CV32

After Action Report: Thailand Quarrel [spoiler ALERT] A scenario by Mark Gellis Early in the game I lost the Khamrosin class patrol boat Longlom to an unseen attacker, and I had a pair of F-16s jumped by Su-30s while the Vipers were flying CAP near the Chakri group. It was not an encouraging start. I was able to gain a little redemption by using the P-3T Orion to lure the marauding Su-30s through the air defense envelope of the Chakri group. Radars were energised at the last minute and the Chakri took both down with Sea Sparrow. Several other Indonesian air groups (mostly pairs of F-16s, but including one larger group of Hawks) attempted to approach the Chakri group, but were repelled by AV-8S Harriers. Later I encountered the Ahmad Yani (ex Dutch Van Spejik) class frigates Karel Satsuitub and Slamet Riyadi, each operating alone. Because of their limited air defense, I was able on each occasion to approach closely and drop 500 lb GBU-12 Paveway laser guided bombs that finished them quickly. The Thai Navy Prabrarapak missile craft Hanhak Sattru was surprised and sunk by a trio of RGM-84 Harpoons near the Greater Sunda Islands, for my second naval loss, but I encountered no further Indonesian naval activity in the Gulf of Thailand. The game ended in a draw. As usual, Mark has produced a small scale scenario that isn't too taxing on your time or patience but nevertheless provides enjoyable gameplay.

A very interesting graphic, thanks to the blog at Steeljaw Scribe:

This one could end nasty.

From Aviation Week's ARES Blog July Horror Show Finale Posted by Douglas Barrie at 3/31/2009 8:01 AM CDT The fate of the Airbus A400M – at least as far as the UK is concerned – will be decided by July. Any bets on a decision being coughed-up on the last day of Parliament before the summer recess? The august members’ minds will be on sun, sea, and sand, rather than the mess of a development progam which is leaving a hole in the Royal Air Force’s lift capability. Airbus CEO Tom Enders was quoted in Parliament, March 30, by Liam Fox, the Conservative shadow defense-secretary, as saying “It is better to put an end to the horror than have horror without end,” - apparently popular German phrase. Enders comments over the weekend also provoked a flurry of activity from EADS saying that it would not pull the plug on the program, while reiterating “the contract signed in 2003 does not provide the necessary conditions for the successful development of the program.” Fox describes the program as a “fiasco”. Certainly so far those involved have not particularly covered themselves in glory. Irrespective however – whether the program stands or falls – the requirements will remain. John Hutton, the Def, Sec. told Fox that the UK “will come to a decision on the A400M in July.” The industrial implications of pulling out – for the UK – may well temper political exasperation with industry’s failings. Additional lift – leased or bought – will be required until when, and if, the A400M eventually turns up at RAF Brize Norton.

lotta rust there Yeah, the Persian Gulf has quite high salinity, and without your anechoic coating/paint, I expect the rust starts to form pretty quick when you're surfaced.

Ah, the September 2005 incident. Okay. You're welcome.

Turkish?

Yes, the game is moving.

From Aviation Week Russian Subs To Have Nuke Cruise Missiles Mar 30, 2009 Alexey Komarov/Moscow The Russian Navy is planning in two years to receive its first multipurpose nuclear-powered submarines with long-range cruise missiles, a move that could follow with arming them with low-capacity nuclear warheads, a Russian defense ministry source told the official Itar-Tass news agency there March 27. The new Severodvinsk attack submarine - Project 855 Yasen, also known as Graney - is expected to be commissioned in 2011. At least six such subs of the class will be built, the ministry said. The Sevmash shipyard could complete deliveries of the entire group by 2017. Manufacturing of the Severodvinsk was initiated at the end of 1993 and was practically frozen for more than a decade due to luck of adequate financing. The Severodvinsk's long-range cruise missiles could be equipped with low-capacity nuclear warheads and intended to attack aircraft carrier strike groups, as well as a coastal targets, the ministry said. The missile could maneuver at a hypersonic speed at its terminal phase of flight. New weapon capabilities could influence Russian Navy strategy. "Probably, tactical nuclear weapons [on submarines] will play a key role in the future," Vice Adm. Oleg Burtsev, deputy head of the Navy General Staff, told the Ria Novosti state news agency. "Their range and precision are gradually increasing." "There is no longer any need to equip missiles with powerful nuclear warheads. We can install low-capacity warheads on existing cruise missiles," he said. Nevertheless, the Navy is planning to boost and upgrade its fleet of strategic submarines, carrying larger nuclear ballistic missiles. "We will build at least six Borey-class [Project 955] strategic submarines to serve in the Northern and the Pacific fleets," Burtsev said. The Yury Dolgoruky, the Borey-class flagship, already is built and is undergoing trials. The sub will carry up to 16 Bulava-M (SS-NX-30) solid-propellant rocket engine ballistic missiles, which are still in development. Ten Bulava test launches have been conducted since 2003, with only five officially recognized as successful. Nevertheless, Deputy Defense Minister Vladimir Popovkin said the ministry expects to complete trials by the end of this year. Consequently, more than four missiles will be built and tested this year. Ria Novosti reported a year ago that Russian officials had predicted wrapping up tests in 2008. The Russian Navy is believed to operate a fleet of about 60 subs, including 10 nuclear-powered strategic boats and more than 30 nuclear-powered attack subs.

Thanks Mark!

I assume you're aware of the "Current Events" subforum here? Not that you can't talk about it here, of course, particularly if there's a H4/other wargame angle, but chances are you will find more discussion in the above noted subforum.

With OPSEC in mind, I can say that even for what looks to be a relatively simple scenario, there are a LOT of little things to consider. I'm sure the players will have plenty to say when its over.

Consider it done. A new iteration of the HCDB should be released soon. Thanks for the suggestion.

File Name: Even More Wrath File Submitter: CV32 File Submitted: 29 Mar 2009 File Category: IOPG DB Used: HCDB-090128 Authors: Brad Leyte (remake) Battleset-IOPG: .scp - EC2003 - EC2003 Even More Wrath A Harpoon Commander's Edition (HCE) scenario for the EC2003 Battle for the IOPG Battleset. This is a remake of the original scenario "Wrath" produced for the same battleset. This scenario is intended for play by the BLUE side only. The CIA has developed absolute proof the Iranian and Libyan governments were directly involved in the recent terrorist attacks against US forces. The National Command Authority has authorized Operation "Double Jeopardy." Forces attached to the US Sixth Fleet in conjunction with TF 68.0 will attack assigned targets in Iran and Libya. The CRAF system has been mobilized and lead elements of the Rapid Deployment Force are expected to touch down in theater within 48 hours. Click here to download this file

From Aviation Week's Ares Blog Mystery Shrouds Air Strike in Sudan Posted by David Eshel at 3/27/2009 12:17 PM CDT Last January, unidentified fighter jets reportedly hit a convoy of Iranian weapons bound for Hamas in Gaza as the trucks made their way across the Sudani desert toward the Egyptian border. For unknown reasons, the strike was revealed only yesterday, Thursday March 26. Intelligence analysts here believe that the arms convoy was headed across the Gulf of Suez to Sinai and, from there, through the tunnels that serve Hamas in Gaza. No one has so far officially admitted carrying out this strike, but whoever did this one, was operating with pretty hard intelligence," said Mark Heller, principal research associate of the Institute for National Security Studies at Tel Aviv University. "The strike itself would have required satellite guidance or cameras on the missiles," Mr. Heller said. "There are only two air forces that could have carried it out: the U.S. and Israeli." The United States has strongly denied carrying out any such attack. Although Israel did not officially respond to the CBS report, outgoing prime minister Ehud Olmert's remark Thursday that "we act everywhere we can hit terror infrastructure, close and less close," can be seen as an unofficial confirmation of the report. The alleged Israeli air force strike on a weapons convoy in Sudan was a signal to Hamas and Iran that Israel had exposed their smuggling route, and that they should cease using it, a security analyst said on Thursday. Maj. Gen. (res.) Prof. Yitzhak Ben-Israel, who headed the Defense Ministry's weapons development program, said "the main innovation in the attack on Sudan, according to reports, was the ability to hit a moving target at such a distance ... The fact that Israel has the technical ability to do such a thing proves even more what we are capable of in Iran." Maj. Gen. (res.) Gil Regev said the fact that this was a moving target whose exact location was not known in advance affected the pilots' training, since they could not rehearse a precise mission outline. "But today, we have the platforms, and the pilots routinely train for such long distances, as well as for aerial refueling," he said. It was not the first time that Israelis operated over Sudan. In the mid-1980s with Mossad agents to facilitate the airlift of Ethiopian Jews to Israel in Operation Moses. Former IAF commander Eitan Ben-Eliyahu said Thursday the main difficulty in such an attack is precise intelligence. Getting there requires a flight of about two and a half hours, presumably on a southerly flight path along the Red Sea coast, below Saudi and Egyptian radar and with aerial refueling. As for Israeli precision intelligence, both Hamas and Hezbollah leaders were surprised after the Air Israeli Air Force hit their camouflaged pits, prepared in advance containing launchers armed with rockets, with near 100% precision. Although the actual strike could be carried out against low risk opposition, the very decision was risky, from both political and operational considerations as with any attack 1,400 kilometers away from home bases. However the mission was apparently considered necessary due to highly critical intelligence, that Iran was about to inject a significant quantity of advanced long-range weapons into Gaza, possibly 70-kilometer-range Fajr rockets, which could reach Tel Aviv. With this supply route now discovered, Iran will certainly find other ways to continue to send weapons to their clients in Gaza. While air strikes and intercepting sea lanes might perhaps delay some of those shipments, the best way to stop the weapons influx, is still to close the Rafah border line, through Israeli military reoccupation and once and for all destroy the subterranean smuggling city- the main Hamas weapons life-line.

From Defense Update Mystery Shrouds Air Strike in Sudan A convoy of trucks carrying weapons destined for the Hamas in Gaza through Sudan was attacked and destroyed January 2009 but no country has assumed responsibility on this attack. Sudanese State Minister for Highways, Mabrouk Mubarak Saleem confirmed that a "major power bombed small trucks carrying arms, burning all of them. According to Sudan-Tribune the attack launched from a US base in Djibouti took place in a desert area northwest of Port Sudan city, near Mount al-Sha'anun and destroyed all 17 trucks in the convoy killing 39 people, among them Sudanese, Eritreans and Ethiopians. The totality of the attack hints on the employment of a combination of precision attack by fighter bombers and 'mopping up' by special operations 'gunsip' type assets. For example, the AC-130 Spectre flown by US Special Operations Command uses direct fire 40mm and 105mm guns. However, the true identity of the attacker remains unknown. Unidentified US officials disputed the report about US involvement in the operation. A CBS report aired yesterday (March 25, 2009) claims the Israel Air Force fighter bombers have carried the attack however, official Israeli sources refused to confirm or deny the report. According to CBS News national security correspondent David Martin the Israeli intelligence learned of plans to move weapons through Sudan, north toward Egypt and then via the Sinai into the Gaza Strip. During the final days of the Israeli offensive against Hamas Israel and the USA reached a security-intelligence memorandum on intensifying cooperation in a joint effort to block the smuggling of arms from Iran to Hamas via Sudan. CBS also quotes unnamed Israeli security sources saying that an international network has been set in place in which smugglers move arms caches from Iran through the Persian Gulf to Yemen, on to Sudan and then to Egypt and Sinai where they are brought into the Gaza Strip through tunnels. Israeli intelligence has warned that the deliveries include anti-tank missiles, small arms, and military grade high explosives, as well as missiles.

Hehe, no opposition to a logistics model here (far from it), but will it keep the AI from racing at flank speed until he runs out of fuel?

Thanks, JMS. Appreciated. At this rate, we'll eventually build up some idea of what the parameters are. Or, at least, until someone comes along with an epiphany.

From Defense Aerospace China’s Military Capabilities Continue to Grow, Report Says (Source: U.S Department of Defense; issued March 25, 2009) WASHINGTON --- Transformation of the Chinese military has gained speed, but U.S. officials would like to see China become more transparent about military and security affairs, according to a report to Congress released today. The report, called “Military Power of the People’s Republic of China,” provides some new details, “but there are no new, major strategic insights revealed or capabilities revealed,” Pentagon Press Secretary Geoff Morrell said today. In the report, officials said that Chinese transparency has improved over the past year, “but much remains to be learned about China’s national and military strategies, progress and trends in its military modernization, and the related implications for regional security and stability.” China’s increased military ability stems from the nation’s emergence as an economic superpower. With 8 percent per year economic growth, the Chinese have been able to invest significant sums in military modernization. Morrell said the United States continues to ask for “more dialogue and transparency in our dealings with the Chinese government and military, all in an effort to reduce suspicions on both sides.” The Chinese still look at transparency as “a transaction to be negotiated.” U.S. officials would like the Chinese to see transparency as a responsibility that accompanies the accumulation of national power. Without this transparency, conclusions in the report are subject to best guesses by U.S. experts. To begin, the Chinese need to be more transparent in budgeting, the report says. The People’s Liberation Army budget has more than doubled since 2000 -- from $27.9 billion to $60.1 billion. Officials believe the Chinese are underreporting the amount they spend on security. The real budget in 2008 is probably between $105 billion and $150 billion, they said. Llimited transparency can be dangerous and lead to instability. Also, the Chinese reluctance creates uncertainty and increases the potential for misunderstanding and miscalculation, U.S. officials say. “The United States continues to work with our allies and friends in the region to monitor these developments and adjust our policies accordingly,” the report says. Chinese military capabilities have increased tremendously. People’s Liberation Army officials have invested in the acquisition of advanced foreign weapons, and they have fueled hothouse growth in domestic defense industries. The Chinese military also has poured money into research and development. On top of this, there is a far-reaching organizational and doctrinal reform of the People’s Liberation Army. “China’s ability to sustain military power at a distance remains limited, but its armed forces continue to develop and field disruptive military technologies, including those for anti-access/area-denial, as well as for nuclear, space and cyber warfare, that are changing regional military balances and that have implications beyond the Asia-Pacific region,” the report says. China continues to put military pressure on Taiwan. “China’s armed forces are rapidly developing coercive capabilities for the purpose of deterring Taiwan’s pursuit of de jure independence,” the report says. More advanced missiles, more equipment and better-trained troops have deployed to the military regions opposite the island. The military balance in the region continues to shift in Beijing’s favor, the report says, and Taiwan no longer enjoys “air dominance” over the Taiwan Straits. The capabilities the Chinese are putting in place “could in the future be used to pressure Taiwan toward a settlement of the cross-Strait dispute on Beijing’s terms while simultaneously attempting to deter, delay or deny any possible U.S. support for the island in case of conflict,” the report says. Some of the Chinese capabilities have allowed the military to contribute to peacekeeping operations, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief and counter-piracy. “However, some of these capabilities, as well as other, more disruptive ones, could allow China to project power to ensure access to resources or enforce claims to disputed territories,” the report says. The Chinese assert that the People’s Liberation Army is purely defensive and aimed solely at protecting China’s security and interests. “Over the past several years, China has begun a new phase of military development by beginning to articulate roles and missions for the PLA that go beyond China’s immediate territorial interests,” the report says. But these statements have not cleared up international community questions about the purposes and objectives of the PLA’s evolving doctrine and capabilities. China has modernized its intercontinental ballistic missile arsenal with the deployment of DF-31 and DF-31A missiles, the report says. They also are readying to launch a new class of ballistic missile submarines soon, it says. The Chinese military has worked to develop anti-access and area-denial weapons, the report says. This capability goes beyond the nation’s borders. China has developed the capability to hold surface ships, including aircraft carriers, at risk. The weaponry includes quiet submarines, advanced anti-ship cruise missiles, wire-guided and wake-homing torpedoes, or anti-ship ballistic missiles. They are working to deny use of shore-based airfields, secure bastions and regional logistics hubs via conventional ballistic missiles with greater ranges and accuracy, and land-attack cruise missiles, the report says. The Chinese also can project air power using new advanced aircraft, advanced long-range surface-to-air missile systems, air surveillance systems and ship-borne air defenses, the report says. China’s space-based reconnaissance and positioning are leading to a precision-strike capability. China still lags in developing an amphibious and airborne capability, airborne, air-to-air refueling, at-sea replenishment and joint integration, the report says. Click here for the full report (78 pages in PDF format) on the Pentagon website. (ends) China: US Military Report a Gross Distortion of Facts (Source: Voice of America news; issued March 26, 2009) China is calling on the U.S. government to stop issuing an annual report on the Chinese military, saying its latest edition is a "groundless" and "gross interference in China's internal affairs." Foreign Ministry spokesman Qin Gang told journalists in Beijing Thursday that the report continues to play up what he says is the fallacy of China's military threat. He warned that if the United States does not stop issuing the report, it would have an impact on U.S.-China relations. The U.S. Department of Defense report on Wednesday said the Chinese military is developing what it calls "disruptive" capabilities, including technologies for space, nuclear, and cyber warfare. The report said such pursuits are shifting the balance of military power within Asia and possibly outside the region. It also said China's lack of transparency increases the potential for misunderstanding and miscalculation. The release of the report comes weeks after the U.S. accused Chinese sailors of harassing a U.S. Navy ship in the South China Sea. After that dispute, the U.S. Director of National Intelligence, Dennis Blair, told a U.S. Senate panel that China seems to be taking a "more military, aggressive" stance. He added that the U.S. intelligence community sees this as a "trend." (ends) Skelton Statement on Annual Report to Congress on China’s Military Power (Source: House Armed Services Committee; issued March 25, 2009) WASHINGTON, DC --- House Armed Services Committee Chairman Ike Skelton (D-MO) released the following statement on the Department of Defense’s Annual Report to Congress on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China: “I am concerned by some of the continuing trends and ambiguities regarding China’s military modernization, including China’s missile buildup across from Taiwan and the steady increase of China’s power projection capabilities. Moreover, China’s military budget continues a trend of double-digit increases and questions remain about China’s strategic intentions. “At the same time, the reduction of tensions across the Taiwan Strait is a positive development and I encourage further progress in this area, including meaningful action by China to reduce its military presence directly opposite Taiwan. Also helpful would be China’s implementation of points made in President Hu Jin Tao’s December 2008 speech, governing the future of cross-Strait relations, including cross-Strait military confidence building measures and negotiation of a peace agreement. “Other developments may also be encouraging. The 2008 White Paper on China’s National Defense and China’s submission of an annual report to the United Nations on its military expenditures reflect positive steps by China toward increasing transparency and openness regarding its defense strategy and expenditures. Yet, such steps are modest and I hope China will increasingly come to view transparency more as a responsibility to accompany the accumulation of national power and less as a transaction to be negotiated. “I am also encouraged by China’s recent involvement in counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden. This demonstrates a responsible use of China’s military power, in line with its international responsibilities, of which I hope to see more. It also demonstrates the potential for U.S.-China military cooperation in this area. President Obama recently called for an increase in the level and frequency of military-to-military contacts between the U.S. and China. I couldn’t agree more and I hope we will be looking at opportunities in the Gulf of Aden and elsewhere around the world.” (ends) DoD Releases Annual China Military Power Report (Source: US Department of Defense; issued March 25, 2009) Pursuant to the National Defense Authorization Act ofFiscal Year 2000, the Department of Defense released to Congress today the “2009Military Power of the People’s Republic of China”report.

From Aviation Week Edwards F-22 Pilot Did Not Eject Mar 26, 2009 David A. Fulghum Some senior U.S. Air Force officials were notified yesterday that there was no pilot ejection from the F-22 that crashed near Edwards AFB Base. The Lockheed Martin pilot was declared dead at the hospital which seemed to indicate he was killed after ejection, but officials at Edwards said that statement was simply a pro forma statement for the investigation. USAF officials said the report of no ejection came soon after the crash, but almost immediately a complete security blanket was dropped over the investigation and no more data has been revealed.

From Defense Aerospace F-22A Crash Claims Life of Edwards Pilot (Source: US Air Force; issued March 25, 2009) EDWARDS AIR FORCE BASE, Calif. --- An Air Force F-22A crash March 25 near here claimed the life of an Air Force veteran and Lockheed Martin test pilot. David Cooley, 49, of Palmdale, Calif., died when the F-22A he was piloting crashed northeast of the base here. Mr. Cooley worked as a test pilot with Lockheed Martin, and was employed at the 411th Flight Test Squadron, 412th Test Wing, on Edwards. Mr. Cooley joined Lockheed Martin in 2003 and was a 21-year veteran of the Air Force. He worked at the F-22 Combined Test Force, where a team of Lockheed Martin and Air Force pilots conduct F-22 aircraft testing. "This is a very difficult day for Edwards and those who knew and respected Dave as a warrior, test pilot and friend," said Maj. Gen. David Eichhorn, Air Force Flight Test Center commander. "Our thoughts and prayers are with Dave and his family as we struggle through, and do all we can to support them." Edwards officials said they were notified around 10 a.m. that the F-22A had gone down 35 miles northeast of the base. First responders transported Mr. Cooley from the crash scene to Victor Valley Community Hospital in Victorville, Calif., where he was pronounced dead. A board of officers is investigating the accident through an Accident Investigation Board, whose findings will be released to the public upon completion. (ends) Lockheed Martin Statement - F-22 Accident (Source: Lockheed Martin; issued March 26, 2009) FORT WORTH, Texas --- Lockheed Martin test pilot David Cooley, 49, was killed today at about 10 a.m. Pacific time in the crash of an F-22 aircraft flying on a test mission from Edwards AFB, California. We are deeply saddened by the loss of David and our concerns, thoughts and prayers at this time are with his family. David joined Lockheed Martin in 2003 and was a 21-year veteran of the U.S. Air Force. He worked at the F-22 Combined Test Force, where a team of Lockheed Martin and Air Force pilots conduct F-22 aircraft testing.

From Stratfor Iran's View of Obama March 23, 2009 By George Friedman U.S. President Barack Obama released a video offering Iran congratulations on the occasion of Nowruz, the Persian New Year, on Friday. Israeli President Shimon Peres also offered his best wishes, referring to “the noble Iranian people.” The joint initiative was received coldly in Tehran, however. Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, said the video did not show that the United States had shifted its hostile attitude toward Iran. The video is obviously part of Obama’s broader strategy of demonstrating that his administration has shifted U.S. policy, at least to the extent that it is prepared to open discussions with other regimes (with Iran being the hardest and most controversial case). The U.S. strategy is fairly straightforward: Obama is trying to create a new global perception of the United States. Global opinion was that former U.S. President George W. Bush was unwilling to engage with, and listen to, allies or enemies. Obama’s view is that that perception in itself harmed U.S. foreign policy by increasing suspicion of the United States. For Obama, offering New Year’s greetings to Iran is therefore part of a strategy to change the tone of all aspects of U.S. foreign policy. Getting Peres to offer parallel greetings was undoubtedly intended to demonstrate to the Iranians that the Israelis would not block U.S. initiatives toward Iran. The Israelis probably were willing to go along with the greetings because they don’t expect them to go very far. They also want to show that they were not responsible for their failure, something critical in their relations with the Obama administration. The Iranian response is also understandable. The United States has made a series of specific demands on Iran, and has worked to impose economic sanctions on Iran when Tehran has not complied. But Iran also has some fairly specific demands of the United States. It might be useful, therefore, to look at the Iranian view of the United States and the world through its eyes. From the Iranian point of view, the United States has made two fundamental demands of Iran. The first is that Iran halt its military nuclear program. The second, a much broader demand, is that Iran stop engaging in what the United States calls terrorism. This ranges from support for Hezbollah to support for Shiite factions in Iraq. In return, the United States is prepared to call for a suspension of sanctions against Iran. For Tehran, however, the suspension of sanctions is much too small a price to pay for major strategic concessions. First, the sanctions don’t work very well. Sanctions only work when most powers are prepared to comply with them. Neither the Russians nor the Chinese are prepared to systematically comply with sanctions, so there is little that Iran can afford that it can’t get. Iran’s problem is that it cannot afford much. Its economy is in shambles due more to internal problems than to sanctions. Therefore, in the Iranian point of view, the United States is asking for strategic concessions, yet offering very little in return. The Nuclear Question Meanwhile, merely working on a nuclear device — regardless of how close or far Iran really is from having one — provides Iran with a dramatically important strategic lever. The Iranians learned from the North Korean experience that the United States has a nuclear fetish. Having a nuclear program alone was more important to Pyongyang than actually having nuclear weapons. U.S. fears that North Korea might someday have a nuclear device resulted in significant concessions from the United States, Japan and South Korea. The danger of having such a program is that the United States — or some other country — might attack and destroy the associated facilities. Therefore, the North Koreans created a high level of uncertainty as to just how far along they were on the road to having a nuclear device and as to how urgent the situation was, raising and lowering alarms like a conductor in a symphony. The Iranians are following the same strategy. They are constantly shifting from a conciliatory tone to an aggressive one, keeping the United States and Israel under perpetual psychological pressure. The Iranians are trying to avoid an attack by keeping the intelligence ambiguous. Tehran’s ideal strategy is maintaining maximum ambiguity and anxiety in the West while minimizing the need to strike immedi ately. Actually obtaining a bomb would increase the danger of an attack in the period between a successful test and the deployment of a deliverable device. What the Iranians get out of this is exactly what the North Koreans got: disproportionate international attention and a lever on other topics, along with something that could be sacrificed in negotiations. They also have a chance of actually developing a deliverable device in the confusion surrounding its progress. If so, Iran would become invasion- and even harassment-proof thanks to its apparent instability and ideology. From Tehran’s perspective, abandoning its nuclear program without substantial concessions, none of which have materialized as yet, would be irrational. And the Iranians expect a large payoff from all this. Radical Islamists, Iraq and Afghanistan This brings us to the Hezbollah/Iraq question, which in fact represents two very different issues. Iraq constitutes the greatest potential strategic threat to Iran. This is as ancient as Babylon and Persia, as modern as the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s. Iran wants guarantees that Iraq will never threaten it, and that U.S. forces in Iraq will never pose a threat to Iran. Tehran does not want promises alone; it wants a recognized degree of control over the Iraqi government, or at least negative control that would allow it to stop Baghdad from doing things Iran doesn’t want. To achieve this, Iran systematically has built its influence among factions i n Iraq, permitting it to block Iraqi policies that Iran regards as dangerous. The American demand that Iran stop meddling in Iraqi policies strikes the Iranians as if the United States is planning to use the new Baghdad regime to restore the regional balance of power. In fact, that is very much on Washington’s mind. This is completely unacceptable to Iran, although it might benefit the United States and the region. From the Iranian point of view, a fully neutral Iraq — with its neutrality guaranteed by Iranian influence — is the only acceptable outcome. The Iranians regard the American demand that Iran not meddle in Iraq as directly threatening Iranian national security. There is then the issue of Iranian support for Hezbollah, Hamas and other radical Islamist groups. Between 1979 and 2001, Iran represented the background of the Islamic challenge to the West: The Shia represented radical Islam. When al Qaeda struck, Iran and the Shia lost this place of honor. Now, al Qaeda has faded and Iran wants to reclaim its place. It can do that by supporting Hezbollah, a radical Shiite group that directly challenges Israel, as well as Hamas — a radical Sunni group — thus showing that Iran speaks for all of Islam, a powerful position in an arena that matters a great deal to Iran and the region. Iran’s support for these groups help s it achieve a very important goal at little risk. Meanwhile, the U.S. demand that Iran end this support is not matched by any meaningful counteroffer or by a significant threat. Moreover, Tehran dislikes the Obama-Petraeus strategy in Afghanistan. That strategy involves talking with the Taliban, a group that Iran has been hostile toward historically. The chance that the United States might install a Taliban-linked government in Afghanistan represents a threat to Iran second only to the threat posed to it by Iraq. The Iranians see themselves as having been quite helpful to the United States in both Iraq and Afghanistan, as they helped Washington topple both the Taliban and Saddam Hussein. In 2001, they offered to let U.S. aircraft land in Iran, and assured Washington of the cooperation of pro-Iranian factions in Afghanistan. In Iraq, they provided intelligence and helped keep the Shiite population relatively passive after the invasion in 2003. But Iranians see Washington as having betrayed implicit understandings that in return for these services, the Iranians would enjoy a degree of influence in both countries. And the U.S. opening to the Taliban is the last straw. Obama’s Greetings in Context Iran views Obama’s New Year greetings within this context. To them, Obama has not addressed the core issues between the two countries. In fact, apart from videos, Obama’s position on Iran does not appear different from the Bush position. The Iranian leadership does not see why it should respond more favorably to the Obama administration than it did to the Bush administration. Tehran wants to be very sure that Obama understands that the willingness alone to talk is insufficient; some indications of what is to be discussed and what might be offered are necessary. Many in the U.S. administration believe that the weak Iranian economy might shape the upcoming Iranian presidential election. Undoubtedly, the U.S. greetings were timed to influence the election. Washington has tried to influence internal Iranian politics for decades, constantly searching for reformist elements. The U.S. hope is that someone might be elected in Iran who is so obsessed with the economy that he would trade away strategic and geopolitical interests in return for some sort of economic aid. There are undoubtedly candidates who would be interested in economic aid, but none who are prepared to trade away strategic interests. Nor could they even if they wanted to. The Iran-Iraq war is burned into the popular Iranian consciousness; any candidate who appeared willing to see a strong Iraq would lose the election. American analysts are constantly confusing an Iranian interest in economic aid with a willingness to abandon core interests. But this hasn’t happened, and isn’t happening now. This is not to say that the Iranians won’t bargain. Beneath the rhetoric, they are practical to the extreme. Indeed, the rhetoric is part of the bargaining. What is not clear is whether Obama is prepared to bargain. What will he give for the things he wants? Economic aid is not enough for Iran, and in any event, the idea of U.S. economic aid for Iran during a time of recession is a non-starter. Is Obama prepared to offer Iran a dominant voice in Iraq and Afghanistan? How insistent is Obama on the Hezbollah and Hamas issue? What will he give if Iran shuts down its nuclear program? It is not clear that Obama has answers to these questions. Rebuilding the U.S. public image is a reasonable goal for the first 100 days of a presidency. But soon it will be summer, and the openings Obama has made will have to be walked through, with tough bargaining. In the case of Iran — one of the toughest cases of all — it is hard to see how Washington can give Tehran the things it wants because that would make Iran a major regional power. And it is hard to see how Iran could give away the things the Americans are demanding. Obama indicated that it would take time for his message to generate a positive response from the Iranians. It is more likely that unless the message starts to take on more substance that pleases the Iranians, the response will remain unchanged. The problem wasn’t Bush or Clinton or Reagan, the problem was the reality of Iran and the United States. Only if a third power frightened the Iranians sufficiently — a third power that also threatened the United States — would U.S.-Iranian interests be brought together. But Russia, at least for now, is working very hard to be friendly with Iran.

Ouchie! From Defense Aerospace Program Official Offers Cash Rebate on JSF (Source: defense-aerospace.com; published March 24, 2009) By Giovanni de Briganti PARIS --- Pricing of the Joint Strike Fighter has always seemed to be firmly rooted in fantasy, and the outgoing head of the JSF Program Office has again demonstrated just how divorced this program is from reality. The “official” unit price quoted by Lockheed Martin for the JSF remains pegged at about $65 million, although even Lockheed recently admitted that it won’t know the exact price until 2012. JSF Program Office (JPO) director Major General Charles Davis now tells Jane’s Defence Review that the US and F-35 partner countries “could save as much as USD 13 billion” by buying “about 150 extra aircraft between 2010 and 2015,” he says. Davis’ figures mean that each of the 150 extra aircraft he’s offering would save $86.6 million, far more than the $65 million that the JSF is supposed to cost. Does this mean a cash rebate of $21.6 million for each additional JSF bought? If so, it would explain why Norway, the Netherlands and the UK remain enthusiastic JSF backers, despite all the contrary evidence that has emerged in recent years regarding the program’s viability. By the way, in its latest JSF report GAO calculated that buying an additional 169 aircraft between FY2010 and 2015 would cost “up to $33.4 billion in additional procurement funding,” although they are the same extra aircraft that Davis sees as the source of $13 billion savings. Simple arithmetic shows that each of these 169 additional aircraft would cost $197.6 million each. So, in a nutshell, Davis says that each extra aircraft would save $86.6 million, but GAO says they would cost $197.6 million each, but Lockheed says unit cost is $65 million. Now that Madoff funds are no longer available, here’s an idea for a great investment: buy JSF aircraft at Lockheed’s price, pocket the cash rebate from the JPO, and sell the aircraft on to the Pentagon at the GAO price: $197.6M - $65M = $132.6M + $21.6M cash rebate = $154.2M net profit per aircraft. Don’t have any spare cash? Then forget the aircraft, just buy JSF options, and settle for the $21.6 million cash rebate. For a 12-aircraft squadron, net profit is $259.63 million. If you’re Norway, you could run a profit of $1,036.8 million (that’s $1.03 billion) on 48 aircraft. And Dassault might even pay you to take near-new Mirage 2000 Mk 9s off the U.A.E.’s hands so they can buy Rafales. So the JSF finally starts to make financial sense – just as long as you don’t buy any.

No worries. I know the hard information is elusive, so that leaves us only with informed opinion. Yes, that's what I would expect. Flank speed being limited only by conditions (e.g. sea states), fuel expenditure, or the physical limits of the machinery (overheating, etc). So a broad guideline, or a collection of specific examples, is perhaps the best I can hope for.