CV32

Excellent. I think you've gained some excellent ASW experience from this scenario. I would not want to be the sub skipper trying to sneak up on you next time.

From Jane's Iran accelerates missile production in preparation for possible conflict By Alon Ben-David 11 December 2008 Iran more than tripled its arsenal of Shahab-3 intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) in 2008, Western intelligence sources have said, in a sign that the country is preparing for a prolonged conflict. "At the beginning of 2008 [iran] had about 30 operational missiles compared with more than 100 missiles today," an intelligence source told Jane's. The Shahab-3 has a reported range of 2,000 km, but is believed to have an operational range of 1,800 km. Israel would be the likely target for any offensive action from Iran, an Israeli defence source said.

LOL. Yes, that would make a difference in some respects, but hopefully the tactics are sound.

Keeping in mind your schedule for getting the convoy to port, of course. (This is where the scenario author gets his laughs). That's the spirit! Good hunting.

Don't give up! Staying under 20 kt means you get "some" passive sonar performance. But its far from optimum at that speed. Are you creeping (5 kt or less) at all?

From Stratfor Next Steps in the Indo-Pakistani Crisis December 8, 2008 By George Friedman In an interview published this Sunday in The New York Times, we laid out a potential scenario for the current Indo-Pakistani crisis. We began with an Indian strike on Pakistan, precipitating a withdrawal of Pakistani troops from the Afghan border, resulting in intensified Taliban activity along the border and a deterioration in the U.S. position in Afghanistan, all culminating in an emboldened Iran. The scenario is not unlikely, assuming India chooses to strike. Our argument that India is likely to strike focused, among other points, on the weakness of the current Indian government and how it is likely to fall under pressure from the opposition and the public if it does not act decisively. An unnamed Turkish diplomat involved in trying to mediate the dispute has argued that saving a government is not a good reason to go to war. That is a good argument, except that in this case, not saving the government is unlikely to prevent a war, either. If India’s Congress party government were to fall, its replacement would be even more likely to strike at Pakistan. The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), Congress’ Hindu nationalist rival, has long charged that Congress is insufficiently aggressive in combating terrorism. The BJP will argue that the Mumbai attack in part resulted from this failing. Therefore, if the Congress government does not strike, and is subsequently forced out or loses India’s upcoming elections, the new government is even more likely to strike. It is therefore difficult to see a path that avoids Indian retaliation, and thus the emergence of at least a variation on the scenario we laid out. But the problem is not simply political: India must also do something to prevent more Mumbais. This is an issue of Indian national security, and the pressure on India’s government to do something comes from several directions. Three Indian Views of Pakistan The question is what an Indian strike against Pakistan, beyond placating domestic public opinion, would achieve. There are three views on this in India. The first view holds that Pakistani officials aid and abet terrorism — in particular the Pakistani Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI), which serves as Pakistan’s main intelligence service. In this view, the terrorist attacks are the work of Pakistani government officials — perhaps not all of the government, but enough officials of sufficient power that the rest of the government cannot block them, and therefore the entire Pakistani government can be held accountable. The second view holds that terrorist attacks are being carried out by Kashmiri groups that have long been fostered by the ISI but have grown increasingly autonomous since 2002 — and that the Pakistani government has deliberately failed to suppress anti-Indian operations by these groups. In this view, the ISI and related groups are either aware of these activities or willfully ignorant of them, even if ISI is not in direct control. Under this thinking, the ISI and the Pakistanis are responsible by omission, if not by commission. The third view holds that the Pakistani government is so fragmented and weak that it has essentially lost control of Pakistan to the extent that it cannot suppress these anti-Indian groups. This view says that the army has lost control of the situation to the point where many from within the military-intelligence establishment are running rogue operations, and groups in various parts of the country simply do what they want. If this argument is pushed to its logical conclusion, Pakistan should be regarded as a state on the verge of failure, and an attack by India might precipitate further weakening, freeing radical Islamist groups from what little control there is. The first two analyses are essentially the same. They posit that Pakistan could stop attacks on India, but chooses not to. The third is the tricky one. It rests on the premise that the Pakistani government (and in this we include the Pakistani army) is placing some restraint on the attackers. Thus, the government’s collapse would make enough difference that India should restrain itself, especially as any Indian attack would so destabilize Pakistan that it would unleash our scenario and worse. In this view, Pakistan’s civilian government has only as much power in these matters as the army is willing to allow. The argument against attacking Pakistan therefore rests on a very thin layer of analysis. It requires the belief that Pakistan is not responsible for the attacks, that it is nonetheless restraining radical Islamists to some degree, and that an Indian attack would cause even these modest restraints to disappear. Further, it assumes that these restraints, while modest, are substantial enough to make a difference. There is a debate in India, and in Washington, as to whether this is the case. This is why New Delhi has demanded that Pakistan turn over 20 individuals wanted by India in connection with attacks. The list doesn’t merely include Islamists, but also Lt. Gen. Hamid Gul, the former head of the ISI who has long been suspected of close ties with Islamists. (The United States apparently added Gul to the list.) Turning those individuals over would be enormously difficult politically for Pakistan. It would create a direct confrontation between Pakistan’s government and the Pakistani Islamist movement, likely sparking violence in Pakistan. Indeed, turning any Pakistani over to India, regardless of ideology, would create a massive crisis in Pakistan. The Indian government chose to make this demand precisely because complying with it is enormously difficult for Pakistan. New Delhi is not so much demanding the 20 individuals, but rather that Pakistan take steps that will create conflict in Pakistan. If the Pakistani government is in control of the country, it should be able to weather the storm. If it can’t weather the storm, then the government is not in control of Pakistan. And if it could weather the storm but chooses not to incur the costs, then India can reasonably claim that Pakistan is prepared to export terrorism rather than endure it at home. In either event, the demand reveals things about the Pakistani reality. The View from Islamabad Pakistan’s evaluation, of course, is different. Islamabad does not regard itself as failed because it cannot control all radical Islamists or the Taliban. The official explanation is that the Pakistanis are doing the best they can. From the Pakistani point of view, while the Islamists ultimately might represent a threat, the threat to Pakistan and its government that would arise from a direct assault on the Islamists is a great danger not only to Pakistan, but also to the region. It is thus better for all to let the matter rest. The Islamist issue aside, Pakistan sees itself as continuing to govern the country effectively, albeit with substantial social and economic problems (as one might expect). The costs of confronting the Islamists, relative to the benefits, are therefore high. The Pakistanis see themselves as having several effective counters against an Indian attack. The most important of these is the United States. The very first thing Islamabad said after the Mumbai attack was that a buildup of Indian forces along the Pakistani border would force Pakistan to withdraw 100,000 troops from its Afghan border. Events over the weekend, such as the attack on a NATO convoy, showed the vulnerability of NATO’s supply line across Pakistan to Afghanistan. The Americans are fighting a difficult holding action against the Taliban in Afghanistan. The United States needs the militant base camps in Pakistan and the militants’ lines of supply cut off, but the Americans lack the force to do this themselves. A withdrawal of Pakistani forces from the Afghan border would pose a direct threat to American forces. Therefore, the Pakistanis expect Washington to intervene on their behalf to prevent an Indian attack. They do not believe a major Indian troop buildup will take place, and if it does, the Pakistanis do not think it will lead to substantial conflict. There has been some talk of an Indian naval blockade against Pakistan, blocking the approaches to Pakistan’s main port of Karachi. This is an attractive strategy for India, as it plays to New Delhi’s relative naval strength. Again, the Pakistanis do not believe the Indians will do this, given that it would cut off the flow of supplies to American troops in Afghanistan. (Karachi is the main port serving U.S. forces in Afghanistan.) The line of supply in Afghanistan runs through Pakistan, and the Americans, the Pakistanis calculate, do not want anything to threaten that. From the Pakistani point of view, the only potential military action India could take that would not meet U.S. opposition would be airstrikes. There has been talk that the Indians might launch airstrikes against Islamist training camps and bases in Pakistani-administered Kashmir. In Pakistan’s view, this is not a serious problem. Mounting airstrikes against training camps is harder than it might seem. The only way to achieve anything in such a facility is with area destruction weapons — for instance, using B-52s to drop ordnance over very large areas. The targets are not amenable to strike aircraft, because the payload of such aircraft is too small. It would be tough for the Indians, who don’t have strategic bombers, to hit very much. Numerous camps exist, and the Islamists can afford to lose some. As an attack, it would be more symbolic than effective. Moreover, if the Indians did kill large numbers of radical Islamists, this would hardly pose a problem to the Pakistani government. It might even solve some of Islamabad’s problems, depending on which analysis you accept. Airstrikes would generate massive support among Pakistanis for their government so long as Islamabad remained defiant of India. Pakistan thus might even welcome Indian airstrikes against Islamist training camps. Islamabad also views the crisis with India with an eye to the Pakistani nuclear arsenal. Any attack by India that might destabilize the Pakistani government opens at least the possibility of a Pakistani nuclear strike or, in the event of state disintegration, of Pakistani nuclear weapons falling into the hands of factional elements. If India presses too hard, New Delhi faces the unknown of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal — unless, of course, the Indians are preparing a pre-emptive nuclear attack on Pakistan, something the Pakistanis find unlikely. All of this, of course, depends upon two unknowns. First, what is the current status of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal? Is it sufficiently reliable for Pakistan to count on? Second, to what extent do the Americans monitor Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities? Ever since the crisis of 2002, when American fears that Pakistani nuclear weapons could fall into al Qaeda’s hands were high, we have assumed that American calm about Pakistan’s nuclear facilities was based on Washington’s having achieved a level of transparency on their status. This might limit Pakistan’s freedom of action with regard to — and hence ability to rely on — its nuclear arsenal. Notably, much of Pakistan’s analysis of the situation rests on a core assumption — namely, that the United States will choose to limit Indian options, and just as important, that the Indians would listen to Washington. India does not have the same relationship or dependence on the United States as, for example, Israel does. India historically was allied with the Soviet Union; New Delhi moved into a strategic relationship with the United States only in recent years. There is a commonality of interest between India and the United States, but not a dependency. India would not necessarily be blocked from action simply because the Americans didn’t want it to act. As for the Americans, Pakistan’s assumption that the United States would want to limit India is unclear. Islamabad’s threat to shift 100,000 troops from the Afghan border will not easily be carried out. Pakistan’s logistical capabilities are limited. Moreover, the American objection to Pakistan’s position is that the vast majority of these troops are not engaged in controlling the border anyway, but are actually carefully staying out of the battle. Given that the Americans feel that the Pakistanis are ineffective in controlling the Afghan-Pakistani border, the shift from virtually to utterly ineffective might not constitute a serious deterioration from the United States’ point of view. Indeed, it might open the door for more aggressive operations on — and over — the Afghan-Pakistani border by American forces, perhaps by troops rapidly transferred from Iraq. The situation of the port of Karachi is more serious, both in the ground and naval scenarios. The United States needs Karachi; it is not in a position to seize the port and the road system out of Karachi. That is a new war the United States can’t fight. At the same time, the United States has been shifting some of its logistical dependency from Pakistan to Central Asia. But this requires a degree of Russian support, which would cost Washington dearly and take time to activate. In short, India’s closing the port of Karachi by blockade, or Pakistan’s doing so as retaliation for Indian action, would hurt the United States badly. Supply lines aside, Islamabad should not assume that the United States is eager to ensure that the Pakistani state survives. Pakistan also should not assume that the United States is impressed by the absence or presence of Pakistani troops on the Afghan border. Washington has developed severe doubts about Pakistan’s commitment and effectiveness in the Afghan-Pakistani border region, and therefore about Pakistan’s value as an ally. Pakistan’s strongest card with the United States is the threat to block the port of Karachi. But here, too, there is a counter to Pakistan: If Pakistan closes Karachi to American shipping, either the Indian or American navy also could close it to Pakistani shipping. Karachi is Pakistan’s main export facility, and Pakistan is heavily dependent on it. If Karachi were blocked, particularly while Pakistan is undergoing a massive financial crisis, Pakistan would face disaster. Karachi is thus a double-edged sword. As long as Pakistan keeps it open to the Americans, India probably won’t block it. But should Pakistan ever close the port in response to U.S. action in the Afghan-Pakistani borderland, then Pakistan should not assume that the port will be available for its own use. India’s Military Challenge India faces difficulties in all of its military options. Attacks on training camps sound more effective than they are. Concentrating troops on the border is impressive only if India is prepared for a massive land war, and a naval blockade has multiple complications. India needs a military option that demonstrates will and capability and decisively hurts the Pakistani government, all without drawing India into a nuclear exchange or costly ground war. And its response must rise above the symbolic. We have no idea what India is thinking, but one obvious option is airstrikes directed not against training camps, but against key government installations in Islamabad. The Indian air force increasingly has been regarded as professional and capable by American pilots at Red Flag exercises in Nevada. India has modern Russian fighter jets and probably has the capability, with some losses, to penetrate deep into Pakistani territory. India also has acquired radar and electronic warfare equipment from Israel and might have obtained some early precision-guided munitions from Russia and/or Israel. While this capability is nascent, untested and very limited, it is nonetheless likely to exist in some form. The Indians might opt for a drawn-out diplomatic process under the theory that all military action is either ineffective or excessively risky. If it chooses the military route, New Delhi could opt for a buildup of ground troops and some limited artillery exchanges and tactical ground attacks. It also could choose airstrikes against training facilities. Each of these military options would achieve the goal of some substantial action, but none would threaten fundamental Pakistani interests. The naval blockade has complexities that could not be managed. That leaves, as a possible scenario, a significant escalation by India against targets in Pakistan’s capital. The Indians have made it clear that the ISI is their enemy. The ISI has a building, and buildings can be destroyed, along with files and personnel. Such an aerial attack also would serve to shock the Pakistanis by representing a serious escalation. And Pakistan might find retaliation difficult, given the relative strength of its air force. India has few good choices for retaliation, and while this option is not a likely one, it is undoubtedly one that has to be considered. It seems to us that India can avoid attacks on Pakistan only if Islamabad makes political concessions that it would find difficult to make. The cost to Pakistan of these concessions might well be greater than the benefit of avoiding conflict with India. All of India’s options are either ineffective or dangerous, but inactivity is politically and strategically the least satisfactory route for New Delhi. This circumstance is the most dangerous aspect of the current situation. In our opinion, the relative quiet at present should not be confused with the final outcome, unless Pakistan makes surprising concessions.

File Name: Lets Go To War File Submitter: CV32 File Submitted: 10 Dec 2008 File Updated: 10 Dec 2008 File Category: WestPac DB Used: HCDB-081124 Authors: Brad Leyte Battleset-WPac: .scq - WPac - WestPac Lets Go To War A Harpoon Commander's Edition (HCE) scenario for the Westpac Battleset. This scenario is intended for play by the BLUE side only. What if China carried out its threat to attack Taiwan? What if North Korea launched an offensive against South Korea? What if an reinvigorated Russia was complicit with both aggressors? What if all of these conflicts happened at the same time? This scenario examines the hypothetical worst case scenario, the stuff of nightmares for Westpac war planners. Please Note: This scenario is very large (a "monster"), and it is both memory and labor intensive. You will not be able to maintain good control of all your units at all times, and you will take losses. Some units you may have to sacrifice. For some players, that might be frustrating. I have added some limited air patrols for BLUE which might help to reduce the burden in the opening phase of the scenario. If you think this might be useful, enable Auto Formation Air Patrols for this scenario. Victory Conditions tip: Sink 25 enemy ships or destroy 15 enemy bases. Keep your carriers alive! Click here to download this file

Now you're talking ...

From Defense Aerospace Lockheed Martin Delivers First C-5M Super Galaxy (Source: Lockheed Martin; issued December 9, 2008) MARIETTA, Ga. --- Lockheed Martin today delivered the first fully modernized C-5M Super Galaxy to the U.S. Air Force at Warner Robins Air Logistics Center, Robins AFB, Ga. The aircraft is the first of three developmental test C-5M aircraft to be delivered, with the other two to be delivered to Dover AFB, Del., in February 2009. All three aircraft successfully completed developmental testing in August 2008. Current Air Force plans call for Lockheed Martin to deliver 52 modernized C-5Ms. "The C-5 fleet is now beginning to realize its full operational potential as we begin fielding both Avionics Modernization Program and Reliability Enhancement and Re-engining Program enhanced C-5s for the Air Force," said Lorraine Martin, vice president of the C-5 Program at Lockheed Martin. "The combined U.S. Air Force and Lockheed Martin team can take great pride in its success, which is keeping this national strategic airlift asset viable for decades to come." The C-5M Super Galaxy is the product of a two-phase modernization effort. The Avionics Modernization Program (AMP) provides a state-of-the-art glass cockpit and a digital backbone to support the Reliability Enhancement and Re-engining Program (RERP) modifications. Forty-six C-5 aircraft have completed the AMP modifications. The aircraft already returned to the fleet have logged more than 45,000 hours with the new systems, including many hours flown in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. RERP is the second phase of the modernization effort, which adds new GE CF6-80C2 commercial engines (military designation F108-GE-100) and 70 other enhancements or replacements of major components and subsystems. The additional 10,000 lbs of thrust per propulsion system creates 40,000 lbs of additional thrust across the platform, significantly improving operational performance. This comprehensive modernization program improves the fleet mission-capable rate (aircraft availability) and the overall reliability and maintainability of the aircraft while reducing total ownership costs. C-5 modernization is expected to pay for itself with operational savings. The C-5 has been the backbone of strategic airlift in every engagement since it entered service. It is the only aircraft capable of carrying 100 percent of certified air-transportable cargo, with a dedicated passenger compartment enabling commanders to have troops and their equipment arrive in an area of operation simultaneously. The C-5 can carry twice the cargo of other strategic airlift systems. With more than 70 percent of its structural service life remaining, Lockheed Martin is committed to sustaining the C-5 fleet throughout its lifecycle. The C-5M Super Galaxy will continue to be a force enabler through 2040. Headquartered in Bethesda, Md., Lockheed Martin is a global security company that employs about 140,000 people worldwide and is principally engaged in the research, design, development, manufacture, integration and sustainment of advanced technology systems, products and services. The corporation reported 2007 sales of $41.9 billion.

Both your escorts (the Perry and the Boxer (Type 22/2) frigates) have excellent towed arrays. You also have an excellent means of destroying an enemy submarine at standoff range (2x Seahawk and 2x Lynx helicopters). I'm trying to keep from giving you direct advice (you might have noticed), because half the fun here is learning what tactics might work best. Keeping a tighter formation will certainly concentrate your defenses and let you have a smaller area to defend, but at the same time it may be inhibiting your best passive sonar performance to have so many ships clustered together in a small space. And your helicopters have to travel further out to drop sonobuoy fields in your path. Also, having your ships closer together means that if and when you do get a sub detection, he's going to be that much closer to your group and all of his potential targets will be grouped ... Have you considered separating one escort from the group and having it (and its helos) search ahead?

From ARES Blog U.S. Confirms Iran Bought SA-20 Missiles Posted by David A. Fulghum at 12/10/2008 10:10 AM CST “The Iranians are on contract for SA-20,” says a senior, U.S. government official. The U.S. and Israel now face a “huge set of challenges in the future that we’ve never had [before]. We’ve been lulled into a false sense of security because our operations over the last 20 years involved complete air dominance and we’ve been free to operate in all domains,” he adds. Other senior officials independently confirm that Iran will get the Russian SA-20 strategic SAM system, irrespective of Kremlin protestations to the contrary. Tehran’s deployment of such a system would mark a step-up in capability, and considerably improve the country’s ability to defend its controversial nuclear facilities where the West remains concerned that Iran is pursuing a nuclear weapons capability. The proliferation of so-called double-digit surface-to-air missile systems – such as the Almaz Antey SA-20 (S-300PMU1/S-300PMU2) – poses an increasing threat to non-stealthy aircraft, and will force changes in tactics and operational planning. The SA-20 has an engagement envelope of up to 150 kilometers; and Iran may be signed up for the S-300PMU-2 variant of the system. Russia could use Byelorussia as the route for a sale, allowing it to deny any direct involvement, says a U.S. official. It would likely take the Iranian armed forces some time, as much as 22 months, to become proficient in the operation of the SA-20, however, any deal would almost certainly cover training support of the system in the interim. Analysts suggest ships delivering the missiles and the training, support and assembly areas could become targets. The SA-20, and even more so the SA-21 Growler (S-400) which is now entering service, pose an increasing problem for mission planners using conventional strike aircraft. While low observable aircraft offer greater latitude for operations, they are not totally immune to air defenses. The Lockheed Martin F-22 with its all-aspect, -30dB radar cross section signature can operate within the engagement envelope of the SA-20 and SA-21. But the Lockheed Martin F-35 with its -20dB signature, which is not all-aspect stealth, is at greater risk. The rear quadrant of the F-35, particularly around the tailpipe area, is not as stealthy as the F-22. The Northrop Grumman B-2, because of its aging stealth design, also has limitations in the amount of time it can spend within the range of double-digit systems since small signature clues can become cumulative and offer a firing solution. The U.S.’s next-generation bomber program is aimed at developing a low-observable platform capable of operating irrespective of the threat from systems of the SA-21 class. More capable point defense systems – that would likely be used to protect SA-20 sites, for example – are also being introduced into the region. Syria is getting the SA-22 Greyhound (KBP Pantsyr), which uses a vehicle-mounted combination of cannon and missiles intended to provide defense against aircraft, helicopters, precision-guided munitions and cruise missiles. New threats – involving advances in commercially available electronics – continue to rapidly mutate in the area of secure communications and command and control. Recent pictures of the interior of a new Chinese surface-to-air missile command and control vehicle show two Inovo laptops and the commander of the integrated air defense system talking on a Blackberry. In the battery’s briefing vehicle, there’s a VOIP connection. These are all good, cheap commercial products. With reporting from Douglas Barrie

The "Scenario Design and Discussion" forum would be ideal, but here's ok too. As you have noticed, detection (and, preferably, as early as possible) is the linchpin to ASW. If you're able to detect a hostile submarine before he's in range to engage you, you've denied him his principal asset: stealth. And if you have any decent ASW tools at your disposal (i.e. helicopters or fixed wing maritime patrol aircraft), you have a significant advantage and the means to deter or destroy the sub before it can threaten you. With only mediocre ASW tools available to you (e.g. ASROC or shipboard torpedoes), it comes down to a knife fight of sorts. Both of you may already be in range of the other, and with the means to destroy each other. Without any ASW tools, your only option is to evade. Possible, perhaps even probable, when facing a conventionally powered submarine. Perhaps unlikely when facing a nuke sub. Fortunately, if you have the means of detecting a hostile sub at standoff range (such as with a towed array or air dropped sonobuoys), it is highly likely you also have the means to destroy him before he can engage you.

Go forth, ye minions of nefarious henchmen?

No. (Serves me right for not checking with the code guru). An active radar is only required for offensive (area/escort) jamming. "Point defense" countermeasures (i.e. defensive ECM, chaff/flares, etc) do not need an active radar.

Yeah, the Kerry is command guided.

The AI controlled fighters love to attack helicopters and AEW aircraft. Against this, you have virtually no defense without adequate fighter cover of your own. Aside from exercising very judicious and conservative control of your helicopters (such as flying only one helo at a time and not letting it stray too far from its host ship), I can suggest the following: When enemy fighters appear (and it is critical that you get as much advance warning of their approach as possible), fly your helicopter to the far side of your own ship formation. In pursuit of your helicopter, the enemy will likely fly into the air defense envelope of your ships and you will likely get an opportunity to shoot them down. The danger in this, of course (aside from not having enough time to fly out of harm's way), is that the enemy will get a good look at your ship formation and/or your air defense systems will miss.

Saab's reply to the Norwegian decision to pick JSF over Gripen: Incomplete and faulty - a comment to the Norwegian aircraft procurement (a PDF document)

The first one, Sixth Battle.

If I understand what you're saying, and this is by no means guaranteed, then this is what is likely happening: When the anti-radar missiles (ARMs) are attacking SAM batteries, they are doing so on a bearing only launch (BOL) mode and from quite a long range. The exact location of the target is unknown, hence the BOL launch, and you get a yellow uncertainty area. The ARMs thus lack the precision to home on the SAM batteries' exact positions and miss. When there are no SAM batteries attached to Reykjavik, there is no such problem. The position of the installation is exactly known and the ARMs are launched against the installation's own radars. No area of uncertainty and only the usual possibility of a miss (calculated via Ph).

From DefenseNews Explosion May Put U.S. Mini-Sub Program in Danger By christopher p. cavas Published: 9 Dec 11:43 EST (16:43 GMT) The long-stalled future of the U.S. special warfare community's troubled mini-submarine is even cloudier after a serious explosion and fire struck the craft last month, ironically on the cusp of a new mission and a new way ahead for the program. The Advanced SEAL Delivery Vehicle 1 (ASDS-1) was having its lithium-ion batteries charged Nov. 9 when an explosion started a battery fire that burned for about six hours. No one was aboard the 60-ton craft, which was on shore at its base in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. Federal firefighters sealed the ASDS to put out the fire and continued to hose it down for several hours to cool hot spots. The mini-sub remained sealed for more than two weeks before the hatch was opened. "The Navy has not yet determined the cause of the fire or the extent of the damage," Lt. Clay Doss, a Navy spokesman at the Pentagon, said Dec. 5. Two investigations are underway to determine the fire's cause and the extent of the damage, he added. Sources familiar with the incident said that, in addition to fire damage, the craft would likely have significant water damage from having its interior flooded to fight the fire. The incident came at a key time for the mini-sub program. The ASDS was to have deployed in November aboard the guided-missile submarine Michigan - the first SSGN deployment for the craft. And, more than two years since the U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) canceled further ASDS acquisitions, Pentagon officials reportedly were preparing to submit new program plans in the fiscal 2010 budget due to be sent to Congress on Feb. 2. No details of the new way ahead for the program have been revealed, although Pentagon sources said the submission would need to be reviewed in light of the pending investigations into the ASDS fire. A primary question investigators will have is whether the craft's new lithium-ion batteries caused or contributed to the explosion. The ASDS' original silver-zinc batteries had insufficient power for the craft's missions, and more powerful lithium-ion batteries were recently substituted. Built at Yardney Technical Products in Pawcatuck, Conn., the lithium-ion batteries are known to present hazards if not properly handled, particularly when the batteries are being recharged. Although SOCOM canceled the ASDS program in 2006, the Navy and the special warfare community remain eager to field the kind of capability embodied in the craft. Five or six people can ride inside the ASDS in a dry environment, unlike existing wet submersibles, where riders sit astride their vehicles wearing diving gear. The wet environment is debilitating and causes fatigue even before the SEAL reaches his destination - problems the ASDS eliminates. The 65-foot-long mini-sub is intended to be carried to operational areas aboard submerged submarines and has an operational range of more than 100 nautical miles. The ASDS is intended to carry out a range of covert missions, including reconnaissance and surveillance, infiltration, sabotage and diversionary attacks, counterterrorism and foreign internal defense missions. Navy officials routinely tout the ability to carry the craft as a key capability of existing and new nuclear attack subs and converted SSGNs. The ASDS has had a long, checkered history. The first batch of six craft was to have been completed in the late 1990s, but technical problems led to long delays and a twelvefold cost overrun - the original $70 million contract for the first boat in 1994 ballooned to expenditures of at least $883 million by 2007, according to the Government Accountability Office. Only the first ASDS was completed and "conditionally" accepted by the Navy in August 2001, but the craft suffered from noise, vibration, power and a host of other technical and reliability problems. While some of those problems have been solved, others have only been reduced in intensity or remain as challenges. However, the ASDS has been used on several classified missions while improvements continue to be made. The now-defunct Oceanic Division of Westinghouse Electric received the original design and construction contract. The division was bought by Northrop Grumman in 1996. Sources at Northrop Grumman and rival General Dynamics Electric Boat said both companies remain eager to compete in a new ASDS program. One submarine expert familiar with the program expected, before the fire, a new program for three boats at a cost of about $1.2 billion. Early, unofficial estimates of about $100 million to repair the damage to ASDS-1 are "very uninformed" and likely very low, the source said. Several sources said they expected the explosion and fire would not end the use of lithium-ion batteries in the ASDS. "Lithium-ion batteries can be quite dangerous but they've been safely used many times before, and these batteries have gone through many cycles" a Pentagon official said. "It almost certainly was a procedural issue," the submarine expert said. "Like most things, it is very safe if you follow the procedures. But if you don't follow the procedures, things can happen that you don't expect."

From Jane's RAF's Harrier fleet may face early retirement By Tim Ripley 09 December 2008 The UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) is discussing plans to withdraw the entire Royal Navy (RN) and Royal Air Force (RAF) Harrier GR.9 fleet from service in less than five years, in an attempt to save more than GBP1 billion (USD1.5 billion), Jane's has learned. The discussions come as budget planners finalise their efforts to reconcile the MoD's equipment programme and force structure with limited available funding. Jane's understands that the ministry's defence board reviewed the proposals at its meeting in the last week of November, after senior RN officers had objected. They had stressed that the withdrawal of the Harrier aircraft five years ahead of their scheduled out-of-service date of 2018 would create a major capability gap ahead of the introduction of the first Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighters (JSFs). RN officers have been lobbying hard for at least a squadron of up to 20 BAE Systems Harriers to remain in service until the arrival of the JSFs towards the end of the next decade.

Oh, that was pretty ingenious of your enemy, bouncing his radar signals off the bridge ironwork to fool your HARMs.

Almost, Range50 is the distance from radar to jammer where the jammer could potentially reduce the radar's range by 50%. Alrighty. We'll go with that.

Nope. Military Times moved the pics, and I haven't been able to locate them, unfortunately. I did find another bunch of nice pics here though: http://dlund.20m.com/MMC1.html#J