CV32

Welcome back, T. I'm sure you were a fabulous ambassador for Harpoon to all of the 'lesser' games out there.

A total of 77 Hornets are due to be upgraded under the modernisation program, 57 single-seaters and 20 twin-seaters. The last jet completed Phase I in August 2006, and the first completed Phase II in August 2007. The program is supposed to be complete by March 2010.

Yep, and I see the ASRAAM too.

A nice pic from the Pitch Black '08 exercise, a biennial exercise held in Australia that focuses on offensive counter air (OCA) and defensive counter air training. Participants included Australia, the U.S., Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, France, Germany, Canada, the United Kingdom and NATO. More here: http://www.defence.gov.au/pitchblack08/gal...0625b/index.htm

Beta testers are always welcome. The beta testing is actually done here at HarpGamer, and there's a beta testing subforum that isn't visible to the public or other HG members. Firstly, though, you need to sign up as a beta tester with AGSI.

Pics in the official DB are obtained by agreement with the copyright holder. Any new additions to the official DB must go the same route.

Start time will vary between computers. You can't (yet, at least) hardwire the start time for a scenario. I'm not sure what you're asking here?

Short answer, yes. Medium answer, a lot of NATO equipment has US origins but there's quite a bit of European kit and stuff from other countries too. Long answer, just way too long to put here.

Not that any of the Scud B's still in Iraqi inventory by that time wouldn't have done the same. They had fired off most of them, iirc, during the 1980-88 war with Iran. The Al-Husayn was hoped to achieve a bit better range (arising from the experience with Iran), but as you pointed out, it didn't quite work out as well as hoped.

And Malkin was offered $15 million (iirc) to play back home in Russia. Meanwhile, Lord Stanley's Cup will be here on the Rock (thanks to Dan Cleary) come July 1.

Well, you will note the CF-18AM designation for the updated aircraft. I don't have any CF specific information, but generally speaking, having only a portion of one's aircraft 'operationally available' is not all that terribly unusual for most air forces.

From Flight International DATE: 26/06/08 SOURCE: Flight International USAF formally revives B-52 jammer with five-year study By Stephen Trimble The US Air Force has revived a plan to transform a portion of the Boeing B-52 bomber fleet into long-range, radar-jamming platforms, formally launching a five-year study phase on 23 June. The revival comes nearly three years after the USAF was forced to cancel the B-52 stand-off jammer system (SOJS) programme after cost estimates ballooned sevenfold to $7 billion. The delay has shifted the operational debut of the new jammer fleet at least four years to 2018. The new programme seeks to hold overall costs to about $3 billion or $4 billion by scaling back the jamming requirements and reducing the number of B-52s involved. The SOJS programme was cancelled after requirements grew to target all emitter threats in the low and middle bands of the electromagnetic spectrum. The new programme continues to focus on the early warning radars that fall mostly in the low band, but is aimed at only a subset of the potential threats in the middle band, says Jeff Weis, Boeing's programme manager for airborne electronic attack technology maturation. The numbers of B-52s expected to be modified has shrunk from the entire bomber force to 34 aircraft, Weis says. Also, the USAF also plans to buy only 24 sets of wingtip pods during the programme, he adds, so only two dozen B-52s would be able to perform the mission at any one time. The USAF plans to spend $68 million over the next five years to improve the technical maturity of the contracts involved. On 23 June, Boeing received a contract worth nearly $15 million to complete aircraft integration studies for new phased-array pods called core component jammers (CCJ) and advanced exciters. Northrop Grumman's Integrated Systems division, Boeing's previous competitor for the original SOJS contract, is now Boeing's subcontractor. Potential suppliers for the CCJ - EDO, ITT, Northrop's Electronic Systems division and Raytheon - are being awarded separate contracts to develop the new jamming systems. The USAF is launching the revived programme with support from the US Navy, which plans to develop a new phased-array called the next-generation jammer to replace the analogue ALQ-99.

Why oh why can't the sheeple in Canuckistan understand this? District of Columbia et al v. Heller

I'll ask. Pretty sure those pics were taken in the Ft Worth, TX, area, but I'd venture to say the C-130 appearing here is probably one of our own CC-130H(T). We had the Boeing 707 (CC-137) tankers until about 1997, and since then have acquired two new CC-150 (A310 MRTT) tankers. They're using em to hop over to Hawaii this weekend. Rough life.

From Defense Aerospace Decision (edited excerpt) (US Government Accountability Office; issued June 25, 2008) The Boeing Company protested the award of a contract to Northrop Grumman Systems Corporation under request for proposals (RFP) No. FA8625-07-R-6470, issued by the Department of the Air Force, for aerial refueling tankers. Boeing challenges the Air Force’s technical and cost evaluations, conduct of discussions, and source selection decision. We find that the agency’s selection of Northrop Grumman’s proposal as reflecting the best value to the government was undermined by a number of prejudicial errors that call into question the Air Force’s decision that Northrop Grumman’s proposal was technically acceptable and its judgment concerning the comparative technical advantages accorded Northrop Grumman’s proposal. In addition, we find a number of errors in the agency’s cost evaluation that result in Boeing displacing Northrop Grumman as the offeror with the lowest evaluated most probable life cycle costs to the government. Although we sustain Boeing’s protest on grounds related to these errors, we also deny many of Boeing’s challenges to the award. Conclusion And Recommendation This decision should not be read to reflect a view as to the merits of the firms’ respective aircraft. Judgments about which offeror will most successfully meet governmental needs are largely reserved for the procuring agencies, subject only to such statutory and regulatory requirements as full and open competition and fairness to potential offerors. Here, we find a number of errors in the Air Force’s conduct of this procurement, including the failure to evaluate proposals in accordance with the RFP criteria and requirements and to conduct discussions in a fair and equal manner. But for these errors, we believe that Boeing would have had a substantial chance of being selected for award(Emphasis added—Ed.). Accordingly, we sustain Boeing’s protest of the Air Force’s award of a contract to Northrop Grumman for the aerial refueling tankers. We recommend that the Air Force reopen discussions with the offerors, obtain revised proposals, re-evaluate the revised proposals, and make a new source selection decision, consistent with this decision. If the Air Force believes that the RFP, as reasonably interpreted, does not adequately state its needs, the agency should amend the solicitation prior to conducting further discussions with the offerors. If Boeing’s proposal is selected for award, the Air Force should terminate the contract awarded to Northrop Grumman. We also recommend that Boeing be reimbursed the reasonable costs of filing and pursuing the protest, including reasonable attorneys’ fees. Boeing should submit its claim for costs, detailing and certifying the time expended and costs incurred, with the contracting agency within 60 days after receipt of this decision. (end of excerpt) Click here for the full redacted version of the GAO’s decision (67 pages in PDF format) Government Cites Litany of Errors in Tanker Award (edited excerpt) (Source: Washington Post; published June 26, 2008) The Air Force bungled its biggest procurement deal to spend $40 billion to buy new aerial refueling tankers to replace its aging fleet, federal investigators declared last week. But what wasn't publicly known until yesterday was just how badly they did so. In a 67-page review, the Government Accountability Office sharply criticized the Air Force for a litany of contracting transgressions, including everything from failing to follow its own evaluation criteria to miscalculating the maintenance costs, size and amount of fuel a plane could carry and holding unfair discussions with one of the bidders. …/… When they announced the winner, Air Force officials said repeatedly that they'd run an "incredibly open and transparent" process that would withstand any legal challenges. But the GAO report made public yesterday differed about as sharply as could be imagined. It found that the Air Force's selection process was so misguided that it was "undermined by a number of prejudicial errors that call into question the Air Force's decision." Along the way, the Air Force seemed to guide Northrop through some pitfalls. In one instance, the Air Force first told Boeing that it had satisfied one set of objectives, but later, after discussions had been closed, decided that it had not. But the Air Force told Northrop about objectives it had not met, allowing that company to change its proposal and meet the requirements. "It is a fundamental precept of negotiated procurements that discussions, when conducted, must be meaningful, equitable, and not misleading," the GAO said in its assessment. The GAO said the Air Force "treated the firms unequally" in holding discussions with one but not the other. (end of excerpt) Boeing Statement on Government Accountability Office Tanker Protest Report (Source: Boeing Co.; issued June 25, 2008) ST. LOUIS --- Boeing today responded to the public release of the full redacted Government Accountability Office (GAO) report sustaining the company's protest of the U.S. Air Force's award of a $35 billion contract to Northrop Grumman/EADS to supply the service with its next-generation aerial refueling aircraft. Boeing released the following statement on the 67-page report from Mark McGraw, vice president, Tanker Programs: "Our initial review of the full redacted GAO sustainment further validates Boeing's decision to protest this contract award. It is clear the award was the result of a flawed process. It also confirms the strength of our KC-767 offering to the Air Force, as the GAO reports that Boeing had a 'substantial chance of being selected for award' were it not for the numerous process flaws." (ends) Northrop Grumman Stands Ready to Support Air Force Tanker Decision (Source: Northrop Grumman; issued June 25, 2008) WASHINGTON --- Northrop Grumman Corporation said, today, that it continues to support the United States Air Force and looks forward to its next steps regarding the direction of the KC-45 tanker program. This follows today's public release of the full Government Accountability Office (GAO) analysis of the original tanker contract award to Northrop Grumman. "The document makes clear that the GAO's issues with the contract do not reflect on the tankers' capabilities. In fact, in several areas key to the selection decision the GAO found no basis to object to the Air Force evaluation," said Paul Meyer, Northrop Grumman vice president of Air Mobility Systems and KC-45 program manager. "We look forward to a prompt assessment from the Air Force concerning what happens next." On Feb. 29, the Air Force selected Northrop Grumman to provide the next generation of aerial refueling tanker, the KC-45. The Air Force has an urgent need to replace its aging tanker fleet. "The KC-45 is needed now, and Northrop Grumman is ready now to provide it," said Meyer. "Should the Air Force choose to proceed with our existing contract, we are ready to get to work. Northrop Grumman offered the superior tanker and nothing in the GAO analysis contradicts this essential truth. "Northrop Grumman remains the only company in this competition that has built, tested and flown its plane. In addition, our refueling boom has just completed its 100th flight test. At this point, our competitor has offered only a paper plane," Meyer said. "For our men and women in uniform, the most important thing is to field the new tanker as soon as possible. Only Northrop Grumman is ready to do that." The KC-45 Tanker aircraft will be assembled in Mobile, Ala. - establishing Mobile as the new cornerstone of the Southern Aerospace Corridor. The program will employ 48,000 American workers at 230 U.S. companies in 49 states; and will be built by a world-class industrial team led by Northrop Grumman, and includes EADS North America, General Electric Aviation and Sargent Fletcher. Northrop Grumman Corporation is a global defense and technology company whose 120,000 employees provide innovative systems, products and solutions in information and services, electronics, aerospace and shipbuilding to government and commercial customers worldwide.

Hehe, with the Israelis, who knows?

Look for Back Net or Big Back if you want older examples.

Oh, I know, and I didn't have a copy of the H4.1 rules in front of me when I provided my two cents, so I guess my point is that I don't see why there would be any reason for a special rule.

Depending on the missile and launching aircraft, yes. Looks like you're dealing with 'fire and forget' heat seekers here, so no reason why more than one couldn't be launched at the same target. For early generation IR seekers, there were probably some practical limitations when it comes to immediately shooting a second missile, i.e. the hot rocket exhaust of the first potentially interfering with the seeker of the second. It gets more complicated when you add semi-active radar guided missiles to the mix, but iirc, it was part of Soviet air combat doctrine for the AA-10 Alamo to shoot both a SARH variant and an IRH variant at the same target.

Since we seem to be in the mood to share pics , here's a few of the Canadian Forces CF-18 ... The latest CF-18AM out of 409 Tactical Fighter Squadron (TFS), 4 Wing, Cold Lake, Alberta Some cool in-flight refueling shots And, one of the latest Tu-95MS Bear H intercepts

Could be the one on this page? http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/2001/gulf.war/...ment/index.html

From Stratfor Mediterranean Flyover: Telegraphing an Israeli Punch? June 23, 2008 By George Friedman On June 20, The New York Times published a report saying that more than 100 Israeli aircraft carried out an exercise in early June over the eastern Mediterranean Sea and Greece. The article pointed out that the distances covered were roughly the distances from Israel to Iranian nuclear sites and that the exercise was a trial run for a large-scale air strike against Iran. On June 21, the British newspaper The Times quoted Israeli military sources as saying that the exercise was a dress rehearsal for an attack on Iran. The Jerusalem Post, in covering these events, pointedly referred to an article it had published in May saying that Israeli intelligence had changed its forecast for Iran passing a nuclear threshold — whether this was simply the ability to cause an explosion under controlled conditions or the ability to produce an actual weapon was unclear — to 2008 rather than 2009. The New York Times article, positioned on the front page, captured the attention of everyone from oil traders to Iran, which claimed that this was entirely psychological warfare on the part of the Israelis and that Israel could not carry out such an attack. It was not clear why the Iranians thought an attack was impossible, but they were surely right in saying that the exercise was psychological warfare. The Israelis did everything they could to publicize the exercise, and American officials, who obviously knew about the exercise but had not publicized it, backed them up. What is important to note is that the fact that this was psychological warfare — and fairly effective, given the Iranian response — does not mean that Israel is not going to attack. One has nothing to do with the other. So the question of whether there is going to be an attack must be analyzed carefully. The first issue, of course, is what might be called the “red line.” It has always been expected that once the Iranians came close to a line at which they would become a capable nuclear power, the Americans or the Israelis would act to stop them, neither being prepared to tolerate a nuclear Iran. What has never been clear is what constitutes that red line. It could simply be having produced sufficient fissionable material to build a bomb, having achieved a nuclear explosion under test conditions in Iran or having approached the point of producing a deliverable nuclear weapon. Early this month, reports circulated that A.Q. Khan, the former head of Pakistan’s nuclear program who is accused of selling nuclear technology to such countries as Libya, North Korea and Iran, had also possessed detailed design specifications and blueprints for constructing a nuclear weapon small enough to be mounted on missiles available to North Korea and Iran. The blueprints were found on a computer owned by a Swiss businessman, but the reports pointedly said that it was not known whether these documents had been transferred to Iran or any other country. It was interesting that the existence of the blueprints in Switzerland was known to the United States — and, we assume, Israel — in 2006 but that, at this point, there was no claim that they had been transferred. Clearly, the existence of these documents — if Iran had a copy of them — would have helped the Iranians clear some hurdles. However, as we have pointed out, there is a huge gap between having enriched uranium and having a deliverable weapon, the creation of which requires technologies totally unrelated to each other. Ruggedizing and miniaturizing a nuclear device requires specializations from materials science to advanced electronics. Therefore, having enriched uranium or even triggering an underground nuclear device still leaves you a long way from having a weapon. That’s why the leak on the nuclear blueprints is so important. From the Israeli and American point of view, those blueprints give the Iranians the knowledge of precisely how to ruggedize and miniaturize a nuclear device. But there are two problems here. First, if we were given blueprints for building a bridge, they would bring us no closer to building one. We would need experts in multiple disciplines just to understand the blueprints and thousands of trained engineers and workers to actually build the bridge. Second, the Israelis and Americans have known about the blueprints for two years. Even if they were certain that they had gotten to the Iranians — which the Israelis or Americans would certainly have announced in order to show the increased pressure at least one of them would be under to justify an attack — it is unclear how much help the blueprints would have been to the Iranians. The Jerusalem Post story implied that the Iranians were supposed to be c rossing an undefined line in 2009. It is hard to imagine that they were speeded up to 2008 by a document delivered in 2006, and that the Israelis only just noticed. In the end, the Israelis may have intelligence indicating that the blueprints did speed things up, and that the Iranians might acquire nuclear weapons in 2008. We doubt that. But given the statements Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has made over the years, the Israelis have to be planning based on worst-case scenarios. What the sum total of their leaks adds up to is an attempt to communicate widely that there is an increased urgency in dealing with Iran, based on intelligence that the Iranian program is farther along than previously thought. The problem is the fact that the Israelis are communicating. In fact, they are going out of their way to communicate. That is extremely odd. If the Israelis were intending to strike Iran’s nuclear facilities, they would want to be absolutely certain that as much of the equipment in the facilities was destroyed as possible. But the hard truth is that the heart of Iran’s capability, such as it is, does not reside in its facilities but in its scientists, engineers and technicians who collectively constitute the knowledge base of Iran’s nuclear program. Facilities can be replaced. It would take at least a generation to replace what we already regard as an insufficient cadre of expertise. Therefore, if Israel wanted not simply to take out current facilities but to take Iran out of the nuclear game for a very long time, killing these people would have to be a major strategic goal. The Israelis would want to strike in the middle of the workday, without any warning whatever. If they strike Iran, they will be condemned widely for their actions. The additional criticism that would come from killing the workforce would not be a large price to pay for really destroying the Iranian capabilities. Unlike the Iraqi reactor strike in 1981, when the Israelis struck at night to minimize casualties, this strike against a more sophisticated program could not afford to be squeamish. There are obviously parts of Iran’s nuclear capability that cannot be moved. There is other equipment that can be, with enough warning and with more or less difficulty, moved to unknown locations. But nothing would be easier to disperse than the heart of the program — the people. They could be moved out of harm’s way with only an hour’s notice. Therefore, providing warning that an attack was coming makes very little sense. It runs counter to basic principles of warfare. The Israelis struck the Osirak reactor in Iraq in 1981 with not the slightest hint of the attack’s imminence. That was one of the reasons it was successful. Telegraphing your punch is not very smart in these circumstances. The Israelis have done more than raise the possibility that an attack might be launched in 2008. They have publicized how they plan to do it. Based on the number and type of aircraft involved in the exercise — more than 100 F-15 and F-16 fighter jets — one Israeli attack scenario could involve a third of Israel’s inventory of fourth-generation strike aircraft, including most of its latest-model F-15I Ra’am and F-16I Sufa fighter bombers. If Greece were the target in this exercise, then the equivalent distance would mean that the Israelis are planning to cross Jordanian airspace, transit through Iraq and strike Iran from that direction. A strike through Turkey — and there is no indication that the Turks would permit it — would take much longer. The most complex part of the operation’s logistics would be the refueling of aircraft. They would have to be orbiting in Iraqi airspace. One of the points discussed about the Mediterranean exercise was the role of Israeli helicopters in rescuing downed flyers. Rescue helicopters would be involved, but we doubt very much they would be entering Iranian airspace from Israel. They are a lot slower than the jets, and they would have to be moving hours ahead of time. The Iranians might not spot them but the Russians would, and there is no guarantee that they wouldn’t pass it on to the Iranians. That means that the Israeli helicopters would have to move quietly into Iraq and be based there. And that means that this would have to be a joint American-Israeli operation. The United States controls Iraqi airspace, meaning that the Americans would have to permit Israeli tankers to orbit in Iraqi airspace. The search-and-rescue helicopters would have to be based there. And we strongly suspect that rescued pilots would not be ferried back to Israel by helicopter but would either be sent to U.S. hospitals in Iraq or transferred to Israeli aircraft in Iraq. The point here is that, given the exercise the Israelis carried out and the distances involved, there is no way Israel could do this without the direct cooperation of the United States. From a political standpoint in the region, it is actually easier for the United States to take out Iran’s facilities than for it to help the Israelis do so. There are many Sunni states that might formally protest but be quite pleased to see the United States do the job. But if the Israelis were to do it, Sunni states would have to be much more serious in their protestations. In having the United States play the role of handmaiden in the Israeli operation, it would appear that the basic charge against the United States — that it is the handmaiden of the Israelis — is quite true. If the Americans are going to be involved in a strike against Iran’s nuclear program, they are far better off doing it themselves than playing a supporting role to Israel. There is something not quite right in this whole story. The sudden urgency — replete with tales of complete blueprints that might be in Iranian hands — doesn’t make sense. We may be wrong, but we have no indication that Iran is that close to producing nuclear weapons. Second, the extreme publicity given the exercise in the Mediterranean, coming from both Israel and the United States, runs counter to the logic of the mission. Third, an attack on Iran through Iraqi airspace would create a political nightmare for the United States. If this is the Israeli attack plan, the Americans would appear to be far better off doing it themselves. There are a number of possible explanations. On the question of urgency, the Israelis might have two things in mind. One is the rumored transfer of S-300 surface-to-air missiles from Russia to Iran. This transfer has been rumored for quite a while, but by all accounts has yet to happen. The S-300 is a very capable system, depending on the variety (and it is unclear which variety is being transferred), and it would increase the cost and complexity of any airstrike against Iran. Israel may have heard that the Russians are planning to begin transferring the missiles sometime in 2008. Second, there is obviously the U.S. presidential election. George W. Bush will be out of office in early 2009, and it is possible that Barack Obama will be replacing him. The Israelis have made no secret of their discomfort with an Obama presidency. Obviously, Israel cannot attack Iran without U.S. cooperation. The Israelis’ timetable may be moved up because they are not certain that Obama will permit an attack later on. There are also explanations for the extreme publicity surrounding the exercise. The first might be that the Israelis have absolutely no intention of trying to stage long-range attacks but are planning some other type of attack altogether. The possibilities range from commando raids to cruise missiles fired from Israeli submarines in the Arabian Sea — or something else entirely. The Mediterranean exercise might have been designed to divert attention. Alternatively, the Israelis could be engaged in exhausting Iranian defenders. During the first Gulf War, U.S. aircraft rushed toward the Iraqi border night after night for weeks, pulling away and landing each time. The purpose was to get the Iraqis to see these feints as routine and slow down their reactions when U.S. aircraft finally attacked. The Israelis could be engaged in a version of this, tiring out the Iranians with a series of “emergencies” so they are less responsive in the event of a real strike. Finally, the Israelis and Americans might not be intending an attack at all. Rather, they are — as the Iranians have said — engaged in psychological warfare for political reasons. The Iranians appear to be split now between those who think that Ahmadinejad has led Iran into an extremely dangerous situation and those who think Ahmadinejad has done a fine job. The prospect of an imminent and massive attack on Iran could give his opponents ammunition against him. This would explain the Iranian government response to the reports of a possible attack — which was that such an attack was just psychological warfare and could not happen. That clearly was directed more for internal consumption than it was for the Israelis or Americans. We tend toward this latter theory. Frankly, the Bush administration has been talking about an attack on Iran for years. It is hard for us to see that the situation has changed materially over the past months. But if it has, then either Israel or the United States would have attacked — and not with front-page spreads in The New York Times before the attack was launched. In the end, we tend toward the view that this is psychological warfare for the simple reason that you don’t launch a surprise attack of the kind necessary to take out Iran’s nuclear program with a media blitz beforehand. It just doesn’t work that way.

Welcome, welcome. To use the new database (DB), simply unzip the download file to your HCE main directory. It will overwrite your 'commondb.res' file. From this point the game engine (GE) will recognize the new DB and you can play the game using the new DB. If you want to look at or edit the new DB in the Platform Editor (PE), you'll need to 'Import' using the PE. I'll add these steps to the FAQ and/or DB file download section eventually.

Nice set of photos ... From Aviation Week's ARES Blog Eurotorp's MU90 Finally Fired From Australian Warship Posted by Joris Janssen Lok at 6/23/2008 1:29 AM CDT Australia's Defence Materiel Organisation (DMO) successfully test fired the new Franco-Italian Eurotorp MU90 lightweight anti-submarine warfare (ASW) torpedo late last week, the country's defense minister Joel Fitzgibbon says. “While the MU90 Lightweight Torpedo has been successfully tested in Europe, this Acceptance Test and Evaluation exercise represents the first time an MU90 Lightweight Torpedo has been fired from an Australian warship,” Fitzgibbon says. The test firing happened from the Anzac-class frigate HMAS Toowoomba at sea in the Western Australian Exercise Area approximately 30 km off Mandurah in Western Australia. It was a long-awaited milestone for the DMO’s delayed Joint Project 2070, Project Djimindi – Replacement Lightweight ASW Torpedo. According to Fitsgibbon, “the MU90 will provide a significant upgrade to the ASW capabilities of the surface combatant platforms of the Royal Australian Navy (RAN), including the RAN’s FFG and Anzac frigates.” The MU90 Lightweight Torpedo is being acquired in a three-phase program worth A$616 million at January 2008 prices. The Eurotorp MU90/Impact torpedo was selected in 1999 after a competitive tender. The MU90 is 3 meters long, weighs 300 kg, has a range of greater than 10 km and is designed to track and attack quiet-running submarines at depths to more than 1,000 meters, according to the Australian defense dept. *** And now for the bad news ... *** The Australian Minister of Defence Mr. Fitzgibbon has ordered that the airborne integration portion of the MU90 torpedo project will be canceled. "I am pleased that we have been able to make the MU90 work off the navy's warships," Mr Fitzgibbon said. "However, I was not prepared to follow the previous government's practice of gambling with taxpayers' money by proceeding with the allocation of $300million to fit the torpedo to various aircraft while doubt remained that it would work properly in that role." The Defence Department had planned to fit the torpedo to up to five separate platforms starting with the Anzac frigates, adding to the overall risk of the project.. "A complicated systems-integration task involving old aircraft sets off several bright-red warning lights for me, especially when Australia would have been the only country attempting to make that aircraft and weapon combination," he said. Patrick Walters, Integration doubts sink $300m torpedo project, The Australian, June 21, 2008

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