CV32

From Stratfor Geopolitical Intelligence Report - Russia: Kosovo and the Asymmetry of Perceptions 12.18.2007 Russia: Kosovo and the Asymmetry of Perceptions By George Friedman Kosovo appears to be an archaic topic. The Yugoslavian question was a 1990s issue, while the Kosovo issue has appeared to be one of those conflicts that never quite goes away but isn't regarded very seriously by the international community. You hear about it but you don't care about it. However, Kosovo is getting very serious again. The United States and Europe appear committed to making Kosovo, now a province of Serbia, an independent state. Of course, Serbia opposes this, but more important, so does Russia. Russia opposed the original conflict, but at that point it was weak and its wishes were irrelevant. Russia opposes independence for Kosovo now, and it is far from the weak state it was in 1999 -- and is not likely to take this quietly. Kosovo's potential as a flash point between Russia and the West makes it important again. Let's therefore review the action to this point. In 1999, NATO, led by the United States, conducted a 60-day bombing campaign against Yugoslavia and its main component, Serbia. The issue was the charge that Yugoslavia was sponsoring the mass murder of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo, just as it had against Bosnian Muslims. The campaign aimed to force the Yugoslav army out of Kosovo while allowing a NATO force to occupy and administer the province. Two strands led to this action. The first was the fear that the demonstrable atrocities committed by Serbs in Bosnia were being repeated in Kosovo. The second was the general feeling dominant in the 1990s that the international community's primary task was dealing with rogue states behaving in ways that violated international norms. In other words, it was assumed that there was a general international consensus on how the world should look, that the United States was the leader of this international consensus and that there was no power that could threaten the United States or the unity of the vision. There were only weak, isolated rogue states that had to be dealt with. There was no real risk attached to these operations. Yugoslavia was identified as one of those rogue states. The United States, without the United Nations but with the backing of most European countries, dealt with it. There was no question that Serbs committed massive atrocities in Bosnia, and that Bosnians and Croats carried out massive atrocities against Serbs. These atrocities occurred in the context of Yugoslavia's explosion after the end of the Cold War. Yugoslavia had been part of an arc running from the Danube to the Hindu Kush, frozen into place by the Cold War. Muslims had been divided by the line, with some living in the former Soviet Union but most on the other side. The Yugoslav state consisted of Catholics, Orthodox Christians and Muslims; it was communist but anti-Soviet and cooperated with the United States. It was an artificial state imposed on multiple nationalities by the victors of World War I and held in place after World War II by the force field created by U.S.-Soviet power. When the Soviets fell, the force field collapsed and Yugoslavia detonated, followed later by the rest of the arc. The NATO mission, then, was to stabilize the western end of this arc, Yugoslavia. The strategy was to abolish the multinational state created after World War I and replace it with a series of nation-states -- such as Slovenia and Macedonia -- built around a coherent national unit. This would stabilize Yugoslavia. The problem with this plan was that each nation-state would contain substantial ethnic minorities, regardless of attempts to redraw the borders. Thus, Bosnia contains Serbs. But the theory was that small states overwhelmingly consisting of one nationality could remain stable in the face of ethnic diversity so long as there was a dominant nation -- unlike Yugoslavia, where there was no central national grouping. So NATO decided to re-engineer the Balkans much as they were re-engineered after World War I. NATO and the United States got caught in a weird intellectual trap. On the one hand, there was an absolute consensus that the post-World War II borders of Europe were sacrosanct. If that wasn't the case, then Hungarians living in Romanian Transylvania might want to rejoin Hungary, Turkish regions of Cyprus might want to join Turkey, Germany might want to reclaim Silesia and Northern Ireland might want to secede from the United Kingdom. All hell could break loose, and one of the ways Europe avoided hell after 1945 was a cardinal rule: No borders would shift. The re-engineering of Yugoslavia was not seen as changing borders. Rather, it was seen as eliminating a completely artificial state and freeing genuine nations to have their own states. But it was assumed that the historic borders of those states could not be changed merely because of the presence of other ethnic groups concentrated in a region. So the desire of Bosnian Serbs to join Serbia was rejected, both because of the atrocious behavior of the Bosnian Serbs and because it would have shifted the historic borders of Bosnia. If all of this seems a bit tortured, please recall the hubris of the West in the 1990s. Anything was possible, including re-engineering the land of the south Slavs, as Yugoslavia's name translates in English. In all of this, Serbia was seen as the problem. Rather than viewing Yugoslavia as a general failed project, Serbia was seen not so much as part of the failure but as an intrinsically egregious actor that had to be treated differently than the rest, given its behavior, particularly against the Bosnians. When it appeared that the Serbs were repeating their actions in Bosnia against Albanian Muslims in 1999, the United States and other NATO allies felt they had to intervene. In fact, the level of atrocities in Kosovo never approached what happened in Bosnia, nor what the Clinton administration said was going on before and during the war. At one point, it was said that hundreds of thousands of men were missing, and later that 10,000 had been killed and bodies were being dissolved in acid. The post-war analysis never revealed any atrocities on this order of magnitude. But that was not the point. The point was that the United States had shifted to a post-Cold War attitude, and that since there were no real threats against the United States, the primary mission of foreign policy was dealing with minor rogue states, preventing genocide and re-engineering unstable regions. People have sought explanations for the Kosovo war in vast and complex conspiracies. The fact is that the motivation was a complex web of domestic political concerns and a genuine belief that the primary mission was to improve the world. The United States dealt with its concerns over Kosovo by conducting a 60-day bombing campaign designed to force Yugoslavia to withdraw from Kosovo and allow NATO forces in. The Yugoslav government, effectively the same as the Serbian government by then, showed remarkable resilience, and the air campaign was not nearly as effective as the air forces had hoped. The United States needed a war-ending strategy. This is where the Russians came in. Russia was weak and ineffective, but it was Serbia's only major ally. The United States prevailed on the Russians to initiate diplomatic contacts and persuade the Serbs that their position was isolated and hopeless. The carrot was that the United State agreed that Russian peacekeeping troops would participate in Kosovo. This was crucial for the Serbians, as it seemed to guarantee the interests of Serbia in Kosovo, as well as the rights of Serbs living in Kosovo. The deal brokered by the Russians called for a withdrawal of the Serbian army from Kosovo and entry into Kosovo of a joint NATO-Russian force, with the Russians guaranteeing that Kosovo would remain part of Serbia. This ended the war, but the Russians were never permitted -- let alone encouraged -- to take their role in Serbia. The Russians were excluded from the Kosovo Force (KFOR) decision-making process and were isolated from NATO's main force. When Russian troops took control of the airport in Pristina in Kosovo at the end of the war, they were surrounded by NATO troops. In effect, NATO and the United States reneged on their agreement with Russia. Russian President Boris Yeltsin and the Russian Foreign Ministry caved in the face of this reneging, leaving the Russian military -- which had ordered the Kosovo intervention -- hanging. In 1999, this was a fairly risk-free move by the West. The Russians were in no position to act. The degree to which Yeltsin's humiliation in Kosovo led to the rise of Vladimir Putin is not fully understood. Putin represented a faction in the intelligence-military community that regarded Kosovo as the last straw. There were, of course, other important factors leading to the rise of Putin, but the Russian perception that the United States had double-crossed them in an act of supreme contempt was a significant factor. Putin came to office committed to regaining Russian intellectual influence after Yeltsin's inertia. The current decision by the United States and some European countries to grant independence to Kosovo must be viewed in this context. First, it is the only case in Yugoslavia in which borders are to shift because of the presence of a minority. Second, it continues the policy of re-engineering Yugoslavia. Third, it proceeds without either a U.N. or NATO mandate, as an action supported by independent nations -- including the United States and Germany. Finally, it flies in the face of Russian wishes. This last one is the critical point. The Russians clearly are concerned that this would open the door for the further redrawing of borders, paving the way for Chechen independence movements, for example. But that isn't the real issue. The real issue is that Serbia is an ally of Russia, and the Russians do not want Kosovar independence to happen. From Putin's point of view, he came to power because the West simply wouldn't take Russian wishes seriously. If there were a repeat of that display of indifference, his own authority would be seriously weakened. Putin is rebuilding the Russian sphere of influence in the former Soviet Union. He is meeting with the Belarusians over reintegration. He is warning Ukraine not to flirt with NATO membership. He is reasserting Russian power in the Caucasus and Central Asia. His theme is simple: Russia is near and strong; NATO is far away and weak. He is trying to define Russian power in the region. Though Kosovo is admittedly peripheral to this region, if no European power is willing to openly challenge Russian troops in Kosovo, then Russia will have succeeded in portraying NATO as a weak and unreliable force. If the United States and some European powers can create an independent Kosovo without regard to Russian wishes, Putin's prestige in Russia and the psychological foundations of his grand strategy will suffer a huge blow. If Kosovo is granted independence outside the context of the United Nations, where Russia has veto power, he will be facing the same crisis Yeltsin did. If he repeats Yeltsin's capitulation, he will face substantial consequences. Putin and the Russians repeatedly have warned that they wouldn't accept independence for Kosovo, and that such an act would lead to an uncontrollable crisis. Thus far, the Western powers involved appear to have dismissed this. In our view, they shouldn't. It is not so much what Putin wants as the consequences for Putin if he does not act. He cannot afford to acquiesce. He will create a crisis. Putin has two levers. One is economic. The natural gas flowing to Europe, particularly to Germany, is critical for the Europeans. Putin has a large war chest saved from high energy prices. He can live without exports longer than the Germans can live without imports. It is assumed that he wouldn't carry out this cutoff. This assumption does not take into account how important the Kosovo issue is to the Russians. The second option is what we might call the "light military" option. Assume that Putin would send a battalion or two of troops by air to Belgrade, load them onto trucks and send them toward Pristina, claiming this as Russia's right under agreements made in 1999. Assume a squadron of Russian aircraft would be sent to Belgrade as well. A Russian naval squadron, including the aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov, already is headed to the Mediterranean. Obviously, this is not a force that could impose anything on NATO. But would the Germans, for example, be prepared to open fire on these troops? If that happened, there are other areas of interest to Russia and the West where Russia could exert decisive military power, such as the Baltic states. If Russian troops were to enter the Baltics, would NATO rush reinforcements there to fight them? The Russian light military threat in Kosovo is that any action there could lead to a Russian reaction elsewhere. The re-engineering of the Balkans always has assumed that there is no broader geopolitical price involved. Granting Kosovo independence would put Russia in a position in which interests that it regards as fundamental are challenged. Even if the West doesn't see why this should be the case, the Russians have made clear that it is so -- and have made statements essentially locking themselves into a response or forcing themselves to accept humiliation. Re-engineering a region where there is no risk is one thing; re-engineering a region where there is substantial risk is another. In our view, the Russians would actually welcome a crisis. Putin wants to demonstrate that Russia is a great power. That would influence thinking throughout the former Soviet Union, sobering eastern Central Europe as well -- and Poland in particular. Confronting the West as an equal and backing it into a corner is exactly what he would like. In our view, Putin will seize the Kosovo issue not because it is of value in and of itself but because it gives him a platform to move his strategic policy forward. The Germans have neither the resources nor the appetite for such a crisis. The Americans, bogged down in the Islamic world, are hardly in a position to deal with a crisis over Kosovo. The Russian view is that the West has not reviewed its policies in the Balkans since 1999 and has not grasped that the geopolitics of the situation have changed. Nor, in our view, has Washington or Berlin grasped that a confrontation is exactly what the Russians are looking for. We expect the West to postpone independence again, and to keep postponing it. But the Albanians might force the issue by declaring unilateral independence. The Russians would actually be delighted to see this. But here is the basic fact: For the United States and its allies, Kosovo is a side issue of no great importance. For the Russians, it is both a hot-button issue and a strategic opportunity. The Russians won't roll over this time. And the asymmetry of perceptions is what crises are made of.

Discussed this with Tony: Battle damage to your ship's damage point (DP) value is not repairable, but most critical hits can be repaired over time. Repairs are attempted once per hour, and a repair only begins if the 'die roll' produces a favourable result. (This is the same for normal maintenance failures). Some systems appear to require 12 or 24 hours to complete repairs.

There should be three files as follows: Hole2_5.blq ... this is the Blue Orders file Hole2_5.rdq ... this is the Red Orders file (though this scen is for Blue only) Hole2_5.scq ... this is the actual scenario file You can unzip these directly into your HCE main directory or you can create a new sub directory for scenarios. (I use the latter for ease of organisation). When you open the Westpac Battleset and select User Scenarios, it should automatically call up filenames with the *.scq extension.

Finally, some information about the other ships in the Russian deployment: Interfax "A naval attack group led by the Admiral Kuznetsov aircraft carrier has performed a number of duties during a tactical exercise, Russian Navy spokesman Cap. 1st Rank Igor Dygalo said. "A naval attack group including the Admiral Kuznetsov aircraft carrier, the Admiral Levchenko and Admiral Chabanenko anti-submarine ships, and the Sergei Osipov and Nikolai Chiker support ships successfully performed its duties on rebuffing air strikes and ensuring anti-submarine defense during a marine cruise as part of a tactical exercise," Dygalo told Interfax on Saturday. "Ka-27 helicopters took off from the aircraft carrier" during the exercise, Dygalo said. "The cruise of the Northern Fleet naval attack group has drawn special attention from the intelligence services and naval forces of the NATO states," he said. "At 1:40 p.m. Moscow time on December 7, an Orion patrol aircraft of the Norwegian Air Force flew over the naval attack group. A Nordkapp- class frigate of the Norwegian coastguard forces has been escorting the attack group and monitoring its maneuvers over the past two days," Dygalo said. "The Norwegian ship started escorting and monitoring the Russian warships at about 8:00 p.m. on December 6, and it is currently moving parallel to it 40-50 cable lengths away," he said. The Russian ships are continuing their planned journey toward the Northeastern Atlantic and the Mediterranean. Two support ships, the Lena and the Kola, left the Baltiisk port, the main base of the Russian Baltic Fleet, on December 7 and will soon join the Northern Fleet attack group." [Emphasis mine] *** (Sergei Osipov is a Boris Chilikin class oiler, while Nikolai Chiker is a salvage tug (might need him, hehe). Lena is a Uda class oiler, and Kola is an Altay class oiler. (These are old ships). I've also seen mention of: The Slava class Moskva missile cruiser (as mentioned earlier), the Boris Chilikin class oiler Ivan Bubnov, the Olekhma class oiler Iman, and another, unnamed salvage tug.

For all you fans of Silent Hunter III, the GWX 2.0 upgrade to the excellent GWX mod is now available: GWX 2.0 download link

From Air Force Times New tanker named but still not selected By Bruce Rolfsen - Staff writer Posted : Monday Dec 17, 2007 7:14:43 EST The Air Force doesn’t know who is going to build the KC-X tanker, but the service has decided what to call the jet. Drum roll, please. The KC-X is designated KC-45A. While the service didn’t make a formal announcement about the KC-45A naming, the designation has started to appear in briefings given by Air Force officials and a service spokesman confirmed the name. Technically, KC-45A is the tanker’s mission design series name. The “KC” designates the jet as a tanker. Why “45A” was chosen isn’t clear, other than it doesn’t seem to conflict with any other cargo or tanker aircraft. The name also avoids appearing to side with either of the jets vying for the production contract. Boeing Co. calls its proposed Air Force tanker the KC-767 while Northrop Grumman calls its candidate the KC-30. The nickname for the jet is still to be decided.

From Aviation Week Israel Wants JSF As Soon As Possible Dec 16, 2007 David A. Fulghum, Robert Wall and Douglas Barrie Israel plans to keep its aerial domination of the Middle East intact, and that includes buying Lockheed Martin’s F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, accelerating its first deliveries, and deciding whose advanced equipment will be packed into the stealthy strike aircraft. A senior Israeli air force (IAF) official says those major areas of concern appear to be on the right track because of an “understanding” with the U.S. officials. Washington’s representatives are more ambiguous, saying that there has been no official change to Israel’s F-35 program. “The plan is that we will get the F-35 as soon as it’s possible,” the senior IAF official says. He says the service will end up with more than 100 F-35s, but he would not confirm the size of the purchase or that Israel is asking that the initial delivery date be accelerated by two years to 2012. The IAF wants the JSF “the minute it is available.” “Israel has a unique requirement, it doesn’t operate in a coalition, [and it has a] different kind of strategic relationship” with the U.S. than the other F-35 partners,” says Tom Burbage, Lockheed Martin’s vice president and general manager for the F-35. However, he says the overseas release of the first export aircraft will be no sooner than 2014. The purchase, which could include an initial batch of 25 aircraft, is still being negotiated. Brig. Gen. Johanan Locker, head of the IAF’s air division, was in Fort Worth as recently as late November. Israel’s ambitions to integrate indigenous weaponry also pose some problems for the program. The weapons road map for the Blocks 1-3 F-35 standards has already been drawn up with no Israeli weaponry on the list. Partner nations are currently working on a list for Block 4, but there’s pressure to cut weapons from the process rather than add them. Israel undoubtedly will want its F‑35s to carry the Rafael Python 5 air-to-air missile and possibly its successor, as well as the Rafael Spice family of precision-guided weapons. Moreover, an influential retired IAF general says total sales will be limited by the JSF’s disadvantages. He points to its overdependence on stealth, a single crewman and what could be proprietary U.S. avionics. “Eventually somebody will come up with a way to detect it,” he says. “A stealthy configuration also means you can’t carry additional weaponry on the exterior. The weapons system is more important than stealth. Israel will have F-35s, but not as many as we once thought.” Smaller numbers won’t detract from the aircraft’s deterrence value, he concedes. Even a small fleet will ensure a first-day-of-war, surprise-strike capability. But once daily combat operations escalate, nonstealthy aircraft aided by standoff weapons, escort jammers and information operations will sustain air operations. Nonetheless, he worries that the JSF will start showing its limitations within five years. Among the drawbacks will be its one-person crew. As a result, “we can’t operate the F-35 by itself,” the retired general says. “We really need two-seaters, with one person concentrating on flying and someone else focused on the strike mission. One man can’t take advantage of all the options,” particularly since JSF capabilities will include jamming, information warfare and network attack. Inevitably, the avionics will present an area of contention. For example, Israeli aerospace officials say they can offer a tailored, active, electronically scanned array radar for less money than an AESA bought from the U.S. However, many of the electronic warfare and attack techniques are routed through the radar to produce jamming, false-target and other effects at ranges of 125 mi. or more. As a result, integration could be difficult and expensive. Elta, the electronics division of Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI), has a version of the AESA, according to the retired general. “We need our own radar that we don’t share with others. We also need our own advanced radar warning and active jamming.” The Israeli AESA was flown last year; but for now it remains a generic system, not tailored to any specific aircraft—although it’s sized for an F-16, an Elta official says. Flight trials are continuing. Meanwhile, current IAF leadership appears less concerned about the international trade issue. “The number of aircraft [we obtain initially] could be irrelevant,” a senior general says. “The main issue now is that we get the first squadron as soon as possible. We give the basic capability to the squadron, and later on we increase it [with technology upgrades].” The idea is to get just enough aircraft to develop a concept of operations and to lay out a technology development road map to tailor the JSF’s systems—particularly EW and attack capabilities—to Israeli-specific needs. “At the beginning, we expect to get at least one squadron, with more to follow by the end of the decade [in 2020],” he says. “This is the first time there is not only an understanding [with the U.S.], but also a plan.” Another major issue is what comes with the aircraft and what is Israel allowed to develop on its own. Industry officials are struggling with the problem since the F-35 has a highly integrated sensor suite that makes it harder to replace one black box with another. A senior Lockheed Martin official says Israel will not be allowed to simply replace parts of the electronic suite. However, an IAI executive sees a workaround. The company expects to build JSF structural elements. Once the structure is well understood, there could be opportunities for embedding unique sensors, he says. The information from these sensors could be shown in the cockpit through bolt-on displays if integration proves too difficult. However, the air force is more concerned about threats than industrial hurdles. “We did not decide on the exact systems and processes by which we intend to [proceed],” the senior IAF officer says. “But I think there’s an understanding that Israel will get the best [u.S.] aircraft, and we’ll be able to put the best Israeli systems inside [to meet] the IAF’s unique needs. We need to adapt them to the systems and the platform. That’s what we’ve done with the F-15I and the F-16I, and I believe we will be able to do that with the JSF. It’s very important that we get this capability on our own. “That includes systems related to network offense and defense,” he says. “Some are the same as the Americans’, but we insist on some unique [capabilities] in every area. [israel has] to have a relevant operational capability. You can’t wait to get [an upgrade to meet a new threat] a year late. You need to get intelligence, capability [and] precision on your own in a very short time.” Syria, for example, is reputed to have the largest air defense capability in the region, and they are upgrading it with new investments. “We are working to understand what our enemies are trying to do so we can tailor our power to deal with it,” he says. “The main reason why we have to modify the F-35 [is to counter] the relevant systems at the relevant time. We must be able to deal with them. . . . We’re also developing new systems and weapons that we can’t talk about. Sometimes reality is more impressive than the imagination.” Israel also must wrestle with its weapons inventory, which often differs from that of the U.S. or other JSF buyers. Rafael officials say they are already working on alternative designs for the Spice precision air-to-surface bomb that can be integrated into the F-35. Foldout wings for the existing 2,000-lb. Spice will not fit in the JSF’s internal bay. Adapting it could reduce the bomb’s standoff range, but officials think that may be moot, since stealth will enable the JSF to fly closer to its targets. Tied closely to the F-35 procurement is a decision to upgrade the F-15s and F-16s, particularly with new AESA radars that offer more range, small-target detection and broadband communications. However, the advanced radars are expensive. “Do we intend to let the F-15s fly more years than we had planned?” the IAF official says. “It’s on the table. I intend to do the same with the F-16s. We have the second largest fleet in the world. With the right investment in avionics upgrades, they can be relevant for years.” “The JSF will not replace all our needs,” agrees a senior defense ministry official. According to IAF plans, not every aircraft will have the full package of upgrades. Instead, more advanced aircraft will feed target information to the others. However, U.S. radar developers point out that AESAs won’t be able to pass the same amount of information to non-AESA aircraft as they can to one that’s similarly equipped. “For the future, the idea is to work as a group,” the IAF official says. “That allows you to do [advanced operations] without investing in each aircraft. If we have some of the best of the best technology, we can spread it to the other platforms, weapons and systems. You upgrade the group via the network.” Here too, the former general expressed caution. “You have to attack information more than targets,” he says. “You need air superiority and information dominance. If you’re not building network-centric operations the right way, the capability can be eliminated [by the foe’s own network attack].”

Well, some critical elements of gun engagements will change, Rene, but not the 'center to center' formation engagement issue. When trying to determine valid targets, the code looks first to see if the centers of the firing and target groups are in range, and if they are not, no examination of units in range is attempted. This obviously makes some close range gunnery encounters act entirely contrary to what you would expect in a real battle. Umm, no. There is no capability for 'replenishment at sea' right now.

Its in the Downloads section under Databases, here. As others have pointed out on occasion, HC is not terribly well suited to WWII era warfare (unfortunately), principally because of limitations in the way gun engagements are modeled.

In the interim, I'll remove the 'surface ship capable' flag from the weapon. (There aren't many situations in which an Il-38 May would attempt to sink a surface ship with an air dropped torpedo, of course, but I don't like to second guess people's choice of tactics ).

From Defence Talk Russia walks away from CFE arms treaty Agence France-Presse | Dec 13, 2007 MOSCOW: Russia on Wednesday walked out of a key Cold War treaty setting limits on troops and weapons across Europe, but promised there were no immediate plans for a major military build-up. Russia's participation in the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty was suspended from midnight in Moscow (2100 GMT Tuesday), the Russian Foreign Ministry said in a statement. "Such a step has been caused by the exceptional circumstances connected to the content of the treaty which concern the security of Russia and demand that we take immediate measures," the ministry statement said. Signed in 1990 and modified in 1999, the CFE places precise limits on the stationing of troops and heavy weapons from the Atlantic coast to Russia's Ural mountains -- a mammoth agreement that helped resolve the Cold War standoff. President Vladimir Putin, who has made a priority of restoring Russian military might, signed a decree ordering Moscow's suspension of the treaty last month. Suspension means troops can now be moved around the country without notifying NATO. The foreign ministry said that Russia was no longer "constrained by the limitations placed on arms deployments on its flanks." However, the ministry added a reassuring note, saying: "We have no current plans to accumulate massive armaments on our neighbours' borders." In theory, Russia can return to the treaty at any time, but analysts say that is unlikely, given mounting East-West tensions. The demise of the CFE comes on top of Moscow's threat to leave the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces treaty, as well as tensions around US plans to install a missile-defence shield in NATO members Poland and the Czech Republic. At the heart of Russia's complaints on the CFE is NATO's failure to ratify the amended 1999 version of the treaty, taking into account the huge changes wrought by the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union. NATO countries say they cannot ratify the 1999 version because Russian troop presence in ex-Soviet Georgia and Moldova violates the treaty, a charge Moscow rejects. In addition, Moscow has been pushing for changes to CFE limits on moving troops to the European, western flank of the vast country. "Imagine that President (George W.) Bush cannot move his forces from California to the New York region," Antonov said. "It's ridiculous." Russia also wants Baltic countries such as Estonia, once part of the Soviet Union and thus of the Warsaw Pact, to join the CFE. Observers said the long list of problems made the CFE unlikely to get back on track. "The treaty is dead," military analyst Pavel Felgenhauer said. Last week Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Grushko gave a mixed message about possible changes in troop levels. "Russia has no plans to raise its military presence in Europe, obviously, that is, if there is not an attempt to raise the military presence by NATO countries," he said. According to Felgenhauer "it is practically inevitable that Russia will begin moving weapons west, primarily to borders of Baltic states." [Emphasis mine] "It makes a lot of economic sense to move forces from Siberia to Leningrad district, because it's two or three times more expensive to keep them in Siberia. It will also send a powerful signal to the West. It's a win-win situation for Russia."

From Air Force Times NORAD not moving — for now By Erik Holmes - Staff writer Posted : Wednesday Dec 12, 2007 12:41:59 EST Congress has put the brakes on a plan to relocate North American Aerospace Defense Command and U.S. Northern Command from the secretive Cheyenne Mountain Air Station, Colo., to Peterson Air Force Base, Colo. The 2008 defense authorization bill approved Dec. 6 by the House and Senate armed services committees orders that the move not go ahead until the Office of the Secretary of Defense submits to Congress a cost-benefit analysis and final plans for the relocation. OSD must also include in its report a security and vulnerability assessment of the command’s proposed new home at Peterson. The bill withholds $5 million from the Air Force’s 2008 budget that the service intended to put toward partially shutting down Cheyenne Mountain. Plans call for putting the facility in what it calls a “warm standby” status. The report must be submitted by March 1, the bill said, and the Air Force will get its $5 million once OSD submits the report. NORAD is charged with defending U.S. airspace, and for decades, it has used Cheyenne Mountain as a secure, blast-proof location from which to watch the skies for missiles, aircraft and other threats. But Adm. Timothy Keating, then commander of NORAD and Northern Command, told the Denver Post last year that the need to maintain a 24-hour-a-day nuclear-proof facility has diminished because a nuclear strike by China or Russia appears unlikely. Air Force Space Command decided last year to relocate its Joint Space Operations Center-Mountain from Cheyenne Mountain to Vandenberg Air Force Base, Calif., and NORAD announced in July 2006 that it would move most of its personnel from the facility. The moves would leave the hardened Cold War-era complex nearly deserted. As recently as last year, it hosted more than 1,000 military and civilian employees. Cheyenne Mountain was conceived in 1961, at the height of the nuclear threat. But it took so long to excavate 700,000 tons of granite and create a base deep in the mountain that the facility didn't become operational until 1966. The complex is protected by 2,000 feet of granite above and 25-ton blast doors. The facility secured a place in the popular imagination by serving as the basis for movies such as 1983’s “War Games,” in which a rogue computer nearly starts World War III.

With a sad connection to Newfoundland ... From Army Times Campbell to honor plane crash deaths today By Gina Cavallaro - Staff writer Posted : Wednesday Dec 12, 2007 5:47:00 EST One of the saddest days in the history of the 101st Airborne Division will be commemorated Wednesday with a ceremony at Fort Campbell, Ky. The 8:30 a.m. ceremony at Gander Memorial Mark on post will recall the Dec. 12, 1985, plane crash in which 248 soldiers and crew members were killed. Before the ceremony, a wreath will be placed at each of the trees planted in memory of the fallen soldiers, and another wreath will be placed at the memorial site, followed by a scripture reading and the playing of “Taps” by an Army bugler. Lt. Col. Thomas Kunk, rear detachment for the 101st Airborne Division, will lead the memorial event. The Screaming Eagles were traveling in a chartered Arrow Air Douglas DC-8 jet, which crashed on takeoff at Gander, Newfoundland. The soldiers were on their way home for Christmas after a six-month Sinai peacekeeping mission. The tragedy was the single largest loss of life in a single day for the 101st and Fort Campbell. Three years after the crash, Canada’s Air Safety Board released an official report that concluded the disaster was caused by icing on the wings.

From Flight International DATE: 11/12/07 SOURCE: Flightglobal.com Production of first Boeing P-8A begins at Spirit By Graham Warwick Spirit AeroSystems has begun production of the fuselage for the first Boeing P-8A Poseidon maritime-patrol aircraft, a derivative of the Next Generation 737 under development to replace the US Navy’s Lockheed P-3 Orion. Loading of the assembly jig began at Spirit’s Wichita, Kansas plant on 11 December, and the first fuselage is scheduled to be dispatched by rail car 100 days later to Boeing’s 737 final-assembly line in Renton, Washington on 19 March 2008. The first P-8 is one of five – three flight-test aircraft and two ground-test airframes – to be built under the system development and demonstration (SDD) programme. Fuselages for P-8s and commercial 737s will be produced on the same line at Spirit. “We are on track and entering the build of the first of five aircraft with highly certain dates because we are integrated with the 737 production line,” says Bob Feldmann, Boeing vice-president and P-8A programme manager. Changes to the 737 line required for the P-8 include procedures to comply with the security restrictions of US International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) and additional side stations to assemble and install the fuselage weapons bay. P-8s will be completed on a third, ITAR-compliant, 737 final-assembly line in Renton. The first aircraft is to roll off the line in August 2008 and, after extensive loads testing, is scheduled to fly in September 2009. After installation of the mission system at Boeing Field in Seattle, the first P-8 – aircraft T-1 – will enter flight testing in September 2009, says US Navy integrated programme team lead Capt Mike Moran. Boeing, meanwhile, is nearing completion of the third of five software builds for the P-8. “Software is tracking right to plan,” says Feldmann. “In 2008 we will finish testing of Build 3 and begin working on Build 4.” Build 4 is the baseline software for the first mission-system test aircraft, T-2, which is scheduled to fly early in 2010. The final software block under SDD, Block 5, will incorporate any fixes and additional capabilities from flight testing. The US Navy plans to buy 108 P-8As, with initial operational capability scheduled for 2013.

Also, there are quite a few 'DONOTUSE' entries in the Installations Annex of the HCE release database. You can use those first to create new installations if you want to postpone deleting other entries.

From Jane's USN announces SIGINT aircraft replacement programme By Martin Streetly 11 December 2007 As part of its post-Aerial Common Sensor intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance and targeting (ISRT) recapitalisation effort, the US Navy (USN) published a broad agency announcement (BAA) in November 2007, regarding an Electronics Patrol Experiment (EPX) programme intended to find a replacement for the service's existing EP-3E signals intelligence (SIGINT) aircraft after Fiscal Year 2017 (FY17). The BAA document states that the programme is intended to "recapitalise the EP-3 aircraft to provide tactical, theatre and national level ISRT support to carrier strike groups and to theatre, combatant and national commanders". As such, the EPX architecture is to be "a flexible, responsive, manned, multimission, multi-intelligence [M-INT], ISRT aircraft capable of carrying expendables". Onboard intelligence and sensor capabilities are to include "SIGINT, imagery intelligence [iMINT] and radar intelligence [RADINT]", with the IMINT capability being built around electro-optic (EO) and infrared (IR) sensors and the RADINT package including synthetic aperture radar (SAR), inverse SAR and maritime moving target indicator operating modes. The ability to perform onboard or offboard processing and M-INT data fusion (or a combination of the two) will enable the EPX to "operate successfully in either communications-permissive or communications-constrained environments". Other requirements include the ability to self-deploy worldwide.

From Dale Hillier (aka VCDH) at AGSI:

From Navy Times Pearl Harbor recalled, 66 years later By Audrey McAvoy - The Associated Press Posted : Friday Dec 7, 2007 11:43:41 EST HONOLULU — Everett Hyland was ferrying ammunition to an anti-aircraft gun aboard the battleship Pennsylvania on Dec. 7, 1941, when a bomb hit, throwing him down. “I never heard anything. The only thing I knew, I was flat on my face and my arms were extended in front of me and they were all purple and bleeding,” Hyland said. “I ended up pretty well banged up.” On Friday, Hyland was to join some 50 survivors and hundreds more family members and officials at a Pearl Harbor pier overlooking the USS Arizona Memorial to honor the attack’s victims. The Pennsylvania was among the last ships hit by Japanese bombs 66 years ago as it was dry-docked and not sitting in Battleship Row. The vessel escaped with moderate damage and set sail again after being repaired. Even so, 15 men aboard were killed and 38 men were wounded. Fourteen were judged missing in action. The casualties added to the overall Pearl Harbor attack toll of 2,388 dead and 1,178 wounded. The shocking assault thrust the U.S. into World War II. Hyland spent nine months in the hospital recovering from the blast. Shrapnel tore through his left leg and he lost part of his left elbow and biceps. He suffered flash burns that seared skin off his arms and legs. “I got a quick facial out of it,” joked Hyland, 84. His brother, after visiting the burn unit where Hyland was staying, “said we looked like roast turkeys lined up.” This year, survivors and their family members are dedicating a new memorial for the battleship Oklahoma, which lost 429 sailors and Marines — the second-greatest loss of life among any of the battleships in Pearl Harbor. About 18 of the estimated 90 living survivors who were aboard the Oklahoma were expected to join Oklahoma Gov. Brad Henry and other dignitaries for the dedication of the $1.2 million memorial. The monument includes 429 white marble standards, each with the name of a fallen sailor or Marine, surrounded by black granite panels etched with a silhouette of the battleship and notable quotes from World War II-era figures that were selected by some of the survivors, said retired Navy Rear Adm. Greg Slavonic, co-chair of the USS Oklahoma Memorial Committee. The Oklahoma was hit with the first torpedo of the morning assault. It capsized after being struck by eight more, trapping 400 men in its overturned hull. About 30 of the trapped men were later rescued by Pearl Harbor Navy Yard workers who hammered their way through the ship’s metal. Retired Navy Cmdr. Tucker McHugh, who co-chaired the USS Oklahoma Memorial Committee, said he thinks the memorial will bring some sense of closure to those who survived and even to those who perished. “I think there’s been a void in the minds and hearts of these shipmates that their shipmates were never honored with a lasting memorial,” McHugh said. “Total closure might come when the last survivor passes away and they’re all reunited together. “Even though 429 soldiers and Marines died, I believe they’re still with us. I think they’re looking down and saying, ‘Thank you.’” Sen. Daniel Inouye, D-Hawaii, who witnessed the Pearl Harbor attack as a 17-year-old high school senior and who later received the Medal of Honor for fighting in Europe, said he hoped the ceremony would prompt people to think of those serving today. “There are over 1.4 million in many countries, not just Iraq and Afghanistan, serving us, ready to stand in harm’s way for us,” Inouye told The Associated Press this week. “And there are an equal number of families, children and wives and husbands spending time at home thinking about them.” Inouye has regularly participated in annual Pearl Harbor remembrance ceremonies since he became a U.S. senator in the 1960s. But he’s missing this year’s event because of Senate business. Organizers expected about 2,500 people to attend Friday’s ceremony. But it was likely to be smaller than the 65th anniversary, which drew some 500 survivors and their families.

Thats a great idea, Terry. And it looks like its coming together nicely. Maybe in addition to it being a separate document, you can incorporate it into an 'Advanced Tactics' thread here at HarpGamer.

5, 4, 3, 2 ... Looks like maybe the missile range at CFB Gagetown in New Brunswick.

Could be, Dale. Trying to track their current state of repair in any reliable fashion is a task, as you know. I had understood that Moskva had undergone refit and was now flagship of the Black Sea Fleet. Maybe the flagship is out of service again.

Revised version of this scenario attached. I tried it and was able to achieve minimum victory before being snagged by a Bear F. Henhouse_v1.zip

I'll give you 'girly man' ... AIM-120 karate chop !

Well, the Admiral Kuznetsov is a given for the carrier. As for the guided missile cruiser, it would be nice to see the Petr Velikiy or Admiral Nakhimov sailing with her. Though it could be a Slava, perhaps Marshal Ustinov, or Moskva from the Black Sea Fleet. The 'anti-submarine ships' are probably going to be Udaloy class destroyers (maybe the Chabanenko and Levchenko ?) or Krivak class frigates, though it could just as possibly include the frigate Neustrashimy from the Baltic. It sounds like they're drawing on the Northern, Baltic and Black Sea fleets to put this group together. These are all wild a** guesses, of course.

From Flight International DATE: 05/12/07 SOURCE: Flightglobal.com USAF F-15s remain grounded as more cracks found By Graham Warwick US Air Force Boeing F-15A-Ds are to remain grounded, even after structural inspections are completed, until investigation of the November crash is complete and a solution to fuselage longeron cracking is developed. The F-15s had been returning to flight after undergoing inspections, called time compliance technical orders (TCTO), but on 3 December the head of USAF Air Combat Command, Gen John Corley, ordered the aircraft to remain grounded. ACC says the decision followed a briefing on the investigation into the 2 November crash of a Missouri Air National Guard F-15C following structural failure, in which investigators reported they had found additional longeron cracking in the mishap aircraft. Since ordering inspection of all F-15A-Ds, the USAF has found longeron cracks in two aircraft operated by the Oregon Air National Guard. Both were built in the early 1980s, and are about the same age as the Missouri mishap aircraft, says ACC. Additional TCTOs were ordered on 29 November and so far more than 195 of the USAF’s 445 F-15A-Ds have undergone these inspections, says the command. “The TCTOs are still out there, and aircraft will still undergo inspection, but even if they pass they will not fly,” says ACC. The command does not know whether the solution to the cracking problem will be “a repair, more TCTOs or what, and we are not putting a date to it.” Grounding of the F-15s continues to be used by US Air Force leadership to underline its need for additional funding to continue procurement of the Lockheed Martin F-22A beyond the planned 183 aircraft.