CV32

From Aviation Week U.S. Ponders Georgian Air Defenses Aug 13, 2008 David A. Fulghum U.S. analysts are beginning to address the question of why the Israeli Air Force was able to penetrate Syria’s Russian-made air defenses, while the Russian Air Force was not able to finesse Georgia’s Russian-made air defenses. That Russian-built and designed air defenses are exploitable was shown in the Israeli Air Force’s total shutdown of Syrian air defenses prior to bombing a suspected nuclear site last year (Aerospace DAILY, May 2). But Russia apparently didn’t have or didn’t use the digital keys to unlock the Georgians’ network. There are indications from U.S. analysts that the relative simplicity – meaning far less networking – of the Georgian air defenses made it tougher to knock out the system all at once. Nevertheless, theories abound about the apparent effectiveness of Georgia’s air defense (Aerospace DAILY, Aug. 12) that run from incompetence on the part of the Russians to links to Israel’s sophisticated electronics companies and their aggressive military export goals. During the months before the conflict, the Russians claimed to have shot down several Hermes 450 drones (supplied by Israeli-based Elbit) with fighter aircraft stationed, at least temporarily, in South Ossetia. Israeli companies also supported Georgia’s Su-25 modernization program. The same companies – Israel Aerospace Industries and Elbit – are renowned for their radar, electronic warfare and electronic attack capabilities. Wartime operating frequencies for the comparatively formidable SA-11/Buk-1M and Tor-M1 can be changed, thus making them hard for Russian electronic warfare systems to defeat, U.S. aerospace industry specialists note. Simplicity Another reason why the Russians would have difficulty affecting the whole Georgian air defense system lies in its simplicity, according to a senior U.S. Air Force officer with combat flying experience in two wars and long experience in the stealth community. “The Georgian air defense system is much less networked than that of the Syrians and [therefore relies on] autonomous sector operations,” he says. So there’s no way for tactical electronic warfare systems to create massive blind spots. A Washington-based analyst also pointed to the fog of war and the likelihood of fratricide of Russian aircraft by Russian surface-to-air missiles. “I think it’s probably something much more simple [that also was at work],” he says. “If you look at some of the videos of Russian equipment pouring into the conflict zone, you’ll note a couple SA-11 surface-to-air missile systems included. Quite possibly, it could be a case of the [Russian] air defenses not realizing the aircraft were Russian systems or something silly like that. Or, it could be simply that they just didn’t factor [friendly aircraft] into the mission planning like they should have.” In a similar situation during the 2003 invasion of Iraq, U.S. air defenses shot down both British and U.S. aircraft.

Still working my way through this one. I'll post some comments or an AAR eventually.

I haven't converted to Vista, I'm running XP and the SE runs fine with it. The SE doesn't run under Vista 64 bit without an emulator. Hopefully Tony will have some answers for you.

From Stratfor The Russo-Georgian War and the Balance of Power August 12, 2008 By George Friedman The Russian invasion of Georgia has not changed the balance of power in Eurasia. It simply announced that the balance of power had already shifted. The United States has been absorbed in its wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as potential conflict with Iran and a destabilizing situation in Pakistan. It has no strategic ground forces in reserve and is in no position to intervene on the Russian periphery. This, as we have argued, has opened a window of opportunity for the Russians to reassert their influence in the former Soviet sphere. Moscow did not have to concern itself with the potential response of the United States or Europe; hence, the invasion did not shift the balance of power. The balance of power had already shifted, and it was up to the Russians when to make this public. They did that Aug. 8. Let’s begin simply by reviewing the last few days. On the night of Thursday, Aug. 7, forces of the Republic of Georgia drove across the border of South Ossetia, a secessionist region of Georgia that has functioned as an independent entity since the fall of the Soviet Union. The forces drove on to the capital, Tskhinvali, which is close to the border. Georgian forces got bogged down while trying to take the city. In spite of heavy fighting, they never fully secured the city, nor the rest of South Ossetia. On the morning of Aug. 8, Russian forces entered South Ossetia, using armored and motorized infantry forces along with air power. South Ossetia was informally aligned with Russia, and Russia acted to prevent the region’s absorption by Georgia. Given the speed with which the Russians responded — within hours of the Georgian attack — the Russians were expecting the Georgian attack and were themselves at their jumping-off points. The counterattack was carefully planned and competently executed, and over the next 48 hours, the Russians succeeded in defeating the main Georgian force and forcing a retreat. By Sunday, Aug. 10, the Russians had consolidated their position in South Ossetia. On Monday, the Russians extended their offensive into Georgia proper, attacking on two axes. One was south from South Ossetia to the Georgian city of Gori. The other drive was from Abkhazia, another secessionist region of Georgia aligned with the Russians. This drive was designed to cut the road between the Georgian capital of Tbilisi and its ports. By this point, the Russians had bombed the military airfields at Marneuli and Vaziani and appeared to have disabled radars at the international airport in Tbilisi. These moves brought Russian forces to within 40 miles of the Georgian capital, while making outside reinforcement and resupply of Georgian forces extremely difficult should anyone wish to undertake it. The Mystery Behind the Georgian Invasion In this simple chronicle, there is something quite mysterious: Why did the Georgians choose to invade South Ossetia on Thursday night? There had been a great deal of shelling by the South Ossetians of Georgian villages for the previous three nights, but while possibly more intense than usual, artillery exchanges were routine. The Georgians might not have fought well, but they committed fairly substantial forces that must have taken at the very least several days to deploy and supply. Georgia’s move was deliberate. The United States is Georgia’s closest ally. It maintained about 130 military advisers in Georgia, along with civilian advisers, contractors involved in all aspects of the Georgian government and people doing business in Georgia. It is inconceivable that the Americans were unaware of Georgia’s mobilization and intentions. It is also inconceivable that the Americans were unaware that the Russians had deployed substantial forces on the South Ossetian frontier. U.S. technical intelligence, from satellite imagery and signals intelligence to unmanned aerial vehicles, could not miss the fact that thousands of Russian troops were moving to forward positions. The Russians clearly knew the Georgians were ready to move. How could the United States not be aware of the Russians? Indeed, given the posture of Russian troops, how could intelligence analysts have missed the possibility that t he Russians had laid a trap, hoping for a Georgian invasion to justify its own counterattack? It is very difficult to imagine that the Georgians launched their attack against U.S. wishes. The Georgians rely on the United States, and they were in no position to defy it. This leaves two possibilities. The first is a massive breakdown in intelligence, in which the United States either was unaware of the existence of Russian forces, or knew of the Russian forces but — along with the Georgians — miscalculated Russia’s intentions. The United States, along with other countries, has viewed Russia through the prism of the 1990s, when the Russian military was in shambles and the Russian government was paralyzed. The United States has not seen Russia make a decisive military move beyond its borders since the Afghan war of the 1970s-1980s. The Russians had systematically avoided such moves for years. The United States had assumed that the Russians would not risk the consequences of an invasion. If this was the case, then it points to the central reality of this situation: The Russians had changed dramatically, along with the balance of power in the region. They welcomed the opportunity to drive home the new reality, which was that they could invade Georgia and the United States and Europe could not respond. As for risk, they did not view the invasion as risky. Militarily, there was no counter. Economically, Russia is an energy exporter doing quite well — indeed, the Europeans need Russian energy even more than the Russians need to sell it to them. Politically, as we shall see, the Americans needed the Russians more than the Russians needed the Americans. Moscow’s calculus was that this was the moment to strike. The Russians had been building up to it for months, as we have discussed, and they struck. The Western Encirclement of Russia To understand Russian thinking, we need to look at two events. The first is the Orange Revolution in Ukraine. From the U.S. and European point of view, the Orange Revolution represented a triumph of democracy and Western influence. From the Russian point of view, as Moscow made clear, the Orange Revolution was a CIA-funded intrusion into the internal affairs of Ukraine, designed to draw Ukraine into NATO and add to the encirclement of Russia. U.S. Presidents George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton had promised the Russians that NATO would not expand into the former Soviet Union empire. That promise had already been broken in 1998 by NATO’s expansion to Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic — and again in the 2004 expansion, which absorbed not only the rest of the former Soviet satellites in what is now Central Europe, but also the three Baltic states, which had been components of the Soviet Union. The Russian Periphery The Russians had tolerated all that, but the discussion of including Ukraine in NATO represented a fundamental threat to Russia’s national security. It would have rendered Russia indefensible and threatened to destabilize the Russian Federation itself. When the United States went so far as to suggest that Georgia be included as well, bringing NATO deeper into the Caucasus, the Russian conclusion — publicly stated — was that the United States in particular intended to encircle and break Russia. The second and lesser event was the decision by Europe and the United States to back Kosovo’s separation from Serbia. The Russians were friendly with Serbia, but the deeper issue for Russia was this: The principle of Europe since World War II was that, to prevent conflict, national borders would not be changed. If that principle were violated in Kosovo, other border shifts — including demands by various regions for independence from Russia — might follow. The Russians publicly and privately asked that Kosovo not be given formal independence, but instead continue its informal autonomy, which was the same thing in practical terms. Russia’s requests were ignored. From the Ukrainian experience, the Russians became convinced that the United States was engaged in a plan of strategic encirclement and strangulation of Russia. From the Kosovo experience, they concluded that the United States and Europe were not prepared to consider Russian wishes even in fairly minor affairs. That was the breaking point. If Russian desires could not be accommodated even in a minor matter like this, then clearly Russia and the West were in conflict. For the Russians, as we said, the question was how to respond. Having declined to respond in Kosovo, the Russians decided to respond where they had all the cards: in South Ossetia. Moscow had two motives, the lesser of which was as a tit-for-tat over Kosovo. If Kosovo could be declared independent under Western sponsorship, then South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the two breakaway regions of Georgia, could be declared independent under Russian sponsorship. Any objections from the United States and Europe would simply confirm their hypocrisy. This was important for internal Russian political reasons, but the second motive was far more important. Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin once said that the fall of the Soviet Union was a geopolitical disaster. This didn’t mean that he wanted to retain the Soviet state; rather, it meant that the disintegration of the Soviet Union had created a situation in which Russian national security was threatened by Western interests. As an example, consider that during the Cold War, St. Petersburg was about 1,200 miles away from a NATO country. Today it is about 60 miles away from Estonia, a NATO member. The disintegration of the Soviet Union had left Russia surrounded by a group of countries hostile to Russian interests in various degrees and heavily influenced by the United States, Europe and, in some cases, China. Resurrecting the Russian Sphere Putin did not want to re-establish the Soviet Union, but he did want to re-establish the Russian sphere of influence in the former Soviet Union region. To accomplish that, he had to do two things. First, he had to re-establish the credibility of the Russian army as a fighting force, at least in the context of its region. Second, he had to establish that Western guarantees, including NATO membership, meant nothing in the face of Russian power. He did not want to confront NATO directly, but he did want to confront and defeat a power that was closely aligned with the United States, had U.S. support, aid and advisers and was widely seen as being under American protection. Georgia was the perfect choice. By invading Georgia as Russia did (competently if not brilliantly), Putin re-established the credibility of the Russian army. But far more importantly, by doing this Putin revealed an open secret: While the United States is tied down in the Middle East, American guarantees have no value. This lesson is not for American consumption. It is something that, from the Russian point of view, the Ukrainians, the Balts and the Central Asians need to digest. Indeed, it is a lesson Putin wants to transmit to Poland and the Czech Republic as well. The United States wants to place ballistic missile defense installations in those countries, and the Russians want them to understand that allowing this to happen increases their risk, not their security. The Russians knew the United States would denounce their attack. This actually plays into Russian hands. The more vocal senior leaders are, the greater the contrast with their inaction, and the Russians wanted to drive home the idea that American guarantees are empty talk. The Russians also know something else that is of vital importance: For the United States, the Middle East is far more important than the Caucasus, and Iran is particularly important. The United States wants the Russians to participate in sanctions against Iran. Even more importantly, they do not want the Russians to sell weapons to Iran, particularly the highly effective S-300 air defense system. Georgia is a marginal issue to the United States; Iran is a central issue. The Russians are in a position to pose serious problems for the United States not only in Iran, but also with weapons sales to other countries, like Syria. Therefore, the United States has a problem — it either must reorient its strategy away from the Middle East and toward the Caucasus, or it has to seriously limit its response to Georgia to avoid a Russian counter in Iran. Even if the United States had an appetite for another war in Georgia at this time, it would have to calculate the Russian response in Iran — and possibly in Afghanistan (even though Moscow’s interests there are currently aligned with those of Washington). In other words, the Russians have backed the Americans into a corner. The Europeans, who for the most part lack expeditionary militaries and are dependent upon Russian energy exports, have even fewer options. If nothing else happens, the Russians will have demonstrated that they have resumed their role as a regional power. Russia is not a global power by any means, but a significant regional power with lots of nuclear weapons and an economy that isn’t all too shabby at the moment. It has also compelled every state on the Russian periphery to re-evaluate its position relative to Moscow. As for Georgia, the Russians appear ready to demand the resignation of President Mikhail Saakashvili. Militarily, that is their option. That is all they wanted to demonstrate, and they have demonstrated it. The war in Georgia, therefore, is Russia’s public return to great power status. This is not something that just happened — it has been unfolding ever since Putin took power, and with growing intensity in the past five years. Part of it has to do with the increase of Russian power, but a great deal of it has to do with the fact that the Middle Eastern wars have left the United States off-balance and short on resources. As we have written, this conflict created a window of opportunity. The Russian goal is to use that window to assert a new reality throughout the region while the Americans are tied down elsewhere and dependent on the Russians. The war was far from a surprise; it has been building for months. But the geopolitical foundations of the war have been building since 1992. Russia has been an empire for centuries. The last 15 years or so were not the new reality, but simply an aberration that would be rectified. And now it is being rectified.

Link didn't work for me. Try this one: http://www.nypost.com/seven/08122008/posto...ogue_124032.htm I'd agree that its an event of important strategic implications; that it was a calculated, planned event on the part of Russia; and that the Western response has been less than impressive (although I am unsure what they could have done in any event). But "rogue military power with a nuclear arsenal" may be a bit of a stretch. That said, are you a fan of Ralph Peters? If so, don't let your USAF friends know. The guy absolutely castigates the air force at every opportunity. (I have to admit, however, that his novel "Red Army" is one of my favorite paperbacks).

Saw that. Nasty. Of course, lugging around a TV camera on your shoulder probably does look dangerously like a MANPADS to a Frogfoot pilot. In any event, looks like Medvedev has taken Brains' advice and is stopping short of lining the Georgians up against the Turkish border. All of this points to a Bear who is stirring in his den, perhaps?

Hey, seems I might be right. Imagine that. From DefenseNews Missile Threat Helped Drive DDG Cut Zumwalt Class Could Not Down Chinese Weapons By christopher p. cavas Published: 4 August 2008 The threat posed by a super-secret new Chinese ballistic missile is among the factors driving the U.S. Navy's decision to "truncate" the planned seven-ship DDG 1000 Zumwalt class of advanced destroyers and build more DDG 51-class ships. Navy officials say the primary advantage of DDG 51 Arleigh Burke-class ships equipped with the Lockheed Martin Aegis combat system is that they can shoot down ballistic missiles - a capability the Navy never asked for in its high-technology and high-priced Zumwalts and its new Raytheon-developed combat system. A program to upgrade 15 existing DDG 51 destroyers, along with three Aegis cruisers, will be complete by year's end. But the new missile threat is causing combatant commanders - the "cocoms" who lead regional commands such as U.S. Pacific Command and European Command - to demand more ships that can handle ballistic missile defense (BMD). The Navy's solution is to drastically reduce the number of Zumwalts to two ships that critics say will be simply technology demonstrators. "The DDG 1000 … is incapable of conducting ballistic missile defense," Vice Adm. Barry McCullough, deputy chief of naval operations for Integration of Resources and Capabilities, told Congress July 31 during a hearing called to address the destroyer issue. McCullough, in his written testimony, also revealed that the DDG 1000 cannot perform area air defense - the ability to shoot down enemy planes and missiles over a wide region. The Zumwalts, McCullough said, "cannot successfully employ the Standard Missile-2 (SM-2), SM-3 or SM-6." The SM-2 is the Navy's primary air defense missile, and Raytheon is developing the SM-6 replacement. The SM-3 is a BMD missile. A Navy source said the ships could carry and launch Standard missiles, but the DDG 1000 combat system can't guide those missiles onward to a target. The new information contrasts with a DDG 1000 briefing provided this spring by the Naval Sea Systems Command, which listed Standard missiles as among the Zumwalt's weapons, and with well-known sources such as Jane's Fighting Ships, which lists the new ships as carrying the SM-2 missile. BMD Issue Grew The BMD issue gained prominence with Navy planners over the winter as intelligence assessments described the new threat. McCullough, in response to a question at the hearing by the House Seapower subcommittee, said work to rejigger the destroyer program began "four and a half to five months" ago, making it late February or early March. Although a "secret, classified" threat was discussed during the hearing, neither Navy officials nor lawmakers would reveal any details. One source familiar with the classified briefing said that while anti-ship cruise missiles and other threats were known to exist, "those aren't the worst." The new threat, which "didn't exist a couple years ago," is a "land-launched ballistic missile that converts to a cruise missile." [CV32: Emphasis mine] Other sources confirmed that a new, classified missile threat is being briefed at very high levels. One admiral, said another source, was told his ships should simply "stay away. There are no options." Information on the new threat remains closely held. "There's really little unclassified information about this stuff," said Paul Giarra, a defense consultant in McLean, Va., "except for the considerable amount of information that's appeared in unclassified Chinese sources." Several experts on Chinese missiles contacted for this story said they weren't sure which specific threat drove the Navy to change its destroyer plans. One source speculated it might be "Threat D, a cruise missile that separates to a supersonic missile." A Chinese ballistic missile with terminal radar-homing capabilities - "a carrier killer" - is another possibility. Retired Rear Adm. Eric Vadon, a consultant on East Asian defense affairs, thought the weapon sounded like a Dong Feng 21 (DF-21) missile, also known by its western designation CSS-5. Although the basic missile has been in service since the 1970s, the Chinese are known to be working to turn it into a homing ballistic missile. "There's a possibility that what we're seeing is that somebody is calling this thing a cruise missile because it has some of those characteristics," Vadon said. "It maneuvers and it homes in. But a cruise missile breathes air." The Chinese targetable ballistic missile threat has long worried U.S. Navy planners and military professionals. "We're pretty certain the Chinese have been working on this for some time," said Bernard Cole, a professor at National Defense University in Washington and an expert on the Chinese military. "It would pose a threat. I don't know how you would counter that missile." But Cole said the description of a ballistic missile turning into a cruise missile is new: "I've never heard this described this way." Sources in the Pentagon said the U.S. Navy has not yet moved to add the BMD upgrade to any more existing Aegis ships. But a senior defense official confirmed the Navy is embracing BMD as a mission for Aegis surface combatants - and that all the new DDG 51s the Navy is asking for will be BMD-capable. McCullough also said that the destroyer modernization program, which will start in 2011 with the oldest ships, will include signal processors "with inherent ballistic missile defense capability." Those electronics will make the ships more easily upgradeable should the service choose to add the BMD upgrade. Even if the Pentagon and Congress approve the request to build more DDG 51s, the new ships won't start to come on line until at last 2015, estimated Eric Labs of the Congressional Budget Office, who also testified at the July 31 hearing. A Controversial Move Navy leaders received permission July 22 to ask the Pentagon to build only two DDG 1000s and instead ask for at least nine more DDG 51s. While observers have known for months that support for the DDG 1000 program inside the Navy was weak, the move nevertheless surprised Raytheon, which is developing the combat system and numerous subsystems for the Zumwalts, and a number of lawmakers who support the DDG 1000 program. "Wow. We're turning on a dime," Rep. Joe Sestak, D-Pa., a former Navy vice admiral, said July 31 about the Navy's decision to halt DDG 1000 construction. "Where's the analysis, the strategic thought, the studies, and the cost studies that will show: is this really the way to go, or is there a different change or a better approach? I don't think we've seen those." Rep. Roscoe Bartlett, R-Md., ranking member of the Seapower subcommittee and a former chairman, noted that he supported the Zumwalt program when the understanding was that the design's new tumblehome hull would be used in the follow-on CG(X) cruiser. Now, although the Navy has not revealed any details of an analysis of alternatives being conducted for the CG(X), Bartlett said the new ship will likely not have the new hull. "I feel a little bit 'had' now when I'm told that the hull will probably not be used in CG(X)," Bartlett said. Navy officials have been reluctant to explain the program shift publicly. Although senior Navy leaders began briefing Congress July 22, no press conferences have been held and no official statements released. And while McCullough and Allison Stiller, the deputy assistant secretary of the Navy for ship programs, appeared at the July 31 hearing, they declined to speak with the media afterward, instead hurrying to a waiting van which sped off before the doors closed.

From Aviation Week Georgia Strikes Back With Air Defenses Aug 11, 2008 By David A. Fulghum and Douglas Barrie If the land war in Georgia so far seems to be going decidedly in favor of the Russian army and navy, the Georgians seem to be racking up a lopsided score with their air defenses. Over the weekend, the Russians made a successful advance on land through South Ossetia to the outskirts of the Georgian east-west transportation hub of Gori. There also was a one-sided naval battle - that resulted in the sinking of a Georgian gunboat - in the Black Sea off the coast of the second breakaway enclave of Abkhazia. However, Georgian air defenses appear to be taking a steady toll on Russian aircraft. Russia has admitted to losing a total of four aircraft (the Georgians claim 10) in the conflict. So far they've admitted to the destruction of three Su-25 Frogfoot strike aircraft and a Tu-22M3 Backfire bomber that was flying a reconnaissance mission. Photos from the combat area show the wreck of the Tu-22 and a Frogfoot as well as a picture of the Backfire pilot in a Georgian hospital. The pilot was Col. Igor Zinov, a 50 year-old Tu-22M3 instructor pilot stationed at the Russian Flight Test Center at Akhtubinsk. (See Aviation Week's defense photo gallery for photos.) "Ergo, the Russians are using their A-Team, as expected," a U.S. analyst says. Other analysts say the Georgians are probably operating the SA-11 Buk-M1 (low-to-high altitude) and the (low-to-medium altitude) Tor-1M mobile air defense missile systems. "The Russians have gone to great lengths to try and implicate the Ukraine in the Russian Air Force losses, even going as far as to suggest that an SA-5 sold to the Georgians by the Ukraine was responsible for the Backfire loss," a second U.S. analyst says. "That's clearly not the case, but shows the Russian attempt to bring the Ukraine into the periphery of this event by implication, and to attempt to explain how one of their premier long-range attack assets could have been shot down so easily. "The Russian press has been making lots of noise about the BUK and TOR systems, and I would say that the BUK is the most likely culprit for all of these aircraft losses," the analyst says. "If so, it points out a major flaw in the Russian plan - not gaining [and] maintaining pure air superiority [and] dominance over the battlespace by taking out the Georgian air defenses and air defense network before they went into the conflict." Russian-built and designed air defenses are apparently exploitable, as was shown in the Israeli Air Force's total shut down of Syrian air defenses prior to bombing a suspected nuclear site. But Russia apparently has yet to apply the digital keys to unlock the Georgians' network. During the months before the conflict, the Russians claimed to have shot down several Hermes 450 UAVs (made by Israeli-based Elbit) with fighter aircraft stationed at least temporarily in South Ossetia. The Russians say they shot down a Georgian Frogfoot outside the town of Eredvi in South Ossetia today. The Russians - in a stunning piece of irony - have twice bombed the Su-25 Frogfoot manufacturing plant on the outskirts of the Georgian capital of Tbilisi. So if the Georgians over-estimated their ground forces, "it appears that the Russians underestimated the Georgian air defense abilities in this conflict, and have paid the price," the second U.S. analyst says. Georgia's foreign minister, Eka Tkeshelashvili, and deputy interior minister, Eka Zguladze, will be in Brussels tomorrow for emergency talks at NATO headquarters. The two officials will meet with NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, and address the North Atlantic Council.

Yeah, the blogs are running wild right now. A good source of late breaking or more detailed info, if you can trust it (no difference there from the mainstream media, of course) and sort through all the personal bias and commentary. Sounds like the Internet, huh?

From Russia Today August 11, 2008, 5:14 Russia sinks Georgian boat after attack The Russian navy says it's sunk a Georgian naval vessel in the Black Sea just off the Abkhazian coast. According to the Defence Ministry, four Georgian missile boats made two attempts to attack Russian warships. After their vessels were attacked, the Russian navy fired warning shots before hitting and sinking one of the boats. Russian warships are continuing to patrol the coastline of Georgia's breakaway region of Abkhazia to support Russian peacekeepers. Ukraine’s Foreign Ministry has announced that Russian ships returning from the Georgian shore may be refused permission to enter its territorial waters in the Black Sea. The ministry says Ukraine doesn’t want to be involved in the conflict between Russia and Georgia. It underlines that the move corresponds with international law. Meanwhile, Moscow remains unconvinced about Ukrainian claims of neutrality. Referring to the shooting down of a Russian Tu-22 bomber over Georgia, the Defence Ministry says the Georgian military would have needed a C-200 anti-aircraft system to carry out the attack. According to Russia, the Georgian army did not possess such equipment before the conflict. Only Russia and Ukraine are armed with C-200 anti-aircraft systems, which is leading Russian defence officials to suspect that Kiev may have sold the equipment to Georgia.

Nothing wrong with your suggested approach, Mark. A possibly collaborative and staged approach was being suggested because of the impression that many people were unfamiliar with the Scenario Editor or scenario writing in general, and might benefit from some 'hand holding' along the way. It appears, however, that the specific method of how to proceed is not the problem. Rather, there simply isn't enough interest or enough people willing to become involved.

SPOILER ALERT ... * * * * * * Joe, I am still battling my way across the western Pacific in this scenario (as I do not have nearly as much time on my hands as does Herman, and that in itself alarms me ), but I do have some preliminary thoughts (some of which I may have already mentioned to you on IRC): 1. You may wish to consider reducing the combined US CVBG by a carrier, but I am not sure I would reduce it by two. I have been able to repel most airborne attacks, but have still lost a pair of Perry frigates (on picket duty) and the Wasp class LHD Essex was torpedoed. 2. I'd repeat Herman's comment about having Red submarines inside the formation at game start. I understand there may be sometimes good reason for doing so, and occasionally I'd be in favor of maybe putting one sub in there. Multiple submarines, however, can cause considerable havoc and the player is powerless to prevent it. Again, there may be sometimes a good reason for doing it this way, but it can lead to player frustration and can sometimes end a game before it has even begun. 3. The Red integrated air defense system (IADS) is extremely formidable. Two of my attempts at hitting Red bases have been repulsed. This was despite my launching over a hundred decoys and nearly a hundred stealthy JASSM cruise missiles at a single base, after an offensive counter-air (OCA) fighter sweep. I am left wondering if the Red IADS are maybe a little too thick? (And considering that real life expenditures of munitions in these numbers would probably lead to rapid depletion of available stocks in theater). 4. Fighter escort for your Red bomber attacks (where possible) would significantly improve their survivability and likelihood of success. 5. Blue has no submarines of its own? 6. Do the two LCS ships at Guam have a mission?

A few thoughts ... * The Geneva Conventions deal with broad and (relatively speaking) non-controversial issues like civilians, POWs and wounded. * The Geneva Conventions are ratified by just about everybody and their dog, probably in large part to the nature of the subject matter (as above). * Is there really a treaty against combat shotguns? I know there have been disagreements in the past about whether they violate certain Hague Conventions because of the nature of the injuries they may inflict, but I think in large part the argument against them is either weak or obsolete.

Interesting analysis from the BBC ... From BBC News Early lessons from S Ossetia conflict By Paul Reynolds World affairs correspondent, BBC News website Although the fighting over South Ossetia is not over, and fighting for another Georgian enclave, Abkhazia, looks like developing, it is perhaps not too early to learn some tentative lessons from the crisis. 1. Do not punch a bear on the nose unless it is tied down. Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili must have thought that Russia would not react strongly when he sent his forces in on the eve of the Olympic games to regain control of a territory he had insisted must remain part of Georgia, albeit with some form of autonomy. Yet Russia was always likely to respond. It already had forces there, leading the peacekeeping force agreed back in the easier days of 1992 between President Boris Yeltsin of Russia and President Edward Shevardnadze of Georgia, himself the former Soviet foreign minister who helped bring the Cold War to an end. Russia has been supporting the separatists in South Ossetia and handed out Russian passports to the population, thereby enabling it to claim that it was defending its own citizens. The result of what many see as his miscalculation is that President Saakashvili might well lose any hope of reasserting Georgian power in the enclave. 2. Russia is in a determined mood, to say the least. Russia, as it has so often done in the past, sees itself being encircled. In a revealing interview with former BBC Moscow correspondent Tim Whewell earlier this year, an adviser to the then President Vladimir Putin, Gleb Pavlosky, said that the Russian leadership had concluded after the Orange Revolution in Ukraine that "this is what we faced in Moscow, that they would try to export this to us, that we should prepare for this situation and very quickly strengthen our political system..." What applied after Ukraine moved towards the West also applied as Georgia did the same. Moscow wanted to prevent any such internal revolution in Russia itself and therefore saw Ukraine and Georgia as hostile influences. It is not clear how far Russia wants to push this, but given that it says it wants to re-establish order in South Ossetia, that probably means a permanent presence, with no return to a Georgian government role. Diplomats think it unlikely that Russia will invade Georgia 'proper'. 3. Remember Kosovo. Russia was mightily displeased when the West supported the separation of Kosovo from Serbia and warned of consequences. This might be one of them. Of course, Russia has not argued in this crisis that it is simply doing what the West did in Kosovo - that would undermine its own argument that states should not be broken up without agreement. But everyone knows that underneath, Kosovo is not far from its mind. 4. Georgia is unlikely to join Nato anytime soon. Georgia and Ukraine were denied membership of Nato in April, although they were allowed to develop an action plan that could lead to membership one day. The Americans argued for both countries to be accepted, but the Germans and others countered that the region was too unstable for these countries to join at the moment and that in particular Georgia, a state with a border dispute, should not be given formal Nato support. 5. Vladmir Putin is still in charge. It was Mr Putin, prime minister not president these days, who went to Beijing for the Olympic opening ceremony and who then rushed to the crisis region to take control of the Russian response. His language was uncompromising - Russia was right to intervene, he stated. 6. Do not allow a cuckoo to police the nest. Mr Shevardnadze's decision in 1992 to allow Russia into South Ossetia as part of the peacekeeping force enabled a later and very different Russian government from the one led by Boris Yeltsin to gradually extend its influence and control. It was not hard for Russia to justify its intervention. It simply stated that its citizens were not only at risk but under attack. 7. The West still does not know how to deal with Russia. Some of the old Cold War arguments are resurfacing, with no consensus about what to do. There are the neo-conservatives, led by US Vice-President Dick Cheney (and supported by Republican presidential candidate John McCain) who see Georgia (and Ukraine) as flag bearers for freedom which must be supported. In due course, they argue, Russia will be forced to change, just as the old Soviet Union was. Against that is the argument, expressed to the BBC for example on Sunday by the former British Foreign Secretary Lord Owen, that it is "absurd" to treat Russia like the Soviet Union and that Georgia made a miscalculation in South Ossetia for which it is now paying. 8. Are borders in Europe to be sacrosanct for ever? It has been one of the rules of post-war Europe - borders cannot be changed except by agreement, as say in Czechoslovakia. Perhaps this rule has been applied too inflexibly. Yet governments like that of Georgia are reluctant to give up any territory, even when the local population is so clearly hostile and might be in that state simply as a result of some past arbitrary decision. It was the Soviet Union that created a semi-autonomous region of South Ossetia in Georgia in 1922. Nikita Khrushchev gave Crimea to Ukraine in 1954. Will this lead to trouble one day? 9. August is good month in which to reflect on alliances. In August 1914, the First World War broke out following the assassination in June of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo. It did so because alliances had been formed in Europe which came into play inexorably. Russia supported Serbia, Germany supported Austria, France supported Russia and Britain came in when Belgium was invaded. Alliances must not be entered into lightly or unadvisedly. If Georgia had been in Nato, what would have happened?

6 August, when Georgian forces moved into South Ossetia.

No.

Yeah, I know the media report was Tu-22 (as in Tu-22 Blinder), but they have been out of service in Russia for quite some years now, and I think its considerably more likely that if the aircraft was in fact a "Tu-22", it was a Tu-22M3 Backfire. They have been used in the low level bombing role before, in Afghanistan and Chechnya, and there was some reference to American objections over the use of "strategic" aviation, which again suggests Backfires.

Yes, the air force has about 124 and the navy has about 58 Backfires.

To some degree semantics, of course, but Georgia is reported to have declared war today with Russia.

This one is also a hold over from the old stock DB, but in this case I believe the intention was to create an ELINT platform (hence the ESM).

From Aviation Week Pentagon Issues New Tanker Bid Parameters Aug 6, 2008 Amy Butler The Pentagon plans to take extra capabilities - including added fuel offload capacity - into account as it scores revised proposals from Boeing and Northrop Grumman/EADS that could lead to $35 billion in work replacing aging KC-135 tankers. The Defense Department will consider "value over threshold" when reviewing the revised offers, said Shay Assad, director of defense procurement and acquisitions policy, during an Aug. 6 briefing at the Pentagon. This could put Boeing's 767-200LRF-based proposal at a disadvantage as its cargo, passenger and fuel offload abilities are hampered by its size compared to the larger Airbus A330-200 design proposed by Northrop. Today, a revised draft request for proposals (RFP) for the KC-X refueling tanker was provided to both teams, kicking off the recompetition of the controversial program. The new draft RFP is intended to provide "clear and unambiguous insight into the relative order of importance" of various capabilities, including fuel offload, cargo and passenger capacity and survivability, among other aspects. Assad did not identify the capabilities in order of importance, and DOD officials did not publicly release the draft RFP, breaking with typical protocol, which calls for solicitations to be posted publicly online. The draft was, however, sent to Congress and is already drawing criticism because it may favor the larger A330 offering. (Click here (6.1-meg pdf) and here (1.2-meg pdf) for the documents). For instance, an aide to Rep. Norm Dicks (D-Wash.) argued there is an obvious change inserted into the system requirements document in the revised tanker RFP that "clearly" favors the larger Airbus aircraft "even though it is not necessarily connected to any real-world use of tanker." The congressional Government Accountability Office found that in the earlier competition the Air Force did not clearly articulate how it would score attributes that surpassed the threshold requirements for the system. This, among other irregularities, called into question the Northrop Grumman/EADS North America win of a $1.5 billion development contract for the new refueler Feb. 29. Both teams will have about one week to discuss the draft RFP with the Office of the Secretary of Defense. By mid-month, a final RFP will be released and contractors will have about 45 days to submit their revised proposals. Source selection should be finished by the end of the year with a final winner announced by New Year's Eve, Assad said. The existing contract with Northrop Grumman will remain in stop-work status until a winner is selected. If Northrop Grumman again prevails, its contract will be revised and restarted. If, however, Boeing wins this new competition, Northrop's contract will be terminated, he said. The Pentagon does plan to shift the life-cycle cost estimates from an expected useful life of 25 years to 40 years on the aircraft, Assad says. And, it will take into consideration the cost of fuel and anticipated fuel burn rates of each aircraft throughout those years.

All nuclear powered warships, but especially Soviet/Russian submarines, have the ability to convert their reactor spaces to 'short term' sauna facilities.

Agreed, the Deltas look the part of boomers. But the Typhoons, they look like BOOMERs.

From Jane's Opinion: Gripen hard to beat in Indian MMRCA contest By Craig Caffrey 05 August 2008 While there is no shortage of fighter aircraft procurement programmes currently under way, the most eagerly anticipated contest is undoubtedly India's medium multirole combat aircraft (MMRCA) requirement for at least 126 aircraft. The six contenders have now submitted their proposals: Boeing's F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, Dassault's Rafale, Eurofighter's Typhoon, Lockheed Martin's F-16, Russian Aircraft Corporation's (RAC's) MiG with the MiG-35 and the Saab JAS 39 Gripen. Arguably each aircraft stands a fighting chance of securing the lucrative USD10 billion contract. India continues to have a close relationship with Dassault, which supplied the Indian Air Force (IAF) with Mirage 2000 fighters in the 1980s. However, given the IAF's emphasis on future upgrades for its MMRCA aircraft, the lack of operators of the Rafale is likely to be seen as a significant issue. The Rafale and the Typhoon could also struggle with the issue of cost. Both are relatively large twin-engined platforms, which will significantly increase operating costs compared with the single-engined MiG-21 fleet it will replace. The MiG-35 is seen by many as a strong contender. India has a very close relationship with Russia, which has provided the majority of its equipment over the past 30 years. However, over the past year India's relationship with Russia with regards to arms contracts has soured. The two US contenders seem well placed in terms of price and capability as India seeks to establish closer military bonds with Washington. However the F-16 is hindered by the fact that Pakistan already operates the type. Furthermore the aircraft is already being phased out by the US Air Force. The Boeing Super Hornet does not suffer from these issues. However, one unresolved issue with regards to both US platforms is the authorisation of technology transfer. Saab holds a strong hand with the Gripen. The aircraft is single engined, which will keep operating costs low, upgrades are already being defined under the Gripen Demonstrator programme and acquisition costs are highly competitive. [CV32: I've been liking the MiG-35's chances in India, but I have to admit the Gripen is a strong contender just about anywhere these days]

I wouldn't put too much stock in the merging of the icons and such. Sometimes you will notice a torpedo 'merge' with the submarine icon and then switch direction back and forth in the pursuit endgame. A torpedo that sails past may also re-acquire.