CV32

From Aviation Week Sukhoi Chief To Head MiG; Integration Goal Jan 13, 2009 By Alexey Komarov The head of Sukhoi’s holding company, Mikhail Pogosyan, has taken the general director’s chair of the rival fighter manufacturer MiG Corp. with an aim to integrate the latter company into United Aircraft Corp.’s (UAC) combat aircraft division. MiG — which has in its structure a design bureau, two serial manufacturing plants in Moscow and Lukhovitcy, and also the controls activity of engine manufacturers Chernyshev and Klimov — needs urgent financial recovery. A recent audit revealed that its debt amounted to roughly $1.5 billion, according to reported figures. The collapse of a $1.3 billion export deal with Algeria on deliveries of 28 MiG-29SMTs and six MiG-29UBTs, as well as a lack of domestic orders, heave created serious problems with the corporation’s cash flow. One of Pogosyan’s new tasks is to improve MiG’s financial position prior to its inclusion into UAC. He also intends to integrate both fighter manufacturers, Sukhoi and MiG, into a single efficient structure, which will develop, manufacture and support combat aviation UAC products. “Our aim is to gain [synergistic] effect through infrastructure ... optimization, manufacturing cost [cutting], single technical politics development [and] after-sales service improvement,” Pogosyan said in his inauguration speech at MiG. He retains his posts of vice president of UAC and Sukhoi general director. The new appointment was supported by the government, which already decided to inject 15 billion rubles ($500 million) into its establishing capital fund. The Russian defense ministry recently signed a contract with MiG worth more than 20 billion rubles to acquire 28 MiG-29SMTs originally intended for Algeria, and is negotiating the purchase of the remaining MiG-29UBTs from this batch.

Test it and find out I tested it myself some time ago when trying to build an anti-AWACS AAM, sad to say without success. But, by all means, feel free to test it again. I'd be pleased to see it working.

TACTICS 101: ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE (ASW): PART 2 - THE TOOLS OF ASW In Part 1, we learned the basics of naval oceanography, and in large part, how sound behaves in the subsurface ocean environment. Now, in Part 2, we move to the tools of anti-submarine warfare (ASW), the sensors, platforms, and weapons. Much of the material contained here is probably "old hat" to seasoned Harpoon players, and certainly generally available to anyone who is willing to take the time and effort to dig up the information. The purpose of this "Tactics 101" discussion, however, is to provide a workable foundation for those who may be completely new to naval warfare and its concepts. Part 2 tries to touch on many of those concepts. A. ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE (ASW): A VERY SHORT HISTORY War never changes (there's my Fallout 3 quote of the day ), but in the case of anti-submarine warfare (ASW), it has perhaps changed just a little. The emergence of unrestricted submarine warfare in World War I and the early days of World War II led to grievous (and unanticipated) losses among all major naval powers and their merchant navies, and in turn, threatened both their economic lifelines (the sea lines of communication, or SLOC) and their only means of deploying troops to distant foreign shores. The danger now posed by submarines to what had been, up to that point, somewhat of a grand surface war, was not particularly welcomed by those on the receiving end. In the words of the First Sea Lord, Admiral Lord Charles Beresford, circa 1900, submarines are "under-handed, under-water, and damned un-English"! World War II was a watershed event for several major developments in undersea warfare. The Battle of the Atlantic saw the Kriegsmarine's U-boats pitted against emergent (and increasingly potent) ASW technologies as American and Allied forces herded their convoys to Europe. In the Pacific, US Navy submarines waged their own offensive war against Japanese SLOCs. The development of active sonar or ASDIC, believed to be an acronym for "Allied Submarine Detection Investigation Committee" (but in any event, with Canadian roots. Ahem! ), is a prominent example of emerging ASW technology during WWII. Submarine performance during WWII was optimised for surface operations, and accordingly, the submarines of the era were more properly termed "submersibles". The first true submarine did not emerge until the end of the war (too late to be of any consequence in affecting the outcome) in the form of the German Type XXI. The new boat sought to address shortcomings in previous designs that were being vigorously exploited by Allied ASW efforts after 1943, most particularly the low submerged speed and endurance of the U-boat. (The Type XXI design had fallen into Soviet hands at the conclusion of WWII, leading in due course to the Project 611 (NATO codename Zulu) class submarine). The number of operational German U-boats peaked at some 240 hulls in March 1943, but by this time the Kriegsmarine force faced - in the British Royal Navy alone - some 875 ASDIC equipped surface escorts, 41 escort aircraft carriers, and 300 Coastal Command patrol aircraft. The tide had turned. The final moments of German Type IXC-40 U-boat U-185 Image credit: S. Burbridge, "Final Moments", subart.net In the post war era, and throughout the Cold War, as the hard lessons (and promising technologies) of WWII were developed and improved upon, the punch and counter-punch of ASW continued to develop at a fervent pace. This included such rapid post war developments as the teardrop hull form (derived from the USS Albacore (AGSS-569) design, circa 1948), the emergence of nuclear powered propulsion (from Admiral Hyman G. Rickover's USS Nautilus (SSN-571), circa 1951), and the arrival of the ballistic missile submarine in the mid 1950s. The evident teardrop hull form of the USS Albacore Image credit: US Navy. Submarine warfare in the modern era has been much less exciting, or perhaps more accurately, much less outside the gaze of the public eye. The examples of successful engagements, both by submarines and against them, are fairly well publicised. For example, the sinking of the Argentine cruiser General Belgrano by the British Royal Navy nuclear attack submarine HMS Conqueror during the 1982 Falklands war and, on the other side of the equation, the destruction of the Pakistani Navy submarine PNS Ghazi during the 1971 conflict with India. Much less well known are the countless times during the Cold War when submarines have attempted to affect, directly or indirectly, the course of geo-political events by their very presence, without a shot ever having been fired. For example, the deployment of HMS Dreadnought to the Falklands in November 1977 under the auspices of Operation Journeyman; or the report that a Dutch Walrus class sub was stationed off Kotor during the 1999 Kosovo conflict and tasked to engage any Yugoslavian submarines that might emerge to threaten NATO ships. In modern times, submarines have been more notable for tasks that defy traditional undersea warfare, such as launching cruise missiles against distant shore targets, or delivering special operations forces ashore to conduct clandestine small unit operations. Suffice to say, undersea warfare - both from the point of view of the submariner, and from that of those attempting to hunt him down - has been a complex, fluid, and militarily important affair. It remains so today. And, notably, the see-saw battle of how to find, hunt and destroy submarines - and on the other side, how submarines evade, hunt and attack their enemies - continues to push technological boundaries. B. SONAR: THE MAINSTAY OF ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE (ASW) Stealth is arguably the defining characteristic of the submarine. The foremost, and by far the most difficult task in the ASW cycle, therefore, is actually finding them. The acronym ASW has sometimes been translated as "awfully slow warfare", and this is probably a good description. A couple of anecdotal references serve to highlight this portrayal of ASW: Being in a submarine is like "being stuck in the boiler room of your high school for several weeks"; or, that the weather on a "sealed people tube" is always the same, “69 degrees and fluorescent”. One can rest assured that it is an equally mind numbing exercise for the crew of the ships and aircraft that are scouring the ocean for a hint of an enemy submarine, the proverbial search for a "needle in a haystack". When ASW does get exciting, however, and perhaps more than a little nerve wracking, is when you finally do get that "contact". So, the question naturally follows: How does one get (and ultimately prosecute) a contact? 1. Active Sonar As we learned in Part 1 of this discussion, active sonar operates much like active radar, sending out a burst or pulse of sound energy (the "ping") through the water, which then reflects off a target and returns as a reflection (or echo) to the sonar transducer. A single transducer has little directional control over the ping, but by arranging or stacking multiple transducers in an array, and using special signal processing techniques, it is possible to use "beam forming" to send active sonar pings in specific directions. The Sonar 2051 transducer array aboard Oberon class submarines Image credit: web.ukonline.co.uk. Generally speaking, the power of the transducer will dictate its maximum range. It also directly impacts signal frequency, since the longest ranges will be achieved with the lowest frequencies, and therefore only the largest transducer array will be able to produce the necessary long wavelengths. All of this means that, in order to increase the transmitted power for a given array configuration, it is usually necessary to increase the size of the array. The necessity of a large sonar array obviously leads to physical limitations, especially when space aboard a warship or submarine is at a premium. Large arrays can add significant drag and require large power sources together with their supporting electrical and electronic equipment. Hull mounted sonar arrays are typically cylindrical in shape, to give good coverage outward and downward, while those fitted to modern submarines are often spherical in shape, providing a much wider vertical field of view (useful in the subsurface environment, where you need coverage both above and below). Active sonar arrays are generally mounted in the bow or keel, giving good coverage ahead of the ship, except in the area directly behind the array (the "baffles"; more on those later). Sound absorption materials are mounted directly behind the array, both to protect the occupants of the ship or submarine from the very loud sound energy (recall, up to 250 decibels!) and to prevent reflections back into the system. Streamlining and shielding around the array is done both to reduce drag and to reduce self-noise (including flow noise created by the passage of water around the array). Modern surface ships and submarines are also likely to have a "suite" of active and passive sonars (a collection of bow, hull, flank, and/or towed systems) rather than relying on a single system. Sonar suite on the Type 212 submarine Image credit: Gerwalk, subpirates.com As we discussed in Part 1, surface ships or submarines performing ASW will only rarely employ their active sonar, as it may be heard at over twice the distance (and given the proper acoustic conditions, much further) it can effectively return an echo. Banging away with active sonar in the blue water ocean environment typically serves only as a beacon for lurking enemies or, worse, invites a spread of torpedoes or cruise missiles in your general direction. There are circumstances, however, where active sonar is useful or even preferable. (Always keeping in mind the drawbacks already mentioned, of course). For example, in shallow water, where your towed array is unavailable (due to the risk of it hanging up on the bottom) or where the topography prevents good acoustic conditions (e.g. no CZ formation). Active sonar may also be your only useful choice when dealing with diesel-electric submarines, since these are extremely quiet when running on their batteries. Here's an (alarming) analogy to get an idea of just how difficult (with thanks to Scott Gainer): Try to locate a refrigerator by listening for it from outside the house. 2. Passive Sonar The preferable approach for detecting enemy submarines has historically been the use of passive sonar. It is the instrument of choice for ASW, and as stated, active sonar is most often relegated to the attack phase or special circumstances. As already discussed, passive sonar involves an array of dedicated hydrophones, or the receiver portion of an active sonar array, being used to "listen" for the acoustic signals generated by a target. As with active transducers, hydrophones can be arranged in an array to improve beamwidth and directivity. A dedicated passive hydrophone array is much lighter and considerably less complex than an active transducer array, generally because it does not have the same high power requirements. Conformal arrays, placed alongside the length of the ship or submarine (often the latter), take advantage of this reduced weight and complexity. As mentioned in Part 1 of this discussion, a ship or submarine's self-noise, both narrowband and broadband in combination, forms its "acoustic signature". This signature can be exploited by an enemy's passive sonar to identify the target. For example, the broadband noise from a target's propellers (generally of low frequency, less than 1000 Hz) can be detected and demodulated to measure the shaft or propeller blade rate (blade rate tonals) - a useful identifier. (Narrowband noise is typically plotted and shown on the famous "waterfall display"). 3. Variable Depth Sonar (VDS) To improve the ability to hunt for submarines that might be hiding in shadow zones or below the thermocline (the "layer"), the Variable Depth Sonar (VDS) was developed in the 1950s. A VDS employs a streamlined body (the "fish") which contains the transducer and is towed behind the ship. In conjunction with the speed of the ship and the length of the tow cable, and by employing control vanes and depth sensors, the fish can be deployed at depth. The principal advantages of VDS, of course, are the ability to move the transducer away from the ship's self-noise, penetrate the layer, and provide 360 degree coverage by placing the transducer behind and below the baffles. VDS does have its limitations, however. Early models (such as the SQS-9) were streamed over the side, a rather cumbersome method, though in later practise the fish was streamed from the fantail via a hoist or winch system. The system does restrict ship maneuverability while in operation, and its bulky equipment is difficult to handle during inclement weather. Thales TSM 2640 Salmon VDS aboard Royal Danish Navy frigate Thetis (F357) Image credit: www.naval-technology.com, SPG Media Limited. In recent years, the VDS has been supplanted by the linear towed array for ASW work, while VDS systems have become more specialised tools in the field of mine countermeasures (MCM). In this role they are often equipped with high frequency side scan sonars which are short ranged but provide excellent resolution, sufficiently high in most cases to perform imaging of the bottom and object classification. 4. Towed Arrays During the Cold War, when the North Atlantic was the main hunting ground of both NATO and Warsaw Pact submarine forces, the low frequency passive towed array sonar emerged as the prime ASW sensor for surface ships. Exploiting advances in signal processing, and taking advantage of the excellent acoustic propagation characteristics in the deep sound channel (DSC), towed arrays were capable of detecting and holding contacts at ranges at dozens of miles. Unlike a VDS, in which the sonar array is encased in a streamlined body or "fish" at the end of a relatively short tow cable, the towed array or "streamer" comprises a hose or sheath of an elastomeric material (such as rubber) between 2 and 4 inches in diameter and containing numerous transducers (typically of ceramic piezo-electric design) or receivers arranged in a linear fashion. The array can be thousands of feet (even miles) in length. The towed array's sheath is filled with an acoustically transmitting material (typically a fluid) that provides structural integrity, dissipates internal heat, and provides some isolation from flow noise. Since the array's diameter has a direct correlation with flow noise, it is desirable to reduce the diameter of the array to as small as possible. This is difficult from an engineering point of view, but even so, modern "thin line" towed arrays have been able to achieve a minimum diameter of about one inch. In addition to the engineering and design obstacles, towed arrays have their own characteristic problems: these include boundary layer noise; internal self-noise caused by waves propagating between transducers inside the array; or external self-noise or "cable strumming" caused by towing the cable through the water. The cable may vibrate, that vibration is passed into the array, and is picked up by the transducers. A fundamental problem with towed arrays is that the position of the hydrophones or "nodal points" within the array is inherently unstable. Because of ocean currents, their position in the array, the speed of the host platform, or other factors, their relative positions are changing continuously. Because of the negative effect this can have on acoustic properties, it is important to monitor the relative positions of the nodal points of the array at all times. One common method is to use multiple "birds" clipped onto the tow lines, each comprising a transducer used to calculate the range between nodal points. The results are used to determine the shape of the array, which in turn is critically important to its performance. SQR-19 towed array Image credit: Federation of American Scientists. Surface Ship Towed Arrays Notably, towed array systems have offered the surface ship, for the first time, the possibility of parity with the submarine in passive sonar capability. The long range detections made possible by towed arrays are of limited value to surface ships, however, without some means of localizing and prosecuting an enemy submarine contact. And, of course, this is the function performed by aircraft acting in conjunction with the surface ship. From an ASW point of view, the US Navy surface fleet evolved slowly from a sensor/weapon suite based on the SQS-26 hull mounted active/passive sonar set of the 1960s, the RUR-5 ASROC (Anti-Submarine Rocket) stand-off weapon, and the SH-2 Seasprite LAMPS I (Light Airborne Multi-Purpose System) helicopter. By the mid 1980s, it had become a system based largely on variants of the SQS-53 hull mounted sonar first introduced in 1972, the SQR-19 TACTAS (Tactical Towed Array) passive towed array, and the longer range SH-60B Seahawk LAMPS III helicopter. (There never was a LAMPS II system). Along the way, during the period of this evolution, the US Navy conducted: (1) Its first experiments and deployment with the ITASS (Interim Towed Array Surveillance System) towed from VDS fish on the Dealey class destroyer escort USS Van Voorhis (DE-1028) in 1970; (2) Its first experiments and deployment with an interim tactical towed array design (the SQR-18) on the Knox class frigate USS Moinester (FF 1097). The SQR-18 was a passive towed array some 800 feet long streamed from the SQS-35 IVDS (Independent Variable Depth Sonar) body on a tow cable nearly 5,600 feet long. (The SQS-35 was evolved from the EDO Model 983, a 13 kHz VDS). (3) Its first experiments and deployment of a higher speed tactical array (the SQR-19) on the Spruance class destroyer USS Moosbrugger (DD 980) in the early 1980s. The most recent, new generation towed arrays, such as the British Sonar 2087 and the US SQR-20 Multi-Function Towed Array (MFTA), employ both active and passive arrays, exploit the range advantages of the low frequency range, and are more tolerant of high speeds. Submarine Towed Arrays Submarines can deploy "fat line" towed arrays using a process known as flushing, wherein water is pumped into the tube to exert pressure upon and hence deploy the array. The US Navy's TB-16 is an example of a fat line towed array, which consists of an acoustic detector array weighing some 1,400 lb, measures about 3.5 inches in diameter, and 240 feet long. The TB-16 array is towed at the end of a cable some 2,400 feet in length. Alternatively, submarines may deploy "thin line" towed arrays using mechanical handling systems. A thin line array comprises an outer sheath or hose that contains the hydrophones and supporting wiring and electronics. When the array is deployed or retrieved, it is fed through a guide by a handling system. The US Navy's TB-23 is an example of a thin line towed array. Winch system for the Type 212 submarine's TAS-3 towed array Image credit: Gerwalk, subpirates.com Advances gained from commercial off the shelf (COTS) computer processing (such as that made available through the Advanced Rapid COTS Insertion, or ARCI, program) has substantially reduced cost while significantly improving processing power, which in turn permits the use of powerful new algorithms for better towed array detection ranges. The US Navy's TB-29 thin line towed array, for example, is a version of the legacy TB-29 array utilising commercial off the shelf (COTS) telemetry. Towed array technology has advanced rapidly with longer, multiple line systems that provide increasing number flexibility for submarine based ASW. Many existing Navy tow cable systems have single coaxial conductors, 1-2 kilometers in length, within which power, uplink data, and downlink data are multiplexed. These systems typically run at uplink data rates of less than 12 Mbit/sec due to the bandwidth limitations of a long coaxial cable. Operational beam formers for towed arrays have traditionally assumed the array geometry to be straight and horizontal aft of the host platform, but in reality there is always some deformation in this geometry. "Chain link" and "stiff stick" models have been used to estimate towed array position and heading, but the newer arrays (such as the TB-29) are equipped with their own sensors to accurately determine the position of the array and its heading. This is more accurate than either of the previous methods, and will be used to optimise TMA solutions. 5. Dipping Sonars Dipping or dunking sonars are a variant of the VDS concept. While principally fitted aboard helicopters, they can also be found aboard some small patrol craft and surface ships (such as the MGK-345 Bronza (NATO Rat Tail) dipping sonar found aboard Project 1241.2 (NATO Pauk) class corvettes). While operating in the hover, a helicopter can use a winch and cable to lower a sonar transducer into the water and to the desired depth. Again, self-noise is minimal because the array is isolated from both the noise and vibration of the power source and the helicopter. AQS-13 dipping sonar deployed from a Sea King helicopter Image credit: www.solarnavigator.net A helicopter dipping sonar typically consists of a "wet end" or transducer; a cable (at least 1,000 feet in length) and reel/winch assembly; and a "dry end", consisting of the power supply and sonar processing systems. There are, of course, no baffles or blind spots with a dipping sonar. It has full 360 degree capability, and for the size of the transducer, most are quite capable, with source levels exceeding 200 decibels (dB) and an effective range of several thousand yards. Newer systems also have a sonobuoy interface, allowing them to process the returns from three or more sonobuoys, and the ability to communicate with friendly submarines via underwater telephone. Power was supplied to the transducer via a lead-acid battery in most older systems, and recharged between transmission cycles, but newer dipping sonars are powered directly by the helicopter rather than by a battery. Helicopter dipping sonars have also joined the drive to enhance capabilities in the littorals, both in terms of locating ultra quiet diesel subs and in the mine countermeasures role. Examples of the latter include the AQS-14 and AQS-20 systems. The new AQS-22 FLASH (Folding Low Frequency Active Sonar for Helicopters) system is being fitted to the new MH-60R Seahawk (as well as other types), and is claimed to provide submarine detection, tracking, localization and classification; acoustic interception; underwater communications; and environmental data acquisition, both in blue water and littoral zones. The AQS-22 transducer/receiver weighs only 100 lb and has a cable length of over 2,500 feet. 6. Jezebel, Julie, and Company: Sonobuoys Sonobuoys are essentially expendable sonar devices typically deployed by aircraft, though they may also be hand deployed over the side of a ship. In fact, the first sonobuoys of early WWII were an expendable sensor towed behind convoy escorts and used to detect German U-boats attempting to approach from the rear. Their usefulness as an aircraft delivered sensor, however, was not fully appreciated until late in the war, by which time the US Navy finally ordered some 150,000 examples (mostly the CRT-1 type). Sonobuoy development languished somewhat immediately after WWII, that is, until the quick pace of Soviet submarine development became an increasing concern and the SOSUS project began in earnest (more on SOSUS later). In 1951, Project Jezebel combined LOFAR (Low Frequency Analysis and Recording) equipment with fixed hydrophone arrays (such as SOSUS), and aircraft became the means of rapidly prosecuting the SOSUS detections. Whereas SOSUS provided only the initial detection and a general area of probability, sonobuoys could be used for tactical level search and localization. Passive sonobuoys thus became known as Jezebel buoys. Whether sonobuoys are parachute delivered from the air or dropped over the side of a ship, the launching platform must be equipped with the electronic equipment needed to receive and process the data being gathered and returned by the sonobuoy (typically via VHF transmitter). The sonobuoy's own battery (often silver chloride) power is activated by contact with seawater (though some types are now switching to lithium), and a mechanism for inflating a flotation device is activated, such that the transducer or receiver is suspended below the surface to a certain specified depth while the buoy (and antenna) remain floating. Sonobuoys are classified by their size (A, B, C, etc.) and their type (active or passive, or measurement). Most US manufactured sonobuoys are A size, measuring about 4 7/8 inches in diameter and 36 inches in length. (An A/2 size buoy is a half size A type buoy). A sonobuoy being dropped from a P-3 Orion Image credit: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). Passive Sonobuoys Passive sonobuoys have traditionally been the type of choice for open ocean ASW efforts by aircraft. By relying on passive sonar detection, a passive sonobuoy denies an enemy submarine the knowledge that it is being tracked or that an aircraft is searching for it. The earliest passive LOFAR sonobuoys (such as the SSQ-23) provided only target detection with no indication of range or bearing. The CODAR (Correlation Detection And Ranging) method was developed to provide localization, wherein two pairs of sonobuoys were used to compare signal arrival times and resolve directional ambiguity. This was time consuming, however, and not particularly effective when the submarine went quiet. Another method was called Julie, more on that later. The development of a LOFAR sonobuoy with directional capability, called a DIFAR (Directional Frequency Analysis and Ranging) buoy, combined omnidirectional hydrophones with compass information to provide target bearing. The US Navy's SSQ-53 DIFAR series of passive sonobuoys have directional detection capabilities, and offer selectable depths (between 90, 200, 400, and 1,000 feet, depending on type) and selectable endurance (between 0.5, 1, 2, 4 or 8 hours). Another example, the SSQ-77 VLAD (Vertical Line Array) combines the directional capability of the DIFAR with a vertical line array of omnidirectional hydrophones for improved tracking in a noisy, high traffic environment. Active Sonobuoys The acoustic pulse (ping) from an active sonobuoy more readily provides directional information (range and bearing) on a potential submarine target. Moreover, when two or more fixes are obtained, it is possible to establish the speed and course of the submarine. Active sonobuoys are typically deployed at deeper depths than passive buoys, and because of their power requirements, have typically shorter endurance. The early SSQ-47 Ranger active sonobuoy produced a free running acoustic pulse every 10 seconds at one of six frequencies. It had a selectable depth, but a short life span, and provided only range information. It was replaced in due course by the SSQ-50 CASS (Command Activated Sonobuoy System), which pinged on command (in four fixed frequencies) from the launch platform rather than pinging continuously. In the late 1970s, the US Navy introduced the SSQ-62 DICASS (Directional Command Activated Sonobuoy System) series active sonobuoys, with directional capability and frequency modulated (FM) sonar sweeps. The proliferation of very quiet diesel-electric submarines among world navies (too quiet for effective use of passive sonobuoys) has led to increased interest in active sonobuoys and other shallow water detection techniques. This has included a return to the early concepts of broadband acoustics and echo ranging. Explosive Echo Ranging Acoustic propagation experiments conducted by Ewing and Worzel during WWII and the years thereafter used explosives as impulse sources to discover and exploit the Sound Fixing And Ranging (SOFAR) channel (now called the Deep Sound Channel). In 1960, for example, they dropped 100 kg depth charges off Perth, Australia, and discovered that the low frequency sounds could be heard by hydrophones near Bermuda some three and a half hours later. Like CODAR, another operational mode saw the use of small explosive charges that could be detonated near passive sonobuoys to create a broadband acoustic pulse that would (hopefully) reflect off a nearby enemy submarine. This explosive echo ranging technique, called Julie, was introduced into the US Navy in 1956. The Soviets made extensive use of explosive echo ranging. In the late 1960s, the Julie approach was replaced by active sonobuoys, but the use of explosives as an acoustic sensor continues today with the SSQ-110 Explosive Echo Ranging (EER) sonobuoy and the more recent SSQ-101 ADAR (Air Deployed Active Receiver) sonobuoy. The latter uses a multiple element planar hydrophone array to further improve detection capability in shallow littoral waters. Special Purpose Sonobuoys Specialized measurement sonobuoys can also be used to detect electric fields, magnetic anomalies, and bioluminescence (the light emitted by microscopic organisms disturbed by a passing submarine), as well as measuring important environmental parameters like water temperature, air temperature, barometric pressure, and wave height. Although incapable of detecting submarines directly, measurement sonobuoys are critical to the ASW cycle. Prior to the deployment of detection sonobuoys, it is advisable to obtain a vertical temperature profile of the local ocean environment. This information can then direct the ASW operator as to what depths it might be useful to place detection sonobuoys. The SSQ-36B bathythermograph (typically abbreviated BT), for example, is widely used by the US Navy for this purpose. It places a temperature probe at 800 meters depth and has an operating life of about 12 minutes. Submarines can also release bathythermograph probes (abbreviated XBT), which rise to the surface before then sinking and returning temperature data to the submarine. Obviously if the submarine is very deep, it may take awhile to start receiving data. The SSQ-71 and SSQ-86 sonobuoys are used to establish two-way communications between an aircraft and a submarine. 7. SOSUS The story of Project Caesar and SOSUS is perhaps one of the most significant and secretive stories in the history of the Cold War. SOSUS would become a key early warning asset against the perceived threat of Soviet submarines and in providing vital long range cueing information for open ocean ASW. The culmination of several research efforts in the early 1950s on the topic of low frequency acoustic propagation, including Projects Hartwell, Jezebel and Michael (and including the findings of such researchers as Maurice Ewing, discussed earlier), was brought together to design, engineer, and eventually deploy a broad area surveillance system under the unclassified designation Project Caesar and the highly classified acronym SOSUS (Sound Surveillance System). Simply described, SOSUS (designation FQQ-1/2/3/9) is comprised of passive hydrophone arrays hung vertically from the sides of underwater mountains. It takes advantage of the very long range propagation of low frequency noise in the deep sound channel (DSC) we described in Part 1, and "looks" into the deep ocean basins of the Atlantic. (It is not located at the chokepoints of the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom (GIUK) Gap, contrary to popular belief). The low frequency noise emanating from a submarine, arriving at several different arrays, is triangulated and a SOSUS Probability Area (SPA) can be plotted as an ellipse ranging in size from 10 x 20 nautical miles (nm) up to 100 x 200 nm, depending on the range, angles, and numbers of arrays in contact with the target source. By late 1957, several shore based monitoring stations, rather innocously termed "naval facilities" (or NAVFACs), were placed along the eastern seaboard of North America, forming a huge semi-circle from Barbados to Nova Scotia and opening toward the deep water west of the mid Atlantic Ridge. SOSUS was also extended into the Eastern Pacific, with NAVFACs spanning from California to Washington state, and with arrays later terminating at Guam, Midway, Adak (in the Aleutians), and at Hawaii. In 1959, another NAVFAC was established at Argentia, Newfoundland (less than a couple of hours from where I live), to monitor a number of shallow water arrays placed south of the Grand Banks. Others were strategically placed at locations like the North Cape (off northern Norway) and the Strait of Gibraltar. SOSUS Naval Facilities (NAVFACs) in the Atlantic Image credit: Edward C. Whitman Though initially aimed at detecting snorkeling diesel-electrics, SOSUS proved even better at finding deep running nuclear powered submarines. The Soviets remained largely oblivious to the sensitivity and success of the SOSUS network until the criminal espionage of one John Walker Jr. The end of the Cold War has seen the mothballing of much of the SOSUS network, with several monitoring stations closed (including, for example, the NAVFACs at Keflavik in Iceland, Adak, and Bermuda). The hydrophone arrays are still there, of course, but they have been placed in a stand-by status in which the data is available but not is no longer being continuously monitored. A kind of "son of SOSUS" has since emerged in the Advanced Deployable System (ADS), a rapidly deployable net of broadband passive sensors that could be laid to detect submarines (particularly ultra quiet diesels), surface ships, and mine laying activities in shallow littoral waters. ADS is still in the development stage, and if procured and deployed, could be fitted to the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS). 8. SURTASS While SOSUS is the fixed site portion of the Integrated Undersea Surveillance System (IUSS), the Surveillance Towed Array Sensor System (SURTASS) was developed in the early 1980s as the mobile, tactical element. Several types of tactical auxiliary general ocean surveillance (T-AGOS) ships, namely the Stalwart, Victorious, and Impeccable classes, were deployed for the SURTASS mission, beginning in the mid 1980s. These ships employed the UQQ-2 passive sonar array, which was streamed for miles behind the ships and used for very long range submarine detection. With the mothballing of the SOSUS network, SURTASS has been called upon to provide the undersea surveillance necessary to support regional conflicts and sea lane protection. Even SURTASS, however, has been the victim of a shift away from open ocean, deep water ASW toward the littoral, shallow water environment. By 2004, only five of the US Navy's 22 Cold War era T-AGOS ships continued to perform the ASW mission, comprising only one of the 18 original Stalwart class ships and all four Victorious class vessels, together with the ocean surveillance ship MV Cory Chouest. Despite significant curtailment of the SURTASS fleet, however, the remaining assets have seen some significant upgrades in their capability, principally among them the Low Frequency Active (LFA) sonar array, and the TL-29A twin line array. Both are primarily aimed at detecting ultra quiet diesel-electric submarines. The LFA is a powerful active sonar array system, designed to exploit low frequency acoustic propagation in the deep sound channel, and intended for use against targets too quiet to be detected by the passive system alone. Its extremely loud acoustic source is blamed for causing the deaths of numerous marine mammals during development and testing of the system, and has been the subject of considerable litigation. Presently installed only aboard the Cory Chouest, the LFA will eventually be fitted aboard the USNS Impeccable (T-AGOS 23). The Low Frequency Active (LFA) system Image credit: Pacific Whale Foundation (how's that for irony). The prototype TL-29A twin line array (which incorporates a pair of arrays towed side by side) is aimed at use in the littoral zone. It was tested during 1996 in a variety of world locations, with positive results, and was certified for deployment in November 2005. It is reportedly far superior to any other shallow water passive towed array system previously employed. Six TL-29A systems will support SURTASS vessels operating in the Western Pacific. C. NON-ACOUSTIC DETECTION 1. Visual Detection Submarines operating at or near the surface are extremely vulnerable to visual detection. Anything that protrudes above the surface, such as a periscope, antenna, or mast will leave a significant wake if the submarine is moving at any speed over a few knots. And, since depth control and steerage is quite difficult at low speeds, it is not uncommon for submarines to be traveling at least 4 or 5 knots just below the surface. The periscope (for example) will create a wake, called "feather", which is quite visible, and will also leave a remnant of its passage, called a "scar". The scar is a long streak of foam or bubbles left behind after the object passes. The feather may be just a few meters, but the scar may be tens of meters long. Either may be visible for up to 10 miles, and are easily spotted by low flying aircraft in the vicinity. Periscopes and other protuding masts and antennas are also often painted in dark or camouflage colors to reduce their visibility. If the water is especially clear, the submarine hull or its shadow may be visible for a few hundred feet under water, but is usually not distinguishable unless the water is shallow with a light colored bottom (like white sand). The vulnerability of the submarine at shallow depth visibly demonstrated Image credit: Unknown. 2. Radar As their radar cross section (RCS) is generally very small, exposed periscopes and masts cannot usually be detected by ordinary surface search radars. Furthermore, the interference from sea clutter (e.g. waves) near the target will generally obscure it. To be effective against a periscope or mast, a radar needs to have high resolution (both in range and bearing). Inverse synthetic aperture radar (ISAR) systems, such as the Raytheon APS-137B(V)5 set fitted to the P-3C Orion AIP variant, have proven very effective against submarine periscopes and masts. Traditional submarine periscopes, masts, and antennas have been of the hull penetrating type, i.e. a column or pole of a length that typically extends the vertical length of the sail and the diameter of the submarine. New technology, however, will use non-hull penetrating systems by exploiting COTS advances in photonics (especially fibre optics). In addition to eliminating an opening in the pressure hull (always a good idea), eliminating the periscope column will potentially permit submarine designers to build longer, flatter sails than was previously possible, thereby improving hydrodynamic performance. Taking advantage of this technology, the US Navy's Virginia (SSN-774) class attack submarines have the Universal Modular Mast (UMM) - eight of them, in fact. Two will house a photonics sensor package, with high resolution color CCD TV, monochrome HDTV, thermal imager, eye safe laser rangefinder, ESM sensor, and a communications and GPS receiver. Two more will have high data rate satcom antennas. Some synthetic aperture radars have also demonstrated the capability to detect the presence of a submarine by the change in the surface water height as it passes, known as the "Bernoulli hump". This effect is greatest when the submarine is at shallow depth and moving rapidly. These is not a real time asset, however, since the necessary signal processing requires significant computing power and may take several hours to complete. Also, few submarine commanders would be so silly as to cruise at speed just below the surface in any situation where stealth was a priority (and it most often is). 3. Infra-red (IR) Detection Submarines are vulnerable to passive infra-red (IR) detection when they are snorkeling, since the diesel exhaust is released close to the surface (as it must be because of the back pressure limitation). The exhaust gases give off a sufficiently strong IR signature as to be detectable. However, this is only useful if the submarine is snorkeling, which is only a few hours a day for diesel-electric submarines. Periscopes and masts are also susceptible to IR detection, though much less so than diesel exhaust. Factors which play to the favor of the submarine, and limit the usefulness of IR sensors, include bad weather and high humidity levels, which reduce the effective range of an IR sensor. Modern naval helicopters and maritime patrol aircraft are often equipped with forward looking IR (FLIR) systems, not just because they are useful tools for spotting submarines, but make for excellent aids in detecting, classifying and identifying surface ships as well. More recently, the FLIR systems of maritime patrol aircraft, such as the P-3 Orion, have proven useful in the overland reconnaissance mission. 4. Magnetic Anomaly Detection (MAD) Magnetic anomaly detection (MAD) systems use ionized noble gas (such as helium) to measure changes in the Earth's magnetic field due to the presence of a large amount of ferrous material found in most submarines. While ionized, the atoms in the gas are aligned, but when they pass by a localized magnetic disturbance (that pesky submarine), they change their alignment. This change in alignment is measurable, and can be recorded and displayed on a scrolling paper loop like an electrocardiogram (ECG) monitor or seismometer. MAD gear is typically mounted aboard fixed wing aircraft and helicopters, and will indicate the presence of a ferrous metallic object when the aircraft overflies it. MAD detection only works if the submarine is relatively shallow, and therefore is not a great long range detection system, being effective to within about 1,000 to 2,000 feet of the aircraft's path. It can however, provide a precise location of the submarine of sufficient accuracy to permit weapons delivery, which is its main use. ASQ-81 MAD system in the tail boom or "stinger" of a P-3C Orion Image credit: Maryu, 2005. 5. Electronic Surveillance Measures (ESM) There are two sides to submarine electronic surveillance measures (ESM): firstly, as a means of self-defense, and secondly, as a means of targeting or situational awareness. Typically a submarine has an omni-directional radar warning antenna atop the periscope, which functions much like aircraft's radar warning receiver (RWR), and indeed, some submarine radar warners are just versions of airborne systems. For diesel-electric submarines, in particular, radar warning is vital since the submarine must spend considerable time either surfaced or snorkeling and therefore exposed to enemy radar. During World War II, when submarines still hunted their prey on the surface, it became evident to the German Kriegsmarine that their U-boats were being detected by Allied airborne radar. The first basic RWR, the FuMB-1 Metox (FuMB, or Funkmess-Beobachtungs-Gerat, means "radar warning apparatus"), was rushed into service in mid 1942 in an effort to give U-boats adequate warning of the presence of Allied radar. However, it was eventually discovered that Metox itself emitted a signal that could be detected and tracked by the Allies, with the result that it was much a beacon as it was a warning device. Several successors were developed and pressed into service, but the Germans found it difficult to field a reliable system that could accurately match Allied radar frequencies and provide more than a very short warning time (sometimes only one minute). By the time they had seemingly perfected the technology (with the FuMB-35 Athos), the Battle of the Atlantic was over. Modern day submarines are still equipped with radar warning and direction finding (DF) systems, but these have grown significantly more complex, and have evolved into tools of electronic surveillance rather than simple warning devices. The attack submarines deployed by Western navies bear physical evidence of the importance being assigned to the electronic surveillance mission. The submarine's sail houses the upper portion of each periscope, mast, and antenna. When a submarine extends these devices while at periscope depth (roughly 60 feet), its steadiness in the water and the degree to which the boat is affected by surface wave action, depends on how deep in the water the hull remains. With a tall sail, the submarine's hull can remain deeper in the water and thus remain steadier. However, sail height has a price. It creates considerable drag, increases flow noise, and is prone to a dangerous phenomenon called "snap roll", in which the sub can unintentionally dive while attempting to execute a turn (because the sail acts like a plane). Because of these problems, there have been attempts over the years to reduce or eliminate the sail, but beginning with the Sturgeon (SSN-637) class, the US Navy actually enlarged the sail, specifically to expand electronic surveillance capabilities (a testament to the importance of the mission). The Soviets, meanwhile, have traditionally used considerably lower sail structures (presumably due to significantly less interest in using their submarines in the electronic surveillance mission). Submarines that use active emitters while at periscope depth or when surfaced (such as the surface search radar or communications mast, the latter exploiting HF, VHF, UHF and SATCOM channels) are advertising their position to enemy assets that have the ability to detect or intercept those emissions, even if the submarine is not otherwise detectable by other traditional methods (sonar, radar, IR, MAD, or the good old Mark I human eyeball). This is because, just like sound waves, radio frequency (RF) waves travel much further (and can be intercepted much further) than the range at which they can effectively be used by the emitter. Because of the risks associated with coming to a shallow or periscope depth to conduct communications, and the generally inhospitable relationship between salt water and most radio frequency communications, the US and Soviet navies explored alternate methods. Only extremely low frequencies (ELF) in the range of 3-100 Hz are able to penetrate to any appreciable distance under the ocean, and for many years, ELF was the principal means of long range covert communications with their deployed submarines. The US Navy used an ELF system in the 76 Hz range, while the Soviets had a 82 Hz system. The ELF system had certain advantages: worldwide range, low power requirements (only a few watts), and the ability to communicate with submarines at deep depths. However, it also had certain, significant disadvantages: one way transmission (submarines were receive only), very slow data transmission and limited bandwidth (meaning a typical ELF message comprised only a short coded message), and multi-path distortion (the result of energy arriving at the receiver over more than one path). The end of the Cold War and the availability of many more communications options spelled the decline of the importance of ELF. In September 2004, the US Navy announced it was turning off its ELF transmitters at Clam Lake, in the Chequamegon National Forest, in northern Wisconsin, and in Upper Michigan’s Escanaba State Forest near Republic. Extremely low frequency (ELF) concept of submarine communications Image credit: R. Romero and V. Lehtoranta, 22 November 1999. Submarines also sometimes use buoys to establish communications while remaining submerged. Examples in US Navy use include the BRC-6 XSTAT (Expendable Submarine Tactical Transceiver) for two-way UHF communications between a submarine and aircraft; the BRT-1 SLOT (Submarine Launched One-way Transmitter), which broadcasts a pre-recorded message of up to four minutes duration; the BRT-3/4/5 identification buoys; and the BRT-6, which transmits one-way UHF communications to a satellite. 5. Lasers Lasers have long been a favorite subject of military related research, and its no surprise, then, that they also have application in undersea warfare. In the 1980s, the US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) studied the possibility of developing laser based communications between satellites and submerged submarines. The system would use complex blue-green lasers to accomplish this task, since the attenuation of light in sea water is minimized in the blue-green region of the electromagnetic (EM) spectrum. The technological challenge was steep, however, since the satellites would need to be fitted with a highly efficient, solid-state laser with a high power output, and the submarine receiver would need a filter to remove the background solar radiation that would otherwise interfere with their detection of the very faint laser signals. The project was eventually abandoned. (It is notable that optical data relay via satellite was eventually achieved and successfully deployed, as exemplified by ARTEMIS (Advanced Relay and Technology Mission Satellite) launched in 2001). Blue-green lasers have since, however, found a niche in the mine countermeasures role, again due to their ability to penetrate water. The AES-1 ALMDS (Airborne Laser Mine Detection System), the first of which was fielded in 2007, uses a blue-green LIDAR (Light Detection And Ranging) laser to rapidly detect, localize, and classify near surface, moored and floating sea mines. Housed in a 9 foot long, 820 lb pod hung from a MH-60S helicopter, the laser images the entire near-surface volume of water that might potentially contain mines. AES-1 ALMDS pod aboard MH-60S helicopter Image credit: Northrop Grumman. C. ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE (ASW) WEAPONRY 1. Depth Charges Perhaps the oldest anti-submarine weapon is the depth charge, developed during World War I as a relatively simple "barrel" of TNT detonated by a water pressure activated "pistol" at a selected depth. The first (and most basic) means of delivery was to simply roll the depth charges off the stern of a surface ship as it passed over the guesstimated location of the enemy submarine. Scoring a direct hit with a depth charge was improbable, of course, but the shock of a nearby explosion could cause serious and accumulating damage, and did tremendous psychological damage to the crew of the submarine being subjected to the barrage. The slow speed and limited endurance of early submarines meant that their only means of defense was to conduct evasive maneuvers at the last possible moment and to try and get as deep as possible (a depth charge sinking above a deeply submerged submarine would take longer to reach its depth, thereby giving the submarine more time to move away). If a surface ship could catch a submarine in shallow water, however, depth charges were a cheap and effective means of damaging it or at least driving it off. (A kill was unlikely. The fact that U-427 is reported to have survived an onslaught of some 678 depth charges during an attack in April 1945, is a good illustration of the same). Eventually depth charge projectors (like the British K-gun) were developed, which could hurl a depth charge out to the side of the ship, and when used in combination with stern racks, could lay a pattern of depth charges over an enemy submarine, hoping to bracket it. An Allied destroyer dropping a pair of depth charges Image credit: Mary Bellis. 2. Ahead Thrown ASW Weapons Ahead thrown ASW weapons fire a salvo of charges or bombs in a pattern over an enemy submarine's position. The most famous, the Royal Navy's Hedgehog system of World War II fame, fired a salvo of 24 bombs from a spigot mortar (essentially derived from a type of infantry trench mortar where the mortar launching tube is actually built into the tail of the bomb). Each bomb weighed about 65 lb and contained 30-35 lbs of explosives. The pattern, dropped ahead of the ship at ranges approaching 200 yards, could be either elliptical or circular in shape (depending on variant) and measured 120 to 200 feet across. The principal advantages of Hedgehog over ordinary depth charges lay in the fact that the bombs were contact fuzed rather than working on a time or depth fuze; their smaller, streamlined shape allowed them to sink faster than depth charges (able to sink 200 feet within 30 seconds of launch); and the depth of the targeted submarine did not need to be known. Hedgehog rapidly achieved favor over the depth charge, and a much more impressive success rate, approaching 25 percent. A very similar American system, called Mousetrap, used four or eight rails for rocket propelled charges. Hedgehog on the forecastle of the V&W class destroyer HMS Westcott (D47), 28 November 1945 Image credit: IWM Collections, UK. Ahead thrown weapons like Hedgehog and Mousetrap were so successful that the concept was immediately copied by the Soviets in the post war period, as the MBU and RBU series of ASW rocket launchers. The RBU series system, the latest of which is the RPK-8 variant of the RBU-6000, is still in use today despite the fact that it entered service nearly 50 years ago. The RPK-8 can launch a pattern of twelve 90R actively guided projectiles to a distance of over 2 nautical miles, each of which is equipped with a shaped charge. The system is believed to have secondary capability as a hard kill torpedo defense and anti-diver system. RPK-8 launch from the Project 133.1 (Parchim) class ASW corvette Bashkartostan (MPK-228) Image credit: www.rusarmy.com The UDAV-1/RPK-5 Leevyen (Heavy Rain) or RBU-10000/12000 series system optimises the torpedo defense role, creating an anti-torpedo barrier by launching rockets that deploy an outer layer of acoustic decoys, a middle layer of depth charges suspended by buoys, and an inner layer of explosives. 3. Torpedoes The favoured, and most effective, ASW weapon remains the torpedo. The earliest "torpedoes" were probably better described as mines, demolition charges, or underwater booby traps, and the modern torpedo, a self-propelled underwater projectile, did not see widespread use until World War I. (Although the first victim of such a device is believed to have been the Turkish steamer Intibah on 16 January 1878). Torpedoes are generally divided into two categories or types: (1) Heavyweight torpedoes, typically launched only from submarines (with the notable exception of some Soviet surface ship systems), usually 21 inches (533mm) in diameter (but sometimes larger, as with the 25.6 inch (650mm) Soviet Type 65), up to around 20 feet long, and may weigh several thousand pounds. (2) Lightweight torpedoes, typically launched from aircraft and surface ships (again, with some exceptions), usually about 12.75 inches (324mm) in diameter (though Soviet types are often 16 inches), are less than 10 feet long, and weigh about 500 lbs. Torpedoes are often also categorised by their method of guidance. More on that in just a bit. Propulsion The first truly successful torpedo designs used compressed air fed into a piston engine for propulsion, which was later modified to use a liquid fuel injected into an oxygen combustion chamber. In the "wet heater" design, perhaps most popular among torpedoes of the two world wars, introducing water into the combustion chamber produced cooling and steam for even greater power (and speed). The principal drawback was that the steam left a visible trail of bubbles in the torpedo's wake. (The German G7a torpedo was eventually relegated to use at night because of this). Wakeless torpedoes came with the introduction of electrical (battery) power, but at the cost of reduced range and speed. Electric propulsion is relatively cheap and is still used with some modern designs, though with more efficient, long lived batteries (often silver-oxide or magnesium types), such as the British Royal Navy's Mk 24 Tigerfish or the German DM2 series. Electric propulsion also tends to have the advantage of being very quiet. Other modern choices include gas turbines and swashplate piston engines powered by a high density (and often highly toxic) fuel, such as Otto Fuel II, for a so called "thermal" engine propulsion system. As with submarines, torpedoes have sought to modify their propellers in an effort to improve propulsion and silencing. Pump jet propulsors encase the propellers in a shroud or duct, taking in water through an inlet in the front and pushing it out the rear, which both reduces noise and boosts speed. Propulsor on Mk 50 Barracuda Advanced Light Weight Torpedo (ALWT) Image credit: US Navy. Speed is of critical importance in a torpedo engagement. For early straight running torpedoes, it meant reducing the margin of error, where the target might maneuver at any time and ruin your firing solution. For modern undersea warfare, it means the ability to engage a fast nuclear powered submarine or surface warship, and the possibility of a rapid re-attack. As a reliable rule of thumb, an ASW torpedo needs a 50 percent margin of superiority in speed over its target in order to assure that the target cannot escape once alerted to the attack. Nuclear submarines were expected to achieve 30 kt speeds at 1,000 ft depths, thus creating the need for an ASW torpedo capable of at least 45 kt. A US Navy development program to achieve this for both light and heavyweight torpedoes was begun in 1956. (The later appearance of the Soviet Project 705 Lyra (NATO Alfa) class SSN was particularly alarming to NATO and repeated the process in some respects, spawning both the US Mk 48 ADCAP and British Spearfish torpedo programs). In the first case, this effort resulted in the Mark 46 lightweight torpedo, which began deployment in 1965. In the latter case, requirements for a heavyweight torpedo were established in 1960, aiming for a 55 kt speed, a range of 35,000 yd, and a depth capability of 2,500 ft. In 1967, it was decided to make the heavy weapon also capable of anti-surface attack, which in turn mandated a larger warhead. In 1971, production of the Mark 48 began and the first examples were delivered in 1972, about 7 years after the first lightweight Mk 46 was delivered. Many torpedo designs (of both today and yesteryear) have the option of trading range for speed. The German G7a (T1) steam driven torpedo of WWII was capable of an impressive 44 knots over about 6,500 yards, but at a leisurely 30 knots it could potentially achieve over 15,000 yards (though the chances of hitting anything at that distance was slim to none). A modern example, for comparison, would be the aforementioned Spearfish. It can reach 24,000 yards (almost 12 nm) at a blistering speed of 65 knots, or cruise to a distance of 50,000 yards (nearly 25 nm) at 29 knots. There is another, rather radical option for torpedo propulsion: rocket power. The advantage? Pure, unadulterated speed. The Soviets near monopolized the technology, starting with the introduction of the 70 knot RAT-52 anti-ship torpedo in 1953 (and copied by the Chinese as the Yu-2). They continued the trend with the APR-1, APR-2 and APR-3 rocket powered anti-sub lightweight torpedoes (though, in the case of the APR-3, the rocket motor drives a pumpjet), all capable of impressive speeds in the 62 to 65 knot range. The most famous (or infamous) rocket powered torpedo is the Shkval (Squall) supercavitating projectile. Supercavitation is a phenomenon by which cavitation effects are exploited to create a bubble of gas under the water. An object within the gas bubble is able to escape the tremendous drag ordinarily created by traveling in water, and thereby move at high speed. By diverting some of its rocket exhaust through a nozzle on the nose, which helps to form the gas bubble, Shkval can achieve speeds approaching 200 knots. This eliminates the possibility of an acoustic homing head, leaving the weapon unguided, but as the Shkval can reach its maximum range of about 11,000 yards in less than two minutes, this may not matter. VA-111 Shkval - note the opening at the nose for the rocket exhaust Image credit: One half 3544. Guidance The earliest "guided" torpedoes were straight running, relying only on the crew's skill in using a slide rule and protractor, and gyroscopes in the torpedo, to send the weapon on what they hoped would be a collision course. The German T4 or Falke, the first homing torpedo, was fitted with a passive acoustic homing device. Introduced in March 1943, it was quickly replaced by the T5 or G7s Zaunköning (Wren), which came into service that autumn. The T5 was faster, had superior range, and could use either magnetic or contact fuzing. Again, however (as was the Kriegsmarine's curse, it seems), these advances in ASW technology really came too late to have significant impact on the war, and by this time the Allies' own technological pace was rapidly increasing. The Foxer towed acoustic decoy, for example, which was really just a noise maker that produced a more attractive target, condemned German passive homing torpedoes to a life of harmlessly circling behind their target until they ran out of fuel. Passive sonar homing has traditionally been used as an anti-surface weapon. Although the Soviets had been pursuing the development of a domestic homing torpedo, that study had been interrupted by World War II. The capture of German T5 torpedoes got that project back on track, and by 1950, the first Soviet passive homer, the SAET-50, was in service. This was followed in 1961 by the electrically propelled SAET-60. Active sonar homing has, on the other hand, been traditionally an anti-submarine weapon. The acquisition range of an active homing torpedo depends largely on its "ping rate" or "interrogation rate", which is typically increased as the torpedo nears the target, in order to improve accuracy. The seeker's aspect angle will define the band depth which the seeker can "see" at any given moment. Seekers with narrow depth bands tend to follow helical search patterns, while those with broader depth bands often use a snake like search pattern. British Royal Navy Stingray lightweight torpedo Image credit: Royal Navy. Flow noise over the acoustic seeker head of a homing torpedo tends to interfere with its operation, but better signal processing and seeker dome shaping has brought improvements. Even so, active homing faces several obstacles. Near the surface, or in shallow water, reflections and reverbations can interfere with the seeker, and so active homing must rely on the Doppler effect to distinguish the real target from clutter. Considerable effort has been expended in recent years to improve active seeker performance in shallow littoral zones. Moreover, since active sonar can be heard at some distance, any submarine hearing an incoming torpedo can be expected to try to escape at high speed. The generally accepted solution has been to combine active and passive homing, and moreover, to add wire guidance. This allows the torpedo's guidance package to receive course correction commands, benefiting from the superior sensors of the launch platform to update the weapon on the target's position. The guidance wire is dispensed from both the torpedo and the submarine to avoid stress on the wire due to their relative motion. Furthermore, with the advent of two-way or dual wire guidance, the torpedo becomes a self-propelled offboard sensor. This way, a torpedo can be run out to the target's vicinity under wire control and without alerting the target (except by its own propulsion noise). Upon reaching that area, the torpedo can carry out the terminal attack phase with its active sonar seeker. If the wire is broken (either accidentally or intentionally), the weapon can immediately switch to acoustic homing. Wire guidance has typically been reserved for heavyweight torpedoes, with the exception of some Swedish and Russian lightweight torpedoes that use wire control to help overcome the difficult acoustic conditions found in the Baltic and other shallow water seas. There is another, unique torpedo guidance option: wake homing. The Soviets have exploited wake homing for quite some time, firstly with its Type 53-57M in the mid 1960s, and it is only in recent years that the method has found its way into some Western torpedoes as an adjunct seeker capability (e.g. the French F17 Mod 2, Italian A.184 Mod 3 and Black Shark). Wake homing uses an upward looking sonar beam to detect a ship's wake boundaries. The control vanes are set to automatically turn the torpedo through a fixed angle each time the weapon crosses the wake, allowing it to follow a snake like track to the apex of the wake (the target). Since a ship's wake extends for quite some distance (see the depth charge picture above for reference), it is a relatively simple matter for the seeker to determine its boundaries. One notable advantage of wake homing is that it is practically immune to countermeasures. A further refinement of wake homing, cutely termed "wake nibbling", seeks efficiencies by having the torpedo follow the boundaries of the wake rather than expend time (and fuel) crossing the wake. The most well known wake homer is the Soviet Type 65-76 heavyweight torpedo, a monster 650mm weapon carrying a huge warhead capable of devastating the largest US Navy supercarriers. The Type 65-76 entered service with the first Project 671RT (Victor II) class attack submarine in 1972. It was retired in February 2002 after the tragic loss of the Kursk, an event widely blamed on an explosion related to the torpedo's High Test Peroxide (HTP) fuel. 4. Stand-off ASW Missiles As sonar performance steadily improved in the post World War II years, the US Navy perceived the need for a stand off weapon that could more closely match the range at which new sonars could detect enemy submarine targets. The objective was to be able to deliver an acoustic homing torpedo (or, alternatively, a nuclear warhead) to a point where the targeted submarine could not escape. This could be difficult, especially when engaging a submarine that was moving quickly, and so the process was largely dependent on an accurate prediction of where the target was going to be when the missile arrived. Absolutely precise accuracy was not required (particularly when using a nuke, of course), but it was necessary to drop the torpedo within acquisition range of its own acoustic seeker. What was needed was a quick reaction weapon with a short flight time. Development of the RUR-5 ASROC (Anti-Submarine Rocket) began in the early 1950s, based on a relatively simple concept of using a solid rocket motor to deliver a Mk 44 homing torpedo or nuclear depth charge (the 10 kiloton W44) to a specific water entry point right above the enemy submarine. Range (up to 5 nautical miles) was determined by a timer set before launch, such that when the timer expired in flight, the rocket motor separated and the payload fell on a ballistic trajectory into the ocean. Another program was soon launched to provide a similar weapon for underwater launch from submarines. Several technical problems delayed the program, but the UUM-44 SUBROC (Submarine Rocket) entered service with the USS Permit (SSN-594) in 1965. SUBROC was launched from a standard 21 inch torpedo tube, igniting its solid rocket motor once it safely cleared the submarine and breaching the surface. An inertial guidance system directed the missile toward the target location up to 30 nautical miles away, where, like ASROC, the motor separated from the payload. The only payload option for SUBROC was a 200 kiloton nuclear depth charge, leaving virtually no chance of escape for any enemy submarine within a radius of about 4 nautical miles. In the early 1980s, the US Navy initiated the RUM-139 Vertical Launch ASROC (VLA) program to take advantage of the new Mk 41 Vertical Launch System being fitted in US Navy warships. However, another more promising program intervened - the RUM/UUM-125 Sea Lance - which promised a common successor to both ASROC and SUBROC. The Sea Lance would be capable of launch from either a submarine or surface ship, and would deliver either the new Mk 50 Barracuda Advanced Light Weight Torpedo (ALWT) to a range of 30 nm or a nuclear depth charge to 60 nm. Progress with the program was slow, and the end of the Cold War also spelled the end of Sea Lance. RUR-5 ASROC launch Image credit: David Schmitt. Fortunately for the old reliant, this meant a revival of the RUM-139 VLA. It uses a new solid rocket booster and combines a digital autopilot with the inertial guidance system, improving maximum range to 12 nautical miles, making the missile more maneuverable, and permitting it to fly a lower altitude trajectory. Range is controlled in the usual manner, and the payload is the Mk 46 Mod 5A or Mod 5AS lightweight homing torpedo. (The originally plan to add the Mk 50 Barracuda was shelved, and instead the newest variant will use the Mk 54 Lightweight Hybrid Torpedo (LHT), which combines the guidance and warhead of the Mk 50 with the propulsion system of the Mk 46). In the face of a growing Soviet submarine threat in the 1950s, NATO and Allied nations were quick to jump on the bandwagon. The Marine Nationale (French Navy) introduced the Malafon in 1964, which could deliver the 533mm L4 acoustic homing torpedo to a distance of about 11 nm. A turntable launcher would slew to the target bearing and launch the missile at a fixed elevation of 15 degrees. Upon launch, two solid rocket boosters accelerated Malafon to about 450 knots before falling away, allowing the weapon to glide toward the target under radio control, dropping its torpedo payload in the usual manner about 800 meters from the target submarine. Malafon also had a secondary anti-ship attack capability. The Australian Ikara (from an Aborigine word for "throwing stick"), meanwhile, which entered service around 1966, delivered a Mk 46 acoustic homing torpedo to a range of nearly 10 nm. The Soviet Union did not take long to recognize the inherent advantages of a stand off ASW missile, and developed its own version of ASROC. The 82R Vikhr (NATO Free Rocket Anti-Submarine, or FRAS-1) was essentially a navalised version of the FROG-7 (Free Rocket Over Ground) battlefield artillery rocket. Launched from the SUW-N-1 twin arm launcher, it was capable of delivering a 200 kiloton nuclear depth charge to a range of about 16.5 nm. The FRAS-1 was fitted to the Project 1123 (Moskva) and Project 1143 (Kiev) class aviation ships (except Admiral Gorshkov). The RPK-3 Metel (Snowstorm) (NATO SS-N-14a/b Silex) appeared in 1970 aboard the new Project 1134A (NATO Kresta II) class guided missile cruiser. The 60R version carried a 5 kiloton nuclear depth charge, while the 70R carried a 450mm homing torpedo. Rocket propulsion and radio command guidance carried the weapon out to a maximum range of 28 nm, whereupon the payload was released.The SS-N-14 saw further variants developed in the early 1980s, including the 85R Metel-M (SS-N-14c), which carried a heavier 533mm homing torpedo; and the 85RU Rastrub (SS-N-14d), which returned to a lightweight (and more advanced) 400mm homing torpedo. Most interestingly, the SS-N-14d was capable of anti-ship attack, made possible by the addition of an IR guidance mode and a 185 kg warhead ahead of the torpedo payload. The Soviets also did not fail to appreciate the utility of a submarine launched, stand off ASW missile. The RPK-2 Viyuga (Blizzard) (NATO SS-N-15 Starfish) introduced in or about 1972 performed the same way as the US Navy SUBROC, launched from a 21 inch torpedo tube, utilising a solid rocket motor and delivering a nuclear depth charge to a distance of about 25 nm. Unlike the US Navy and the failed Sea Lance program, however, the Soviets have expanded their stand off ASW missile arsenal. The 83R Vodopad and 84R Vodoley versions of the SS-N-15 (RPK-6), introduced in 1981, delivered a homing torpedo and nuclear depth charge, respectively, and moreover, could be launched from a surface ship. A further system, the SS-N-16 Stallion (RPK-7), takes advantage of the 650mm torpedo tube to achieve even greater range, at nearly 60 nm. The 86R Veter (SS-N-16a) and 88R Vsplesk (SS-N-16b) versions of the weapon deliver a homing torpedo and a nuclear depth charge, respectively. The latest Soviet stand off ASW weapon, the RPK-9 Medvedka (NATO SS-N-29), is intended for launch from small surface combatants, delivering a homing torpedo to a little over 12 nm. Comparison of stand off and airborne ASW weapon delivery methods Image credit: Brian Burnell. In recent times, the US Navy has pursued a new concept in airborne stand off ASW, namely the High Altitude ASW Weapons Concept (HAAWC). (The effort was largely born out of a desire to reduce P-3 Orion airframe fatigue, and improve P-8 Poseidon endurance, by obviating the need to drop the torpedo at low altitude). HAAWC mates a low cost wing adaptor kit, nicknamed "LongShot", with a lightweight torpedo and uses GPS based navigation to accurately deliver a torpedo to ranges of 50 nm. In May 2007, a HAAWC equipped Mk 54 torpedo was successfully deployed from a P-3 Orion flying at 8,000 feet. 5. Naval Mines Mines, cheap and easily deployed, are perhaps the single most effective weapon available to a combatant who seeks to prevent the projection of naval power onto his shores. More than 50 nations currently possess naval mine inventories and are able to deploy more than 300 varieties of mines. Mine countermeasures (MCM), therefore, remain a critical enabler for maritime expeditionary forces. Like the weather, everyone likes to complain about mines but there's not much we can do about it. If you think ASW is mind numbing, try MCM. Mines can be offensive or defensive, that is, placed in enemy territorial waters to destroy or hamper the movement of enemy shipping, or alternatively, placed in defensive fields to protect friendly areas from intrusion by enemy shipping and to force them elsewhere. That being the case, mines can be either a deadly nuisance or a useful tool from an ASW point of view. Mines can be classified in either of several ways: (1) Method of delivery: aircraft laid, submarine laid, or surface laid; (2) Method of deployment: bottom, moored, or drifting; and (3) Method of actuation: contact, influence, controlled, or rising. Method of Delivery Whether offensive or defensive, any force intending to lay mines must prepare and maintain minefield plans for all geographic locations where it is intended to deploy mines. The cost and time necessary to remove mines (even your own) is many times more than the cost and time to deploy them. And, of course, hitting your own mines would be entirely unsatisfactory. Just about any aircraft that can drop a simple iron bomb can also lay a mine. In fact, some mines are simply converted iron bombs. The US Navy Destructor (DST) series, introduced in the late 1960s, are a prime example. With a Mk 75 modification kit, any Mk 80 series iron bomb becomes a naval mine: the 2,000 lb Mk 84 becoming the Mk 41 DST, the 1,000 lb Mk 83 becoming the Mk 40 DST, and the 500 lb Mk 82 becoming the Mk 36 DST. The newer US Navy Quickstrike series mines of the early 1980s work on the same principle, converting the 500 lb Mk 82 iron bomb into the Mk 62, the 1,000 lb Mk 83 into the Mk 63, and the 2,000 lb Mk 84 into the Mk 64. A fourth version, the Mk 65, uses a Mk 84 bomb with a thinner walled case and some other improvements. The advantage of a submarine laid mine is related, unsurprisingly, to the submarine's ability to reach waters usually inaccessible to other platforms, and to do so covertly. The US Navy's Mk 67 Submarine Launched Mobile Mine (SLMM), introduced in 1987, is essentially a modified Mk 37 torpedo that can be launched from a distance and delivered to a bottom laid deployment. Once deployed, it sits on the bottom until actuated by magnetic/seismic or magnetic/seismic/pressure sensors. It was retired in or about the year 2000. The Russian SMDM mine works on the same principle, using a 650mm heavyweight torpedo. Many types of mines that can be laid from aircraft or submarines can also be laid from surface ships, much like depth charges, by rolling or sliding them off the ship from a rack. The advantage of laying mines in this manner is that a ship can typically carry and deploy much larger numbers of mines than an aircraft or sub. The principal disadvantage of surface mine laying is that the ship can only undertake the operation while in relative safety, making the task difficult to accomplish in enemy waters and thereby relegating surface laid mines largely to the defensive mission. Many moored mines are laid from surface ships, including, for example, the Russian MAG and UGM types. Method of Deployment Drifting mines are perhaps the most feared, not because they're particularly effective but rather because they tend to be indiscriminate. A drifting mine, carried anywhere by the wind and the currents, is just as liable to sink your own ship, or a non-combatant, as the enemy. Drifting contact mines were used on occasion during the world wars, but this limitation was eventually recognised. Sometimes a moored mine may break its cable and become a drifting mine, but modern types are usually equipped with electronics to sense the problem and deactivate or scuttle the mine. The US Mk 19 and Russian APM (circa 1955) are examples of drifting contact mines. A moored mine is connected to the seabed by a cable and anchor to keep it in place. The mine itself will float at a predetermined depth, the latter being determined by the tides in the area and more importantly, the intended target. Shallow moored mines are typically intended for use against surface ships, while deep moored mines seek submarine targets. Moored mines are unavailable, of course, where the water is too deep to result in effective deployment. The US Navy's Mk 56 and Mk 57 are examples of moored mines intended for the anti-submarine mission. Early in the morning of 18 February 1991, the Iwo Jima class amphibious assault ship USS Tripoli (LPH 10) hit a moored contact mine that ripped a 16 x 20 foot hole in her hull below the waterline. The ship had been operating for some 11 hours in the previously undetected Iraqi minefield. Bottom mines are generally used where the water is either very shallow or too deep for moored mines. As the name suggests, a bottom mine is deployed on the ocean floor and is typically difficult to detect and sweep. Bottom mines are useful in shallow waters where an enemy amphibious assault might be expected, or where you need a large warhead. The Destructor and Quickstrike series mines described earlier are all examples of bottom mines, as is the Italian Manta which also haunted US Navy warships in the Persian Gulf during the first Gulf War. A few hours after the incident with Tripoli, the Bunker Hill class guided missile cruiser USS Princeton (CG 54) struck a Manta mine in about 16 meters of water, and about three seconds later, was hit by the sympathetic detonation of another about 350 yards away. The damage was substantial, including a cracked superstructure, severe deck buckling, and a damaged propeller shaft and rudder. A Manta bottom mine just a few hours after deployment Image credit: SEI. Method of Actuation The earliest and simplest type of actuation was the contact mine, which in many respects typifies the traditional image of a naval mine. Early versions of the contact mine had mechanical detonators, but later evolved into chemical (such as the Hertz Horn, where contact with a target's hull cracked a vial of acid that poured into a lead-acid battery) and electrical fuzes (where a copper wire attached to a buoy created a voltage and activated the detonator when in contact with a target's hull). Contact mines are increasingly rare in the modern era. The Russian AG, AGSB, and AMAG 1 are all examples of WWII era contact mines. Influence mines are actuated by the "influence" of a target, that is, triggered by the presence of a ship or submarine itself, through the use of such sensors as magnetic, passive acoustic, or water pressure displacement. Early influence mines used simple magnetic sensors or broadband hydrophones. Advances in electronics and computer processing have seen the introduction of increasingly sophisticated sensors; for example, the introduction of "total field" magnetometers and narrowband passive sensors that can listen for certain acoustic signatures. These sophisticated systems permit a mine to be programmed to ignore all passing ships and submarines except for a very specific target. When first introduced, pressure actuated mines were virtually immune to sweeping. There was no device that could simulate a ship's pressure signature, except, well, a real ship. The only protection against them was to move so slowly as to not cause a change in water pressure sufficient to set off the mines. In practise, however, very few mines have been equipped with pressure actuation only, and in fact, most modern influence mines use multiple influence sensors as to avoid premature actuation by some natural phenomenon and to defeat simple countermeasures. (Most pressure mines, therefore, can be swept by using an acoustic noisemaker or magnetic field). Examples of influence mines include the German DM 61 (G2), British Stonefish, and the Russian MDM-3/4/5/6 series of bottom mines. Remotely controlled mines are typically found in defensive minefields, where the mines can be deactivated or detonated on command, usually by electrical signal from shore (usually when you can visually observe enemy targets), or switched over to normal (contact or influence) methods. Examples of controlled mines include the Chinese EM-57 and Swedish M/9 (GMI 600). There is a fourth category of naval mine actuation, although in most cases it is a sub-variant of influence mines. The rising mine can lay very close to the ocean bottom, usually in moored fashion and in very deep water, and then launch a torpedo or projectile when a ship or submarine passes by. The influence sensor needs to have long range (1,000 feet or more), which generally necessitates a passive acoustic or magnetic system, because of the lag time between triggering the mine and the warhead or payload reaching the target. The classic example of a sophisticated rising mine is the US Navy's Mk 60 CAPTOR (Encapsulated Torpedo), which is a deep water (up to 3,000 ft) moored mine that uses "reliable acoustic path (RAP) sound propagation" as its influence method and the Mk 46 lightweight torpedo as its payload. It is strictly an ASW mine, ignoring surface ships and (reportedly) friendly submarines, and may be laid by air, ship, or submarine. Mk 60 CAPTOR method of operation Image credit: Federation of American Scientists. CONCLUSION Hopefully this rather lengthy discussion has given you a useful foundation in the tools of anti-submarine warfare (ASW). In Part 3 we'll move to the ASW cycle, the specific methodology of detecting, locating, and attacking submarines. Source references: Jane's Navy International, November/December 1995, November 1997. Naval Institute Guide to World Naval Weapons Systems, 1997-98. Military Parade, Stanislav Proshkin and Valery Marinin, 1998. The Third Battle: Innovation in the US Navy's Silent Cold War Struggle with Soviet Submarines, Dr. Owen R. Cote Jr., March 2000. Jane's Information Group: August 1999; June 2003; September 2005. Journal of Electronic Defense, March 2001. ASW after the Cold War, Owen Cote and Harvey Sapolsky, MIT Security Studies Program, April 2001. Proceedings, June 2002. National Defense, January 2003. Undersea Dragons: China's Maturing Submarine Force, Lyle Goldstein and William Murray, International Security, Spring 2004. World of Defence, UDT, Issue No.2, 2004. U.S. Destroyers, Norman Friedman, 2004. Naval Institute Guide to the Ships and Aircraft of the US Fleet, Norman Polmar, 2005. Navy Times, August 2005. SOSUS: The "Secret Weapon" of Undersea Surveillance, Edward C. Whitman, Undersea Warfare, Winter 2005. Principles of Naval Weapon Systems, Craig Payne, 2006. Not Ready for Retirement: The Sonobuoy Approaches Age 65, Holler et al., Sea Technology, November 2006. Harpoon 3 Sonar Model, AGSI, 2007. Proceedings, June 2007. ES310, Introduction to Naval Weapons Engineering. Ocean Talk, Naval Meteorology and Oceanography Command. Federation of American Scientists. www.globalsecurity.org www.uboat.net www.designation-systems.net

Let's hope the one you just elected to the White House bucks the trend.

From Code One, Third Quarter 2008 Vikings Ashore The very last at-sea deployment for the S-3 Viking ended on 29 May as crews from Sea Control Squadron 22 (VS-22), known as the Checkmates, returned home to NAS Jacksonville, Florida. VS-22 crews completed more than 300 flight hours during their two-month deployment on board the USS George Washington (CVN-73) as the ship sailed around South America en route to its new home port of Yokosuka, Japan. The VS-22 flyoff as the Washington neared San Diego marked the last planned S-3 catapult shot. The Checkmates and Sea Control Wing Atlantic Fleet are both scheduled to disestablish in January 2009, closing out the Viking's thirty-eight year career with the US Navy.

From Code One, Third Quarter 2008 Nighthawk Memories Compiled By Jeff Rhodes Surprise, Surprise The US Air Force announced Thursday the existence of an operational stealth fighter aircraft, officially known as the F-117A. The single-seat, dual engine aircraft is built by Lockheed Corporation in California. The F-117A first flew in June 1981. The F-117A has been operational since October 1983, and is assigned to the 4450th Tactical Group at Nellis AFB, Nevada. The aircraft is based at the Tonopah Test Range Airfield in Nevada. A total of fifty-nine aircraft are being procured. Fifty-two have already been delivered to the Air Force, and seven more are in production. With disclosure of the F-117A program, this mature system, which has enjoyed bipartisan Congressional support since its inception, can now be fully integrated into operational plans in support of worldwide defense commitments. This system adds to the deterrent strength of US military forces. —US Air Force News Release, 10 November 1988 The Black Jet The F-117 Nighthawk, the world's first combat aircraft to fully exploit radar-evading stealth technology, was developed, tested, and flown operationally in complete secrecy. Even the official program name — Senior Trend — was a secret. First flown in 1981 and declared operational in 1983, the futuristic-looking stealth fighters were based at the Tonopah Test Range in Nevada, an isolated facility roughly 250 miles north of Las Vegas. The pilots, maintainers, and support staff of the cryptically designated 4450th Tactical Group would leave their homes at Nellis AFB in Las Vegas on Monday, fly via minimally marked 727 airliners to Tonopah, shift their body clocks to night operations for a couple of days, and then fly back to Nellis on Friday. After the F-117 program was publicly acknowledged, the unit was redesignated the 37th Tactical Fighter Wing. The revolutionary design of the F-117, with its black paint scheme and faceted surfaces, would enter the national consciousness a little more than two years after the official Pentagon announcement. As Operation Desert Storm kicked off, TV news reports showed grainy video of targets in Baghdad — one of the most heavily defended cities on earth — being destroyed with a single 2,000-pound bomb being dropped precisely down an air ventilation shaft. Two months shy of twenty-seven years since it was first flown, the F-117 was retired in ceremonies at Holloman AFB, New Mexico, where the 49th Fighter Wing had operated it since 1992, and then on 22 April in Palmdale, California, for the people who had designed and built it. What follows is certainly not a complete history of what was called the Black Jet, but memories from some of the hundreds of people associated with the F-117 during its career. In The Beginning The genesis for stealth came in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War [between Egypt and Israel]. Russia had supplied Egypt with a sophisticated radar network, and the Israelis were sending aircraft to the front lines that the Egyptians were shooting down even though the Israeli aircraft were equipped with electronic countermeasures. What was needed was a way to make the aircraft invisible, or nearly so. If you can't see it, you can't shoot at it. DARPA [the US Defense Advanced Projects Agency] gave $100,000 contracts to two companies [McDonnell Douglas and Northrop] to study the problem. The plan was that one of the companies would eventually build a stealth prototype. Lockheed received a $1 contract that gave us access to the DARPA data. We got in the competition through the back door. We had produced a stealth aircraft in the SR-71 that DARPA didn't know about. We got the CIA to let us brief DARPA on the A-12/SR-71. After some convincing, DARPA officials told us to go ahead and bid on the program. Dick Scherrer was Lockheed's director of operations research. He was a very inventive guy. He couldn't get anyone to explain RCS [radar cross section] to him in normal English. I was at home with a broken leg, and Dick called me on an open phone line and told me I had to design an invisible aircraft. The day I came back to work, I explained stealth to him. The lowest RCS is taking the smallest number of flat panels and tilting those surfaces over, sweeping the edges away from the radar view angle. Dick went away and came back with some drawings. I told him to make it flatter so the radar couldn't reflect back. He came back with some new drawings. We got Ben Rich [the head of Lockheed's Skunk Works] to get some money to build an anechoic chamber and a wind tunnel test model. The aerodynamics guys gave the design a name — the Hopeless Diamond. It didn't have a tail. The idea was just to look at the basic shape. But the engineers looked at the model and said, 'You know, that would almost fly.' Scherrer told me to write a computer program to show what we would need to measure RCS. He also said, 'I need it in a month.' It took us five 100-hour weeks, but we built the program [called Echo 1] to test the Hopeless Diamond design. It worked — our predictions matched reality. I went from being regarded as the village idiot to being hailed as the village expert. The Hopeless Diamond design led to the XST design, which was much more of an airplane. The XST design led to Have Blue, which was essentially a subscale version of the F-117. We had a pole model shoot-off at the test range at Holloman, and Have Blue did really well. We turned in our proposal for Have Blue. Ben said to mark it as confidential. Two weeks later, we heard from DARPA, and the proposal was now Top Secret Special Access Required. Only two of our engineers had DoD Top Secret clearances. The rest of us had only Agency clearances. We got that situation cleared up and went to work. We had great success with Have Blue. We proved the design would fly. The Air Force thought there was enough proof that stealth worked to start, even though the design wasn't completely tested. They asked us to take the Have Blue and weaponize it. — Denys Overholser, Lockheed mathematician and engineer It Is A Model Lockheed built a wooden mockup of the F-117. It was used it to plan where the displays would go and how the wiring and plumbing runs would be installed. The F-117 is probably one of the last aircraft to be mocked up in wood. — Hal Farley, Lockheed test pilot, Bandit 117 Flight Control Laws We spent two years and hundreds of hours in the simulator working with Bob Loschke, the chief flight control engineer. It was an iterative process. Bob would get aerodynamic data from the wind tunnel models and put the data in the simulator. We would then fly the simulator and evaluate the flying qualities. We took the F-117 control law package to Calspan to incorporate it in their NT-33 variable stability test aircraft. When they were ready, Dave Ferguson and I went to Buffalo, New York, to evaluate the predicted flying qualities in a real airplane. Rogers Smith was the Calspan project pilot and flew with us during our evaluation. Since the NT-33 was a variable stability aircraft, we could modify the control laws to see where the corners of the flight envelope were and how well we could handle the aircraft with degraded stability. This proved to be a very valuable experience. — Hal Farley, Lockheed test pilot, Bandit 117 Tumbling Down Dick Cantrell, the head of the aerodynamics department, wanted to see what would happen if the F-117 exceeded the AOA [angle of attack] limits. He made a crude catapult and launched a scale model from the rafters of Building 310 in Burbank [California, then the Lockheed assembly facility] where we had built the U-2 and the SR-71. He launched the model in the hangar and caught it in a net. He filmed the aircraft's departure [from controlled flight] characteristics. When it exceeded the AOA limits, the aircraft would tumble end over end. We pilots watched with some trepidation. — Hal Farley, Lockheed test pilot, Bandit 117 Dead Of Night The aircraft was taken from Burbank to the test range in a C-5 in the dead of night. It was loaded in nearly complete blackout conditions. I don't think the fact a C-5 was landing at the Burbank Airport in the middle of the night tipped the neighbors off to anything unusual. We did receive some complaints about the noise of the C-5 taking off. — Hal Farley, Lockheed test pilot, Bandit 117 First Flight I was well prepared for the first flight. I had flown the simulator during development of the flight control laws and had been practicing by flying the F-111, F-15, and F-16. I was also in the cockpit for all of the ground tests and engine runs leading up to first flight. We made several taxi runs and had reached the point of lifting the nose wheel off the ground and deploying the drag chute. We planned the flight for early morning to take advantage of the smoother air at dawn. Just after liftoff, I noticed the nose was yawing considerably, indicating directional stability wasn't as great as anticipated. We took off with the AOA and sideslip sensors on the air data probes disabled, planning to turn them on after gaining some altitude. After it became evident that the yawing was getting worse and my attempts to control it weren't helping, I turned on the yaw sensor, and the airplane stiffened up and felt normal. Dave Ferguson, the primary chase pilot checked me over, and we continued. Early in the climb, I heard this bang, and I wasn't ready for that. It was the intake blow-in doors slamming shut and not a problem. After we leveled off at 15,000 feet, the canopy warning light came on and that was troubling because the canopy is also the windscreen. That turned out to be a misadjusted microswitch. As we began to set up for the test maneuvers, Dick Burton, the test director, informed me that temperatures in the tailpipe were approaching limits and I would need to return and land. Overall, it was a simple flight with the gear down all the way. We did some mild maneuvers in pitch, roll, and yaw as we returned to base. There was a big party after the first flight, but I stayed behind to write the flight test report while everything was still fresh in my mind. I wanted to be as detailed as possible. In the end, I didn't even get to the party. — Hal Farley, Lockheed test pilot, Bandit 117 Small Group One reason the F-117 came about so quickly was the effectiveness of the team. Air Force program management consisted of seven people. We were able to work one-on-one with the Air Force experts. We went from paper to airborne in two-and-one-half years. The Air Force team worked with us, gave us good suggestions, and let us get on with the program. — Dr. Alan Brown, Lockheed F-117 chief technical engineer It's In Your Hands I started on the F-117 in 1981. There were eleven people in the 4450th Tactical Group when I joined. Early on, I went in a room in the basement at Lockheed in Burbank and was told, 'This is the aircraft, and this is how it is supposed to work. Your job is to make sure it does.' — CMSgt. Kenneth Cody (ret.) Really Black Program Thousands of people kept the F-117 program secret. I had to take a polygraph test at the beginning, middle, and end of my time on the program. For years, we never even said 'F-117.' We called it 'The Asset.' Since it wasn't designated the F-19, which is probably what it should have been in the Air Force designation sequence protocol, I was able to truthfully answer, 'No, I don't fly the F-19' when somebody asked me if I did. — Mark Dougherty, Bandit 168 Team Nighthawk The thing I most remember is the sense of dedication we all had. We had a real sense of purpose. They were tremendous people, and there was tremendous camaraderie. We probably had 400 people on the program, including mechanics on the assembly line. We also had one of the first true combined Air Force-contractor test forces. That teamwork was even part of the F-117 revolution. It's standard practice today. — Tom Morgenfeld, Lockheed test pilot, Bandit 101 Stealth Trifecta After the F-117, I went to the YF-22. After the YF-22, I came back to the F-117 and flew right up until the time I became involved with the X-35. I probably have about 1,295 hours in the F-117. — Tom Morgenfeld, Lockheed test pilot, Bandit 101 Flight Envelope We cleared the full AOA, loads, and speed flight envelope of the F-117, and the Air Force test pilots would evaluate operational aspects within the cleared flight envelope. Bill Park was the chief test pilot who made the decision that Hal [Farley] would make the first F-117 flight. I still feel slighted — sort of. I was in the F-117 program for nine years and made the first flight of Ship 2. I mainly flew Ship 2 and did a lot of high AOA tests, loads test, high sink rate landings, and stalls. — Dave Ferguson, Lockheed test pilot, Bandit 105 Test Fleet Flight test missions began, and we worked our way incrementally through the flight envelope. The first two aircraft were flown continuously. Aircraft 780 is now on static display at Nellis, and 781 is at the Air Force Museum [National Museum of the US Air Force at Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio]. Aircraft 781 flew a tremendous amount while 782 served as the mission systems airplane. Aircraft 783 was the primary RCS test airplane, and 784 served as a catchall and did a lot of avionics testing. We were flying fifteen to twenty times a week. We would typically fly as many as two flights in the morning and two in the afternoon. We spent a lot of time making sure nobody else was around. That added a level of complexity that most programs don't have to deal with. — Jon Beesley, Bandit 102 Bandit Origin Bandit was a standard radio call sign used by the Aggressor pilots at Nellis. We used Bandit because it wouldn't draw attention. In the test program, we were allowed to pick our number. The test pilots took Bandit numbers 100 to 125. — Dave Ferguson, Lockheed test pilot, Bandit 105 Bandit Legacy A pilot was given a Bandit number after his first flight. His name and the date of the flight were embroidered on an aviator's scarf and then hung with the other Bandit scarves. All those scarves will be going to the Air Force Museum. There were 557 operational F-117 pilots. The operational pilots started with Bandit 150 [Col. Al Whitley]. There was no Bandit 666. The last Bandit was Brig. Gen. David Goldfein, who was the 49th Fighter Wing commander. He's Bandit 708. — Lt. Col. Ken Tatum, Bandit 527 Blue Suiter My introduction to the aircraft came before its first flight. Skip Anderson, the Air Force's flight test director, showed me the airplane and asked me to be the operations officer for the Combined Test Force. I was the only Air Force test pilot for all five years of development and flight test. The whole time I was there, the program didn't officially exist. I remember calling my wife in 1988 and telling her to look at the TV when they made the official announcement. I told her that's what I was doing for five years. She was excited to finally know. — Jon Beesley, Bandit 102 Fin Departure In 1985, I had a vertical fin explosively flutter off the back of the airplane. We were doing a weapons compatibility test, and the aircraft went into a flutter. The general sensation was like riding a motorcycle going fifty miles an hour on the crossties of a railroad track. We had a bomb hanging out in the airstream but were able to get it back in. We came back, landed the aircraft successfully, and were able to fix the problem and re-clear the envelope. We learned some things we hadn't known before. — Jon Beesley, Bandit 102 Welcome To The Air Force I spent four years at Tonopah as a weapons troop. I was a young airman, only nineteen years old. It was really exciting. In the barracks, which were ten miles from the flightline, we even had maid service. I was new to the Air Force and didn't know any better — I thought it was like that everywhere. — MSgt. Michael F. Parkison, 49th Aircraft Maintenance Squadron, Holloman AFB, New Mexico First Launch Anybody who worked on the jet at Tonopah will remember their first launch. We ran completely blacked-out operations. It was lights out, comm out. The first time those doors opened with nothing on and nothing else out there on the outside was something to experience. For a long time, we weren't really sure it was flying. All we'd see were the lights go by. — CMSgt. Wendy Jones (ret.) Psych For the distinguished visitors who came to Tonopah, we would show them an invisible aircraft. We would place a set of chocks on the ground and set up a workstand with an air hose held up with fishing line looking like it was attached to the aircraft. — CMSgt. Wendy Jones (ret.) Local Fauna I When I started, Tonopah had no billeting. We would fly there from Nellis every day. Later on, when we had billeting, I would stay for the first launch and recovery and then go home before the second launch. I would see wild horses as I walked back to billeting. They would follow people and nip them if they weren't careful. — CMSgt. Kenneth Cody (ret.) Local Fauna II I was walking back to billeting at Tonopah through the snow one night carrying food when I got cornered by a coyote. I just gave it the food and quickly went the other way. — CMSgt. Wendy Jones (ret.) On The Other Hand We used palm readers to get into the secure area. One time I had a broken right hand, and the reader would go 'fail,' 'fail,' 'fail,' and then I could use my left hand. Those particular readers were right hand first, then left. — CMSgt. Wendy Jones (ret.) No Follow-Up Questions, Please The first eight years I worked on the program, I couldn't tell anyone what I did. I could say I worked on A-7 avionics, and that was the hard part — I knew nothing about A-7 avionics. — CMSgt. Kenneth Cody (ret.) First ORI The group's first Operational Readiness Inspection was memorable. Time just flew by. We had to refuel, load bombs, and put in a new brake chute, all in the dark. Forty-five minutes was the standard. The evaluator asked me how long it took. I knew we had done it pretty fast, so I guessed about thirty-eight minutes. He said, 'No, it was a twenty-minute turn time.' — CMSgt. Kenneth Cody (ret.) Light Load You worked on the jet with one hand tied behind your back. One hand had to hold the flashlight with the red lens — there were no night vision goggles. — CMSgt. Wendy Jones (ret.) Can I Touch It Now? Even the janitors outranked us. I was just a buck sergeant. Everybody was so professional. When I started, I kept asking when I could touch the jet. For the longest time, they would only let me look at the jet. There was a lot of one-on-one training. — CMSgt. Wendy Jones (ret.) Through The Looking Glass Lt. Col. Jerry Fleming [bandit 152] came to Homestead [AFB, Florida] where I was flying F-4s and interviewed me personally. He landed in an A-7 with no tail markings and wore no insignia on his flight suit. He looked like someone from the CIA. I was wondering if I were still going to be in the Air Force. He said, 'What you think you're going to do is not what you're going to do. I need you to make a decision now because I need you quick.' I got orders in two days to report to Nellis. It was fun being wanted. It was even more fun getting picked to fly the F-117. — Mark Dougherty, Bandit 168 What Else Do You Do? I was flying F-15s at Langley AFB [Virginia], and my commander asked if I wanted to join the 4450th Tactical Group. I knew they flew the A-7 and did other things as well. We had a pilot in the squadron who had come from the 4450th. and he told me it would be a great thing to do. — Maj. Gen. Greg Feest, Bandit 261 SLUF Time All the pilots first went to Tucson [162nd Fighter Wing, Arizona Air National Guard at Tucson IAP] to learn to fly the A-7. We used the A-7 to chase the F-117 and also to prepare us to fly at night. When we were done, they put us in a secure room at Nellis and showed us a video of the F-117 taxiing out and flying. That was my first chance to see the aircraft and see that it can fly. It doesn't look very aerodynamic. — Maj. Gen. Greg Feest, Bandit 261 Initial Cadre We had a whole bunch of hard-charging guys. Everybody had at least 1,500 flight hours. We had one or two F-15 and F-16 pilots and a lot of F-111, F-4, and A-10 pilots. In those early days at Tonopah, we flew the A-7 a lot more than the F-117. It was simply a matter of having more A-7s on the ramp. We did the operational test and evaluation and developed tactics and procedures. We took our business pretty seriously. — Mark Dougherty, Bandit 168 Got To Go I was working at TAC headquarters at Langley when my boss asked if I were serious about going any place, any time, anywhere to get back to flying airplanes instead of a desk job. I said, 'Uh-huh.' He said to call this guy. So I called Col. Mike Short, who was the 4450th Tactical Group commander at Nellis. He said, 'I'm going to bring you on as the ops officer for avionics testing in the A-7, but I can't tell you anything about what else you're going to be doing.' I accepted the assignment and went to Nellis. I knew I didn't know what the secret was beyond the A-7. I didn't know what the program was. — Bill Lake, Bandit 252 Joining Up I signed my life away and was then taken into a vault. There was a standard projector that showed a frontal view of the F-117 coming out of the hangar. It was a jaw-dropping experience. The only thing that was more jaw-dropping was when they took me into the hangar at Tonopah, closed the personnel door behind us, turned on the lights, and I saw the jet for real. — Bill Lake, Bandit 252 Big Sweep My initial briefing was in the vault in our compound at the Lake Mead base north of Nellis; I was shown photos of the aircraft, and my initial reaction was, 'What the hell is that?' The sweep of the wings — seventy-two degrees — was striking. I wondered how that thing flew. It was sort of disconcerting to look at it. I figured it must have very high speeds for taking off and landing. — Mark Dougherty, Bandit 168 Life In Tonopah Flying from Nellis to Tonopah, we essentially moved a small city of people back and forth every week. We would get there on Monday, fly a short schedule, and then come back and play midnight basketball to try and stay awake. We'd fly a full schedule on Tuesday, Wednesday, and Thursday nights. One turn, two goes flying the A-7 or the F-117. The A-7s were parked outside the hangars partly as operational cover for the base, but it was cold and dark getting into them. It was warm and lighted in the hangars where the F-117s were parked. They eventually had trailers for us to live in with heavy curtains to keep out the sunlight so we could sleep during the day. However, the beep, beep, beep of the trash truck backing up early in the morning could penetrate anything. — Mark Dougherty, Bandit 168 Nighthawk Night Owls We flew at night under the cover of darkness. We would sleep until late in the day in what we called our cocoons or caves. They were completely dark with blackout curtains. We would get up, exercise, go eat, and go to the office. After dark, we would take the jets up and go fly. We would finish between 1:00 and 3:00 a.m. We would debrief, clean up, and relax a little. We would have to be in our caves by sunup. We had to be in the dark to minimize the psychological effects on our bodies and our circadian rhythms. On Friday, you'd go home [to Nellis] and try to get to sleep at 11:00 p.m., when we were used to staying up until 5:30 a.m. Then your four-year-old would come in at 7:00 a.m. and jump on your chest. And, of course, the only time the dishwasher would overflow or the car would break down was while you were away. — Bill Lake, Bandit 252 I Can't See You When the program was in the black world, we only flew on the Nevada test ranges. We slowly expanded and went into other airspace. We would file our flight plans as A-7s. We would hear airline pilots say they couldn't see the other traffic that was being called to them. We were in black jets running with lights out. They couldn't see us, and that was pretty cool. Until we came out of the black, our cover story was that we flew A-7s. — Maj. Gen. Greg Feest, Bandit 261 Out In The Open Halfway through my tour at Tonopah, DoD issued the grainy photo of the stealth fighter. Families were then able to talk to one another. We could show the American public what we could do. — Maj. Gen. Greg Feest, Bandit 261 Jato Preto I knew information about the F-117 had been released when I saw a photo of my airplane in a Brazilian newspaper with a caption in Portuguese. — Dr. Alan Brown, Lockheed F-117 chief technical engineer Jumping In The Deep End I was selected to be a squadron commander before I even flew the F-117. The wing commander made me a squadron commander — morale was low in one of the squadrons and time was tight because of an ORI [Operational Readiness Inspection]. I pretty much came in from the cold. I knew the people, but I knew I needed to get vector going in the right direction for the ORI. I went off for a week and learned to fly the jet. It was really a matter of rallying the people who knew what to do to get the job done. — Bill Lake, Bandit 252 Limited View The jet flies better than you think it would from looking at it. The visibility for the pilot isn't good. But the jet was designed to minimize radar signature so the canopy had to be a certain shape. — Lt. Col. Ken Tatum, Bandit 527 Limited SA The jet is easy to fly. Other jets had equipment like radar or radar warning that let pilots know what is going on around them. The situational awareness for the pilot just wasn't there in the F-117. We went into the target alone and unafraid. The other aircraft in the strike package would always want to know where we were. We just didn't talk on the radio during missions. — Lt. Col. Todd Flesch, Bandit 447 Martian Kudos I have to give a lot of credit to our Martians — the maintainers who kept up the low observable materials on the jet's skin. We quite literally placed our lives in those young Airmen's hands. — Lt. Col. Todd Flesch, Bandit 447 Different Personalities Our maintenance troops knew every little detail about every jet. Each aircraft had a different personality — little quirks in how it flew or worked. The crew chiefs gave the jets individual nicknames. — Lt. Col. Ken Tatum, Bandit 527 Weaponology The GBU-10 Paveway II 2,000-pound laser guided bomb and the Mk. 84 general purpose bomb were the baseline weapons for initial operational capability. I was working on a program called Have Void for an improved 2,000-pound penetrating weapon. This weapon needed to penetrate concrete and not fracture itself. We took the more compact guide fins from the Paveway II and the penetrating capability of the BLU-109 warhead and kluged them together. We did a very slow fit check to make sure it would fit in the F-117's weapons bay. I called the program office and they sort of got mad. I wasn't authorized to do that kind of thing. After getting chewed out, the program people turned around and asked, 'Well, how did it do?' It was so new, it was called GBU-XX. I drew up the requirements, and Tactical Air Command went forward on IOC [initial operational capability] with it. It worked so well that TAC threw out the toss delivery mode. The weapons guys said, 'This is stupid. We are not going to fly straight and level to a target,' even though that's the best way to deliver weapons. In the first test, the GBU-27 split the barrel. It later went directly down an air shaft in Baghdad. — Chuck Pinney, former Air Force F-117 Program Office director Follow The Leader The GBU-27s we used in Desert Storm were dropped singly. With the GBU-10 and Mk. 84, we could drop simultaneously. They would follow each other in, and you could see both explosions. — Klaus Klause, Bandit 283 Solo Flight The first time you flew the F-117, you flew it alone. It was never a bad aircraft to fly. Wobblin' Goblin was a phrase invented by somebody who liked to rhyme words. The aircraft always flew pretty well. — Jon Beesley, Bandit 102 Not For Beginners You learn to fly the F-117 in the simulator. Your first flight is solo. You have to have 750 to 1,000 fighter hours to get in F-117s. The jet flies like any other fighter tactically. But you usually fly with seven other aircraft, all at the same time. — Col. Jack Forsythe, Bandit 460 Family Affair My wife and I both got stationed at Nellis with the 4450th Tactical Group at the same time. I was sent to Tucson to learn to fly the A-7, so she actually saw the stealth fighter before I did. Later on, we both deployed with the unit in support of Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Once combat started, she would be there to meet me when I landed. — Maj. Gen. Greg Feest, Bandit 261 Home Front The time in Tonopah was tough on families. The people we worked with became our family away from our family. They were the only people we could talk to about what we were doing but we knew it was a safeguard for the defense of the United States. — CMSgt. Kenneth Cody (ret.) Tropicana Or Golden Nugget? My wife and I knew what each of us did and where we went on Mondays. People told us we should sell all of our household goods and just live in the Vegas casinos on the weekends. We'd both spend all week at Tonopah. — Maj. Gen. Greg Feest, Bandit 261 Lifestyle Change The lifestyle of going away on Monday and coming home on Friday was not the most stressful aspect of what the men and women in the program had to endure. The inability to talk about what we did for five days out of seven with our families, friends, and neighbors was a bigger challenge. In between, phone calls and communications were limited. We were 250 miles north of home in a location at a higher elevation where it would actually snow. We could be talking with our families and even having the usual conversation about the weather, and we couldn't say what our weather was. It was an 'I can neither confirm nor deny that' situation. The inability to tell somebody how our week was going was hard. We could ask how our spouse's week was, but it was as if our week didn't exist. — Bill Lake, Bandit 252 Separate Conversations We were a tightknit group. We hung out on weekends together and attended a lot of social functions together. The pilots would get together in one area of the house or yard, and the spouses would meet in another area. We couldn't talk about what we did away from Tonopah. — Maj. Gen. Greg Feest, Bandit 261 Unique Distinction I was chosen to fly the mission during Operation Just Cause. We didn't even go into Panama in stealth mode. We were chosen because we could drop a precision munition and hit what we aimed at with a specific time on target. We were told to hit a field. We didn't really show what stealth could do. — Maj. Gen. Greg Feest, Bandit 261 Getting Real In Desert Shield, we didn't believe we were going to war until the second squadron arrived in theater in December of 1990. Then we started getting serious. We did a lot more target study and reading up on Iraqi order of battle. When we got the warning order, we realized we were going to war. — Klaus Klause, Bandit 283 Limited Asset There was a general worry going into Desert Storm about whether the stealth stuff really worked. The naysayers said we were going to lose one or two aircraft a night. If that were the case, it wouldn't have been a problem for long — we only had a small number of aircraft. — Klaus Klause, Bandit 283 First Night Having dropped a bomb in Panama, I was chosen for the first mission of Desert Storm. On the first night, none of the pilots knew whether stealth would work or not. The engineers told us what it could do, and we trusted them. But until we got through the enemy air defenses in Iraq, we weren't sure. We anticipated some losses that first night. But we returned with none of us getting hit by triple-A [anti-aircraft artillery] or SAMs [surface-to-air missiles]. Then we knew stealth worked. — Maj. Gen. Greg Feest, Bandit 261 Opening Shot We only had four guys who had been in combat, but they were all professional pilots. All I said to them was: 'This is Night One, and you are going to hit your targets; concentrate on getting the job done; put your [ejection] seat all the way down and don't even look out the window.' We had a couple of devastating strikes, and we took the Iraqi C3I off the air. The mission was a great success. — Klaus Klause, Bandit 283 See It Live I was watching CNN's coverage of the opening night of the Gulf War. I saw the explosions going off in the background, and then the power went out. The air raid sirens started going off after that. I knew it was the F-117s, and I knew we had succeeded. -- Denys Overholser, Lockheed mathematician and engineer Shack During a drop, we would fly in on autopilot and put the cursor on the target. We would get consent to release, and the weapon bay doors would open. We could feel the bombs leave the bomb bay. The jolt would sometimes knock off the autopilot. We couldn't hear the explosions, obviously, but we could see the splash. We knew immediately if we hit the target. — Klaus Klause, Bandit 283 Fourth Time's The Charm For deeply buried targets like Sadam's [Hussein] bunkers or the chemical [storage] bunkers, we'd have four pilots attack the target. The first bomb would move the sand. The second guy would hit the same spot; the third guy would breach the target; and the fourth would destroy it. We went after the C3I bunkers or antennas first; then we went after bridges and dropped the spans. We dropped on SA-2 SAM sites — the BUFFs [b-52 bombers] wouldn't go in until the missiles were gone. — Klaus Klause, Bandit 283 Improving The Jet I was the squadron commander of the 410th Flight Test Squadron — the F-117 flight test unit — from 1997 to 1999. We had Air Force test pilots and maintenance, but we also had Lockheed test pilots and maintainers to help us. It was the most ideal test force I've ever been in. The depot was there; the engineering was there; the experience was there. We put the ring-laser gyroscope in the aircraft, GPS [Global Positioning System], and the new brake controller. We did the testing and development for the single configuration fleet. Our job was to keep the signature and reduce maintenance. We did that. — Crash Jaspers, Bandit 121 Keeping Information Flowing I came to Holloman [AFB, New Mexico] a lot to brief the 8th and 9th Fighter Squadron pilots. I would interface with the operational pilots and their commander. It kept up rapport with the operational force. We had an operational test detachment at Holloman. Everything was right there for the operational pilots. Our OT guys would research how the operational guys would use a new piece of equipment. We tried to keep a free flow of information back and forth. Those were some fun times. — Crash Jaspers, Bandit 121 Changing Priorities When we started, the priorities were: (1) security overall, (2) low observable performance, (3) software, (4) aircraft performance, and (5) cost. By 2001, everything was about dollars. In 2000, there was an effort to eliminate six aircraft from the fleet as a cost-cutting measure. We had to defend why we needed to keep the aircraft operational. — Chuck Pinney, former Air Force Program Office director Life At Holloman On my second tour in F-117s, the wing was in the white world. We had relocated to Holloman, and things were moving very well. It was a time when lots of things were happening. We were quite often called on to execute deployments. Some of those deployments came under the cover of darkness, and we did them well. We packed equipment and flew the aircraft out of town and nobody noticed. Other times we went overseas in support of contingencies. — Bill Lake, Bandit 252 Making A Statement We wanted to go to Aviano for Operation Deliberate Force in Bosnia. We were going to put about 300 people forward, but Italy wouldn't let us in, and the aircraft never arrived. To them, the F-117 in country was an indication of an escalation in force. That made a key statement. — Col. Jack Forsythe, Bandit 460 No Go/Go Now While I was commander of the 9th Fighter Squadron on my second tour in the F-117, we were supposed to deploy in support of Operation Deliberate Force in Bosnia [1995]. Due to some political reasons, squadron personnel deployed, but the host nation didn't allow the F-117s in country. We were not allowed to participate. We did deploy to Kuwait for Operation Desert Strike [1996], and our presence, we felt, was one of the main reasons Sadam backed off the border and avoided conflict. — Maj. Gen. Greg Feest, Bandit 261 Shootdown As a wing commander, you always want all the aircraft to come back and all the pilots back on the ground healthy and happy. Unfortunately, one time it didn't work out that way. In Kosovo, one of the F-117s was shot down by a SAM. I was in New Mexico, and the squadron was deployed. We knew the pilot had gotten out and was in his parachute. He had the presence of mind to pull out his emergency radio and relay that information. We wanted to keep it under wraps. We were not going to hide the fact that an aircraft was shot down or went down. But we didn't want to highlight the fact the pilot wasn't back in friendly hands. I had to break the news to the pilot's spouse without being overly optimistic or overly pessimistic. Fortunately, she was a uniformed officer, so I could call her into my office rather than make a visit to her home and draw all kinds of attention. I told her where we were, and that I would keep her up to speed. Later that night at my vice wing commander's going-away dinner, there came one of those sterling moments in life when you get to go up to the podium, take the microphone, and relate the fact that the pilot of Vega 31 [radio call sign] had been picked up, was in US hands in a US helicopter, and was on his way to a safe haven. He got back to Aviano; we got his wife on the phone — and all was good. — Bill Lake, Bandit 252 JDAM Addition We could do close air support when the capability to drop JDAM [the GPS/inertial-guided, 2000-pound GBU-31 Joint Direct Attack Munition] was added to the aircraft. Retargeting the weapon in flight was easy. We would get the coordinates of a new target and drop it there. Ten years ago, we would have never even thought about dynamic retargeting with the F-117. We went where the mission was planned to go. With laser-guided bombs, we couldn't drop if the weather was bad at the release point. — Lt. Col. Todd Flesch, Bandit 447 Keep On Keepin' On We were combat capable until the very end. The F-117 retirement has been a leadership challenge. There could have been an attitude of 'why are you still worried about that?' There is too much history in this aircraft to not be worried about it until the end. There is a lot of love for this airplane all up and down the chain of command. It wasn't very hard to keep people motivated. — Col. Larry Stephenson, 49th Maintenance Group vice commander, Holloman AFB, New Mexico Roadside Attraction The American public just loved the F-117. The crowds would always flock around us at airshows. There was just something about this aircraft. When we took off out of the depot at Palmdale, people would pull over to the side of the road and watch. I had about 300 hours in the jet, and we put up a four-ship formation for my fini flight. We just about shut down the highway. — Crash Jaspers, Bandit 121 Been Everywhere Over its career, the F-117 has been deployed to the desert, to Europe, and to the Pacific. The jet has done its job every time. The bombs go right where they are supposed to, and we go home. — Lt. Col. Todd Flesch, Bandit 447 What Goes Around We had to modify some of our load and test equipment for the F-117. Now that the jet is retired, that equipment is going back into the inventory. I'm now the head of the weapons shop and I have young troops who are complaining, 'Who did this shoddy work?' I've never told them that it was probably me. My career's come full circle. — MSgt. Michael F. Parkison No Letup We were moving full-throttle even at the end. We stopped training a week before the aircraft was officially retired. We could have been called up right up until the last minute. — Lt. Col. Todd Flesch, Bandit 447 Influence Last year when things in Korea got hectic, the US Forces Korea commander said, 'Get those black things up to the front.' We made the F-117's last deployment and took eighteen jets to South Korea. We knew we were influential. North Korea came back to the Six Party talks because we were there. We did that. Everybody knows what the jet can do. — Lt. Col. Ken Tatum, Bandit 527 Last To Land I think there is going to be a fight between the four of us as to who will be the very last F-117 pilot to land when we take the jets to Tonopah for storage. I'm thinking I'll flame out an engine if I have to. Making that last landing will be quite a distinction. — Lt. Col. Todd Flesch, Bandit 447, prior to the last F-117 flight on 22 April 2008 Lasting Legacy Anybody who touched this aircraft will be sad to see it go. We will probably never be able to do what this program did. There was a lot learned on this aircraft that is being applied to every other stealth aircraft. — Crash Jaspers, Bandit 121 Game Changer There was a lot of pride in the F-117. We knew we were making history working on it. This aircraft changed the way we fight wars. We don't want to see war, but we need to be prepared for it. — CMSgt. Wendy Jones (ret.) Old School I was here in 1995 and 1996 and from 2007 to 2008, and the jet always amazed me. The fighter we flew into combat has no radar, no radar warning, no chaff, and no flares. What it can do makes it unique. We relied on signature, which was maintained by our maintainers. — Col. Jack Forsythe, Bandit 460 All Star The F-117 is the most capable air-to-ground platform in history. This jet changed the way people think about attacking ground targets. We were the first to use stealth. From concept to being fielded, development of this aircraft was amazingly fast. — Lt. Col. Todd Flesch, Bandit 447 What A Team We had an Air Force and industry partnership that worked very well. We trusted the geniuses who developed the aircraft, and they came through for us. The Lockheed engineers and technicians always came up to help us. It was a neat, flexible organization for an aircraft that was developed in secrecy, on time, on schedule, and on budget. The program worked. — Mark Dougherty, Bandit 168 National Treasure The F-117 was based on 1970s technology, and the American people got their money's worth. The military, the contractors, and the civilians kept the program a secret for so long. The F-117 was a national treasure. Everybody knew someday we would use that fighter in a war, and it would do a great job. And it did. — Maj. Gen. Greg Feest, Bandit 261 Hearts and Minds We were at Wright-Patterson for the program office farewell. I went to the Air Force Museum, and I realized this aircraft has entered the national mind. It's like the B-17, P-51, or F-86. The jet's capability is also stuck in an adversary's mind. Kim Jong Il went into hiding when we deployed to South Korea. When we deployed, it was national news. — Col. Jack Forsythe, Bandit 460 Nighthawk Alumni This was a unique program. The people involved still see each other and go to reunions. It is a testament that we kept this aircraft a secret until we needed to use it in combat. — Maj. Gen. Greg Feest, Bandit 261 New Paradigm The F-117 changed combat capability overnight. The thinking changed from how many sorties does it take to destroy a target to how many targets can be destroyed on a sortie. I'm proud of the ground-breaking legacy of this aircraft. We really did own the night. — George Zielsdorff, Lockheed Martin F-117 program manager Nighthawk Legacy The F-117 is regarded as one of the great success stories in aviation history. It made an impact on the Air Force and on the future of combat operations. Ben [Rich] trusted the engineers and mathematicians. He knew this aircraft would work. He never doubted that the team could deliver the jet on time and on budget. And it did. The F-117 retires at its peak. — George Zielsdorff, Lockheed Martin F-117 program manager Unmatched The F-117 was the leadoff batter for stealth combat aircraft. It proved the value of low observable technology, and its precision weapons delivery was unmatched. — Bill Lake, Bandit 252 Footprints The F-117 changed the way wars are fought. This country has not started a major conflict when those little black airplanes were not asked to kick down the door. They are a critical part of history. — Jon Beesley, Bandit 102 Jeff Rhodes is the associate editor of Code One.

Too often folks forget about the lawyers on the other side of frivolous claims, fighting against them. And, notably, when they do win, its the juries of your "peers" that grant them.

You didn't read the story very carefully, I see. Note that the pirates' money sank with them. How they gonna afford attorneys now?

Yes, I've heard about Lt. Dan's, er, Gary Sinise's good reputation and accomplishments in this regard. Something to be applauded, for sure. Thumbs up.

From Flight International DATE: 09/01/09 SOURCE: Flight International USAF starts public search for Air Force One replacement By Stephen Trimble The US Air Force yesterday took the first public step in the search for a replacement of the Boeing VC-25 Air Force One, the presidential aircraft fleet. The USAF posted a request for information for market sources that can provide three widebody aircraft to replace two, 19-year-old VC-25s, which are converted Boeing 747-200s. An analysis of alternatives performed in 2007, which identified the Airbus A380 as a candidate, found that it would be more cost-effective to buy new aircraft rather than modernize the VC-25s, the acquisition document says. The first “presidential aircraft replacement” must be delivered in 2017, followed by a second and third aircraft in 2019 and 2021. The USAF’s options for commercially-derived widebody aircraft in that timeframe could be limited to the 747-8I and A380. In October 2007, Airbus executives confirmed that they were invited by the USAF to submit data about the A380, A340 and A330 as part of an analysis of alternatives. EADS officials added that the company gave unprecedented access to the USAF for data about its commercial aircraft designs. Asked for comment about the new RFI, an EADS spokesman replied: “We have received it and are taking a look. We’ll settle on a course of action after our review.” In September, EADS North America publicly posted a recruitment advertisement for a business development manager to pitch Airbus aircraft designs for a variety of USAF programmes, including the Air Force One replacement. In the past, Boeing executives have described retaining the Air Force One contract as one of the company’s top priorities. “It is a very important program for the Boeing Company and we have been supporting for it more than 50 years so clearly we understand the presidential requirements,” a Boeing spokesman said. Boeing delivered the first 707-based VC-137 Air Force One to the White House in 1962. The company also replaced those 28 years later with the VC-25s, which would be 27 years old at the time of their replacement. “We are going to respond to the request for information and look forward to supporting our customer’s needs in the future,” Boeing’s spokesman said. Boeing would compete from a position of long-term incumbency and as the sole domestic manufacturer of commercially-derived widebody aircraft. But the US domestic industry’s dominance of the presidential aircraft fleet crumbled in 2004. A Lockheed Martin proposal based on the AgustaWestland EH101 – at the time, an Italian-Anglo manufacturer beat incumbent Sikorsky’s “All-American” H-92 proposal. Transatlantic defence industry cooperation, however, was strained last year by the results of the KC-X tanker competition. Although Northrop Grumman proposal based on the A330-200 was selected by the USAF, the Government Accountability Office overturned the contract award on technical grounds.

Yep. From Aviation Week's ARES Blog: Israel's Navy Displays Precision Guided Missiles Fired at Gaza targets Posted by David Eshel at 1/5/2009 8:18 AM CST The Israeli Navy has taken part in attacks on Gaza, targeting coastal targets and boats formerly operated by the Palestinian police. For the first time, the Navy has acknowledged the use of precision guided missiles integrated with the Typhoon weapon system. Records of the attack, published by the Israeli Navy, indicate the Israelis have equipped naval vessels with Rafael Spike ER electro-optical guided missiles. Two missiles fired at coastal targets are seen in a video aired by Israel TV. The video depicts the attacks by the Typhoon remotely controlled gun and the firing sequence of the two missiles, one targeting a small patrol boat whoile the other hits through the window of a building on the coastline. The 8 km-range Spike ER missile was known to be have been used from helicopters, vehicles and ground positions, but are now being used on ships, probably Super Dvora fast attack craft (FAC), carrying Rafael's Typhoon stabilized gun mount. Other videos from the attack show the boat's Typhoon gun scoring precision hits even from a rolling ship in rough seas.

Hehe, a little dramatic, don't you think? I don't think anyone was suggesting that wind changes happen instantly and are typified by "whirling tornado/waterspout-like wind tunnels". Rather, the point is that they are probably not predictable enough to provide a rock solid foundation for predicting exactly where the carrier will be at the end of that hour long launch and recovery cycle. Even, with a 5 to 10 degree bearing change, as you've stated, just consider where the carrier will be at the end of its 30 knot sprint. Teleportation might be a useful tool for that sub commander.

I'm surprised no one has even breathed mention of the situation in Gaza. Yes, its a politically sensitive issue, and maybe the silence is because we have been conditioned to the same tired, old Israeli-Palestinian grudge?

If the missile was launched at an exactly detected target, the activation point for terminal guidance is set to 5 nm before intercept/impact. If the target is further than 60 nm away, the activation point is set progressively further away from the target as the distance to the target increases. Otherwise, it is based on the size of the uncertainty zone. (All credit to the code guru, of course).

Okay, let's assume for the moment that your submarine is able to detect what you think is maybe a carrier during a sprint. At what distance do you think you can do that? If you're not in a position to attack at that very moment, he's probably 25 nautical miles away or more. I'm thinking, for example, half the maximum range of the Soviet Type 65-76 wake homer, which it can only achieve at 30 knots. No sub captain shooting a 30 knot torpedo at a 30 knot target from 25 nm away is betting on a kill, right?. (Much closer than that and the submarine is already inside the carrier formation, so a chance at the big prize is more luck of the draw than anything, I suppose. The carrier may sprint in your direction if you're real lucky.) But lets assume that at 25 nm distance your sub is gathering enough passive sonar info to build a TMA solution of the identity, speed, and most importantly, for our purposes, the general course of the carrier when she is sprinting. That's pretty good info, but we'll run with it. Now your assumption that you can use that contact info to lay a trap (or that he can put himself to hear or intercept the next sprint without detection) is a pretty big leap. We've assumed you were in a position to detect the first sprint (the first you can hear, anyway), but when the sprint ends and the contact fades, where is the carrier heading now? Are you going to even be in a position to hear the next sprint? The carrier's course may take her directly away from your sub. It would be major stroke of luck to be in a position to guess the carrier's intended course (her destination) from observing a number of her wind sprints. If she is heading away, or even anywhere but in your general direction, your submarine will need to be sprinting itself just to stay in a position where it can get a sonar contact, let alone put itself ahead of the carrier and in a position to take a shot. As for wind directions and their ability to change rapidly, I think perhaps you've never spent much time living next to an ocean.

At first glance, I suppose it would. But I think it would be a difficult trap for a submarine to set up in practise. For example, how would the submarine know which direction the wind was blowing and where exactly the carrier would be turning into the wind? Unless a sub was in pretty much exactly the right place at exactly the right moment, a 30 knot carrier is a rather difficult and fleeting target.

With Soviet groups, the carrier was the escort.

Someone with first hand experience can probably answer this, but I would say that they do not strive to keep pace or absolutely maintain station with the carrier during such a high speed run. (Keeping in mind that some escorts, especially the nuclear powered ones, would be capable of doing a decent job of it). Safety concerns and giving the carrier room to maneuver would be more important. And, all of that said, a carrier won't be heading into the wind at 30 knots for any longer than is necessary. I would think the ASW escorts (especially the SSN) would definitely not be running at 30 knots during that period, but rather keeping ASW concerns in mind (because of the carrier's increased noise and vulnerability). I would think so, at least while flight operations were underway.

As detailed by Warhorse, yellow means an uncertain contact. It means you've detected something, maybe even had a firm contact on it once upon a time, but you don't right now. Sometimes a yellow icon will be surrounded by a yellow polygon, which denotes the size of the uncertainty zone. The larger the zone, the more uncertain your sensor is about exactly where the object is located. Red means you have a firm idea of where the contact is located. For most weapons, accuracy goes way up when you have a red contact. For many weapons, it tends to go way down when you do not. The colors are only an indication of your own sensor performance. It does not mean the enemy does not see you just fine. Whether intermittent or continuous, every time you turn on a sensor, any enemy asset within range that has ESM capability is going to get a sniff. Like a bloodhound, whether the trail is constant or only intermittent, he can still track you down. In any situation where you have a well equipped foe, I have found the intermittent setting to be largely self-defeating. HCE is a considerably different beast than HC2002 or HC Gold. The radar models, for example, have been significantly revamped and improved. No longer are you going to be able to rely on tried and true HC simplicities.

From Jane's Japanese MoD maintains plan to pursue F-22 By Jon Grevatt and Craig Caffrey 07 January 2009 The Japanese Ministry of Defence (MoD) has dismissed reports that it is prepared to drop plans to evaluate the F-22 Raptor fifth-generation air superiority fighter as part of its programme to procure next-generation (FX) fighters for the Japan Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF). Media reports from Japan have quoted government sources as saying that the MoD will abandon efforts to seek access to the aircraft's technologies and performance data in light of increasing budgetary pressures on the F-22 programme in the United States and the continuing ban on its export. A spokeswoman from the Japanese MoD told Jane's on 6 January, however, that "the situation has not changed and there has been no change in policy". Japan stated on numerous occasions throughout 2008 that it is seeking access to information about the F-22 in order to review its performance before selecting an FX aircraft to replace its ageing fleet of 80 Mitsubishi/McDonnell Douglas F-4EJ fighters. In addition to the F-22, the MoD's shortlist includes Dassault's Rafale; Eurofighter's Typhoon; Boeing's F/A-18E/F and F-15FX; and Lockheed Martin's F-35 Joint Strike Fighter.

Hmm, what can I say? The USNI scenarios were built and play tested by three pretty seasoned Harpoon players. None of them reported the behavior or results you are describing, i.e. being totally "pwned" by the AI. The scenarios are tough, yes. Impossible, no. Yes, assuming your unit(s) have ESM capability. Have you read the after action report (AAR) for this scenario written by Victor in the Pacific over at the Matrix forums? He seemed to be doing okay holding his own. I should add that there's a fair bit of variability built into USNI #1, and the scenario could be quite tough if you don't get the F/A-18s. But, you said you played it several times, so I assume you did get them at least once?

Yes, I think that's been abundantly clear all along. What isn't clear is whether the JSF can live up to the selling points being made by "LockMart".

And, unsurprisingly, rapid commentary from Bill Sweetman at Aviation Week's ARES Blog ... JSF News 2 - Stealth Questions Raised

New analysis of the F-35 JSF from Carlo Kopp and the APA gang ... Assessing JSF Defence Penetration Capabilities

You can shoot an anti-radar missile (ARM) on BOL, but it has zero chance of success. Rene is going to test whether we can work around that limitation for ARMs that should be more capable in this regard, i.e. the British ALARM.