CV32

From Aviation Week's ARES Blog FCS, DD(X), F-22, Deepwater ... is EFV Next? Posted by Michael Bruno at 8/4/2008 12:18 PM CDT Each of the U.S. armed services seems to have had a major - if not their biggest - acquisition program rescaled in recent months as Defense Secretary Gates and budget pressures collide to challenge the military on these monstrous efforts. Everyone, that is, but the Marine Corps - and its Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV) could be just the juicy target Pentagon reformers and electioneering lawmakers will address next. What makes me think of this is that the Pentagon on Friday said the Marine Corps Systems Command awarded EFV prime contractor General Dynamics Land Systems a $766.8 million cost-plus-incentive-fee contract for development and manufacture of two EFV prototypes under a so-called system development and demonstration-2 phase. The contractor also will modify existing EFV prototypes, procure preliminary spares and repair parts, long lead materials for the SDD-2 prototypes, and conduct systems engineering, studies and analysis, logistics support and test support. The contract, which was not competitively awarded, is for work that won't be completed until September 2012. And notice they're calling it "SDD-2," as in the second attempt at it. That's because about a year ago, the Navy and Marines rewrote the program - and had to hike the cost by billions of dollars while slashing expected deliveries in half and pushing back the timeline by years. Surprisingly, in my opinion, that announcement didn't draw much attention at the time. At least not for what it was: declaring the Corps' top acquisition effort a failure (although one necessary to keep pursuing). This year, things changed; the House Government Oversight Committee spotlighted the program in a surprise move April 29 and the panel's scathing hearing came shortly after yet another, critical Government Accountability Office report March 31. Most recently, the House and Senate Armed Services committees have weighed in with increasing concern themselves. Under current plans, the EFV will not achieve initial operational capability until 2015 and full operational capability until 2025 - or about 35 years after the EFV program entered development. The SASC bill says the plan puts "the Marine Corps' primary mission capability - amphibious operations - at risk for an unacceptably long duration." Senators want the Pentagon to seriously consider spending toward an annual production rate far beyond the one limited to 55 vehicles per year once full-rate production begins in 2016. The HASC, meanwhile, is concerned that plans to begin fabrication of the new EFV prototypes in fiscal 2009 have not sufficiently addressed protection from mines and improvised explosive devices in some operational scenarios. In their House-passed bill, they cut authorized spending for research and development by $40.2 million to $275.9 million. The two bills seem to go in opposite directions, but they also show growing pressure on the program to perform and produce despite its major setback. EFV may have benefited from less attention before, but perhaps its time in the spotlight is coming.

My favourite WWII era fighter, the Supermarine Spitfire, entered service 70 years ago today. Link to a collection of articles at Flight International.

IIRC, it is expected that five Delta III SSBNs will remain in service until at least 2015. There were six in service last year, but one of these was in the process of decommissioning and has probably been withdrawn by now. Three of the Delta IV's were also being overhauled, so those will probably stay in service for the foreseeable future as well.

Following up from the recent report regarding the Zumwalt (DDG-1000) program's curtailment at two hulls ... From Navy Times New DDG-51s could get tweaks, upgrades By Philip Ewing - Staff writer Posted : Monday Aug 4, 2008 6:39:19 EDT Even though the Navy will resume building Arleigh Burke-class destroyers because the ships are cheaper and the costs are predictable, the eight new Burkes could get new refinements that set them apart from earlier siblings, according to a congressional report. According to written testimony submitted Thursday to the House Seapower Subcommittee by Navy shipbuilding expert Ron O’Rourke, the Navy has several options to improve and accessorize the new series of destroyers that will resume with the ship carrying hull number DDG 113. The Navy acquisitions officials who appeared before the subcommittee Thursday said there isn’t yet a plan for how and when to begin the paperwork for buying the new ships, which take the place of five bigger, more advanced Zumwalt-class destroyers. The general sense was that the new Burkes would correspond to the Flight IIA standard — including the latest SPY-1 radar— and be equivalent to ships that had been upgraded with the Navy’s DDG Modernization, which includes open architecture, consumer off-the-shelf systems. Testifying for the Navy were Vice Adm. Barry McCullough, deputy chief of naval operations for integration of resources and capabilities; and Allison Stiller, deputy assistant secretary of the Navy for ship programs. According to statistics provided by the Navy, the estimated cost for two new DDG 51s is about $3.5 billion, as compared to an estimated $3.2 billion per ship for DDG 1000. But lawmakers, including the Seapower Subcommittee’s chairman, Rep. Gene Taylor, D-Miss., hope that serialized production for new DDG 51s would bring down the per-ship costs by the time the next copies are being built. Stiller said it would take extra money and about 50 additional weeks to re-start production on the destroyers’ main reduction gear, which ended when the Navy ordered what it thought would be the final ships in the class. Shipbuilders at Bath Iron Works in Bath, Maine, are already at work on what was formerly the last destroyer, the Michael Murphy, the 62nd ship in the class. The cost for each ship of that vintage is about $1.3 billion. O’Rourke’s report spelled out a number of options that the Navy could request for its new ships, from money-saving possibilities to new propulsion systems to new weapons. Apart from adding technology, the report’s first money-saving option is to reduce crew sizes as much as possible. The House Armed Services Committee in 2005 gave the Navy a goal to reduce destroyer crew sizes from around 300 people to 200. That same year, the Navy reported to Congress that a Burke cost $25 million per year to operate, of which its crew cost $13 million. The more people the Navy can take off its warships, the more money it saves, O’Rourke wrote. As for upgrades to the ships themselves, the report mentions that if the new generation of DDG 51s included some of the technology from the DDG 1000s’ all-electric drive system in a “hybrid plant,” the new destroyers could use at least 16 percent less fuel. In the near-term, though, the novel gas-turbine and electric power plant would cost about $17 million to develop and add just under $9 million to the cost of each ship. Another potential fuel-saving upgrade would be a second bow bulb, located just above the sonar dome protrusion on the existing generation of destroyers. According to internal Navy studies, O’Rourke wrote, the second bow bulb would improve the ships’ fuel efficiency by about 4 percent and lead to slightly better speed and range. The report also posits that a new DDG 51 could be outfitted with the 155mm Advanced Gun System that the DDG 1000 was intended to carry. With a range of 63 nautical miles and highly precise guided ammunition, the AGS is a much deadlier and longer-range gun than the 5-inch gun carried aboard today’s Burke-class destroyers. O’Rourke’s report quotes Navy studies that found a DDG 51 could carry an AGS forward of its superstructure, but only if its existing gun and missile tubes were removed. Even then, the ship could only carry 120 rounds for the larger gun, as opposed to the 600 rounds a DDG 1000 would carry for its two AGS guns. But there may be no need for an AGS after all, according to testimony Thursday. The gun was designed to provide long-range fire support to Marine Corps forces ashore, in the tradition of the 16-inch guns carried aboard Navy battleships of yesteryear. That fire-support mission can now be handled by Tactical Tomahawk cruise missiles and precision air strikes, McCullough told the seapower subcommittee, and the Navy was studying ways to provide more long-range fire support from the new littoral combat ships, which carry a 57mm gun. There is a limit to how many upgrades engineers could shoehorn into a DDG 51 hull, which is about 100 feet shorter and 6,000 tons lighter than a DDG 1000. O’Rourke wrote that if the Navy wanted its new Burkes to have a radar system comparable to the one meant for the DDG 1000, there’s a good chance the new destroyers would need to be longer and heavier, or lose some of their existing weapons. One alternative, he wrote, was to mount an advanced new radar on what he called a “non-combat adjunct ship,” a vessel built around the powerful dual-band radar that was to have been fitted in the DDG 1000’s composite deckhouse. The radar ship wouldn’t be armed, but would travel with surface task groups and feed the other ships data from its sensors. If there were an attack, the warship escorts in formation with the radar ship would need to defend it.

From Flight International DATE: 04/08/08 SOURCE: Flight International US Navy discloses three-year, 36-aircraft buy for P-8A By Stephen Trimble The US Navy clarified today that it will order 36 Boeing P-8A Poseidons during the first three years of production, perhaps further opening the door to accelerating the in-service date by one year. The Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) disclosed the purchasing plans for the first three low-rate initial production (LRIP) lots from 2010 to 2012 on the Federal Business Opportunities web site. NAVAIR expects to order 10 aircraft in fiscal 2010, followed by 12 in FY2011 and 14 in FY2012. Advance procurement funds for the first batch in FY2010 must be awarded to Boeing next year. Nearly $6.3 billion has been set aside in long-range budget plans for the LIRP phase to buy all 36 aircraft, averaging about $175 million for each P-8A. The in-service date for the first P-8A unit is scheduled for late 2013, but Boeing promised NAVAIR it could accelerate this schedule by up to one year when the contract was awarded in 2004. An airframe fatigue crisis facing the Lockheed P-3 Orion fleet has recently forced NAVAIR to publicly consider accepting Boeing’s offer to accelerate deliveries. Under the LRIP production schedule, the first 10 aircraft should be delivered in FY2012, which may be enough aircraft for the USN to declare the first unit operational. Five developmental prototypes are now in various stages of assembly, with the first expected to achieve first flight in the fourth quarter of 2009. The land-based P-8A is being designed primarily to hunt for submarines.

There are (as yet) no provision for acoustic countermeasures or decoys, so its a simple case of detecting the torpedo (note that torpedo noise signature varies) and then running like h*ll in the opposite direction.

Warhorse, I just created a test scenario using HCDB-080712. I dropped a Mk 50 Barracuda right on top of a racing Akula and scored a hit (and a kill) with that first shot. I expect your own bad luck was simply that, or else you dropped outside of acquisition range and the torpedoes failed to acquire.

Acquisition range for the Mk 50 Barracuda is 3,000 yds.

Added No.24.

Yep, I had the same thoughts (and from the tone of the ARES report, so did they).

Seems JASSM is back from the brink and is proving itself ... maybe? From ARES Blog Sue Payton's "Kick Ass Missile" Posted by Amy Butler at 8/1/2008 10:49 AM CDT Take a look at the slick new video made by Lockheed Martin and showing its new cruise missile's recent successes. Company officials say the video has not been doctored in any way, and the images were captured from test video. After dipping to an all-time low reliability last year of 58% and experiencing a major cost overrun, the Air Force now reports the fixes to the stealthy cruise missile have boosted reliability to 88%. Good thing, since the weapon costs nearly $1 million per copy. Sue Patyon, the Air Force's acquisition chief, says the weapon is just what she asked for: a kick ass missile. ** Meanwhile, from another ARES report, it seems the AGM-129 Advanced Cruise Missile (now being withdrawn) was a lame duck: "The [Advanced Cruise Missiles] are considered so unreliable, Air Force officials say, that they have to target at least three to ensure a single hit."

Added No.23.

Any guesses as to the identity of the "classified threat"? Anti-ship ballistic missiles?

From DefenseNews Navy: No Need to Add DDG 1000s After All By philip ewing Published: 1 Aug 08:18 EDT (12:18 GMT) Top Navy acquisition officials dramatically reversed course during a congressional hearing July 31, saying the service needed to purchase more Arleigh Burke-class DDG 51 destroyers, and no longer needs the next-generation destroyer it has been pushing for over the past 13 years. This, after years of vigorously claiming the service needed to move beyond the 1980s technology in the Burkes and leap ahead with the new ship, the DDG 1000 Zumwalt class. Now, they're saying the Zumwalts just won't cut it, citing the planned ship's inability to fire advanced versions of the Standard Missile, contradicting previous industry claims. They also said there was a new "classified threat" for which the Burkes are better suited but would not go into specifics. Speaking for the Navy were Vice Adm. Barry McCullough, deputy chief of naval operations for integration of resources and capabilities; and Allison Stiller, deputy assistant secretary of the Navy for ship programs. "Now, we're turning on a dime," mused Rep. Joe Sestak, D-Pa., a former Navy vice admiral, after hearing their testimony. In earlier congressional and public discussions, the sticking point for the DDG 1000 had been its cost, which is now estimated to be $3.2 billion per copy. Rep. Gene Taylor, D-Miss., chairman of the House Armed Service's Seapower subcommittee earlier this year struck the third Zumwalt from the Navy's budget request because he said ballooning costs for the advanced warships would bankrupt the Navy's acquisitions budget. Navy leaders confirmed last week that they would end the ship class at two hulls, nixing earlier plans to build seven ships. Before that, the Navy had called for 32 hulls. At the hearing, Taylor maintained his stance that cost was the biggest problem with the program. But the Navy's stated position July 31 wasn't that officials couldn't control the costs for its future ships but that the world threat picture had changed in such a way that it now makes more sense to build at least eight more Burkes. Precise details were still unclear for when the ships would be built and how they'd be outfitted. "Why not go with the Zumwalt if you don't care about affordability?" Sestak asked. Taylor, interjecting, said affordability may not have been a consideration for Navy planners, but it remained important to the subcommittee. But McCullough maintained that more Burkes are needed to counter: a bigger threat from ballistic missiles; sea-skimming anti-ship cruise missiles; and quiet diesel-electric submarines. They also told subcommittee members that the Marine Corps no longer needs the long-range fire support from the Zumwalts' 155mm Advanced Gun System, because such fire support could be provided by Tactical Tomahawk cruise missiles and precision airstrikes. McCullough said the Marine Corps agreed, although a spokesman for Headquarters Marine Corps, Capt. Carl Redding, said he could not immediately confirm there had been a new accord with the Navy. A second panel of congressional Navy experts, including Ron O'Rourke of the Congressional Research Service and Eric Labs of the Congressional Budget Office, told lawmakers they hadn't heard before McCullough mentioned it July 31 that the Marine Corps had withdrawn its requirement for long-range fire support from offshore naval guns. Reporters weren't able to ask McCullough or Stiller for details about the acquisition plan for the new Burkes or the Marine Corps fire support issue. Surrounded by a phalanx of aides, McCullough and Stiller jogged from the hearing room and out the door of the Rayburn House Office Building into a waiting motorcade, ignoring shouted questions from journalists. It was a departure from previous hearings, where it's not out of the ordinary for witnesses to stop and answer reporters' questions after giving testimony. Earlier in the hearing, many subcommittee members appeared incredulous that the Navy could have conducted such a sweeping re-evaluation of the world threat picture in just a few weeks, after spending some 13 years and $10 billion on the surface ship program known as DD 21, then DD(X) and finally, DDG 1000. That figure does not include the money spent for the two hulls. Rep. Niki Tsongas, D-Mass., noted that in March, McCullough told Congress that DDG 1000 was critical the Navy's future missions. Did he still stand by his testimony? McCullough and Stiller said they still thought the ship would be highly capable, but more Burkes would be better for today's asymmetrical threats. McCullough cited the Lebanese terrorist group Hezbollah's anti-ship missile attack on an Israeli patrol boat in 2006. Rep. Jim Langevin, D-R.I., asked why the Navy had made such an about-face after it had already asked for a third DDG 1000 in this year's budget request. Had the Navy done an analysis of alternatives, or consulted with other military commanders, before deciding to stop building DDG 1000 after two ships? No, McCullough said, adding that when Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Gary Roughead started his job last October, the new Navy leader pointed out an "asymmetric mismatch" in what the Navy would need and the types of ships it was building. The service had "excess capacity in fire support," so it didn't need more of the new ships it has been planning, in various stages, since 1995. McCullough and Stiller added that Roughead still has not given his final approval on eliminating the five ships beyond the two the Navy has already ordered. In the second panel, Paul Francis, an acquisitions expert with the Government Accountability Office, said the fire support issue came as a "surprise" to him. Sestak said he was worried about what he called the recent "sea change" the Navy had apparently undergone in the threats it perceived over the next few years. "My issue today is one of credibility. Not of an individual but of a process. I don't know what the strategic sense of the Navy is today," he said. "Whither the Navy of the future?" Staff writer Bryan Mitchell contributed to this report. [CV32: Emphasis mine. It all sounds remotely familiar, no? ]

Done. Will appear in the next HCDB update. Thanks for pointing it out.

The EH-60 Quick Fix is an old platform entry. And you're right, it does need a radar for the jammer to work. I'll review the DB entry, probably add a weather radar to serve the purpose.

From Air Force Times Ecuador: U.S. must leave Manta next year By Gonzalo Solano - The Associated Press Posted : Wednesday Jul 30, 2008 9:42:50 EDT QUITO, Ecuador — The U.S. military must stop using its only outpost in South America for anti-drug flights when Washington’s 10-year lease on the base in Ecuador expires in 2009, the Foreign Ministry said Tuesday. Leftist President Rafael Correa has repeatedly said that Ecuador would not renew the agreement to use the Manta air base, but Tuesday’s Foreign Ministry statement said the South American nation has now formally notified the U.S. Embassy of the decision. Some 300 U.S. troops are stationed at the Pacific base, and flights from Manta are responsible for about 60 percent of U.S. drug interdiction in the eastern Pacific. The statement said that surveillance flights will end in August 2009 “and the withdrawal of foreign personnel from the Ecuadorean Air Force base in Manta will end in November of that year.” The U.S. and Ecuador signed the 10-year agreement in Nov. 12, 1999. U.S. military officials have said that Washington is not planning to set up an alternative to the base in neighboring Colombia or Peru. The U.S. government has previously said it will respect Ecuador’s decision. A draft constitution backed by Correa that was recently approved by a special assembly, abolishes any foreign military bases on Ecuadorean soil. The draft charter must still be approved by voters in a referendum. Ecuador produces very little cocaine but is often used as a transit country for drugs sent from Colombia and Peru — the world’s top two cocaine producers — to the U.S.

From Stratfor China, the Olympics and the Visa Mystery July 29, 2008 By Rodger Baker Something extraordinary is happening in China, and we are not talking about the Olympics. Rather, Chinese officials have been clamping down on visa applications and implementing bureaucratic impediments to new and renewed visa applications under the guise of pre-Olympic security. In some ways, Beijing’s plan for a safe and secure Olympics appears based on the premise that if no one shows up, there can be no trouble. But placing restrictions on the movement of managers and employees of foreign businesses operating in China, even if for a limited time as Chinese officials have been at pains to reassure, makes little sense from the standpoint of gaining political and economic benefits from hosting the Olympics. Something just isn’t right. The Post-’70s Economic Framework Since China’s economic reform and opening in the late 1970s, China’s economic policy — and thus the basis for the overall development of the nation — has been based on a simple two-part framework. First, draw in as much foreign investment as possible and use the money and technology to strengthen China while using the subsequent economic leverage to secure China. And second, encourage growth for growth’s sake to ensure an ever-increasing flow of money through the system to provide employment and social services to a massive and urbanizing population. Key to this policy has been creating a very open environment for foreign businesses, which bring money, technology and expertise and use their influence with their own governments to keep stable international relations with China — hence reducing international and economic frictions and increasing the efficiency of the supply chain. For more than two decades, Chinese national strategy has thus revolved around the principle of encouraging investment, joint ventures and wholly-owned foreign enterprises in China. There have been two foundations for this strategy: the evolution of financial facilities for transferring and controlling foreign money with a level of transparency nearing international standards, and the ease of movement of personnel in and out of China. It is this latter point that recently has been hit the hardest. Over the past several months as the Beijing Olympics drew nearer, the Chinese government has effectively frozen up most financial reform plans. It also has issued a raft of new security measures not entirely unlike other host cities in the post 9/11 security environment. But China has gone several steps further than its predecessor hosts, placing official and bureaucratic impediments on visa applications. This not only has targeted potential “troublemaking” rights advocates, it has also impacted foreign businesses ranging from invited guests to the Olympic games to managers and employees of foreign companies in China. Business and the New Visa Hassles The visa restrictions in particular have been a source of angst for foreign businesses and business associations. Many smaller operations may circumvent Chinese regulations and travel on tourist visas (provided they can still obtain them). And there are ways around the tighter regulations or bureaucratic hurdles if one has the right connections or the willingness to apply several times or from different locations. But multinational corporations are less willing to jeopardize their operations by skirting the laws. Instead, they are making their concerns known to Beijing and hoping that restrictions are eased in September, as Beijing has rumored and hinted will occur. In general, these visa restrictions have been brushed aside by foreign observers as simply paranoia on China’s part regarding protests or terrorist attacks during the Olympics. In many ways, however, this makes little sense. First and most obvious, the Olympics were supposed to highlight the opening of China — not restrict the very people who have made China a key part of the global economy. Second, imposing tight restrictions in Shanghai, the center of the Chinese foreign-domestic economic nexus, makes little sense on grounds of Olympic security since Shanghai is playing only a minor role in the games compared to Beijing and Qingdao. (Think shutting down visas to New York during the Atlanta games in the name of security, though Shanghai admittedly is hosting some soccer matches.) Shutting down business visas to keep terrorists out makes little sense anyway — it is hard to imagine Uighur militants traveling on business visas as representatives of foreign multinationals. Furthermore, by restricting business visas — even if not across the board in a coherent fashion — China is putting a massive strain not only on the ability of businesses to trust Chinese regulations and business relations with the government, but also on the fluidity of the global supply chain. Shutting down or impeding visas affects much more than delaying the movement of a single individual into China; it impacts the ability of multinational corporations to move, replace or supplement managers and dealmakers in China. A delayed visa applications of just three months still represents an entire quarter that multinational corporations cannot reliably manage their businesses operations i n China, and that doesn’t take into account the visa backlog when restrictions are loosened or lifted. Disrupting an integral part of the global economy for a full quarter because of an international exposition makes little sense. The Germans in 1936 didn’t do it, the Russians in 1980 didn’t — no one has. One doesn’t simply shut down international business transactions for three months or more to stop a terrorist — and particularly not China, which depends on foreign direct investment. This is not simply an inconvenience for some people: It is the imposition of friction on a part of the system that is supposed to be frictionless. And it is not merely individuals who are affected, but the relations between mammoth companies. A Period of Erratic Policies China’s behavior has been erratic for several months now, if not for the past few years, with the implementation of new and often contradictory security and economic policies. These have all been brushed aside as somehow related to preparation for the Olympics. But they are in fact anomalous. China’s behavior is not that of a country trying to show its best side for the international community, nor that of a nation simply concerned about potential terrorist or public relations threats to the Olympic games. In another two months, after the Olympics and Paralympics have ended, it will become clearer whether this was a spate of excessive paranoia or a reflection of a much more significant crisis facing the Chinese leadership — and the evidence increasingly points toward the latter. As mentioned, China’s economic policies in the reform and opening era have been based on the idea of growth. This in many ways simply reflects the Asian economic model of maintaining cheap lending policies at home, subsidizing exports, flowing money through the system and focusing on revenue rather than profits. In essence, it is growth for the sake of growth. This was the policy of Japan, South Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand. And it led each of those countries to a final crisis point, striking Japan first in the early 1990s and the rest of the Asian tigers a few years later. But China managed to avoid each of the previous Asian economic crises points, as it was on the lagging end of growth and investment curves. Following the Asian economic crisis, China fully recovered from the international stigma of Tiananmen Square and became the global economic darling. By the time the 21st century rolled around, China was already taking on the mantle of the Japanese and other Asians. It began to be labeled both an economic miracle and a rising power; a future challenge to U.S. economic dominance with all the political ramifications that brought. Were it not for 9/11, Washington would have squared off with Beijing to prevent the so-called China rise. The reprieve of international pressure that came when U.S. attention turned squarely toward Afghanistan and then Iraq freed China’s leaders from an external stress that could have brought about a very different set of economic and political decisions. With the United States preoccupied, and no other major power really challenging China, Beijing shifted its attention to domestic issues, and its review quickly revealed the stresses to the system. These did not primarily come from “splittist” forces like the Tibetans or the Falun Gong, but rather from the economic policies that had brought China from the Third World to the center of the global economic system. Beijing is well-aware that should it continue with its current economic policies, it will face the same risk of crisis as Japan, South Korea and the rest of Asia. It is also aware that growing internal challenges — from the spread and invasiveness of corruption to geographic economic imbalances, from rising social unrest to massive dislocation of populations ̵ 2; are causing immediate problems. Economics from Mao to Hu Mao Zedong built a China designed to be self-sufficient and massively redundant. Every province, every city, every factory was supposed to be a self-contained unit, making the country capable of weathering nearly any military attack. Deng Xiaoping didn’t get rid of these redundancies when he opened the economy to foreign investment. Instead, he and his successors encouraged local officials to work to attract foreign investment and technology so as to raise China’s economic standard more rapidly. By the time Jiang Zemin was in power it had become clear that the regionally and locally driven economic policies threatened to throw China back into its old cycle of decentralization — and, ultimately, competing centers of power. Attempts by Jiang to correct this through the Go West program, for example, came to naught after meeting massive resistance in the wealthy c oastal provinces. The central government accordingly backed off, shifting its attention to reclaiming centralized authority over the military. Hu Jintao has sought once again to try to address the problem of the concentration of economic power in China’s coastal provinces and cities through his Harmonious Society initiative. The idea is to redistribute wealth and economic power, regain central authority over the economy, and at the same time reduce redundancies and inefficiencies in the Chinese economy. With minimal external interference, Hu was able to test policies that by their very nature were going to sacrifice short-term social stability in the name of long-term economic stability. Growth was replaced by sustainability as the target; longer-term redistribution of economic growth engines would replace short-term employment and social stability. This was a risky proposition, and one that met strong resistance in China. But the alternative was to sit back and wait for the inevitable economic crisis and the social repercussions thereto. In some ways, Hu was suggesting that China risk stability in the short term to preserve stability in the long run. But Hu didn’t anticipate the massive surge in global commodity prices, particularly of food and oil. This was compounded by increased international scrutiny over China’s human rights record ahead of the Olympics, natural disasters hitting at the availability and distribution of goods, a rise in domestic social unrest triggered by local government policies and economic corruption, several attempted and successful attacks against China’s transportation infrastructure, and the uprising in Tibet. Thus, the already-risky policies the central government was pursuing suddenly looked more destructive than constructive from the point of view of continued rule by the Communist Party of China (CPC). The global economic slowdown was the external impetus China feared — something that could undermine the flow of capital and leave Beijing unable to control the outcome of a reduction in the inflow of capital. At the same time, the internal social tensions triggered both by Hu’s attempts to reshape the Chinese economy and by the slow pace of those changes created a crisis for the Chinese leadership. It was hard enough internally to control a measured economic slowdown to reshape the economic structure of China, but quite another thing altogether to have such a slowdown imposed on China from outside at the very moment social stability was in a critical state at home. A Government in Crisis China’s rapid and contradictory economic and security policies, rising social tensions, and seemingly counterproductive visa regulations appear to be signs of a government in crisis. They are the reactionary policies of a central leadership trying to preserve its authority, stabilize social stability and postpone an economic crisis. At the same time, we see signs that the local governments, and even organs of the central government, are putting up steady resistance to the announcements coming from Beijing. Slapping restrictions on foreign businessmen may make little sense from a broader business continuity sense, but if the point is to begin breaking the backs of the local governments — whose strength lies in their relations with foreign businesses — then the moves may make more sense. If the central government has reached the point that it is willing to risk its international business role to rein in wayward local officials, however, then the Chinese leadership sees a major crisis looming or already under way. It is one thing to toss out a few local leaders and replace them, quite another to undermine the structure of the Chinese economy for the sake of regaining control over local officials. But if Chinese history since 1949 (and really quite a ways before) is any guide, the core of the CPC leadership is willing to sacrifice social and economic stability to preserve power. One need only look at the Great Leap Forward, the Cultural Revolution or the crackdown at Tiananmen Square for evidence of this. Revolution is not, after all, a dinner party, and maintaining CPC control is paramount to the government. After each major revolution or crisis, China eventually has recovered. The Cultural Revolution was followed by diplomatic relations with the United States, Tiananmen Square was put aside as China joined the World Trade Organization and surged ahead in gross domestic product (GDP). Certainly, there was change among the leadership and in the way the party dealt with policies at home and abroad. But if there is the likelihood of loss of control due to an impending economic crisis, better to have some role in shaping the crisis to preserve the chance of maintaining a role in the future political structure than to sit by and try to clean up as things fall apart. The Party in fact has a long history of taking a self-generated crisis/revolution over an externally or domestically initiated one. It may be that the contradictory policies Beijing is tossing around these days will simply fade away after September and things will get back to “normal.” But already, Chinese officials are downplaying the previously hyped political and economic benefits of the Olympic games. They are now warning that economic conditions may not be so strong in the future, and at least internally discussing the distinct possibility that at least certain regions of China are facing the same economic crises faced by their mentors Japan, South Korea and the Asian tigers. Internal Crises vs. the Economy A recent article in the Global Times, a paper that addresses myriad topics of domestic and international significance and is read among China’s leaders, discussed how economics is not the best measure of strength. It referred to the overall comparative GDP and the size of China’s military in the late 1800s. Then, China was considered at its weakest, but from an economic or military perspective it could have been considered comparable to the global powers of the day. This hints at the deeper internal debate in Beijing, where true national strength and the role of the economy is under discussion. Assumptions that China is only focused on continued good economic ties with the world shouldn’t be taken as gospel — China has a track record of shutting down external connections when internal crises brew. Numerous polices are being thrown around in firefighting fashion, including blocking or at least hindering foreign business movement in and out of the country and tightening the flow of foreign capital in both directions. They are coming in reaction to flare-ups in economic, environmental, public relations and social arenas. Energy policies are making less sense, imbalances in supply and demand are growing and seemingly contradictory policies are being issued. Social unrest, or at least local media coverage of such unrest, seems to be increasing; either is a sign of weakening control. Local officials are still failing to fall in line with central government edicts. Strategic state enterprises like China National Petroleum Corp., China Petroleum & Chemical Corp. and the China Development Bank are all defyi ng state-council orders — and the State Council itself is apparently going head-to-head with major policy bodies long given control over economic policies. Something extraordinary is happening in China. And while not everyone may want that to be the case, and so have sought to use the Olympics to explain things away, the easy explanation simply doesn’t make enough sense.

No problem. As you know, we operate at the 'bleeding edge' around here.

Nothing. I have to do a little juggling of the ADCAP allocations. The Ohio SSGN may need updating in that respect, for example.

From Navy Times Russian reports: Fastest sub to be scrapped By Philip Ewing - Staff writer Posted : Tuesday Jul 29, 2008 11:57:35 EDT The fastest attack submarine ever built, Russia’s one-of-a-kind Papa-class guided missile boat, is at last being scrapped after a long fleet career and an ignominious retirement, Russian news agencies reported Monday. The submarine, known first as the K-162 and later the K-222 to its Northern Fleet crews, clocked a speed of 44.7 knots during sea trials in 1969, according to the nuclear watchdog Bellona. The ship served as a technology demonstrator for the subsequent high-speed, deep-diving Alfa class. The ship achieved its high speed by using a novel titanium hull and a pair of pressurized water reactors, according to Bellona. The news agency Russia Today reported that its crew called the K-222 “the Golden Fish,” a reference as much to its high operating cost as its distinction as the world’s fastest sub. The ship was very noisy and uncomfortable at its top speed, Russia Today reported. In addition to pioneering the high-speed technologies that later were incorporated into the Alfa class, the K-222 also led to the Russian Charlie-class guided missile submarines, built to fire cruise missiles at U.S. Navy carrier groups. The Papa-class carried 10 S-S-N-9 “Siren” missiles, according to Jane’s Fighting Ships. The K-222 suffered some kind of accident with one of its nuclear reactors in 1980, according to Bellona, although details were unclear, and has been in mothballs since the mid-1980s. The ship is to be scrapped at the Russian port of Severodvinsk, at the only plant capable of cutting apart its titanium hull.

The Mk 48 Mod 7 CBASS variant was added in HCDB-080712 and appears in the Virginia class SSN.

As mentioned, there are no plans (to my knowledge) to integrate Harpoon with the JSF. And Warhorse's point about the use of guided bombs is well made; I think there is an expectation that the latest 'moving target' capable versions of JDAM and like weapons will serve more than adequately in the ASuW role. One of the problems with modeling a stealthy aircraft like the JSF in HCE is that you can't really model the degradation of stealth caused by hanging weapons on pylons (outside the internal weapons bay). You could potentially create two models of the JSF - one using internal weaps and the other external - but I think that would be quite cumbersome.

From Defense Aerospace Nation's First Littoral Combat Ship Under Way (Source: Lockheed Martin; issued July 28, 2008) MARINETTE, Wis. --- History was made today when the nation's first Littoral Combat Ship, Freedom (LCS 1), put to sea for the first time, marking the beginning of Builder's Sea Trials for the first-in-class coastal surface combatant. The agile 378-foot Freedom, designed and built by a Lockheed Martin (NYSE: LMT - News)-led industry team, is conducting Builder's Sea Trials in Lake Michigan. The trials -- which are a coordinated effort between the U.S. Navy and the Lockheed Martin team -- will include operational testing of the vessel's propulsion, communications, navigation and mission systems, as well as all related support systems. "Freedom is now under way. Our team is looking forward to this trials period to demonstrate all the capabilities our unique design for LCS will bring to the Navy," said Joe North, director for Lockheed Martin's Littoral Combat Ship program. "We're pleased to be closing in on delivering this advanced warship to the Sailors who protect our nation all over the world." Following the completion of Builder's Sea Trials, Freedom will return to Marinette Marine to prepare for Acceptance Trials that will be conducted by the U.S. Navy's Board of Inspection and Survey. LCS 1 will be delivered to the Navy later this year and home ported in San Diego, CA. The Lockheed Martin team's design for LCS is a survivable, semi-planing steel monohull that provides outstanding maneuverability with proven sea-keeping characteristics to support launch and recovery operations, mission execution and optimum crew comfort. Team members also include naval architect Gibbs & Cox, ship builders Marinette Marine, a subsidiary of The Manitowoc Company, Inc. and Bollinger Shipyards, as well as best-of-industry domestic and international teammates to provide a flexible, low-risk war fighting solution. Headquartered in Bethesda, MD, Lockheed Martin employs about 140,000 people worldwide and is principally engaged in the research, design, development, manufacture, integration and sustainment of advanced technology systems, products and services. The Corporation reported 2007 sales of $41.9 billion.

I'm partial to the Arleigh Burke class, and there will always be a special place of fondness for USS Ronald Reagan (CVN 76).