pmaidhof

This was done solo on the floor (I know the title is using the CIC Plotter, but there is more coming), with three minitures (only one matching an actual participant, an O.H. Perry FFG) and the rest being carboard chits. This run through began much in line with history as Joshan (Combattante II) responded to being warned away from the Sirri GOPLAT by firing harpoons, in this case 4, at the US SAG. Simpson (FFG-56) immediately detected three of the four inbound missiles and things went downhill from there. At medium range, Simpson fired two SM1MR - both missed. At short range, two SM1MR's accounted for one of the harpoons. At very short range Simpsons 76mm/62 fired but missed, the CIWS fired but missed as well. Chaff seduced one of the harpoons away, but rolled to lock onto Wainwright (CG-28) trailing behind Simpson. Wainwright launched two SM2ER's and downed the leaker. Meanwhile Simpson took two harpoons, who in turn rolled two crippled results - sinking the frigate. While this was happening an SH-60B detected Iranian surface ships headed toward the Sirri GOPLAT. Air,in the form of 2x A-6E's with LBG's, was called for while Bagley (FF-1069) launched two two Harpoons that annhiliated Joshan. The A-6E's struck the helo-detected Sahalan with two of three 500kg LBG's, quickly sinking her. While the US met its objective of neutralizing the GOPLAT with 20min of NGF, the scenario had been lost to the Iranians by simply hitting a US ship, let alone sinking one.

The following link from Time Magazine in May 1988 gives a look at events before the benefit of looking back 18 years later. Brad, for our Combat Plotter scenario see the first page or two regarding the mission specifics. Find it http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/...,967308,00.html

OK, here is a recap of the first small scenario that I ran through using the rule set named “Shipwreck”. For a description of these rules, see the strangecargogames website. The distances given are all the outermost limit of each respective “range band” The situation has a radiating, pre-VLS, Ticonderoga Class CG being passively detected by a Tu-95 Bear at a range of approximately 150nm (very long range band). At this range, the Tico cannot detect the Bear. The Bear reports the detection and a request for air support is made (rolled for). Two AS-20 Kayak equipped Tu-22M Backfires are tasked to attack the CG. When the Backfires are approximately 85nm out (long range band), they are flying at Low Altitude and begin radiating to get a lock on the target. While the Backfires successfully detect the cruiser, two blips also appear on the radar scope within the CG’s CIC. Combat Turns are declared and the Backfires unleash their barrage of twelve AS-20 Kayak anti-ship missiles. The CG detects 11 of the vampires, but cannot intercept at this range with their SM2MR SAMs. While the Backfires break off to return to base, the missiles move to about 25nm (medium range band). The CG detects the twelfth vampire, and launches one SM2MR from both the forward and aft launchers – downing two of the vampires. The ten vampires are now approximately 12nm (short range band) from the CG. Two more SM2MR’s are launched and down to more vampires. The CG fires off a chaff cloud and causes one vampire to crash into the sea while seducing a second missile off target. Six vampires now drop to a sea skimming altitude, and are now in the Very Short Range Band 0-4nm. The forward Mk45 5” gun fires and misses. The aft Mk45 5” gun fires and destroys one vampire. The Mk15 Phalanx fires and misses its mark. Since the missile launchers fired in the previous range band, there is not enough time for them to fire again. The CG attempts one final defensive maneuver by firing off one last chaff cloud, again causing one to crash into the sea, and seducing another off target. In the end, three AS-20’s reach the CG. The AS-20 is rated a “heavy missile”. The CG displaces 9,470 tons. These attributes are cross referenced on the “ship damage chart” and rolls are made for each missile strike. Extremely favorable D10 rolls of 8,9,9 are made and three “light” damage results ensue. The third “light” is bumped up to “heavy” damage. Specific damage rolls result in both SM2MR launchers and the P/S Quad Harpoon Launchers are permanently damaged. General damage is that the ship glides to a sizzling, smoking halt. All of its sensors are non-operational, but may possibly be repaired. It cannot attack targets beyond short range. And finally, aircraft cannot be launched or recovered. On the subsequent maneuver turn, a D10 result of 3 in the damage repair phase provided weapons and sensor reactivation, and the ability to gain ½ speed. The CG limps away toward safer waters. All in all, this was an enjoyable, straight forward exercise taking between 1-1.5 hours, from start to finish.

They can be found at www.strangecargogames.com. I picked them up the other day, read through them. They have a fairly responsive yahoo group. it is a D10 based rules set. Like I mentioned it is highly abstracted, but seems to be quite fun when you want to set up and play a scenario in a relative short period of time. I'll let you know how it plays once I get a chance to give them a run through.

Has anyone here tried the mini rules Shipwreck. They are a "highly" abstracted set of modern naval rules.

They forgot to mention precision guided weapons! Hmm, what interesting webs we weave

It seems to me that B-2 long range strike mission would really be recognized in longer, wider in scope scenarios, or even dare I say CPX/MBX's where [insert your preferred version of harpoon here] is but a tool in the overall effort. Ah...one day.

I am not familiar enough with the names listed above or being considered outside of this thread, beyond Jan. Unfortuanately for Jan, I am not familiar enough with his work to vote with a clear conscience. Therefore, my vote is for sale...step right up.

Here is the link to an interesting article that I read. It may not be new news to some of you, but I did. Find it here: http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/15757360/ Air Force details secret MiG program U.S. pilots were given chance to practice dogfighting against Soviet jets The Associated Press Updated: 6:43 a.m. ET Nov 17, 2006 DAYTON, Ohio - A once-secret program that enabled thousands of U.S. military pilots to practice dogfighting against Soviet-designed MiG fighter jets was detailed Thursday by the Air Force as part of the first public acknowledgment of the program's existence. The classified air combat training program ran from 1977 to 1988 at the Tonopah Test Range in remote desert scrubland near Las Vegas and Nellis Air Force Base. "I guess the mouse is out of the pocket," said Gail Peck, who helped start the program and was its first commander. "After 20-some odd years, you have a little bit of a tingling feeling talking about things that were so closely held for so long." Officials decided to declassify the program after determining that releasing the information would not harm anyone, and the Air Force announced the move Monday. A news conference was held Thursday at the National Museum of the United States Air Force, which has a MiG fighter on display. MiGs are among the Soviet Union's most famous high-speed jet fighters, known for their speed and agility. Several other countries have produced their own versions. John Manclark, the Air Force's director of test and evaluation, said as many as 25 MiGs were used in the U.S. training program — MiG-17s, MiG-21s and MiG-23s. The MiGs were flown by Air Force, Navy and Marine pilots. Manclark would not say where or how the military obtained the MiGs. However, he did say accidents involving the MiGs claimed the lives of two pilots. He said there were about 100 accidents for every 100,000 flight hours, far higher than the average of four accidents per 100,000 hours for Air Force fighter jets. Trainees would first observe the MiGs in operation and then practice dogfighting with them to hone their skills against MiGs they might encounter in combat situations. Peck said young pilots were especially impressed when they went up against MiGs for the first time. "They would pull up beside you in formation, and you could almost see their eyeballs popping out of their heads," he said. "It was that exciting for them." About 6,800 pilots went through the program, which was code-named Constant Peg after a general's call sign and a commander's wife. "If you talk to any general officer in the Air Force that is still on active duty and he flew fighters, he flew against the MiGs," Manclark said. "It was that big of a program." The scale of the program created challenges in keeping it secret. The MiGs were kept in their hangars or put in the air to avoid detection when Soviet satellites were overhead. When U.S. military pilots in other operations made emergency landings at the airfield, they would have to sign secrecy oaths about what they had seen. And the crews that maintained the MiGs dressed in civilian clothing to avoid drawing attention. An end to the Cold War, coupled with the expense of the program, contributed to its end in 1988, Manclark said.

[Dripping with sarcasm] but I thought they don't have or desire a carrier.

Interesting fodder for possible land/air warfare scenario. There must be some legacy border disputes from the soviet era worthy of at least some F-16 vs S-300/ SA-10 skirmishes?

Happy 231st Birthday Marines. And to all veterans, thank you.

1st Mission of a 3 Day Skirmish Campaign in Iraq, 1991. Target: Communications Center in Northern Iraq. It appears to be lightly defended – intel has only uncovered a solitary 37mm AA Gun and SA-7. We can expect a minimal air threat. The distance involved cuts our weight capacity in half. It is a four aircraft strike, led by the veteran Snake (2x AIM-9, 1x Mk84), average Fox (2x AIM-9, 1x Mk84) and Lightning (2x AIM-9, 1x AGM-65), and green Big Red (2x AIM-9, 1x AGM-65). No Special Option used in this raid. Saving for bigger things to come. Snake and Big Red approach from the south, while Fox and Lightning approach from the west. Bad weather over the target area creates ground clutter which will negatively (-2) affect AtG attacks launched from High Altitude. All aircraft enter at low altitude. “Site Adjustment Event Card” determines that the target approaches are much more heavily defended than anticipated. One defensive counter is placed in each approach area. Fox and Lightning will now overfly a ZSU-23-4. Snake and Big Red have to contend with an SA-13. Snake drops a Mk84 on the SA-13, but misses. Sa-13 random fires on Snake who evades, resulting in a +1 Stress (missile), and +1 Stress (evasion). ZSU-23-4 attacks Fox, who evades. Result of no effect (gun) and +1 Stress (evasion). Lightning and Big Red attack the communication center with AGM-65 Mavericks, scoring one hit. Lightning and Fox enter the Target Area on a bombing run. The 37mm anti-aircraft gun attacks Fox, who evades. The AAA gun misses, but +1 stress to Fox. The SA-7 attacks Fox as well. Fox evades again, the missile misses, but Fox gains a +1 Stress (Fox: total +3 Stress). Fox bombs the communications center with a stick of Mk84 GP bombs. Fox rolls lights out and unmodified 10, increase to 11 with his AtG rating of +1. Three hits. The target is destroyed. Lightning and Fox depart the target area to the west, increasing altitude to High. “Home Bound Event Card - Coordination” indicates saving the card until the next AtA mission and adjust the die roll with a +2. All aircraft return to the carrier safely. The mission inflicts a +3 Stress on all pilots. Results: Target Destroyed: +2 Victory Points. Radar and Intel Tracks increased one. Snake: Stress +5, Status OK. Fox: Stress +6, Status Shaken. Lightning: Stress +3, Status OK. Big Red: Stress +3, Status Shaken. Lesson Learned: On such a long flight and with such a low estimated air threat, carry only one AIM-9 per aircraft to increase AtG ordnance load. Could have exchanged am AIM-9 for a rockeye cluster bomb unit. This mission was only successful because of a final roll of a pure 10, securing the final 3 hits needed for a four hit capacity target. Won that one by a knat's rear end. An enjoyable game in that even a neophite such as myself could set up and play this mission to completion in about an hour. This game can be found at dvg.com

Find it here. Early reports of an interesting naval/GOPLAT situation developing in the Persian Gulf. Scenario seed?

We hardly knew ya Nighthawk, and they use to tell us that the last CH-46 pilot had not yet been born. That may also have gone by the wayside with the continued progress of the Osprey, but what about the B-52's?

Third run through October 21, 2006. Refinements so far: Inverted the Perimeter SAM's and Target SAM determination procedures to more accurately represent the believed more point-defense nature of Iranian air defenses. More nodal than crust. Optional Floating "PGM Launch Node". If PGM is employed, compare its range to the "game specific" Target Defense SAM range, if the PGM range is greater, then PGM Launch Node is conducted prior to Target SAM Defense Node. If the SAM can engage before raid enters the PGM Launch envelope, conduct the Target SAM Defense first, then do the same procedure with the Target AAA Defense Node. Implore the use of declared raid altitude upon entering each node. Modifier thresholds increased for GCI Intercept Table. For this raid, the US force continued to be made up of three squadrons of F/A-18E/F's with a detachement of four EA-6B's. A total of 40 aircraft at start. I tweaked the US mission assignment taking into account the lack of Iranian AEW support and the losses taken to GCI fighters in the past two run throughs. I would be supprised again. Squadron 1's 12 aircraft were assigned Fighter Suppression. Squadron 2: 10x aircraft were assigned SAM Suppression, 2x were assigned AEW Suppression. Squadron 3's 12 aircraft were assigned the strike mission. The Detechment consisted of 4x EA-6B providing EW Support. Ftr Sup and AEW Sup A/C were armed with 4x AIM-120 and 2x AIM-9M SAM Sup A/C were armed with 4x AGM-88, 2x AIM-9M Strikers were armed with 4x GBU-31(V)4/B BLU-109's US Readiness rolls took a toll of 2x Fighter Suppression A/C, 1x SAM Suppression A/C, and 1x Striker. Iranian's deployed their squadrons the same as last time; Sector Patrol-7, Ground Alert-6, AEW Escort-1. Their readiness is 85% across the board, so 10x A/C per squadron. Iranian AEW D100 = 04. The AEW is in the air, and in position. AEW Escort is determined to be one of the F-4E squadrons. Aircraft actually on station is Squadronx50%, then determine final AEW Escort Availability. In this case 3x F-4E can make BVR attacks. In the end, the opposing forces exchange A/C, both F/A-18's and all three escorts go down, but the AEW craft survives and detects the raid. The raid enters the Perimeter SAM Node. There is a -2 Modifier SAM Type Table due to the presence of the 4x EA-6B and over 2 groups of 4x SAM Suppression A/C. It is determined the the missile battery type is SA-6b and that there are three batteries in position. Each battery launches 3x 2-missile salvoes. All miss, the suppression A/C did their job well. The raid now enters the Inbound GCI Intercept Node. There is +1 net Modifier (+2 AEW warning, +1 seven squadrons on Sector Patrol, -2 eight aircraft on Ftr Sup). The intercepting fighters are determined to be three pairs of MiG-29's attacking separately. R-27 Alamo's knock down one SAM Support A/C. R-73 Archer's down one SAM Support and one Striker. One MiG is shot down by an AIM -9M. The Raid now consists of 7x SAM Suppression, 10x Strikers, 4x EW Support (and 10x Fighter Suppression though not actually part of the raid - more of an orbiting CAP). Upon entering the Target SAM Defense, it is determined that the target SAM's are two batteries of SA-15. The PGM Launch Node then moves up ahead of the Target SAM Defense Node. 40x JDAM's are launched at the pre-assigned target. A potential of 1,920 DP's. 19 JDAM end up striking the target, inflicting 912 DP, destroying the 800 DP rated underdround, hardened facility. The raid begins its egress by entering the outbound GCI Intercept Node. The modifier is -2 due to the over 8 Fighter Suppression mission US fighters. The raid is determined to be intercepted by two separate flights of four fighters. The fighters are determined to be 4x Shenyang F-7's armed with 2x PL-7's each, and 4x F-4E armed with 4x AIM-7F Sparrow and 4x AIM-9L's each. The Raid now considered Clean is able to destroy both enemy flights without loss. All eight enemy A/C are downed. Upon re-entering the Perimeter SAM Defense Node, the defenses are determined to be two batteries of SA-10b SAM's. Once again the SAM Suppression A/C, and the fact that the raid is now Clean, enabled the raid to return to its carrier without loss to the Grumbles. Losses are as follows: US Combat losses inluded 2x AEW Suppression A/C downed by AIM-7F Sparrows, 1x SAM Suppression downed by an R-27 Alamo, 1x SAM Suppression and 1x Striker were downed by R-73 Archer missiles. A total of 5 F/A-18E/F's. Four aircraft had to abort the mission at take off due to readiness issues. Iran lost 3x F-4E Phantom II's to AIM-120's on AEW Escort. 1x MiG-29, 4x Shenyang F-7, and 4x F-4E Phantom II's to AIM-9M during GCI interceptions. Take Aways: I like the concept of a floating PGM Launch Node. You can't totally ignore the chance of enemy AEW being in position. This time I cut the numbers of aircraft on the AEW Suppression mission in favor of Fighter Suppression because it was only a 15% chance and I had lost "heavily" the last time to GCI directed fighters. This time I was detected and that fact caused my extra Fighter Suppression fighters to be negated by the extra Iranian fighters cuased by the AEW detection. Damned if you do, damned if you don't Need to flesh out my "article" based on these three play throughs. Would like to resolve some of the engagements with standard H4 rules vice the Missile Engagement Table and see how they compare. All and all, much fun again. Pete

Here is a teaser. "We didn't encounter them in the Gulf or in Kosovo. Next time, we will. The Double-Digit SAMs By John A. Tirpak, Senior Editor Since the inception of stealth aircraft such as the B-2 bomber and the F-22 fighter, the Air Force has been warning that advanced surface-to-air missile systems in the early 2000s would begin proliferating among US adversaries, sharply raising the danger to nonstealthy combat aircraft. As if on cue, Russia in December announced it had struck a multibillion dollar arms deal to equip Iran with the deadly S-300 family of SAMs and its associated radars." The full article is here.

An Interesting article article about the Israeli Air Forces campaign in Lebanon 1982, with particular attentio to SEAD/Anti SAM operations. Find this article here. In one spectacular engagement in the skies over Lebanon, modern airpower took a dramatic leap forward. The Bekaa Valley War By Rebecca Grant In June 1982, Israeli ground forces pushed into Lebanon in an effort to put an end to cross-border terror attacks. Operation Peace for Galilee, as Israel dubbed it, led to a prolonged conflict with Lebanon and produced mixed overall results. However, the initial phase of that operation included a spectacular moment when the Israeli Air Force destroyed 19 surface-to-air missile batteries, with no losses, and downed a huge number of enemy aircraft. With real-time intelligence and careful exploitation of adversary weaknesses, the IAF dealt modern air defenses their first major defeat. So startling was the IAF success in that Bekaa Valley air war 20 years ago this month that it ever since has stood out as a critical turning point in the deadly duel of fighters and SAMs. The Bekaa Valley success was long in the making. Israel's small but elite air force dominated the Six Day War of June 1967, pulling off one of the most successful surprise attacks of all time. Flying about 3,300 sorties, the IAF smashed the air forces of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria. The three Arab nations, taken together, lost around 400 aircraft on the ground and in the air. Thereafter, the Egyptian, Syrian, and Jordanian armies were routed in the Sinai, Golan Heights, and West Bank. However, the IAF's dominance in the air was successfully challenged in the War of Attrition which officially started in March 1969 and ended in mid-1970. Egypt's campaign to harass Israeli forces in the Sinai was backed by a massive infusion of Soviet weapons, including modern aircraft and missiles. As a result, the IAF was the first air force that had to contend with advanced Soviet-made SAMs. During these years, IAF raids destroyed some Egyptian SAM batteries, but sporadic action was not enough. Worse, the SAMs were taking a toll on the small Israeli Air Force. One historian of these events, retired RAF Air Vice Marshal Tony Mason, observed, "Squadron attrition exchange ratios had changed from 1-to-40 in the air to 2-to-4 against missiles" during the peak of the War of Attrition. It was only too apparent that the Arab states were shifting from fighters to SAMS for air defense. The October War Major changes were on display during the October 1973 war. When Egypt and Syria mounted their coordinated surprise attack on Oct. 6, 1973, the IAF faced a formidable air defense environment--"denser than anything in North Vietnam," according to a 1978 Air University report. Egypt had only 20 mobile SA-6 SAM systems, but these were backed up by 70 SA-2s, 65 SA-3s, and upward of 2,500 anti-aircraft batteries and perhaps as many as 3,000 shoulder-fired SA-7s. Syria deployed another 34 SAM batteries. IAF pilots had to fight for air superiority while making frantic efforts to deliver close support to Israel's embattled ground forces east of the Suez Canal. "Israeli fighters and Arab missile sites engaged in mutual bloodletting," said one official Israeli report. When SAM batteries in the Bekaa Valley threatened Israel's air superiority over its border with Lebanon, IAF F-4 Phantoms such as these used high-speed anti-radiation missiles to destroy the sites. (Photo courtesy IAF Magazine) During this dangerous time, the IAF's second in command was David Ivry. Ivry, a fighter pilot who flew in the 1967 war (and who recently served as Israel's ambassador to the United States), recalls that the surprise nature of the attack meant "we didn't have any time to eliminate the air defense, and we had to fight within very dense air defenses, to participate in the land forces campaign, and we lost a lot of airplanes." In the first three days, the IAF lost 50 aircraft in about 1,220 sorties. This was an unsustainable loss rate of four percent, rivaling the loss rate of the early US bomber offensives over Germany in World War II. The losses tapered off, but the SA-6s, SA-7s, and ZSU-24 guns scored hits on 53 of Israel's prewar total of 170 A-4 Skyhawks and 33 of its 177 F-4 Phantoms. Some of the battle damage was light and some serious, but the air defenses were finding their mark and making it difficult for the IAF to provide emergency close air support to Israeli ground forces. Egypt's air defenses stymied the IAF's attempt to support Israel's early counterattacks. The IAF was undertaking very high-risk missions and, ultimately, Israel reaped the reward. The air support helped turn the tide in huge battles east of the canal. On Oct. 14, Egypt moved up reserves to the Sinai and pushed ahead of its own air defenses. Egypt paid the price with the loss of 28 aircraft that day. The attack unraveled as Israeli air and ground troops quickly stopped the advance. One Egyptian division commander, in an interview with British historian Trevor N. Dupuy, said, "When we tried to move out beyond the SAM umbrella, we took unacceptable losses from the Israeli Air Force." Fighting continued for several days more, ending in a cease-fire with Israeli ground troops ensconced west of the canal and all sides bloodied and battered. Israel had prevailed, but the cost of the October War made clear the fact that the IAF's tactics would have to change. Even at the end of the war, Israel was still groping for solutions to the SAM problem, losing five Phantoms in a single raid. Devastating Losses To Ivry, the IAF's loss of effectiveness was devastating. "At the end of the war," he said, "we managed to come up with quite an impressive victory," but Israel's military leaders had "a very bad feeling" about the fact that the F-4 was "not successful against SAM batteries." SAM belts restricted the ability of the IAF to interdict an invading army. Surface-to-air missiles could also shelter batteries of short-range surface-to-surface missiles like the SS-21, which would be capable of holding Israeli territory at risk of attack. As Ivry saw it, airpower's role in future wars had been placed in doubt. The 1973 war left Israel--not to mention other Western air forces--with the fear that fighters might no longer be able to gain air superiority against an integrated air defense. One such skeptic was Ezer Weizman, a former commander of the IAF. Ivry recalled Weizman's stated view as "the wing of the fighter plane was broken by the SAM." Clearly, the IAF's freedom to operate in future battles depended on its finding a way to rapidly and systematically take out stationary or mobile SAMs. In Ivry's view, the main lesson of 1973 was simple: "We have to find an answer to the SAM batteries." Years passed, and Egypt and Israel made peace, but the overall SAM problem did not go away. If anything, it intensified. In April 1981, Syria began to deploy its first SAM brigades to the Bekaa Valley of Lebanon. The move came in response to the IAF's shootdown of two Syrian helicopters which had been participating in attacks on Christian militia--Israel's allies--in southern Lebanon. One who was studying Syria's move with great interest was Ivry, who had become head of the IAF. "From our point of view," he said, the movement of SAM brigades into the Bekaa Valley was "crossing the red line" because it threatened Israel's air superiority over its border with Lebanon. SAMs in the Bekaa Valley restricted the IAF's ability to conduct reconnaissance or to provide air cover for ground operations. However, the clock was ticking on implementing the final phases of the 1978 Camp David Accords and the 1979 Israel-Egypt peace treaty, which called for withdrawal of forces from the Sinai in 1982. The political situation was "very delicate," in Ivry's words. Israel was tempted to carry out an attack on the Bekaa Valley SAM brigades, but the IAF had a bigger challenge in mind: destruction of the Osirak nuclear reactor then under construction in Iraq. On June 7, 1981, in a stunning attack, a strike package of 14 Israeli fighters destroyed the reactor outside Baghdad. A year later, however, the elimination of the Bekaa Valley SAM sites became an urgent priority. Palestine Liberation Organization forces in southern Lebanon had become part of an escalating cross-border conflict aimed at Israeli settlements. The PLO fired artillery and rockets against Israeli civilian areas in Galilee. Israeli Defense Minister Ariel Sharon got Prime Minister Menachem Begin's support for an operation in Lebanon to attack the PLO forces there. Operation Peace for Galilee aimed to drive Israeli ground forces into Lebanon to keep Syria at bay, while Lebanese Christian militiamen drove out the PLO. The first week of the operation culminated with the most significant air battle of the 1980s and one of the most important in the history of military airpower. The Hunt Begins On June 6, Israeli ground forces began an advance into the PLO settlements in Lebanon with the IAF fighters and attack helicopters providing support. Israeli forces moved fast, pushing north to Jazzin, where action stalled. Israeli ground forces needed continued air support, but the pace threatened to put IAF fighters, attack aircraft, and helicopters in range of the Bekaa Valley SAM sites. Ivry and his headquarters staff at the Tel Aviv command post were watching Syria closely. One major concern was trying to "avoid any war with Syria," said Ivry. The SAM sites were in the Bekaa Valley in Lebanon with others in Syria itself, protecting the Bekaa Valley batteries. Syrian troops and Palestinian guerrillas were crowded into the small operational area along with Israeli helicopters and rescue operations. Remotely Piloted Vehicles (a Scout is shown here) detected additional SAMs deployed to the valley. This allowed IAF leaders to adjust their strategy. Later, the RPVs smoked out SAM sites for the F-4s to destroy. (Photo courtesy IAF Magazine) "Sometimes we had more than 100 planes flying in this kind of environment," said Ivry. It was "a real saturation area," about 1,500 square miles of airspace, where command and control was paramount. Ivry ran the central control of the operation himself. Initial plans called for attacks on 14 SAM sites. Then on Tuesday, June 8, Ivry learned that Israeli Remotely Piloted Vehicles (RPVs) had spotted an additional five SA-6s moving from the Golan Heights into the Bekaa Valley. "They had a very dense belt along the Golan Heights to prevent Israeli penetration" toward Damascus, Ivry explained. "We found this out in the morning," Ivry said, and "it meant quite a lot for us." The move signaled that Syria had no intention of becoming involved in a major war--or the SAMs would have been positioned to defend the approach to Damascus, instead of going north and reinforcing the Bekaa Valley. The redeployment suggested to Ivry that they could strike the SAM sites without drawing Syria into a wider war and achieve the goal of eliminating the SAM defenses from Lebanon. Conditions were perfect. Ivry changed plans on the morning of Wednesday, June 9, taking into account the five newly spotted SAM batteries. He planned to launch the attack at noon but had to wait for Israel's Cabinet to approve the raid. The Cabinet's deliberations finished shortly after 10 a.m. and "we got the green light." Ivry by that time had postponed the attack until 2 p.m. "Before the attack, there were a lot of Syrian patrols on the border," recounted Ivry, but no air combat engagements that morning. The Syrians avoided battle. "We'd shot down quite a lot of Syrian MiGs before," commented Ivry. "Free-Fire Zone" When Israel launched its strike force at 2 p.m., the Syrians ordered their combat air patrols to return to base and land. With their fighters down and safely out of the way, Ivry said, Syrian commanders thought they "were going to have a free-fire zone to shoot anybody who flies." He added, "They've been so confident that their air defense is so strong that why should they risk any Syrian fighter planes?" Now, Ivry directed his strike aircraft toward the nest of SAMs. The SAM sites were a combination of SA-2s, SA-3s, and SA-6s. "It was a challenge to attack," said Ivry. Key to the plan was gathering data to exploit weaknesses in the technology of the SAMs and the way they were operated by the Syrians. Ivry recalled that "the intelligence-gathering effort which we did was an enormous one." Other sources describe how, prior to the war, Israeli drones tested out the radar and communications frequencies of the SAM batteries. In his 1991 book The Samson Option, Seymour M. Hersh writes that clandestine operations in May 1982 produced a wealth of data on SAM frequencies and radar coverage that later proved useful to IAF electronic warfare in the Bekaa Valley. Attacking the SAMs in daylight relied on command, control, and intelligence to make the strike fast and effective--and standoff missiles to give the Israeli aircrews the first shots. The plan had been well-rehearsed. Aircrews practiced attack runs against dummy SAM sites in Israel's Negev desert for months before the operation. The IAF conducted mock jamming of fighter and ground communications in order to undercut centralized control of the air defense. "You have to find a way when to jam and when not to jam," explained Ivry. "You can jam it when you need it to assist your fighter planes. And you cannot jam it when you want to get information, when you want to listen." IAF aircraft also carried electronic countermeasures pods to foil radar tracking. Ivry needed direct control over the attack to make it a success. The IAF command post in Tel Aviv gave Ivry a real-time command picture of the air battle through various data links. E-2Cs with their airborne surveillance radar downlinked their pictures to the command post. Remotely Piloted Vehicles provided video. Israel had one squadron of RPVs; this was not enough, in Ivry's view, and it had limited nighttime capability, but the squadron was enough for Ivry to keep at least two RPVs in the air all the time. Israeli RPVs helped provide constant locations of the Syrian SAM batteries. "We tried to follow them, because some of them had been mobile," said Ivry. He added, that morning "we'd been following them, all of them, [and] this was one of the conditions for that morning, to get all the information. Yes, we knew, no doubt, we knew all of them, where they were located." One at a time, four-ship formations of Israeli fighters flew into the engagement zone. The IAF pilots were able to shoot down as many as two or three out of four Syrian fighters. Here, three IAF F-15s carry out a patrol. (Photo courtesy IAF Magazine) The IAF also set up two-way voice communications between Ivry and his pilots. This real-time command, control, and intelligence capability, largely new to modern air warfare, delivered what Ivry termed the "real-time intelligence" to the local operators and the strike force. When the attack was launched, F-15s and F-16s provided interception and air defense capability while F-4 Phantoms took the main role in attacking the SAM batteries. RPVs went in first to get the Syrian SAMs to turn on their radars. Then the F-4s destroyed them with high-speed anti-radiation missiles. Because the fighters were striking known locations, the attack moved fast, minimizing the exposure of aircraft to the SAMs. The rapid flight time of the missiles also furnished just enough standoff to maximize the F-4s' chances of getting away. Immediately, the SAM batteries were "disrupted one after another," recounted Ivry. When the shooting was over, the IAF had destroyed all 19 SAM batteries within two hours without losing an airplane. The IAF had Laser-Guided Bomb capability, but Ivry said, "In this case we didn't use it. It's too slow. But then, after the attacks, after eliminating the SAM battery, you can come over to destroy part of the site" with no risk. Score: 87-to-Zip Meanwhile, Syria's fighters found themselves badly out of position when the Israeli attacks on the SAM sites began. "After about 20 minutes, they launched fighter planes to intercept, to try to disturb our attacks on the SAM batteries," Ivry noted. Helicopters, drones, electronic warfare, strike fighters, and now air combat made up a massive aerial melee. "You have a kind of concert which you are conducting," recalled Ivry. "It's not only just the fighter planes that are killing MiGs and other ones on SAM batteries. Once you have them in the same area, you have to conduct a concert. You cannot play the drums in the same time as the piano is playing a different concert. And air combat is a different concert than [the attack on] the SAM batteries." From the command center, Ivry had the E-2C air picture plus F-15s capable of sorting out engagements at shorter range. IAF pilots relied frequently on VHF radio, hoping to preserve their tactical communications and links to the command post. Ivry's tactic was to vector four-ship formations of Israeli fighters into the engagement zone, one at a time. Each air battle lasted one to two minutes. Ivry did not want to let any more than one four-ship into the battle area. "Never mind if I'm not going to catch all the MiGs" he said; he wanted "to be on the safe side that I'm not going to intercept one of ours." For the Syrians, the battle was hopeless, tactically and psychologically. Selective airborne communications jamming frazzled the airwaves for the Syrian MiG-21s and MiG-23s and cut them off from ground control. Ivry described their lack of confidence as the Syrian fighter pilots launched and came up into the fight without any idea of the interception route they would run. When they did try something, the interceptions attempted by the MiG pilots were "not very efficient," in Ivry's opinion. "So, we catch them slowly, one by one," he remembered. Listening in the command post, Ivry heard the Israeli fighters shooting down "sometimes two or three out of four" of the Syrians. "And the more they came, the lack of confidence on their side was increased." Psychologically, as Ivry said of the Syrian pilots' state of mind, "you're losing and losing." He went on, "Once you start to lose, you think, 'Well, I'm going to be a target, and I'm going to go over there because I've been summoned?'" The Israeli pilots kept the advantage. "I can only tell you that, within half an hour, we shot down about 26 MiGs," Ivry said. After two hours Ivry called off the SAM attacks. The tally grew so that by noon on Friday, when a cease-fire took effect, IAF pilots had shot down 82 airplanes without losing any in air combat. Wiping out the Bekaa Valley SAMs cleared the way for the IAF to give full support to the Israeli ground forces. Subsequently, the IAF also scored hits on Syrian tanks using attack helicopters with TOW missiles and fighters with LGBs. "We were attacking a lot of tanks," Ivry said. "We had an operation to prevent an armored division coming from the north, by night." After Israeli and Syrian tank clashes, the IAF used F-4s and A-4s, with Mk 82 and Mk 83 laser guidance kits attached, to designate and attack tanks by night. Real-Time Targeting Two weeks later, Ivry got a chance to test out real-time command and control against another small set of SAM batteries. The Syrians moved a new SAM battery into Lebanon. One F-4 Phantom loitering in the area was shot down by the ambush and "attacked by a missile coming from Syria, not from inside Lebanon." Ivry ordered an immediate strike and now believes they caught three out of the four batteries. The success came because the IAF constantly tracked the SAMs. "In some ways it was much more a kind of hunting," as Ivry described it. "We had RPVs running after them [the SAM batteries] all the time." The SAM batteries ducked into villages, causing frustration. This left the IAF following them, "waiting to see that we are not going to miss them [the SAM batteries] getting out of the city and to attack them on a place which [was not] very populated." The RPVs gave a video picture that matched up with a map grid system familiar to the Israeli pilots, who knew the terrain well. With a lot of practice, the system gave Ivry the ability to call each fighter and pass the information within "seconds." "This was real-time communications," Ivry said. "By voice, I could speak with anyone from my command post. Sometimes I even knew the names" of the pilots in the formation, he added, especially when his son was flying. A Change in Warfare In contrast with the desperate air battles of October 1973, Israel's 46-hour Bekaa Valley air war set a new standard for orchestrated air operations and proved that even sophisticated mobile SAMs could be dismembered by well-coordinated air attacks. The Bekaa Valley War forced Israel's enemies to consider alternative weapons and helped the IAF--whose F-15s still bear the kill markings from this battle--regain its stature within Israel's armed forces. (Photo courtesy IAF Magazine) "The ability to disrupt the SAM batteries, this kind of achievement, it made a major impact strategically," Ivry noted. The lopsided scores against both Syrian SAMs and fighters put orchestrated airpower back in the center of modern warfare. Not losing airplanes was "mainly luck, I can tell you," Ivry said later, pointing to the close-packed nature of the air battles. Bekaa Valley underscored the value of electronic warfare and the benefits of coordination and careful planning. Ivry's role in coping with unexpected SAM batteries and altering attack plans in real time showed that success in air warfare rested on skillful execution in the heat of battle as well as prior planning. For Israel, the Bekaa Valley air war established a strong deterrent against Syria, according to Ivry. It also helped the IAF regain balance within Israel's armed forces. Yet the Bekaa Valley air war also helped drive Middle East strategy in a new direction. Potential opponents started to look for new weapons, since challenging the IAF in the skies was deemed pointless. Ivry cited conclusions drawn by the Syrian minister of defense, who felt that Israeli airpower and electronic warfare won the day in the Bekaa Valley and the next war would be a "surface-to-surface war and not the surface-to-air war anymore." As Ivry said, "That's when they started to buy the Scuds." He was referring to Syria and Iraq. In Moscow, the Bekaa Valley operation threw military men into a kind of shock. Top Soviet systems had been trounced. On a visit to Czechoslovakia in 1991, Ivry met a Czech general who had been serving in Moscow in 1982. He told Ivry that the Bekaa Valley air war made the Soviets understand that Western technology was superior to theirs, and in this Czech general's view, the blow to the Bekaa Valley SAMs was part of the cascade of events leading to the collapse of the Soviet Union. The Bekaa Valley also provided a preview of the technological marvels of the 1991 Persian Gulf War, with the US Air Force's destruction of integrated air defenses, to increasing real-time control by those in charge of fighter operations, to Laser-Guided Bombs hitting tanks in the desert. Used aggressively and skillfully by the IAF, airpower once again had come out on top. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Rebecca Grant is president of IRIS Independent Research in Washington, D.C., and has worked for Rand, the Secretary of the Air Force, and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force. Grant is a fellow of the Eaker Institute for Aerospace Concepts, the public policy and research arm of the Air Force Association's Aerospace Education Foundation. Her most recent article, "The War Nobody Expected," appeared in the April 2002 issue. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Copyright by Air Force Association. All rights reserved

SINCGARS Radio System Remains Secure, Expert Says (Defense Aerospace.com) Find it here. WASHINGTON --- U.S. servicemembers can use the SINCGARS radio system with confidence, officials with the Army’s Communications-Electronics Command at Fort Monmouth, N.J., said today. James Bowden, project leader for the single-channel ground and airborne radio system, said recent media articles claim that Hezbollah used advanced technology to crack Israeli communications during the fighting in Lebanon. The articles allege that the group used technology from Iran to thwart Israeli tank attacks, Bowden said, adding that some servicemembers have expressed the fear that Hezbollah or Iran has shared this technology with extremists in Iraq. But the articles are wrong, Bowden asserted. The Israelis do not use the U.S. SINCGARS system, but rather they use another frequency-hopping technology, he said. Frequency hopping means messages switch among dozens of frequencies per second to evade being jammed or intercepted, Bowden said. “We are concerned, because these articles lead people to think that SINCGARS is vulnerable, and that this technology is available to bad guys,” Bowden said. “This is not the case. The Israelis do not have SINCGARS radios. They have another frequency-hopping radio that does not have the U.S. frequency-hopping algorithm, does not use the U.S. communications security devices and does not use the U.S. transmission security devices. All three provide robust protection for U.S. SINCGARS.” Those three pieces of the SINCGARS provide servicemembers with assured communications security when they follow proper communications procedures, Bowden said. Servicemembers deploying to Iraq should take all normal precautions, but they do not need to distrust their communications, he said. He said some soldiers have called the office with concerns about communications security in light of these articles. “We want to make it clear that they do not have a problem,” he said. “SINCGARS is the robust type of communications they need to protect against these kinds of threats.” His office has sent messages to the field with this same information. Servicemembers with questions or concerns should e-mail Bowden at James.Bowden@us.army.mil. He noted that he has been working on SINCGARS since the 1980s and can answer any questions about it.

URL: Here. A Script for Doomsday Why the military option is not an option against Kim Jong Il and his nuclear program. WEB-EXCLUSIVE COMMENTARY By John Barry Newsweek Updated: 6:41 p.m. ET Oct 19, 2006 Oct. 19, 2006 - Kim Jong Il doesn’t need the bomb to defend his country. If military force were an acceptable option against Pyongyang, you probably would have forgotten the North Korean dictator’s name long ago—if you ever knew it in the first place. The Pentagon has been bracing for trouble on the peninsula ever since the 1953 armistice. The basic plan, in place for almost 50 years, is predicated on a North Korean invasion of the South. But in the early 1990s, that plan was expanded. Titled OPPLAN 5027, it now lays out a campaign in which, the invading North Korean Army having been destroyed, U.S. and South Korean forces invade the North and topple the regime. The Pentagon even has a contingency plan for taking out all known nuclear facilities in the North. Kim shouldn’t lose sleep over it. Not that he should dream of invading the South. Defeating such a move would be bloody but relatively simple, the Pentagon’s planners expect. “We will halt the North Korean Army in the passes,” Colin Powell, then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, assured the Clinton administration in 1993. “Then we will kill them.” By passes, Powell meant Kaeson and Chorwon, the only two corridors from the North broad enough to allow the movement of formations the size of North Korean divisions. Those places would be killing grounds. But repelling an invasion has never been the problem. The real issue is Seoul, a city-sprawl of 22 million—almost half of South Korea’s entire population—within range of North Korean bombardment. The U.S. military reckons that two thirds of the North’s 11,000 artillery pieces and multiple-rocket launchers are deployed in hardened shelters just behind the DMZ, with at least half within range of Seoul, capable of pounding the South with 500,000 rounds per hour for several hours. The South Korean capital is Kim Jung Il’s hostage. The North’s attack strategy is assumed to be nothing fancy: a massive barrage on Seoul, causing a tidal wave of refugees and (supposedly) forcing the South’s government to surrender quickly under threat of further destruction of the capital. Defending the South against such a blitzkrieg would be tough. The Pentagon’s plan has U.S. air reinforcements pouring in at six main airbases, ready to fly more than 3,000 sorties a day. All of those fields are vulnerable to strikes by Northern missiles armed with chemical warheads or cluster munitions. And the fields are all near the coast. The North’s special forces (nominally more than 100,000 strong) are known to have been practicing submarine-launched assaults, and the airbases would presumably be key objectives of such assaults. Worse yet, the Pentagon plan has U.S. Army reinforcements all arriving through a single port, Pusan, in the far south—again a target for Northern missiles. And after disembarking, the Americans would have only two good roads up the length of the peninsula, roads that would be packed with fleeing civilians and presumably under bombardment. The Pentagon has worked like crazy trying to improve South Korea’s defenses. There has been a huge effort, for example, to set up sensor-communications-counterfire systems so each of those North Korean artillery pieces, as soon as it fires a single shell, can be pinpointed and destroyed faster than it can be rolled back into its cave. Current plans rely on massive U.S. airpower against targets in the North: stealth aircraft, cruise missiles and precision-guided munitions (a.k.a. “smart bombs). They also include a detailed outline for action on the ground, such as placing U.S. Marines deep inside the North to threaten Pyongyang. But none of these expedients looks remotely likely to cut the butcher’s bill to an acceptable level. And so far we’re only talking about confronting an attack from the North. Bill Clinton and William Perry, his Defense secretary, considered going to war against Pyongyang in 1994. On May 19 of that year, Perry, along with the then Joint Chiefs chairman, John Shalikashvili, and the commander of U.S. forces in South Korea at the time, Gen. Gary Luck, briefed the president on the anticipated costs of such a war: roughly 52,000 U.S. military killed or wounded; 490,000 South Korean military ditto, and untold numbers of Northern dead and civilian casualties, all in the first 90 days of conflict—together with a U.S. price tag of more than $61 billion. Luck later calculated the ultimate toll at more than 1 million dead, possibly including as many as 100,000 Americans, and a final bill to U.S. taxpayers in excess of $100 billion—not to mention more than $1 trillion in damage to South Korea’s economy. Which helps explain why Clinton opted instead to make a deal with Pyongyang, despite the deficiencies of the 1994 Framework Agreement. “We all knew it wasn’t a solution,” says one senior Defense Department official involved in those discussions. “But it staved off war. And it bought time.” The 1994 casualty estimates “haven’t changed,” says a senior Pentagon official. “A major war on the Korean peninsula would have a disastrous effect on the region’s economies,” Maj. [now Lt. Col.] Daniel Orcutt warned in a study published by the U.S. Air Force Academy in 2004. In particular, he wrote: “War would obliterate South Korea’s goal of becoming a top-ten economic power.” Even so, the prospect of North Korea getting the bomb worried the Pentagon sufficiently that in 1994 it launched another study, this time asking whether a way could be found to destroy the North’s known nuclear facilities without triggering all-out war on the peninsula. The Americans could obliterate the targets in short order, using long-range bombers and carrier-based aircraft to avoid implicating the South. The main thing, as described by one of those involved in drawing up the scenario, would be to make clear to the North’s leadership that the attacks were intended only to eliminate Pyongyang’s nuclear capability, not to overthrow the regime. But the Northerners would also be put on notice: if they responded by attacking the South, the regime would become a target. The scheme—it never got as far as a plan—was scrapped. Pyongyang’s reaction was simply too hard to predict. A few things have changed since the mid-1990s. In those days America had more ground troops in South Korea than it has now, and the United States wasn’t fighting even one war back then, let alone a pair of them. Today the Pentagon could muster just about enough air and sea power to defend South Korea if the North invaded, according to the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s latest annual “apportioned forces” estimate. But doing the job would take pulling every Marine out of Iraq without delay and sending them all straight to Korea. In May of this year, Bush signed a directive assigning the U.S. Strategic Command the task of overseeing and coordinating all U.S. plans to counter threats of WMD proliferation worldwide. Bad idea. As overseer of America’s nuclear forces, STRATCOM at once set about doing what it knows how to do, which is to plan for nuclear strikes. Duly it hatched a concept—notional, global, and nowhere near as detailed as a plan—for nuclear strikes against proliferators who are judged to pose an impending threat to the United States. The proposal inevitably leaked and was quickly quashed. Now everyone has gone back to the drawing board—except Kim’s scientists. They’re doing just fine. URL: http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/15337837/site/newsweek/

While not a rabid sports fan, my father would always be interesting in watching a game, either live or on tv. Unfortunately, I can remember countless times when he got up, waving his hand in virtual disgust after either the Mets or Jets, however improbably, yet again snatched defeat from the jaws of victory. I could even hear him late last night saying "same ole Mets" (or Jets for that matter - another chance for failure coming up on Sunday)

Bah Humbug. Harpoon anyone?

I'll be watching. This series, going toward midnight each night, has been putting a cramp on my Harpooning. Go Mets!

Some people just have way too much time on their hands, not you Brad, these people who produce these things.

In order to initiate and consolidate discussion on developments with regard to North Korea's drive to develop nuclear power/weaponry, I submit this article...here. Unrelated specifically to the article, footage of the UN Security Council meeting and US UN Ambassador John Bolton's comments on the behaviour of the representative of the north Korean government was extremely interesting. In the end, the UN Security Council unaminously voted to impose sanctions, find it here. It will be of interest to see how this develops as the People's Republic of China has already inserted doubt into the effectiveness of these sanctions. Also of note will be how North Korea's actions effect the actions of its neighbors like Japan, South Korea, and others.