Thanks for the links, PAK.

 

The best valued finded in the text, about the 1973 Yom Kippur War:

The Israeli air base of Bir Gifgafa needs 4 hours to repair 5 runway craters,

 

Some other simplified translations from the Portuguese language link:

IWW: First recorded strike on an air base on 24 August 1914, a British plane destroying with one bomb three German airplanes in a grass strip in Lessines. Progressive introduction of air defences, dispersion sites, camouflage, fake bases and plane decoys, reinforced or subterraneous hangars and installations (first air base installations were mere tents), and searchlights.

IIWW: Battle of Britain 1940: Great number of planes destroyed on the ground by the Germans using blitz-krieg tactics in Poland, Norway and France campaigns, but the Luftwaffe attack against air bases not was effective because: small bombs and small bomb loads, effective air defences, a lot of small bases, dispersion sites, and simple grass fields.

IIWW: A air base can be neutralized, but only by continous attacks and only for some hours. As example, Iwo Jima 1945: in a island only 7 Km long X 4 Km wide, some ten weeks before the landing, on 16 February 1945, the air base was attacked by 6.800 bomb tons, 203 guns shots of 406 mm, 6.472 of 203 mm and 15.251 of 155 mm, keeping the base unoperative for only some hours. Craters are repared easily, but continuos attacks precludes effective use of air bases.

- Korean War: New jets, bases with hard runways are required. F-80 Shooting Star forced to operations from Japan (only 4 bases capable of fast jets operations in Japan) after the occupation by North Korean forces of the Kimpo e Suwon bases, only bases capables of operate fast jets.

In Pohang e Taegu were used Perforated Steel Planking (PSP) on the runways, but late was observed than only F-51 Mustang was operable in those surfaces. One F-51 operating from Taegu was equivalent to 4xF-80 operating from Kyushu for close air support. North Korean bases destroyed early in the war, but MiG operating from China sanctuaries.

Damage by 100 lb bomb of easy reparation, the next attacks were with at least 500 lb bombs. Big craters are of most difficult reparation, but repair capability and technics improving in the time, with repair teams each time more efficient. For closing an air bases frequent attacks and reconnaisance are required.

- 1956 Suez Campaign: Airplanes are unprotected in bases without HAS.

- 1967 Six Days War: SA-2 uneffective at low height, none Israeli fighter shoot-down by SA-2. Used Dibber, Israeli rocket-assisted anti-runway penetrating bomb, with retarded blast. Sinai air bases not attacked by Dibber, for not preventing his use after capture by Israeli forces.

- 1973 Arab-Israeli War: Egypt equipped with 1.000 HAS, Israel only capable of destroy one. Only 22 arab planes destroyed in the ground. 500 lb bombs and Maverick uncapables of destroy HAS. Between 9 and 12 hours the Arab bases were out of service after each attack. When the war progress less surprise, better defences and less success in the air base attacks. Akotmiya air base out of action 2 days because continued attacks, Mansura air base closed for 6 days with 7 MiG-21 destroyed on the ground.

F-4E Phantom attacking air bases on 3 waves, each of 8-16 planes. First wave atracting enemy fighters far of the target, second wave attacking enemy fighter over the target, third wave attacking target, first the air defences with dive tossing bombing or cluster bombs, later keeping-on above the target protecting the last attackers, attacking with dumb bombs.

 

The Israeli air base of Bir Gifgafa needs 4 hours to repair 5 runway craters,

 

and control tower destroyed. Ramat David attacked by Syria with FROG rockets, with mixed success. Failed commandoes incursions in Mi-8 against Redfin, Ras Sudar e Tasa.

- Vietnam: Between 1964 and 1973 NVA and Viet-cong attacks American air bases 475 times destroying 99 American or South Vietnamese and damaging 1.170. Other 375 destroyed in attacks against forward or small air bases.

- Vietnam: Four airbases capables of operate jet fighters in North Vietnam (Phuc Yen, Gia Lam, Kep and Kien An). North Vietnam using China as sanctuary and dispersion site. Air bases radar placed some 5-10km from the bases. POL and ammo depots some 10 Km from the bases. Some 70.000 concrete blocks deployed in the bases for fast repairs. The blocks were 1.8x1.8 meters and 20 cm thin. Other blocks 1x1 meter and 16 cm thin. 150 specialized repair troops in each base. Aircraft shelters between 500 meters or 2-3 Km from the runways/taxiways. Taxiways sometimes used as runways. Mi-6 helicopters uses for moving MIGs from the bases to cave shelters 30 Km away, where they were rearmed and mantained, and after returned to the bases from the next exit.

- Vietnam 1967: Kien An attacked 25 times, Hoa Lac 33 times, Kep 29 times and Noi Bai 9 times. Employing time-delayed bombs and mines. One time Kep air base was repaired the same night. As maximum delay, the runways were repaired in 2 days. In 50% of the strikes bases out of operation from 5 hours to some days. In 40% of the strikes bombs impacted in the base, in 30% in the runway, and in 10% in the taxiways. Four bases were out of operation 36 times, on 120 days on a 15 months period.

- Chipre 1974: Nicosia airport needs 5 weeks in peacetime to repair runway and taxiways.

- Falklands 1982: bad accuracy with 1000 lb bombs in the Vulcan attacks against Port Stanley. Only 1 bomb in the runway, preventing his use for fast jets, but not for Pucaras and Hercules, more by fear of loss the fast jets than because real damage in the runway. Limited Argentina repair capability.

- El Dorado Canyon Libya 1986: a number of undispersed planes destroyed. Benina airfield keeps his runway with light in the same attack time.

- Operation Epervier Chad 1986: French strike with 16 Jaguar using Durandal bombs. Later a Libyan radar destroyed using Martel missiles.

- Panama 1989: covert SEAL teams with M-82 heavy sniper rifles near the runways and taxiways preventing the take-off of planes, including the Noriega personal plane.

- In Jugoslavia 1999 each air base received some 600-700 impacts in some 50 strikes, basically Mk82 dumb bombs. Also unexploted precision bombs finded in the runways after the war. In the Obvra Air Base a B-2A with only a past bombed the two runways with 3xJDAM each, cutting each runway in four segments.

- 66 Air Bases in Iraq in 1991. Those of the Project 202 from 1975, and built from mid-1980s, with very reinforced HAS, and with very redundant runways and taxiways, and with emergency runways capables of Il-76 Candid. Allied forces targeted initially the taxiways. Very professional Iraqi repair teams, not attacked by Allied forces (but at the war end the Iraqi repair capability was reduced in 50%). Iraqi repair teams painting fake damage and craters with papier-mache. Taxiways damaged by cluster bombs (Tornado equipped with JP233 is named) repaired in 4-6 hours. Durandal in the USAF inventory but not employed. Cluster bomb in taxiways and runways satured the Iraqi repair capability. When USMC re-takes Kuwait Airport, a lot of unexploted allied submunition of cluster bombs prevent his use. In a second phase, GBU-24 used against runways, and 594 HAS destroyed by the Allied forces with guided bombs, with 10-20 destroyed each night. First attack packs were of 6 planes, later of 20-24 planes. 31 CALCM used against air bases, later B-52 attacking with 1000 lb dumb bombs and cluster bombs.

- In Iraq 2003 Talil Air Base was repaired in 3 days after previous Iraqi sabotage and occupation by US forces.

- The Iraqi forces keep the air bases near constantly operational in 1991, someted to contious allied bombing.

 

I've not idea about if those facts are historical or not, it's only direct translation of relevant paragraphs.

Thanks Enrique. Some relevant data highlighted:

 

* The Israeli air base of Bir Gifgafa needs 4 hours to repair 5 runway craters

* Damage by 100 lb bomb of easy [repair], the next attacks were with at least 500 lb bombs. Big craters are of most difficult [repair], but repair capability and technics improving in the time, with repair teams each time more efficient. For closing an air bases frequent attacks and reconnaisance are required.

* 1973 Arab-Israeli War ... Akotmiya air base out of action 2 days because continued attacks ...

* Vietnam ... Some 70.000 concrete blocks deployed in the bases for fast repairs. The blocks were 1.8x1.8 meters and 20 cm thin. Other blocks 1x1 meter and 16 cm thin. 150 specialized repair troops in each base ... Taxiways sometimes used as runways.

* As maximum delay, the runways were repaired in 2 days. In 50% of the strikes bases out of operation from 5 hours to some days. In 40% of the strikes bombs impacted in the base, in 30% in the runway, and in 10% in the taxiways. Four bases were out of operation 36 times, on 120 days on a 15 months period.

* Iraq in 1991 ... very redundant runways and taxiways, and with emergency runways capables of Il-76 Candid. Allied forces targeted initially the taxiways. Very professional Iraqi repair teams, not attacked by Allied forces (but at the war end the Iraqi repair capability was reduced in 50%). Iraqi repair teams painting fake damage and craters with papier-mache. Taxiways damaged by cluster bombs (Tornado equipped with JP233 is named) repaired in 4-6 hours. Durandal in the USAF inventory but not employed. Cluster bomb in taxiways and runways satured the Iraqi repair capability. When USMC re-takes Kuwait Airport, a lot of unexploted allied submunition of cluster bombs prevent his use. In a second phase, GBU-24 used against runways, and 594 HAS destroyed by the Allied forces with guided bombs, with 10-20 destroyed each night. First attack packs were of 6 planes, later of 20-24 planes. 31 CALCM used against air bases, later B-52 attacking with 1000 lb dumb bombs and cluster bombs.

* The Iraqi forces keep the air bases near constantly operational in 1991, someted to contious allied bombing.

 

All of it seems to confirm the rule of thumb that runways are generally easily repaired, as long as you aren't subjected to continuous attack (a necessity if you are the attacker) and your efforts aren't hampered by such things as mines, submunitions or lack of repair capability.

Currently use of dedicated anti-runway weapons doesn't have much appeal to the player, because planes can still take off from a base with reduced runway. So why bother? More, anti-runway weapons are scarce in HCDB. Changing this problem along the lines you mentioned below, will give the player much more tactical possibilites, which equals more fun! About the code itself - would it be possible to give certain weapons (heaviest guided bombs) something like dual capabilities - I mean when You launch those 2000 lb JDAMs against an airbase You would get an option to use them in antirunway "mode" or in general purpose "mode"? Generally reducing the runway itself should be much made easier and faster then destroying the entire airbase. If not, why bother with going after the runway?

 

I'd offer the opinion that dedicated anti-runway weapons are 'scarce' because the mission itself is extremely risky. They generally required you to overfly the runway/taxiway that you were targeting, usually at low level, and into the teeth of an enemy's air defense systems. NATO continued to explore the idea of standoff anti-runway munitions during the height of the Cold War but most of these (e.g. BKEP, AGM-109H MRASM, etc) died on the vine with the end of that era.

 

I expect dual role anti-runway/general purpose bombs are unlikely to happen anytime soon as far as the code is concerned (speaking for Tony's workload here).

 

I could create a set of general purpose bombs (e.g. Mk 80 series, JDAM, etc) that are 'anti-runway' in the DB, but then they would not be very useful if the player wanted to use them for other targets.

I've once raised the problem of anti-runway ops in HCE http://www.matrixgames.com/forums/tm.asp?m...y=

Currently use of dedicated anti-runway weapons doesn't have much appeal to the player, because planes can still take off from a base with reduced runway. So why bother? More, anti-runway weapons are scarce in HCDB. Changing this problem along the lines you mentioned below, will give the player much more tactical possibilites, which equals more fun!

About the code itself - would it be possible to give certain weapons (heaviest guided bombs) something like dual capabilities - I mean when You launch those 2000 lb JDAMs against an airbase You would get an option to use them in antirunway "mode" or in general purpose "mode"?

Generally reducing the runway itself should be much made easier and faster then destroying the entire airbase. If not, why bother with going after the runway?

 

Brady mentioned 1999's NATO air ops against Yugoslavia - look at the picture of Obvra airbase (one B2 and 6 JDAMs http://tinyurl.com/6cwzy5q

Many interesting pictures http://www.bf2brasil.com/forum/showthread.php?t=35717 - the article looks even more interesting, but it's in portuguese.

 

Honestly, any large ordnance like that is going to leave a large crater in the runway if it hits it. One would think that for even a simple WWII style iron bomb attack you would have a good chance of damaging the runways.

The runway requirements for the aircraft are for combat loaded aircraft IIRC. One that is loaded with only enough fuel to get from base A to base B might not require as long a runway. Would a ferry or 'escape' loadout allow for a safer take-off from a damage shortened runway?

 

We can't currently account for the actual loaded or unloaded weight of an aircraft, so this approach is not presently feasible.

 

I expect the easier, more likely approach will be an 'all or nothing' approach when it comes to whether a damaged runway imposes a risk of aircraft loss or the aborted takeoff idea.

Let's try and focus the discussion now on what remains undecided, which we will need to nail down before we proceed to implement any changes.

 

1. Repair algorithm

 

Things to consider:

 

* time to repair minor, medium or serious damage

* size of installation

* number and size of runways (often related to the size of the installation)

* whether repair capability is influenced by installation size, number and size of runways, and if so, how?

 

2. Chance of aircraft loss during takeoff/landing from damaged runway

 

* whether aircraft risk loss (crashing) on takeoff from or landing to a damaged runway

* what should be the chance of loss be? Tony and I are both leaning toward a small chance, maybe 2%?

* should the risk (percentage chance of loss) rise as the damage to the runway is increased? this is a possibility for future implementation if we choose a single risk value (e.g. 2%) for the interim

 

This, of course, assumes that the aircraft is capable of taking off from or landing upon the damaged runway, i.e. we will prevent takeoff/landing from runways too short to permit operation of the aircraft.

Let's try and focus the discussion now on what remains undecided, which we will need to nail down before we proceed to implement any changes.

 

1. Repair algorithm

 

Things to consider:

 

* time to repair minor, medium or serious damage

* size of installation

* number and size of runways (often related to the size of the installation)

* whether repair capability is influenced by installation size, number and size of runways, and if so, how?

 

I'd equate installation size to be a multiplication of the number of runways times their length as measured in HCE (1=small helo, 6=vlarge as Tony showed us earlier)

I'm working here with the idea of "cuts" and take two "cuts" to reduce a runway's effective length by one HCE length (ie vlarge to large)

I'll call the HCE # for runway length as RWL#

the number of runways as RWN#, the current number of cuts as cuts# and current airfield condition (inverse of damage) as AFD%

My guess at a repair algorithm is:

repair time(hours) per cut = 6/RWL#/RWN#/AFD%

e.g. That means 2 hour for a vlarge two runway airfield at 50% general damage to repair from an effective large runway back to vlarge.

It is rough but simple. It does mean that multi runway airfields get back to full operation much sooner but this reflects not only the larger establishment but also the likely hood that one of the runways is much less damaged.

 

2. Chance of aircraft loss during takeoff/landing from damaged runway

 

* whether aircraft risk loss (crashing) on takeoff from or landing to a damaged runway

* what should be the chance of loss be? Tony and I are both leaning toward a small chance, maybe 2%?

* should the risk (percentage chance of loss) rise as the damage to the runway is increased? this is a possibility for future implementation if we choose a single risk value (e.g. 2%) for the interim

 

This, of course, assumes that the aircraft is capable of taking off from or landing upon the damaged runway, i.e. we will prevent takeoff/landing from runways too short to permit operation of the aircraft.

I keep seeing a tussle between a good simulation and AI getting a fair go.

Will the AI be able to redirect its aircraft soon after the damage has occurred? Will priority be given to undamaged alternative AFs and for long range units how to compromise with distance? How will AI utilise AC that have been redirected?

I don't want to see the player getting a very big reward for minor damage that only takes an hour or so to repair.

That said I think 2% base risk is good. I think it shouldn't go higher for more damage unless AI has some way of making a decision on the risk, maybe just that it only takes the higher risk if there is no suitable AF in range.

 

 

Don Thomas

Will the AI be able to redirect its aircraft soon after the damage has occurred? Will priority be given to undamaged alternative AFs and for long range units how to compromise with distance? How will AI utilise AC that have been redirected?

I don't want to see the player getting a very big reward for minor damage that only takes an hour or so to repair.

That said I think 2% base risk is good. I think it shouldn't go higher for more damage unless AI has some way of making a decision on the risk, maybe just that it only takes the higher risk if there is no suitable AF in range.

 

Thanks Don

 

The AI will redirect aircraft soon after damage. It will land aircraft that can still land on the damaged runway at that runway, it will only divert if some planes in the group need a longer runway.

 

No priority will be given to undamaged airfields at this time.

 

No idea on how to compromise with distance at this point. Likely it will be trivial to land at the closest correct-sized base to the original base.

 

The AI will be pretty stupid about using redirected aircraft since they will not be able to perform an pre-planned duties. So they'll still take off for air intercepts, ship attack, MLU attack but they won't conduct any scenario-designer listed longe range patrols/strikes/ferries since they aren't in the right location.

Killing them is easier but I'd certainly listen to well formed arguments to make them taxi and go back into the Readying pool.

 

One way to look at is would be any aircraft requiring a "Very Large Aircraft" runway at the installation that has been reduced to a "Small aircraft" runway have been "mission killed".

Will the AI be able to redirect its aircraft soon after the damage has occurred? Will priority be given to undamaged alternative AFs and for long range units how to compromise with distance? How will AI utilise AC that have been redirected?

I don't want to see the player getting a very big reward for minor damage that only takes an hour or so to repair.

That said I think 2% base risk is good. I think it shouldn't go higher for more damage unless AI has some way of making a decision on the risk, maybe just that it only takes the higher risk if there is no suitable AF in range.

 

Thanks Don

 

The AI will redirect aircraft soon after damage. It will land aircraft that can still land on the damaged runway at that runway, it will only divert if some planes in the group need a longer runway.

 

No priority will be given to undamaged airfields at this time.

 

No idea on how to compromise with distance at this point. Likely it will be trivial to land at the closest correct-sized base to the original base.

 

The AI will be pretty stupid about using redirected aircraft since they will not be able to perform an pre-planned duties. So they'll still take off for air intercepts, ship attack, MLU attack but they won't conduct any scenario-designer listed longe range patrols/strikes/ferries since they aren't in the right location.

Sounds better than I'd hoped for, at least the aircraft will still be being put to use if possible. Will be interesting to see if targetting runways after SEAD ops will be better value than trying to wipe out the whole base, especially for countries with less technical equipment. Might even be a bonus for AI in the hands of good scenario authors.

Thanks again to you and Brad for so much work and great ideas.

Don Thomas

Yep, and I probably confused things in my last post since I forgot that for now we'll let any plane land at damaged airfields that could have landed before the damage. It will face the 2% chance of crashing but otherwise will not be restricted. That keeps the AI a little more 'in the game' and hopefully it will still put the planes to their original use in repeat patrols and such once the runways are repaired enough.