CV32

This is probably as good a place as any, Gopher. This question has been the impetus for plenty of controversy in the past, and probably still would incite flames among those people who are firmly in one camp or another. Some community websites go so far as to refuse to acknowledge the existence of the "other" Harpoon, but you won't find any of that nonsense here. There are plenty of players around here who enjoy both versions, without feeling the need to trash talk about the other. We're happier for it. My feeling is that if a person has familiarised himself with the features of each version, and perhaps been brave enough to try both of them, he's probably qualified enough to offer a respectable opinion. What either version of Harpoon attempts to "accomplish" is really very subjective, anyway. Personally, I would agree with you that HCE (and all Harpoon Classic versions, for that matter) tend to portray large scale conflict somewhat better than smaller engagements, and its vice versa for H3/ANW. HCE's gameplay is quick and easy to get into, while H3/ANW is considerably more complex. Overall, IMHO, both have far more depth than we often give them credit for.

From Defence Talk Protecting North Americans for half a century: NORAD turns 50 Canadian Department of National Defence | Sep 14, 2007 Yesterday marked 50 years since Canada and the United States decided to form a new command responsible for protecting North America and its citizens. Our two nations made the decision to activate the North American Aerospace Defense (NORAD) command on September 12, 1958, while a more formal agreement was signed on May 12, 1958. Because the stand-up of NORAD has two dates attached to its formation, military personnel at NORAD Headquarters in Cheyenne Mountain, Colorado Springs, Colorado plan a year-long celebration between now and next fall. NORAD members agree that this birthday celebration is a time to reflect on the good relationship between Canada and the U.S. and how important it is that the two countries grow and strengthen together. "We're celebrating 50 years of dedicated service to the defence of North America and we'd like to highlight NORAD's evolution over the years," says Major Jason Proulx, a Canadian officer at NORAD Headquarters in Colorado. "We are as relevant now as in the past but we have different mission sets and the public should know that we continue to be here for them, making sure they can sleep soundly at night knowing the skies and waterways are safe." NORAD came about after the Second World War when Canada and the U.S. recognized they were vulnerable to enemy attack, especially by long-range Russian bombers. As a result, the two countries decided to integrate their defence planning and strategies into a bi-national military command. In 1958 they signed the NORAD agreement, outlining how they were going to organize the command, what kind of operations they would undertake, and defence plans against possible attacks. NORAD is charged with the missions of aerospace warning and aerospace control for North America. Aerospace warning includes the monitoring of man-made objects in space, and the detection, validation, and warning of attack against North America whether by aircraft, missiles, or space vehicles, through mutual support arrangements with other commands. Aerospace control includes ensuring air sovereignty and air defence of the airspace of Canada and the United States. The NORAD agreement has been renewed 10 times since 1958. The May 2006 NORAD Agreement renewal added a maritime warning mission, which entails a shared awareness and understanding of the activities conducted in U.S. and Canadian maritime approaches, maritime areas and inland waterways.

From Defence Talk Israel keeps up blackout on mystery Syria air strike Agence France-Presse | Sep 13, 2007 JERUSALEM (AFP): Israel on Wednesday maintained an official blackout on an apparent strike by its warplanes on Syria, amid reports that the mysterious attack targeted weapons financed by arch-foe Iran. No official Israeli comment was issued on allegations that its military carried out an attack deep inside Syria last Thursday, despite confirmation of a strike by a defence official of Israel's main ally the United States. Citing anonymous Israeli sources, an Arab Israeli newspaper, the Assennara, said on Wednesday that the jets "bombed in northern Syria a Syrian-Iranian missile base financed by Iran.... It appears that the base was completely destroyed." The previous day CNN reported that the strike, which could also have involved the use of ground forces, was believed to have targeted weapons either coming into Syria or moving through Syria from Iran to the Iranian-backed Hezbollah, Lebanon's Shiite militia that Israel fought in a war last year. The New York Times also reported on Wednesday that Israel thinks Syria and Iran are buying nuclear material from North Korea and had recently carried out reconnaissance flights over Syria, taking pictures of possible nuclear installations. A US administration official said Israeli officials believe that North Korea might be unloading some of its nuclear material on Syria, the newspaper said. "The Israelis think North Korea is selling to Iran and Syria what little they have left," the unidentified official was quoted as saying. Syria on Tuesday lodged a formal complaint with the United Nations over the "flagrant violation" of its airspace in the early hours of September 6, when it said its air defences opened fire on Israeli warplanes flying over the northeast of the country. Earlier a US defence official said that Israel had carried out an air strike as a warning to Damascus. "It wasn't big. It was a quick strike. They were engaged by the Syrians, they dropped their ordnance and scooted out of there," said the official who spoke on condition of anonymity. He said he did not know the target of the strike, but said the US military believed it was aimed at sending a message to the Syrians over their support for Hezbollah. "The Israelis are trying to tell the Syrians: 'Don't support a resurgence of Hezbollah in Lebanon'." Israeli officials have refused to comment on the report, as Prime Minister Ehud Olmert "specifically instructed ministers not to talk about the incident related to Syria at all," a senior Israeli government official told AFP earlier this week. This silence -- uncharacteristic in a nation notorious for media leaks -- continued on Wednesday, with even visiting French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner saying he was also being kept in the dark. "I asked my hosts and they did not inform me," Kouchner told reporters in Jerusalem when asked about the reported strike, as he wrapped up his first visit to Israel and the Palestinian territories. "If indeed... they have bombed a weapons convoy which was headed to Lebanon, we understand why they would do it," he said. "Everybody in Lebanon knows that large quantities of weapons arrive from the Syrian border." Olmert bypassed his traditional interviews with Israeli newspapers ahead of the Jewish New Year that starts at sundown on Wednesday, leaving President Shimon Peres to mention Syria in only general terms. "The central problem with Syria is Lebanon -- the question is to know whether Lebanon will be Lebanese or Iranian," Peres told public television. "The Syrians support Hezbollah and provide them with arms. As long as they continue on this route there will be tension in the air." And Sylvan Shalom, a former foreign minister, told army radio: "Syria should draw the lessons from what happened and change its attitude to avoid being completely in the hands of Iran."

From DefenseNews Posted 09/12/07 18:40 Alabama Senator: Proposed LCS Cut Likely To Stand By WILLIAM MATTHEWS Sen. Richard Shelby, R-Ala., said it would be hard for him to reverse a decision Sept. 12 by the Senate Appropriations Committee to cancel construction of a second Littoral Combat Ship to be built in an Alabama shipyard. Senate appropriators unanimously approved a $459.3 billion defense spending bill for 2008. That’s $3.8 billion less than President George W. Bush requested for fiscal 2008, which begins Oct. 1. In July, the House Appropriations Committee passed a $459.6 billion defense spending bill for 2008. Differences between the two bills will be resolved by a conference committee made up of members from both houses of Congress. During a Senate Appropriations Committee meeting Sept. 12, Shelby complained that the Senate version of the 2008 budget eliminates $910.5 million that the Navy had requested for the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program. The ship’s ability to operate in shallow water, hunt submarines and find mines make it “extremely important to the Navy,” Shelby said. But he conceded that the LCS program has been plagued by “huge cost overruns.” Shelby blamed those on the Navy, which he said has repeatedly made costly design changes to the ship. Originally priced at $233 million apiece, the Navy has acknowledged that LCS costs have ballooned by 50 percent to 75 percent. Shelby declined to try to amend the Defense Appropriations Act to restore funding for an LCS that was to be built by Austal USA in a shipyard in Mobile, Ala. “I don’t think an amendment would carry right now,” he said. Senators won’t restore funding until the Navy develops program reforms to keep costs under control, he said. Shelby voted with the rest of the Appropriations Committee to approve the spending bill minus money for the LCS. The House version of the bill cut $571 million from the program for 2008, leaving $339.5 million. That money and materiel from prior years would be used to build a single LCS, House lawmakers said. Austal and its partner, General Dynamics, were supposed to build two LCS prototypes. A rival team headed by Lockheed Martin was supposed to build two others, whereupon the Navy was to pick one design and buy a total of 55 ships. Because of spiraling costs, the Navy canceled the second Lockheed Martin ship last April. Now Senate appropriators have voted to cancel the second Austal-General Dynamics ship. In a report on their bill, the appropriators said the two ships should be delivered to the Navy next summer, and by the end of 2008, the Navy should decide which ship it wants to continue building. The committee also directs the Navy to produce “a new acquisition strategy for the future procurement of the LCS class.” RRW, JSF Engines Funding for the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) may become a last-minute target when the full Senate takes up the spending bill later this month. Sen. Diane Feinstein, D-Calif., said the Senate should cut $30 million now in the bill for engineering planning on how to place the RRW on a Navy Trident missile. The spending is premature because no decision has yet been made to go forward with the RRW, she said. The House has cut all funding for the program, and Feinstein urged senators to do the same. The warhead, which the Defense Department insists is an upgrade of an existing design, will be seen by other countries as a new warhead, and as such, “is going to be interpreted as an opportunity for nuclear proliferation,” she said. Feinstein hinted she may try to amend the spending bill to remove RRW funding during debate on the Senate floor. Sen. Tom Harkin, D-Iowa, urged his colleagues to halt spending on an alternate engine for the Joint Strike Fighter. Having competing engine suppliers for the fighter is supposed keep costs down, but Harkin said three reports have concluded an engine competition would save little or nothing. Having to maintain two engines will lead to parts mix-ups and training problems for JSF engine mechanics, he said. “We’re not talking about chicken feed,” he said of the $480 million expense in the 2007 budget. The Defense Department has consistently opposed developing a second engine for the fighter, and so have the eight countries working with the United States on the plane, Harkin said. “There was a competition” to determine who would build the JSF engine and “one company lost.” Since then, it has been lobbying Congress to build an alternate engine, Harkin said. Pratt & Whitney is the Joint Strike Fighter engine supplier. General Electric wants to produce the alternate.

Woot.

From BBC News Last Updated: Wednesday, 12 September 2007, 20:38 GMT 21:38 UK Israel's Syria 'raid' remains a mystery By Jonathan Marcus BBC diplomatic correspondent During the early hours of last Thursday morning, a number of Israeli jets appear to have entered Syrian air-space from the Mediterranean Sea, possibly penetrating deep into the country. Later unidentified drop tanks, which may have contained fuel for the planes, were found on Turkish soil near the Syrian border, indicating perhaps the Israeli jets' exit route. The Syrian authorities are livid. They say that the aircraft were driven off but that they fired their weaponry into a deserted area. The implication is that the planes effectively dumped their munitions so better to manoeuvre during their escape. The Syrian government has briefed Western diplomats and complained to the United Nations. But there have been no images of the empty countryside where the weapons are alleged to have landed. Israeli sources are saying nothing. Long-standing contacts are uncharacteristically silent, noting only that Israel's military censorship on this subject is as tight as they can ever remember. Mood of satisfaction From Washington has come some partial illumination of the shadows. US officials indicate that at least one target in northern Syria was hit and despite the Israeli silence there does seem to be a perceptible mood of satisfaction in Israel; a sense that what they wanted to achieve was carried out. So what actually went on during the early hours of Thursday morning? Why were Israeli jets over Syria at all? And if they indeed released weapons, what were they firing at? Initially experts suggested that this might simply have been an over-flight to trigger air defence radars and gather electronic intelligence. Such a probe might be linked to new air defence missiles reportedly supplied to Syria by the Russians. Other pundits wondered if a potential strike path to Iran was being tested out; though a southern route here into US-controlled Iraqi air-space would be more logical. And neither option would explain why such aircraft might be armed with air to ground weapons. North Korea link As far as likely targets of any attack go there are two broad suggestions. One, cited by the New York Times newspaper quoting a US source, suggests that the attack was in some way linked to North Korea. The former US ambassador to the UN, John Bolton, in a recent article in the Wall Street Journal, raised the possibility that Syria is sheltering technology or materials relating to North Korea's nuclear programme. When I spoke to Mr Bolton in London just the other day he strongly defended this thesis though he would not be drawn on the reliability of his sources. Another suggestion is that maybe a missile store or factory with weaponry heading to Hezbollah in Lebanon was hit. Israel has long complained that the Damascus government is at the very least turning a blind eye to such weapons supplies coming from Iran. Maybe Israel decided to send the Syrian government a message that it would understand. Muted response What is intriguing is that the response of both the Syrian and Israeli governments has been muted - in the Israeli case largely mute. The Syrians, while angry, are clearly embarrassed that something may have occurred that they failed to prevent. Israel and Syria remain technically at war Israel's deterrent capacity, weakened by the summer 2006 war in Lebanon, is partially restored. But an explanation too is needed for Israel's silence. Maybe it does not want to over-play its hand. This apparent raid comes after a summer of tensions between the two countries which some feared might lead to open warfare. During the past few weeks tensions have markedly declined. Indeed prior to the bombing mission, if that is what it was, Israel reportedly sent messages to Syria via an intermediary, indicating that it was scaling down its forces on the Golan Heights. Was this an effort to ensure that this "raid" was not interpreted by the Syrians as a prelude to a large-scale Israeli attack? There are still more questions than answers in this affair. More information is slowly seeping out. But in many ways it is remarkable that in an age of instant news and the worldwide web spreading information almost at the speed of light, there can still be episodes like this that remain shrouded in so many layers of mystery.

From Stratfor The Obstacles to the Capture of Osama bin Laden By Fred Burton and Scott Stewart Al Qaeda's As-Sahab media arm released a video Sept. 11 to commemorate the sixth anniversary of the 9/11 attacks. Although the 47-minute video features a voice-over introduction by Osama bin Laden, the bulk of it is of Abu Musab Waleed al-Shehri, one of the suicide bombers who crashed American Airlines Flight 11 into the World Trade Center's north tower. That recording was made prior to al-Shehri's travel to the United States in the spring of 2001. There is nothing in bin Laden's audio segment to indicate it was recorded recently. The production does include a still photograph of him -- one taken from what appears to be a real bin Laden video released Sept. 7 (in which he sports a dyed beard), but bin Laden's comments about the death of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi suggest they were recorded during al Qaeda's 2006 media blitz. The release of two successive bin Laden messages, however, has again focused attention on bin Laden, who before last week had not been seen on video since late October 2004. This increased attention has once again caused people to question why the United States has failed to find bin Laden -- and to wonder whether it ever will. While the feds generally get their man in the movies or on television, it is very difficult in real life to find a single person who does not want to be found. It is even harder when that person is hiding in an extremely rugged, isolated and lawless area and is sheltered by a heavily armed local population. The United States and Pakistan have not launched a major military operation to envelop and systematically search the entire region where bin Laden likely is hiding -- an operation that would require tens of thousands of troops and likely result in heavy combat with the tribes residing in the area. Moreover, this is not the kind of operation they will take on in the future. The United States, therefore, will continue intelligence and covert special operations forces efforts, but if it is going to catch bin Laden, it will have to wait patiently for one of those operations to produce a lucky break -- or for bin Laden to make a fatal operational security blunder. Needle in a Haystack Finding a single man in a large area with rugged terrain is a daunting task, even when a large number of searchers and a vast array of the latest high-tech surveillance equipment are involved. This principle was demonstrated by the manhunt for so-called "Olympic Bomber" Eric Rudolph, who was able to avoid one of the largest manhunts in U.S. history by hiding in North Carolina's Great Smoky Mountains. The task force looking for Rudolph at times had hundreds of federal, state and local law enforcement officers assigned to it, while some of its search operations involved thousands of law enforcement and volunteer searchers. The government also employed high-tech surveillance and sensor equipment and even offered a $1 million reward for information leading to Rudolph's capture. However, Rudolph's capture in May 2003, more than five years after he was listed on the FBI's most-wanted list, was not the result of the organized search for him. Rather, he was caught by a rookie police officer on a routine patrol who found Rudolph rummaging for food in a dumpster behind a grocery store. The officer did not even realize he had captured Rudolph until he had taken him to the police station for booking. Hostile Terrain The terrain in the Smoky Mountains is tough and remote, but it is nothing compared to the terrain in the soaring, craggy Safed Koh range that runs along the Pakistani-Afghan border or in the Hindu Kush to the north. Some of the peaks in the Safed Koh range, including Mount Sikaram, are well over twice as high as any peak in the Smokies, while the Hindu Kush contains some of the highest peaks in the world. But it is not only the terrain that is hostile. In the Great Smokies, there are some people who are not happy to see "revenuers" and other government agents -- or other strangers, for that matter -- but at least the area is under the federal government's control. The same cannot be said of the lawless areas along the Afghan-Pakistani border -- the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP). The presence of Pakistani military forces is resented in these areas, and troops are regularly attacked by the heavily armed tribesmen living there. This is not a new phenomenon by any means, though. The Pashtun tribes in the rugged area along the Durand Line (the line set to demarcate the border between the British Raj and Afghanistan, which later became the Afghan-Pakistani border) have always been difficult to control. Even before the establishment of Pakistan, the inhabitants of the area gave the British colonial authorities fits for more than a century. The Britons were never able to gain full control over the region, so they instead granted extensive power to tribal elders, called maliks. Under the deal, the maliks retained their autonomy in exchange for maintaining peace between the tribesmen and the British Raj -- thus allowing commerce to continue unabated. However, some dramatic flare-ups of violence occurred against the Britons during their time in the region. One of the last of them began in 1936 when a religious leader known as the Faqir of Ipi encouraged his followers to wage jihad on British forces. (Jihad against invading forces is a centuries-old tradition in the region.) The faqir and his followers fought an extended insurgency against the British forces that only ended when they left Pakistan. The United Kingdom attempted to crush the faqir and his followers, but the outmanned and outgunned insurgents used the rugged terrain and the support of the local tribes to their advantage. Efforts to use spies to locate or assassinate the faqir also failed. Although the British and colonial troops pursuing the faqir reportedly numbered more than 40,000 at one point, the faqir was never captured or killed. He died a natural death in 1960. A Modern Faqir? Under U.S. pressure, the Pakistani military entered the FATA in force in March 2004 to pursue foreign militants -- for the first time since the country's creation -- but the operation resulted in heavy casualties for the Pakistani army, demonstrating how difficult it is for the Pakistani military to fight people so well integrated in the Pashtun tribal badlands. Following that failed operation, the Pakistani government reverted to the British model of negotiating with the maliks in an effort to combat the influence of the Taliban and foreign jihadists -- and has been harshly criticized because of it. Nowadays, jihadist insurgents are attacking Pakistani security and intelligence forces in the Pashtun areas in the Northwest. The parallels between the hunt for the Faqir of Ipi and bin Laden are obvious -- though it must be noted that bin Laden is a Saudi and not a native-born Pashtun. However, many of the challenges that the United Kingdom faced in that operation are also being faced by the United States today. Aside from the terrain -- a formidable obstacle in and of itself -- U.S. forces are hampered by the strong, conservative Islamic conviction of the people in the region. This conviction extends beyond the tribes to include some members of the Pakistani military and Pakistan's intelligence agencies -- especially those at the operational level in the region. It must be remembered that prior to 9/11 the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence agency and military openly supported the Taliban and their al Qaeda allies. In addition to the relationships formed between bin Laden and the so-called "Afghan Arabs" (foreign jihadists) during the war against the Soviets, Pakistani troops also trained and fought alongside the Taliban and al Qaeda in their battles against the Northern Alliance and other foes. Because of these deep and historic ties, there are some in the Pakistani government (specifically within the security apparatus) who remain sympathetic, if not outright loyal, to their friends in the Taliban and al Qaeda. Additionally, and perhaps just as important, many in the Pakistani government and military do not want to kill their own people -- the Pashtuns, for example -- in order to destroy the much smaller subset of Pakistani and foreign militants. The challenge is to eliminate the militants while causing very little collateral damage to the rest of the population -- and some in the Pakistani government say the airstrikes in places such as Chingai and Damadola have not accomplished this goal. In August, Pakistani Foreign Minister Khurshid Kasuri told television channel AAJ that Pakistan had done all it can in the war on terrorism and that, "No one should expect anything more from Islamabad." In an operation such as the manhunt for bin Laden, intelligence is critical. However, the Taliban and al Qaeda so far have used their home-field advantage to establish better intelligence networks in the area than the Americans. According to U.S. counterterrorism sources, U.S. intelligence had gathered some very good leads in the early days of the hunt for bin Laden and other high-value al Qaeda targets, and they shared this intelligence with their counterparts in the Pakistani security apparatus to try to organize operations to act on the intelligence. During this process, people within the intelligence apparatus passed information back to al Qaeda, thus compromising the sources and methods being used to collect the information. These double agents inside the Pakistani government did grave damage to the U.S. human intelligence network. Double agents within the Pakistani government are not the only problem, however. Following 9/11, there was a rapid increase in the number of case officers assigned to collect information pertaining to al Qaeda and bin Laden, and the CIA was assigned to be the lead agency in the hunt. One big problem with this, according to sources, was that most of these case officers were young, inexperienced and ill-suited to the mission. The CIA really needed people who were more like Rudyard Kipling's character Kim -- savvy case officers who understand the region's culture, issues and actors, and who can move imperceptibly within the local milieu to recruit valuable intelligence sources. Unfortunately for the CIA, it has been unable to find a real-life Kim. This lack of seasoned, savvy and gritty case officers is complicated by the fact that, operationally, al Qaeda practices better security than do the Americans. First, there are few people permitted to see bin Laden and the other senior leaders, and most of those who are granted access are known and trusted friends and relatives. Someone else who wants to see bin Laden or other senior al Qaeda leaders must wait while a message is first passed via a number of couriers to the organization. If a meeting is granted, the person is picked up at a time of al Qaeda's choosing and taken blindfolded via a circuitous route to a location where he is stripped and searched for bugs, beacons and other tracking devices. The person then reportedly is polygraphed to verify that his story is true. Only then will he be taken -- blindfolded and via a circuitous route -- to another site for the meeting. These types of measures make it very difficult for U.S. intelligence officers to get any of their sources close to the al Qaeda leaders, much less determine where they are hiding out. The areas where bin Laden likely is hiding are remote and insular. Visitors to the area are quickly recognized and identified -- especially if they happen to be blond guys named Skip. Moreover, residents who spend too much time talking to such outsiders often are labeled as spies and killed. These conditions have served to ensure that the jihadists maintain a superior human intelligence (and counterintelligence) network in the area. It is a network that also stretches deep into the heart of Islamabad and Rawalpindi, Islamabad's twin city and home to the Pakistani army's general headquarters. The Price of Security Although al Qaeda's operational security and the jihadist intelligence network have been able to keep bin Laden alive thus far, they have lost a number of other senior operatives, including Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, Mohammed Atef, Abu Zubaydah, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, Abu Faraj al-Libi and others. Most of these have been al Qaeda operational managers, people who, by the very nature of their jobs, need to establish and maintain communications with militant cells. This drive to recruit new jihadists to the cause and to help continue operational activity is what led to the lucky break that resulted in the 1995 arrest of Abdel Basit, the operational planner and bombmaker responsible for the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. Basit had tried to recruit a foreign student to assist him in one of the attempts to conduct "Operation Bojinka," a plan to bomb multiple U.S. airliners. Having gotten cold feet, the student revealed the plot, thus allowing Diplomatic Security special agents the opportunity to coordinate an operation to arrest Basit. Al Qaeda has learned from the mistakes made by the men it has lost and has better secured the methods it uses to communicate with the outside world. This increased security, however, has resulted in increased insulation, which has adversely affected not only communications but also financial transfers and recruiting. Combined with U.S. efforts against al Qaeda, this has resulted in a reduction in operational ability and effectiveness. The tension between operations and security poses a significant problem for an organization that seeks to maintain and manage a global militant network. By opting to err on the side of security, bin Laden and the others could escape capture indefinitely, though they would remain operationally ineffective. However, should they attempt to become more operationally active and effective -- and decrease their security measures to do so -- they will provide the United States with more opportunities to get the one break it needs to find bin Laden.

From DefenseNews Posted 09/12/07 10:26 Paper: Russia Developing Top-Secret Submarine By REUTERS, MOSCOW Russia could be developing a top-secret new type of submarine capable of patrolling underwater longer than existing diesel-powered submarines, a Russian newspaper said Sept. 12. The project — code-named 20120 — came to light when details were inadvertently posted on the Internet site of a provincial town, Kommersant newspaper reported. The posting has now been taken down and the navy denied any knowledge of the project. Russia is boosting military spending to back up its increasingly assertive foreign policy. That has allowed it to resume work developing new hardware that was shelved because of a lack of cash after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Earlier this year, Russia launched the Yuri Dologruky nuclear submarine, its first new-generation submarine since the end of Soviet rule. Kommersant said the specifications for the 20120 and the secrecy around it suggested it contained technology that was radically different from any submarines in service. It said the new design may involve installing a small nuclear reactor on a diesel-powered submarine to extend the time it can operate without surfacing. The Russian navy did not provide the details cited by Kommersant, according to a spokesman. “We are not going to make any comment,” the spokesman said. Details of the submarine were released by the town of Sarov, northeast of Moscow, in a press release on a visit by a naval captain who commands a submarine named after the town.

I've always been partial to, "If it bleeds, we can kill it".

From Flight International DATE:10/09/07 SOURCE:Flight International Japan to halt AH-64D Apache orders after 13th airframe By Seiji Hirokawa Tokyo's planned final purchase of one Fuji Heavy Industries/Boeing AH-64D Apache Longbow attack helicopter in fiscal year 2008 will halt orders of the type for Japan's army after just 13 airframes way short of the 60 originally sought to replace the service's current Fuji Heavy Industries/Bell AH-1S fleet. The decision to stop Apache orders has been taken due to the type's high unit cost, and as a result of Japan's annual procurement model, under which the nation would take around 20 more years to complete its planned purchase. Fuji, which will this year complete a new licence production facility for the AH-64D, will receive compensation from the Japanese defence ministry following the decision. With only enough aircraft being acquired to equip one Apache squadron, the army will extend AH-1S operations until a new replacement plan is been determined through a future White Paper. Fuji delivered Japan's first AH-64D in March 2006, and the type participated in an army firepower demonstration in late August.

From Flight International DATE:11/09/07 SOURCE:Flightglobal.com Australia's Boeing C-17 fleet passes operational milestone By Emma Kelly The Royal Australian Air Force is ready to put its first two Boeing C-17 strategic transports into operational service, after achieving initial operating capability with the type following eight months of intensive introduction to service activities. Australia received its first of four C-17s in December 2006, with its second having followed in May and the remainder to be delivered by mid-2008. The aircraft, which can carry a load almost four times that of the RAAF's current Lockheed Martin C-130s, will provide “a quantum leap” in the nation’s ability to rapidly lift cargo and equipment in support of military and humanitarian operations, its Department of Defence says. Operated from RAAF Base Amberley in Queensland by 36 Sqn, the C-17 will undergo further development to allow the unit to fly more complex tactical roles, including the air drop of personnel and equipment, and to provide aeromedical evacuation duties, the DoD says. Australia's $1.8 billion C-17 project budget also includes the construction of permanent facilities for 36 Sqn and support agencies at Amberley, plus facilities improvements at the RAAF's Darwin, Edinburgh, Pearce and Townsville bases.

From DefenseNews Posted 09/10/07 21:39 Third Time Could Be the Charm for LPD Program By CHRISTOPHER P. CAVAS PASCAGOULA, Miss. — With the U.S. Navy still smarting from the unsatisfactory delivery of two amphibious ships, Northrop Grumman has put a special emphasis on making sure the third ship avoids the pitfalls of its predecessors. If early returns are any indication, the shipbuilder and the Navy might be third time lucky. The USS Mesa Verde (LPD 19) carried out its initial builder’s trials in mid-August in the Gulf of Mexico. The ship returned Aug. 16 to Northrop’s Ingalls shipyard in Pascagoula flying two brooms — a traditional “clean sweep” symbol representing success for both the Navy and Northrop Grumman. But while the shipbuilder might be expected to trumpet its success, the ultimate goal is to please the customer. And the customer, at least at this stage, seems happy. The Mesa Verde “sets a new standard for the LPD class as far as being a complete ship,” said Capt. Beth Dexter, the Navy’s supervisor of shipbuilding in Pascagoula. “My Navy team is proud to present it.” The San Antonio-class LPD 17 program has been in trouble since late 1998, when the initial construction contract was awarded to Avondale Industries in New Orleans. Avondale beat out Litton Ingalls primarily because it planned to use a new computer program to design the ships — the first time a Navy ship was designed in its entirety using computer tools. But the program didn’t work, the Navy kept making design changes, costs escalated and major delays ensued. Litton Ingalls bought Avondale in 1999 thinking it could fix the program — which it couldn’t — and in late 2000 the shipyards were acquired by Northrop Grumman. On the customer side, a succession of Navy program managers and acquisition executives struggled — unsuccessfully in most cases — to hold down the design churn and manage costs, which have more than doubled from the $750 million per ship the Navy forecast in the late 1990s. The Navy now estimates the acquisition cost for the ninth ship, LPD 25, will be $1.8 billion. All those problems and more affected the first two ships of the class. The USS San Antonio (LPD 17) was delivered in mid-2005 in an incomplete state. The Navy accepted the ship knowing it had numerous construction defects, many of which would need to be fixed for extra cost after the shipyard’s obligation period ended. The USS New Orleans (LPD 18) was delivered last December, also with incomplete spaces, and neither ship has yet to deploy. Navy leaders remain irked by the problems on the first ships. An inspection of the San Antonio in April listed a host of issues, and in June Navy Secretary Donald Winter sent a scathing letter to Northrop Chairman Ron Sugar restating his dissatisfaction with the ships. That’s a lot of baggage to shed, acknowledged Phil Teel, head of the Northrop Grumman Ship Systems Ingalls and Avondale shipyards in an Aug. 21 interview at Ingalls. “We heard the Navy at all levels,” Teel said. “We heard the operational Navy even before we heard the acquisition Navy. And we hope that [LPD] 19 responds to that. Because that’s really the only way we can respond, by building ships that they’re proud to take. And I think they’ll be proud to take 19.” Improvements in building the LPDs will be seen on the follow-on ships as well, Teel said. “We’ll see the same if not slightly better in 20. And then 21,” he added. “We’re investing a significant amount of our time, money, human capital, intellectual capital in making this ship class the best it can possibly be.” Walking the Ships Northrop managers and employees still feel sharp pangs and express a certain awkwardness when asked about the problems on LPD 17, and clearly don’t like the reputation the ship class has received. There’s a determination evident at both Ingalls and Avondale to make the ships better and turn the story around. The Mesa Verde certainly seems better than the San Antonio when the first ship was delivered. The ship is clean, most fittings are in place on the bulkheads, and electrical wiring — a particularly sore point on the San Antonio — appears neat, tidy and professional. Northrop’s managers are proud of the relatively small number of “trial cards” issued on LPD 19 after the builder’s trials. The cards indicate items that need attention — ranging from indicator lights and small fittings to major ship systems — and new ships typically come back with thousands of them. The LPD 17 returned from her trials with more than 18,000 cards. LPD 18 had over 17,000. The score for LPD 19: about 6,500. “All of the ship was operational for the builder’s trials except for one of 26 video cameras,” said Kevin Jarvis, shipyard manager of the Ingalls facility. The one camera, he said, had a bad circuit, since replaced. Northrop also claims the LPD’s Engineering Operating System (EOS), an automated system to control the ship’s machinery, which failed to function properly on the first ships, has been debugged. “We had no big hiccups on the control system on trials,” Jarvis said. Other advances on the first ships include completion of the aviation certifications, and all the ship’s internal elevators are operational. All of the Mesa Verde’s 1,109 compartments are complete and — in an atypical circumstance — about three dozen spaces already are being turned over to the ship’s crew, in advance of the planned Sept. 28 delivery date. The move shifts responsibility for the space from the shipbuilder to sailors. “I’m told that is very unusual,” said Cmdr. Shawn Lobree, the Mesa Verde’s commanding officer. “One of the ship directors told me he’s been here 40 years or so and he’s not aware of a ship that’s proceeded like that.” The Mesa Verde is the first of the new LPDs to be built at Ingalls, while six of the new ships, including the next two, come together at the Avondale yard. Ingalls, in addition to the LPDs, cranks out assault ships and destroyers for the Navy and builds new Coast Guard cutters. For the 5,300 workers at Avondale, it’s all LPD, and the workers in New Orleans also seem eager to give the Navy and Marine Corps a ship all will be proud of. Tommy “Cabbage” Barrett, ship director of the Green Bay (LPD 20), pointed out improvements as he walked a reporter through his ship on Aug. 20. “We’re sealing up compartments in blocks as they’re completed to cut down on pass-through traffic and damage to items,” he said of his ship, which is 82 percent complete. He pointed to the flooring, where the Navy-specified latex “underlayment” caused problems on the first two ships. “The latex bubbled up when it got wet,” he said. “We’ve switched to epoxy, which solved the problem.” The non-skid covering on the weather decks also was an issue on the earlier ships, where a contractor failed to lay it down properly. That’s also been fixed, Barrett said. On board the New York (LPD 21), which won’t enter the water until late this year, ship director Hank Corcoran also pointed out improvements. “The wireway routing is a lot better,” Corcoran said, and pointed out that the shipyard continues to improve pre-installation outfitting such as insulation. “We’re doing much more work in advance” of ship blocks being lowered into the ship, he said, noting that on the San Antonio, only about 10 percent of the insulation was complete at launch. On the New York, he said, that figure will be 75 percent. Later ships will also benefit from a new consolidated planning tool, said Bob Merchent, head of the Avondale yard. The computerized tool will bring together engineering drawings, material, parts, the craftsmen needed to do the work, sequence of construction, schedule and budget into one place. The tool will first be used on the San Diego (LPD 22), Merchent said. Navy LPD program officials declined repeated requests for an interview on the progress of the program. “The LPD 17 Program Office is unable to do media interviews at this time,” Katie Dunnigan, a spokesperson for the Naval Sea Systems Command in Washington, said Aug. 27. Instead, she provided a written statement from Capt. Bill Galinis, the Navy’s LPD 17 program manager, commenting on the initial sea trials of the Mesa Verde. “This was a very successful Builder’s Trial and the Navy/Northrop Grumman team did a tremendous job completing this ship and executing the Trial,” Galinis said in the statement. “There is work that remains, however, as we ready this ship for presentation.” The LPD program will get an extra dose of scrutiny March 1 when the christening ceremony for the New York is held at Avondale. Sen. Hillary Clinton of New York and former New York City mayor Rudy Giuliani — vying respectively for the Democratic and Republican nominations — are expected to speak at the event and note that the ship’s bow contains several tons of metal from the fallen World Trade Center. But when the dust settles the following day and the presidential campaign spotlight moves on, the Navy still will be keeping a watchful eye on the LPDs, waiting for the day — expected late next year — when the first ships begin to deploy.

From DefenseNews Posted 09/07/07 09:48 Report: BAE to Seal $40B Eurofighter Deal With Saudis Next Week AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, LONDON British defense firm BAE Systems will next week clinch a 20-billion-pound ($40.4 billion) deal to supply 72 Eurofighter Typhoon jets to Saudi Arabia, a report said Sept. 7. "It is understood that the British government sent the Typhoon contract to King Abdullah two days ago," The Times newspaper in London wrote. "The king is expected to sign the contract next week, sealing one of the largest export orders ever won by the UK.” A spokeswoman for BAE told the newspaper, "This is a government-to-government negotiation and we are unable to make any comment on it." The Ministry of Defence said negotiations were continuing, according to The Times. It had been feared that the deal would be scuppered because of a British investigation into allegations that Saudi Arabia took bribes from BAE under a military plane deal struck between Britain and the Middle Eastern kingdom more than 20 years ago. Britain’s Serious Fraud Office last year investigated BAE Systems’ 43-billion-pound Al-Yamamah deal in 1985, which provided Hawk and Tornado jets plus other military equipment to Saudi Arabia. But the investigation was shelved by the British government last December in a move supported by then-Prime Minister Tony Blair amid concerns over Britain’s national interests. Despite this, the U.S. Department of Justice in June launched its own investigation into BAE Systems amid allegations the British arms maker paid bribes to secure contracts in Saudi Arabia in the 1980s. BAE Systems is alleged to have set up a 60-million-pound "slush fund" for members of the Saudi royal family to secure business, and made illegal payments to those involved in its deals. BAE strenuously denies the charges.

From Air Force Times Commander disciplined for nuclear mistake By Michael Hoffman - Staff writer Posted : Wednesday Sep 5, 2007 19:26:41 EDT The Air Force continued handing out disciplinary actions in response to the six nuclear warheads mistakenly flown on a B-52 Stratofortress bomber from Minot Air Force Base, N.D., to Barksdale Air Force Base, La., on Aug. 30. The squadron commander in charge of Minot’s munitions crews was relieved of all duties pending the investigation. It was originally reported that five nuclear warheads were transported, but officers who tipped Military Times to the incident who have asked to remain anonymous since they are not authorized to discuss the incident, have since updated that number to six. Air Force and defense officials would not confirm the missiles were armed with nuclear warheads Wednesday, citing longstanding policy, but they did confirm the Air Force was “investigating an error made last Thursday during the transfer of munitions” from Minot to Barksdale. The original plan was to transport non-nuclear Advanced Cruise Missiles, mounted on the wings of a B-52, to Barksdale as part of a Defense Department effort to decommission 400 of the ACMs. It was not discovered that the six missiles had nuclear warheads until the plane landed at Barksdale, leaving the warheads unaccounted for during the approximately 3 1/2 hour flight between the two bases, the officers said. President Bush was immediately alerted to the mistake and the Air Force launched a service-wide investigation headed by Maj. Gen. Douglas Raaberg, director of Air and Space Operations at Air Combat Command Headquarters, said Air Force spokesman Lt. Col. Ed Thomas. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has requested daily briefings from Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Michael Moseley on the progress of the probe. Sen. Byron Dorgan, D-N.D., a member of the Senate Appropriations defense subcommittee, requested a full classified briefing, not just the preliminary information being provided to lawmakers, to explain how a mistake of this magnitude could have happened. Thomas said the transfer was conducted safely and the American public was never in any danger since the weapons were in Air Force custody and control at all times. But few critics were placated Wednesday by the Air Force’s reassurances. “Nothing like this has ever been reported before and we have been assured for decades that it was impossible,” said Rep. Edward Markey, D-Mass, co-chair of the House Bi-partisan Task Force. Non-proliferation treaty experts said the Air Force didn’t violate any international nuclear treaties by transporting the nuclear warheads on the B-52, but it was the first time since 1968 that it’s been known publicly that nuclear warheads were transported on a U.S. bomber. After six nuclear-armed B-52s crashed from 1959-1968, the Defense Department ordered all bombers off nuclear airborne alert. The policy change occurred after a B-52 crashed in Greenland in January 1968, dropping three nuclear warheads on the island and one into the ocean. As a gesture to Russia and the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, the first Bush administration took it one step farther in 1991 by ordering all bombers to halt nuclear ground alerts, which allowed bomber crews to practice loading a nuclear warhead, but never taking off with one. The Defense Department does transport nuclear warheads by air, but instead of bombers it uses C-17 or C-130 cargo aircraft. “These reports are deeply disturbing,” said Rep. Ike Skelton, D-Mo., chairman of the House Armed Services Committee. “The American people, our friends, and our potential adversaries must be confident that the highest standards are in place when it comes to our nuclear arsenal.” Nuclear weapon experts said they were shocked to find out how completely command and control over the six nuclear warheads failed to allow such a mistake to occur. Hans Kristensen, director of the Nuclear Information Project at the Federation of American Scientists, said a host of security checks and warning signs must have been passed over, or completely ignored, for the warheads to have been unknowingly loaded onto the B-52. ACMs are specifically designed to carry a W80-1 nuclear warhead with a yield of 5 to 150 kilotons and delivered by B-52 strategic bombers. “It’s not like they had nuclear ACMs and conventional ACMs right next to each other and they just happened to load one with a nuclear warhead,” Kristensen said. The Defense Department uses a computerized tracking program to keep tabs on each one of its nuclear warheads, he said. For the six warheads to make it onto the B-52, each one would have had to be signed out of its storage bunker and transported to the bomber. Diligent safety protocols would then have had to been ignored to load the warheads onto the plane, Kristensen said. All ACMs loaded with a nuclear warhead have distinct red signs distinguishing them from ACMs without a nuclear yield, he said. ACMs with nuclear warheads also weigh significantly more than missiles without them. “I just can’t imagine how all of this happened,” said Philip Coyle, a senior adviser on nuclear weapons at the Center for Defense Information. “The procedures are so rigid; this is the last thing that’s supposed to happen.” The risk of the warheads falling into the hands of rogue nations or terrorists was minimal since the weapons never left the United States, said Michael O’Hanlon, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, an independent research and policy think tank in Washington D.C. At no time was there a risk for a nuclear detonation, even if the B-52 crashed on its way to Barksdale, said Steve Fetter, a former Defense Department official who worked on nuclear weapons policy in 1993-94. A crash would ignite the high explosives associated with the warhead, and possibly cause a leak of plutonium, but the warhead’s elaborate safeguards would prevent a nuclear detonation from occurring, he said. “The main risk would have been the way the Air Force responded to any problems with the flight because they would have handled it much differently if they would have known nuclear warheads were onboard,” Fetter said. It’s still unclear specifically how the B-52’s flight from Minot to Barksdale would have been different since most nuclear security protocols are classified. But, Kristensen said the flight pattern might have been different since there would have been airspace restrictions. Also, security at both airports would have heightened considerably and the communications between the pilot and the control towers would have been altered, he said. Air Combat Command will have a command-wide mission stand-down Sept. 14 to review its procedures in response to the mistake. Even units without oversight of nuclear weapons will take part in the stand-down, Thomas said. “The Air Force takes its mission to safeguard weapons seriously,” he said. “No effort will be spared to ensure that the matter is thoroughly and completely investigated.” Along with the 5th Munitions Squadron commander, the munitions crews involved in mistakenly loading the nuclear warheads at Minot have been temporarily decertified from performing their duties involving munitions, pending corrective actions or additional training, Thomas said. The error comes after the Air Force announced last March the 5th Bomb Wing won two servicewide safety awards during fiscal year 2006. “This is really shocking,” Coyle said. “The Air Force can’t tolerate it, and the Pentagon can’t tolerate it, either.”

I believe the BrahMos started (at least originally) with the Yakhont's liquid ramjet engine and radar seeker, coupled with Indian computers and software.

From Sky News RAF Intercepts Russian Bombers Updated: 14:00, Thursday September 06, 2007 RAF Tornados have intercepted eight Russian bombers as they approached UK airspace. [Me: That's a lot of ursidae.] The Bear Tupolev-95 planes - which can carry nuclear and Cruise missiles - were detected by Nato early this morning. Ministry of Defence officials said four F3 fighters were scrambled from RAF Leeming in Yorkshire and RAF Waddington in Lincolnshire. The Russian planes diverted before entering British territory. They headed back to their base in north Russia without incident and are still thought to be in the air, with Nato tracking their progress. Sky's Defence correspondent Geoff Meade said: "Diplomatic relations between Moscow and London haven't been great for some time and I think this is maybe a bit of sabre-rattling on behalf of the Russians. "This is the biggest formation of Russian aircraft to be challenged in this way since the Cold War and marks a stepping up of Moscow's challenge to British defences." He described the incident - the second of its kind in a month - as a "probing mission". Norway twice scrambled F-16 fighters to monitor the Russian planes as they neared - but did not breach - its airspace. As well as carrying missiles, the long-range Bear planes are used for surveillance. Last month, two of the RAF's new Typhoon Eurofighter jets were used to intercept and turn back a single Bear over the north Atlantic. And in July, two Russian aircraft were warned off by RAF jets as they headed towards UK airspace. In May, two Tornado F3s were scrambled from RAF Leuchars in Scotland to intercept a Tu-95 observing the Royal Navy exercise Neptune Warrior.

From DefenseNews Posted 09/06/07 08:14 India to Launch BrahMos From Russian Sub By VIVEK RAGHUVANSHI, NEW DELHI India’s supersonic cruise missile BrahMos, built jointly with Russia, is ready to be launched from a submarine, Defence Minister A.K. Anthony reportedly told the Indian Parliament on Sept. 5. Currently, the Indian navy’s submarines do not have the capability to launch BrahMos missiles. Sources in the Indian Defence Ministry said the BrahMos will be tested on an unspecified Russian submarine later this year. Versions of the BrahMos have been developed for the Indian army, navy and air force. The air version will be integrated on IL-38 maritime surveillance aircraft and the SU 30 MKI multirole aircraft. BrahMos has a range of 300 kilometers. The BrahMos cruise missile has been jointly developed by the BrahMos Corp., a joint venture between India's Defence Research and Development Organization (DRDO) and Russia's NPO Mashinostroeyenia.

Should be fine doing so, but if you like, just rename your existing b25 winharp.exe file to something else.

Pretty much the same as it has always been, huh.

Memories must be awfully short in Serbia.

Well, not really. You have the option to fire any surface attack capable (ie. dual purpose) guns (regardless of caliber) in impact with airburst fuzing (even at max range). These are typically not the light caliber AAA guns, but rather the heavier stuff.

From DefenseNews Posted 09/04/07 21:22 Nuclear Warheads Mistakenly Flown on B-52 By MICHAEL HOFFMAN A U.S. Air Force B-52 bomber mistakenly loaded with five nuclear warheads flew from Minot Air Force Base, N.D, to Barksdale Air Force Base, La., on Aug. 30, resulting in an Air Force-wide investigation, according to three officers who asked not to be identified because they were not authorized to discuss the incident. The B-52 was loaded with Advanced Cruise Missiles, part of a Defense Department effort to decommission 400 of the ACMs. But the nuclear warheads should have been removed at Minot before being transported to Barksdale, the officers said. The missiles were mounted onto the pylons of the bomber’s wings. Advanced Cruise Missiles carry a W80-1 warhead with a yield of 5 to 150 kilotons and are specifically designed for delivery by B-52 strategic bombers. Air Force spokesman Lt. Col. Ed Thomas said the transfer was safely conducted and the weapons were in Air Force custody and control at all times. However, the mistake was not discovered until the B-52 landed at Barskdale, which left the warheads unaccounted for during the approximately 3 1/2 hour flight between the two bases, the officers said. An investigation headed by Maj. Gen. Douglas Raaberg, director of Air and Space Operations at Air Combat Command Headquarters, was launched immediately to find the cause of the mistake and figure out how it could have been prevented, Thomas said. Air Force officials wouldn’t officially specify whether nuclear weapons were involved, in accordance with long-standing Defense Department policy regarding nuclear munitions, Thomas said. However, the three officers close to the situation did confirm the warheads were nuclear. Officials at Minot immediately conducted an inventory of its nuclear weapons after the oversight was discovered, and Thomas said he could confirm that all remaining nuclear weapons at Minot are accounted for. “Air Force standards are very exacting when it comes to munitions handling,” he said. “The weapons were always in our custody and there was never a danger to the American public.” At no time was there a risk for a nuclear detonation, even if the B-52 crashed on its way to Barksdale, said Steve Fetter, a former Defense Department official who worked on nuclear weapons policy in 1993-94. A crash could ignite the high explosives associated with the warhead, and possibly cause a leak of the plutonium, but the warheads’ elaborate safeguards would prevent a nuclear detonation from occurring, he said. “The main risk would have been the way the Air Force responded to any problems with the flight because they would have handled it much differently if they would have known nuclear warheads were onboard,” he said. The risk of the warheads falling into the hands of rogue nations or terrorists was minimal since the weapons never left the United States, according to Fetter and Michael O’Hanlon, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, an independent research and policy think tank in Washington, D.C. The crews involved with the mistaken load at the 5th Bomb Wing at Minot have been temporarily decertified from performing their duties involving munitions pending corrective actions or additional training, Thomas said. Air Combat Command will have a command-wide mission stand down Sept. 14 to review their procedures in response to this oversight, he said. “The Air Force takes its mission to safeguard weapons seriously,” he said. “No effort will be spared to ensure that the matter is thoroughly and completely investigated.” [Just a tad scary. ]

Reasonably reliable details here: http://www.india-defence.com/specifications/missiles/48

Great reading. I would like to see this engagement played out with the BrahMos missile in use.

Done.