CV32

Must be going around ... WWII seaplane found in St Lawrence

A new version of the Harpoon Commander's Edition World Wars Database (HCWW-090805) is available. Get it in the Downloads section of the HarpGamer website. New units include: Ships: Arbiter (May 45) CVE - Great Britain Archer CVE - Great Britain Archer (Feb 43) CVE - Great Britain Ark Royal (1939) CV - Great Britain Ark Royal (May 41) CV - Great Britain Avenger CVE - Great Britain Battler (Jan 43) CVE - Great Britain Bogue CVE - USA Bogue (late) CVE - USA Casablanca CVE - USA Charger (1942) CVE - USA Commencement Bay CVE - USA Courageous CV - Great Britain Eagle (1939) CV - Great Britain Eagle (1942) CV - Great Britain Erebus BM - Great Britain Formidable (1944) CV - Great Britain Formidable (1945) CV - Great Britain Furious (1939) CV - Great Britain Furious (late) CV - Great Britain Glorious CV - Great Britain Hermes (1939) CVL - Great Britain Hermes (1942) CVL - Great Britain Illustrious (1940-43) CV - Great Britain Illustrious (1944) CV - Great Britain Illustrious (1945) CV - Great Britain Implacable CV - Great Britain Implacable (May 45) CV - Great Britain Indomitable (1941) CV - Great Britain Indomitable (Apr 43) CV - Great Britain Indomitable (1944) CV - Great Britain Indomitable (May 45) CV - Great Britain Indefatigable (Nov 44) CV - Great Britain Long Island CVE - USA Renown (1939) BC - Great Britain Renown (Nov 40) BC - Great Britain Repulse (1939) BC - Great Britain Repulse (Nov 40) BC - Great Britain Repulse (1941) BC - Great Britain Roberts (1941) BM - Great Britain Searcher CVE - Great Britain Terror (1941) BM - Great Britain Tracker CVE - Great Britain Tracker (late) CVE - Great Britain Victorious (1944) CV - Great Britain Victorious (1945) CV - Great Britain Enjoy.

From the August 2009 issue of Air Force Magazine Fighting Under Missile Attack By John Stillion The Air Force hasn’t thought about air base defense for a while. Now, things are changing. For the first time in decades, Air Force aircraft deployed in an international crisis now face substantial risk of damage or destruction on the ground. By some estimates, missile and air attacks could disable up to 70 percent of the aircraft at some overseas bases in the opening minutes of a fight. The problem is not insurmountable; the Air Force and the Pentagon already have the means to start addressing this critical problem. Even so, there is no doubt the threat is growing. The affordability, accuracy, and ease of operation of today’s cruise and ballistic missiles make possible an effective surprise attack on theater air bases. Some of the more obvious countermeasures, such as operating from more-distant bases, raise major questions about the ability of current and planned USAF forces to fight an effective and efficient air campaign. These difficulties are compounded in areas such as the Western Pacific, where the missile and air threat is large, bases are few, and political access to existing facilities often is limited or greatly constrained. The full magnitude of this challenge can be glimpsed by examining a single, highly realistic scenario—emergency movement of US military forces to the Far East in response to a brewing China-Taiwan confrontation in the year 2015. In this scenario, one of the main difficulties facing the Air Force would be the shortage of suitable bases in the Western Pacific. Only four of the eight US bases there have hardened aircraft shelters. Already, three of those four (Osan Air Base and Kunsan Air Base in South Korea and Kadena Air Base in Japan) are well within reach of hundreds of Chinese People’s Liberation Army missiles. Currently, China has fielded about 400 conventional ballistic missiles and 250 cruise missiles that could reach bases in Japan and South Korea. Beijing also boasts a large fleet of advanced fighter-bombers. The fourth hardened base (Misawa AB, Japan) lies just outside this threat ring. However, that puts Misawa about 1,850 miles from the Taiwan Strait, roughly the same distance from the strait as Andersen AFB, Guam, far to the south. The US currently operates from only two bases—both on Okinawa—that lie within 500 miles of the strait. Requirements of tanking, sortie rates, and infrastructure availability make Kadena the best theater base for a large fighter contingent. A typical US crisis response would likely see Kadena receiving a mix of aircraft similar to what was sent to Aviano AB, Italy, for Operation Allied Force in 1999, or to Shaikh Isa AB, Bahrain, for Operation Desert Storm in 1991. In a crisis, one could find roughly 190 aircraft on the ground at Kadena. Virtually all of these would be parked in the open, as Kadena has only 15 hardened aircraft shelters. The shelter shortage could be a critical vulnerability if Kadena ever came under attack from a sophisticated enemy—such as China—which has large numbers of advanced, long-range weapons ready at hand. Consider a Kadena scenario, built around the following realistic assumptions: * The attacking force finds two categories of targets: (1) stationary aircraft parked in the open, and (2) aircraft that have some measure of protection because they are airborne, taxiing for takeoff, or cocooned in hardened shelters. * Of the total, nonsheltered parking space, 90 percent is covered by a massive missile attack. No parked aircraft has time to take off. Of this unprotected aircraft force, 75 percent is destroyed. All others are severely damaged. * Taxiing aircraft escape without damage. Also undamaged, of course, are aircraft that are already airborne. * Aircraft ensconced in hardened shelters ride out the attack undamaged. However, these bunkered aircraft are stuck on the ground due to massive debris on operating surfaces and more than 2,500 unexploded submunitions. They are targeted in follow-on attacks by cruise missiles. Substantial Losses Losses would be substantial. According to our calculation, only 82 of 268 aircraft deployed to Kadena—31 percent—would be available for postattack operations. These surviving aircraft are assumed to land at other airfields in Japan where specialized parts, maintenance personnel, weapons, etc., are unlikely to be available—further reducing their immediate combat capability. The threat comes from the PLA 2nd Artillery Corps, which operates China’s land-based strategic missile force—in practice a fourth service co-equal with the Army, Navy, and Air Force. The 2nd Artillery modernization has special significance for US air and naval forces. As a “missile-centric” service, 2nd Artillery has created the world’s first large, accurate, conventional missile bombardment capability. The latest DOD report on Chinese military capability observes that, if recent trends continue, the 2nd Artillery by 2015 will have about 500 CSS-6 ballistic and 800 DH-10 cruise missiles capable of reaching airfields in Korea, Japan, or the Philippines. The speed and accuracy of these systems, combined with the difficulty of defending against them, make the missiles ideal for carrying out rapid, accurate, and intense surprise attacks. This missile capability is qualitatively different from anything US forces have faced in the past. The Chinese ballistic missiles of greatest significance to US forces operating in the Western Pacific are the CSS-5 and CSS-6. Both are launched from mobile vehicles, have advanced guidance systems, and solid propellant motors. They have longer range, greater ease of operation, and higher reliability than previous-generation missiles such as the liquid-fueled V-2 and Scud. The CSS-5 and CSS-6 also are accurate and have a range of warhead options that make them more flexible and destructive than earlier missiles. The CSS-6 and similar Russian systems are for sale on the world market. The attack scenario above assumes each CSS-6 warhead contains 750 1.1-pound bomblets similar to the M74 bomblet carried by the US Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS). The bomblets also are dispensed in a manner similar to the ATACMS dispensing sequence, with an assumed average pattern density of one bomblet every 51 feet. This gives each warhead an effective lethal radius against soft targets (such as aircraft parked in the open) of approximately 650 feet. Warding off this kind of threat would be difficult. The key would be dispersal. China could theoretically saturate the entire airfield at Kadena with only 34 warheads. That would hit everything found on Kadena’s parking ramps. Pentagon officials believe the PLA has about 100 launchers for CSS-6 missiles, so a highly scripted, well-rehearsed surprise attack like this would require fewer than half the available mobile missile launchers. China would still have plenty more for attacks on other targets. Current Chinese conventional ballistic missiles cannot quite reach Andersen on Guam. However, improved missiles having this capability will likely enter service over the next decade. Assuming aircraft deployed to Andersen during a crisis would be similar to those deployed to European bases and Diego Garcia during Desert Storm, an attack with as few as 17 missiles could produce devastating results. For more than a decade, PLA planners have assumed that Washington would intervene in any future conflict between Taiwan and China. This assumption is buttressed by the US response to incidents such as the 1996 Taiwan missile crisis, the 2001 EP-3 collision and internment, and the October 2006 surfacing of a PLA Navy submarine near a US aircraft carrier. Chinese strategists believe a conflict over Taiwan independence would be a “local war” where neither the US nor China would seek to destroy its opponent. The focus would instead end with the political status of Taiwan and the post-conflict political-military situation in the Western Pacific. Chinese strategists also recognize that it will be decades before the PLA could take on the US in a traditional force-on-force battle and expect to win. Therefore, they focus on strategic principles that would allow China to prevail in a limited conflict with a “technologically superior enemy”—the United States. These principles include: * Seizing the initiative early in the conflict. * Achieving surprise by striking at unexpected times and places and/or when the enemy is unprepared. * Attacking pre-emptively to achieve maximum surprise, psychological shock, disrupt deployments, and increase chances of gaining the initiative. Chinese planners say initial attacks should feature “key point strikes” against information systems, command centers, key weapon systems, support systems, and bases. These should be conducted with a goal to “paralyze first, annihilate later.” Initial attacks should be conducted by the best available forces and concentrated in space and time “against targets vital to sustaining and supporting the enemy’s operational system.” The strategists also seek to raise enemy costs by causing significant military casualties early and “smashing the enemy’s will to resist.” The PLA has had about a decade to develop operational concepts, acquire systems, and train forces based on these principles. The ballistic missile forces of the 2nd Artillery Corps are especially well-suited for implementing these principles. The problem isn’t just the missiles. US planners seeking to ensure the availability of air bases overseas must consider that ballistic missile attacks are likely to be combined with (or serve as precursors to) additional attacks by cruise missiles and fixed wing aircraft. Other nations, such as Russia and Iran, have or are working to acquire similar capabilities. Fortunately, US airpower bases are not mere sitting ducks. Far from it. There are several prudent steps that can be taken or already have been taken to minimize the threat. Defenses One response, already implemented, is the deployment of a Patriot anti-missile battalion to Okinawa. With PAC-3 missiles, the latest Patriot systems are much more capable than those deployed during Desert Storm. However, when presented with dozens of fast, maneuvering CSS-6 re-entry vehicles simultaneously, even the PAC-3 system will likely intercept only a few incoming missiles. It is probable that any surprise attack would seek to overwhelm the Patriot and also include some missiles aimed at Patriot radar and control systems—to help ensure subsequent missile or aircraft attacks face minimal defenses. Even if active defenses such as Patriot become much more effective, the large footprint of each “leaking” warhead (well over one million square feet can be covered by dispersed bomblets) means that aircraft must be kept outside missile range, parked inside a shelter, or face a significant risk of destruction on the ground. Over the short term, USAF will need to use existing systems and facilities in creative ways to negate the growing threat posed by accurate, proliferating missiles. One obvious response is to disperse combat and support aircraft across a larger number of bases—preferably outside the reach of the majority of PLA systems. There are, for example, numerous airfields on the eastern periphery of the Philippine Sea that could be used by USAF aircraft over the short term. The inherent drawback is that safety comes from being outside of Chinese missile range, but this would simultaneously put aircraft farther from the action. Iwo To (Iwo Jima) is already inside the reach of CSS-5 missiles and therefore is not a good choice as a major deployment base. Wake Island lies nearly 3,000 miles east of the Taiwan Strait (approximately the distance from Diego Garcia to Baghdad). It is best suited to be a bomber base. Andersen has long runways and ample parking and fuel storage areas, but is completely unhardened. Washington might be tempted to concentrate a large number of aircraft at Andersen. That would go completely against the logic of dispersal. Fortunately, there are additional options, in the Mariana Islands. The civil airport on Guam (Won Pat Airport), along with Tinian and Saipan, could host reasonable numbers of fighters and support aircraft. The remaining three airfields—in the Marianas, Micronesia, and Palau—all offer runways shorter than 7,200 feet, have limited parking space and other infrastructure, and could at best support modest numbers of aircraft. There is also the political issue of gaining permission to use airfields outside US territory. Dispersal comes with an operational cost. With fighter and attack bases about 1,600 miles from the Taiwan Strait, sortie rates (and thus combat power) would be reduced by 40 percent or more compared to operations from Kadena. Meanwhile, tanker support requirements would increase enormously—with about three tankers required to support every five fighters deployed. To fly the same number of combat sorties per day as if from Kadena, the US would need to deploy about 100 additional combat aircraft and 200 additional tankers. Beyond 2020 In the medium term (2015-20), USAF could benefit by making improvements to the airfield infrastructure on the eastern periphery of the Philippine Sea. Extending runways and parking ramps, enhancing fuel storage, and beginning to harden all critical systems would clearly improve the ability of this set of bases to support combat operations under fire. In the years beyond 2020, more will be required—it is likely that China by then will possess a significant number of missiles with the range to attack unprotected aircraft operating from the periphery of the Philippine Sea. USAF will need to be able to shelter large numbers of aircraft from missile attack and conduct significant rapid runway repair and air base damage repair. Given the distances involved and limited basing options, it will also be necessary to protect not just fighters, but large support aircraft (tankers, AWACS, Global Hawk, etc.) as well. Fighter-size shelters have existed for decades: Cold War-era NATO fighter shelters were three- to six-feet thick and could protect aircraft against submunition attack but not direct hits by penetrating missile warheads. The accuracy of modern ballistic and cruise missiles would allow an adversary to put two or three missiles on each shelter with high confidence of achieving a hit. With shelters, instead of killing multiple aircraft with each missile, future enemies may have to settle for killing one front-line aircraft with two or three $10 million missiles. It is still a good trade. Shelters with nine-foot-thick walls and 12-foot-thick roofs constructed of high-strength concrete would be required to defeat ballistic and cruise missiles armed with penetrating warheads. This was done during World War II to protect German U-boats. So shelters suitable for protecting any USAF aircraft could be built, but as always, would come at a price. Officials estimate the cost of a large, 12-bay shelter at $700 million. This is expensive, but obviously not as expensive as failing to deter a war with China or permanently losing a large portion of USAF combat capability in a surprise attack. Such a shelter could hold wide-bodied aircraft and could protect $10 billion worth of USAF assets from attack. If the Air Force can protect its aircraft, then an opponent such as the PLA can expect much less benefit from a quick strike. By targeting runways and taxiways, an adversary may be able to disrupt or temporarily halt sorties from a given base. When the attacking missiles run out, the Air Force could repair its bases and bring its full combat power to bear with little or no interference. The key to success is protecting combat and support aircraft until an opponent’s missile inventory is exhausted. Having more long-range bombers wouldn’t hurt, either. The Air Force has taken some initial steps toward beefing up its long-range combat capability in the region. International training exercises and bare-bones “lily pad” deployments have become common. The Air Force may need to fight from a small number of “bunker spaces” in a future Western Pacific war, but steps taken even today to provide access through improved range, dispersal, and hardening can ease the strain. John Stillion was an Air Force officer from 1984 to 1992 and over the past 15 years has published multiple analytic reports on airpower topics. He currently lives in Virginia and is an adjunct professor at the University of Richmond. This is his first article for Air Force Magazine.

Autotest batch files for HDS II battleset completed without issues.

From DefenseNews Soviet Carrier Turns Into India's White Elephant By PRATAP CHAKRAVARTY, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE Published: 1 Aug 2009 10:25 NEW DELHI - When Russia gave India a retired Soviet aircraft carrier five years ago, New Delhi was delighted - little realizing the vessel would turn into a costly white elephant. Russia, India's longtime weapons supplier, said in 2004 it would give the country the 44,570-ton "Admiral Gorshkov" as a gift, provided Delhi paid a Russian shipyard $974 million to refurbish the carrier. Since then, the price has skyrocketed for fixing up the 27-year-old ship, which was decommissioned after the collapse of the Soviet Union. In 2007, Russia demanded $850 million more, citing cost escalations. Then, six months ago, Russia startled India with another demand - this time for 2.9 billion dollars. It also pushed back the ship's delivery by four years to 2012 - a year after India must mothball its last remaining aircraft carrier, the British-origin INS Viraat. Now India's national auditor has waded into the row, saying the navy could have paid less for a new carrier. "At best, the Indian navy would be acquiring, belatedly, a second-hand ship with a limited lifespan by paying significantly more than what it would have paid for a new ship," it said in its military spending report. The Russian price hikes have sparked outrage, forcing India's Defence Minister A.K. Antony to assure parliament this week that fresh negotiations were once again under way. "At present, the price escalation is in the negotiation stage and nothing has been finalised," Antony said, but he conceded India was paying "a substantially huge price" for the Admiral's refit. New Delhi has already paid hundreds of millions of dollars in advance to Russia's state-run Sevmash shipyard. "It's no doubt giving India a severe headache but we're stuck with it because if we pull out now, we don't get back a penny," said retired Gen. V. N. Sharma, a former chief of India's million-plus army. India must also dig deeper into its pocket for tens of millions of dollars extra to equip the docked Admiral Gorshkov with Sukhoi-30 warjets and Russian missiles, officials say. Russia's state-run defence export agency Rosoboronexport, which is handling the deal, has rejected suggestions that it is short-changing India. "Every step in the process of the refit of the aircraft carrier is monitored by the Indian navy's technical team and they have never raised objections," spokesman Vyacheslav Davidenko was quoted as saying by the Press Trust of India. The shipyard refitting the vessel has insisted that the cost escalations are due to Indian demands for features not included in the original contract. Minister Antony says New Delhi, which is trying to build an aircraft carrier of its own, was forced to turn to Russia as no other country would give India a tactical vessel of such a size. Russia, which accounts for 70 percent of India's military hardware, has up to $9 billion worth of defense orders from New Delhi in the pipeline. General Sharma said he believes the Russians "grossly miscalculated when writing up this contract in 2004". But retired Rear Adm. Raja Menon, who was associated with the project, said he believes Russia is seeking to get as much out of India as it can. He said Moscow is in the habit of arm-twisting its traditional weapons buyers. "Russia's track record is very poor in this regard and this time the nation has to take a call on this," he said. "In other contracts too they had escalated costs and thought they could get away with it again," Menon said.

Pretty certain it was NATO in NACV 6.0, and I think it was Blue in IOPG 10.0, but I cannot be absolutely sure of the latter.

A couple of errors last nite while running autotest batch file "ap-ORIG-2core.bat" (for a dual core machine) and 2009.038, as follows: NACV 6.0 IOPG 10.0 Still running the remaining scenarios in that batch file.

From Navy Times Skelton’s recommended military reading By Rick Maze - Staff writer Posted : Friday Jul 31, 2009 16:14:01 EDT The House Armed Services Committee chairman has come up with a new national security reading list of 50 essential books that he personally recommends for military officers and noncommissioned and petty officers, as well as his colleagues. Reading the list is not essential to testify before the committee, but Rep. Ike Skelton, D-Mo., who prepared a similar list in 2003, doesn’t mind if people think so. Skelton, an avid reader, said he feels strongly that officers and senior enlisted members need to read books about military strategy and American history to benefit from lessons of the past and better understand American values. “I really think the officer corps and senior noncoms need to have a deep understanding of history,” Skelton said. The 2009 reading list, which he has been passing out to colleagues in Congress and to military officers who show an interest, is intended to be read in addition to a 50-book list he recommended in 2003, Skelton said. “There are some essential books on the first list,” he said — like the U.S. Constitution, Carl von Clausewitz’s book “On War” and Sun Tzu’s “The Art of War.” In an ideal world, Skelton said, he likes to think people would read the 2003 and 2009 lists, or 100 books in all. But even he admits that some of them are a “hard read,” such as the two books on his new list by Barbara Tuchman — a 1970 book about Army Gen. Joseph Stilwell, a 1904 West Point graduate who went on to serve as commander of U.S. forces in China during World War II, and the 2004 book “Guns of August,” about events leading up to World War I. His new list contains Thomas E. Ricks’ 2006 book “Fiasco,” about Operation Iraqi Freedom, and Ricks’ 2009 book, “The Gamble,” about current military strategy and Army Gen. David Petraeus. That is balanced by a guide to the Peloponnesian War, a two-volume biography of Napoleon and biographies of Daniel Boone — to whom Skelton is related — and Daniel Webster. Although only military or American history buffs may have heard of some of the works, there are a couple of popular books on the list. James Bradley’s 2001 book “Flag of our Fathers,” about Iwo Jima, is there, and so is Tom Brokaw’s 1998 book “The Greatest Generation.” “You can get 2,000, 3,000 years of experience by reading,” Skelton said. ** Chairman Ike Skelton’s Recommended Booklist II 1. Robert B. Strassler. The Landmark Thucydides: A Guide to the Peloponnesian War. Simon & Schuster, 1998. a. Thucydides called his account of two decades of war between Athens and Sparta "a possession for all time," and indeed it is the first and still most famous work in the Western historical tradition … The Landmark Thucydides is a guide to the Peloponnesian War and a mine of military, moral, political, and philosophical wisdom.” – Google Books 2. H. W. Crocker III. Don’t Tread on Me. Crown Forum, 2006. a. “In Don' t Tread on Me, Crocker unfolds four hundred years of American military history, revealing how Americans were born Indian fighters whose military prowess carved out first a continental and then a global empire…. From the seventeenth century on, he argues, Americans have shown a jealous regard for their freedom-- and have backed it up with … a tradition that includes Rogers' Rangers, Merrill's Marauders, and today's Special Forces.” – Google Books 3. John Keegan. Intelligence in War. Vintage Books, 2004. a. In this case-based study of the practicality of intelligence in military campaigns, John Keegan argues that, while certainly important, military intelligence has failed to decisively decide campaigns from Napoleon’s invasion of Egypt to the present day. 4. Brendan Simms. Three Victories and a Defeat. Allen Lane, 2007. a. “This highly original, extremely enjoyable book tells the story of Britain's extraordinary scramble to world power in the 18th century and how, through hubris and incompetence, it lost almost everything it had gained …. Having created a new empire through battle and diplomacy, Britain then spectacularly lost it, this time because of its chaotic failure to maintain its European alliances.” – Google Books 5. Robert Asprey. The Rise and Fall of Napoleon (vols. 1 & 2). Little, Brown and Company, 2000. a. “Despite his stand-alone genius regarding tactical maneuver, Napoleon’s weakness in the field of grand strategy precipitated gross blunders, such as the invasion of Egypt and Russia. Covering the entirety of Napoleon’s life, these two volumes place Bonaparte in his full military context.” – Amazon 6. G. J. Marcus. The Age of Nelson. Viking Press Inc., 1971. a. As Geoffrey Marcus accurately depicts, the Anglo-French war between 1793 and 1815 was a period that abounded in extremely important lessons for the Royal Navy: the right use of intelligence; defense against invasion; the conduct of joint operations; and the various measures of commerce raiding and protection. In this book, Marcus has given the first modern history of the most formidable fighting force on earth and the instrument that forged for England more than 100 years of Empire. – Inside Cover 7. David Hackett Fischer. Washington’s Crossing. Oxford University Press, 2006. a. “Fischer's narrative reveals the crucial role of contingency in Washington’s winter offensive around Trenton, New Jersey … and argues that while British and German forces remained rigid and hierarchical, Americans evolved an open and flexible system that was fundamental to their success.” – Google Books 8. David McCullough. John Adams. Simon & Schuster, 2001. a. “In this powerful, epic biography, David McCullough unfolds the adventurous life-journey of John Adams, the brilliant, fiercely independent, often irascible, always honest Yankee patriot -- "the colossus of independence, " as Thomas Jefferson called him -- who spared nothing in his zeal for the American Revolution; who rose to become the second President of the United States and saved the country from blundering into an unnecessary war.” – Google Books 9. Robert Morgan. Boone. Algonquin Books, 2001. a. “Morgan’s objectivity gives us a completely realized man, the greatest pioneer of the Trans-Appalachian West, who helped open Kentucky to settlement but kept going, settling eventually in Missouri…. Morgan skillfully assesses and often questions the validity of all the tales of good fortune and heroism attached to Boone, especially his friendly relations with Native Americans.” – Publishers Weekly 10. Jon Meacham. American Lion. Random House Inc., 2008. a. “Jackson was, in short, a lot like his country: alternately kind and vicious, brilliant and blind; and a man who fought a lifelong war to keep the republic safe–no matter what it took. Jon Meacham in American Lion has delivered the definitive human portrait of a pivotal president who forever changed the American presidency–and America itself.” – Google Books 11. Robert Remini. Daniel Webster. W.W. Norton and Company, 1997. a. “The life of Daniel Webster, eminent politician and statesman of the four decades preceding the Civil War, is here chronicled by a veteran biographer of the Jacksonian era … Remini's scholarship and style are flawless, and he introduces substantial new information, notably a new medical interpretation of Webster's death.” – Library Journal 12. Martin Dugard. The Training Ground. Little, Brown, and Company, 2008. a. “Few historical figures are as inextricably linked as Ulysses S. Grant and Robert E. Lee. But less than two decades before they faced each other as enemies at Appomattox, they had been brothers--both West Point graduates, both wearing blue, and both fighting in the same cadre in the Mexican War…. when a group of young men came together to fight as friends, only years later to fight as enemies.” – Google Books 13. Roger Launius. Alexander William Doniphan. University of Missouri Press, 1997. a. “Alexander William Doniphan (1808-1887) - Missouri attorney, military figure (Mexican War), politician, and businessman - is one of the most significant figures in antebellum Missouri…. however, the key to Doniphan's importance was his persistent moderation on the critical issues of his day.” – Google Books 14. William Elsey Connelly. Quantrill and the Border Wars. Pageant Book Company, 1956. a. An account of the daring Confederate raider, his accomplices, and his action along the Missouri-Kansas border. Connelly also relates the strange circumstances by which Quantrill became a Rebel standard-bearer. 15. John G. Niehardt. Black Elk Speaks. SUNY Press, 2008. a. “This inspirational and unfailingly powerful story reveals the life and visions of the Lakota healer Nicholas Black Elk (1863-1950) and the tragic history of his Sioux people during the epic closing decades of the Old West.” – Google Books 16. Doris Kearns Goodwin. Team of Rivals. Simon & Schuster, 2006. a. “Acclaimed historian Doris Kearns Goodwin illuminates Lincoln's political genius … as the one-term congressman and prairie lawyer rises from obscurity to prevail over three gifted rivals of national reputation to become president.” –Google Books 17. James Robertson. Stonewall Jackson. Macmillan, 1997. a. “A distinguished Civil War historian unravels the complex character of the Confederacy's greatest general. Drawing on previously untapped manuscript sources ... the author capably covers the battles that made Jackson a legend--Sharpsburg, Fredericksburg, etc.—while emphasizing ‘the life story of an extraordinary man.’” – Amazon.com 18. Michael B. Ballard. Vicksburg. UNC Press, 2004. a. “When Confederate troops surrendered Vicksburg on July 4, 1863--the day after the Union victory at Gettysburg--a crucial port and rail depot for the South was lost.… In a thorough yet concise study of the longest single military campaign of the Civil War, Michael B. Ballard brings new depth to our understanding of the Vicksburg campaign by considering its human as well as its military aspects.” – Google Books 19. Brian M. Linn. The Philippine War: 1899-1902. University Press of Kansas, 2000. a. “Focusing purely on the military aspects of the war, Linn argues that previous studies of the war have mischaracterized it as having qualities which can only be ascribed to the final few campaigns … he finds that the American victory was due more to rebel mistakes and American ‘social reform’ than to overwhelming military force.” – Google Books 20. Edmund Morris. Theodore Rex. Random House Inc., 2001. a. “This well written book is a superior account of the presidency of Theodore Roosevelt, backed by first rate research. Above all, Morris finds a rare balance that blends personal story with policy analysis, judiciously sifting the key issues of the Roosevelt administration.” – Foreign Affairs 21. Ronald Spector. At War at Sea: Sailors and Naval Combat. Viking, 2001. a. Beginning with the 1905 Battle of Tsushima and concluding with the missile engagements off the Faulklands and Persian Gulf, Spector chronicles not only the mechanics of battle and the changing technology of war, but also presents these extraordinary stories from the point of view of the participants. – Google Books 22. Barbara Tuchman. Guns of August. Random House Inc., 2004. a. “Barbara Tuchman has brought to life again the people and events that led up to World War I. With attention to fascinating detail, and an intense knowledge of her subject and its characters, Ms. Tuchman reveals, for the first time, just how the war started, why, and why it could have been stopped, but wasn't.” - Amazon 23. Barbara Tuchman. Stilwell and the American Experience in China 1911-1945. Macmillan, 1970. a. Tuchman uses “the life of Joseph Stilwell, the military attaché to China in 1935-39 and commander of United States forces and allied chief of staff to Chiang Kai-shek in 1942-44, to explore the history of China from the revolution of 1911 to the turmoil of World War II, when China's Nationalist government faced attack from Japanese invaders and Communist insurgents.” – Amazon 24. Michael Korda. With Wings Like Eagles. Harper Collins, 2009. a. “This in-depth history of the pivotal air contest, known as the Battle of Britain, draws on the firsthand perspectives of pilots, ground crews, and commanders on both sides, in an account that places the campaign against a backdrop of the political forces that shaped it.” – Google Books 25. Richard G. Davis. Carl A. Spaatz: The Air War in Europe. DIANE Publishing Company, 2004. a. “This is an authoritative study of United States air doctrine from its imaginative theoretical beginnings to its grim implementation and reevalutaion during and after WWII…. This book will be of special interest to air force enthusiasts and military strategists who wish to explore the struggles for limited resources and the problems of managing multinational military coalitions.” – Journal of American History 26. Rick Atkinson. An Army at Dawn. Macmillan, 2003. a. “This book depicts the U.S. Army's introduction to modern war in North Africa. The Tunisian campaign, Atkinson shows, was undertaken by an American army lacking in training and experience alongside a British army whose primary experience had been of defeat…. Yet, after Tunisia, the tide of war rolled one way: toward Berlin.” – Publisher’s Weekly 27. Rick Atkinson. The Day of Battle. Macmillan, 2008. a. “The battles in Sicily and Italy developed the combat effectiveness and the emotional hardness of a U.S. Army increasingly constrained to bear the brunt of the Western allies' war effort, he argues…. Atkinson makes a convincing case that the Mediterranean campaign played a decisive role in breaking German power.” – Publishers Weekly 28. John Wukovits. Pacific Alamo: The Battle for Wake Island. New American Library, 2003. a. “Few know the full story of Wake Island. Now a prominent military historian, breaking new ground on the assault, relates the compelling events of that day and the heroic struggle that followed.… This is the story of that battle from survivors on both sides.” – Google Books 29. James D. Hornfischer. The Last Stand of the Tin Can Sailors. Bantam Books, 2005. a. “James D. Hornfischer paints an unprecedented portrait of the Battle of Samar, a naval engagement unlike any other in U.S. history—and captures with unforgettable intensity the men, the strategies, and the sacrifices that turned certain defeat into a legendary victory.” – Google Books 30. Maxwell Taylor Kennedy. Danger’s Hour. Simon and Schuster, 2008. a. “In the closing months of World War II, Americans aboard the U.S.S. Bunker Hill found themselves facing a new and terrifying weapon: kamikazes. Drawing on years of research and firsthand interviews with both American and Japanese survivors, Maxwell Taylor Kennedy draws a gripping portrait of men bravely serving their countries and the advent of a terrifying new weapon.” – Google Books 31. Thomas Parrish. Roosevelt and Marshall. William Morrow and Company Inc., 1989. a. “Provides a provocative portrait of two larger-than-life leaders who orchestrated the Allied victory in World War II, changed the role of the American military, and controlled the fate of American politics.” – Google Books 32. James Bradley. Flags of our Fathers. Bantam Books, 2001. a. “The beloved bestseller that honors not only one battle and one achievement, but the stories of six heroes and one indelible image: the photograph of the flag raising at Iwo Jima.” - Google Books 33. Tom Brokaw. The Greatest Generation. Random House Inc., 1998. a. “In this superb book, Tom Brokaw goes out into America, to tell through the stories of individual men and women the story of a generation, America's citizen heroes and heroines who came of age during the Great Depression and the Second World War and went on to build modern America.” – Google Books 34. David Halberstam. The Coldest Winter. Hyperion, 2007. a. “Around Thanksgiving, 1950, units of the Second Infantry Division were virtually annihilated by forces of the People's Republic Army…. In The Coldest Winter, award-winning reporter and historian David Halberstam explodes this moment in time, using it as a jumping off point to delve into the Korean War's particular horrors and triumphs.” – Google Books 35. Tim Castle. At War in the Shadow of Vietnam. Columbia University Press, 1993. a. “The first book to recount the full story of U.S. covert operations in Laos during the Vietnam War. Based on newly declassified materials and interviews with dozens of key American and Lao officials, it examines the structure of the U.S. "secret war" in Laos and the long-term consequences associated with it.” – Amazon 36. Mark Clodfelter. Limits of Airpower. Simon & Schuster, 1989. a. “Analyzes the three major American bombing campaigns against North Vietnam and explains why they proved less effective than expected.” - Google Books 37. Robert Gates. From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider’s Story. Simon & Schuster, 2007. a. “As the only person to rise from entry-level analyst to Director of the CIA and to serve on the White House staffs of four Presidents, Robert Gates is uniquely qualified to tell the unprecedented inside story of the Cold War. Drawing on his access to classified information and top-level involvement in policy decisions, Gates lays bare the hidden wars and operations the United States waged against communism worldwide.” – Google Books 38. Norman Schwartzkopf. It Doesn’t Take a Hero. Random House Inc., 1993. a. “He set his star by a simple motto: duty, honor, country. Only rarely does history grant a single individual the ability, personal charisma, moral force, and intelligence to command the respect, admiration, and affection of an entire nation. Now, … General Norman Schwarzkopf reviews his remarkable life and career…” – From the Inside Flap 39. George Tenet. At the Center of the Storm. HarperCollins, 2007. a. “At the Center of the Storm recounts George Tenet's time at the Central Intelligence Agency… illuminating the CIA's painstaking attempts to prepare the country against new and deadly threats, disentangling the interlocking events that led to 9/11, and offering explosive new information on the deliberations and strategies that culminated in the U.S. invasion of Iraq.” – Google Books 40. Thomas E. Ricks. Fiasco. Penguin Press, 2006. a. “Provides eye-witness accounts of people, ranging from commanders to intelligence officers, army doctors to ordinary soldiers, that contradict the official stories and figures of the second Iraq War. This book gives an insight into the plight of ordinary soldiers doing nightmarish jobs, and the real nature of the fighting in Iraq.” – Google Books 41. Thomas E. Ricks. The Gamble. Penguin Group Inc., 2009. a. “At the core of this story is General David Petraeus, a military intellectual who has gathered around him an unprecedented number of officers with both combat experience and Ph.D.s…. The Gamble offers news breaking information, revealing behind-the-scenes disagreements between top commanders … and examines the congressional hearings through the eyes of Petraeus and Ambassador Ryan Crocker, and their views of the questions posed by the 2008 presidential candidates.” – Google Books 42. Marc Gonsalves et al. Out of Captivity: Surviving 1,967 Days in the Jungle. William Morrow, 2009. a. After crash landing in the midst of the Colombian jungle, five civilian contractors find themselves caught in a struggle for survival that would last over three years. 43. Bob Woodard. The War Within. Simon & Schuster, 2008. a. “As violence in Iraq reaches unnerving levels in 2006, a second front in the war rages at the highest levels of the Bush administration…. With unparalleled intimacy and detail, this gripping account of a president at war describes a period of distress and uncertainty within the U.S. government from 2006 through mid-2008.” – Google Books 44. William G. T. Tuttle Jr. Defense Logistics for the 21st Century. Naval Institute Press, 2005. a. “Since 1959, a revolutionary change in information technology and defense strategy has swept the field of defense logistics and mandated a new understanding of the objectives and principles of military logistics. Renowned defense logistics expert General William Tuttle covers all aspects of the subject including force projection, force sustainment, and minimizing the logistics "footprint" in battle spaces.” – Google Books 45. David Kilcullen. The Accidental Guerilla. Oxford University Press US, 2009. a. “As the former Senior Counterinsurgency Advisor to General David Petraeus in Iraq, his vision of war has dramatically influenced American military policy. Kilcullen sees today's conflicts as a complex combination of two trends: small wars and global confrontations …. and warns that America's actions in the War on Terrorism have tended to conflate these trends, blurring the distinction between local and global struggles and thus enormously complicating our challenges.” – Google Books 46. Malcolm Gladwell. Outliers: The Story of Success. Hachette Book Group USA, 2008. a. “Challenging our cherished belief of the ‘self-made man,’ Gladwell makes the democratic assertion that superstars don't arise out of nowhere…. Examining the lives of outliers from Mozart to Bill Gates, he builds a convincing case for how successful people rise on a tide of advantages, ‘some deserved, some not, some earned, some just plain lucky.’” – Amazon 47. Douglas E. Schoen and Michael Rowan. The Threat Closer to Home. Simon & Schuster, 2009. a. “Drawing on two decades of experience working at the highest level of Venezuelan and American politics, Schoen and Rowan go behind the scenes to examine Chávez's efforts to subvert both the American economy and his own country's stability.” – Google Books 48. Richard A. Clarke. Against All Enemies. Free Press, 2004. a. “Clarke, the U.S.’s former terrorism czar, offers a complex and illuminating look into the successes and failures of the nation’s security apparatus, especially with regards to George Bush’s post-9/11 War on Terror.” – Publisher’s Weekly 49. William Murray and Richard H. Sinnreich (eds). The Past as Prologue. Cambridge University Press, 2006. a. “Exploring the usefulness of the study of history for contemporary military strategists, this volume illustrates the great importance of military history while simultaneously revealing the challenges of applying the past to the present.” – Amazon 50. Gen. David Petraeus and Gen. James Amos. Counterinsurgency: U.S. Army/ Marine Corps FM 3-24. University of Chicago Press, 2007. a. “The result of unprecedented collaboration among top U.S. military experts, scholars, and practitioners in the field, FM 3-24 espouses an approach to combat that emphasizes constant adaptation and learning, the importance of decentralized decision-making, the need to understand local politics and customs, and the key role of intelligence in winning the support of the population.” – Google Books ** Congressman Ike Skelton’s National Security Book List With Reviews 1. Constitution of the United States, Constitutional Convention, 1787. The Constitution is a product of the Constitutional Convention which was held in Philadelphia, PA, in 1776. The original 13 states ratified it and ever since it has been the base of the American government and freedom. 2. Sun Tzu. The Art of War. Samuel B. Griffith (Translator). Oxford University Press,1986. Written in China over two thousand years ago, Sun Tzu's The Art of War provides a basis for the planning and training of military operations. These essays contain principles used by modern day military leaders. This classic work is timeless. 3. Carl von Clausewitz. On War. Ed. and trans. By Peter Paret and Michael Howard.Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984. Clausewitz’s classic work on war, written at the time of Napoleon's greatest campaigns, is the basis for a thorough discussion of the art of warfare. Clausewitz is best remembered by the assertion that war is a continuation of politics by other means. 4. Michael I. Handel. Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought. Frank Cass & Company, 2001. Masters of War is a study based on the works on war by Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, Mao Tse-tung, and, to a lesser extent, Jomini and Machiavelli. The author explains that these military leaders had a great deal in common. Handel states the logic of waging war and of strategic thinking are universal and timeless. 5. John Keegan (ed). The Book of War. Viking, 1999. Keegan brings together several writings on war, including first hand accounts of battles. The conflicts waged by Caesar, Wellington, Hemingway, and Ernie Pyle are reflected in this book. 6. Edward Sheperd Creasy. Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World: From Marathon to Waterloo. DaCapo Press, 1994. This book, originally published in 1851, discusses famous battles of the past 2,300 years that changed the course of world history. Conflicts which are discussed include the battle of Marathon down through the battle of Waterloo. 7. Peter Bamm. Alexander the Great. New York, MacGraw-Hill, 1968. Bamm’s writing reflects the brilliant military tactics of Alexander the Great as he fought his way through mountains and deserts of central Asia, all the way to the Himalayas. 8. Sir Gavin De Beer. Hannibal. Viking Press, 1969. Hannibal fought a losing battle in his quest to protect his birthplace, Carthage. Nevertheless, this work highlights his courage and excellent battlefield tactics. 9. John Keegan. The Face of Battle. New York: Vintage Books, 1977. Keegan, an instructor at Sandhurst, speaks for soldiers who were involved in the battles at Agincourt, Waterloo, and the Somme. 10. Fred Anderson. Crucible of War: The Seven Years War and the Fate of Empire in British North America, 1754 - 1766. Vintage Books, 2001. Anderson makes a convincing argument that the American Revolution could not have taken place but for the French and Indian War that was waged in the Americas. The book discusses Washington’s engagements as well as the roles of Pontiac, William Pitt, and Montcalm. 11. John Mack Faragher. Daniel Boone: The Life and Legend of an American Pioneer. Owlet, 1993. Faragher gives an excellent account of the life of America’s legendary pioneer and the early struggle against the Indians as he tried to settle the West. Drawing from records and documentation from Boone's own hand, this is an accurate reflection of young America during times that helped shape our country. 12. Richard Barksdale Harwell and Douglas Southall Freeman. Washington. Collier Books, 1995. An abridgment by Richard Harwell of Freeman’s seven-volume biography of the “Father of our Country” helps to place Washington in a historical context. 13. John Sugden. Tecumseh: A Life. Henry Holt & Company, Inc., 1999. Tecumseh, a Shawnee, endeavored to organize the Native American Confederacy to halt the westward expansion of the American settlers. 14. Stephen Ambrose. Undaunted Courage. Touchstone Books, 1997. Ambrose’s biography of Lewis and Clark is based on their journals, regarding their travels up the Missouri River from St. Louis all the way to the Pacific. Ambrose discusses the military leadership of the explorers as they dealt with Indians and reported to Jefferson. 15. Vincent Cronin. Napoleon Bonaparte: An Intimate Biography. Vergara Editor S.A., 1991. Cronin gives an accurate portrayal of the famous French general and emperor with full explanation of his various battlefield triumphs including his defeat at Waterloo. 16. Napoleon Bonaparte. The Military Maxims of Napoleon: The Principles of Warfare by Napoleon. Trans. by George C. D’Aguilar. Greenhill Books/Lionel Leventhal, 2002. This is a distillation of the knowledge, intuition, and wisdom of history's greatest military commander. Napoleon's success was built upon practical experience combined with his own study of classical warfare and his natural grasp of the key principles of war. His thoughts, theories, and commentaries on the subject are presented in the form of accessible and readable maxims, and these, with explanatory comments, reveal the fundamentals of Napoleon's art of waging war. 17. Christopher Hibbert. Nelson: A Personal History. Perseus Publishing, 1996. Hibbert gives an excellent account of England's best maritime leader. It follows Nelson’s story from his joining the navy at age 12 through his decisive victory over the French and Spanish at Trafalgar in 1805, which resulted in his death. 18. John Keegan. The Price of Admiralty: The Evolution of Naval Warfare. Penguin USA, 1990. Keegan illuminates the history of naval combat by expertly dissecting four landmark sea battles, each featuring a different type of warship: The Battle of Trafalgar, the Battle of Jutland in World War I, the Battle of Midway in World War II, and the long and arduous Battle of the Atlantic. 19. Donald R. Morris. The Washing of the Spears: The Rise and Fall of the Zulu Nation. DaCapo Press, 1998. Morris provides a sixty year history of Africa’s Zulu empire including descriptions of the battles of Isandhlwana and Rorke’s Drift. 20. Douglas Southall Freeman. Lee. Touchstone Books, 1997. Freeman's provides an excellent biography of Confederate war general Robert E. Lee. It captures Lee's military genius and why so many Southerners enthusiastically fought and died under his banner. 21. Ulysses S. Grant. Personal Memoirs: Ulysses S. Grant. Modern Library, 1999. Grant’s memoirs is one of the finest military biographies ever written. It follows Grant’s boyhood through his leadership in the Civil War. This fine work was written as Grant was dying from lung cancer. 22. Richard S. Brownlee. Gray Ghosts of the Confederacy: Guerrilla Warfare in the West, 1861-1865. Louisiana Paperback Ed. 1984. Brownlee’s book, incorrectly named, is an excellent discussion of guerrilla warfare along the Missouri and Kansas border from the years 1861-1865. It includes discussion of Missouri’s guerrilla’s Quantrill and Anderson. 23. James M. McPherson. Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era. Ballantine Books 1989. McPherson provides a one volume full discussion of the Civil War. This book earned McPherson the Pulitzer Prize. He highlights the military aspects of the war and also describes economic, political, and social forces behind the conflict. 24. Evan S. Connell. Son of the Morning Star. North Point Press, 1997. Connell gives a thorough account of George Armstrong Custer's military career and the events that lead up to the Battle of Little Bighorn. 25. Elbert Hubbard. A Message to Garcia. Peter Pauper Press, 1983. This is the famous essay involving the carrying of a message from President McKinley to an insurgent leader in Cuba named Garcia. This is a story of Lieutenant Colonel Rowan, who without question, accepted the mission and fulfilled it. 26. John Eisenhower. Yanks: The Epic Story of the American Army in World War I. Touchstone Books, 2002. This is an excellent discussion of how Gen. John Pershing created a war-winning army in less than 18 months. The book focuses on World War I senior officers Douglas MacArthur, George Patton, and George C. Marshall. 27. Frank Everson, Vandiver. Black Jack: The Life and Times of John J. Pershing. (Two Volumes). Texas A&M University Press, 1977. This is a two-volume work on the military leadership of General John J. Pershing. General Pershing is portrayed as a simple, direct, honest, energetic, efficient, and dedicated man and soldier who rose to the rank of General of the Armies. Vandiver traces Pershing from his youth, his cadet days at West Point through his leadership in World War I. 28. Roy Jenkins. Churchill: A Biography. Plume, 2002. This is one of the best biographies of Churchill, Britain’s most famous member of Parliament in the last century. It traces his life from his unhappy boyhood through his two term service as Prime Minister. 29. Allan R. Millet and Williamson Murray. A War to be Won. Harvard University Press, 2000. This one-volume study of World War II was written by two distinguished military historians. Murray and Millett unapologetically consider the war just and necessary. 30. Douglas MacArthur. Reminiscences. United States Naval Institute, 2001. MacArthur wrote this book in his own hand and finished it only weeks before his death. This revered and admired general was a remarkable leader of many successful military campaigns. 31. William L. Shirer. Rise and Fall of the Third Reich. Touchstone Books, 1990. Shirer’s book published in 1960, is portrayed as the definitive record of Adolph Hitler and how Hitler nearly succeeded in taking over the world. 32. John Prados. Combined Fleet Decoded: The Secret History of American Intelligence and the Japanese Navy in World War II. Random House, 1995. Prados gives an excellent picture of World War II’s Pacific battles and the role of intelligence in defeating Japan. 34. Hampton Sides. Ghost Soldiers: The Forgotten Epic Story of World War II’s Most Dramatic Mission. Doubleday, 2001. Sides describes the rescue of American and British POW’s after three years in a Japanese prison camp near the city of Cabanatuan. The prisoners included the last survivors of the Bataan Death March. 35. Richard Frank. Guadalcanal: The Definitive Account of the Landmark Battle. Penguin USA, 1992. This is an excellent history of the battle at Guadalcanal as well as the Navy battles that surrounded the island. It draws on first-time translations of Japanese first-hand accounts and declassified U.S. radio intelligence. 36. Stephen Ambrose. The Victors: Eisenhower and His Boys: The Men of World War II. Touchstone Books, 1999. The Victors is a compilation of Stephen E. Ambrose's best works, drawing heavily from his biography of General Dwight D. Eisenhower. 37. Lynn M. Homan and Thomas Reilly. Black Knights: The Story of the Tuskegee Airmen. Pelican Publishing Company. Gretna, 2001. Between 1941 and 1948, African American airmen trained at a segregated facility in Tuskegee, Alabama. The Tuskegee airmen secured a significant place in American and African American history for bravery in service on and off the battlefield. 38. Frank Freidel. Franklin D. Roosevelt: A Rendezvous with Destiny. Little Brown & Company, 1991. Freidel details Roosevelt's life before and during his presidency. It focuses on Roosevelt’s service during the Depression and wartime periods. 38. Maj. Gen. Jeanne Holm, USAF, Retired. Women in the Military: An Unfinished Revolution. Presidio, Revised 1993. Updated through Desert Storm, this revision of Holm's comprehensive history of women in the U.S. armed forces exemplifies excellent scholarship. Holm, a retired major general and former director of the WAF, marshals an impressive body of evidence to support her contention that the increasing number of women in uniform since the 1960s has diminished neither the American military's operational readiness nor its combat effectiveness. 39. William Slim. Defeat Into Victory. Cooper Square Press, 2000. An account by Field-Marshall Viscount William Slim who led shattered British forces from Burma to India. 40. David McCullough. Truman. Touchstone Books, 1993. McCullough offers a detailed account of the life of Harry Truman, defining his character and describing his life as a farmer, haberdasher, local official, Senator, Vice President and President. 41. T.R. Fehrenbach. This Kind of War: The Classic Korean War History. Brasseys, Inc., 2000. This is the classic discussion of the Korean War, which began in June 1950. It brings to life the harrowing and bloody battles that were fought up and down the Korean Peninsula. 42. Robert Coram. Boyd: The Fighter Pilot Who Changed the Art of War. Little Brown & Company, 2002. John Boyd (1927-1997) was a brilliant military scholar and strategist. Boyd wrote the first manual on jet aerial combat, was primarily responsible for designing the F-15 and the F-16 jet fighters, was a leading voice in the post-Vietnam War military reform movement and shaped the smashingly successful U.S. military strategy in the Persian Gulf War. 43. Harold G. Moore and Joseph L. Galloway. We Were Soldiers Once...and Young. New York: Random House, 1992. This is a description of the first major battle fought by U.S. troops in Vietnam. It highlights the story of Lieutenant Colonel Moore as he commanded the battalion that initiated the fighting. This work depicts Ia Drang through the eyes of junior officers and enlisted men of the 1st Cavalry Division and their North Vietnamese opponents. 44. Thomas G. Houlahan. Gulf War: The Complete History. Schrenker Military Publishing, 1999. This is a thorough history of the Gulf War covering all aspects of the conflict. 45. Robert D. Kaplan. Warrior Politics: Why Leadership Requires a Pagan Ethos. Vintage Books, 2003. Kaplan explores the wisdom of the ages for answers for today’s leaders. While the modern world may seem more complex and dangerous than ever before, Kaplan writes from a deeper historical perspective to reveal how little things actually change. 46. MG Robert H. Scales Jr. Yellow Smoke: The Future of Land Warfare for America’s Military (Role of American Military Power). Rowman & Littlefield, 2003. This is an excellent book discussing current doctrinal debates and the vision of future war. It argues the U.S. Army should instead prepare for more complex political settings as it continues to try to win wars with the minimum of fighting. 47. Russel Frank Weigley. The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy. Indiana University Press, 1978. This is an excellent work on the development of American military strategy over the years. It discusses wars from the time of the early republic through post World War II. 48. Eliot Cohen. Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen and Leadership in Wartime. Anchor Books, 2003. An excellent discussion about Abraham Lincoln, Georges Clemenceau, Winston Churchill and David Ben Gurion and what made them great wartime leaders. 49. John P. Murtha with John Plashal. From Vietnam to 9/11: On the Front Lines of National Security. Pennsylvania State University Press, 2003. Congressman John P. "Jack" Murtha is a Vietnam combat veteran who combines personal memoirs with an analysis that provides accounts of the United States military strategy from Vietnam to 9-11. 50. Thomas E. Ricks. Making the Corps. Touchstone Books, 1998. Making the Corps discusses Marine boot camp at Parris Island, South Carolina. Here, old values are stripped away and new, Marine Corps values are forged.

A new version of the Harpoon Commander's Edition World Wars Database (HCWW-090731) is available. Get it in the Downloads section of the HarpGamer website. New units include: Ships: Arkansas (1945) BB - USA California (Jan 44) BB - USA Colorado (1943) BB - USA Enterprise (1941) CV - USA Enterprise (Apr 42) CV - USA Enterprise (late 42) CV - USA Enterprise (Oct 43) CV - USA Hornet (Jan 42) CV - USA Hornet (Jun 42) CV - USA Hornet (Jul 42) CV - USA Idaho (Jan 45) BB - USA Independence CVL - USA Independence (1944) CVL - USA Langley CV - USA Maryland (1941) BB - USA Maryland (1944) BB - USA Mississippi (Sep 44) BB - USA Nevada (1941) BB - USA Nevada (Dec 42) BB - USA New Mexico (Dec 42) BB - USA New York (1941) BB - USA New York (1942) BB - USA New York (1944) BB - USA Pennsylvania (1941) BB - USA Pennsylvania (Feb 43) BB - USA Pennsylvania (Jun 45) BB - USA Ranger (1941) CV - USA Ranger (1942) CV - USA Ranger (1943) CV - USA Ranger (Jul 44) CV - USA Saratoga (Nov 41) CV - USA Saratoga (May 42) CV - USA Saratoga (Nov 42) CV - USA Saratoga (Jan 44) CV - USA Saratoga (Sep 44) CV - USA Tennessee (1941) BB - USA Tennessee (May 43) BB - USA Texas (1942) BB - USA Texas (1944) BB - USA West Virginia (1944) BB - USA Wyoming (1941) BB - USA Yorktown (1940) CV - USA Yorktown (1942) CV - USA Installations: Airfield Large - Intl Airfield Medium - Intl Airfield Small - Intl Iwo Jima (Bonin) - Japan Marcus Island - Japan Tarawa (Gilberts) - Great Britain Enjoy.

Yes.

Yes, I'm aware of that. However, at scenario start the NATO subs are about 45 nm away from that objective. The Soviets are instantly able to achieve theirs.

I think you need to be very careful not to confuse rates of fire, fire control director limits, and SAM allocation values between real life, Harpoon 4 paper rules, HCE, and for that matter, ANW. IIRC, all of these (excepting maybe ANW) were discussed in that Matrix thread back in February. There are several flavours of Harpoon, and while they all strive to simulate real life, they each have their own limitations. All of these factors or values may be different given different Harpoon sims and different databases, and furthermore, not all of them are actually modeled in HCE. Keep in mind, as well, that database (DB) values will affect the behavior of the sim, particularly when it comes to an issue like SAM rate of fire. Whether ROF=15 or ROF=20 is going to affect your results significantly, obviously. And those DB values will vary between databases, sources, whether new info has emerged, and yes, whether there's a typo. The bigger issue that I think you're driving at is that, from your observations, actual SAM rate of fire is higher than mandated by the DB value?

All in PDF US nuclear warheads, 1945-2009 Russian nuclear forces, 2009 US nuclear forces, 2009

That it is. Thanks for the link.

My After Action Report: *** Log Entry 0500L061488 USS Providence (SSN-719) entered the battle area from the northwest corner. Initial speed and depth were 12 knots and 200 meters (the top of the Intermediate II depth band), respectively, and of course, moving easterly in the direction of the objective: the Soviet SSBN bastions. The TB-16D high speed towed array was already deployed (800 yd astern), and the four 21 inch (533mm) torpedo tubes were loaded with a single Mk 48 Mod 4 heavyweight torpedo, a pair of UGM-84C Sub Harpoon anti-ship missiles and a Mk 70 MOSS decoy. USS Pittsburgh (SSN-720) was supposed to be about 20,000 yd due south of SSN-719, while USS Boston (SSN-703) was supposed to be about 49,000 yd further south. All were expected to be traveling at a similar speed and depth, and with a similar (if not identical) initial torpedo tube loadout. Their Royal Navy companion, HMS Turbulent (S110), was expected to be somewhere between Pittsburgh and Boston, though exactly where was unknown and, to be frank, coordination between the US Navy and Royal Navy commands regarding this particular mission had been less than ideal. It had been agreed, however, that Providence and Pittsburgh would make for the enemy submarine bastions and probe the minefield barrier for the entrance(s). Boston would play decoy, where necessary, and Turbulent would be the designated hitter for dealing with enemy surface groups - most particularly the threat posed by the Kresta II cruiser Kronstadt and its Krivak I escorts. (In large part due to its lack of a mine avoidance/under ice sonar and the advantage of an extra torpedo tube). Other submarines would join an anti-surface attack if the tactical circumstances permitted. Log Entry 0506L061488 Immediately, at 0500L, the TB-16D towed array picked up two faint surface contacts, designated Sierra 1 and 2. Bearing ambiguity put them at 159 (or 339) and 154 (or 334) degrees. A third contact, Sierra 3, had been detected by the BQQ-5 bow sonar, was an active sonar source bearing 135 degrees. Providence changed course to 105 degrees to resolve the bearing ambiguity, maintaining speed and depth. The towed array quickly identified a fishing trawler bearing 326, and this contact was dropped. Another surface contact was confirmed at bearing 158 (possibly the Kresta group?) and a Grisha III at bearing 146. The bow sonar reported a surface contact at bearing 143, possibly a second Grisha. Log Entry 0515L061488 Success! The towed array now identified Krivak class frigates at bearings 151 and 163, the latter ranged at about 40,000 yd and heading south at 10 knots. A Kresta class cruiser was identified at bearing 152, estimated range 34,500 to 35,000 yd and also heading south at 12 knots. The Grisha contact was lost, the acoustic source blocked by hull baffles, with last bearing at 146. Log Entry 0517L061488 The towed array reported a very distant torpedo contact, bearing 190. The range made it unlikely to have been associated with Pittsburgh, so it is more likely that a Soviet aircraft had dropped on a contact made with Turbulent or Boston. A lucky detect, perhaps, or maybe Boston had been a little more overt with its acting as decoy than was prudent. :shock: Hope those guys are okay. Providence continued on course 090, speed 12 kt, depth 200. Log Entry 0519.5L061488 Distant contact, possibly an explosion, detected on bearing 190. Appears to match the range and bearing of the earlier torpedo report. The rapid resolution between the torpedo contact and the explosion again suggests an airborne torpedo drop, hopefully on a decoy released by either Turbulent or Boston. Log Entry 0530L061488 Providence now situate at position 70.15.37N 38.55.08E The sonar is giving a good picture of the surface situation now. A Krivak frigate is reported at bearing 162-163, range about 20,550 yd, course north at 10-12 kt. Another Krivak is at bearing 170-171, range about 38,400 yd, also moving north at 10-12 kt. A third surface contact, the Kresta cruiser, is reported at bearing 156-158, range about 32,450 yd, again moving north at 10-12 kt. The Krivaks appear to be bracketing the Kresta II on the north and south, and positioned somewhat westerly of the cruiser. This is probably to shield the more valuable vessel somewhat from attack, and to take advantage of its SS-N-14d Silex ASW missiles. Two Grisha contacts were identified by the towed array: one at bearing 151, range 55,100 yd, heading east at 10 kt; and another at bearing 153, range 58,200 yd, heading south at 10 kt. The BQQ-5 identified two more Grisha contacts, one at bearing 125, range 30,500 yd, heading east at 10 kt, and another at bearing 116, range 30,500 yd, heading east at 10 kt. Ivan appears to be operating his Grishas in two pairs, one at the northern end of their known patrol area, and the other at the southern end. Log Entry 0530L061488 If Pittsburgh continued on its original course, unimpeded, it should now be fairly close to the lead Krivak I. The Soviet frigate may in fact be passing less than 6,000 yd in front of her and will be a tempting torpedo target for her commander. (I think I know him and his proclivities fairly well. ) In any event, the Kresta group will be passing quite close to Pittsburgh, and even if he does not attack, he stands a fair chance of detection, if only randomly. The earlier furor to the southwest, probably an attack by an aircraft upon Boston, meanwhile, should attract the attention of Soviet air for the moment. I am therefore gambling that it is an excellent time to exploit an attack against the priority surface target, the Kresta II. I will shoot 2x UGM-84C Sub Harpoon anti-ship missiles at the Kronstadt, exploiting their launch offset and waypoint capabilities to make it look like the launch was much further south and west, somewhere behind Pittsburgh. This will also have the advantage of skirting the SA-N-4a SAM range of the lead Krivak while approaching the Kresta II from the general direction of that Krivak, acting as a blind spot and hopefully giving the Soviets some ROE considerations to think about. If I gamble correctly, Pittsburgh will be in a position to engage the lead Krivak (probably with torpedoes) and Turbulent might be able to engage the rear Krivak. Providence is sufficiently far from the Kresta II group that I should be able to clear datum safely. Tubes 2 and 3 will be reloaded with a torpedo and MOSS decoy, respectively, as it is unlikely that I will get a second shot with Sub Harpoon. Log Entry 0533L061488 Providence turned on new course 100 deg at speed 6 kt. Ascending to Shallow depth (50 meters) for UGM-84C Harpoon launch against Kresta II cruiser. All sonar contacts remained the same with minor distance/bearing change. No new contacts detected. Log Entry 0536L061488 Providence reached Shallow depth (50 meters). 2x UGM-84C Sub Harpoon away from Tubes 2 and 3. Reloading Tube 2 with Mk 48 Mod 4 heavyweight torpedo, and Tube 3 with Mk 70 MOSS decoy. All sonar contacts remain the same with minor distance/bearing change. No new contacts detected. Descending again to Intermediate II depth (200 meters), and turning onto new course 145, Providence will clear datum in the direction of the lead Krivak I. I am anticipating the Soviets will think the Harpoon shooter would want to clear datum away from the Kresta II group and move to the north. Hopefully that lead Krivak I will be coming under torpedo attack from Pittsburgh. If not, we may engage him ourselves. Log Entry 0539L061488 At 0539L, Providence returned to a depth of 200 meters (Int II), on course 145 and proceeding at 6 kt. Sonar contacts remained the same with minor bearing/distance change. All contacts have good TMA solutions. No new contacts. Ordered speed increase to 12 kt to clear datum from the area of the UGM-84C Sub Harpoon launch. Log Entry 0550L061488 Our sonar has been tracking a Los Angeles class submarine for the past minute, bearing 170 (+/-10 deg), range est. 60,000 yd. The Los Angeles is cavitating. Soviet type torpedoes have been detected near the Los Angeles, and at 0550 a small explosion was heard on that bearing. Passive sonar continues to detect the Los Angeles, but detecting transits (transients?) come from the Los Angeles. A full contact report is expected at 0551. This is no doubt USS Boston, whom we suspected had been tangling with Soviet air from very early on. Seems she is having a rough time of it. :cry: Meanwhile, USS Providence has continued to clear datum from our Sub Harpoon launch, thus far without incident, in the direction of the lead Krivak I. If our calculations are at all accurate, she should be about 5,000 yd ahead. We are slowing to 6 kt. However, given the short range of our Sub Harpoon missile shot (about 42,000 yd), I would have expected to have heard results by now. We may have missed, or our missiles were shot down. :oops: It also looks like my assessment of Pittsburgh's skipper were off the mark, and he has passed up the lead Krivak I, which should have passed to the north of him by now. This might, however, put him off about 6,000 yd the port beam of the Kresta II. We had discussed this vessel as the primary surface target, and he just might be looking to engage her. Log Entry 0551L061488 Current position of USS Providence is 38.59.25E 70.14.17N, heading 145 kt at 6 knots, depth Int II (200 m). First, the bad news: it is now almost certain that our 2x Sub Harpoon were either shot down by Soviet SAMs or missed their target entirely. Worse, the Kresta group looks to have turned completely around and are now headed south, and are spread further apart than before. The closest of them, a Krivak frigate, is nearly 8 nm away - much further than I would like to take a torpedo shot. This Krivak has a little different course than the others, moving south-southeast, and maybe it is investigating a contact. Notably, if USS Pittsburgh had maintained her original course and speed, she and the Krivak would be nearly on top of each other - maybe 1,000 yd apart. I expect, that being the case, that Pittsburgh must have altered course earlier, and my estimation of her current position cannot be relied upon. Now, the really bad news ... we've definitely lost the USS Boston. Current sonar contacts are: Krivak frigate, bearing 165, range 15,500 yd, course SSE, speed 12 kt, TMA: Good Kresta cruiser, bearing 160, range 28,000 yd, course South, speed 12 kt, TMA: Good Krivak frigate, bearing 174, range 33,000 yd, course South, speed 12 kt, TMA: Good Grisha corvette, to the east, est range 25,000 yd Grisha corvette, to the southeast, est range 40,000 yd There is a lot of open ocean ahead of me. This is both good and bad. Good in the sense that I do not have to worry about ships lurking overhead. Bad because the Sovs are probably using aircraft to cover these kinds of gaps. I will continue to angle southeast for the time being. Log Entry 0559L061488 Sonar reports a low flying aircraft passing overhead, followed by splashes. I'm guessing it is probably less than 1.5 nm away. Possible passive sonobuoy drop (there have been no active pings as yet), or worse, a pattern of depth charges. USS Providence is turning onto new course 139 and reducing speed to steerage, 3 knots or less, and rigging for ultra quiet. I am gambling that these are passive sonobuoys and we may be able to slip by. Worst case scenario - the aircraft was very close, 0.25 nm away or less, got a solid MAD contact, and those are not sonobuoys. :shock: If we are detected or come under attack, I am preparing to program and launch a Mk 70 MOSS decoy in an attempt to divert attention elsewhere. All other sonar contacts remain the same, with no major changes. All TMA solutions remain Good. Log Entry 0603L061488 Following the passage of a low flying aircraft nearby, and the splashes from likely sonobuoy drops, USS Providence has slowed to 3 kt on course 139, and rigged for ultra quiet. No new splashes have been reported, nor the pings from any active sonobuoys. (And, thankfully, no depth charges or torpedoes either!) It is probably safe (probably) to assume that the sonobuoys were passive sets, so we are maintaining our ultra quiet status for the next little while. At 0603, a low flying aircraft was detected astern of our position. We are guessing that the aircraft did not obtain a MAD contact, but there is no way of knowing for sure, and the aircraft may in fact be lining up for a weapons drop. Submarine warfare, always waiting to see what happens next ... Log Entry 0606L061488 Other then the surface contacts earlier reported, which are to the south and are moving south with good TMA, no other contacts detected. I assume the low flying aircraft has passed astern of us by now, though it probably has dropped some passive sonobuoys in its wake. I've ordered present course and speed for the next four (4) minutes. At 0610L, we'll come left and bring the boat back up to a very quiet 6 kt. Log Entry No.2 0606L061488 We've received an ELF/VLF message from COMSUBLANT advising that at approx 0300, Warsaw Pact forces attacked several West German urban targets with persistent chemical weapons. Two hours later, at 0500, NATO forces responded in kind against military targets along the Warsaw Pact axis of advance. COMSUBLANT has advised that an escalation from conventional warfare to nuclear warfare is possible. We are advised to continue with our mission. Priority target remains enemy boomers. *** Conclusions While one could always be accused of spouting the usual PBEM/MBX "whoa is me" whine (and admittedly there's probably always some degree of truth to that), I think this particular scenario is slanted pretty heavily in favour of the Russkies. Not in terms of OOB or the mission objectives, but in the sense that the Victory Conditions give the Soviets a win for sinking just one of the four NATO SSNs in play. IMHO, given the number of Soviet assets in play (ASW capable warships, SSNs, SSBNs, SSKs, and most especially the numbers of available aircraft - the submarine's nemesis), the relatively confined battlefield (40 x 45 nm), the depth (maximum Intermediate II), and the presence of a minefield that must be navigated safely before the NATO subs reach their target (a target that is quite adept at defending itself, I might add) - all of these factors in combination make it very likely that at least one NATO sub would not survive the trip out and back. We figured on at least one of our brethren being detected early on into the scenario. This because the numbers of aircraft available could fairly quickly lay a number of sonobuoy barriers that we would certainly have to cross. Yeah, Soviet sonobuoys are pretty crappy performance wise, but Soviet carry a LOT of them and all you need is one faint contact. Even faint contacts can be exploited with more sonobuoys, dipping sonars, and MAD. One of the other scary tools in the Soviet arsenal was the SS-N-14d Silex standoff ASW missile. Even without being precisely located, having one or more of these dumped in your vicinity would make it very difficult for a NATO sub to maintain its single greatest asset - stealth. I worked up a HCE scenario for this H4 scenario that we used to roughly simulate the possibilities. It was not pretty. I may polish it up for release in due course. To summarize, a pretty cool scenario - the apex of Cold War era submarine warfare: slipping into the enemy's frontyard to kill boomers. But the vicconds need some adjustment to make it a real contest.

Thanks! (I hate it when unhappy folks armed with Kalashnikovs show up at the door. Happy folks are welcome, unhappy not so much).

I've posted to the PBEM forums, but no reply from the Ump yet. I could ask Larry or Chris, or post to the Admiralty Trilogy list, but I'm pretty certain about the interpretation of the rule, just the same.

I am wondering if there are any updates to the story you posted above.

Anything to report with 2009.037, guys? Problems? Issues? Or is everything hunky dory?

Any updates?

I think you're referring to Rule 6.4.1.6 re engagement of sea skimming targets. As I understand it, the rule permitting engagement of sea skimmers (with the added 4.0 ATA penalty) is intended for SAMs that have a minimum engagement altitude that matches the Vlow altitude band, but may not be necessarily sea skimmer capable (SSC). For example, the SA-N-5 'Grail' is Vlow capable, but not SSC capable. It would be subject to the penalty when attempting to engage an incoming sea skimmer. SA-N-3a 'Goblet', however, is neither Vlow capable nor SSC capable. Its minimum engagement altitude, btw, to be specific, is 100 meters. Sub Harpoon flies at less than 60 meters. Also, I can only see reference to 12x SAMs being expended on the Soviet side: 4x SA-N-3a Goblet and what appears to have been 8x SA-N-4b Gecko (which are SSC).

Excellent AAR. Now that you've set the standard, I will have to find some time to put one together.

There about a million diagrams, drawings and concept pictures of Arihant going around right now. As long as the blackout on photography continues, or until someone gets the 'scoop', its all guesswork.

A further note, picked up by Brains and I: Unless we're missing something, Smarter Radar rules for High Tide would indicate that Sub Harpoon should not have been detectable at all by airborne surface search radars like those aboard the Soviet aircraft.

Btw, I noticed that Kronstadt engaged the incoming Sub Harpoons with her SA-N-3a Goblet SAMs. Someone should remind her commander that SA-N-3a cannot engage Vlow targets.