pmaidhof

Can GBU-31 JDAM's, a VSmall RCS-sized object, be engaged by "RA" Fire Control Mode anti-aircraft guns? I assume that "OP"/optically directed guns, while they can theoretically spot VSmall objects at 1.5nm, would not get a shot at such a small object moving at 528kts (2.2nm/movement phase). While not personally believing so, I will assume so as not to underestimate the enemy, until I hear others chime in. Please give your thoughts.

here Mission The Joint Direct Attack Munition is a guidance tail kit that converts existing unguided free-fall bombs into accurate, adverse weather "smart" munitions. With the addition of a new tail section that contains an inertial navigational system and a global positioning system guidance control unit, JDAM improves the accuracy of unguided, general purpose bombs in any weather condition. JDAM is a joint U.S. Air Force and Department of Navy program. Features JDAM is a guided air-to-surface weapon that uses either the 2,000-pound BLU-109/MK 84, the 1,000-pound BLU-110/MK 83 or the 500-pound BLU-111/MK 82 warhead as the payload. JDAM enables employment of accurate air-to-surface weapons against high priority fixed and relocatable targets from fighter and bomber aircraft. Guidance is facilitated through a tail control system and a GPS-aided INS. The navigation system is initialized by transfer alignment from the aircraft that provides position and velocity vectors from the aircraft systems. Once released from the aircraft, the JDAM autonomously navigates to the designated target coordinates. Target coordinates can be loaded into the aircraft before takeoff, manually altered by the aircrew before weapon release, or automatically entered through target designation with onboard aircraft sensors. In its most accurate mode, the JDAM system will provide a weapon circular error probable of 13 meters or less during free flight when GPS data is available. If GPS data is denied, the JDAM will achieve a 30-meter CEP or less for free flight times up to 100 seconds with a GPS quality handoff from the aircraft. JDAM can be launched from very low to very high altitudes in a dive, toss and loft or in straight and level flight with an on-axis or off-axis delivery. JDAM enables multiple weapons to be directed against single or multiple targets on a single pass. JDAM is currently compatible with B-1B, B-2A, B-52H, F-15E, F-14A/B/D, F/A-18E/F, F-16C/D, F/A-22 and F/A-18C/D aircraft. Follow-on integration efforts are currently underway or planned to evaluate compatibility with the A-10, F-117, AV-8B, S-3, Joint Strike Fighter, and unmanned aerial vehicles. Background Desert Storm highlighted a shortfall in air-to-surface weapon capability. Adverse weather conditions limited employment of precision guided munitions. Unguided weapon accuracy was also degraded when delivered from medium and high altitudes. Research and development of an "adverse weather precision guided munition" began in 1992. The first JDAMs were delivered in 1997 with operational testing conducted in 1998 and 1999. More than 450 JDAMs were dropped during testing, recording an unprecedented 95 percent system reliability while achieving a 9.6-meter accuracy rate. JDAM performance has been demonstrated in operationally representative tests including drops through clouds, rain and snow. These tests included a B-2 releasing 16 JDAMs on a single pass against multiple targets in two separate target areas. JDAM and the B-2 made their combat debuts during Operation Allied Force. The B-2s, flying 30-hour, nonstop, roundtrip flights from Whiteman Air Force Base, Mo., delivered more than 600 JDAMs during Allied Force. This combination of stealth and accuracy has revolutionized air warfare. Growth of the JDAM family of weapons expanded to the MK-82 500-pound version, which began development in late 1999. Also, the Navy is currently studying the effects of adding enhancements such as improved GPS accuracy, a precision seeker for terminal guidance and additional warheads. General Characteristics Primary Function: Guided air-to-surface weapon Contractor: Boeing Corp. Length: (JDAM and warhead) GBU-31 (v) 1/B: 152.7 inches (387.9 centimeters); GBU-31 (v) 3/B: 148.6 inches (377.4 centimeters); GBU-32 (v) 1/B: 119.5 inches (303.5 centimeters) Launch Weight: (JDAM and warhead) GBU-31 (v) 1/B: 2,036 pounds (925.4 kilograms); GBU-31 (v) 3/B: 2,115 pounds (961.4 kilograms); GBU-32 (v) 1/B: 1,013 pounds (460.5 kilograms) Wingspan: GBU-31: 25 inches (63.5 centimeters); GBU-32: 19.6 inches (49.8 centimeters) Range: Up to 15 miles Ceiling: 45,000-plus feet (13,677 meters) Guidance System: GPS/INS Unit cost: Approximately $21,000 per tailkit (FY 2001 dollars) Date Deployed: 1999 Inventory: The tailkit is in full-rate production. Projected inventory is 158,000, and 82,000 for the U.S. Navy January 2006

Knowingly transited the channel undetected...With all the chatter about the pros and cons of the USN procuring and employing LCS, are they paying enough attention to combatting the newer generation of stealth stechnologies integrated with small combatants in the littorals. Think of the threat already posed by small missile boats and now couple that with these stealth-like technologies. While hopefully it is being addressed by those whose responsability is is, and it may not be of Dreadnaught proportions, it certainly interesting to think about.

Continued with transitioning the High Tide annex to work (hopefully) with other arenas. Got through Mission Planning Guidance, AEW & Offshore Fighters, Perimeter SAMs, and GCI Directed Fighters. It seems like one will have to own high tide to have access to some of the tables.

That's all fine and dandy, but if you were me, you would not know which item is which.

Thanks Brad. Development continues.

Thanks Brad, from discussion last night, we sort of agreed that the the AEW plane in question would be a standard IL-76 equipped with a Schmel radar. Sound about right? Also, looking at giving it about a 15% readiness chance of it both being operational and in position to possibly provied detection and early warning of the raid. Pete

Took some raw numbers from the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies to develop a revised Fighter Type Table: Type D100 F-14A 1-14 MiG-29 15-35 F-4 II 36-56 Mirage F-1 57-65 F-7I 66-79 F-5 80-100 Also came up with SAM/AAA types/# of batteries, and AAM types avaialble. Need to determine any AEW capability. Site mentioned 5x 707 with ECM/ECCM capabilities, and 2-3 C-130 with an electronic surveillance capability. Any help on the AEW question is much appreciated.

Find it here. I have heard grumblings of this the past few weeks. October 06, 2006 Mine commands merge By Christopher P. Cavas Times staff The Navy’s new Naval Mine and Anti-Submarine Warfare Command (NMAWC) was created Oct. 1, merging the former Mine Warfare Command (MINEWARCOM) in Corpus Christi, Texas, with the San Diego-based Fleet Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) Command. The move — controversial among many mine warfare professionals — merges the mine community’s staff and research elements with similar work being done in the ASW area. Along with the staff, the ships at the Corpus Christi base — slated for closure in 2009 — will move to San Diego, while mine warfare helicopter squadrons will move to the East Coast. Improving capabilities in three primary areas — platforms, conceptual and research work, and operational abilities — are key to the moves, said a senior Navy official overseeing the merger. “We think we can leverage off the traditional investment in ASW to help with the investment in mine warfare,” Vice Adm. Kevin Cosgriff, deputy commander of Fleet Forces Command in Norfolk, Va., which directed the merger, said Oct. 4. With the merger, the one-star rear admiral formerly commanding MINEWARCOM is now deputy to the two-star head of NMAWC. But Cosgriff insisted that retaining the mine community’s flag-level officer and the command’s ability to deploy and carry out mine warfare “is the one part that doesn’t get changed at all. We want to advance it.”

I sort of fell into this beginning saturday and finished up tonight. Don't put too much credance into this yet as it did not start out too "detailed" in planning. The twist was that I was interested in a possible airstrike on an Iranian weapons lab/complex. I used a modified Appendix 5 Gaming the Kola Air Defenses from High Tide. By modified, I ignored the Off-shore AEW/Interceptor phase as I assumed that a pre-mission fighter sweep would have taken its toll. The second and third modifications were SWAG's to the GCI Fighter Table and "Iranian" Fighter Type Table. I did not believe that the Iranians could get anything above a squadron in the air and within range of the strike force at any given time, so the max that they could achieve would be 6+ D6 Aircraft (squadron strength). The Fighter Types were determined by D100 roll: 1-10 F-14A; 11-20 MiG-29: 21-40 J-7I; 41-70 F-4 II; and 71-100 F-5. The strike force was made up of 36x F/A-18F's and 4x EA-6B. Of the F/A-18's, 8x were equipped for SEAD, and 8x were equipped for AAW. The remaining 20x were equipped with 4x JDAM each. When the force got feet dry at Low altitude, they entered the Perimeter SAM Zone. Random rolls provided for 2x SA-10b battalions, which accounted for 4x F/A-18's taken hits. The Inbound GCI ditrected Fighters turned out to be 2x flights of 4x J-7I AC. The J-7's were eaten for lunch by the AIM-120's carried by the AAW F/A-18's, who launched a total of 18x AIM-120's. Target SAM Defenses turned out to be a battalion of SA-3's and SA-11's. Effective SEAD prevented any losses to these SAM systems. Target AAA proved much more problematic and I will need to re read this section. pre-attack and post-attack AAA cost 10x planes, 6x and 4x respectively. The airstrike in between the two AAA phases left an enormous hole in the ground by the impacts of 4x JDAM per striker. Target SAM defenses were again suppressed for no losses. Outbound GCI Fighters were two flights of 4x F-4 II's this time. One striker was lost to an AIM-7F Sparrow while the F-4's went down succumming to swarms of AIM-120s and AIM-9M's. Before getting feet wet, the strike force lost 2x F/A-18's to the barrage fires of 3x SA-10 battalions. In the end, 17x of the 36x F/A-18F's were hit. Harpoon Chapter 8 provides for optional damage detail. Here individual rolls identified 9/17 being shot down with the rest being forced to turn back and abort the mission. I will be doing this again with a significant more planning and detail. I'll be sure to update you all. Pete

Found this while trying to find out more about the SA-10b. Scroll to the bottom for an outstanding graphic. Find it here at the Australian Airpower website.

There is an interesting sidebar article beginning on Page 30 of the September 2006 issue of Proceedings, titled Misnaming Aircraft Carriers by Norman Polmar. I do not believe that an online copy is available however.

Unless someone can come up with a more recent example, the 1994 Harpoon Naval Review indicates in its F/A-18C data form #20 (page 152) that the AAS-138 FLIR Pod and ASQ-73 Laser Spot Tracker (LST) Pod are carried on the respective starboard and port "special" fuselage hardpoints. Therefore the answer to my question would be "no", the carrying of these pods does not reduce the weapon hardpoint capacity. Pete

Gentlemen, Please find the above article here. It is a very interesting read for better understanding some of the problems encountered with attempts at suppressing enemy air defenses in the relative recent past.

Would the AN/AAS-38 Nite Hawk FLIR targeting pod take up a hardpoint, in place of another weapon, when completing an F/A-18 data forms? Thanks

Yeah, wonder what will become of all the LANTIRN (sp?) pods or will the new AT-FLIR out perform it - probably so? Sure do slam the Nitehawk FLIR as well.

The GBU-39 Small Diameter Bomb is also described in the October 2005 Naval Sitrep (#29)

How about the naming them after polititions who even some of the most astute people would have a hard time identifying with. "Carl Vinson"?, "John C. Stennis"? My bad...simple google searches provided http://www.stennis.gov/senatorpage.htm states he was considered the father of the modern US Navy, and http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodi...l?index=V000105 describing these two politicians, however neither of which instill any of the impact that a majestic battle, campaign, historic ship, "concept" or even a strong president - Saratoga, Lexington, Midway, Hornet, Enterprise, Independence, America, Teddy Roosevelt to name a few. I don't have a problem with former presidents who may have had a positive impact on national defense issues either as president or an actual participant - therefore George Washington, Theodore Roosevelt, John F. Kennedy, Nimitz, Dwight D. Eisenhower, Harry S. Truman (although as a Marine, I have some issues with him, hehe), Ronald Reagan. I hope to high heaven that there will never be a Clinton - neither William J. nor Hillary Rodham

Ran through a portion of this simple scenario again today using only 2x A-6E loaded up with 8x Mk82 500lb bombs which dive bombed an enemy command center from both medium altitude and low atlitude to see the differences between the two. Dive bombing from medium altitude with a computing bombsight provides for a 12% base "to hit". From Low altitude, you start at 23%. The attackers visually spotted the target at about the base 14nm (75% visibility, but a "9" was rolled on the sigma 4 column). The A-6E was unsuccessfully engaged by S-60 and ZU-23 AAA during the ingress, and by an SA-7b during the egress. The computing bombsight accounted for a total of three bombs actually striking home. I then used the "deviation" rules to determine direction and distance of my 13 misses. The errant bombs landed 100 yards to the south-southwest of the target coming within an estimated 25 yards of a civilian structure. Rating the "Effective Casualty Radius" is too far into the weeds for H4 so I will believe that we rocked the world of some non-combatants in this strike. Question - once the bombs are dropped and the A-6E's are egressing, they are not considured to be at a 0.5 ATA since the bombs have been dropped and they are getting out of dodge.

Find it here. This article relates pretty well to what was discussed last night on HG chat.

Will we ever get away from naming capital ships after politicians, let alone while they are still alive? Too bad I already know the answer.

Thanks again Brad. H4.1 Data Annex B groups its two Hornet entries as F/A-18C/D and F/A-18E/F, each consolidated. I do not have my H4(.0) data annex handy, but should the F/A-18A appear within, is there any major heartburn using that data? I know that some other platforms also disappeared in the transition to 4.1, most probably due to them being effectively unemployed before the "start-date" of the platforms effective use - some may have slipped away by accident, such as the F/A-18A. Thanks again, Pete

Now that the F-14's have been retired, how has this effected the typical make up of the carrier air wing? The H4.1 data annex lists examples of air wings circa 1996. Is it as simple as doubling the F/A-18? If so, what is the breakdown between the F/A-18C/D's and the F/A-18E/F's? Thanks, Pete

I transitioned the situation and platforms from the H3 (paper rules) scenario found in Harpoon Naval Review 1994 by Dave Schueler. The entire scenario encompasses a joint airstrike in the Southern No Fly Zone of post-Desert Storm Iraq. I did however, use H4 data regarding the aircraft performance as well as their respective ordnance. Due to time constraints, I only "flew" the Navy/Marine attack on two command centers in Amara, Iraq. It was the smaller of two packages, compared to the strike on two sites outside of Basra. This package included 2x A-6E, 2x F/A-18C, and 1x EA-6B. Each A-6E carried 8x Mk-82 500lb bombs along with a drop tank, while the F/A-18's each carried 4x AGM-65E Mavericks, 2x AIM-9M, and a drop tank. The strike flew at 5,000m/16,000' (Medium altitude). Due to conditions and turn sequence, the F/A-18's Laser Spot Tracker did not pick up the command centers until almost through the AGM-65's employment envelope. That said, the centers did not stand up very well to maverick strikes, both sites swallowing an AGM-65E each. The A-6E were only successful in dive bombing an S-60 57mm AA Gun. The EA-6B played no apparent role at this site. The Iraqi defence only got off 3x ZU-23 shots, a 57mm shot, and 1x SA-7B for no gain. All aircraft returned safely to an unnamed carrier in the northern gulf.

Very interesting Fred. Small scenarios are my thing for the most part as they are easy to do for me as I continue to consider myself "H4 inexperienced/beginner" level. Thanks for posting. Pete