CV32

From DefenseNews DoD: U.S. Needs Stealthy Airlifter By JOHN T. BENNETT Published: 8 March 2010 By the 2020s, U.S. special-forces troops will need a stealthy new airlifter to sneak past ever-improving radar and missile systems into "denied areas," says the Pentagon's top civilian special operations official. "At some point, serious consideration will need to be given to the development and fielding of a more survivable, long-range SOF [special operations forces] air mobility platform that exploits advances in signature reduction and electronic attack," Michael Vickers, assistant U.S. defense secretary for special operations, low-intensity conflict and interdependent capabilities, said during a March 4 interview at the Pentagon. "We don't have to decide today" what to buy, but the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review probably "will have to look at this pretty hard." Currently, U.S. special operators use a mix of helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft, like modified C-130 transports, to move by air. While it's too early to determine what a new stealth transporter might look like or how much it would cost, Vickers said "it will be expensive" and look less like a modified C-130 and more like a traditional stealth aircraft. He also said the need for range would force it to operate from land bases, not ships. The Pentagon flies stealthy F-22 fighters and B-2 bombers, but the development of a radar-avoiding airlifter could require a radically different design. "This is a tough one," said Ronald Epstein, an analyst at Banc of America Securities-Merrill Lynch. "You have to carry a lot of weight." The most likely choice, Epstein said, is a blended-wing aircraft. A NASA fact sheet shows a concept for a blended-wing airliner that resembles a flying wing with a thick airfoil-shaped fuselage section. But Epstein said a flying wing design "wouldn't give you the volume you need, especially to get all the gear in with them." Another option might be a swing wing that would look like a B-2 bomber in flight, and then could "swing to look more like a C-130 for the insertion part," Epstein said. Several Pentagon veterans and defense analysts said they agree about the need for a stealthy insertion plane in an era of improving air defenses. "The issue for the SOF community, however, has been, and remains, cost," said Barry Watts, a former director of the Pentagon's Program Evaluation and Analysis directorate who now is an analyst at Washington's Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. "I am skeptical that the SOF community will find the funding to procure the kind of insertion platform they need." But Pentagon leaders appear determined to stay ahead of potential adversaries who are improving their ability to keep U.S. forces at bay. Just weeks ago, the 2010 QDR declared weapons and vehicles that can break through or outmaneuver anti-access systems are "funda-mental to the nation's ability to protect its interests and to provide security in key regions." The drive to create this arsenal will reshape DoD spending discussions, said Peter Huessy, a defense and national security consultant. "I think the major debate within the defense budget over the next five years will come in" the anti-access realm, Huessy said. For the next few years, U.S. special operations forces will use their modified C-130s and helicopters to go where their secret missions send them. But a decade hence, defenses will be much more able to lock onto the planes' radar, infrared, and acoustic signatures. "The air defense environments are becoming so threatening, particularly because of these advanced, double-digit [surface-to-air missiles], that it's driving our air forces - Navy and Air Force - to signature reduction and electronic attack to penetrate those defenses," Vickers said. "So, at some point, if I ... also want to insert SOF in, or if I can only put in a B-2 or its successor, then I'm kidding myself if I think a clever C-130 is going to get in there with terrain-following radar." Watts concurred. "Mike's right: An upgraded C-130 isn't going to get the job done in the face of double-digit SAMs." Vickers said the new aircraft will not likely resemble today's MC-130s. "If you want the signature reduction, it would have to look more like stealth aircraft," he said. Not all things will be possible. For instance, he said, "you would make tradeoffs between payload and a number of things to maximize the survivability aspects of the aircraft. You may not get the short takeoff or landing on hard strips that we would like to see." Vickers said the Pentagon might also decide to buy a variety of aircraft to meet SOF needs. A long-range, stealthy insertion airplane would not be needed "everywhere in the world, so you might have a high-low mix," he said. "But if I say, 'I want to put them into this area where only the leading edge of air power is going,' I would need corresponding technology." "Not every contingency by any stretch will require these capabilities; just [a] small set," he said. "But when you need it, you need it." Purpose-Built Airlifter? Today's special-forces airlifters are generally upgraded versions of military airlifters, but "the idea of taking a transport aircraft that moves GPFs [general-purpose forces] around and then modifying that may be coming to an end," Vickers said. Nevertheless, he said his special operations/low-intensity shop would closely follow relevant technology work elsewhere in DoD. "A SOF program would probably follow on larger efforts in this realm, taking advantage of work the services have done elsewhere so it might not take us as long as [it] takes them," Vickers said. Still, such a development effort is "typically, a decade or so of effort," he said. U.S. Air Force Special Operations Command has been studying possible stealthy airlifters for years as part of its M-X program. And several major U.S. defense firms from time to time have floated conceptual solutions. Vickers added that the next-generation SOF airlifter will likely fly from ground bases, not ships, because of the ranges involved. "These [enemy] capabilities and the variety of them can push you out further, and threaten your close-in bases. And then when you try to penetrate, they've got all these defenses that make life tough for you there," he said. "Depending on their geographic depth and where the target is, you compound your problem in that you've got to go a long way. That range problem ... generally drives you to land-based." Still, he said, for missions like taking out "coastal targets, then a sea-based capability might make sense." Loren Thompson, a defense analyst at the Lexington Institute, said big-ticket acquisition programs could make SOF less attractive to Washington. "Political appointees have been enamored with SOF throughout this decade," he said, but "once SOF starts demanding big money for items like stealthy insertion aircraft, its appeal will wane." What's more, Thompson said, as acquisition program costs grow, so does congressional poking around for details on how federal funds are being spent. "As the budgetary footprint of SOF grows," he said, "legislators will want to know more, and that could lead to controversy about the role of such capabilities in our overall defense posture."

From DefenseNews Containers, Motherships and Multimission Modules - Boxes as the U.S. Navy's New Vision? By CMDR. GREG PARKER Published: 8 March 2010 Last month, the Navy's first Littoral Combat Ship, USS Freedom, began its inaugural deployment to the Caribbean Sea and South America. Designed to address the Navy's capability gap in the "green water" near the world's land masses, or littorals, the LCS represents a change in naval design philosophy from mission-specific ships to a multi-function concept that has begun to pervade the service from top to bottom. With its interchangeable modules - large boxes resembling rail cars tailored for specialized missions ranging from minehunting to reconnaissance - the LCS is a Swiss Army knife by design. But how this emerging multimission ethic comes together with broader, coherent formulations of naval doctrine, policy and even tactics is unclear. While the LCS was designed from the ground up in a plug-and-play fashion, the multimission ethic has infected the larger Navy as well. Indeed, Robert Work, Navy undersecretary and spokesman for the service's most recent 30-year shipbuilding plan, has described all of the Navy's ships, from the LCS to the aircraft carriers, as boxes or capability containers able to individually deploy and act as motherships for wider congregations of vessels and aircraft, manned and unmanned. The new, descriptive vocabulary carries hints of industry and the information age. It is scalable and tailorable to the environment; the ships aggregate, disaggregate and perform distributed operations. There is little of the chest-beating, "wooden ships and iron men" philosophical core of naval heritage here. It is more about networking than naval gunfire, more about sea bases than sinking battleships. If John Paul Jones were alive today, he would indeed proclaim, "I have not yet begun to creatively adapt." It is unclear yet whether Alfred Thayer Mahan, the Navy's 19th-century high priest of seapower, is rolling over in his grave. Noticeably absent in the boxes concept, after all, is talk of Mahanian capital ship battles and blue-water sea control. What is clear is that the Navy is using the multimission mantra to address two existential issues. The first is relevance. Overshadowed by the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Navy continues to argue the importance of the world's littoral regions and maritime strategy in general, especially in the context of a rising, resource-hungry China. The second issue is one of capacity. Hampered both by the 1990s drawdown in defense funds and a striking inability to control shipbuilding costs in the last decade, the Navy operates with an inventory of approximately 285 ships, well below the 600-ship target of the 1980s and a mere shadow of the 6,700 ships it had when World War II ended. Indeed, the LCS itself is as notorious for its cost overruns - from a planned $220 million per ship to approximately $600 million at last count - as it is famous for its new design. That's a big problem: Quantity, after all, has a quality all its own. But if a multifunction ship mitigates the concern about quantity, the broader vision of how these boxes might work together in a new and distinct fashion has not been laid out. Somewhere in the gray area between grand maritime strategy and shipbuilding lies an emerging concept of how the Navy organizes itself and how it views itself as a fleet on the seas, especially for the low end of conflict, the uninspiring realm of piracy, drug trafficking, maritime security and disaster response. The Navy is addressing the high end of conflict, more conventional warfare involving a near peer, with its fledgling Air-Sea Battle Doctrine, a joint effort with the Air Force. There is, however, no comparable Littoral Battle Doctrine. Naval tradition dies hard, and the Navy still deploys the majority of its assets in large, concentrated strike groups centered around major capital ships such as aircraft carriers and amphibious assault ships. The boxes concept suggests something different is afoot, something borrowing from years of obsession with net-centric warfare. It suggests the LCS is not just an overpriced frigate, as its critics have claimed, but the harbinger of a new, modular vision for 21st-century seapower. It suggests that all these floating boxes are somehow more than just a sum of their parts. The Freedom itself, ostensibly deploying two years earlier than planned because of "urgent combatant commander needs," is headed to the warm waters of U.S. Southern Command. Perhaps its maiden deployment is as much about publicity as it is about war fighting. But behind all the gala fanfare lies something more fundamental that bears watching. Like the proverbial iceberg, the emerging boxes concept has only just begun to breach the surface. It may be something profound, and it may be something only passing. Whatever it is, the Navy would do well to substitute solid doctrine and detailed vision for hints, allusions and the rare quote from an interview. Without it, the boxes concept risks remaining perpetually adrift. Cmdr. Greg Parker is a U.S. Navy federal executive fellow with the 21st Century Defense Initiative, Foreign Policy. at the Brookings Institution, Washington.

File Name: Hammerfall (Part 4 of 5) File Submitter: CV32 File Submitted: 8 Mar 2010 File Updated: 9 Mar 2010 File Category: Middle East DB Used: HCDB-100308 Authors: Brad Leyte Battleset-Middle East: .scv - CDB - CDB Hammerfall (Part 4 of 5) A Harpoon Commander's Edition (HCE) scenario for the Middle East Battleset. This scenario is designed for play by the BLUE side. Thus far, this multi part campaign has witnessed Israel carry out a preemptive strike in defense of the nation, only to ignite a wider regional conflict which resulted in the destruction of both Nevatim and Damascus by nuclear fire. Russia has condemned the action and come to the aid of Syria and Iran, moving troops into both countries to help defend against them against what they have called Israel's bald faced nuclear aggression. Though continuing to put up a vigorous defense, Israel is clearly out muscled by the combined power of its enemies. Though late arriving on the scene, an American carrier strike force is now pushing north through the Red Sea. [Version 2.0] Click here to download this file

A good reminder, for sure.

A hard fought battle, thanks for sharing it with us. Sounds to me like the results were a pretty fair guess of could have potentially happened in real life.

Heh, I'm wondering what you guys are doing with all of your spare time?

That's too bad. A lot of great material in HT just waiting for someone to grab it and run with it.

From Flight Global DATE: 05/03/10 SOURCE: Flight International USAF considers options to preserve F-22 production tooling By Stephen Trimble Five months after the US Congress approved the cancellation of the Lockheed Martin F-22, the air force is still deciding whether to preserve or scrap the production tooling. The options under discussion include preserving at least the core of Lockheed's ability to build F-22 components and systems, although restarting production is not the USAF leadership's intent, says acquisition chief Lt Gen Mark Shackelford. Rather, USAF officials are considering the cost of preserving tooling to sustain the F-22, which could include a service life extension programme in several years. The same tooling could also be used to repair or replace damaged Raptors. Shackelford has not discussed the timeline for the USAF's decision-making process. Lockheed is scheduled to deliver the last of 187 F-22s in early 2012, although the long-lead elements of the supply chain could begin shutting down late this year. The Obama administration in September defeated an attempt by F-22 supporters in Congress to continue building the advanced stealth fighter. As lawmakers debated the issue from April to September, the USAF asked the Rand Project Air Force analytical team to study options to ending F-22A production. Rand's team briefed lawmakers on a draft report last June, and the final version of its report was published on 3 March. The Rand team was asked to analyse four different options: shutting down production; continuing full production; scaling back to building five F-22s annually; and restarting production after a two-year delay. Unless the Obama administration reverses course, the only option available now is to restart production after a two-year delay. Taking that step would itself require a dramatic policy change, and require the air force to preserve Lockheed's production capacity. Rand's analysis shows that most of Lockheed's supply chain could be reactivated after two years, with very few suppliers leaving the market or going out of business because of the F-22 termination. But the costs of restarting production after such a shutdown would increase significantly. Assuming a 75-aircraft production run over five years, the average unit cost per F-22 is $227 million. If production continued without stopping, the average is $173 million, according to the Rand study. [CV32: With all of the heat focused on JSF those days, you gotta wonder if this is more than coincidental.]

File Name: Scimitar (Part 3 of 5) File Submitter: CV32 File Submitted: 5 Mar 2010 File Updated: 9 Mar 2010 File Category: Middle East DB Used: HCDB-100304 Authors: Brad Leyte Battleset-Middle East: .scv - CDB - CDB Scimitar (Part 3 of 5) A Harpoon Commander's Edition (HCE) scenario for the Middle East Battleset. This scenario is designed for play by the BLUE side. In this third instalment in a five part series, the crisis in the Middle East has deepened and expanded into a regional war in which old superpowers threaten to become involved. The Israelis have struck the Iranian nuclear facility at Esfahan, and have largely decimated the Syrian air force. But the Syrian army has nevertheless managed to seize positions in the Golan Heights, and ominously, appear to be enjoying Russian military support. So called Russian 'peacekeepers' are arriving in force in Syria, and it appears, in Iran as well. Click here to download this file

Did this one ever get off the ground?

HCDB-100304 Aircraft: F-16C/D Blk 50/52 - Pakistan Heron TP (Eitan) - Israel Ka-28 Helix - Intl Submarines: Kilo II (636/VN) SS - Vietnam

A new version of the official Harpoon Commander's Edition (HCE) Database (HCDB-100304) is now available. Get the new DB in the Download section. New additions (or overhauls of existing entries) include: Aircraft: F-16C/D Blk 50/52 - Pakistan Heron TP (Eitan) - Israel Ka-28 Helix - Intl Submarines: Kilo II (636/VN) SS - Vietnam Enjoy.

Boeing's offer for KC-X

From Aviation Week Boeing Selects 767 for USAF KC-X Tanker Bid Mar 4, 2010 By Amy Butler Boeing’s so-called NewGen Tanker, a 767-based design for the U.S. Air Force KC-X competition, will feature a new refueling boom and a flight deck based on the 787 commercial transport. Company officials announced this afternoon that the aircraft will be based on a 767, but they declined to say which 767 variant is the departure design. An artist’s concept of the design appears to point to a 767-200. In a departure from its last KC-X design proposal, Boeing is using the new flight deck, which they say will provide information displays that are 75% larger than the Airbus A330, on which a potential competitor’s design will be based. A Northrop Grumman/EADS team won the last KC-X competition in February 2008 with the A330-based tanker, which drew from the Multi-role Tanker Transport being built for Australia. But, government auditors found missteps in the Air Force’s source selection and the contract has been terminated in favor of a new competition. Also a departure in Boeing’s new design is “a new generation fly-by-wire boom with an expanded refueling envelope and increased fuel offload rate,” according to Boeing’s announcement. The refueling boom design is more reminiscent of a KC-10 boom rather than that of the KC-135. It is likely this switch was made to achieve the 1,200 gallon-per-minute offload rate demanded by the final KC-X request for proposals (RFP), which was released by the Air Force on Feb. 24. Boeing’s boom offered in the last competition used a ruddervator structure more like the KC-135 boom, according to pictures, although its exact capabilities were shrouded in mystery. The wings on this 767-based tanker appear to be significantly longer than a baseline 767-200 commercial model, perhaps a design choice made to address wing flutter issues experienced on the Italian 767 tanker. However, Boeing officials declined to comment on whether the wings, doors, floors and flaps were being pulled from other commercial models. In the 2007-2008 competition, Boeing’s offering was derided by some as a “Frankentanker” for pulling pieces of its commercial aircraft models into a single new design. This approach was considered by USAF officials to be higher risk at the time. However, in the forthcoming KC-X competition, all 327 requirements are pass/fail, so this approach may not carry the same stigma as it did before. Boeing Defense, Space and Security President Dennis Muilenburg says the design will meet all of the 372 pass/fail requirements. Northrop Grumman/EADS officials have not said yet whether they will bid or back out of the competition as they have threatened. They feel the latest KC-X RFP favors a smaller tanker.

File Name: Paralyzer (Part 2 of 5) File Submitter: CV32 File Submitted: 3 Mar 2010 File Updated: 9 Mar 2010 File Category: Middle East DB Used: HCDB-100206 Authors: Brad Leyte Battleset-Middle East: .scv - CDB - CDB Paralyzer (Part 2 of 5) A Harpoon Commander's Edition (HCE) scenario for the Middle East Battleset. This scenario is designed for play by the BLUE side only. This scenario is the second in a multi part campaign. In the first scenario, called Threshold, we examined what happened when the Israelis carried out a preemptive air strike against what they believed to be a Syrian nuclear weapons research facility. In the aftermath of that action, full scale war has now broken out between Syria and Israel, and Iran is vowing to join the cause against the Zionist aggressors. Click here to download this file

No kidding, she probably could have made that shot 95 times out of 100, ordinarily.

The Simulation-Reality Mismatch By John Michael Loh Manned aircraft will be able to penetrate future advanced defenses. Now somebody tell the simulation gang. Historically, there has been a mismatch between the air combat attrition predictions of analysts’ computer models and the actual attrition experienced in major air campaigns. Simply put, the models have always erred on the pessimistic side. Understanding the sources of this mismatch is important today because many Air Force and Pentagon experts are at it again. This time, they are claiming that even stealthy fifth generation fighters and B-2 bombers cannot penetrate future threat arrays without unacceptable losses. They conclude that the Air Force must depend almost solely on weapons launched from standoff distances to defeat future integrated air defense systems (IADS). If this viewpoint takes hold, the consequences would be severe. Such a belief undermines the perceived value of airpower, weakens our ability to deter potential adversaries, and will raise the cost of equipping future air forces. However, an accurate review of history reveals a far different picture of the ability of USAF aircraft to penetrate contemporary defenses. More here.

File Name: Trophy Hunters File Submitter: CV32 File Submitted: 2 Mar 2010 File Category: South Africa DB Used: HCDB-100206 Authors: Brad Leyte Battleset-South Africa: .scu - CDB - CDB Trophy Hunters A Harpoon Commanders Edition (HCE) scenario for the South Africa Battleset. This scenario is designed for play by the BLUE side only. In 1969, thousands of Chinese workers began arriving at the Tanzanian port of Dar es Salaam and immediately set to work on the TAZARA project, a national railway that would stretch deep into the East African interior and would not only connect remote rural communities but also drive across southern Tanzania into the Zambian copper belt. Back then Tanzanian national leaders had first approached Western nations to assist with the project, but one after another, the USA, Great Britain, and even the United Nations and the Soviet Union, all turned them down. The Communist Chinese, however, seized the opportunity, and now, nearly 50 years later, the investment was paying off in a big way. Large deposits of uranium have been discovered near the northern end of Lake Nyasa, and the People's Republic of China is keen to realize on its long term investment. Unfortunately, the area is also the subject of a longstanding boundary dispute between Tanzania and its western neighbor, Malawi. Perhaps repeating the transgressions of the Western colonial powers more than a hundred years before, the Chinese are not about to permit anything to stand in the way of their plans for strategic economic gain. In response to rising tensions between Malawi and Tanzania, the PRC has moved significant military forces into Tanzania. Click here to download this file

This is exactly the point Tony was making earlier. Whatever changes are made to SAM air defense not only need to account for what degree of control can be exercised by the player, but it absolutely must take into account how the AI will handle its own end of the air defense equation. Any advances or improvements to the player side must not result in a disadvantage for the AI.

After Action Report for 'A Nice Little Shootout' A scenario by Pawel Kurek (PAK) 'A Nice Little Shootout' is a new HCE scenario for the EC2003 GIUK Gap battleset. I played the scenario using beta 2010.001 and the HCDB database. Scenario Background Orders As commander of the NATO (Blue) forces, you are directed to move the friendly amphibious group (AFS) southward at best speed toward safer waters along the Polish coast, while a multinational surface action group (AGS) is directed to try and rendezvous with AFS, to provide it with some better degree of protection against Russian attack. Also, you are directed to scramble as many fighter aircraft as can be mustered from friendly bases in Denmark, Germany, and Poland in an effort to lend support. Intelligence reports high levels of activity at Kaliningrad and in Belarus. Further strikes against NATO naval groups are expected, but the current status of Russian naval forces in the Gulf of Finland is unknown. Despite the high level of tension, the ROE is tight and we are not to engage Russian forces unless fired upon. What Happened My two naval formations are about 100 nm apart in the mid Baltic, east of Kaliningrad, with the phibgru (AFS) moving south at a best speed of 17 kt and the SAG (AGS) racing north at 28 kt. An AWACS was available at Ramstein, so I immediately dispatched it (in company with a tanker) to a position near Laage on the German Baltic coast. Front line airfields at Malbork, Poznan and Lask held a mixture of elderly MiG-29s and new Block 50/52 F-16s, while the airfields at Laage (in Germany) held a small number of very capable Eurofighters and Tornado IDS. The Danish base at Vaerlose was truly multinational, with a grab bag of MLU F-16s, French Rafales and British Typhoons. None was available in great quantity. I immediately launched a curtain of my most capable fighters in anticipation of an impending Russian air attack. The best of these, the Eurofighters and Typhoons, were sent to provide air cover over the retreating naval forces. My expectations were not to be disappointed, as it wasn't long before the Russians launched a wave of heavy air strikes against my front line Polish bases. Malbork was particularly exposed, just 99 nm from the nearest Russian airfield. The ex Warsaw Pact MiG-29 Fulcrums didn't have much to offer in defense of the NATO line, unfortunately, and my small combat air patrol (CAP) had to flee toward Laage soon after exchanging missile fire with intruding Flankers. The presence of Russian jamming did not help. Malbork soon took hits from anti-radar missiles, but sustained only minor damage. F-16s arriving from other Polish bases, bolstered by Eurofighters, took a heavy toll among the attacking force of Fencers and Frogfoots. The Russians soon turned their attention to the NATO naval forces, however, and my defenses there would be tested. Massed raids by Fencers, Frogfoots, and Fullbacks launched a heavy antiship attack against the SAG (AGS). In the event, the Perry class frigate General Pulaski and the light frigate Kazsub both succumbed to missile hits, despite a furious defense offered by the Dutch frigate Evertsen and the Pulaski herself. During a second wave of attacks, before I could effectively reconstitute my air cover, Evertsen sustained heavy damage and was forced to withdraw west toward safer waters along the Swedish coast. The survivors, both Orkan class missile craft, soon linked up with the phibgru and by this time, friendly air cover had arrived. The momentum of the battle had shifted, and NATO aircraft now put up a solid wall of defense against further Russian intrusion. Minimum Victory was soon awarded. I elected to discourage further Russian hostilities by singling out their primary airfield, that at Chernyakhovsk, and give them a healthy dose of offensive counter-air. Tornado IDS strike aircraft battered away at the considerable air defenses, including SA-20 SAM batteries, with HARM, while Rafales launched stealthy SCALP cruise missiles at the airfield. After several sorties, the SA-20 threat had been reduced enough that F-16s could approach close enough to lob JDAMs. In a few more hours, the remaining NATO surface ship forces had arrived in safe waters and the Russians did not elect to press further attacks against them or NATO territory. I did not detect or encounter any Russian surface ships or submarines, though I was seriously fearful of running head long into the latter while trying to flee the battle zone with my ships. I did not achieve Major Victory before time ran out, presumably because I did not completely destroy any Russian bases (just a wild guess on my part). Comments I think Pawel has done a fine job with this scenario, his professed first for HCE. Well done! It appeared to be well researched, and balance was not bad at all. It was in fact exactly as promised, a "fine little shootout", and I enjoyed it thoroughly. Thank you very much for sharing it!

Sounds like a fair amount of scrap metal is piling up along Western European roads, Pete.