broncepulido

http://www.hisutton.com/Ukraine-Maritime-Drones-Evolution.html https://www.navyrecognition.com/index.php/naval-news/naval-news-archive/2023/july/13391-idef-2023-ukraine-firm-ste-unveils-maritime-drone-usv-magura-v5.html

Probably of great interest, history of the SQS-26 sonar by one of its designers. Thanks Bob Mack. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA538018.pdf

Thanks!

Some sources: https://www.navyrecognition.com/index.php/naval-news/naval-news-archive/2023/june/13234-exclusive-ukrainian-naval-drones-target-russian-spy-ship-priazovye-in-a-bold-move-amid-ongoing-conflict.html https://www.navyrecognition.com/index.php/focus-analysis/naval-technology/13208-detailed-analysis-unmanned-ukrainian-naval-drone-attacks-russian-reconnaissance-ship-in-black-sea.html http://www.hisutton.com/Implied-Threat-To-TurkStream-Gas-Pipeline.html https://www.thedefensepost.com/2023/06/12/ukraine-black-sea-warship-attack/ https://ac.nato.int/archive/2022/nato-awacs-to-ROU https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_215106.htm https://www.kchf.ru/eng/ship/intelligence/priazovye.htm https://russianships.info/eng/intelligence/project_18280.htm https://russianships.info/eng/intelligence/project_864.htm https://odessa-journal.com/the-fire-at-the-boyko-towers-in-the-black-sea-was-shown-from-space/

Notes on some platforms: - Project 18280 Yuriy Ivanov-class maximum speed is 20 knots (and cruise speed 16), not 16 as usually stated. - For H I Sutton the Ukrainian kamikaze USVs speed is 43 knots. - Ship platform 3264 Suicide Boat is employed as Ukrainian USVs (but her maximum speed is only 30 knots).

View File Black Sea Ghosts. June 2023. Historical Alternate Scenario. A Harpoon Commander's Edition scenario for EC2003 Battle for the Mediterranean Battleset and the HCDB2-170909 (or later) 1980-2025 era Platform Database. This scenario is designed with Advanced Scenario Editor Build 2017.013 and to be run with HCE 2015.008+ or later. This scenario is designed to be played from the Blue/Ukrainian/NATO side or from the Red/Russian. You should play a few times first the Blue side to avoid spoilers, and only later play the Red side. Image: The Soviet Project 864 Meridian-class intelligence collection ship Kareliya (SSV-535), sistership of Priazovye (437) who was involved in the receiving side of the Ukrainian mid-2023 USVs open sea strikes, steaming alongside the U.S. Navy guided missile cruiser USS Texas (CGN-39) in the First Cold War. Texas was assigned to the aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson (CVN-70) for a deployment in the Western Pacific from 15 June to 16 December 1988. US Navy photo by a serviceperson on duty and in consequence on public domain, and took from Wikipedia Commons. From the eventful year of 2014 (Mainly from the Russian invasion of Crimea) the world was beginning clearly the so-called Second Cold War, the President of Russia Vladimir Putin (ex-KGB lieutenant colonel) was showing clearly his plan to recover the Russian Empire including previous Soviet territories for reinstitute the greatness of "his" Russia, and to guarantee his passage on the History as saviour of the Rodina. After the massive Russian build-up of forces from late 2021 in Russia and Belarus near the Ukrainian border, NATO forces were forced to an increased and constant deployment near Ukraine and the Eastern Mediterranean, to deterrent Putin's ambition. The probably original plan was to avoid an intervention by NATO ground forces but preventing the Russian main forces to enter Ukrainian territory, and to get this target to establish an air and sea exclusion zone around and over Ukraine. But at last, on February 24, 2022, Russian forces invaded Ukraine against most forecast, sinking the world in a new state of international relations, as consequence of a long and failed campaign of unexpected outcomes. On the conflict naval side, many new tactics and strategies has been employed as novelties in the Ukrainian campaign, including many that could be called of naval guerrilla warfare. One of the novelties is the employ of USVs (Unmanned Surface Vehicles) not only against moored ships in port, but also against underway ships on open sea. In concrete attacks on the Russian intelligence ships Ivan Khurs on May 24, and Priazovye on June 11, 2023, the first with three USVs, and the second employing six USVs. This scenario depicts those inconclusive Ukrainian attacks against Russian AGIs in the Black Sea. A very simple and easy scenario, at least apparently, and perhaps surprisingly balanced. Enrique Mas, June 17, 2023. Submitter broncepulido Submitted 06/17/2023 Category MEDC  

Number 2/ for me. In fact thinking for years on it, mostly about neutral submarines launching torpedoes to the blue/red side attacking it.

In fact, in real world, some or all land attack missiles should be capable to attack sea platforms, as are fixed targets with fixed coordinates.

More considerations on Iranian submarines: https://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htsub/articles/20230508.aspx

Many thanks, you are welcome! For me is a scenario more interesting as I did think when designing it, very curious. Also by error I didn't include the tag "variable replayable" because its randomness, I forget that!

Notes on some platforms: Against the usually stated 12, other loads of long torpedoes in Ohio-class are: - For Norman Polmar and K.J. Moore in "Cold War Submarines", Potomac Books 2004, page 200: 24 torpedoes. - For H.I. Sutton: 4+18=22 torpedoes. http://www.hisutton.com/World-Submarine-Ranking-Weapons-Load.html - But old reports say many times US submarines sail with only 6-9 torpedoes. - By World Air Forces 2023, later corrected by The Military Balance 2023, the Iranian Navy has some 3xP-3F Orion (at Shiraz), and some 10xASH-3D Sea King, sometimes based at Kish Island (and 3xRH-53D, sometimes based at Bushehr) currently in service, but probably of no use in this scenario because the USS Florida transit should be covered by US fighters. - The Iranian Sea King, introduced 1978, were out of service 1997-2014, and reintroduced 2015: https://www.hispantv.com/noticias/defensa/77289/iran-armada-sayari-helicoptero-sh3-buque

Some sources: https://www.navyrecognition.com/index.php/naval-news/naval-news-archive/2023/april/13085-iran-navy-allegedly-forced-a-us-submarine-to-surface-in-strait-of-hormuz.html http://www.hisutton.com/Fateh-Class_Submarine.html https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IRIS_Fateh_(920) https://iranpress.com/content/30896/fateh-submarine-symbol-iran-entry-into-club-submarine-manufacturers https://military-history.fandom.com/wiki/Ghadir-class_submarine http://www.hisutton.com/Guide-to-heavyweight-533mm-torpedoes.html https://en.topwar.ru/84443-v-irane-zapuschena-liniya-po-proizvodstvu-torped-val-fadzhr.html https://www.elsnorkel.com/2020/01/armas-embarcadas-en-submarinos-desde.html https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transit_passage About the the infamous The Hunt for Red October game (1990), from minute 1:10: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RF4a3zeL4Xo

View File Big Dolphin in Small Waters, April 2023. Historical Hypothetical Scenario. Big Dolphin in Small Waters, April 2023. Historical Hypothetical Scenario. A Harpoon Commander's Edition scenario for EC2003 Battle for The Middle East Battleset and the HCDB2-170308 new standard 1980-2025 Platform Database. This scenario is designed with advanced Scenario Editor and to be run with HCE 2015.008+ or later. This scenario is designed to be played from the Blue/US side or from the Red/Iranian side. You should play a few times first the Blue side to avoid spoilers, and only later play the Red side. Image: Mediterranean Sea, Ohio-class guided-missile submarine USS Florida (SSGN-728), equipped with a Special Forces dry deck shelter (DDS) and overflown by a CV-22B Osprey assigned to 7th Special Operations Squadron, 352nd Special Operations Wing (based primarily at RAF Mildenhall), in a special operations forces interoperability exercise, February 26, 2023 (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communications Specialist 2nd Class Matthew Dickinson/Released/A serviceperson on duty and in consequence on public domain) With the world centred early 2022 on the Russian menaces to Ukraine anything can happen the next months (This was an original phrase of the LCS scenario from where I took part of this text, posted January 30, 2022!) ... but that is now an alternate world. In the nowadays real world, after her April 2006 SSGN conversion, USS Florida SSGN-728 after some months in the Mediterranean Sea sailed to the Persian Gulf, entering it April 2023. Iranian claims surprised the international scene alleging one of its Fateh-class coastal submarines forced USS Florida to surfaced entering the Persian Gulf This apparently simple scenario is developed to test the verisimilitude of those claims. This scenario is simple on its planning and execution, but perhaps difficult to master. I only hope this scenario is not similar to the infamous The Hunt for Red October game (1990). Enrique Mas, May 6, 2023. Submitter broncepulido Submitted 05/06/2023 Category Middle East  

The Russian surface group quitted the Mediterranean some days ago (probably for maintenance tasks after many months at sea, and uncapable to enter Black Sea), and is now near UK: https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/british-warship-keeps-watch-on-russian-task-group-near-uk/

A good and clear article on the LCS issues, adding data on real speeds (38 kn for Freedom (later limited to 34), 41 kn for Independence): https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2023/april/time-scrap-lcs

Here link to the simulation https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/simulation-shows-ireland-cant-defend-against-unarmed-plane/

Tested and now the ASW Stand-off weapons work fine, just in top of the target {to compensate I have reduced the PH of all homing torpedoes a 17%, but that is other long story). About the far more rounds than needed fired, suspect is not only in the case of ASW Stand-off weapons, but in case of any multitube ASW torpedo launchers employed by the AI, but I dont see as research it in a test scenario.

Notes on some units: - Greek P-3B Orion were retired from service in 2009, but structurally overhauled and returning to service from May 17, 2019. The first one returned in the original configuration, four others are waiting for a return in updated configuration, including EL/M-2022A radar. - The submarine concrete classes and names (Aside Turkish Preveze, a Type 209-1400, Scire, an Italian Type 212A and a Greek Type 214) participating in DYMA23 are not verified. - It is not clear the identity of an Italian AOR, if present. The rest of NATO ships present in DYMA23 is verified. - British Poseidon MRA1 are represented by Australian P-8A. - The some 38 Italian Tornado IDS are not depicted in the scenario, as Kormoran 1 AShM was retired circa 1997. - Italian G550 CAEW are represented by Israeli equivalents. - Meteor AAM missiles apparently are not yet deployed in Italian Eurofighter as on March 2023 (Also, in the Air Forces Monthly of May 2023, the Meteor service use in Italian Eurofighter is depicted as "shortly"). - Longshot HAAWC stand-off ASW weapon (with Mk54 torpedo) achieved at last IOC on November 2022.

Some sources (2023): https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/british-maritime-patrol-aircraft-in-sicily-for-exercise/ https://www.defensa.com/videos/armada-espanola-ejercicio-caza-submarinos-dynamic-manta-23 https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/photos_212511.htm https://www.navyrecognition.com/index.php/naval-news/naval-news-archive/2023/march/12904-nato-starts-anti-submarine-warfare-exercise-dynamic-manta-23-near-sicily.html https://seawaves.com/2023/03/06/nato-advanced-anti-submarine-warfare-exercise-dynamic-manta/ On the delivered Italian F-35: https://www.f-16.net/index.php?module= AircraftDB&func=view_airframes_byaf&airforce=ANI&actype=F-35 A mention to the use of seven different types of helicopters (Just as inferred in the scenario design!): https://www.dvidshub.net/video/876257/snmg2-dynamic-manta-2023

View File Exercise Dynamic Manta 2023 (DYMA23). 27 February-10 March 2023. Historical Training Scenario. Exercise Dynamic Manta 2023 (DYMA 23), February 27-March 10, 2023. Historical Training Scenario. A Harpoon Commander's Edition scenario for EC2003 Battle for the Mediterranean Battleset and the HCDB2-170308 new standard 1980-2025 Platform Database. This scenario is designed with advanced Scenario Editor and to be run with HCE 2015.008+ or later. This scenario is designed to be played from the Blue/NATO side or from the Red/NATO side. You should play a few times first the Blue side to avoid spoilers, and only later play the Red side. Image: The Arleigh Burke-class guided missile destroyer USS James E Williams (DDG-95) flagship of Standing NATO Maritime Group 2 on this time period, departs from Norfolk, Virginia, for Mediterranean NATO deployment, December 2, 2022. Photo released by Commander, US 2nd Fleet Public Affairs, took by a serviceperson on duty, and in consequence on public domain. This text begins as the usual introduction to Dynamic Manta exercise previous years, but this time is for more real, as we are for a year living in the abyss edge. From the eventful year of 2014 the World was beginning the so-called Second Cold War, the President of Russia Vladimir Putin (ex-KGB lieutenant colonel) was showing clearly his plan to recover the Russian Empire and later Soviet territories for reinstitute the greatness of his Russia, and to guarantee his passage on the History as saviour of the Rodina. At last the Russian campaign for the invasion of Ukraine started on February 24, 2022. But was only the apex and last outcome of a succession of military actions. From May 2014 Putin was provoking in succession the Crimea, Ukraine, Donetsk, Baltic States, October 2014 Swedish submarine incursion, G-20 Brisbane meeting naval crisis, November 2014 Faslane submarine incident, frigate Yaroslav Mudryy February "Channel Dash", April 2015 Finnish submarine incursion (for many observers causing the pre-mobilization of Finland reserve forces), Russian intervention in Syria from 30 September 2015, shoot-down by Turkish F-16 fighters equipped with AIM-120 AMRAAM on 24 November 2015 of a Russian Su-24M as consequence of the repeated unlawful overflights of Turkey by Russian warplanes based in Latakia, and after two months of repeated warning, March 2016 detection by the French of a Russian submarine near Bay of Biscay and the SSBN base, the propaganda stunt of the deployment of the only one Russian aircraft carrier Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Kuznetsov steaming (a lot, literally) from Kola Bay towards Eastern Mediterranean from October 15, 2016, and with constant and multiple Russian overflies with military warplanes entangled in potential incidents with commercial flights in Europe, so far as at the Portuguese shores. That without counting in other unrelated naval incidents aside the upcoming Second Cold War, just as the Iranian seizure of the merchant Maersk Tigris in 28 April 2015, the shore-based anti-ship missile attacks against the catamaran transport ex Swift (HSV-2) and US destroyers on the Red Sea in October 2016 and the ulterior retaliation, the first military operation of the Trump Administration on January 28, 2017, the MV-22B tiltrotor raid of SEAL Team 6 operating from USS Makin Island (LHD-8) against Houthi Yemen, and later on January 30, an Al-Madinah-class Saudi frigate was attacked and damaged probably by a Houthi suicide or drone boat off Al Hudaydah, Houthi Yemen. (And neither counting in great landlocked actions, as the counter-Daesh operations in Middle East). And meanwhile, more towards Far East a less perceived and growing problem was China, as reflected in the transfer of the 60% of the USN and USAF combat forces to the Pacific Theatre of Operations from 2012, move to be completed by 2020. The first iteration of this scenario was designed six years ago, based in the big anti-submarine exercise Dynamic Manta 2017 begun in 13 March 2017, and was not interpreted by many journalists as an answer to the latest Russian actions and menacing postures as in the case of Dynamic Mongoose 2015, as it was actually a yearly exercise. But in the current world situation was legit to think otherwise. Four years later the reality was probably those and other continuous exercises, the NATO Baltic Air Policing, and the deployment of token NATO ground forces in the Baltic States and rest of Eastern Europe, are showing to Putin's Russia the resolution to defend Europe and allies as a whole, and preventing the development of a hot war. But from 2017 to 2022 the international situation was going worse. Increased tensions and open conflicts in Eastern Ukraine, Libya, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, the recent, fast, innovative and decisive war between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and the increased foreign operations of Iran, Qatar and the UAE, including proxy attacks against Saudi Arabia and the crescendo of the Turkish military power cutting ties with the Western alliances. Not an easy near future for the new President Biden and the traditional European partners. But ... by hazard the previous lines were wrote and posted (minor corrections aside) for Dynamic Manta 2022 in February 25, 2022, just minutes before the first news of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. From then, all we live in a different and more extreme world. But standard procedures and drills need to continue. Nowadays Dynamic Manta 2023 is centred in Standing NATO Maritime Group 2, commanded by Rear Admiral Michael Scott Sciretta, USN, composed this time by the flagship Arleigh Burke-class Flight IIA guided missile destroyer USS James E. Williams (DDG-95), Italian Navy FREMM ASW-variant frigate Carlo Margottini F-592, Turkish Barbaros-class/Meko 200TN Track-IIA frigate Barbaros F-244, and Greek Hydra-class/Meko 200HN frigate Psara F-454), and many others air, surface and subsurface elements. Of course this is a training exercise and actual shots, torpedoes and missiles aren't fired and nobody is hurt ... but in the alternate timeline we share now everything is possible, and that previous affirmation can be untrue. Enrique Mas, March 25, 2023. Submitter broncepulido Submitted 03/25/2023 Category MEDC  

I know these weapons were corrected as four years ago in the game engine because excessive accuracy (don't remember it well now). With many years of delay at last Longshot HAAWC (weapon entry #22580) reached IOC in November 2022, and my idea was to introduce it in the new scenarios after 11/2022. Previously Stand Off ASW are little employed (mostly for old Soviet/Russian SSNs) and I didn't repair on this bug. When a Stand Off ASW weapon is now employed, the torpedo (I didn't tested nuke depth bombs) drops in water TEN NM from the target, and the torpedo never can reach the submarine target. If the launching ship is less than 10 NM from the target, the torpedo drops in water almost inmediatally, making the ship's ASW torpedo tubes redundant, and also never reaching the submarine target. I don't know how to focus this problem (reducing the torpedo drop distance to 1, 2 or 3 NM???). I upload a test scenario here to show the situation. Is of the 2003 Mediterranean Battleset. It's a Red DISSUB some 7 NM south of each Neutral Oil Rig, the idea is to find it and attack with Stand Off ASWs (the effect and meditions is clearer employing the Longshot-carrying P-8A Poseidon based at Catania-Sigonella, now, in game terms, the "updated" Poseidon are a complete failure!), to observe the mentioned effect, Thanks! 2023-03 ASROC et alt TEST.zip

Concept and practical testing before build the ships: https://www.defenseone.com/policy/2023/02/marines-begin-testing-leased-vessel-pier-less-operations/383234/