CV32

Full PDF article at National Defense University Excerpt follows, from Defense Aerospace: "Faced with the prospect of aerial stealth proliferation, states in the 21st century are looking for anti-stealth defense options. One such alternative, passive radar, appears a cost-effective counter to stealth. Passive radar is a receive-only system that uses transmitters of opportunity. Integrating a system of netted receivers, passive radar can detect, track, and target piloted and unpiloted stealth systems and provide cuing for antiair weapons systems. A passive radar system emits no radio energy and can be well camouflaged in both urban and rural landscapes. The threat system produces no indications on friendly radar warning receivers and is difficult to locate and target. Faced with a passive radar threat, the United States may find itself unable to achieve air superiority at an acceptable cost. As this article shows, ongoing advances in passive radar will deny traditional means to defeat enemy air defenses, make air superiority difficult to achieve against a passive radar opponent, and require changes in thinking to maintain U.S. power projection capability. In developing this central idea, this article describes the history of the battle between aircraft and radar, the rise of stealth and counter-stealth, and the ongoing surge in passive radar and how it relates to advances in signal processing and sensor fusion. Additionally, this article assesses the passive radar threat to stealth, posits implications for future U.S. military power, and recommends a U.S. course of action regarding passive radar. (end of excerpt)"

Well done. Thanks!

Confirmed. (With notary seal and everything)

It can be quite a bit of work if you're trying to create a whole database (or armada), but creating a new Mount (such as your proposed 12 cell VLS for Tomahawks) should be relatively simple. Have you yet tried building or creating the Mount (containing the appropriate weapons) and then adding the Mounts to your newly created Ship? (As opposed to 'cloning').

HCE scenario filenames have their own distinctive three character extension which serves to match them to the appropriate battleset. More about the filename structure here. I'd recommend creating a subdirectory in your HCE directory and calling it 'Scenarios' or some such. Download and unzip scenario files to that directory. When you select a battleset, only the scenarios created for that battleset will show as being available to play.

Welcome, we're very glad you're enjoying HCE and HarpGamer. You can swap out databases easily, but you cannot mix and match, so switching to another DB will overwrite your existing additions and mods. You need to save your existing DB (with your additions and mods) before overwriting it (swapping) with another. Absolutely. You can create as many different versions of the same basic platform as space in the annexes will allow.

A new version of the Harpoon Commander's Edition World Wars Database (HCWW-090925) is now available. Get it in the Downloads section of the HarpGamer website. New units include: Aircraft: Do.17E-1 - Germany Do.17F-1 - Germany Do.18D-1 - Germany Do.18G-1 - Germany Do.24T-1 - Germany Do.215B-1 - Germany Do.217E-1 - Germany Do.217E-2 - Germany Do.217E-3 - Germany Do.217E-4 - Germany Do.217E-5 - Germany Do.217J-1 - Germany Do.217J-2 - Germany Do.217K-1 - Germany Do.217K-2 - Germany Do.217K-3 - Germany Do.217M-1 - Germany Do.217N-1 - Germany Do.217N-2 - Germany Do.217P-1 - Germany Fi.167A-0 - Germany Fw.190A-1 Wurger - Germany Fw.190A-2 Wurger - Germany Fw.190A-3 Wurger - Germany I-15bis Chaika - Soviet Union I-153 (I-15ter) - Soviet Union I-16 (Type 10) Ishak - Soviet Union I-16 (Type 17) Ishak - Soviet Union I-16 (Type 24) Ishak - Soviet Union I-16 (Type 27) Ishak - Soviet Union I-16 (Type 29) Ishak - Soviet Union Il-2T Shturmovik - Soviet Union Il-4 (DB-3F) - Soviet Union La-5 - Soviet Union La-5F - Soviet Union La-5FN - Soviet Union La-7 (M series) - Soviet Union La-7 (Y series) - Soviet Union LaGG-3 (1941) - Soviet Union LaGG-3 (1942) - Soviet Union MDR-6A (Che-2) - Soviet Union MiG-1 - Soviet Union MiG-3 Series 1 - Soviet Union MiG-3 Series 2 - Soviet Union MiG-3 Series 2 mod - Soviet Union Morko Moraani - Finland P-39N Kobrushka - Soviet Union P-39Q Kobrushka - Soviet Union Pe-2 Peshka - Soviet Union Pe-2FT Peshka - Soviet Union Pe-3bis - Soviet Union R-5 - Soviet Union SB-2 - Soviet Union Su-2 - Soviet Union TB-3 Type 1932 - Soviet Union TB-3 Type 1934 - Soviet Union TB-3 Type 1936 - Soviet Union Yak-1 - Soviet Union Yak-1M - Soviet Union Yak-3 - Soviet Union Yak-4 - Soviet Union Yak-6 - Soviet Union Yak-7A - Soviet Union Yak-7B - Soviet Union Yak-9D - Soviet Union Yak-9DD - Soviet Union Yak-9T - Soviet Union Yak-9U - soviet Union Yer-2 - Soviet Union Yer-2 (ATSch-30B) - Soviet Union Ships/MLUs: HF/DF Station - INTL Enjoy.

This has been my experience. A 'Good' solution is going to give you pretty accurate info, plus or minus a little. The longer you have a 'Good' solution, the better that info should get.

I suppose, having looked at Rule 6.1.2, it wasn't really necessary to consult them to answer your questions. The whole point of TMA is to obtain a reliable estimate of the contact's course, speed, and range. You are trying to achieve all three. Whether the solution (all those things together) is 'Good, 'Fair', or 'Poor' is a matter of degree, being a reflection of the quality of your estimate. As you've noted already, the quality of the solution will impact the hit probability of your torpedoes or ASW standoff missiles.

A useful backgrounder from the Tactics 101: ASW - Part 3 article: I'll have to look up the H4 rules to offer its particular perspective.

Adding aircraft to the HCDB is the most difficult request, due to the extremely limited space in the Loadouts annex. (Aircraft are pointless without loadouts). Lately I've been only considering adding them if: (1) they are of a type not otherwise represented in the DB; (2) they can use an already existing loadout; or (3) they are desperately needed for a scenario. The Orzel appears under the INTL Kilo (877E) entry. Sure, got the names or numbers handy? These are possibles.

From DefenseNews Iranian Military Planes Crashes in Annual Parade By THOMAS NEWDICK Published: 22 Sep 2009 18:49 TEHRAN - Iran's sole Simorgh AWACS aircraft was lost during a military parade Sept. 22, one of two Iranian military aircraft that crashed in Tehran while participating in a display to mark the anniversary of the start of the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War. The Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force operated a single Simorgh, a former Iraqi Air Force Adnan. The Adnan AWACS was in turn a modification of a Soviet-built Ilyushin Il-76 transport. The Simorgh collided with one of the Air Force's Northrop F-5E Tiger II fighters over the area of the Imam Khomeyni Shrine, southern Tehran. According to eyewitnesses, the crash occurred immediately after the parade. Apparently, no mayday call was issued. Both aircraft crashed in flames. Initial reports indicate that seven crewmembers were killed in the crash. In total, Iraq built three AWACS aircraft, one Baghdad, and two Baghdad-2s, the latter later renamed Adnans. One Adnan and the Baghdad were evacuated to Iran during the 1991 Gulf War, while the second Adnan was destroyed on the ground by a coalition air strike in January 1991. The exact status of the Iranian Simorgh and its onboard systems was long uncertain. However, photographs suggest that the aircraft was equipped with a newly fitted functioning radar suite.

From Flight Global DATE: 22/09/09 SOURCE: Flight International RAF Typhoons arrive for Falkland Islands mission By Craig Hoyle Four Eurofighter Typhoons from the UK Royal Air Force have arrived at Mount Pleasant airport in the Falkland Islands, where the type will soon replace the service's Panavia Tornado F3 to deliver air defence services. The Typhoons left RAF Coningsby in Lincolnshire on 12 September accompanied by a spare aircraft, and were flown to the South Atlantic with support from in-flight refuelling aircraft. The fighters have been drawn from the RAF's 3 Sqn, but left the UK without unit markings. Pictured shortly before its departure from the UK, Typhoon FGR4 ZJ944 is seen armed with MBDA Asraam short-range air-to-air missiles. The type is also equipped with an internally-housed 27mm Mauser cannon. "The Typhoon is taking over the quick reaction alert duties in the Falkland Islands from the Tornado F3, which is being gradually removed from service," says the RAF. The commitment of four of the new type represents a one-for-one replacement, it adds. The Falkland Islands mission is the first frontline overseas commitment of the RAF's Typhoons since the type entered UK service earlier this decade. German Eurofighters are currently providing air policing services for Baltic states Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania from Lithuania's Siauliai air base, while Italian air force examples are providing similar cover for Albania. [CV32: Alright, who is volunteering to make the scenario(s)?! ]

From Aviation Week Race is on for India MMRCA Sep 21, 2009 By Neelam Mathews Flight trials for India’s biggest defense procurement program, the Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA), are underway. India will acquire 126 aircraft—86 single-seat and 40 twin-seat configurations. The air force requirement for the MMRCA is based on a maximum all-up weight of 14,000-30,000 kg. (31,000-66,000 lb.). India plans to procure 18 aircraft in flyaway condition and produce 106 locally under license through technology transfer. Delivery starts within 36 months of contract signing and will be completed 48 months later. The contenders are the Boeing F/A-18, Lockheed Martin F‑16IN, MiG-35, Dassault Aviation Rafale, Eurofighter Typhoon and Saab Gripen NG (New Generation). Flight trials will be held in Bengaluru (Bangalore) for humidity and Jaisalmer in the Rajasthan desert for heat. Trials in the Leh district of Ladakh will be the most challenging. “It will be a pure performance issue at 3,500 meters (11,483 ft.) [above sea level] and 50C (122F) in the summer,” says a vendor. “Nobody can take off in Leh with a full weapons load, even with powerful engines,” adds a defense analyst. The request for proposals (RFP) states the aircraft should be able to take off with a full internal fuel load and significant external load from a runway of 3,300 meters, in air-defense and strike configurations. Vendors are not discussing the weapons their planes will carry during flight trials. Weapon trials will be held in the respective countries, most likely between November and January, and completed in late April when the bids are opened. Initial weapons to be delivered with the flyaway aircraft include active beyond-visual-range air-to-air missiles, antiship missiles with 100-km. (62-mi.) range, air-to-ground and medium-range missiles (with a range of more than 200 km.), and standoff precision-guided munitions (40-km. range). The RFP requires that aircraft, components and accessories be of the latest manufacture and conform to the latest production standards. A game-changer could be the requirement for multimode active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar with a wide band and “adequate growth potential.” Raytheon’s APG-79 AESA radar for the F/A-18 conforms to the requirement, as does Northrop Grumman’s APG-80 for the Block 60 F-16s in the United Arab Emirates’ fleet. Gripen will fly with its AESA radar during trials. Saab and Selex Galileo will jointly develop an AESA radar for the Gripen NG. The system will be based on Selex Galileo’s Vixen AESA radar and use components from the Gripen’s PS-05/A and other programs from both companies. Eurofighter insists the range of mechanically scanned (M‑Scan) Selex Captor radar rivals any AESA. “There are benefits in maintenance because it has no moving parts,” says an official. The Captor electronically scanned array radar is a research and development effort among Germany, Italy, Spain and the U.K. A prototype called Caesar was flown on a Typhoon developmental aircraft in 2007. The final configuration of the MiG-35’s onboard equipment is not clear. The MiG-35 Fulcrum-F, a stripped-down version of the MiG-29M OVT, might use the Zhuk-AE (see p. 8), Bars-29 or Elta Systems’ EL/M-2052 radars. Thales, meanwhile, has a contract to develop the second-generation RBE2 AESA radar for the Rafale from the French defense procurement agency. The transition to active electronic scanning technology, which in the case of the RBE2 involves transmit-and-receive technologies only, will provide new capabilities and enhance performance, while improving reliability and reducing maintenance costs, says Dassault. The AESA antenna will increase the RBE2’s range and angular coverage and make the radar more reliable. “The RBE2 on the Rafale F3 will offer high-resolution ground-mapping modes,” says Thales. Dassault will complete integration of the radar with the Rafale in 2011, in time for delivery should Dassault win all or part of the MMRCA order.

From Stratfor The BMD Decision and the Global System By George Friedman | September 21, 2009 The United States announced late Sept. 17 that it would abandon a plan for placing ballistic missile defense (BMD) installations in Poland and the Czech Republic. Instead of the planned system, which was intended to defend primarily against a potential crude intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) threat from Iran against the United States, the administration chose a restructured system that will begin by providing some protection to Europe using U.S. Navy ships based on either the North or Mediterranean seas. The Obama administration has argued that this system will be online sooner than the previously planned system and that follow-on systems will protect the United States. It was also revealed that the latest National Intelligence Estimate finds that Iran is further away from having a true intercontinental missile capability than previously thought, meaning protecting Europe is a more pressing concern than protecting the United States. Poland and the Czech Republic responded with a sense of U.S. betrayal, while Russia expressed its satisfaction with the decision. Russian envoy to NATO Dmitri Rogozin said Moscow welcomes the decision and sees it as an appropriate response to Russia’s offer to allow U.S. supplies to flow into Afghanistan through Russia. Later, the Russians added another reward: They tentatively announced the cancellation of plans to deploy short-range ballistic missiles in Kaliningrad, which they previously had planned as a response to the components of the U.S. BMD system planned for Poland and the Czech Republic. Polish despair (and Warsaw seemed far more upset than Prague) and Russian satisfaction must be explained to begin to understand the global implications. To do this, we must begin with an odd fact: The planned BMD system did not in and of itself enhance Polish national security in any way even if missiles had actually targeted Warsaw, since the long-range interceptors in Poland were positioned there to protect the continental United States; missiles falling on Poland would likely be outside the engagement envelope of the original Ground-based Midcourse Defense interceptors. The system was designed to handle very few missiles originating from the Middle East, and the Russians obviously have more than a few missiles. Given that even small numbers of missiles easily could overwhelm the system, the BMD system in no way directly affected Russian national security: The Russian strike capability — against both Poland and the continental United States — was not affected at all. Indeed, placing the system on ships is no less threatening than placing them on land. So, if it was the BMD system the Russians were upset with, they should be no less upset by the redeployment at sea. Yet Moscow is pleased by what has happened — which means the BMD system was not really the issue. For Poland, the BMD system was of little importance. What was important was that in placing the system in Poland, the United States obviously was prepared to defend the system from all threats. Since the system could not be protected without also protecting Poland, the BMD installation — and the troops and defensive systems that would accompany it — was seen as a U.S. guarantee on Polish national security even though the system itself was irrelevant to Polish security. The Russians took the same view. They cared little about the BMD system itself; what they objected to was the presence of a U.S. strategic capability in Poland because this represented an American assertion that Poland was actively under the defense of the United States. Of particular note from the Russian point of view was that such a guarantee would be independent of NATO. The NATO alliance has seen better days, and the Russians (and Poles) perceive an implicit American security guarantee as more threatening than an explicit one from NATO. This whole chain of events was an exercise in the workings of the Post-Post-Cold War World, in which Russia is a strong regional power seeking to protect its influence in the former Soviet Union (FSU) and to guarantee its frontiers as well — something that in the West has often been misinterpreted as a neurotic need for respect. Poland is the traditional route through which Russia is invaded, and the Russian view is that governments and intentions change but capabilities do not. Whatever Washington intends now, it is asserting dominance in a region that has been the route for three invasions over the last two centuries. By the Russian logic, if the United States has no interest in participating in such an invasion, it should not be interested in Poland. If the United States chooses Poland of all places to deploy its BMD when so many other locations were willing and possible, the Russians are not prepared to regard this choice as merely coincidence. Overall, the Russians desire a new map of the region, one with two layers. First, Russia must be recognized as the dominant power in the former Soviet Union. The United States and Europe must shape bilateral relations with other former Soviet states within the framework of this understanding. Second, Central Europe — and particularly Poland — must not become a base for U.S. power. The United States and Europe must accept that Russia has no aggressive intent, but more to the point, Poland in particular must become a neutral buffer zone between Russia and Germany. It can sign whatever treaties it wants, attend whatever meetings it wishes and so forth, but major military formations of other great powers must remain out of Poland. Russia sees the BMD system as the first step in militarizing Poland, and the Russians have acted accordingly. From the standpoint of the Bush administration and the Obama administration early on, the Russian claims to great power status, rights in the former Soviet Union and interests in Poland represented a massive overreach. The perception of both administrations derived from an image developed in the 1990s of Russia as crippled. The idea of Russia as a robust regional power, albeit with significant economic problems, simply didn’t register. There were two generations at work. The older Cold War generation did not trust Russian intentions and wanted to create a cordon around Russia — including countries like Georgia, Ukraine and, most important, Poland — because Russia could become a global threat again. The newer post-Cold War generation — which cut its teeth in the 1990s — wanted to ignore Russia and do what it wished both in Central Europe and the former Soviet Union because Russia was no longer a significant power, and the generation saw the need to develop a new system of relationships. In the end, all this congealed in the deployments in Poland and the Czech Republic. For Russia, Poland mattered in ways the United States could not grasp given its analytic framework. But the United States had its own strategic obsession: Iran. Iran: The U.S. Strategic Obsession The Islamic world has been the focus of the United States since 9/11. In this context, the development of an Iranian nuclear capability was seen as a fundamental threat to U.S. national interests. The obvious response was a military strike to destroy Iranian power, but both the Bush and Obama administrations hesitated to take the step. First, a strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities would be no one-day affair. Intelligence on precise locations had uncertainty built into it, and any strike would consist of multiple phases: destroying Iran’s air force and navy, destroying Iran’s anti-aircraft capability to guarantee total command of the skies, the attacks on the nuclear facilities themselves, analysis of the damage, perhaps a second wave, and of course additional attacks to deal with any attempted Iranian retaliation. The target set would be considerable, and would extend well beyond the targets directly related to the nuclear program, making such an operation no simple matter. Second, Iran has the ability to respond in a number of ways. One is unleashing terrorist attacks worldwide via Hezbollah. But the most significant response would be blocking the Strait of Hormuz using either anti-ship missiles or naval mines. The latter are more threatening largely because the clearing operation could take a considerable period and it would be difficult to know when you had cleared all of the mines. Tankers and their loads are worth about $170 million at current prices, and that uncertainty could cause owners to refuse the trip. Oil exports could fall dramatically, and the effect on the global economy — particularly now amid the global financial crisis — could be absolutely devastating. Attacking Iran would be an air-sea battle, and could even include limited ground forces inserted to ensure that the nuclear facilities were destroyed. The country most concerned with all of this is Israel. The Iranians had given every indication that they plan to build a nuclear capability and use it against Israel. Israel’s vulnerability to such a strike is enormous, and there are serious questions about Israel’s ability to use the threat of a counterstrike as a deterrent to such a strike. In our view, Iran is merely creating a system to guarantee regime survival, but given the tenor of Tehran’s statements, Israel cannot afford to take this view complacently. Israel could unilaterally draw the United States into an airstrike on Iran. Were Israel to strike Iran by any means, it most likely would lack the ability to conduct an extended air campaign. And the United States could not suffer the consequences of airstrikes without the benefits of taking out Iran’s nuclear program. Apart from the political consequences, the U.S. Navy would be drawn into the suppression of Iranian naval capabilities in the Persian Gulf whether it wanted to or not simply to keep the Strait of Hormuz open. Even if Iran didn’t act to close off the strait, Washington would have to assume that it might, an eventuality it could not afford. So an Israeli attack would likely draw in the United States against Iran one way or another. The United States has had no appetite for such an eventuality, particularly since it considers a deliverable Iranian nuclear weapon a ways off. The U.S. alternative — in both administrations — was diplomatic. Israel and Complications to the Diplomatic Alternative Washington wanted to create a coalition of powers able to impose sanctions on Iran. At meetings over the summer, the Obama administration appears to have promised Israel “crippling” sanctions to prevent any unilateral Israel action. At an April G-8 meeting, it was decided that Iran must engage in serious negotiations on its nuclear program prior to the next G-8 meeting — on Sept. 24 — or face these sanctions. The crippling sanctions foreseen were some sort of interruption of the flow of gasoline into Iran, which imports 40 percent of its supply despite being a net exporter of crude. Obviously, in order for this to work, all of the G-8 nations (and others) must participate, particularly Russia. Russia has the capacity to produce and transport all of Iran’s needs, not just its import requirements. If the Russians don’t participate, there are no sanctions. The Russians announced weeks ago that they opposed new sanctions on Iran and would not participate in them. Moreover, they seemed to flout the ineffectiveness of any U.S. sanctions. With that, the diplomatic option on Iran was off the table. Russia is not eager to see Iran develop nuclear weapons, but it sees the United States as the greater threat at the moment. Moscow’s fundamental fear is that the United States — and Israel — will dramatically strengthen Ukraine, Georgia and other states in the FSU and on its periphery, and that Russia’s strategic goal of national security through pre-eminence in the region will be lost. From the Russian point of view, the U.S. desire for Russian help with Iran is incompatible with the U.S. desire to pursue its own course in the FSU and countries like Poland. From the U.S. point of view, these were two entirely different matters that should be handled in a different venue. But Washington didn’t get to choose in this matter. This was a Russian decision. The Russians faced what they saw as an existential threat, believing that the U.S. strategy threatened the long-term survival of the Russian Federation. The Russians were not prepared to support a U.S. solution for Iran without American support on Russian concerns. The Americans ultimately did not understand that the Russians had shifted out of the era in which the United States could simply dictate to them. Now, the United States had to negotiate with the Russians on terms Moscow set, or the United States would have to become more directly threatening to Russia. Becoming more threatening was not an option with U.S. forces scattered all over the Middle East. Therefore, the United States had to decide what it wanted. American attention in the run-up to the Oct. 1 talks with Iran was focused by Israel. The Obama administration had adopted an interesting two-tier position on Israel. On the one hand, it was confronting Israel on halting settlement activity in the West Bank; on the other hand, it was making promises to Israel on Iran. The sense in Israel was that the Obama administration was altering Washington’s traditional support for Israel. Since Iran was a critical threat to Israel, and since Israel might not have a better chance to strike than now, the Obama administration began to realize that its diplomatic option had failed, and that the decision on war and peace with Iran was not in its hands but in Israel’s, since Israel was prepared to act unilaterally and draw the United States into a war. Given that the Obama diplomatic initiative had failed and that the administration’s pressure on Israel had created a sense of isolation in Israel, the situation could now well spiral out of control. Although all of these things operated in different bureaucratic silos in Washington, and participants in each silo could suffer under the illusion that the issues were unrelated, the matters converged hurriedly last week. Uncertain what leverage it had over Israel, the United States decided to reach out to the Russians. Washington sought a way to indicate to the Russians that it was prepared to deal with Russia in a different way while simultaneously giving away as little as possible. That little was the redeployment of BMD components originally planned for Poland and the Czech Republic to ships. (Money already has been allocated to upgrade additional Atlantic-based Aegis warships to BMD capability.) Whatever the military and engineering issues involved, whatever the desire not to conflate U.S. strategic relations with Israel with pressure on the settlement issue, whatever the desire to “reset” relations without actually giving the Russians anything, the silos collapsed and a gesture was made. From the Russian point of view, the gesture is welcome but insufficient. They are not going to solve a major strategic problem for the United States simply in return for moving the BMD. For that, the United States got access to Afghanistan through Russia if desired, and the removal of missiles in Kaliningrad. The Americans also got a different atmosphere at meetings between U.S. President Barack Obama and Russian President Dmitri Medvedev at the United Nations next week. But the sine qua non for Russian help on Iran is Russia’s sphere of influence in the FSU. The public relations aspect of how this sphere is announced is not critical. That the U.S. agrees to it is. This is the foreign policy test all U.S. presidents face. Obama now has three choices. He can make the deal with Russia. But every day that passes, Russia is creating the reality of domination in the FSU, so its price for a deal will continue to rise from simply recognizing their sphere of influence to extending it to neutralizing Poland. He can select the military option of an air campaign against Iran. But this means accepting the risk to maritime traffic in the Persian Gulf and the potentially devastating impact on the global economy if oil exports through the Strait of Hormuz are impacted significantly. He can wait to see how things unfold, and place overwhelming pressure on Israel not to attack. But this means finding a way to place the pressure: Israel in 2009 does not have the dependence on the United States it had in 1973. The Importance of Poland Ultimately, the question of Iran is secondary. The question of U.S.-Russian relations is now paramount. And ultimately, policymakers don’t really have as much freedom to make choices as they would like. Under any of these scenarios, the United States doesn’t have the power to stop Russian dominance in the FSU, but it does have the ability to block further Russian expansion on the North European Plain. Preventing an amalgamation between Russia and Europe is a fundamental interest to the United States; neutralizing Poland and depending on Germany as the Russian-European frontier is not inviting — especially as Germany has no interest in reprising the role it played from 1945 to 1991. The United States has an Iran crisis, but it is not its fundamental geopolitical problem. Interestingly, the Iran crisis is highlighting the real issue, which is Russia. It is Russia that is blocking a solution to Iran because Russian and American interests have profoundly diverged. What is emerging from Iran is the issue of Russia. And obviously, when Russia becomes an issue, so does Poland. If the United States acts to limit Russia, it will act in Poland, and not with BMD systems. The Obama administration’s decision to withdraw BMD is insufficient to entice Russia into assisting with Iran. An agreement to respect Russian rights in the FSU would be sufficient (and in a way would merely recognize what is already in place). Obama might quietly give that assurance. But if he does, the United States will not add Poland to the pile of concessions. The greater the concessions in the FSU, the more important Poland becomes. The idea of conceding both Russian hegemony in the FSU and the neutralization of Poland in exchange for Russian pressure on Iran is utterly disproportionate. The United States has already completed delivery of 48 late-model F-16C/Ds with advanced offensive capabilities to Poland. That matters far more to Polish national security than BMD. In the U.S. tradition with allies — particularly allies with strong lobbies in the United States, where the Polish lobby is immense — disappointment on one weapon system usually results in generosity with other, more important systems (something the Poles must learn). As the United States has a strong military option in Iran, redrawing the map of Europe to avoid using that option — regardless of Polish fears at the moment — is unlikely. Moreover, Washington also could decide to live with an Iranian nuclear capability without redrawing the map of Europe. Ultimately, the United States has made a gesture with little content and great symbolic meaning. It is hoping that the Russians are overwhelmed by the symbolism. They won’t be. For their part, the Russians are hoping the Americans panic over Iran. The fact is that while Russia is a great regional power, it is not that great, and its region is not that critical. The Russians may be betting that Obama will fold. They made the same bet on John F. Kennedy. Obama reads the same reports that we do about how the Russians believe him to be weak and indecisive. And that is a formula for decisive — if imprudent — action.

Hellfire II can reach 9 km.

Yes, much depends on the 'variable start points' and 'chance of appearing'. The first time out, I did not have the Minsk and my phibgru was west of Jan Mayen, too far to make effective use of the Flankers out of Norway. I was eaten alive by NATO antiship missile attacks.

Yes, I suppose that's possible in theory, particularly where the mapping of the target area is outdated or hasn't picked up on the "terrain countermeasures" Tactom has added another layer of accuracy (or inaccuracy, depending on the skill of the operator) by installing a real time datalink.

Yes, of course, especially now that GPS is added to TERCOM (Block III Tomahawks and later). (I should add that Block II onward also have DSMAC (digital scene matching area correlation), so even more accuracy).

[spoilers apply!] I found that my Flankers (flying out of Orland) did not have sufficient endurance on-station over the phibgru (which was pretty close to the eastern coast of Greenland) to be able to protect the group. Even when configured for LR Air-toAir. By the time they got out there, they were already pretty low on fuel and could not hang around long enough or use military/afterburner in air combat, to make a difference. When the Minsk was available, however, and it was sited a little closer to Jan Mayen, the combination of Yak-38 Forgers and low-endurance Flankers was just enough to repel most attacks or at least sacrifice my escorts and save the phibs. Tony was able to achieve victory without having the Minsk at his disposal, so kudos to him!

Yeah, in practical terms it is pretty much the same as 'inertial' guidance.

They actually use TERPROM (terrain profile matching), which is very similar but not quite the same.

TERCOM means "terrain contour matching". It guides the missile to the target using the known locations of both the launcher and the target, and then comparing the terrain profile (i.e. altitude) encountered along the preprogrammed flight path to that stored in its memory, and adjusting the flight path accordingly. In other words, TERCOM guides the missile by 'knowing' the nature of the terrain along the flight path and by matching the missile's altitude to that terrain. I take it you are referring to TLAM-D (either Blocks IIB or IIIB). Its warhead carries 166x BLU-97/B CEM (Combined Effects Munition) bomblets in 24 packs. It can carry out three separate attacks, and then dive attack the fourth. So, yes, four attacks at 14 DP strength. (Its a total of 51 DP in the latest version of the annex).

Incredible Victory.

Finally arrived, a first edition with original dust jacket.