accepts leaks only from certified sources. The Russian scientists might be private citizens accepting Iranian employment. But while this is possible, Moscow is very careful about what Russian nuclear engineers do with their time. Or the Russians might be providing enough help to goad the United States but not enough to ever complete the job. Whatever the explanation, the leaks paint the Russians as more reckless than they have appeared, assuming the leaks are true. And whatever their veracity, the leaks — the content of which clearly was discussed in detail among the P-5+1 prior to and during the Geneva meetings, regardless of how long they have been known by Western intelligence — were made for two reasons. The first was to tell the Iranians that the nuclear situation is now about to get out of hand, and that attempting to manage the negotiations through endless delays will fail because the United Nations is aware of just how far Tehran has come with its weapons program. The second was to tell Moscow that the issue is no longer whether the Russians will cooperate on sanctions, but the consequence to Russia’s relations with the United States and at least the United Kingdom, France and, most important, possibly Germany. If these leaks are true, they are game changers. We have focused on the Iranian situation not because it is significant in itself, but because it touches on a great number of other crucial international issues. It is now entangled in the Iraqi, Afghan, Israeli, Palestinian, Syrian and Lebanese issues, all of them high-stakes matters. It is entangled in Russian relations with Europe and the United States. It is entangled in U.S.-European relationships and with relationships within Europe. It touches on the U.S.-Chinese relationship. It even touches on U.S. relations with Venezuela and some other Latin American countries. It is becoming the Gordian knot of international relations. STRATFOR first focused on the Russian connection with Iran in the wake of the Iranian elections and resulting unrest, when a crowd of Rafsanjani supporters began chanting “Death to Russia,” not one of the top-10 chants in Iran. That caused us to focus on the cooperation between Russia and Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei on security matters. We were aware of some degree of technical cooperation on military hardware, and of course on Russian involvement in Iran’s civilian nuclear program. We were also of the view that the Iranians were unlikely to progress quickly with their nuclear program. We were not aware that Russian scientists were directly involved in Iran’s military nuclear project, which is not surprising, given that such involvement would be Iran’s single-most important state secret — and Russia’s, too. A Question of Timing But there is a mystery here as well. To have any impact, the Russian involvement must have been under way for years. The United States has tried to track rogue nuclear scientists and engineers — anyone who could contribute to nuclear proliferation — since the 1990s. The Israelis must have had their own program on this, too. Both countries, as well as European intelligence services, were focused on Iran’s program and the whereabouts of Russian scientists. It is hard to believe that they only just now found out. If we were to guess, we would say Russian involvement has been under way since just after the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, when the Russians decided that the United States was a direct threat to its national security. Therefore, the decision suddenly to confront the Russians, and suddenly to leak U.N. reports — much more valuable than U.S. reports, which are easier for the Europeans to ignore — cannot simply be because the United States and Israel just obtained this information. The IAEA, hostile to the United States since the invasion of Iraq and very much under the influence of the Europeans, must have decided to shift its evaluation of Iran. But far more significant is the willingness of the Israelis first to confront the Russians and then leak about Russian involvement, something that obviously compromises Israeli sources and methods. And that means the Israelis no longer consider the preservation of their intelligence operation in Iran (or wherever it was carried out) as of the essence. Two conclusions can be drawn. First, the Israelis no longer need to add to their knowledge of Russian involvement; they know what they need to know. And second, the Israelis do not expect Iranian development to continue much longer; otherwise, maintaining the intelligence capability would take precedence over anything else. It follows from this that the use of this intelligence in diplomatic confrontations with Russians and in a British newspaper serves a greater purpose than the integrity of the source system. And that means that the Israelis expect a resolution in the very near future — the only reason they would have blown their penetration of the Russian-Iranian system. Possible Outcomes There are two possible outcomes here. The first is that having revealed the extent of the Iranian program and having revealed the Russian role in a credible British newspaper, the Israelis and the Americans (whose own leak in The New York Times underlined the growing urgency of action) are hoping that the Iranians realize that they are facing war and that the Russians realize that they are facing a massive crisis in their relations with the West. If that happens, then the Russians might pull their scientists and engineers, join in the sanctions and force the Iranians to abandon their program. The second possibility is that the Russians will continue to play the spoiler on sanctions and will insist that they are not giving support to the Iranians. This leaves the military option, which would mean broad-based action, primarily by the United States, against Iran’s nuclear facilities. Any military operation would involve keeping the Strait of Hormuz clear, meaning naval action, and we now know that there are more nuclear facilities than previously discussed. So while the war for the most part would be confined to the air and sea, it would be extensive nonetheless. Sanctions or war remain the two options, and which one is chosen depends on Moscow’s actions. The leaks this weekend have made clear that the United States and Israel have positioned themselves such that not much time remains. We have now moved from a view of Iran as a long-term threat to Iran as a much more immediate threat thanks to the Russians. The least that can be said about this is that the Obama administration and Israel are trying to reshape the negotiations with the Iranians and Russians. The most that can be said is that the Americans and Israelis are preparing the public for war. Polls now indicate that more than 60 percent of the U.S. public now favors military action against Iran. From a political point of view, it has become easier for U.S. President Barack Obama to act than to not act. This, too, is being transmitted to the Iranians and Russians. It is not clear to us that the Russians or Iranians are getting the message yet. They have convinced themselves that Obama is unlikely to act because he is weak at home and already has too many issues to juggle. This is a case where a reputation for being conciliatory actually increases the chances for war. But the leaks this weekend have strikingly limited the options and timelines of the United States and Israel. They also have put the spotlight on Obama at a time when he already is struggling with health care and Afghanistan. History is rarely considerate of presidential plans, and in this case, the leaks have started to force Obama’s hand.

Yeah, the Staff Assistant isn't nearly as annoying as he used to be, and truth be told, if you receive repeated prompts to activate your radar (to the point that they become annoying), it is likely that you are being painted by enemy radar and you might as well energize your own radar anyway. Your position has already been compromised.

A new version of the Harpoon Commander's Edition World Wars Database (HCWW-091002) is now available. Get it in the Downloads section of the HarpGamer website. New units include: Aircraft: Fw.190A-4 Wurger - Germany Fw.190A-4/U8 - Germany Fw.190A-5 Wurger - Germany Fw.190A-5/U1 - Germany Fw.190A-5/U8 - Germany Fw.190A-5/R6 - Germany Fw.190A-6/R3 - Germany Fw.190A-6/U8 - Germany Fw.190A-7/R1 - Germany Fw.190A-7/R2 - Germany Fw.190A-8 Wurger - Germany Fw.190A-8/R2 - Germany Fw.190A-8/U8 - Germany Fw.190F-3 - Germany Fw.190F-8 - Germany Fw.190F-8/U14 - Germany Fw.190G-1 - Germany Fw.190G-3 - Germany He.59 - Germany He.60 - Germany He.111B-2 - Germany He.111H-3 - Germany He.111H-4 - Germany He.111H-5 - Germany He.111H-6 - Germany He.111H-18 - Germany He.111H-20 - Germany He.111H-21 - Germany He.114C-1 - Germany He.115A (mod) - Great Britain He.115A-2 - Norway He.115B-1 - Germany He.115C - Germany He.177A-3/R3 Greif - Germany He.177A-5 Greif - Germany He.219A-7 Uhu - Germany Hs.123A-1 - Germany Hs.126B-1 - Germany Ju.52/3m g3e - Germany Ju.52/3m g7e - Germany Ju.86D-1 - Germany Ju.86P-1 - Germany Ju.86P-2 - Germany Ju.87A Stuka - Germany Ju.87B-1 Bertha - Germany Ju.87D-5 Dora - Germany Ju.87D-7 Dora - Germany Ju.87R-1 - Germany Ju.88A-1 - Germany Ju.88C-2 - Germany Ju.88C-4 Zerstorer - Germany Ju.88D-2 - Germany Ju.88G-1 - Germany Ju.88G-6 - Germany Ju.88G-7b - Germany Ju.88G-7c - Germany Ju.88S - Germany Ju.188A - Germany Ju.188A-3 - Germany Ju.188E - Germany Ju.188E-2 - Germany Ju.290A-2 - Germany Ju.290B-2 - Germany Ju.388K-1 - Germany Ju.388L - Germany Ships/MLUs: V-1 Site - Germany V-2 Bunker - Germany V-2 Mobile Site - Germany Submarines: Acciaio (600 Platino) SS - Italy Alabastro (600 Platino) SS - Italy Romolo SS - Italy Installations: La Spezia - Italy Enjoy.

Interesting stuff, Enrique, useful potentially for a PBEM or MBX in particular. I think it would be cumbersome to incorporate it into an HCE database, because 'skills' are reflected in the ATA/DATA and PH values for aircraft and their weapons. You'd have to create duplicates of many entries to reflect this.

A couple or more air-to-air Stingers (aka 'air mines' ) might deter or at least foil an attacker.

Firstly, let me say that HCE does not model detection of active radar seekers, so neither you nor the AI will ever detect a missile because its own onboard seeker is actively emitting. You can, however, detect the launching platform's radar (assuming it is active). Just so we are clear about we're talking about. Your own passive EW is never going to detect any AI groups unless they are actively emitting. Its a prerequisite. I don't see any of these 'problems' (if that is what they are .. I'm reserving personal judgment on that) when I play HCE. Your experience is so hugely different than my own that I have to say the only way I could possibly help get to the bottom of this (and I venture to say, anyone else) would be for you to provide more specific examples. Are there particular scenarios (saved game files might be very useful here) that give you trouble? I am honestly interested in figuring this out, so let's get down to the details.

The only word I can think of to describe your "inability" to acquire the commercial release version of HCE is bizarre. There is an entire subforum here at HarpGamer dedicated to beta testing of new patches and updates for HCE. It is here. The commercial release version receives regular updates (which contains both fixes and upgrades), which are always posted for download here at HarpGamer. You can see the files and instructions here. Official 'patches' are piped through Matrix on a less regular basis and are available for download at its website. Fortunately for you, and others you have not yet purchased HCE thru Matrix, or are similarly caught in some inexplicable 'no mans land' part of the Interwebz, the Demo is also available in updated form here.

admiralskippy, if you do find 'redundancies' in the HCDB, I'd appreciate you pointing them out in the 'HCDB requests' thread (look for it in the Database subforum here). I am not aware of any redundant VLS mounts, but I could be wrong.