CV32

From Defense Aerospace Op-Ed: The Business Case for Buying Tankers from Both Teams (Source: Lexington Institute; issued April 28, 2009) By Loren B. Thompson, Ph.D. Without aerial refueling, the global reach of U.S. air power would be severely limited. However, nearly 90% of the tankers in the current refueling fleet -- 453 planes -- are Eisenhower-era KC-135s that average 50 years of age. Nobody knows how much longer these planes can operate before metal fatigue, corrosion and parts obsolescence cause a disaster. What we do know is that if replacement were to begin tomorrow, it would take at least 20 years to modernize the whole fleet. The Air Force has been trying to acquire new tankers since the decade began, but has encountered a series of obstacles. The latest obstacle is defense secretary Robert Gates. During the Bush years, Secretary Gates presided over a mismanaged effort to award the contract for the first 179 next-generation tankers to one of two teams led by Boeing and Northrop Grumman. A successful protest by the losing Boeing team forced the government to start over. Gates wants to do another winner-take-all competition while correcting the errors of the first round. But since the government has failed to consult with industry teams in formulating its requirements and strategy for the re-competition, the outlook is for another protest by whichever team loses. Congressman Jack Murtha (D-PA) has a better idea: split the contract between both teams, awarding a larger number of planes to the team that shows the best performance and price discipline. Gates says that will cost too much, but he's wrong. The Murtha plan will save money over the long run while avoiding further delays. The most compelling reason for dual sourcing is operational. Boeing and Northrop are both offering planes that would cost less to operate than existing tankers while transporting more fuel, but the Northrop plane is considerably larger than the Boeing plane. What that means in operational terms is that each plane could be better suited to specific contingencies than the other. For instance, the bigger Northrop plane might be a better fit for the long distances of the Western Pacific, while the smaller Boeing plane might be a better fit for the shorter distances and denser basing network of the Middle East. You can't really say which will prove more useful without knowing where future wars will be fought, so the smart option is to buy a mix of both. Secretary Gates doesn't like that option because he says it would cost $7-14 billion more than the winner-take-all approach. Not only would the government have to pay to develop two different tankers, but it would have to buy more tankers each year to sustain competition between two production lines. However, Gates ignores the huge savings that would result from retiring old tankers earlier because their replacements arrive sooner. The old tankers are very expensive to operate and maintain due to their advanced age. They will require new skins and other costly modifications in the near future that could be avoided if new tankers were acquired faster, which the Murtha plan would do. Secretary Gates also overlooks the savings that result from having two teams competing throughout the life of the program for tanker awards. A study by former Pentagon acquisition chief Jacques Gansler found that in winner-take-all competitions, costs tend to increase markedly after the award, whereas when two teams remain competitively engaged costs tend to go down. Under the Murtha dual-sourcing plan, each team could count on getting a minimum award of planes, but the team that offers better price and performance would get a bigger share of the planes. So when Secretary Gates says dual-sourcing would cost more, he means on his watch. Over the long term, it would save a lot of money.

Silly rabbit! Okay, if you really, really want to go down this road ... still here? Okay ... my first suggestion is to set out some parameters for your DB. You've already done that to some degree by focusing on the GIUK theater. You should also decide what time period your DB will use, because, as you know, ships, aircraft, submarines, etc are upgraded and altered almost daily, and you will be modeling a particular platform as it appeared at a certain time. You should also decide what degree of 'realism' you're aiming for. I use the term somewhat loosely because all of our efforts at modeling the weapons of war in the Harpoon community are based on what is unclassified data or open source intelligence. Some of it may be obscure, some of it may even be closely held, but generally speaking, much of it is just our best guess. This is where I would start, the DB Editing Guide (still very much a work in progress, I'd say): http://harpgamer.com/harpforum/index.php?showtopic=2883 Huge can of worms, as you probably well know. In any event, keep in mind that pure data and basic facts are not copyrighted, e.g. the US Navy's DDG-97 is the the USS Halsey. How a collection of those facts is arranged and compiled in a database might be (emphasis on might). As I'm not generally in the habit of giving legal advice on the Internet, or for free , my best suggestion to you is to make your database your own, something that is distinctively Terry Courtney's work, if you know what I mean. There's a huge amount of data available on the Internet. The largest chore is to filter it and determine what is good, reliable information (if you're shooting for realism in your DB) and what is conjecture (and sometimes there might be reliable conjecture). And, Terry, you're welcome to borrow from my databases to help you find useful data. Much more to come, I'm sure ...

HCDB-090427 Aircraft: CF-101B Voodoo - Canada MC-12W Liberty - USA MiG-31 Foxhound A - Russia MiG-31BM Foxhound - Russia P-8I Poseidon - India Su-15TM Flagon F - Russia Super King Air 350ISR - Iraq Ships/MLUs: America (LHA-R) - USA Fajr-5 TEL - Intl Hunt (Lith) MCMV - Lithuania Jericho II TEL - Israel Jericho III TEL - Israel Katyusha Team - Intl Ulsan I (FFX-I) FFG - South Korea Zelzal 2 Bty - Intl

A new version of the official Harpoon Commander's Edition (HCE) Database (HCDB-090427) is now available. Get the new DB in the Download section. New additions (or overhauls of existing entries) include: Aircraft: CF-101B Voodoo - Canada MC-12W Liberty - USA MiG-31 Foxhound A - Russia MiG-31BM Foxhound - Russia P-8I Poseidon - India Su-15TM Flagon F - Russia Super King Air 350ISR - Iraq Ships/MLUs: America (LHA-R) - USA Fajr-5 TEL - Intl Hunt (Lith) MCMV - Lithuania Jericho II TEL - Israel Jericho III TEL - Israel Katyusha Team - Intl Ulsan I (FFX-I) FFG - South Korea Zelzal 2 Bty - Intl Enjoy.

The earliest version I have kicking around here on my desk is Harpoon Classic v1.52 (yes, produced by Alliance Interactive). It seems to happily run under WinXP, itself operated through VMWare Player under Vista 64.

[ACC? I presume you're referring to the carrier?] Absolutely, a submarine is a serious threat to an aircraft carrier. Even in H4/HCE terms, the older Chinese heavyweight torpedoes (Yu-4, circa 1984) carry about 150 DP apiece. The newer Yu-6 would be similar. A couple of those and you're putting serious hurt on a carrier. That's nearly a quarter of a nuclear supercarrier's total DP. Consider something like the old Soviet Type 65 monster torpedo, and its worse still. Torpedoes will be striking along the hull, under the keel, or in the propellers. In the anti-ship missile field, something like the YJ-82 is going to be packing something like 36 DP but there would usually be more of them. Those are going to be hitting along your carrier's hull, flight deck or island superstructure. (Again, something like the Soviet Oscar submarine and its SS-N-19 Shipwreck is a whole other ballgame). In real life terms, anything that prevents an aircraft carrier from carrying out normal, high tempo flight operations is a serious threat to the asset. We're talking explosions, fires and fragmentation damage on flight decks and in hangars, both of which are often packed with munitions, fuel, and personnel. Underwater, a hit in the screws that keeps the carrier from maintaining wind speed over the deck is going to significantly hamper flight ops. There is a reason why aircraft carrier designs invest heavily in torpedo crush spaces, torpedo decoys, CIWS, etc, etc.

Some further thoughts emanating from discussion on IRC ...

From China Daily China's nuke submarines up for maiden parade (Xinhua) Updated: 2009-04-21 09:12 QINGDAO -- China will display its nuclear-powered submarines for the first time in history during a fleet parade to mark the 60th anniversary of the People's Liberation Army Navy, a senior navy officer said in Qingdao Monday. Ding Yiping, deputy commander of the PLA Navy, made the remarks during an exclusive interview with Xinhua, but did not disclose any further details about the submarines. In addition to the fleet parade, there will also be seminars and a sampan race that will be held off the coast of the eastern city of Qingdao during the four-day celebration. "It is not a secret that China has nuclear submarines, which are key to safeguarding our country's national security," Ding said, adding that the number of China's nuclear submarines were far less than those of the United States and Russia. Ding stressed that China's national defense policy and nuclear strategy is purely defensive in nature, and that the country's naval forces would not pose any threat to other countries. "The PLA Navy will continue to make contributions to maintain world, regional and maritime peace," he said. The fleet parade will strive to be grand, practical, safe and frugal, the officer added. The parade would be grand as it was unprecedented in terms of the celebration scale. Dozens of Chinese naval ships and planes and 21 naval vessels from 14 countries will participate in the fleet review, slated for Thursday, he said. He said it is the first time for the country to have a fleet parade participated by high-level naval delegations from 29 countries. Frugality is the professional virtue of both the Chinese navy and their foreign counterparts, he said. The whole celebration will feature the concept of practicality. All activities must have an actual effect rather than just being aesthetic and pompous. To ensure the safety of the celebrations, the navy and local public security departments had worked out a detailed security plan which had referred to that of the Beijing Olympics, he said. All the Chinese naval vessels and weapons displayed during the fleet review were domestic-made. Most of the participant naval vessels were from the Beihai Fleet, with a few from the Donghai Fleet and Nanhai Fleet. Some of the Chinese vessels are new while some of them have already served for some time, he added. Ding called the maritime gathering a naval "Olympics" as a variety of foreign vessels would participate in the fleet review, ranging from warships to auxiliary vessels, and from big naval ships with a displacement more than 10,000 tonnes to smaller ones with several hundred tonnes. The foreign vessels' order would be arranged in conformity with the international practice during the fleet review, he said, adding the warships would sail in front of the auxiliary vessels; ships with bigger tonnage sail in front of the smaller ones; and vessels of the same type and tonnage would be arranged in alphabetical order of their home country.

These are quite challenging scenarios.

Correct. They rely on the Pop Group fire control radar for guidance, but as we don't really model fire control radars in HCE, they are omitted from the HCDB. Hence, no air search radars on the ship.

After Action Report: From Russia with Love? [spoiler ALERT] A scenario by Akula Just a mini AAR of sorts to report on my experience with this monster scenario. The principal victim of joint Russian/DPRK aggression in this scenario is Japan, supported by American forces forward deployed to Westpac. Almost immediately Japan was subjected to a rather intense bombardment by North Korean ballistic missiles. Those that were shot down or missed their target altogether fell upon several of my southern Japanese airfields, causing minor but nevertheless aggravating damage. This was followed by a handful of precision air strikes against targets in the north and south of Japan, most of which I was able to repel. Still, I wasn't able to grab a breather, because the air strikes were followed by massive cruise missile attacks by Russian bombers that were shooting from standoff range, well outside my effective reach and well inside their own defensive IADS envelope. Each time it was a race to try and gather enough fighters to intercept the hordes of incoming ALCMs. When I was finally able to launch a counter-attack of sorts, it was a piecemeal attack to try and chip away at the DPRK air defenses enough that I could get inside and destroy those threatening ballistic missile sites. I had no hope of hitting the Russians just yet, so I focused on the weaker opponent. As I've said many times before, the JASDF suffers from a severe lack of standoff and precision guided ordnance, so I largely used US air assets to smack DPRK targets while the JASDF flew CAP and escort. For a while I was thinking there was a Russian SAG or carrier group in the Sea of Japan, but this proved untrue. Large numbers of Russian naval forces were eventually discovered in the Sea of Okhotsk, heading to the Kuriles. And it wasn't until I was quite far along into the scenario before I found a Russian carrier group in the Pacific, about halfway between Okinawa/Kadena and Guam. I had been shuttling aircraft between those two locations with no idea that they were quite close to running headlong into this force. Two enemy forces proved extremely tough nuts to crack: (1) The SA-20/21 IADS in the Vladiovostok area and in the Kuriles, which were absolutely brutal at reaching way out there and swatting down any friendly aircraft that dared fly at high altitude. I also had a tough time determining the exact extent of the SAM envelope because it was very difficult to locate the batteries. (2) The Russian Navy forces near the Kuriles, in part because of the sheer density of the force and in part because they enjoyed the support of nearby SA-20/21 SAM batteries in the Kuriles and at Sakhalin. The cruise missile attacks continued unabated for a very long time, even after I had begun hitting Russian airfields. I was under constant threat of losing key friendly airbases and had to assign a significant portion of my force to simple local air defense. Minor Japanese naval units in the Sea of Japan and near the Kuriles were lost to antiship missile strikes, but most everywhere else I was okay, except for a couple of successful submarine attacks in chokepoint areas. The US Navy carrier battle group operating east of Japan remained unscathed for the entire time, thankfully. In the end, I destroyed nearly 1,000 fixed wing aircraft, nearly another 100 helicopters, and all 19 (?) enemy bases, while losing 80+ aircraft of my own. It wasn't until I destroyed a significant portion of the Russian naval force in the area of the Kuriles that I managed to achieve victory. It was a long, hard fought battle, and if we had a logistics model in HCE, I think I would have been toast for sure. Many thanks to Akula for writing a scenario that provides many hours of enjoyment.

I think the original ship that Reckall encountered was the Nanuchka I. I'd start there.

From Defense Aerospace Op-Ed: Gates Goals Undercut Air Force Capabilities and Leaders (Source: Lexington Institute; issued April 21, 2009) Air Force chief of staff Norton Schwartz faced biting criticism from his service's senior leaders in a video teleconference last week. They accused him of betraying the service's requirements process by siding with defense secretary Robert Gates in terminating key air power programs without rigorous analysis, and signaled that Schwartz's credibility is at risk among his Air Force peers. Doubts about Schwartz have been rife since Gates selected him to replace the less pliable T. Michael Moseley last summer, after Moseley clashed with Gates over the F-22 fighter and management of nuclear weapons. A look at Gates' plans for Air Force programs shows why Schwartz's tenure could resemble a controlled flight into terrain. Airlifters Gates wants to end production of the only long-range airlifter currently being built, the C-17, at 205 planes. That number is the low end of a fleet mix recommended in the 2005 Mobility Capability Study, adjusted to compensate for a later decision to forego putting new engines on most older C-5 transports. The C-17 and C-5 are the only long-range jet transports in the joint fleet, and under the Gates plan that fleet would be capped at about 315 planes. But a Government Accountability Office report found the 2005 study probably underestimated future mobility needs. Also, Gates is increasing the size of ground forces that would use airlifters by 92,000 personnel while expanding operations in Africa. Nonetheless, he decided to terminate C-17 without completing a new mobility study. Fighters Gates proposes to end the F-22 fighter program at 187 planes while sticking with plans to buy 2,443 less pricey F-35 Joint Strike Fighters -- about 1,800 of which would go to the Air Force. But the two planes were designed to operate together with the F-22 providing air dominance and the F-35 focusing on ground attacks. The F-35 lacks features such as vectored thrust and fuel-conserving supercruise, so it is not as capable in combating enemy defenses. Defense secretary William Cohen wrote ten years ago that, "The F-22 will enable the Joint Strike Fighter to carry out its primary strike mission. The JSF was not designed for the air superiority mission." Neither Gates nor Schwartz has explained how this division of labor can work while ending F-22 production far below stated requirements. Bombers The war-winning potential of long-range bombers was the original rationale for an independent air force, and today the U.S. Air Force is the only military organization in the world possessing a sizable fleet of heavy bombers. But Secretary Gates said on April 6 that "we will not pursue a development program for a follow-on Air Force bomber until we have a better understanding of the need, the requirement and the technology." Money set aside for a future bomber has been taken for other purposes, leaving the service with a decrepit fleet of 160 cold war bombers. Only a handful of these planes -- the stealthy B-2s -- are likely to survive a prolonged encounter with modern air defenses. Tankers The Air Force has been trying since the decade began to modernize the aerial refueling tankers that make it possible for U.S. airlifters, fighters and bombers to operate in remote places like Afghanistan, and secretary Gates has stood by plans to develop a new tanker. That's good, because most of the planes in the aerial refueling fleet are approaching half a century of age. But even on tankers, it isn't so clear Gates knows what he's doing. He says he will lay his body "across the tracks" to prevent Congress from splitting production between two teams because it would cost too much -- ignoring the fact that a dual award would replace aging tankers much faster and avoid billions of dollars in upkeep for the current fleet. Is it any wonder General Schwartz is having a hard time explaining himself?

I am able to delete LR patrols and their Repeats, separately, without issue. Test scenario for EC2003 GIUK and HCDB is attached. A P-3 is scheduled to leave Keflavik at 2:23:30 (ie. 30 minutes elapsed game time) to conduct a patrol off the North Cape. Its replacement is due to launch 3 hours later. It in fact launches at 2:13:30. LRPatrolTest.zip

From Flight International DATE: 20/04/09 SOURCE: Flight International Indian Air Force says Rafale still in fighter competition By Siva Govindasamy The Indian Air Force has denied reports that the Dassault Rafale has been eliminated from the country’s medium multi-role combat aircraft competition. “We have not ruled anyone out yet in the MMRCA competition,” says an IAF spokesman, who confirmed that the service is responsible for evaluating the contenders. “All of the tests have not been completed. The technical evaluations are only just over and we are scheduled to begin the flight tests next month. Everyone is still in the competition.” Last week, several Indian newspapers reported that the Rafale was eliminated after failing the technical evaluation. When contacted, Dassault said that it is waiting for information from the French embassy in India as negotiations are conducted on a government-to-government basis. The embassy had no comment. The aircraft was not brought to the Aero India 2009 show in Bangalore in February, leading to speculation that it was in danger of being eliminated from the competition. A senior French official, however, defended the no-show at the time saying that the country’s aircraft were required for NATO operations in Afghanistan. Apart from the Rafale, the other five contenders for the $10-12 billion contract are the Boeing F/A-18E/F, Eurofighter Typhoon, Lockheed Martin F-16, RSK MiG-35, and Saab Gripen. India is scheduled to begin hot weather trials in May, and the aircraft will be tested in cold weather and humid conditions later in the year. This is not the first time that the Indian media have reported that an aircraft has been eliminated from this closely watched competition. Early this year, it was reported that the Gripen had been knocked out but this was later proven untrue. India is seeking 126 aircraft in the competition, of which 18 will be bought in fly-away condition and 108 license produced by Hindustan Aeronautics in the country. There is also an option for another 64 aircraft. The fighter chosen will replace the IAF’s RSK MiG-21s.

From Aviation Week's Ares Blog Schwartz on F-22 Kill: 243 Still the Reqirement Posted by Amy Butler at 4/17/2009 8:38 AM CDT Perhaps the book isn't closed on the F-22. Though Defense Secretary Robert Gates said he didn't decide to halt production of the stealthy twin-engine fighters solely as a budget decision, it is appearing more and more as if the Air Force leadership acquiesced to the proposal for purely financial reasons. "Two hundred and forty-three is the military requirement as articulated by the United States Air Force,"Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Norton Schwartz told an audience hosted by the National Aeronautic Assn. today. But, "Nothing is free ... If it is more F-22s, what is it less of?" Gates has publicly said the US Air Force agreed with his decision to halt production of the Lockheed Martin fighters at 187. And, he backs his approach by noting that 187 fighters has been the program of record since 2005. Both the Republican Bush administration and the Democratic Obama administration have now proposed ending production of the jet, which is assembled in Marietta, Ga. However, it is becoming more and more evident that Air Force officials feel the 187 program presents the service with a high risk of accomplishing its missions in some war scenarios. It'll be interesting to see how Schwartz answers the question in upcoming posture hearings of what his military advice is.

From Aviation Week Gates Continues to Oppose Split Tanker Buy Apr 17, 2009 By Amy Butler If there was any confusion about U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates’s position on the possibility of a split buy of Boeing and Northrop Grumman/EADS refueling tankers for the U.S. Air Force, he is taking pains to fix it. “I am laying my body down across the tracks” in opposition to it, he told an audience of officers at the Air War College at Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala., on April 15. The response was vigorous applause. During a press conference a day earlier en route to Fort Rucker, Ala., he said he opposes the introduction of two separate training, maintenance and logistics requirements simultaneously into the fleet. He also said that developing two tankers at once could cost $14 billion over five years, double the price of one. Some lawmakers have seized on the idea of a dual buy as the only politically palatable way to move forward with a KC-X program after repeated false starts and protests. Northrop, which partnered with EADS’ Airbus against Boeing in the last round, has also sounded support for such a compromise.

From DNA India French 'Rafale' aircraft out of India's MMRCA race PTI Thursday, April 16, 2009 19:14 IST New Delhi: French fighter aircraft 'Rafale' has been knocked out of India's biggest-ever military tender to purchase 126 medium multi-role combat aircraft (MMRCA) for the Indian Air Force (IAF) estimated to be worth over 10 billion dollar. Defence Ministry sources said it rejected the 'Rafale' bid from the French manufacturer D'assault after careful and cumbersome technical evaluation process that began in May last and ended in February this year. With this, the race for the mother-of-all-deals, as the MMRCA tender is described here, was reduced to five competitors -- US' F-16 Fighting Falcon from Lockheed Martin and F/A-18E/F Super Hornet from Boeing, European consortium EADS' Eurofighter Typhoon, Swedish Gripen NG from SAAB and Russian MiG-35 from United Aircraft Corporation. Though reasons for rejecting Rafale was not revealed, sources indicated that the high cost of the aircraft was one of the factors. "The reasons would be officially communicated to the company," they said. Now, the remaining five competitors would be called for the flight trials of their aircraft, for which the IAF headquarters was currently working out the modalities. "The flight trials will now begin in the next three months and the Air headquarters is working on the modalities for holding the flight trials," sources said. India had issued the Request for Proposals (RFP) for the 126 MMRCA in August 2007 to the six companies, who had submitted their bids by April 2008. Under the RFP norms, IAF would buy 18 of the chosen aircraft off-the-shelf and the remaining 108 would be manufactured through licensing within the country. The tender, which provided for technology transfer, also stipulated that the company bagging the contract for the MMRCA would have to comply with a 50 per cent offset clause. India had first introduced the globally-practiced offsets clause in its Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP) in 2006 under which foreign companies bagging contracts worth over Rs 300 crore re-invest at least 30 per cent of the deal in the country's defence industry. With the rejection of the twin-engine Rafale, the contest would now be among three twin-engine fighters in F/A-18, MiG-35 and Eurofighter Typhoon. The single-engine contenders for the contract would be F-16s and Gripen. IAF sought to purchase the 126 MMRCA as replacements for the aging Russian fleet of MiG-21s, MiG-23s and MiG-27s, and to reduce the different platform types from the current six to just three -- Russian Su-30s, indigenous LCAs and the MMRCAs. With the IAF fleet depleting over the last decade from the sanctioned 39.5 squadrons to 33.5 squadrons at present, the induction of the MMRCA, likely to begin in 2013, would help in increasing the squadron strength to 42 squadrons by 2022.

Thanks, JMS. Every time I think I'm ready to put out another release, you folks suggest more changes. I'm kidding, I do appreciate the suggestions. Please keep it up.

Well, that's a breath of fresh air ... http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/04/14/oba...ates/index.html

Okay. Finished scenarios should be submitted to the Downloads section of the website, rather than appended to a post. Doing so will generate an automatic announcement in the Scenarios section of the forum. Submit it there and I'll approve it right away. Thanks!

From Aviation Week's Ares Blog No More F-22s: USAF Leaders Posted by Bill Sweetman at 4/13/2009 7:02 AM CDT It's official. The USAF did want more F-22s and considered a 180-some force to be a high risk approach, but after the Defense Department provided the service with a new assessment of future wars, the USAF changed its mind. That's what the service's top leaders say in a signed piece in this morning's Washington Post. The most important fact about this story is that it had to be written at all. Gates said on Monday that the AF had fully supported the decision to close the F-22 line. Nobody with any great power and influence (current or retired officers, for example) has spoken against it, except for the usual suspects on the Hill. Maybe Gates is reading the all-time-record comment thread on Ares. The second important piece is here: First, based on warfighting experience over the past several years and judgments about future threats, the Defense Department is revisiting the scenarios on which the Air Force based its assessment. Read this in conjunction with the paragraph before it, which states that Donley and Schwartz concluded last summer that a 381-aircraft force was "low-risk" and that 243 was "moderate risk". It's not a huge logical leap to say that 183 was termed "high risk" - that is, likely to prove deficient against future threats. The USAF has not changed its methodology, but the DoD "is revisiting the scenarios" - that is, changing the inputs to the process. That is of course the DoD's job; but the Gates team seems to have done this in only one specific case. And when was it done? As we've reported before, the USAF in March was saying that it needed more F-22s. Third pivotal comment: Analysis showed that overlapping F-22 and F-35 production would not only be expensive but that while the F-35 may still experience some growing pains, there is little risk of a catastrophic failure in its production line. In its simplest terms, whether a risk is acceptable or not depends on the level of risk - its probability - and its consequences. Most of us will buy a $1 raffle ticket for a $50 prize even if we know that 100 tickets have been sold. Russian roulette has a much higher chance of a "win" - five in six - but most of us won't do that. That's risk management. Now define "catastrophic". If you mean, for example, that JSF unit cost doubles and production rates are halved - as has happened to a lot of programs - there may be "little risk" of this. But its effect in a fixed-budget world would be to gut the US Air Force: the consequence is so severe that the only acceptable level of risk is zero. Far lesser, and more likely JSF problems - a further delay in flight testing, more moderate increases in cost and rate reductions - will have a major impact because of the project's size and because there's no backup plan. They could accelerate the aging of the force, compel the USAF to shrink its front-line strength and starve the otherneeds - nuclear reconstitution, ISR, space and cyber - that the two USAF leaders mention in the WaPo piece. Indeed, a two-year slip and a 25 per cent overrun in the price tag would easily equal the cost of 60 more F-22s over the same period of time. But finally, missing from this piece is the full byline: Michael Donley is secretary of the Air Force. Gen. Norton Schwartz is chief of staff of the Air Force. Both were appointed to their present positions by SecDef Gates last summer, after he fired their predecessors, who had argued in favor of more F-22s.

Akula, it doesn't appear that you submitted this scenario at the Downloads section? Is it a work in progress? (I've been playing it, btw. )

From Lexington Institute AIR FORCE PREPARED TO END F-22 AT 243 AIRCRAFT, NOT 187 Rebecca L. Grant, Ph.D. Issue Brief Apr 9, 2009 When Secretary of Defense Robert Gates stated on April 6 that the Air Force advised him they wanted 187 F-22s, the reaction was shock. That’s because evidence indicates the Air Force was ready and willing to cap off production after buying a total of 243 F-22s, not 187. Do the simple math: just 187 F-22s to replace 522 F-15s now in the total inventory is not enough in a crisis. A total buy of 243 F-22s is the minimum to fill out ten F-22 squadrons for overseas missions and homeland defense. What happened to the 243 number? Is the Obama Pentagon clamping down on the Services? Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Michael Mullen confirmed in December 2008 that he and Air Force Chief of Staff General Norton Schwartz were discussing 60 more, or 243 total F-22s. On April 7, a reporter said to Gates: “As recently as a few weeks ago, Air Force leadership was still publicly saying 260, 265. When did that change for them?” Here is Gates’ verbatim reply: “Well, you’ll have to ask them. (Chuckles.)” Recall how things work in normal times. The Pentagon budget is a $500 billion behemoth that relies on a formal process derived from the checks and balances in the Constitution. The Services submit their budgets. The Office of the Secretary of Defense makes adjustments, then sends the budget to the President, who sends it to Congress. Key committees call generals, admirals and civilian officials to hearings where they swear under oath to give Congress their undiluted opinions. Here’s the dog that didn’t bark in the night. Last summer, Schwartz said in testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee that he believed 381 F-22s were too many but 183 were too few. He promised to “delve deeply” into the analysis and return with a new number. Schwartz had numerous opportunities to call a halt to the F-22 at 183 aircraft. He did not. Going forward, Congress appropriated partial money for the next 20 F-22s based on the long-standing requirement for the F-22 to replace F-15s. Outgoing Bush Administration officials threw in procedural delays to prevent the Lockheed Martin – Boeing – Pratt & Whitney team from getting to work. Then came the election. Many applauded President Obama’s decision to retain Bush’s Secretary of Defense to ensure wartime continuity. What few bargained for was that the first three months of the Obama presidency would give Gates a chance to craft what Senator Carl Levin has called a “novel” approach to the defense budget. Gates kept Bush-Rumsfeld holdovers in crucial program analysis posts and formed a small team to cut the budget in secret, a technique he mastered as CIA director. Next, in February 2009, Gates did what no previous Secretary of Defense had done. He directed top uniformed officers to sign non-disclosure agreements pledging not to talk about the budget process – even to other senior officers in their services. Can you picture even a famous budget cutter like Caspar Weinberger or an experienced legislator like William Cohen making a demand like that? Schwartz never had a chance to present his analysis for 243 F-22s to Congress as promised. To speak up given Gates’ new restrictions might risk the tradition of civilian control begun by George Washington. Air Combat Command, whose airmen fly and maintain F-22s and other fighters, is left to pick up the pieces after this shattering break in faith. Is this what change in Washington means?

From Aviation Week's Ares Blog What Did The Air Force Really Want? Posted by Bill Sweetman at 4/10/2009 10:41 AM CDT Dr Rebecca Grant probably isn't going to get offered a job in the Gates team. In a strongly worded brief [CV32: Also appended below], the respected air power analyst argues that the USAF did have a cogent, established need for another 60 F-22s - but never had a chance to present it before Gates slammed a gag order on all senior officers involved in the budget process. "Gates kept Bush-Rumsfeld holdovers in crucial program analysis posts and formed a small team to cut the budget in secret, a technique he mastered as CIA director. Next, in February 2009, Gates did what no previous Secretary of Defense had done. He directed top uniformed officers to sign non-disclosure agreements pledging not to talk about the budget process – even to other senior officers in their services." The result was that no officer could talk about any of the analysis work without defying the Secretary's orders. Grant also points out that if the USAF really had no need for the extra aircraft, service chief Gen. Norton Schwartz could have said so at any time last year - but didn't. It makes a lot of sense. Recall, too, what Maj Gen Jay Lindell, director for Global Power Programs in the USAF's acquisitions office - and the head of the team responsible for determining the best mix of F-22s and F-35s - said last month at our own Defense Technology and Requirements conference. Asked about the "optimal ratio" of F-35s to F-22s, Lindell said: "It depends on what we can afford but the studies and analysis show a mix with an increased number of F-22s". The argument rested mainly on the F-22's higher speed and air-to-air capability, translating into fewer aircraft needed to cover a given area: in air-to-air, six F-22s were worth ten F-35s. Lindell pointed out later that part of the USAF analysis reflected the fact that a 24-aircraft squadron was more efficient than an 18-aircraft squadron, because both have the same test and support equipment and in some cases need the same minimum number of specialist technicians. So there was a "military case" for more F-22s; but Gates made sure that it was never presented. As Grant concludes: "Air Combat Command, whose airmen fly and maintain F-22s and other fighters, is left to pick up the pieces after this shattering break in faith."