From Aviation Week's Ares Blog

 

What Did The Air Force Really Want?

Posted by Bill Sweetman at 4/10/2009 10:41 AM CDT

 

Dr Rebecca Grant probably isn't going to get offered a job in the Gates team.

 

In a strongly worded brief [CV32: Also appended below], the respected air power analyst argues that the USAF did have a cogent, established need for another 60 F-22s - but never had a chance to present it before Gates slammed a gag order on all senior officers involved in the budget process.

 

"Gates kept Bush-Rumsfeld holdovers in crucial program analysis posts and formed a small team to cut the budget in secret, a technique he mastered as CIA director. Next, in February 2009, Gates did what no previous Secretary of Defense had done. He directed top uniformed officers to sign non-disclosure agreements pledging not to talk about the budget process – even to other senior officers in their services."

 

The result was that no officer could talk about any of the analysis work without defying the Secretary's orders. Grant also points out that if the USAF really had no need for the extra aircraft, service chief Gen. Norton Schwartz could have said so at any time last year - but didn't.

 

It makes a lot of sense. Recall, too, what Maj Gen Jay Lindell, director for Global Power Programs in the USAF's acquisitions office - and the head of the team responsible for determining the best mix of F-22s and F-35s - said last month at our own Defense Technology and Requirements conference.

 

Asked about the "optimal ratio" of F-35s to F-22s, Lindell said: "It depends on what we can afford but the studies and analysis show a mix with an increased number of F-22s". The argument rested mainly on the F-22's higher speed and air-to-air capability, translating into fewer aircraft needed to cover a given area: in air-to-air, six F-22s were worth ten F-35s.

 

Lindell pointed out later that part of the USAF analysis reflected the fact that a 24-aircraft squadron was more efficient than an 18-aircraft squadron, because both have the same test and support equipment and in some cases need the same minimum number of specialist technicians.

 

So there was a "military case" for more F-22s; but Gates made sure that it was never presented. As Grant concludes: "Air Combat Command, whose airmen fly and maintain F-22s and other fighters, is left to pick up the pieces after this shattering break in faith."

From Lexington Institute

 

AIR FORCE PREPARED TO END F-22 AT 243 AIRCRAFT, NOT 187

Rebecca L. Grant, Ph.D.

Issue Brief

Apr 9, 2009

 

When Secretary of Defense Robert Gates stated on April 6 that the Air Force advised him they wanted 187 F-22s, the reaction was shock. That’s because evidence indicates the Air Force was ready and willing to cap off production after buying a total of 243 F-22s, not 187. Do the simple math: just 187 F-22s to replace 522 F-15s now in the total inventory is not enough in a crisis. A total buy of 243 F-22s is the minimum to fill out ten F-22 squadrons for overseas missions and homeland defense.

 

What happened to the 243 number? Is the Obama Pentagon clamping down on the Services? Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Michael Mullen confirmed in December 2008 that he and Air Force Chief of Staff General Norton Schwartz were discussing 60 more, or 243 total F-22s. On April 7, a reporter said to Gates: “As recently as a few weeks ago, Air Force leadership was still publicly saying 260, 265. When did that change for them?” Here is Gates’ verbatim reply: “Well, you’ll have to ask them. (Chuckles.)”

 

Recall how things work in normal times. The Pentagon budget is a $500 billion behemoth that relies on a formal process derived from the checks and balances in the Constitution. The Services submit their budgets. The Office of the Secretary of Defense makes adjustments, then sends the budget to the President, who sends it to Congress. Key committees call generals, admirals and civilian officials to hearings where they swear under oath to give Congress their undiluted opinions.

 

Here’s the dog that didn’t bark in the night. Last summer, Schwartz said in testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee that he believed 381 F-22s were too many but 183 were too few. He promised to “delve deeply” into the analysis and return with a new number. Schwartz had numerous opportunities to call a halt to the F-22 at 183 aircraft. He did not. Going forward, Congress appropriated partial money for the next 20 F-22s based on the long-standing requirement for the F-22 to replace F-15s. Outgoing Bush Administration officials threw in procedural delays to prevent the Lockheed Martin – Boeing – Pratt & Whitney team from getting to work.

 

Then came the election. Many applauded President Obama’s decision to retain Bush’s Secretary of Defense to ensure wartime continuity. What few bargained for was that the first three months of the Obama presidency would give Gates a chance to craft what Senator Carl Levin has called a “novel” approach to the defense budget. Gates kept Bush-Rumsfeld holdovers in crucial program analysis posts and formed a small team to cut the budget in secret, a technique he mastered as CIA director. Next, in February 2009, Gates did what no previous Secretary of Defense had done. He directed top uniformed officers to sign non-disclosure agreements pledging not to talk about the budget process – even to other senior officers in their services. Can you picture even a famous budget cutter like Caspar Weinberger or an experienced legislator like William Cohen making a demand like that?

 

Schwartz never had a chance to present his analysis for 243 F-22s to Congress as promised. To speak up given Gates’ new restrictions might risk the tradition of civilian control begun by George Washington. Air Combat Command, whose airmen fly and maintain F-22s and other fighters, is left to pick up the pieces after this shattering break in faith. Is this what change in Washington means?

Well that is scathing!

From Aviation Week's Ares Blog

 

No More F-22s: USAF Leaders

Posted by Bill Sweetman at 4/13/2009 7:02 AM CDT

 

It's official. The USAF did want more F-22s and considered a 180-some force to be a high risk approach, but after the Defense Department provided the service with a new assessment of future wars, the USAF changed its mind. That's what the service's top leaders say in a signed piece in this morning's Washington Post.

 

The most important fact about this story is that it had to be written at all. Gates said on Monday that the AF had fully supported the decision to close the F-22 line. Nobody with any great power and influence (current or retired officers, for example) has spoken against it, except for the usual suspects on the Hill. Maybe Gates is reading the all-time-record comment thread on Ares.

 

The second important piece is here: First, based on warfighting experience over the past several years and judgments about future threats, the Defense Department is revisiting the scenarios on which the Air Force based its assessment.

 

Read this in conjunction with the paragraph before it, which states that Donley and Schwartz concluded last summer that a 381-aircraft force was "low-risk" and that 243 was "moderate risk". It's not a huge logical leap to say that 183 was termed "high risk" - that is, likely to prove deficient against future threats.

 

The USAF has not changed its methodology, but the DoD "is revisiting the scenarios" - that is, changing the inputs to the process. That is of course the DoD's job; but the Gates team seems to have done this in only one specific case. And when was it done? As we've reported before, the USAF in March was saying that it needed more F-22s.

 

Third pivotal comment: Analysis showed that overlapping F-22 and F-35 production would not only be expensive but that while the F-35 may still experience some growing pains, there is little risk of a catastrophic failure in its production line.

 

In its simplest terms, whether a risk is acceptable or not depends on the level of risk - its probability - and its consequences. Most of us will buy a $1 raffle ticket for a $50 prize even if we know that 100 tickets have been sold. Russian roulette has a much higher chance of a "win" - five in six - but most of us won't do that. That's risk management.

 

Now define "catastrophic". If you mean, for example, that JSF unit cost doubles and production rates are halved - as has happened to a lot of programs - there may be "little risk" of this. But its effect in a fixed-budget world would be to gut the US Air Force: the consequence is so severe that the only acceptable level of risk is zero.

 

Far lesser, and more likely JSF problems - a further delay in flight testing, more moderate increases in cost and rate reductions - will have a major impact because of the project's size and because there's no backup plan.

 

They could accelerate the aging of the force, compel the USAF to shrink its front-line strength and starve the otherneeds - nuclear reconstitution, ISR, space and cyber - that the two USAF leaders mention in the WaPo piece. Indeed, a two-year slip and a 25 per cent overrun in the price tag would easily equal the cost of 60 more F-22s over the same period of time.

 

But finally, missing from this piece is the full byline: Michael Donley is secretary of the Air Force. Gen. Norton Schwartz is chief of staff of the Air Force. Both were appointed to their present positions by SecDef Gates last summer, after he fired their predecessors, who had argued in favor of more F-22s.

From Aviation Week's Ares Blog

 

Schwartz on F-22 Kill: 243 Still the Reqirement

Posted by Amy Butler at 4/17/2009 8:38 AM CDT

 

Perhaps the book isn't closed on the F-22. Though Defense Secretary Robert Gates said he didn't decide to halt production of the stealthy twin-engine fighters solely as a budget decision, it is appearing more and more as if the Air Force leadership acquiesced to the proposal for purely financial reasons.

 

"Two hundred and forty-three is the military requirement as articulated by the United States Air Force,"Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Norton Schwartz told an audience hosted by the National Aeronautic Assn. today. But, "Nothing is free ... If it is more F-22s, what is it less of?"

 

Gates has publicly said the US Air Force agreed with his decision to halt production of the Lockheed Martin fighters at 187. And, he backs his approach by noting that 187 fighters has been the program of record since 2005. Both the Republican Bush administration and the Democratic Obama administration have now proposed ending production of the jet, which is assembled in Marietta, Ga.

 

However, it is becoming more and more evident that Air Force officials feel the 187 program presents the service with a high risk of accomplishing its missions in some war scenarios.

 

It'll be interesting to see how Schwartz answers the question in upcoming posture hearings of what his military advice is.

When Secretary of Defense Robert Gates stated on April 6 that the Air Force advised him they wanted 187 F-22s, the reaction was shock. That’s because evidence indicates the Air Force was ready and willing to cap off production after buying a total of 243 F-22s, not 187. Do the simple math: just 187 F-22s to replace 522 F-15s now in the total inventory is not enough in a crisis. A total buy of 243 F-22s is the minimum to fill out ten F-22 squadrons for overseas missions and homeland defense.

 

Dosvidanya Rodina.

 

What happened to the 243 number?

 

F-15 = 29.9 million in FY 1998. F-22 = 137.5 million in 2008 [this comes from Wikipedia].

 

Recall how things work in normal times.

 

The Death Star has been destroyed. Grand Moff Tarkin is dead. Darth Vader is in a wheelchair and The Emperor is nowhere to be found.....except maybe in a certain city in Texas....

 

The Pentagon budget is a $500 billion behemoth that relies on a formal process derived from the checks and balances in the Constitution. The Services submit their budgets. The Office of the Secretary of Defense makes adjustments, then sends the budget to the President, who sends it to Congress. Key committees call generals, admirals and civilian officials to hearings where they swear under oath to give Congress their undiluted opinions.

 

Career > Truth

 

Here’s the dog that didn’t bark in the night. Last summer, Schwartz said in testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee that he believed 381 F-22s were too many but 183 were too few. He promised to “delve deeply” into the analysis and return with a new number. Schwartz had numerous opportunities to call a halt to the F-22 at 183 aircraft. He did not. Going forward, Congress appropriated partial money for the next 20 F-22s based on the long-standing requirement for the F-22 to replace F-15s. Outgoing Bush Administration officials threw in procedural delays to prevent the Lockheed Martin – Boeing – Pratt & Whitney team from getting to work.

 

The first 100 days are over. It's not cool to blame the former administration any more.

 

Then came the election. Many applauded President Obama’s decision to retain Bush’s Secretary of Defense to ensure wartime continuity. What few bargained for was that the first three months of the Obama presidency would give Gates a chance to craft what Senator Carl Levin has called a “novel” approach to the defense budget. Gates kept Bush-Rumsfeld holdovers in crucial program analysis posts and formed a small team to cut the budget in secret, a technique he mastered as CIA director. Next, in February 2009, Gates did what no previous Secretary of Defense had done. He directed top uniformed officers to sign non-disclosure agreements pledging not to talk about the budget process – even to other senior officers in their services. Can you picture even a famous budget cutter like Caspar Weinberger or an experienced legislator like William Cohen making a demand like that?

 

Conspiratists unite! Go Pierre Salinger!

 

Schwartz never had a chance to present his analysis for 243 F-22s to Congress as promised. To speak up given Gates’ new restrictions might risk the tradition of civilian control begun by George Washington. Air Combat Command, whose airmen fly and maintain F-22s and other fighters, is left to pick up the pieces after this shattering break in faith. Is this what change in Washington means?

 

In many countries [but not all], change is usually brought about by a negative reception to the experiences of a majority. This is called democracy. I can be convoluted, twisted, and cheated, but it's still democracy. As happens very often with change, those previously in power often disagree with it.

 

Considering the personalities and political affiliations of the previous administration......who cares?

 

Later

D