CV32

It would be interesting, wouldn't it?

More photos of the crash have been released:

From Aviation Week's ARES Blog Shore duty for the SM-3 Posted by Amy Butler at 7/16/2008 8:47 AM CDT The Missile Defense Agency is considering a land-based variant of the Standard Missile-3, says Ed Miyashiro, deputy general manager of Raytheon's Missile Systems sector in Tucson, Ariz. Driving the need is Israel, which wants the ability to engage ballistic missiles in the exoatmosphere farther away from its own territory. Iran fired multiple medium- and long-range ballistic missiles July 9 during a military exercise. The long-range Shahab could reach Israeli territory. SM-3 prime contractor Raytheon is examining a range of options -- including a moveable, but not highly mobile, system that could fill Israel's needs. Very few modifications would be needed for the missile and some tweaks would be required in the command and control system. The system would employ the same vertical launch modules, in an eight-pack configuration, used in the Aegis ship-based system.

From Aviation Week's ARES Blog Vulcan 101 Posted by Bill Sweetman at 7/16/2008 2:50 AM CDT Today - Wednesday - is supposed to see the last flyable Vulcan bomber return to the skies over Farnborough. Time for a few facts that you may or may not know about the Vulcan, and why it gets the British public so excited. The Vulcan was designed to a 1945 specification. An industry that had never mass produced an airplane more complex than the World War 2 Lancaster - which with all due respect was a semi-expendable airplane not far removed from a giant cropduster - was challenged to build a jet bomber capable of hitting Moscow with Britain's first nuclear weapon, a fat ten-ton device, outflying jet fighters along the way. Like the "wooden wonder", the de Havilland Mosquito, it was supposed to survive through speed and altitude, rather than defensive guns, with the aid of the jamming equipment that the "boffins" had developed during the 1939-45 unpleasantness. With its huge wing area and powerful engines, the Vulcan totally outperformed its closest US equivalent, the Boeing B-47 (which admittedly appeared some years earlier), in terms of altitude and agility. No coffin corner for Vulcan crews, where the airplane quivered between sonic buffet and stall; the B.2 model could fly well above 60,000 feet, and could outturn and outclimb most contemporary fighters above 50,000 feet. And nobody ever rolled a Boeing bomber at an air show. The Vulcan had less attractive features. One problem that should have been fixed, but never was: the two pilots had ejection seats but the three rear crew in the "coal hole" behind them had to take their chances with a parachute exit. In 1956, a Vulcan returning from a triumphant demonstration flight to Australia hit the ground short of the runway at Heathrow, trying to land in driving rain. The crew managed to drag the airplane into the sky, but the flight controls were damaged and control was quickly lost. The pilots - one of them the boss of Bomber Command - ejected but the rear crew never had a chance. The word was that the boss had pushed the pilot to land at Heathrow, where the press was waiting, rather than diverting; months later, a V-bomber force dining-in night turned into a near-riot, as highly lubricated aircrew pelted the commander with rolls and abuse. But the mystique of the Vulcan remained. The jets - all-white in their early career - were renowned for their ability to flush from dispersal bases inside the "four-minute warning" that the UK could expect in the case of a nuclear attack. Despite missiles and fighters, Vulcan veteran and author Andrew Brookes, in his history of the V-force, reckoned that a good number of them would have made it to their targets. And after that? Brookes remembers being told, as a new Vulcan pilot: "Your best bet, old boy, is to keep flying east and settle down with a nice, warm Mongolian woman." [CV32: Emphasis mine. Thats the best quote I've heard in quite a while. ]

HarpGamer, in conjunction with Advanced Gaming Systems Inc (AGSI) and Matrix Games, is launching what we call the “HCE Challenge”. The Harpoon Commander’s Edition (HCE) Challenge will be, for all intents and purposes, a scenario design contest, the goals of which will include: • providing an interesting, enjoyable and potentially rewarding way to learn how to write scenarios for HCE; and • generating new and challenging scenarios for potential inclusion in the new official HCE BattleSets: Caribbean, South Atlantic, South Africa and the Middle East). The HCE Challenge will have a competitive aspect, and the “winners” will receive rewards which may include any of the following (the final details are yet to be worked out, and may differ from the suggested possibilities identified below): • a period of access to the latest HCE beta version without the usual and strict prerequisite of active participation in the beta testing process (although we’d certainly invite your help as a beta tester!); • a free copy of another Harpoon version, such as Harpoon 3: Advanced Naval Warfare or the Harpoon 4 paper rules; or • a discount on other Matrix Games titles; And, of course, most importantly: • Inclusion of your winning scenario in an official HCE BattleSet! Don’t be intimidated by the competition, however, as we intend the HCE Challenge to be a fun experience and in any event, participants will be organized according to their scenario writing experience. We hope to have at least two participants in each of three tiers (Novice, Intermediate and Advanced), for a total of at least six participants overall (and hopefully quite a few more!). How a participant is assigned among these individual tiers will, in turn, be determinative of how complex their scenario project will be. The format for the HCE Challenge has not yet been finalized, and we thought it might be prudent to gauge your opinion, as HCE players and scenario writers, in how it should proceed. The following three potential formats have been suggested (and if you have another, please let us know): Suggested format No.1: a. Two players (Blue and Red) are paired up in each of the three Tiers (Novice, Intermediate, and Advanced). b. Each pair chooses from one of the four new official HCE BattleSets (Caribbean, South Atlantic, South Africa, Middle East). c. Each pair comes up with a storyline. d. The Blue player chooses his order of battle (OOB) from a narrow set of available choices, and crafts his scenario accordingly. e. Once Blue has finished, Red chooses his OOB, again from a narrow set of choices. f. Red takes the scenario as provided by Blue and adds the Red forces and actions as AI to try and defeat Blue. g. Umpires now have complete scenarios. h. The two players each play the scenario as the Blue side and send in their results. i. Umpires also play the scenarios as the Blue side and make their notes. Suggested format 2: a. Two players (Blue and Red) are paired up in each the three Tiers (Novice, Intermediate, Advanced). b. Each pair chooses from one of the four new official HCE BattleSets. c. Umpires present a storyline and the Red OOB (or a close approximation of what it might look like). d. Each player chooses his Blue OOB, from a narrow set of choices. e. Umpires refine the Red OOB (as necessary). f. Final data is presented to the player, and he crafts his scenario (both sides of it, Blue and Red). g. Umpires now have complete scenarios. h. The two players each play the scenario as the Blue side and send in their results. i. Umpires also play the scenarios as the Blue side and make their notes. Suggested format 3: a. Two players (Blue and Red) are paired up in each the three Tiers (Novice, Intermediate, Advanced). b. Each pair chooses from one of the four new official HCE BattleSets. c. Each pair comes up with a single storyline. d. Blue player chooses a Blue OOB, from a narrow set of choices. e. Red player chooses a Red OOB, from a narrow set of choices. f. OOB's are refined (as necessary) and then revealed to each player. g. Each player crafts the scenario, to be played by Blue or Red (whatever suits them). h. Umpires now have complete scenarios. i. The two players each play the scenarios and send in their results. j. Umpires also play the scenarios and make their notes. We expect that the scenario design process – from start to finish – would take approximately two (2) months, followed by the umpires’ evaluation of the scenarios. Please let us know (by posting here in this thread) which of these suggested formats you prefer, or if you have another brilliant idea you’d like to share for the HCE Challenge. As soon as the format is ironed out, we hope to get this project underway!

Thanks, Pete.

Awesome. Thanks again, Patrick.

Don't we all, hehe. It is the claimed range for the ramjet powered R-77M1. If you can get Vympel to tell you the true range, please let me know.

You can pick one of the generic SAM sites (or other generic installation type, such as a Hangar, Large Building, etc) from the Installations annex and use that as your focal point. Alternatively, you could pick a fixed airfield or port, etc, and then tell the player that the target cluster is XX nm to the west from the airfield, etc. Keep in mind that you can change the location of an Installation on the SE map just as you can with a group of ships.

From Flight International DATE: 14/07/08 SOURCE: Flight International A giant leap: F-35 readies for production ramp-up By Stephen Trimble Production activity for the Lockheed Martin F-35 Joint Strike Fighter is entering the start of an intense phase that will dominate the programme's energies for the next 18 months. Since November 2006, getting the first weight-optimised and short take-off vertical landing prototype aircraft in the air on time was the programme's primary focus, even as the first AA-1 conventional aircraft began flight tests in December 2006. The path to realising the STOVL milestone was obstructed by the discovery earlier this year of a persistent problem affecting the endurance of turbine blades in the Pratt & Whitney PW135 engine. A permanent solution to the problem is under study, and the delay cost the schedule fewer than three weeks. The successful flight debut on 11 June of the first STOVL airframe named BF-1 in conventional mode did more than satisfy the programme's ability to make good on a promise made 18 months before. The flight also pushed the programme's internal focus beyond the first flight milestone for aircraft BF-1, and into a perhaps even greater challenge: escalating the pace of final assembly work. Outwardly, flight-test efforts will continue to capture public interest in the programme. The Lockheed-led industry team's focus will shift from getting BF-1 flying to steadily preparing the prototype for its first flight in STOVL mode, an event previously scheduled to occur by the end of the year, but now planned for early 2009. Meanwhile, Lockheed's assembly line is just at the beginning of a dramatic surge of activity. Since the system development and demonstration phase began in October 2001, and taking into account a roughly 18-month delay to resolve a major weight problem, the programme's production system has completed delivery for the first two prototypes only. Now, under a third revised production schedule unveiled in May, Lockheed's final assembly and check-out facility in Fort Worth, Texas, is committed to deliver new prototype airframes at the rate of one completed aircraft a month for each of the next 17 months. Treading the transition from development to production has been slippery for some contemporary aerospace programmes. On the commercial side, the 15-month delay for the Boeing 787 and the two-year delay for the Airbus A380 are linked to breakdowns in their respective production systems, as opposed to aerodynamic flaws discovered in flight test. The example of Boeing's supply chain problems and subsequent production slowdown has been carefully watched in Fort Worth by Lockheed executives. "We have studied the lessons learned from the A380 and 787," says Dan Crowley, Lockheed's vice-president and general manager for JSF. "Both of those programmes signed up to some aggressive early delivery schedules. The F-35 has a less-steep ramp." Crowley's assessment is correct. Boeing originally planned to deliver the first 787 for flight test in late August, 2007, and to be ready to enter full rate production of 10 aircraft a month by the end of the following year. Lockheed is expected to deliver 19 SDD airframes between December 2006 and December 2009, as well as the first two low-rate initial production (LRIP) aircraft. In all, 19 aircraft are in various stages of assembly in Fort Worth. With BF-1 in flight test, the first STOVL ground-test aircraft - BG-1 - was in the iron maiden test fixture as of mid-June, representing the third fully assembled aircraft. The next three STOVL flight-test aircraft - BF-2, BF-3 and BF-4 - will also roll out this year, Crowley says. Lockheed plans to complete final assembly for a total of seven flight-test aircraft from June until December. The same pace continues into the next year. The next 11 flight-test aircraft are scheduled for delivery in 2009, completing deliveries of all SDD aircraft and the first LRIP phase aircraft. In addition, Lockheed is now on contract to deliver 12 LRIP lot 3 aircraft next year and at least 18 more in 2010, including the first two international aircraft. Foreign orders will start making a greater impact in the next year. The programme will remain in the LRIP phase, but the production ramp starts to move steeply upward in 2011 with at least 32 aircraft potentially on order. The current production plan calls for Lockheed to increase the production rate by almost 50% from 2011-12. US and foreign customers are now expected to buy 47 aircraft in the LRIP lot 5 year, and Crowley believes even that number is likely to grow higher. The US government, through the programme objective memoranda (POM) process "is likely to improve LRIP 5 orders", Crowley says. The POM is a six-year spending plan for the US Department of Defense. It receives a major update every two years, and the POM proposal for fiscal year 2010 is scheduled to be complete in February. Another big jump for the production rate is already planned for FY2013, with annual deliveries expected to amount to 118 aircraft in LRIP lot 6, or nearly 10 aircraft a month. Again, Crowley believes the US government is likely to increase that production rate in the 2010 POM plan. Lockheed officials dismiss concerns that the manufacturing workload could prove overwhelming. "I wouldn't call [the production rate increase] staggering," Crowley says.Nonetheless, Lockheed is preparing to roll out a number of "producibility" enhancements for the F-35, starting with the lot 4 aircraft delivered in FY2011. Improving the production process will mean adding depth to the F-35's global supply chain. BAE Systems, Lockheed and Northrop Grumman have divided responsibility for building the F-35. Lockheed owns the nose, cockpit and wing Northrop builds the centre fuselage and BAE produces the aft section. Most foreign industrial partners were disappointed by Lockheed's original effort to outsource F-35 work. The transition from industrial offsets to the JSF programme's "best value" sourcing strategy caught many foreign suppliers unprepared. Meanwhile, the US government failed to approve a promised export licensing control reform that would have greatly simplified exchanges of technology and information. The need to expand the supply chain for the LRIP production rate increase will seek to address the industrial expectations of many foreign suppliers. Italy's Alenia Aeronautica, for example, has already become a second source to build F-35 wings. Making the manufacturing process more efficient is also a priority for the programme, although certain limits are built into the new design of the aircraft. Lockheed originally designed the F-35 with "quick-mate" joints, essentially large bolts allowing machinists to quickly mate the wing to the centre fuselage on the final assembly line. But the quick-mate joints were dropped from the design in the 2004 rush to shed excess weight, saving about 362kg (800lb). To compensate for the loss, Lockheed has reduced the design tolerances for airframe structures that connect together. This practice makes it easier to join major assemblies, but increases the cost of producing structures with tighter design tolerances. "We're trying to find the right balance point between tolerances and weight savings and 'producibility'," Crowley says. Throughout this period, Lockheed will also be conducting a rigorous flight-test assessment of the conventional and STOVL variants, as well as starting the same phase for the carrier variant. On top of the delivery and flight-test demands, Lockheed must work to rapidly improve the efficiency of the JSF production line. According to a March report by the US Government Accountability Office, assembling the first AA-1 flight-test airframe required 35% more labour hours than planned. That amounts to an extra 65,000h of touch-labour, with the wing and final assembly facing encountering the most inefficiencies. The production line notably improved for BF-1, but the aircraft nevertheless required more than 25,000h of extra work to complete the redesigned wing assembly. Crowley remains confident than the latest revised production schedule for SDD - internally dubbed 6.1 - is achievable and will not need to be adjusted again. Despite the difficulties recorded on the first two prototypes, he points out there are positive indicators. Specifically, the programme's early decision to invest in common tooling and information technology infrastructure for both the SDD and production phases is paying dividends in terms of faster than normal learning curves. "Mechanics are coming down the learning curve as planned," Crowley says. "Defects per thousand hours are equal to or less than production programmes." He also credits a robust supply chain for ensuring the programme should always have enough engineering and manufacturing resources. "The F-16 mainly outsourced assemblies after reaching maturity," Crowley says. "We have partnered with international firms from day one." Bob Fiorentini, Lockheed's vice-president for F-35 global production, cites one example of the programme's outsourcing approach. Netherlands-based Fokker Elmo supplies the wire harnesses for the BF-1 prototype. Of 665 connections contained in 230 individual harnesses, Lockheed found only three defective connectors, Fiorentini says.

From Flight International DATE: 13/07/08 SOURCE: Flightglobal.com Boeing to stick with KC-767 for US tanker recompete By Craig Hoyle Boeing will arrive at the Farnborough air show with a partially new identity and a renewed confidence that its KC-767 design can win the US Air Force’s controversial KC-X tanker competition. The company – which last week learned that its appeal into the USAF’s selection of the Airbus A330-based Northrop Grumman/EADS North America KC-30 had resulted in the deal’s abandonment – is currently “digesting comments and feedback” from a closed hearing on 10 July, says Chris Chadwick, president of the newly rebranded Boeing Military Aircraft. Speaking at the Royal International Air Tattoo at Royal Air Force base Fairford, Gloucestershire on 11 July, Chadwick says a fresh KC-X contest will open with a draft request for proposals, and added: “we’re very optimistic of moving forward quickly.” Although USAF officials highlighted the KC-30’s larger size than the KC-767 in making their original selection – a process which the US General Accountability Office subsequently ruled was severely flawed – Chadwick says: “I’m not convinced yet that they do want a bigger airplane. I think the next RFP will define whether they want a big airplane of not.” Operating a larger aircraft would mean higher life cycle costs, more fuel consumption and limited basing options, he claims. “If the RFP is modified substantially we’ll have to bring it in, look at it and decide how to go forward,” says Chadwick, who adds: “we do have options”. Boeing has conducted previous design studies on a KC-777 tanker, which would be larger than the KC-30. Dave Bowman, a former head of Boeing’s C-17 strategic transport programme and global mobility activities, is also to head the company’s new tanker activities. “He understands the air force,” says Chadwick, who adds that the appointment will provide “a new face as we push forward trying to win the recompete.” Boeing Military Aircraft is the new name for the company’s former Precision Engagement and Mobility Systems business unit, following a rebranding completed early this month. “We wanted to send a statement that the aircraft business is an extremely important part of our company today and in the future,” says Chadwick. Boeing and rival bidders Lockheed Martin and Sikorsky will meanwhile submit final proposals for the USAF’s CSAR-X combat search-and-rescue helicopter requirement during August, with the previous selection of Boeing’s HH-47 Chinook having also been derailed by a series of GAO protests. “We still hope for an award within the end of the year,” says Chadwick.

From Armed Forces Journal, July 2008 Think small Adding small combatant ships would beef up the Navy’s capabilities BY MILAN VEGO The Navy has a relatively large number of surface combatants capable of conducting a wide range of missions in a high-intensity conflict. However, the Navy lacks adequate capabilities to operate effectively in the littorals, in particular in enclosed and semi-enclosed seas (popularly called “narrow seas”). A force of the new Littoral Combat Ships (LCS), when they enter service in the next decade, will not significantly increase the Navy’s capabilities in conducting littoral warfare. This bad situation can be changed by building or acquiring a force composed of multipurpose corvettes and missile combat craft. However, the problem is that the Navy is traditionally opposed to operating small surface combatants in times of peace and in operations short of war. After World War II, and except briefly during the Vietnam War, the Navy did not, until recently, appreciate the potential value of small surface combatants. Perhaps the Navy has felt that if such a force were needed, it could quickly create one. It did this in World War II when, within a short time, some 426 patrol torpedo boats were built, organized and deployed in the most distant war zones. Only 42 of these PT boats were lost to enemy action. Modern small surface combatants are technologically sophisticated and relatively expensive, however. They cannot be built quickly once the conflict at sea starts. There is also the unfounded belief that small surface combatants are of little use in the modern era. Although that might have been true in the past, it is not the case today. Modern multipurpose corvettes and missile combat craft carry weapons and sensors and are fully capable of conducting a wide range of combat and non-combat missions. The primary threats to U.S. surface combatants in the littorals include quiet, conventionally powered submarines; land-based fixed and rotary-wing aircraft; small surface combatants; coastal gun batteries; smart mines; unmanned aerial vehicles medium- and long-range land-based surface-to-air missiles (SAMs); and tactical ballistic missiles. In addition, small, stealthy surface craft armed with small-caliber guns and short-range grenade launchers can, in some cases, threaten even U.S. missile cruisers or destroyers. The Navy also is concerned about potential attacks by the maritime suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices used in Iraq, Yemen and Sri Lanka. Perhaps among all potential threats, anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs) launched from small surface combatants, coastal batteries and aircraft pose the single greatest threat to large U.S. surface ships operating in the littorals. The number and sophistication of ASCMs has increased dramatically over the past decade or so. It is estimated that about 75,000 cruise missiles are in the inventories worldwide and are produced in 130 types. More than 80 countries, many of them in the Middle East and Asia, have sea- and land-launched ASCMs. Nineteen countries produce ASCMs and 11 of them are exporters. The threat from small surface craft to the larger U.S. surface ships is illustrated by several incidents in the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz since the early 1980s. During the Iraq-Iran War, the Iranian Republican Guard Corps (IRGC) attacked the Kuwaiti-owned but U.S.-flagged tankers in the vicinity of Bahrain and Qatar. It also came in direct confrontation with the Navy. Several IRGC ships were sunk by the Navy in the late 1980s. However, the Iranians drew the lessons that U.S. large surface ships were vulnerable to air and missile attacks. This, in turn, led directly to the adoption of so-called “swarming tactics” by the Iranians in future conflict with the Navy in the Gulf. Swarming tactics are nothing new; many armies used them in the past. The Iranian concept employs a large number of small boats to surprise and isolate a force of the enemy’s large surface ships. The boats converge to their prospective targets from a large number of bases and attack using ambushing positions close to the Iranian coast or offshore islands. The greatest potential problem here is with small craft in the 21-mile-wide Strait of Hormuz. On Jan. 7, five Iranian boats approached a three-ship U.S. formation (the cruiser Port Royal, the destroyer Hopper and the frigate Ingraham), maneuvering aggressively. Three of these boats approached within about 300 yards of the U.S. ships. This incident lasted about 20 minutes and no physical contact occurred. The U.S. ships conducted some evasive maneuvers and were ready to take appropriate action before the Iranian boats suddenly broke away. Such swarming attacks were predicted by retired Marine Lt. Gen. Paul van Riper, who played the commander of the red enemy side during the Millennium Challenge exercise in July and August 2002. He creatively used swarming tactics that resulted in the sinking of an aircraft carrier and 16 other ships. The red small boats attacked with machine guns and rockets, reinforced with air- and ground-launched missiles. Some of the small boats were loaded with explosives to detonate alongside U.S. ships in suicide attacks. After the blue fleet was sunk, the game was ordered to begin again. The blue ships were refloated and the blue team eventually was declared the victor. At this point, van Riper quit the game in protest because of his concern that the Pentagon was more interested in proving the superiority of the new transformational concepts than in learning from the exercise. FORCE REQUIREMENTS Despite the lack of a commonly accepted view on the size of small surface combatants, it is generally understood that they are not capable of full-scale operations on the open ocean. Thus, it is generally considered that small surface combatants vary in size from about 500 tons to 1,500 tons. Almost any ship larger than 1,500 tons is fully capable of extended operations on the open ocean. Ships smaller than 500 tons are classified as combat craft. In general, the optimal size for multipurpose surface combatants is between 1,000 tons and 1,500 tons. Such a size allows balanced capabilities for conducting anti-surface, antisubmarine warfare (ASW), air defense and mine-laying tasks. Small surface combatants less than 1,000 tons in displacement are usually dual-purpose, although they might be classified as multipurpose. Small surface combatants should have low draft, perhaps not greater than six feet. They should have high maneuverability in confined waters. They should have long range and high cruising speed combined with high endurance. The need for high speed is much more important for a small surface combatant operating in the littorals for evasive maneuvering and quick withdrawal when facing a much larger enemy surface combatant. Small surface combatants should have a high degree of stealth with reduced radar, acoustic and magnetic signatures. In the past, corvettes and light frigates were the principal small surface combatants. A frigate was smaller in size than a destroyer and larger than a corvette. It was employed primarily as an oceangoing convoy escort. A corvette was a small ASW ship, also used for convoying duties, but primarily in coastal waters. However, over the past three decades, the line between a frigate and corvette has progressively blurred because both types evolved into multipurpose combatants capable of conducting land attack, ASW and air-defense missions. Multipurpose corvettes can attain a maximum speed of more than 30 knots. Their range can vary from 1,500 to 3,500 nautical miles. Modern corvettes are armed with several launchers for anti-ship missiles, multi-purpose guns and ASW weapons. They also are fitted with a landing pad for helicopters. Fast attack Littoral waters are the ideal environment for the employment of fast attack craft (FAC) armed with ASCMs and/or torpedoes and guns. Modern missile-armed FACs range from 250 tons to 500 tons and have maximum speeds between 32 knots and 40 knots. Their cruising range varies from 1,500 to 4,000 nautical miles, and endurance ranges from several days up to almost 10 days. They normally carry four to eight anti-ship missiles, one 76mm or 57mm dual-purpose automatic gun and one or two 20mm to 40mm guns. Some also are fitted with tubes for 400mm or 533mm torpedoes. The main tactical advantages of FACs are their versatility, high speed, great striking power, excellent maneuverability, small silhouette and high degree of immunity to mines. The main drawbacks of FACs lie in their lack of staying power, short range, modest ability to fight in poor weather, quick onset of crew fatigue, high likelihood of loss if hit and, most important, high vulnerability to enemy attacks from the air. Most of them are also unstable weapon platforms. The great majority of U.S. surface combatants are too large and ill-suited for operations in the littorals. The Navy has in active service 22 of its original 27 Aegis Ticonderoga-class missile cruisers and 52 (plus 10 under construction or planned to be built) 8,950- to 9,155-ton Arleigh Burke-class missile destroyers. The plan is to retain the Aegis cruisers until they reach the age of 35. The lead ship of the Arleigh Burke-class was commissioned in 1991; the last will enter service in 2010/2011. In addition, the Navy operates 30 4,100-ton Oliver Hazard Perry-class missile frigates. They will remain in service until the 2010s. The majority of the Navy’s surface forces will be composed of the Aegis cruisers into the 2030s. The Navy is working intensively to build and expand its capabilities for operations in inshore waters and on rivers. The greatest gap is for operations in the littorals and narrow seas. The smallest surface combatants comprise eight (out of originally 14 ships) 355-ton Cyclone-class patrol craft. These lightly armed craft (two 25mm guns and four machine guns) have a maximum speed of 35 knots. The maximum range of the Cyclones is about 2,500 nautical miles at a cruising speed of 12 knots. The Navy is experimenting with the new and highly maneuverable 45-ton surface craft dubbed M80 Stiletto, built for the Pentagon’s Transformation Office as part of the Wolf PAC program. This 80-foot craft has a draft of 3 feet. Its range is about 500 nautical miles at a cruising speed of 40 knots. The Stiletto’s maximum speed is reportedly 50 to 60 knots. The experiments are being carried out in cooperation with U.S. Special Operations Forces’ Command to test command and control of geographically dispersed but networked and autonomous or semiautonomous forces. The Navy’s capabilities in littoral warfare are expected to improve with the commissioning of the first highly maneuverable, fast and networked surface combatant, the LCS, in 2009. When the program was announced in November 2001, the Navy planned to build 55 2,800-ton LCSs as part of the 313-ship force. Originally, the LCS was to cost about $220 million per ship (not including weapons and equipment). However, the combination of numerous changes in the LCS design and poor management escalated the costs by more than 100 percent of the ship’s original price. By this spring, the cost of the lead LCS rose to about $500 million. As a result, the original construction schedule has been slowed. Two lead LCSs of different design are in the final stage of construction. LCS-1 Freedom, with a mono-hull, is built by Lockheed Martin, and LCS-2 Independence, with a trimaran hull, is built by General Dynamics. The Navy plans to select in 2010 a single design based on the testing of these two lead ships. Despite their different hull designs, both ships have the range of 4,500 nautical miles at cruising speed of 20 knots. Their maximum range at the top speed of 50 knots will be about 1,500 nautical miles. The LCS will be a multipurpose ship carrying three mission modules: for antisurface warfare, ASW and mine countermeasures (MCM).However, the LCS will carry only two mission packages at any given time. The LCS is designed for missions in support of expeditionary strike groups (ESGs) or surface action groups (SAGs) in conducting anti-combat craft defense, ASW and MCM. They will use their high speed and off board systems to create a layered defense against small boats. Secondary missions for LCS include patrolling/surveillance, maritime intercept, special operations forces support, and logistics support for personnel and supplies. The LCS is not really a littoral vessel but, rather, an ocean-going platform. Its draft of 20 feet is too large for maneuverability in the confined waters of a typical narrow sea such as the Persian Gulf. Its sprint speed is generally of little use around islands/islets and in shallow water. It is highly doubtful that a ship of 3,500 tons, no matter how well-armed and -equipped, could match the agility of hostile small boats, and suicide boats in particular. Another shortcoming of the LCS is that it has to move outside the littoral for refueling and rearming. POSSIBLE SOLUTION The best weapon to counter enemy small surface combatants is a force of small surface combatants. Aircraft can remain in the threat area for a limited time and are far more adversely affected by bad weather and night conditions than surface combatants. Large surface combatants such as the Burke class destroyers or the Aegis cruisers also have limited capabilities against the small, highly maneuverable and ASCM-armed surface combatants. They also would have significant problems against the threat of the swarming attacks by small boats, especially when transiting straits or narrows such as Bab el-Mandeb Strait or the Strait of Hormuz. The LCS also is too large to provide an effective defense for carrier strike groups, ESGs or SAGs in such seas. Radar systems on U.S. large surface combatants do not have sufficient accuracy or refresh rate to reliably track fast attack craft. Small surface combatants are much more maneuverable and faster than their larger counterparts. Moreover, they can be employed for a greater diversity of missions than fixed or rotary-wing aircraft and they have greater staying power. Their ability to detect and track continuously their enemy counterparts is also much greater than that of aircraft. Nevertheless, a combination of aircraft and small surface combatants is the best counter to the enemy small surface combatants threat. The LCS program is too far into the production cycle to be canceled (although it might be further scaled down). The Navy would be well advised to complement LCS with a modest force of 1,200- to 1,500-ton multipurpose corvettes and 400- to 500-ton missile craft. Such a force would considerably enhance the Navy’s capabilities to conduct operations in the area between the open ocean and inshore waters. They are better-suited than destroyers, frigates or cruisers for counterterrorism patrols, sanctions enforcement, counterpiracy and countersmuggling (narcotics, weapons and humans) and choke-point patrols/surveillance. In times of tensions and crisis, small surface combatants can be used to screen larger ships during their transit through a strait/narrows. During a high-intensity conflict at sea, they can be employed for anti-combat craft defense, ASW, to escort friendly shipping, attack enemy shipping, mine-laying, and to support special operations forces. Finally, but not least, small surface cohabitants are much cheaper than their larger counterparts. The quickest and cheapest way to create a capable force of small surface combatants is to build them at home or buy ships already in service with U.S. allies. Several classes of corvettes are built by friendly countries, such as the Israeli 1,295-ton Sa’ar 5 (Eilat), the German 1,685-ton MEKO A-100, the Swedish 620-ton Visby, South Korea’s 1,200-ton Po Hang and the Italian 1,285-ton Minerva. For example, the Sa’ar 5-class multipurpose missile corvette — three of them were built at Litton’s Ingalls shipyard in Pascagoula, Miss. — is one of the best designs of a small surface combatant today. These $260 million corvettes have a maximum speed of 33 knots. Their range is about 3,500 nautical miles at 17 knots. The Sa’ar 5’s endurance is between 24 and 30 days. They are armed with two quads for the 72-nautical-mile-range Harpoon surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs), two 5.4-nautical-mile-range SAM systems and two triple 324mm torpedo tubes. The Sa’ar 5s are armed with a single 76mm gun or Mk 15 Phalanx Close-In Weapon System. They also can carry one or two helicopters. Another class of multipurpose corvette is the German MEKO A-100. The 1,850-ton K-130 Braunschweig-class has a maximum speed of 26 knots and range of about 2,500 nautical miles at a cruising speed of 15 knots. The Braunschweig is armed with four 108-nautical-mile-range ASCMs, two rolling airframe missile 21-cell launchers, a 76mm dual-purpose gun, a 30mm short-range gun and two .50-caliber machine guns. Two launchers can be installed for the 38-nautical-mile-range Exocet sea-skimming antiship missiles. The Braunschweigs also can carry one helicopter. The Visby corvettes have a maximum speed of 35 knots on gas turbines and 15 knots on diesels. They are built of fiber-reinforced plastic in sandwich construction. The Visby was designed to drastically reduce optical and infrared signature, above water acoustic and hydroacoustic signature, underwater electrical potential, and magnetic signature. The Visby can be detected at the range of 7 nautical miles in rough seas and 12 nautical miles in a calm sea, without jamming. In a jammed environment, the Visby corvette will be detected at a range of 4.3 nautical miles in rough seas and 6 nautical miles in calm seas. They will carry SSMs. Other weapons include a 127mm rocket launcher, depth charges and three 400mm tubes for homing torpedoes, and a single 57mm general purpose gun plus mines. Among more modern missile combat craft are the Israeli 490-ton Sa’ar 4.5 class, the Swedish 400-ton Goteborg class and the Finnish 270-ton Hamina class. The Sa’ar 4.5s have a maximum speed of 33 knots. Their range is 4,800 nautical miles at 19 knots or 2,200 nautical miles at 30 knots. They are armed with four launchers for Harpoons, sea-skimming missiles, a 76mm dual-purpose gun and a 20mm gun. The Sa’ar 4.5s also can carry one helicopter. The Goteborgs have a top speed of 30 knots. They are armed with eight launchers for SSMs, a 57mm gun, four 15.75-inch torpedoes and four 127mm rocket launchers. The Goteborgs can also lay mines. THE CONCEPT The Navy needs a credible force of multipurpose corvettes plus a modest number of missile combat craft to effectively bridge the existing gap in its surface warfare capabilities in the littoral waters. As many as 32 multipurpose corvettes organized in eight squadrons of four ships each should be acquired. They should be forward-deployed in similar manner as are surface MCM ships. In addition, a force of perhaps 12 missile combat craft could be deployed within a striking distance of selected choke points. The most critical deployment areas are the Persian Gulf/Strait of Hormuz, Horn of Africa/Bab-el Mandeb Strait, the Strait of Malacca and the Caribbean. Two squadrons should be rotated within each area and in agreement with friendly countries and observing their sovereignty. For operations short of war, such as maritime counterterrorism or counterpiracy, this new force should operate jointly with allies and coalition partners. In a major crisis or high-intensity conflict, multipurpose corvettes and missile combat craft should be used jointly to provide screen for U.S. large surface combatants. They also can protect convoys and merchant shipping. The Navy must urgently reconsider its traditional opposition to operating a credible force of small surface combatants in peacetime. For a relatively small investment, the Navy would increase the overall number of ships in its active fleet and close the gap in its capabilities in areas between the open ocean and inshore waters. The new Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower cannot be successfully executed without sound application of operational art. This requires a balanced force of surface combatants capable of conducting missions in peacetime, operations short of war, and low- and high-intensity conflicts.

HCDB-080712 Ships: Drakensberg AOR - South Africa Warrior PTM - South Africa

A new version of the official Harpoon Commander's Edition (HCE) Database (HCDB-080712) is now available. Get the new DB in the Download section. New additions (or overhauls of existing entries) include: Ships: Drakensberg AOR - South Africa Warrior PTM - South Africa This update also includes a major overhaul for torpedoes to incorporate data from the latest Harpoon 4 Trilogy annexes. In most instances, you will see an upward change in damage point (DP) values (in some cases 2-3 times as much as before) as well as slight downward changes in torpedo ranges. Enjoy.

Two reasons: (1) the P-3 had good low altitude endurance and could drop its torpedo payload from there, while with the P-8, they don't want to be cutting into its endurance by forcing it down to low altitude (not to mention corrosion issues from low altitude patrol); (2) blue water ASW engagements prior to now typically didn't require broaching an air defense envelope, whereas littoral ASW engagements of the future (such as those against ultra quiet diesels) would not only require flying close to coastal air defenses, but maybe the submarine itself may be armed for air defense. That said, an air delivered, standoff ASW weapon (a cousin to Sea Lance?) may have been an interesting Cold War era weapon for attacking Soviet SSBNs inside their bastions. Problems there too, though, like (1) still some need to approach or penetrate thick Soviet air defenses; and (2) need for good targeting/location data that couldn't be acquired by sonobuoy. Always fun to speculate.

From Flight International DATE: 11/07/08 SOURCE: Flight International Competition quickly forms for new air-launched torpedo By Stephen Trimble A competition is quickly forming to design and build a new weapon that will enable the future US Navy Boeing P-8A Poseidon fleet to attack submarines without first descending to low altitude. Boeing, Lockheed Martin and Raytheon are among the most likely competitors for the contract to develop the high-altitude, anti-submarine weapon concept. This will essentially be a Raytheon Mk54 torpedo modified with a wing kit, datalink and flight controls. A request for proposals is scheduled for September, with contract award likely to follow in the second quarter of 2009, according to an industry source. The completed weapon would be installed as part of the first package of upgrades planned for the P-8A after 2014. The USN has been working on the concept for the past few years. Airframe fatigue for the P-8A's ageing predecessor - the Lockheed P-3C Orion - is partly blamed on the need to practise, descending to low-altitude to release torpedoes. The navy also wants to keep the P-8A at high altitude so the aircrew can continue monitoring the airspace and maritime environment for new threats. Lockheed's design consists of connecting a wing kit to a Mk54 using two metal bands. As the weapon descends to the surface, a pyrotechnic device dislodges the bands to allow the torpedo to jettison from the wing kit. After designing the weapon for the P-3C, Lockheed recently showed that a new version adapted to fit inside the P-8A's weapons bay can be launched at maximum range and altitude from the target. Raytheon is also understood to have demonstrated a similar capability, releasing a guided Mk54 from a Beechcraft King Air in the second quarter of this year, and Boeing is also expected to compete for the same contract. "We know it's going to be a competition," says Richard Fry, Lockheed's business development manager for area attack weapons.

From Flight International DATE: 11/07/08 SOURCE: Flight International Indian Su-30 fighters depart for Red Flag exercise By Radhakrishna Rao An Indian air force contingent with eight Sukhoi Su-30MKI combat aircraft, two Ilyushin Il-78 air-to-air refuellers and one Il-76 transport has left India to participate in the 9-23 August multinational exercise Red Flag '08 at the US Air Force's Nellis AFB in Nevada. It will be the first time that the Russian-made Su-30MKI will participate in multinational manoeuvres involving US and other NATO fighters. India expects to spend around Rp1 billion ($23 million) on its participation in the air combat exercise. Sources in India's state-owned Defence Research and Development Organisation meanwhile say that preparations are in full swing for the first full test firing of the nation's home-grown Astra beyond-visual-range air-to-air missile from an Su-30. DRDO sources say the weapon will interrupt targets at speeds of Mach 1.2 to M1.4, but have not revealed the missile's range. The Astra - intended to arm aircraft such as the Dassault Mirage 2000 and RSK MiG-29 in air force service - has already undergone ground tests to check its avionics, electronics and other subsystems. The DRDO has also hinted at its intention to develop hypersonic weapon systems.

Now, with ever deadlier Adobe Photoshop stealth technology ... New York Times

No worries, Terry. Congrats on the new digs!

Thanks, rainman, for contributing your scenario.

From Defense Aerospace Lockheed Martin HAAWC Demonstrates Compatibility with Multiple Launch Platforms in Wind Tunnel Tests (Source: Lockheed Martin; issued July 9, 2008) ORLANDO, FL --- Lockheed Martin’s enhanced High Altitude Anti-Submarine Warfare Weapons Capability (HAAWC) system recently completed a series of successful high speed wind tunnel tests at a commercial facility in Buffalo, NY. The HAAWC employs a modified Lockheed Martin LongShot Wing Adapter Kit on the MK-54 to allow the launch of torpedoes from high altitudes and long standoff ranges. This technology enables P-3C and P-8A aircrews to launch from outside the range of enemy air defenses. The system is also compatible with shipboard Vertical Launch Systems (VLS). [Emphasis mine. Cool feature!] “We made some minor design changes to the existing, proven design in order to make it compatible with the P-8 and VLS Anti-Submarine Rocket (ASROC), in addition to the P-3,” said Jim Pappafotis, director of the HAAWC program at Lockheed Martin Missiles and Fire Control. “The capability of the system did not change with the new design. HAAWC provides increased mission effectiveness and lethality to both P-3s and P-8s, as well as increases to survivability of both of the aircrew and the aircraft.” HAAWC is a low-cost, self-contained wing adaptor kit that provides range extension and autonomous guidance to a family of existing air-to-surface munitions. No aircraft modification is required to deploy a HAAWC equipped munition. The system is completely self-contained, including a flight control computer, a GPS-based navigation system and power sources. In the wind tunnel test, HAAWC demonstrated expected performance over the full regime of weapon release conditions from the P-3C and P-8A aircraft, enabling the torpedo to be launched at the maximum desired range and altitude from the target. The tests followed successful flight tests of the original system in a Navy sponsored evaluation. Previous versions of the system were compatible with only the P-3C platform, but with the design modifications, HAAWC can be used on all U.S. Navy aircraft used in anti-submarine warfare. In addition, HAAWC can also be successfully employed with MK-41 VLS used to launch torpedoes from surface vessels. The system consists of a wing kit and tail kit connected to the existing torpedo. The wing kit is attached to the torpedo by two metal bands. A pyrotechnic device forces open the bands, enabling the wing kit to jettison normally from the torpedo. In operation, the wing kit jettisons when the torpedo reaches its normal launch altitude close to the surface of the water. From that point, the torpedo follows its normal operational procedures as it would in a normal low altitude launch from a P-3C or P-8A. HAAWC reduces fuel consumption and minimizes mechanical stress on the P-3C and P-8A launching aircraft by allowing it to stay at altitude to launch HAAWC-equipped torpedoes. This will assist in extending the mission time-on-station and reducing fatigue on those aircraft currently in U.S. Navy service as well as future Navy aircraft. When used on the VLS ASROC, HAAWC provides enhanced range, allowing the launching vessel to stay farther away from a submarine. This significantly enhances the survivability of the launch vessel. Headquartered in Bethesda, Md., Lockheed Martin employs about 140,000 people worldwide and is principally engaged in the research, design, development, manufacture, integration and sustainment of advanced technology systems, products and services. The Corporation reported 2007 sales of $41.9 billion.

Boeing Boeing Statement on Defense Department Decision to Reopen KC-X Tanker Bid ST. LOUIS, July 09, 2008 -- Boeing [NYSE: BA] today released the following statement in response to the U.S. Defense Department's decision to reopen the KC-X aerial refueling tanker competition following the company's successful protest of the original $35 billion contract award: "We welcome the decision by Defense Secretary Robert Gates not to proceed with the contract award to Northrop Grumman/EADS and to reopen the KC-X tanker competition. However, we remain concerned that a renewed Request for Proposals (RFP) may include changes that significantly alter the selection criteria as set forth in the original solicitation. As the Government Accountability Office reported in upholding our protest, we submitted the only proposal that fully met the mandatory criteria of the original RFP. "We look forward to working with the new acquisition team as it reopens the competition, but we will also take time to understand the updated solicitation to determine the right path forward for the company. "It's encouraging that the Defense Department intends to take steps to ensure a fair and open competition that, among other things, fully accounts for life-cycle costs, such as fuel, to provide the most capable tanker at the best value for the American taxpayer." [CV32: Wonder if we'll see a KC-777 variant offered?]

From Aviation Week Pentagon Eyes New Tanker RFP By August Jul 9, 2008 By Michael Bruno Boeing and a Northrop Grumman-EADS team will be able to re-bid wholly new proposals for the U.S. Air Force KC-X refueling tanker program, and the Pentagon's acquisition chief expects to choose a winner by the end of the year, officials said today. The defense secretary, Air Force secretary and Defense Department acquisition chief John Young told Pentagon reporters that the move is an attempt to provide a valid acquisition decision as quickly as possible while speeding toward delivery of the new aerial refuelers. Nevertheless, Young said the program's cost and initial operational capability remain uncertain due to the need to re-mount the effort for a third time. Young's office will not just make the final source selection, but it will lead a newly formed source-selection advisory committee. He said the goal was to make as few changes as possible to the Air Force's earlier request for proposals, but enough to address Government Accountability Office concerns. A new RFP is expected late this month or in early August, while the source selection will occur in December. The Air Force's program requirements remain unchanged, Young said, but the bidding rivals will be able to essentially bid anew.

Haha, a typo indeed. Thanks, Pete. Corollary rule: Amateurs type fast, professionals type accurately.

"Amateurs study tactics, professionals study logistics". - General Omar Nelson Bradley, US Army