CV32

Ph is the "probability of hit" of the missile (in this case, the SA-N-7) after taking into account the potential modifiers (fast target? small target? etc.) FPh is the "final probability of hit" or the actual Ph number used in determining hits. It is the Ph arrived at after taking into account whether multiple SA-N-7s were fired at the same target. DPh is the "database probability of hit" of the SA-N-7 as taken directly from the database.

And, at the other end of the spectrum ... http://www.heritage.org/33-minutes/

From DefenseNews French DM Casts Doubt on Need for Missile Defense By JULIAN HALE Published: 2 Dec 18:43 EST (23:43 GMT) BRUSSELS - France's defense minister cast doubt on the need for theater missile defenses in Europe, keeping Paris at odds with the Bush administration on the issue. Speaking to members of the European Parliament here Dec. 1, Hervé Morin asked what funds Europe would have left for other things if it committed to the "huge cost" of such defenses. Morin raised other questions as well. "Who would hold the key" to their use? What threat would they tackle? "There are risks, yes, but to say that there is a threat today would need to be checked," he said. He also said the decision on such defenses would need to be made in the context of relations with Russia. U.S. officials want to install interceptors in Poland and radar in the Czech Republic to shoot down missiles from Iran and North Korea. Russia hotly opposes the idea, and has threatened to deploy theater missiles in Kaliningrad if the project goes forward. Morin's remarks came two weeks after French President Nicolas Sarkozy offered an even more negative assessment of missile defense. On Nov. 14, Sarkozy proposed a mid-2009 meeting on European security, possibly within the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. "It will not be a conclusive summit, but we could put down the basis of what could be an agreement between us," the president said. "And, between now and then, please, let's not talk about the deployment of a missile shield, of missiles, which do not bring anything in terms of security." Other Issues Morin said that delays in the delivery of A400M airlifters were "a real concern." He said France had decided to look at which specifications could be downgraded and what late fees might be reduced, but also said that EADS must commit to a clear program and keep to a timetable. Morin also said that progress is being made on the French idea to have an EU center of command and planning in Brussels.

From Aviation Week Australian Air Force Campaigns For 100 F-35s Dec 3, 2008 By Bradley Perrett The Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) is stepping up its lobbying efforts for a full order of 100 F-35 Lightning IIs, a number that has been officially endorsed but could easily be trimmed in a defense white paper due next year. The chief of the air force, Air Marshal Mark Binskin, strongly defends the choice of Lockheed Martin’s F-35 as its next fighter, arguing that it will be part of an integrated airpower system and the country could not hope to find better. He also endorses the Boeing 737 Airborne Early Warning & Control Wedgetail and Airbus A330 tankers – both on order for Australia but running late – as the best equipment available. The F-35 will be the best multirole fighter in the world, Binskin says, and will be able to beat advanced Russian fighters because it will be backed by other superior equipment and superior personnel. “It will have the best radar, the best defensive system of any of those aircraft in the world,” Binskin said in a speech reported by the Australian Associated Press. “It will be supported by the best airborne early warning and control aircraft and the best tanker in the world and flown, maintained and supported by the best people in the world,” he reportedly said. “I’ve got to tell you: the system ain’t going to get any better than that.” The air force regards the Wedgetails as critical. As Boeing has suffered delays in developing the electronics, including an e-scan radar and advanced passive radio detection equipment, the service has said that it cannot afford to get less capability from them than it has specified – a clear sign that the six aircraft on order are at the center of its planning. While holding F-35s in high esteem, the air force also says its studies show a need for a large quantity of them. “No matter how you model it, the modeling keeps coming back to 100,” Binskin said. The Australian government has previously said that 100 F-35s could be needed, even though that would imply a rare case of one-for-one replacement or even expansion of the combat aircraft fleet. Juggling jets For the past decade or so, the high-speed Australian jet force has consisted of about 70 F/A-18A and B Hornets and about 35 General Dynamics F-111 strike bombers. But the true total is fewer than 100 because the operational F-111 force has been kept at only about 24, with airframes and engines cycled in and out of storage to prolong the type’s service life. The process of retiring the F-111 has now begun, and even before that some of the airframes were regarded as too worn out to return to service. The government ordered 24 F/A-18F Super Hornets last year to replace the F-111s from 2010 (Aerospace DAILY, March 7, 2007). Due to a strong budget surplus and no net debt, the government could afford to boost the defense budget to pay for that order so it would not affect other programs. But the budget is not so strong now, so Binskin’s call for 100 F-35s may imply sacrifices elsewhere, especially if the air force also hopes to retain the Super Hornets for a combined force of 124 jets – more than it has had since the early 1980s. While the Super Hornets could serve for decades alongside F-35s, they could also be sold when the last of the 100 F-35s arrive. That was the suggestion of the defense minister who ordered the Super Hornets, Brendan Nelson.

Maybe this will confuse the heck out of you, jugasa77, but we'll work through it. I think maybe this particular edit to the DB will not cause you any significant problems. I hasten to add that this may be an exception, and cannot be reliably repeated with respect to other edits of the DB. Editing the aircraft capacity of the CV Kuznetsov to increase it to 60 may not (and I repeat, may not) cause crashes of the scenario for players who subsequently load your scenario and an unedited copy of the HCDB. The only way to tell for sure would be to test it. Again, for clarity, this may be an exception to the general rule.

This month's issue of Foreign Affairs has several thought provoking articles that you may want to check out, including: The Logic of Zero, Toward a World Without Nuclear Weapons, by Ivo Daalder and Jan Lodal Summary: Washington must lead the way to a world without nuclear weapons. The first step will be dramatically limiting the U.S. nuclear arsenal's declared size and purpose.

This month's issue of Foreign Affairs has several thought provoking articles that you may want to check out, including: The Latter Day Sultan, Power and Politics in Iran, by Akbar Ganji Summary: The real decision-maker in Iran is Supreme Leader Khamenei not President Ahmadinejad. Blaming Iran's problems on President Ahmadinejad inaccurately suggests that Iran's problems will go away when Ahmadinejad does.

This month's issue of Foreign Affairs has several thought provoking articles that you may want to check out, including: From Great Game to Grand Bargain, Ending Chaos in Afghanistan and Pakistan, by Barnett R. Rubin and Ahmed Rashid Summary: The crisis in Afghanistan and Pakistan is beyond the point where more troops will help. U.S. strategy must be to seek compromise with insurgents while addressing regional rivalries and insecurities.

I don't usually have the H4/4.1 rules in front of me, either, and would defer to Pete on the finer points of the rules anyway. But its cool to see you "diving" into it, so to speak, and I'll offer some comments. Yes, but only when they're surfaced (and the ESM mast goes up). Generally speaking, a launching submarine would only cut the wires if it wished to maneuver immediately after shooting (and if the maneuver was severe enough, the wires would break anyway), and in most cases will want to maintain that control for as long as possible. If a sub is confident in his tactical position and self-noise, he may not want to cut the wires until the last possible moment or at all.

From Marine Corps Times Tarawa to decommission Thursday By Gidget Fuentes - Staff writer Posted : Tuesday Dec 2, 2008 16:37:20 EST SAN DIEGO — After 32 years, Tarawa is going to bid farewell to its sailors. Navy officials on Thursday will retire the amphibious assault ship, which in June returned to its pier at San Diego Naval Base after wrapping up its final operational deployment to the Persian Gulf and Northern Arabian Sea. One of Tarawa’s former skippers, Rear Adm. Garry Hall, will speak during the formal decommissioning ceremony that afternoon. Hall commanded the ship during a 2000 deployment that included assisting with efforts to recover victims of the terrorist attack on the destroyer Cole and assisting with the investigation. He serves as president of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces in Washington, D.C. Tarawa, commissioned in 1976, is the lead ship in the LHA class, which saw only four other ships — Saipan, Belleau Wood, Nassau and Peleliu — constructed by the shipbuilder, Ingalls Shipbuilding, before the Navy shifted to a new, larger LHD, or Wasp, class of amphibious assault ships. Belleau Wood retired in 2005 and nine months later succumbed to the sea in its final role as a naval gunnery target off Hawaii. The Navy retired Saipan last year. Nassau and Peleliu will remain in the fleet after Tarawa’s decomissioning. The 820-foot-long ships, each with a crew of nearly 1,000, can carry more than 1,000 Marines with a Marine expeditionary unit along with more than two dozen helicopters and Harrier attack jump jets, utility trucks, amphibious vehicles and three landing craft. Tarawa’s final deployment included helping with disaster relief operations in Bangladesh, humanitarian assistance missions in Djibouti and maritime security operations in the Persian Gulf. The Navy plans to send Tarawa to the Fleet Ready Reserve Force.

Editing the database will inevitably lead to incompatibility problems if you want players to be able to play your scenarios using the supplied database (the HCDB). A very good alternative, as noxious suggests, is to create your own custom DB and embed it into a battleset.

More analysis from Stratfor Pretty serious suggestions, and we should hope that he's wrong. Emphasis mine. Strategic Motivations for the Mumbai Attack December 1, 2008 By George Friedman Last Wednesday evening, a group of Islamist operatives carried out a complex terror operation in the Indian city of Mumbai. The attack was not complex because of the weapons used or its size, but in the apparent training, multiple methods of approaching the city and excellent operational security and discipline in the final phases of the operation, when the last remaining attackers held out in the Taj Mahal hotel for several days. The operational goal of the attack clearly was to cause as many casualties as possible, particularly among Jews and well-to-do guests of five-star hotels. But attacks on various other targets, from railroad stations to hospitals, indicate that the more general purpose was to spread terror in a major Indian city. While it is not clear precisely who carried out the Mumbai attack, two separate units apparently were involved. One group, possibly consisting of Indian Muslims, was established in Mumbai ahead of the attacks. The second group appears to have just arrived. It traveled via ship from Karachi, Pakistan, later hijacked a small Indian vessel to get past Indian coastal patrols, and ultimately landed near Mumbai. Extensive preparations apparently had been made, including surveillance of the targets. So while the precise number of attackers remains unclear, the attack clearly was well-planned and well-executed. Evidence and logic suggest that radical Pakistani Islamists carried out the attack. These groups have a highly complex and deliberately amorphous structure. Rather than being centrally controlled, ad hoc teams are created with links to one or more groups. Conceivably, they might have lacked links to any group, but this is hard to believe. Too much planning and training were involved in this attack for it to have been conceived by a bunch of guys in a garage. While precisely which radical Pakistani Islamist group or groups were involved is unknown, the Mumbai attack appears to have originated in Pakistan. It could have been linked to al Qaeda prime or its various franchises and/or to Kashmiri insurgents. More important than the question of the exact group that carried out the attack, however, is the attackers’ strategic end. There is a tendency to regard terror attacks as ends in themselves, carried out simply for the sake of spreading terror. In the highly politicized atmosphere of Pakistan’s radical Islamist factions, however, terror frequently has a more sophisticated and strategic purpose. Whoever invested the time and took the risk in organizing this attack had a reason to do so. Let’s work backward to that reason by examining the logical outcomes following this attack. An End to New Delhi’s Restraint The most striking aspect of the Mumbai attack is the challenge it presents to the Indian government — a challenge almost impossible for New Delhi to ignore. A December 2001 Islamist attack on the Indian parliament triggered an intense confrontation between India and Pakistan. Since then, New Delhi has not responded in a dramatic fashion to numerous Islamist attacks against India that were traceable to Pakistan. The Mumbai attack, by contrast, aimed to force a response from New Delhi by being so grievous that any Indian government showing only a muted reaction to it would fall. India’s restrained response to Islamist attacks (even those originating in Pakistan) in recent years has come about because New Delhi has understood that, for a host of reasons, Islamabad has been unable to control radical Pakistani Islamist groups. India did not want war with Pakistan; it felt it had more important issues to deal with. New Delhi therefore accepted Islamabad’s assurances that Pakistan would do its best to curb terror attacks, and after suitable posturing, allowed tensions originating from Islamist attacks to pass. This time, however, the attackers struck in such a way that New Delhi couldn’t allow the incident to pass. As one might expect, public opinion in India is shifting from stunned to furious. India’s Congress party-led government is politically weak and nearing the end of its life span. It lacks the political power to ignore the attack, even if it were inclined to do so. If it ignored the attack, it would fall, and a more intensely nationalist government would take its place. It is therefore very difficult to imagine circumstances under which the Indians could respond to this attack in the same manner they have to recent Islamist attacks. What the Indians actually will do is not clear. In 2001-2002, New Delhi responded to the attack on the Indian parliament by moving forces close to the Pakistani border and the Line of Control that separates Indian- and Pakistani-controlled Kashmir, engaging in artillery duels along the front, and bringing its nuclear forces to a high level of alert. The Pakistanis made a similar response. Whether India ever actually intended to attack Pakistan remains unclear, but either way, New Delhi created an intense crisis in Pakistan. The U.S. and the Indo-Pakistani Crisis The United States used this crisis for its own ends . Having just completed the first phase of its campaign in Afghanistan, Washington was intensely pressuring Pakistan’s then-Musharraf government to expand cooperation with the United States; purge its intelligence organization, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), of radical Islamists; and crack down on al Qaeda and the Taliban in the Afghan-Pakistani border region. Former Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf had been reluctant to cooperate with Washington, as doing so inevitably would spark a massive domestic backlash against his government. The crisis with India produced an opening for the United States. Eager to get India to stand down from the crisis, the Pakistanis looked to the Americans to mediate. And the price for U.S. mediation was increased cooperation from Pakistan with the United States. The Indians, not eager for war, backed down from the crisis after guarantees that Islamabad would impose stronger controls on Islamist groups in Kashmir. In 2001-2002, the Indo-Pakistani crisis played into American hands. In 2008, the new Indo-Pakistani crisis might play differently. The United States recently has demanded increased Pakistani cooperation along the Afghan border. Meanwhile, President-elect Barack Obama has stated his intention to focus on Afghanistan and pressure the Pakistanis. Therefore, one of Islamabad’s first responses to the new Indo-Pakistani crisis was to announce that if the Indians increased their forces along Pakistan’s eastern border, Pakistan would be forced to withdraw 100,000 troops from its western border with Afghanistan. In other words, threats from India would cause Pakistan to dramatically reduce its cooperation with the United States in the Afghan war. The Indian foreign minister is flying to the United States to meet with Obama; obviously, this matter will be discussed among others. We expect the United States to pressure India not to create a crisis, in order to avoid this outcome. As we have said, the problem is that it is unclear whether politically the Indians can afford restraint. At the very least, New Delhi must demand that the Pakistani government take steps to make the ISI and Pakistan’s other internal security apparatus more effective. Even if the Indians concede that there was no ISI involvement in the attack, they will argue that the ISI is incapable of stopping such attacks. They will demand a purge and reform of the ISI as a sign of Pakistani commitment. Barring that, New Delhi will move troops to the Indo-Pakistani frontier to intimidate Pakistan and placate Indian public opinion. Dilemmas for Islamabad, New Delhi and Washington At that point, Islamabad will have a serious problem. The Pakistani government is even weaker than the Indian government. Pakistan’s civilian regime does not control the Pakistani military, and therefore does not control the ISI. The civilians can’t decide to transform Pakistani security, and the military is not inclined to make this transformation. (Pakistan’s military has had ample opportunity to do so if it wished.) Pakistan faces the challenge, just one among many, that its civilian and even military leadership lack the ability to reach deep into the ISI and security services to transform them. In some ways, these agencies operate under their own rules. Add to this the reality that the ISI and security forces — even if they are acting more assertively, as Islamabad claims — are demonstrably incapable of controlling radical Islamists in Pakistan. If they were capable, the attack on Mumbai would have been thwarted in Pakistan. The simple reality is that in Pakistan’s case, the will to make this transformation does not seem to be present, and even if it were, the ability to suppress terror attacks isn’t there. The United States might well want to limit New Delhi’s response. U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice is on her way to India to discuss just this. But the politics of India’s situation make it unlikely that the Indians can do anything more than listen. It is more than simply a political issue for New Delhi; the Indians have no reason to believe that the Mumbai operation was one of a kind. Further operations like the Mumbai attack might well be planned. Unless the Pakistanis shift their posture inside Pakistan, India has no way of knowing whether other such attacks can be stymied. The Indians will be sympathetic to Washington’s plight in Afghanistan and the need to keep Pakistani troops at the Afghan border. But New Delhi will need something that the Americans — and in fact the Pakistanis — can’t deliver: a guarantee that there will be no more attacks like this one. The Indian government cannot chance inaction. It probably would fall if it did. Moreover, in the event of inactivity and another attack, Indian public opinion probably will swing to an uncontrollable extreme. If an attack takes place but India has moved toward crisis posture with Pakistan, at least no one can argue that the Indian government remained passive in the face of threats to national security. Therefore, India is likely to refuse American requests for restraint. It is possible that New Delhi will make a radical proposal to Rice, however. Given that the Pakistani government is incapable of exercising control in its own country, and given that Pakistan now represents a threat to both U.S. and Indian national security, the Indians might suggest a joint operation with the Americans against Pakistan. What that joint operation might entail is uncertain, but regardless, this is something that Rice would reject out of hand and that Obama would reject in January 2009. Pakistan has a huge population and nuclear weapons, and the last thing Bush or Obama wants is to practice nation-building in Pakistan. The Indians, of course, will anticipate this response. The truth is that New Delhi itself does not want to engage deep in Pakistan to strike at militant training camps and other Islamist sites. That would be a nightmare. But if Rice shows up with a request for Indian restraint and no concrete proposal — or willingness to entertain a proposal — for solving the Pakistani problem, India will be able to refuse on the grounds that the Americans are asking India to absorb a risk (more Mumbai-style attacks) without the United States’ willingness to share in the risk. Setting the Stage for a New Indo-Pakistani Confrontation That will set the stage for another Indo-Pakistani confrontation. India will push forces forward all along the Indo-Pakistani frontier, move its nuclear forces to an alert level, begin shelling Pakistan, and perhaps — given the seriousness of the situation — attack short distances into Pakistan and even carry out airstrikes deep in Pakistan. India will demand greater transparency for New Delhi in Pakistani intelligence operations. The Indians will not want to occupy Pakistan; they will want to occupy Pakistan’s security apparatus. Naturally, the Pakistanis will refuse that. There is no way they can give India, their main adversary, insight into Pakistani intelligence operations. But without that access, India has no reason to trust Pakistan. This will leave the Indians in an odd position: They will be in a near-war posture, but will have made no demands of Pakistan that Islamabad can reasonably deliver and that would benefit India. In one sense, India will be gesturing. In another sense, India will be trapped by making a gesture on which Pakistan cannot deliver. The situation thus could get out of hand. In the meantime, the Pakistanis certainly will withdraw forces from western Pakistan and deploy them in eastern Pakistan. That will mean that one leg of the Petraeus and Obama plans would collapse. Washington’s expectation of greater Pakistani cooperation along the Afghan border will disappear along with the troops. This will free the Taliban from whatever limits the Pakistani army had placed on it. The Taliban’s ability to fight would increase, while the motivation for any of the Taliban to enter talks — as Afghan President Hamid Karzai has suggested — would decline. U.S. forces, already stretched to the limit, would face an increasingly difficult situation, while pressure on al Qaeda in the tribal areas would decrease. Now, step back and consider the situation the Mumbai attackers have created. First, the Indian government faces an internal political crisis driving it toward a confrontation it didn’t plan on. Second, the minimum Pakistani response to a renewed Indo-Pakistani crisis will be withdrawing forces from western Pakistan, thereby strengthening the Taliban and securing al Qaeda. Third, sufficient pressure on Pakistan’s civilian government could cause it to collapse, opening the door to a military-Islamist government — or it could see Pakistan collapse into chaos, giving Islamists security in various regions and an opportunity to reshape Pakistan. Finally, the United States’ situation in Afghanistan has now become enormously more complex. By staging an attack the Indian government can’t ignore, the Mumbai attackers have set in motion an existential crisis for Pakistan. The reality of Pakistan cannot be transformed, trapped as the country is between the United States and India. Almost every evolution from this point forward benefits Islamists. Strategically, the attack on Mumbai was a precise blow struck to achieve uncertain but favorable political outcomes for the Islamists. Rice’s trip to India now becomes the crucial next step. She wants Indian restraint. She does not want the western Pakistani border to collapse. But she cannot guarantee what India must have: assurance of no further terror attacks on India originating in Pakistan. Without that, India must do something. No Indian government could survive without some kind of action. So it is up to Rice, in one of her last acts as secretary of state, to come up with a miraculous solution to head off a final, catastrophic crisis for the Bush administration — and a defining first crisis for the new Obama administration. Former U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld once said that the enemy gets a vote. The Islamists cast their ballot in Mumbai.

jugasa77, I've moved your post here rather than the HCDB requests thread. I interpreted your post as an "informational" one, for database editors generally, rather than a specific request or suggestion that the HCDB entry for the CV Kuznetsov be changed. If I'm wrong, and you are in fact making that suggestion, please see the FAQ section re What is the HCDB? To summarize, the HCDB tries to draw its information from the latest Harpoon 4 annexes, and where appropriate or necessary, from other reliable sources. For the time being, re CV Kuzetsov specifically, I'm comfortable with the "36 a/c in the air wing" figure. In fact, I think the operational air wing in real life is somewhat smaller than that.

Thats an interesting angle, for sure. But were the Pakistani forces really doing anything worthwhile in the area of the strongholds anyway?

Welcome, welcome! Absolutely this is the place to be for all things Harpoon.

No problem, jugasa. If you need help along the way, just holler and someone will give you a hand.

Doesn't get much clearer than that, unfortunately. Changing the file suffix won't work, jugasa77. Sorry.

Oh, don't be such an abolitionist, Pete.

What the heck is a "Harpoonist"? Is that like a pianist?

That time again ... My vote for the the 2008 Pooner goes to Freek Schepers, whom, as previously mentioned by Tony, has been able to keep producing new scenarios for H3/ANW, stay active in the multi-player games, and stay out of the bickering. (Which, I have to say, seems to have for the most part now thankfully departed from the scene). Way to go, Freek! My vote for the Lifetime Pooner award has to go to Tony Eischens. Yes, I know full well that he's stated that he would like to steer clear of the awards, but I'm willing to risk his disdain because its about time. Frankly, being the record keeper shouldn't in itself disqualify someone so truly qualified for the recognition. In fact, I believe its more proof of his dedication to this game than anything. Tony has worked tirelessly on the (often byzantine) code for HCE (and its predecessors); and for a very long time, maintained a server (at his own expense, time and effort) for the H3/ANW crowd to venture out onto the multi-player battlefield; and wrote the occasional scenario; and created his own database of uber cool, "what if" platforms (long live the Super Tomcat!); and made himself available to answer, address or otherwise tackle head on every question, query, quirk and nuance that we've ever had about how this game works. What more can I say, I think Tony deserves the Lifetime Pooner bar none. I think we're all mature enough to know that if he truly deserves it, the mere fact that he keeps the records shouldn't keep him from that recognition. (And, besides, we won't have to go through this tortuous process again next year!)

If someone is thinking about writing a new scenario for the Caribbean battleset, couple this story with the one about Russian ships visiting Venezuela, reported here, and you may have some potential scen fodder. Something to consider.

From Defence Talk Southern Partnership Station Begins Aboard Swift US Navy | Dec 1, 2008 MORGAN CITY: Military Sealift Command-chartered high speed vessel HSV-2 Swift (HSV 2) along with various embarked Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force units departed Louisiana Nov. 25 for a five-month deployment in support of Southern Partnership Station (SPS). Southern Partnership Station is an annual deployment of various specialty platforms to the U.S. Southern Command area of focus in the Caribbean and Latin America. The mission's primary goal is information sharing with navies, coast guards and civilian services throughout the region. "Southern Partnership Station provides an excellent opportunity to facilitate cooperation, interaction and communication between regional partners' civil and maritime services," said Rear Adm. Joseph D. Kernan, Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Southern Command and U.S. 4th Fleet. "Working together alongside our partner nations, sharing knowledge and experiences through joint, multinational and interagency exchanges will help to build strong relationships, improve interoperability and enhance regional maritime security." Military training teams and subject matter experts embarked on Swift will provide partner nations with classroom and hands-on training in a variety of subjects. "SPS provides us an opportunity to work with our friends, build partnerships and train together," said Cmdr. Christopher K. Barnes, SPS mission commander. The ship is scheduled to visit El Salvador, Panama, Nicaragua, Dominican Republic, Jamaica, Barbados and Colombia. The mission is coordinated through U.S. Naval Forces Southern Command/U.S. Fourth Fleet (NAVSO/ 4th Fleet) with partner nations to meet their specific training requests. Swift embarked elements of the Navy Expeditionary Training Command from Naval Amphibious Base Little Creek, Va., Marine Corps Training and Advisory Group from Fort Story, Va., and Naval Criminal Investigative Service Security Training Assistance and Assessment Team. Members of the Navy Expeditionary Training Command will provide instruction in small boat operations, maintenance and repair, boarding techniques, armed sentry, search and rescue, combat lifesaving, leadership principles for junior and senior partner nation enlisted service members, and instructor training. The Marine Corps Training and Advisory Group will advise partner nation servicemembers on a variety of different topics including marksmanship, martial arts, and non-lethal weapons tactics. Naval Criminal Investigative Service Security Training and Assessment Team will provide port security instruction and advice. Information systems technicians will help install and instruct partner nation servicemembers on the use of Integrated Automatic Identification Systems (IAIS). IAIS is a computer based vessel identification program that provides ports and other ships with real-time location and information on friendly vessels within their region. "This is a great system, I really like the way it works," said Information Systems Technician 2nd Class German Rodriguez, IAIS instructor. "I'm excited to interact with our friends and show them the great things this system can do." As the Naval Component Command of SOUTHCOM, NAVSO's mission is to direct U.S. Naval Forces operating in the Caribbean, Central and South American regions and interact with partner nation navies within the maritime environment. Various operations include counter-illicit trafficking, Theater Security Cooperation, Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief, military-to-military interaction and bilateral and multinational training. Fourth Fleet is the numbered fleet assigned to NAVSO, exercising operational control of assigned forces in the SOUTHCOM area of focus. Swift is under long-term charter to the U.S. Navy's Military Sealift Command. A crew of civilian mariners working for a private company under charter to MSC operate and navigate the ship.

From Aviation Week F-35 To Become Electronic Attack Aircraft Nov 30, 2008 By David A. Fulghum After years of debate about the future of tactical, airborne electronic attack for the U.S. Air Force and Marine Corps, it appears the F-35 will become the next-generation, digital warfare aircraft for both services. The platform most in demand in combat today is some kind of electronic attack (EA) aircraft, say military operational experts. So the pressure for more aircraft and advanced capabilities is already an operational reality. But the basic question of who does what for whom and to whom remains unanswered. "Who will provide electronic fires to ground troops in contact?" mused Air Force Maj. Gen. Charles Davis, program executive officer for the F-35 Lightning II. "That's a core mission area for the Air Force, Navy and Marines. Delivering electronic fires will be at the heart of what F-35 does. [but] the decision about how this [and other EA aircraft will be used in the electronic fires arena has not been made." Despite the vagaries, Davis says, "There is no doubt in my mind that eventually this airplane will fulfill the [EA] role of the EA-6B Prowler." But development of a specialized electronic attack variant will not take the classic approach that produced the Air Force's EF-111 Raven or the Navy's EA-6B Prowler and EA-18G Growler. While there's still nothing in the order book, top joint program officials say studies are underway that would add advanced electronic weaponry to the aircraft through the use of exterior pods and antenna arrays. Those add-ons are being designed in parallel efforts such as the Next-Generation Jammer program, and they are aimed at taking advantage of the F-35's inherent connectivity and enhancing the EA capabilities already tucked into the aircraft's interior. "[The F-35 has] to be interoperable with 80 different platforms and trade 140+ different kinds of information from the ground, ships and aircraft," Davis says. The role of EA aircraft would add at least one more capability to its 23 missions. Davis hinted at the compatibility of electronic emissions and stealth. "The F-35 is specifically designed to take advantage of lessons learned from [the first stealthy strike aircraft,] the F-117," he says. "Unlike the F-117, the ability to share tactically important information is built into the F-35 [without compromising its] stealth." But the aerospace industry is not united in the view that the F-35 is the single answer to next-generation, airborne electronic attack. Some specialists worry the F-35 will be short of electrical power and payload space with virtually no room to add systems into its packed interior. The options are to put jammers and additional power supplies in the weapons bays to stay stealthy or put them on the exterior and revert to a stand-off jamming role. "Every design has its limitations," says a senior electronics industry official with long experience in electronic warfare. "No one aircraft is going to answer all the problems facing airborne electronic attack." The Growler has two engines, two generators, can produce additional electrical power and could carry the Next Generation Jammer (NGJ), EW specialists note. The NGJ offers a capability for longer-range standoff jamming, is being designed for carriage in a pod with its own ram-air turbine power source and would be available for many platforms. "I would bet that the EF-35 also will carry the Next Generation Jammer," the EW specialist says. "But if it's in an external pod, [the extra radar reflectivity] will give away the aircraft's location. Yet, if you put the guts of an NGJ into the weapon bays of a single-engine single-generator aircraft in order to maintain all-aspect stealth, you are rapidly going to run out of available power to run it." There also are questions about designing operational concepts for the F-35. "If the aircraft has to maintain all-aspect stealth, then how can you do the necessary jamming for a close air support mission or an F-35 strike package from either in close or at standoff range?" the specialist asks. "And electronic attack is one area where size does matter," he says. "[Despite two false starts,] an EB-52 carrying large-aperture, active electronically scanned array radar with the output of an electronic techniques generator routed through it [such as jamming, false targets, power surges, etc.] can be a very long-range electronic weapon. So, in addition to strike aircraft and bombers, tankers and 737-type aircraft [such as the Navy's E-8 Poseidon, Army and Navy Aerial Common Sensor and Air Force tanker] are also possible platforms for the Next-Generation Jammer. Finally, unmanned aircraft of the Global Hawk and Reaper size could have the necessary size, power and payload." But will the services get together soon on a common EW/EA plan? The answer is "yes," but they will be reluctant participants because of divergent operational and budgetary needs. "The budget will be the driver of the solution," the senior electronics industry official says. "They will run out of options before long." And that formula of pressing operational needs and shrinking defense budgets leads back to considering the JSF as a single solution. It is a position which the Marine Corps has already embraced and the Air Force appears to favor. All three current versions of the Joint Strike Fighter will carry active electronically scanned array (AESA) radars with EW capabilities (primarily self-protection and electronic surveillance) and EA capabilities (the offensive use of false targets, network attack, advanced jamming, algorithm-packed data streams and other techniques) as part of the baseline aircraft delivered to the military. As designed now, the F-35's combination EW/EA/AESA system allows it to penetrate well-defended targets while suppressing the ability of enemy radars to detect, exchange information about and threaten a mutually supporting group of F-35s. "We're not bringing in a package that is designed to bring down electronic fires for a widely spread strike force," Davis says. "It's focused on getting a small force of F-35s in and out of a target area with no assistance. It involves anything that would be a threat in suppression or destruction of enemy air defenses missions." While self-protection, penetration and strike are primary roles for the F-35, it also will have to provide support for the Marines and soldiers on the ground, particularly those in contact with the enemy. "The F-35's data collection, integration and information sharing capabilities will transform the battlespace of the future and will redefine the close air support mission," Davis contends. But modern close air support will demand the delivery of those electronic fires, on demand for a forward air controller, just as aircraft now deliver bombs, rockets and cannon fire. To deliver electronic fires as do the EA-6B or EA-18G "would require the addition of [advanced jamming] pods and additional EW arrays," Davis says. Right now, "We are not a wide-area, standoff EW jammer. Our jamming system is designed to get the aircraft into and out of the target area. Can you use it for other things and expand [the EA] capability? Most definitely." The Marines are now working on delivering electronic fires from EA-6B Prowlers newly modified with the ICAP III EA system that provides jamming, silencing as well as breeching and exploiting enemy communications and signals networks. The Navy has the advanced EA-18G coming into service that will be able to attack an even more sophisticated target set when it upgrades from ICAP III to the still nascent NGJ. Electronic attack is just one of the advanced missions expected to emerge from the F-35 program. Davis says planners are looking at three notional capabilities associated with unmanned aircraft: sharing data and information with unmanned aerial systems, helping unmanned platforms with targeting and weapons employment and linking a series of UAVs with a series of F-35s to expand attack capabilities. "There's no doubt you could [field those capabilties] if you chose to," Davis says. "Who controls who, and who offers what data, is what we are looking at."

Ran Rene's test scenarios, subtest and subtest2, yesterday while Rene, Tony and I were in IRC channel at the time. Oberons typically gained detections at 12-13 nm, and the player came under torpedo fire at between 5-8 nm. In the second scenario, a Barracuda SSN is added to the fray (on both sides). Not surprisingly, this Red SSN also shoots at the Blue Oberon when the latter is attacked by the Red Oberon. (Due to the fact that AI platforms share detection information simultaneously). All told, nothing unusual here that I can see. I haven't tried Pason yet, which Rene advises is 4 vs 4 scenario. I think we need to rule out whether other factors are in play, most notably whether the AI is gaining detections from other platforms, i.e. ships and aircraft.

From Defense Aerospace Astor Gears Up For Takeoff (Source: UK Ministry of Defence; issued Dec. 1, 2008) The MoD has today declared the technologically advanced ASTOR (Airborne Stand-Off Radar) in service with the RAF, on the Sentinel R1 aircraft. The new radar system will be operated by the RAF's Number 5 (Army Co-Operation) Squadron based at RAF Waddington in Lincolnshire providing a new all-weather intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance capability to assist commanders on the battlefield. Operating at altitudes in excess of 40,000ft, for over 9 hours at a time, the aircraft is capable of detecting and recognising moving, static and fixed targets at stand-off range. This information is transmitted in near-real time to commanders on the ground, enabling rapid tactical planning and efficient cueing of other sensor and attack systems such as Reaper and GMLRS (Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System). Minister for Defence Equipment and Support, Quentin Davies said: "The new ASTOR system onboard our Sentinel R1 aircraft is a unique and technologically advanced capability that will deliver exceptional battlefield surveillance. The ASTOR radar will link up with other intelligence-gathering equipment providing commanders with a complete picture of the ground allowing them to make immediate decisions on operations. "ASTOR is already providing a number of UK companies the opportunity to participate in a high-technology programme ensuring that the UK remains at the forefront of defence technology. I am delighted to welcome this vital asset into service with the RAF and Army. " Defence Equipment and Support, ASTOR Project Team leader, Bill Chrispin said: "Accepting ASTOR into service with the RAF represents the initial stage in the roll-out of this entirely new capability to our Armed Forces. Only through a strong working relationship between the MoD and the prime contractor, Raytheon Systems Limited, has ASTOR matured into what we see today. 5 (AC) Squadron, re-formed on 1 April 2004, has risen to the doctrinal and training challenges of this dynamic platform, and is now well set to face the future challenges." The ASTOR system is designed to communicate with a wide-range of other systems and networks and is therefore at the heart of the UK's Network Enabled Capability (NEC). NEC facilitates the build-up of a complete picture of the operating environment on land aiding decision making by commanders on the ground, in the air and at sea. As part of the ongoing operational development process ASTOR will undertake an overseas deployment prior to achieving Full Operating Capability about two years from now. The fully operational ASTOR system will comprise five modified Bombardier Global Express business jets (dubbed Sentinel R1) crewed by two aircrew, at least three radar operators, and eight ground stations. Wing Commander Harry Kemsley, Officer Commanding RAF 5 (Army Co-Operation) Squadron said: "ASTOR is a unique, cutting edge, ground surveillance capability for the UK Armed Forces. It will provide battlefield commanders with critical, all-weather wide area, Near-Real Time intelligence, which will enhance the effectiveness of Land operations. Training of Sqn personnel and development of the System has progressed exceedingly well over the last 18 months and the Sqn is now in a position to make a positive contribution to current operations in the very near future." James Klein, vice president of Raytheon's Mission Systems Integration business said: "We are confident that ASTOR will be a critical asset, providing the actionable intelligence necessary to help protect British and coalition forces worldwide. Raytheon is excited to see ASTOR enter service as a valuable asset for the UK. This world-class capability is the product of great teamwork with the MoD, RAF 5 (AC) Squadron, and our industry partners." BACKGROUND NOTES: 1. 5 (AC) Squadron is based at RAF Waddington in Lincolnshire, which is the RAF's Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) hub, also housing the E3D Sentry and Nimrod R1 aircraft. 2. The Sentinel R1 aircraft, based on Bombardier's Global Express business jet, have been converted to specification by Raytheon in Texas and at Broughton near Chester in order to incorporate Raytheon's dual mode radar system. 3. Other companies involved in the project include L3 Com IS (System integration and design authority), Lucas Aerospace (electrical systems), Messier Dowty (landing gear), AgustaWestland (doors), Marshalls (Tactical and Operational Level Ground Stations), BAe Systems (Defensive Aids), Selex (radar components),and Rolls-Royce Deutschland (BR710 engines). 4. The £860M contract to develop, supply and maintain the advanced intelligence gathering system was awarded to Raytheon Systems Ltd in 1999. 5. In-Service-Date is defined as the acceptance in service of two Sentinel R1 aircraft, two Tactical Ground Stations and two trained crews. [CV32: Such a smart looking jet. Probably because its Canadian. ] ASTOR photo gallery at Raytheon