CV32

Excellent and informative article on China's missile forces: http://geimint.blogspot.com/2009/04/dragon...lery-corps.html

Also probably why USFK moved its Army HQ out of Seoul a few years back.

From Aviation Week China adds precision strike to capabilities Apr 8, 2009 By Richard D. Fisher, Jr. China has been developing and purchasing weapons for precision-strike warfare. This is the hard edge of the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) doctrinal drive toward using increasingly sophisticated information technologies such as C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) to improve the capabilities of weapon systems (DTI March, p. 39). The PLA’s near-term goals appear to be greater asymmetric capabilities to target U.S. naval assets in the western Pacific and in space as part of an anti-access strategy. Long-term, however, greater precision will be a feature of most new weapon systems. China’s growing C4ISR capabilities were demonstrated in March by its coordinated two-fleet operation to intercept two U.S. Navy ocean survey vessels. Chinese ships found and harassed the USNS Victorious, operating in the Yellow Sea, and USNS Impeccable, which was about 75 mi. south of Hainan Island. The fallout was diplomatic, as Washington and Beijing clashed over interpretations of the Law of the Sea Treaty, which Beijing contends gives it rights to deny access to military survey missions. This incident, though, was reminiscent in timing and scope to the April 2001 clash that saw China “capture” a U.S. Navy EP-3 electronic intelligence aircraft off Hainan. China’s aggressive challenge of Japanese claims in the East China Sea, plus Washington’s refusal to cease its survey missions could be flashpoints. In February, a provincial Communist Party newspaper contained a threat to sink U.S. survey ships. In this second of three articles on China’s growing regional power, DTI examines the country’s efforts to improve its ability to target and destroy threats. Since the early 1990s, Chinese military scholars have been warning of the need for China to prepare to defend against, and if necessary, conduct military operations in space. In late 2006 reports emerged of China’s use of high-power ground-based lasers to “dazzle” U.S. surveillance satellites. On Feb. 11, 2007, China launched the first successful intercept by its SC-19 direct-ascent antisatellite (ASAT) system, derived from its KT-1 solid-fuel space-launch vehicle, with an interceptor stage whose development was likely aided by China’s micro-satellite programs. A target FY-2 weather satellite was probably illuminated by large phased-array radar developed for tracking Shenzhou manned space capsules. A far less-noted potential co-orbital ASAT demonstration occurred on Sept. 27, 2008, when the Shenzhou-7 manned spacecraft, which had just launched a BX-1 nanosatellite, passed within 45 km. (28 mi.) of the International Space Station. Following the U.S. Navy’s shootdown of an errant satellite on Feb. 21, 2008, and a Mar. 5, 2008, announcement that Russia would resume ASAT development, it is likely that China will continue ASAT testing. China’s direct-ascent ASAT also proves that it is capable of developing a long-range antiballistic missile (ABM) system, a U.S. pursuit that China has opposed. China had an ABM program from 1963-80 that produced a short-range interceptor prototype and long-range radar. Chinese sources told DTI at the recent IDEX expo in Abu Dhabi (see p. 16) that they have tested the new FD-2000 surface-to-air missile (SAM) in an antitactical ballistic missile (ATBM) mode. Developed with help from Russia’s Almaz-Antey Co., the FD-2000 also draws from the earlier passive-guided FT-2000 SAM, which reportedly benefited from U.S. Patriot SAM technology. These indigenous SAMs are entering PLA service, and will complement about 1,000 Almaz-Antey S-300/PMU-1/PMU-2 SAMs purchased since the early 1990s, giving the PLA air force the most formidable air-defense network in Asia. The PLA has also developed short-range SAM systems—including man-portable air-defense systems—for tracked vehicles and trucks. Among these is the TY-90 Yitian for trucks and armored personnel carriers that was disclosed in 2005, but displayed for the first time at IDEX this year. Increasing precision is also the hallmark of new PLA surface-to-surface missiles and air-launched weapons. New Chinese nuclear ballistic missile warheads feature smaller sharp-tip warheads, signifying higher precision. One warhead configuration for the 12,000-km.-range DF-31A ICBM places at least one warhead on a delivery bus that is apparently capable of radical maneuvering to evade ABM defenses. Medium- and short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) are also being upgraded for greater precision. The U.S. and Japanese navies have long been concerned with the PLA program to create an antiship ballistic missile, by placing a maneuverable terminally guided warhead on the 2,400-km.-range DF-21, and likely, on the 600-km. DF-15. Asian military sources are also concerned that a new 3,000-km. version of the DF-21 may have multiple terminally guided warheads. An early 2009 Taiwanese estimate places the DF‑15, DF-11 Mod2 and new land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs) of the second artillery missile force targeting Taiwan at more than 1,500, with newer versions having navigation satellite (navsat) guidance. In 2007 a Chinese source told DTI that the PLA will also be using two new shorter-range SRBMs, the truck-mounted 250-km. B-611M and 150-km. air-transportable P-12. Both are maneuverable, navsat-guided weapons with modular warheads. The PLA is also developing longer-range artillery rocket-based SRBMs, like the 200-km. navsat-guided WS-3. Some Chinese sources indicate that an antiradar or passive-guided 300-km. version of the WS series is possible. Asian sources say the PLA has developed two families of strategic-range LACMs: the DH-10, which equips new units of the Second Artillery, and YJ-62/C-602, which equips PLA navy destroyers and land-based antiship missile units, and is to be developed into an air-launched version for the PLA air force. The air force is expected to equip a new version of the 1950s-era Soviet Tupolev Tu-16 Badger bomber, the Xian H-6K, with the weapon. The H-6Ks modified with more powerful engines, now have a potential 3,000-km. radius—enough to reach Guam. Rumors have long surrounded a potential long-range bomber program at Xian Aircraft Co., and a new stealthy version of Xian’s JH-7A fighter bomber is also in development. Tactical combat aircraft in the PLA air force and navy are receiving new Russian and indigenously designed air-to-air and ground-attack weapons. The air force’s first Sukhoi Su-27SK fighters had the helmet-sighted Vympel R-73 missile a decade before the Raytheon AIM-9X entered U.S. service. The BVR self-guided Vympel R-77 followed the Su-30MKK into PLA service early this decade. But new Chengdu Aircraft Corp. J-10 and Shenyang Aircraft Corp. J-11B multirole fighters will carry air-to-air missiles designed by Luoyang Opto-Electric Co. (LOEC), which include the self-guided PL-12, thought to have a range approaching 100 km. in lofted delivery. Chinese sources also indicate LOEC is developing a high off-boresight air-to-air missile (AAM) similar to the South African Denel A-Darter, and a long-range ramjet-powered AAM. Russian Su-30s in PLA service have been equipped with several guided munitions, including the Zvezda Kh-31 antiradar and antiship ramjet missile, Zvezda Kh-59 interdiction missile and optical image-correlation-guided KAB series bombs. At the 2005 Moscow air show, a Russian source disclosed that Russia had assisted China’s development of electro-optical targeting pods, which have been photographed on J-10, JH-7A and some Hongdu Q-5 fighter-bombers. These will help guide two new families of laser- and navsat-guided bombs developed by LOEC and China Aerospace Science and Technology Corp. (CASC). The latter’s FT family includes the 500-kg. (1,100-lb.) FT-1 navsat-guided bomb, the FT-2, which adds range-extending wings, the 250-kg. FT-3 and the 100-kg. FT-5, which is reportedly comparable with Boeing’s Small Diameter Bomb. At last November’s Zhuhai air show, LOEC revealed a dual-optical navsat-guided bomb. CASC’s bombs can be expected to follow suit. Precision is being packed into smaller munitions like the new 45-kg. AR-1, a laser-guided missile designed for the CH-3 unmanned combat air vehicle (UCAV), similar in capability to the U.S. Predator-1. Guizhou Aircraft Co. has likely developed a larger turbofan UCAV comparable to the MQ-9 Predator-B/Reaper. Most of China’s new precision-strike systems are for sale. Pakistan and Iran have benefited from China’s ballistic and cruise missile technology, and from sales of conventional systems. Many more countries are likely to consider the $22-million Chengdu FC-1 and $41-million J-10 fighters, especially when equipped with precision-guided munitions like the PL-12 and FT-1. This form of power projection will soon be joined by the PLA’s increasing power-projection capabilities, the subject of the final installment. Richard D. Fisher, Jr., is a senior fellow with the International Assessment and Strategy Center of Arlington, Va., and author of China’s Military Modernization: Building for Regional and Global Reach (Praeger, 2008).

New Loadout Type scheme confirmed as now being present in the HCE official database, the HCDB.

I can confirm that the new Loadout Types scheme does now appear in the HCE official database, the HCDB.

You'll have to take that up with the author of the article, Mr. Cha. However, I hope that you're not caught up in the idea that the DPRK's latest test was a failure. If it was a space launch vehicle (SLV), then yeah, seems it was. But if it was a missile test, then maybe it worked just fine. On paper, yeah. But much of it is quite old (like the old Red Army (hehe, probably the new Red Army too, for that matter), they never actually get rid of anything), and moreover, much of it is static or reliant on protected firing positions. You've probably heard of their extensive Hardened Artillery Sites (HARTS), artillery dug into concrete bunkers and cave networks. So, while they might be able to pour a lot of firepower into the DMZ (if its in all good working order and if they can get their soldiers to actually man those positions ... perhaps a big IF), the almost assured domination of the airspace right above those artillery sites by the ROKAF/USAF means that a heckuva lot of DPRK soldiers would spend their last moments buried in rubble.

Hehe, good catch. When I created the Zumwalt entry, I was building a scenario at the same time and wanted to test how an extremely stealthy warship could closely approach a shore target for naval bombardment. The RCS figure will be adjusted upward in the next iteration. (LCS will probably go up too, btw).

Had a look at this issue while on IRC today with Tony. To get a baseline to work from, I created a scenario with Victory Conditions as follows: Blue Minimum Victory: Destroy 1x CG (ie. Broad Type 'CG') Blue Total Victory: Destroy 4x ships (ie. Type 'Ship') Red Minimum Victory: Destroy 4x Attack aircraft (ie. Broad Type 'Attack') Red Total Victory: Destroy 8x aircraft (ie. Type 'Aircraft') Ran the scenario in EC2003 GIUK Gap using HCDB-090128. Results: Blue sank a Kynda guided missile cruiser (Broad Type 'CG') and Min Vic was awarded. Blue then sank 3x more ships, and Total Vic was awarded. Red downed 4x F/A-18E Block II (Broad Type 'Attack'). No Min Vic was awarded, suggesting that this part of the Victory Conditions code is not working as intended. Red downed 4x more aircraft, and Total Vic was awarded. Now, working from here, moved to editing the lVictoryType table in the PE. The Kynda CG appears as VictoryType 'Combat Med' in the HCDB. So I changed the wording of 'Combat Med' in the lVictoryType table, and exported the new DB. Ran the scenario again. Blue sank the Kynda CG, and again Min Vic was achieved, despite the change in the lVictoryType table. So it looks like we're ok on that front. It was deemed unnecessary to examine the effect of changes in the lPlatformSubTypes table on Vicconds. Conclusions: You can probably safely change the text of the entries in the lVictoryType table without breaking scenario victory conditions, as long as you do not change the numerical index (eg. the index is 0 for 'Combat Med'). To avoid breaking scenario victory conditions, however, the DB designer should not change a platform's Subtype or Victory type.

From Foreign Affairs Pyongbang! Washington’s Korea Conundrum Victor D. Cha April 7, 2009 Summary -- What North Korea hoped to gain from its failed missile launch -- and how Washington can avoid falling into its negotiating trap. VICTOR D. CHA is Associate Professor, Director of Asian Studies, and D. S. Song-Korea Foundation Chair in Asian Studies and Government at Georgetown University. From 2004 to 2007, he served as Director of Asian Affairs on the staff of the National Security Council and Deputy Head of the U.S. delegation to the six-party talks. On Sunday, North Korea launched a Taepodong-2 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) that went farther than any of its predecessors before falling harmlessly into the Pacific. What was the point of the exercise? Pyongyang claims the launch was designed to put a communications satellite into orbit and that it succeeded in doing so. Nobody else believes either assertion, with officials in the United States, Japan, and South Korea portraying the launch as a test of a long-range delivery system for a nuclear weapon. Instant commentary in the West saw the launch as essentially a cry for help -- a bid to win attention from the Obama administration and start a new round of talks from a stronger bargaining position. The problem with this explanation is that Stephen Bosworth, Washington's newly appointed special envoy for North Korea, was just in Asia armed with a very clear message from President Obama about the administration's readiness to engage in immediate high-level bilateral negotiations -- and got no answer. In reality, the launch probably reflects two other dynamics. The first is a straightforward desire by North Korea to advance its ballistic missile technology. Countries do not pursue ICBMs or nuclear weapons simply to accumulate negotiating chips. Pyongyang's devotion of massive amounts of very scarce resources to such projects suggests it actually wants to acquire these capabilities and be accepted by the world as a nuclear weapons state. It is unlikely to be willing to trade them away in return for international acceptance and a peace treaty with the United States. The second dynamic apparently at work is turbulence inside the North Korean ruling elite provoked by the poor health of Kim Jong Il. The missile test, after all, represents only the latest in a string of bad behavior on North Korea's part over the last several months. At the end of 2008, Pyongyang walked away from previous understandings it had reached with U.S. negotiators regarding verification of its nuclear declaration. In early 2009, it spewed fiery rhetoric against South Korea and Japan. And in the month before the launch, it ejected U.S. food-donor teams and detained two American journalists, Laura Ling and Euna Lee. All these actions are likely external manifestations of political fluidity within Pyongyang sparked by Kim's debility. While negotiating today, the United States needs to prepare for the real opportunities for engagement that may lie down the road. So how do you solve a problem like Korea? Should the United States and its allies just ride out this rough patch in North Korean behavior, hoping to reengage at some later date? Absolutely not -- even though that is what is likely to happen, with Pyongyang once again suffering little more than a slap on the wrist for its actions. Sunday's launch was a violation of UN Security Council Resolution 1718 -- passed in the aftermath of North Korea's 2006 nuclear test -- but opposition from China and Russia will probably prevent the Security Council from imposing sanctions. And the United States, bogged down in two wars, will not contemplate military action that could precipitate a third. Far from punishment, in fact, what North Korea's brazen actions will most likely bring is more inconclusive diplomacy. China will use its leverage to press Pyongyang back to the six-party negotiating table, where the North will entertain urgent appeals from others to open a new track of missile negotiations in conjunction with the far from finished denuclearization talks. North Korean negotiators will then string out the new diplomatic track, eliciting goodies from the other parties while giving away little, even as North Korea's ballistic missile and nuclear warhead programs slowly advance. Given Pyongyang's record of proliferation -- which includes selling nuclear and missile secrets to rogue regimes across the globe -- this cycle of futility has to stop. The stakes for American security are simply too high. Some observers recommend trying to end Kim's nuclear ambitions by offering him a peace treaty and normalized relations with the United States, but such a course would achieve the opposite effect, giving hardliners in Pyongyang a justification for retaining their nuclear weapons while raising fears in Japan about the reliability of Washington's security guarantee. So while Obama should continue to extend the hand of negotiation to Pyongyang, his administration should also embark on two other tracks: in the short-term, calculated pressure to punish Pyongyang's missile launch, and in the longer-term, preparing for a united peninsula, free and democratic. First, the United States should enforce Resolution 1718 and reimpose economic sanctions, including financial sanctions to target entities that finance ballistic missile development. These types of sanctions, similar to ones used in 2005 and 2006, hit at the personal riches of the North Korean leadership that are stashed away in accounts in Europe and Asia and can be very effective. They were lifted in 2007 in light of North Korea's agreement to allow international inspection and disablement of its nuclear facility at Yongbyon, but it is time for similar instruments to be put to use again. Second, Obama should consider restoring North Korea to the list of state sponsors of terrorism, using the revelations of Pyongyang's help to Damascus's nuclear program as justification. Third, he should instruct relevant agencies to start a quiet but serious dialogue with China and South Korea about how to deal with a post-Kim leadership, reaching out (along with Japan) to potential new leaders in Pyongyang by offering them the prospect of security assurances and economic assistance in return for constructive policies. Fourth, the United States and other countries should offer to educate and feed every North Korean child and dramatically increase humanitarian assistance to the North Korean people in general, including food, medicine, education, and energy. (Some of this could even be tied to stimulus package efforts to employ U.S. workers from Michigan and elsewhere on winterization and house-building projects in North Korea.) All these measures can and should supplement the existing six-party diplomacy. Sustaining the six-party talks is critical for continuing the disablement and degradation of Pyongyang's nuclear capabilities. But U.S. strategy needs to acknowledge that there will never be a true end to the North's nuclear ambitions so long as Kim and his immediate circle remain in power. While negotiating today, therefore, the United States needs to prepare for the real opportunities for engagement that may lie down the road.

Should be under Unguided Air Ordnance (I forget the specific annex offhand). In the interim, the LAU-3/3A contains 19x 2.75 inch (70mm) Folding Fin Aerial Rockets (FFARs). Hang weight is ~200 kg, DP 10. The M229 warhead is HE, while the M261 warhead is a submunition payload.

Sorry, T, I can look at this.

From Navy Times Next-gen carrier launch system could be shelved By Christopher P. Cavas - Staff writer Posted : Monday Apr 6, 2009 15:46:34 EDT A decision point is looming for the Navy’s biggest shipbuilding project: whether to launch carrier aircraft using cutting-edge — but untried, over-budget and behind-schedule — electromagnetic technology, or return to heavy, bulky, maintenance-intensive steam catapult systems that offer proven reliability. Acting Navy Secretary B.J. Penn and Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Gary Roughead are to be briefed in mid-April by service officials on the status of the electromagnetic aircraft launch system, which is to be installed on the new Gerald R. Ford aircraft carrier, a three-star admiral said. The briefing also will include cost, schedule and other data that would result from replacing EMALS on the carrier with steam cats. The review was spurred by technical development problems with EMALS that took place last year, causing further cost growth and production delays. Navy officials declined to reveal cost growth figures, citing the ongoing study, while industry officials have characterized the most recent delays as adding “a couple months” to the schedule. Fabrication work on Ford already has begun, making an early decision on the launch system a necessity before construction proceeds much further. But putting a finer point on the issue is the apparent desire by the Navy to include changes to the carrier program in the fiscal 2010 budget now being prepared by the Pentagon and the Obama administration. The budget is expected to be submitted to Congress in mid-May. Navy officials have not released any cost figures for a potential steam system swap-out. “We don’t know what the delay would be. We don’t know what the cost would be,” Vice Adm. Barry McCullough, deputy chief of naval operations for integrations of capabilities and resources, told reporters April 1 after testifying before Congress. “Obviously at this point in the design of an aircraft carrier, if you’ve got to change it, there would be some delays and some cost increase. We just want to make sure we understand all the options.” Some commercial sources have speculated that the total cost of a swap could approach $1 billion. Such a figure would include purchase of the systems, extensive redesign work in many areas of the ship, the cost of schedule delays, and provision for additional crew members to operate and maintain the system. Unofficial estimates of the added number of people that would result from installing a steam system vary, although it may be no more than 35 to 40 additional sailors. Untested waters Concerns over the viability of the EMALS are not new, and have long been part of the Ford-class carrier program. Although the ship’s keel-laying is to take place later this year, the first launch of a live aircraft by an EMALS isn’t scheduled to happen until 2010. According to a recent report by the Government Accountability Office, the EMALS won’t demonstrate full performance of a shipboard-ready system until at least seven months after system installation is to begin on the ship, and after the flight deck has been laid down. The GAO cites the EMALS as one of the highest risk factors in keeping the construction of the new carrier on cost and schedule, along with the untried dual-band radar system. The option to revert to the steam system has been “an option since the inception of the program,” Allison Stiller, the Navy’s top shipbuilding official, said after testifying with McCullough. Earlier, in response to a question about EMALS from House Appropriations defense subcommittee chairman Rep. John Murtha, D-Pa., Stiller explained that, “We’re looking at all options. There has been cost growth to the EMALS system. We’re looking at the total cost of acquisition and life cycle for EMALS and steam. We’re looking at schedule and what does that do if we went back to steam on CVN 78. What would that do to schedules. We’re in the process of getting information from industry so that we can make an informed decision.” Asked by Murtha whether the EMALS problems were slowing the construction schedule, Stiller replied, “We do not see that it will have an impact on the actual schedule of the carrier at this point in time.” Another key lawmaker is headed to the EMALS factory near Tupelo, Miss., to check on the situation. Asked April 1 whether he thought the EMALS program was in trouble, Rep. Gene Taylor, D-Miss., chairman of the House Armed Services seapower subcommittee said, “I don’t know. I’m hearing different things. That’s why I’m headed down to the factory next week.” Confidence from builder Scott Forney, head of the EMALS program for manufacturer General Atomics, expressed confidence that past problems with the system have been resolved. “We lost a couple of months last year” in the schedule, he said in an April 1 interview, acknowledging “a couple of months of difficulty between September and December.” But the company is keeping to a new, revised schedule agreed on in January. “We’ve been marching to it ever since,” Forney said. “I am pretty confident in our schedule, that we can support the schedule for the aircraft carrier. We have great confidence in the schedule.” Forney declared support for including a backup plan in the carrier program. “I certainly endorse having a backup plan, and the backup plan is steam,” he said. A six-month margin for delivery to shipbuilder Northrop Grumman has been built into the EMALS development schedule, Forney said. “We start delivering material from 2010 to 2014. We help install hardware. Everything has to be available to install by 2014.” Delivery of Ford to the Navy is scheduled for September 2015.

Congrats, Darren, on the new release.

Quoted for general and widespread applicability to just about anything that begins with "Harpoon".

From Ares Blog Out Comes The Gates Chopper Posted by Bill Sweetman at 4/6/2009 7:50 AM CDT Defense Secretary Robert Gates takes the podium at 1330 DC time today, to announce what's expected to be the most important set of defense program cuts in decades. Webcast will be here. Without trying to pretend we know who will be rejoicing and who will be crying into their martinis when Happy Hour draws a veil over the the ravaged streets of Crystal City, here are some of the key points everyone will be listening for. F-22: Gates could cut the program off; approve 20 more aircraft, but no more than that; or clear the next 20 and let the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) decide on another 20+, but allow no more after that. F-35: Will not be cut except possibly in total numbers; Gates may even recommend acceleration of early production, despite what the GAO says. However, the F136 alternate engine may be killed again, adding to the total savings to be claimed today. Future Combat System: It's not whether Gates will propose restructuring and delays, but how much. Tankers: Will Gates endorse Congress's proposed split buy? Transformation Satellite (TSAT): Even if Gates takes an entrenching tool to its zombie brain, the program will shamble on under one identity or another. Carriers: Gates could endorse a cut in air wing numbers, to ten or even nine - but the latter will lead to a congressional war with the homeports that will make Stalingrad look like the Teddy-Bears' Picnic. DDG-1000: Gates could try to cancel the whole program, picking a fight with ship-building states, or axe the third ship in the class. We'll see today whether he wants to deal with the follow-on CG-X anti-missile cruiser, or defer it to the QDR. LCS: This program is already generating bad news for the Pentagon, so Gates may announce restructuring to a greater or lesser degree. The question is how: the trimaran General Dynamics ship is late, but may yet prove better than Lockheed Martin's monohull. VH-71: In splatter-movie terms, VH-71 today is the first cheerleader who says "you guys stay here, I'll check the basement." Missile defense: Boeing's Airborne Laser team and Northrop Grumman's Kinetic Energy Interceptor group will be biting their nails. However, after North Korea's missile test, this area may be safer than it was on Friday. Stay tuned for updates.

Tony has whipped up a subforum for the Current Events forum called "Raw Intel" which will import RSS feeds from select websites and blogs. Take a look here at what our HG S2 (intel officer) is digging up.

Radar Warning Receiver. See Rule 4.3 on page 4-5. See Rule 4.2.4.3 on page 4-4. I think Maverick variants are launched at Low altitude? (There are maximum range limitations that are sometimes dependent on launch altitude).

Welcome aboard, Matt! Make yourself at home. (Matt and I met during the massive Global Thunder MBX a few years back .. feels more like millennia).

It looks like they got the first stage right, anyway. (That's the one that gave em trouble before). Looks like there were issues with the second stage.

Klaus, submit your updated scenario file at the Downloads page and we'll approve the upload. Its better than attaching it here.

From Flight International DATE: 03/04/09 SOURCE: Air Transport Intelligence news Japanese carriers change flightpaths to avoid North Korea missile By Leithen Francis Japanese carriers are changing flightpaths to Europe and Hawaii in response to North Korea's planned missile launch later this month. All Nippon Airways and Japan Airlines (JAL) have announced that all flights to Europe and Hawaii will operate on a different flightpath for the period 4-8 April. This is in response to the planned launch by North Korea, the carriers say. ANA operates to London, Paris and Frankfurt; while JAL operates to Amsterdam, Rome, Paris, Milan and London. North Korea has said publicly it is launching a satellite but the USA and other countries say it is really a missile test. South Korean carriers such as Asiana Airlines and Korean Air have since early last month altered flightpaths in response to concerns over North Korea. The carriers made the changes at the behest of the South Korean Government which on 6 March issued a public statement ordering the country's airlines to bypass North Korean airspace on international flights.

From Flight International DATE: 03/04/09 SOURCE: Flight International Brazilian fighter programme ready to fly By Rebecca Barrett Financial constraints and an unwillingness to commit investment impeded Brazil's first attempt at a fighter programme. But the age of its fighter fleet now threatens the nation's security to the point that the government's back is against the wall and it has been forced to respond. Fortunately for Brazil, it appears that the pieces necessary to complete the project are in place. Years of strong economic growth will be the backbone of support for Project FX-2. The programme will offer Brazil a capital return on its investment through the strengthening of its military industry. Regardless of which fighter is selected, a renewed inventory of next-generation aircraft will offer Brazil prestige. The military investment, both industrial and practical, will boost the country's standing in the international scene. As the giant of Latin America, Brazil is finally prepared for Project FX-2 to take flight. The Brazilian armed forces' requirement for a new fleet of fighters dates to 1996, when an initial request for information was issued. A lack of funding for the programme, then dubbed project FX, caused continual delays for the following nine years. There was even hesitation within the air force about committing to a fighter generation that was, at the time, already being surpassed in the world fighter market by more capable aircraft. By February 2005, Project FX was cancelled. In the same year, the air force's fleet of Dassault Mirage IIIs surpassed its projected design life. The airframes were too worn out to be worth upgrading, and Northrop F-5s and Alenia/Embraer AMXs also needed replacing. Then, in September 2007, President Luiz Ignacio Lula da Silva struck a nationalistic chord by promising to rebuild the domestic defence industry while overhauling the military. The Lula administration, always reticent about the cost of such a procurement, decided to resurrect the fighter programme when the air force again pegged the procurement as its top priority. All plans from the initial FX programme were scrapped, and FX-2 was created according to current and future needs. The original FX programme was estimated to cost between $700 million and $800 million for an initial batch of 12 fighters. With the advent of FX-2, new plans and evolving needs have driven the cost up substantially, with the government prepared to invest $2.2 billion for the first batch of 36 aircraft. And the government is going a step further, saying that it is willing to pay even more depending on the deal - as much as four times more. The defence ministry has confirmed that the aircraft will not be chosen within a monetary framework, as a price tag cannot be placed on the long-term technological benefit the nation will receive. In February, the three shortlisted companies - Boeing, Dassault and Saab - made their final offers to the defence ministry. Saab is offering an enhanced version of the Gripen NG. The next-generation multirole fighter has low operational, acquisition and support costs, and offers a Selex-built active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar. The version offered to Brazil also has increased thrust, payload and an extended range. Able to be deployed from just about anywhere, the Gripen offers great flexibility, especially in remote locations where runways are few and far between, much less paved. However, its single engine might deter the Brazilians should they seek to diversify their inventory and operating capability. The engine is a General Electric F414G, similar to the Boeing F/A-18E/F Super Hornet's F414-400. Minor differences include changes to the alternator for added power and modified full authority digital engine control software to enhance the single-engine operation. To increase its chances, the Swedish company reopened an office in Brasilia in October 2008 as a demonstration of its dedication to Brazil and its desire to improve the nation's industrial strength. While a winner will not be selected until later this year, there has been speculation over Dassault, based on relations between the Brazilian and French governments. The French company is notably a good supplier that offers no political interference on technology transfer. In addition, it is motivated to make the sale as it still lacks its first export customer for the Rafale. As a true multirole fighter, the Rafale offers versatility, by combining ground attack with air-to-air combat. It is also capable of beyond visual range air-to-air firing at low altitudes. But its narrow range of integrated weapons could deter the Brazilians. The on-board radar is a Thales-built terrain-following RBE-2. An AESA radar will not be available on the Rafale until 2012. After problems with the US Congress sanctioning a technology transfer, Boeing has offered the F/A-18E/F to the Brazilian air force. Although the sale has been cleared, fear of political interference in the future could push the Brazilians away from selecting a US company. However, the difficulty in attaining US technology makes the Super Hornet attractive, as it offers prestige, enhancing Brazil's strong position in the southern hemisphere. Compared with the Rafale and the Gripen, some regard the Super Hornet's aerodynamic performance as inferior. However, it arguably offers the best on-board systems technology and has a Raytheon APG-79 AESA radar. Brazil did not specify that an AESA should be in the package, but it could play an important part in the selection process, because of the technical knowhow it will bring. Many of the recent fighter competitions around the globe have been won by aircraft equipped with AESA radar. In some cases, 1970s-designed aircraft equipped with AESA radar have defeated more modern opponents with older types of radar. Export versions of the Boeing F-15E carrying a Raytheon APG-63 AESA radar beat the Rafale in Singapore and South Korea. The Lockheed Martin F-16 Block 60 equipped with a Northrop Grumman APG-80 agile beam radar also defeated newer models from Europe (the Eurofighter Typhoon and Rafale) in a contest to supply the United Arab Emirates with 80 aircraft. Aircraft equipped with AESA radars are not guaranteed to be selected over their non-AESA equipped counterparts, but they seem to have had a significant advantage in the most recent competitions. The Brazilian procurement will include a new fleet of at least 120, possibly as many as 150, supersonic fighters to be in operation between 2023 and 2025. The Gripen is the most affordable, followed by the Super Hornet and then the Rafale. The average cost of a Gripen is between $37 million and $42 million, bringing the total cost for the first batch to $1.33-$1.51 billion. The Super Hornets are listed at $54.6 million, with a first batch estimated to cost $1.97 billion. The Rafales run for $59 million to $64 million and will cost between $2.12 billion and $2.3 billion for a consignment of 36 aircraft. Although the South American giant faces no imminent threats and has a peaceful approach to foreign relations, Project FX-2 offers security. Having a large fighter fleet is the meat to Brazil's flaring muscle. And technology independence provides security through the economic benefit of an export industry and the ability to meet the nation's military needs. In that regard, FX-2 plays a key role in Brazil's national defence strategy. The new strategy, presented in December 2008, stresses the importance of national sovereignty and identifies the role of the military industrial complex in Brazil's national development plan. The document calls for the expansion of the armed forces to protect the Amazon region and its borders as well as the retraining of troops to be capable of rapid-strike guerilla warfare. Seeking to be a more expansive national power within South America, Brazil aims to be independent from the military technology of other nations. The restructuring of the Brazilian defence industry is one of the three main axes of the national defence strategy. In accordance with the plan, technology transfer is a requirement of Project FX-2. While this came close to keeping US-based companies out of the competition, it may just give one of the three final contenders a winning edge. A responsible monetary policy and several years of strong economic growth have put Brazil in a good position to afford an investment of this magnitude - an investment that the nation hopes will yield long-term dividends. Brazil has adopted measures to soften the impact of the global financial crisis. The first were aimed at the credit markets to guarantee greater liquidity in the interbank market. Compulsory deposits from the central bank were then reinvested into the economy. Foreign exchange was provided to the market to assure foreign investors that the government has sufficient funds to pay off external debts and reduce the risk of a moratorium. Despite the recession, the government is committed to maintaining its investment programmes. President Lula da Silva has insisted on strategic financing based on long-term investments. Funding the military industry is one of the most important strategic moves for Brazil. Increasing military industrial capabilities will put the country in the running with the major European powers, China, India, Russia and the USA. As a BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) country, Brazil is seeking to improve its position, not only as a regional leader, but as a global player. After years of failed attempts to fulfil the requirement, Brazil's fighter programme will deliver more than just an attack capability. The advanced supersonic fighter technology to be gained from Project FX-2 will give Brazil a competitive edge in the region for future industrial production. For now, the economic pedestal on which FX-2 stands remains firmly planted and able to weather economic blunders. With the engine of growth running strong, the outlook for FX-2 is optimistic. * Rebecca Barrett is an analyst for Forecast International. Based in Newtown, Connecticut, it provides market intelligence and analysis in aerospace, defence, power systems and military electronics.

From Ares Blog TSSAM Settled, Is A-12 Next? Posted by Robert Wall at 4/3/2009 7:59 AM CDT The long-running legal saga over the Pentagon’s cancellation of the TSSAM stealthy cruise missile is over. Could it pre-sage a settlement for the A-12? Northrop Grumman has announced the end to two cases between it and the government over the Tri-Service Standoff Attack Missile, which the Pentagon announced Dec. 9, 1994 would be cancelled. Northrop began the development program in1986 under a fixed-price, incentive fee contract. The decision was part of a slew of program adjustments the Clinton Administration made on that day, including restructuring the RAH-66 Comanche helicopter, which has since been cancelled as well, and a decision to reduce F-22 and V-22 procurement. The cuts, the Pentagon promised, would save $7.7 billion. The TSSAM cancellation alone was promised to yield $2.1 billion in savings. The docket over the TSSAM court case is voluminous. Due to the classified aspects of the stealthy missile, lawyers at one point argued the case could be bigger and more complex than the one over the Defense Dept.’s 1991 decision to cancel the U.S. Navy’s A-12 Avenger II stealthy attack aircraft program. In the end, the TSSAM settlement is somewhat anti-climatic. Northrop Grumman wins one round, and loses another. The awards cancel each other out. Northrop Grumman claimed that the cancellation for convenience by the government meant it was owed more money. The Justice Dept. determined that was the case, awarding Northrop Grumman $325 million. However, the Justice Dept. also upheld the government’s claim concerning problems with microelectronic parts from missile supplier TRW, which has since become part of Northrop Grumman, also to the tune of $325 million. Northrop’s earnings will actually show a positive outcome from the case, since it took a provision in 2006 for the microelectronics claim. Although the outcome may be financially positive for Northrop, TSSAM also effectively drove the company out of the standoff missile business and the Perry, Georgia, facility where TSSAM was to be built was closed. TSSAM was initially supposed to be a missile for the U.S. Air Force and Navy for air-launched applications (the AGM-173A), and Army for ground-launched applications (the MGM-137B). There would actually be four versions, two for precision attack and two to dispense submunitions. At one point, production was planned to reach 6,650 missiles. There were even plans to see if the U.K. would buy into the program. The Army was the first to jump-ship, followed by the Navy. The Air Force, which led the program, remained with the TSSAM until the bitter end.The development and production program was estimated at $14.5 billion at the time. The Navy, to fill the capability gap, eventually opted for the Boeing Standoff Land-Attack Cruise Missile – Expanded Response. The Air Force launched the Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile program. When the Lockheed Martin missile started encountering development problems and cost growth, there was concern it could become another TSSAM in the making; in that case, however, the Air Force managed to see the program through into production. The TSSAM case and A-12 situation are far from identical, but there are parallels. TSSAM was cancelled for convenience, not for cause as happened with the A-12. Although it was never said so explicitly, it was the legal battle over the A-12 that convinced the government to cancel TSSAM for convenience, not for cause. At cancellation, the missile's unit costs had ballooned to over $2 million per copy from a target of around $720,000. There have been on-again, off-again talks between the Pentagon and Boeing and General Dynamics, the industrial partners legally responsible now for the A-12, to settled the case that stems from the 1991 cancellation of the program under then-Defense Secretary Dick Cheney. He asked for the program to be killed for cause after finding the program was behind schedule and over cost. But the contractor team (General Dynamics and McDonnell Douglas, now a part of Boeing) insisted the program was canceled for “convenience,” entitling them to termination fees. There are major financial issues at stake. If the court sides with the government, the industry team could be forced to pay more than $2.7 billion. Boeing, in a recent annual filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission, says that it is on the hook for more than $1.6 billion. That includes half of $1.35 billion in progress payments and half of $1.4 billion in interest, as well as another $275 million Boeing would write down in inventory costs. General Dynamics has put its total at risk at around $1.4 billion. But if the court sides with the contractors, Boeing says it stands to receive $1.1 billion, which includes interest. The legal battle has been waging for some time, now. The latest round in the appeal was argued in December. The first ruling in the case came in 2001, when the court sided with the government’s default termination. But that outcome was set aside in 2003 by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit because of apparent mistakes made by the lower court. On May 3, 2007, the lower court again ruled in favor of the government, with the contractors filing their renewed appeal the next day. At times it seemed the high dollar amounts involved and the complexity of the deal would mean a government-industry agreement would be out of reach, but perhaps TSSAM indicates that’s not the case.

Great work, Akula. Thanks a bunch!

From Aviation Week's ARES Blog Blue Skies Ahead for JSF Posted by Bill Sweetman at 4/1/2009 8:01 AM CDT The consensus among independent observers is that we're about to see rapid progress in the Joint Strike Fighter program. Few now doubt that the JSF team will notch up 150-plus flights before the end of Fiscal Year 2009 (at the end of September), getting well established in the short-take-off, vertical landing envelope and paving the way for next year's "12 flights per month per aircraft" goal. Issues such as thermal management are now regarded as easily soluble. Operating at a high level of efficiency - around 98 per cent - the drive system will give off a manageable 450 kW of heat energy, which should be easily dissipated along with the heat from the clutch, designed to operate at around the same temperatures as high-performance aircraft brakes. The team is well on its way to validating the 19 million lines of software code, noting that this is now a small number by car standards. The flight test team has established a technical help center in Bangalore to provide direct-to-the-cockpit VoIP resolution of any issues. In the longer term, experts predict that by 2020, the JSF will be operational with the Joint Dual Range Air Dominance Missile (JDRADM) of which as many as a dozen will fit in the fighter's external bays. In a surprising development, it's expected that the Air Power Australia group will soon issue a new report endorsing the JSF as the replacement for all the RAAF's current aircraft, and that the Swedish air force will announce that it is studying the JSF as an early replacement for the Gripen, due to its under-$60 million price tag and the advantages of interoperability with Norway. [is anyone surprised that Sweetman chose JSF as the focus of this April Fool's Day joke? ]