JanMasterson

hello Pooners, i was wondering since some times what was the exact effects of the armor ratings that one can assign to the ships and facilities in DB editors and Dale Hillier (aka VCDH) kindly answered to that question. now in the H4 rules, there's a table titled "Armor effects" (page 7-5, section 7.3.3) where it's shown for example that a GP, an AP shell of 76 to 120mm caliber, an HE shell if 76 to 130 or fragments from an exploding missile can penetrate a light armor. if you know more facts about the Armor Ratings, please share them cheers, Jan

you are welcome guys, pleased that you like it too, the only bad point is that it's too short! take care, Jan

http://www.flightglobal.com/cgi-bin/mt/mt-tb.cgi/11619

IGNORANCE IS RISK THE BIG LESSON FROM DESERT STORM AIR BASE ATTACKS Christopher M. Centner MANY observers have declared that the air campaign was the decisive component of Operation Desert Storm and that air base attacks were a critical component of the campaign. These attacks helped achieve air superiority, destroy many of Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction, and lessen the long-term threat that Iraq poses to its neighbors. The video images from the campaign tend to give spectators the impression that air base attacks were flawlessly planned and executed. In reality, the anti-air base component of the air campaign highlighted a major--and dangerous--omission in the US Air Force's strategic analysis. Specifically, we lack an organization that studies the design and operation of foreign air bases for the purpose of exploiting weaknesses. This article briefly describes how the coalition planned and executed air base attacks during Desert Storm and explains how some of the lessons learned are in reality only symptoms of this more significant omission. Target: The Iraqi Airfield Network Iraq's violent past had taught its air force that air base attacks were a grave menace. Iraqi airfields had undergone recurring onslaughts by Great Britain (in World War II), Israel, and Iran (during the Iran-Iraq war). In particular, the various Arab-Israeli conflicts demonstrated to Iraq that wars could be won or lost as a result of airfield attacks. This fact was most evident in 1967 when, on the dawn of the Six-Day War, a surprise Israeli attack destroyed the Arab air forces at their airfields. Arab aircraft were caught parked wingtip-to-wingtip at their main operating bases (MOB). They were not in shelters because the Arabs had planned to disperse them to other bases for wartime survival. Consequently, at a cost of only 19 aircraft, Israel destroyed 375 Arab aircraft on the first day of the war.1 This bitter lesson inspired a sudden surge in the construction of hardened aircraft bunkers (HAB) and personnel bunkers at Arab air bases. Other critical airfield components--such as petroleum, oil, and lubricant systems--were made more redundant and robust. By the time the Arab-Israeli war of October 1973 broke out, Israel faced well-protected enemy air forces. Because their adversaries' aircraft were now protected by dispersed concrete HABs, Israeli pilots resorted to runway attacks (in conjunction with attacks against command and control [C2] facilities).2 These runway attacks were only temporarily effective, however, since Arab repair teams restored the runways in just nine to 12 hours.3 In Desert Storm, coalition air forces faced a formidable Iraqi air base network, the product of a massive hardening and survivability program that may be considered a model for air forces worldwide. For instance, the Iraqis had extended their air base network to include a ring of identical, hardened dispersal bases along their border. Each base in this network--known as Project 505 and begun during the Iran-Iraq war--contained 12 widely dispersed HABs with half-meter-thick concrete walls, eight fuel tanks, two power stations, and squadron operations facilities.4 Buried and hardened airfield support components were scattered throughout each air base, many of which covered 5,000 acres.5 Iraq also organized airfield-repair teams that were supplied with fast-setting concrete and other critical material.6 Almost 600 HABs built to NATO standards (or better) were constructed in Iraq by British, Belgian, French, and Yugoslavian contractors.7 At the heart of the Iraqi airfield network were three bases built for--and as--strategic assets. Planned as early as 1975 and code-named Project 202, these airfields were designed to function during chemical, biological, and even nuclear war and were dubbed "superbases" by the press. Construction of these bases for Iraq's strategic strike aircraft apparently began in the mid-1980s.8 Every airfield component was protected by layers of thick concrete. "I will admit that this air base literally overwhelmed me," declared Lt Col Sergey Bezlyudnyy, a former MiG-29 flight instructor stationed in Iraq. "I had never seen anything like it before, although while serving in the [soviet] Union I had been in scores of garrisons. The equipment, shelters, and blast walls--everything was the last word in equipment and of outstanding quality."9 The aerodynamic-looking HABs at the airfields were "superhardened," built to withstand all conceivable threats. "As far as I could see," said Colonel Bezlyudnyy, "it would have been virtually impossible to destroy this [HAB] with tactical weapons, even superaccurate ones, and probably only by using nuclear warheads."10 Desert Storm was to be the first war that matched the USAF against an adversary with first-rate, modern air bases. Indeed, Iraq hadn't built mere airfields; it had built fortifications. As described to the US Air Staff in December 1990 by an intelligence analyst, the air base hardening program had "made [iraq's] airfield network the strongest component of [its] air force."11 Air Base Attack Priorities Planners shaping the coalition's air base attacks faced formidable obstacles, the biggest of which was the meager information initially available on Iraqi airfields. Although documents on adversary aircraft and tactics written by analysts at the Foreign Technology Division and Tactical Air Command were available to coalition pilots, similarly detailed documents on Iraq's air bases were nonexistent.12 No USAF organization was dedicated to analyzing air base performance and weaknesses, and the few experts on Iraqi air base operations were scattered throughout the globe.13 Fortunately, the coalition had over five months to consolidate information before Desert Storm began. Even so, critical air base information was still being fed into the theater long after the bombs began to drop.14 Priorities assigned to particular Iraqi air bases reflected the various priorities of the campaign as a whole. Desert Storm's primary goal was the liberation of Kuwait, a feat which required air superiority over Kuwait and southeastern Iraq. Additionally, the campaign sought to neutralize Iraq's weapons of mass destruction (chemical and biological weapons), which threatened the coalition, Israel, and the entire region. Finally, planners wished to break the long-term military threat that Iraq posed to its neighbors by significantly reducing its overwhelmingly large conventional military force.15 Each of these goals mandated that different, but overlapping, sets of air bases be attacked. During the war's initial phase, planners estimated the damage required to render a particular air base inoperable and then created air tasking orders (ATO) that specified the size of strike packages against each air base. They also anticipated reattacks to maintain the required level of damage or to destroy particular target sets. Bomb damage assessment (BDA) was to be a crucial component in determining further attack requirements after the initial attacks. Air Base Target Sets The coalition targeted bases according to their importance to the Iraqi air base network, their location, the type of aircraft they housed, and the presence of weapons of mass destruction. Planners dropped many of Iraq's 66 air bases from ATOs because attacking them would not help accomplish the campaign's strategic goals. During the process of determining the amount of effort to expend on a particular air base, planners paid strict attention to the base's geographic location. They targeted Tallil, Jalibah Southeast, and other air bases because they were only a short flight from the Kuwaiti theater of operations. Air bases used to defend Baghdad's air defense sector and avenues of approach, especially bases that housed advanced aircraft such as the MiG-29, were attacked early in the campaign. Bases north of Baghdad opposite Turkey or Iran were a lower priority. Iraq's deployment bases situated along the Saudi border (e.g., As Salman North and Wadi Al Khirr New) were targeted because of their importance to Iraq's total air base network, as well as their geographic location.16 In peacetime these bases were used infrequently since most of Iraq's aircraft were stationed at interior airfields. However, Iraq's combat aircraft generally lacked sufficient range to attack Saudi targets from peacetime locations. Damaging these deployment bases would reduce Iraq's ability to mount counterstrikes and would force Iraqi aircraft to remain at their MOBs. In short, attacking the dispersal airfields would decrease the Iraqi air threat and increase the value of attacks on the MOBs. Chemical and biological weapons were among the greatest threats facing coalition forces. The coalition intended to smash Saddam Hussein's chemical warfare (CW) capability with swift, massive attacks upon production centers (Samarra and other major sites), storage locations (munitions depots), delivery means (artillery, ballistic missiles, and strategic aircraft), and C2 nodes. These goals mandated that CW storage sites at or near airfields be attacked as part of the anti-air base campaign. Additionally, planners targeted air bases in western Iraq that housed air-delivered chemical weapons or Scud missiles aimed at Israel. Finally, air bases with long-range aircraft (the Mirage F-1 and Su-24 Fencer) capable of delivering these deadly weapons deep into coalition territory were high-priority targets. Individual Target Sets The first Desert Storm attacks were launched against Iraq's C2 facilities, which coordinated operations throughout the nation's air defense network. Coalition F-117s and other aircraft simultaneously attacked Iraq's air force headquarters, the air defense operations center, sector operations centers, intercept operating centers, and observation posts. These assaults immediately shattered the formidable Iraqi air base network into isolated air bases, thus eliminating the enemy's ability to coordinate operations.17 By continuing its attacks on air force-related C2 nodes throughout the campaign, the coalition prevented the Iraqis from reestablishing any semblance of a unified air defense system.18 The Pavement War The first round of air base-specific attacks was directed primarily against runways and operating surfaces. Planners hoped that these attacks would prevent the Iraqi air force from contesting coalition air superiority. However, Iraq's airfields frequently had two or more widely separated and lengthy runways connected by redundant taxiways, at least one of which was long enough to use for emergency operations.19 Multiple-approach taxiways connected each aircraft bunker to the runway. The bunkers were clustered at the ends of the runway, and each bunker's approach taxiway was linked to its neighbor's, thereby providing redundant means to gain access to operating surfaces. Additional emergency operating surfaces were available along highway strips that were wide enough to accommodate Soviet-built Il-76 transports.20 Although trained runway-repair teams and repair equipment were present at Iraqi air bases, the coalition planned no concurrent attacks against these teams or their stockpiles.21 Thus, the pavement attacks addressed only half of the problem: the pavement would be damaged, but the capability to repair it remained viable. In the early-morning calm of Desert Storm, packages of from four to eight Panavia-built Tornadoes sped over at least 10 Iraqi airfields. Flying at levels as low as 30 meters in pitch darkness, the aircraft sped along the enemy aerodromes, releasing submunitions and mines from JP233 runway-denial weapons.22 The taxiways between the HAB groups and the runway were the attackers' aiming points. Determining what effect, if any, the runway attacks actually had on the Iraqi air force is difficult. It is true that Iraqi combat sorties declined after hostilities commenced. The Iraqis quickly found that challenging coalition pilots was tantamount to suicide and essentially remained inactive throughout the remainder of the war. The runway attacks apparently complicated Iraqi air base operations, but there is little evidence to indicate they severely hampered sortie rates.23 The JP233 submunitions were quite small, creating quickly repairable scabs,24 and the redundant taxiway system provided ample alternatives to reach the runway. During the war's first week, Tornado aircraft attacked daily to hinder Iraqi airfield operations. But proper delivery of the JP233 required the aircraft to fly low across the Iraqi airfields, allowing antiaircraft artillery and short-range shoulder-fired missiles to take a disastrous toll. In the war's opening phase, at least four Tornadoes were lost during ineffectual airfield attacks, and about 100 JP233s were expended.25 Mines--the second component of the JP233--along with cluster-bomb submunitions may have had a more significant impact on air base operations. Indeed, the constant reseeding of airfields by aerially dispensed mines and cluster-bomb submunitions may have eventually overwhelmed the capability of any Iraqi explosive ordnance disposal unit. A Russian account of the campaign describes the coalition's use of cluster bombs to cover terrain with a dense, lethal blanket that "trapped" personnel and equipment.26 When US Marine Corps forces attempted a night assault against Iraqi-occupied Kuwait International Airport, they reportedly were held up, not by fierce resistance, but by unexploded coalition cluster-bomb submunitions and mines.27 Photographs taken of captured Iraqi air bases show areas so thick with unexploded submunitions that they were virtually impassable. Busting Bunkers As Iraq's pilots learned they were no match for coalition pilots in the air, they decided upon a strategy of remaining within their fortified HABs. Saddam probably assumed that the bunkers would protect enough of his air force for it to be decisive against the inevitable coalition ground offensive.28 US Air Forces, Central Command (CENTAF) eventually decided that since Iraq's air force would not exit the HABs to fight, the shelters would have to be destroyed, one by one. Air Force planners originally formulated a quick, massive offensive to destroy the 594 Iraqi HABs in just a few days.29 The bunkers would be destroyed in groups, preventing the Iraqis from playing a shell game or dispersing their aircraft. The actual operation, however, did not go as quickly. The target set was too large for the limited number of aircraft capable of delivering precision guided munitions. Poststrike BDA was too slow for the rapid combat tempo, resulting in some restrikes against targets that were already destroyed.30 Inclement weather also forced some missions to abort. Night after night, F-111Fs dropped laser guided bombs on the Iraqi bunkers.31 According to Col Tom Lennon, commander of the 48th Tactical Fighter Wing, initial strike packages consisted of six aircraft, while later ATOs "would put up 20 to 24 aircraft against one airfield at one time."32 On the average, USAF aircraft destroyed 10-20 HABs per night.33 By the end of the war, about 375 HABs sheltering an estimated 141 aircraft had been destroyed.34 Despite the bunker-busting program's initial success, many of Iraq's most advanced aircraft remained unscathed in the "superbunkers" of Project-202 air bases. The first attack against a superbunker, on day seven of Desert Storm, failed to penetrate the target. To Iraqis, this failed attack must have affirmed the HAB's invulnerability to conventional weapons. The second attack, on day nine, penetrated the superbunker and pulverized its contents. Now faced with certain destruction if they remained in the HABs, the cream of Iraq's air force--including Mirage F-1s, Su-22s, MiG-29s, and Su-24s--began their hasty escape to Iran the next morning.35 The total number of advanced aircraft flown to Iran by the end of the war was 137.36 According to news reports, on the same day the exodus began, Iraq's air and air defense force commanders were executed.37 Once its best bunkers were penetrated, Iraq dispersed its remaining aircraft in small groups, parking them near mosques, in villages, and close to priceless archeological treasures.38 Attacking these aircraft without killing innocent civilians would have been impossible. Other aircraft that were spread throughout the countryside could be repositioned faster than US Central Command could respond to information about their position.39 Nevertheless, this dispersal assured the Iraqi air force's defeat since it could not conduct combat operations from the dispersal sites. Dispersal did, however, allow the aircraft to survive the war. Other Major Air Base Targets The coalition also attacked other elements crucial to air base operations at the same time it attacked runways and bunkers. These strikes were not designed to kill aircraft maintenance workers, logisticians, civil engineers, and other air base support personnel. Instead, crucial air base support components--especially aircraft maintenance and logistics facilities--were attacked, severely degrading Iraq's long-term sortie sustainability. By the end of the war, at least 50 percent of Iraq's aircraft maintenance facilities were destroyed. Although coalition warplanes generally ignored airfield support vehicles, which are critical to nearly all aircraft maintenance and support functions, many of these vehicles that were parked in HABs were destroyed during the shelter attacks. Postwar Assessments Trying to second-guess Desert Storm planners has become a major US pastime. Certainly, air base attacks were the primary means by which the coalition defeated the enemy air force. Nevertheless, we should take note of the following miscalculations that occurred in planning and executing air base attacks: * The initial runway attacks were ill considered because Iraqi airfields were specifically designed to withstand and operate under the type of attack mounted by the Tornadoes. As a result of the efficiency and responsiveness of Iraqi airfield-repair teams, damage caused by the JP233 submunition was inconsequential. Furthermore, the JP233 delivery profile forced Tornadoes to fly into the face of massive antiaircraft artillery. The fact that many of Iraq's frontline fighters were able to escape to Iran clearly indicates that many runways remained accessible and useable, despite the coalition's best efforts. * The bunker-busting program effectively ended the threat from Iraq's aircraft by forcing them to flee and disperse. However, had the coalition used more resources to attack the right bunkers earlier, Iraq's best aircraft may not have escaped to become a formidable component of revolutionary Iran's air force. These issues, however, are actually symptoms of a far larger and more troublesome problem: prior to the war, the USAF lacked--and still lacks--an organization responsible for the study of foreign air base operations and weaknesses. Although the USAF expends considerable effort to understand and counter enemy aerial tactics, it remains amazingly indifferent to studying a potential adversary's air bases, where enemy aircraft spend the majority of their time.40 Consequently, before 2 August 1990, CENTAF had little information on Iraqi air base design, support units, manning, runway-repair capabilities, and unique vulnerabilities. By Desert Storm's D day, the coalition had gathered sufficient information to formulate tactics customized to Iraq's air bases. Nevertheless, time constraints and uncertainty over the effect of various tactics may have pushed some coalition tacticians to resort to ill-suited and nearly stereotypical solutions, such as runway attacks. As a result, despite total air supremacy and over 3,000 dedicated air base attack sorties, coalition air forces defeated but did not eliminate their foe.41 Securing victory in future conflicts is likely to require a detailed understanding of the adversary's air base operations and weaknesses. Air bases around the world have undergone dramatic, even revolutionary, changes in the decades since the Six-Day War. Had Iraq's air force been more aggressive or its air defense system more effective, the coalition's air campaign may not have succeeded so overwhelmingly. And the more that air forces worldwide study Operation Desert Storm, the less likely it is that the kinds of mistakes made by Iraq will occur again.42 The coalition air force exercised initiative, used the element of surprise, and enjoyed the advantage of overwhelming numbers, technical superiority, and over five months to prepare for conflict. Future USAF budget constraints, the proliferation of advanced weapons worldwide, and an increasingly volatile world make such advantages unlikely in the future. In future conflicts, successful anti-air base operations may mean the difference between victory and defeat. A USAF center to study and exploit weaknesses in the air bases of potential adversaries could ensure that Desert Storm's mistakes are not repeated against a more formidable foe. Notes 1. V. K. Babich, Aviation in Local Wars (Moscow: Voyenizdat Publishing House, 1988), in Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS) Report--Soviet Union, JPRS-UMA-89-010-L, 2 October 1990, 51. 2. Ibid., 50. 3. Ibid., 52. 4. Fred Vandenbussche, "Belgians Helped Build Eight Air Bases during Gulf War; Iraqi Air Force Tough Nut to Crack," Het Volk, 27-28 October 1990, 2, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service cable, 4 November 1990. 5. Finaly Marshall, "Giant Bases Protect Iraqi Air Force," Nexis Information Services (press association news file), 25 January 1991. 6. Lee Dye and Mark Fineman, "Decade of Digging Aids Iraq; Hussein Imported State-of-the-Art Bunker Building Techniques," Los Angeles Times, 26 January 1991, 1. 7. Lee Hancock, "Saddam Has Long Readied for the Worst, Experts Say," Dallas Morning News, 30 January 1991; Dye and Fineman, 1. 8. "Iraq's Superbase Programme," Jane's Defence Weekly, 2 February 1991, 133. 9. Lt Col Sergey Ivanovich Bezlyudnyy, "I Taught Saddam's Aces to Fly," Komosomolskaya Pravda, 23 February 1991, 3, in JPRS Report--Soviet Union, JPRS-UMA-91-014, 5 June 1991, 62-63. 10. Ibid., 62. 11. Christopher M. Centner, briefing to the US Air Staff, subject: Iraqi Air Base Hardening Program, 26 December 1990. 12. Norman Friedman, Desert Victory (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1991), 169-70. The Foreign Technology Division is now the Foreign Aerospace Science and Technology Center. 13. Additionally, many planners selected tactics that were appropriate for the traditional European theater but ineffective in the new environment. 14. Author's observation. The lack of a centralized air base analysis center also hindered organizations trying to support US Central Command from afar in determining what information was lacking. 15. Friedman, 180-83. 16. Frank Chadwick and Matt Caffrey, Gulf War Fact Book (Bloomington, Ill.: GDW, Inc., 1991), 100. 17. Friedman, 158. 18. Some command centers were so deeply buried that they required specialized munitions. On the war's final dawn, a specialized penetrator, the GBU-28, destroyed Iraq's most hardened command facility. In the span of a few months, the Air Force Systems Command had constructed the 5,000-pound weapon from scrap artillery barrels. "It went through more than 20 feet of reinforced concrete like butter," stated Maj Dick Wright, the GBU-28's program manager. "We're now designing for the next generation of hard targets and delivery platforms. This is all the more important, because everyone now knows we can defeat the current technology of hardened, buried facilities." Capt Leah M. Bryant, "Big Bomb Digs Deep," Leading Edge 33, no. 6 (June 1991): 18-20. 19. Airfields in the Middle East frequently have runways well over 13,000 feet long. Qatar's Doha International Airport maintains a runway 15,000 feet long (The Air Traveler's Handbook [New York: St. Martin's Press, 1988], 16). Sizzling summer temperatures reduce aircraft lift and thrust, necessitating long takeoff and landing rolls. In Iraq's case, long runways on military bases allowed airfields to handle transport and commercial aircraft in emergencies. 20. Dye and Fineman, 1. 21. R. Jeffery Smith, "Iraqi Engineers Quickly Repair Some Airfields," Washington Post, 27 January 1991, A-11. 22. "Industry Update," Defense & Diplomacy 9, nos. 5-6 (May-June 1991): 4-6. 23. Although not stated publicly, the JP233 attacks were probably intended to hinder operations at air bases for at least a day. Instead, runways were reportedly repaired in as little as four to six hours. "Air Attack Short of Goal; Husssein's Force Intact, Defense Aides Say Privately," Newsday, 24 January 1991, 5. 24. Any runway damage will slow aircraft operations, simply because it takes time to determine the location and extent of the damage. Thus, if an attacker is trying to temporarily pin down the enemy's aircraft, runway attacks are appropriate. Modern airfield-attack weapons used by Western forces are typically composed of submunitions delivered across operating surfaces, thus ensuring damage in a single pass. The trade-off for "assured damage," however, is that one delivers small amounts of explosive across a large area. The weapons' designers arrive at the submunitions' explosive requirements by determining the minimum amount of explosive necessary to upheave a "typical target" pavement. Runways, however, are unique. They may rest upon soil that ranges from rock-hard permafrost to impact-absorbing sand. Subbases under the operating surface may range from only several inches of sand to several feet of lean concrete. The operating surface may be built of asphalt, reinforced concrete, or unreinforced concrete. Furthermore, changes in operating requirements and simple wear and tear may mandate runway renovations with overlays, extensions, and reinforcements (G. I. Glushkov, Airport Engineering [Moscow: Mir Publishers, 1988], 305-406). Thus, the submunition is unlikely to encounter anything approximating the pure surface for which it was optimized. The damage produced by submunitions can vary from craters to easily repairable scabs or spalls. In contrast, a large precision guided unitary bomb can ensure massive damage at critical junctures on nearly any surface. 25. "Air War Doctrine Affirmed," Jane's Defence Weekly, 4 May 1991, 738. 26. D. Velikiy and B. Ivanov, "Bombs of a New Generation against the Iraqis," Izvestiya, 13 February 1991, 3, in JPRS Report--Soviet Union, JPRS-UMA-91-008, 18 March 1991, 11. 27. Jeffrey M. Lenorovitz, "Allies Fly Defensive Missions After Air War Smashes Iraq," Jane's Defence Weekly, 11 March 1991, 18-19. 28. Robert Green, "U.S. Puzzled--But Says It Unfazed--by Iraqi Tactics," Reuter Library Report, 23 January 1991. 29. Friedman, 400. 30. Further, assessors and planners were discussing different issues. Some BDA reports listed aircraft bunkers as having "minor" damage because the assessor was reporting damage to the bunker's structural integrity. The planner, however, was more concerned about the aircraft in the bunkers. 31. Some unoccupied dispersal bases were also attacked by B-52s. F-15s, F-16s, and even A-10s were used against various airfield targets. 32. Alfred Price, "Deadly Darkness," Flight International, 10-16 July 1991, 34. 33. "USAF Developed 4,700-lb Bomb in Crash Program to Attack Iraqi Military Leaders in Hardened Bunkers," Aviation Week & Space Technology, 6 May 1991, 67. 34. Friedman, 400. 35. "After the Storm," 738; Operation Desert Storm Update, on "NBC Nightly News," 28 January 1991; and "Interview with Gen Thomas Kelly," Defense Dialog, 29 January 1991, 2. 36. Briefing, US Central Command, subject: Operation Desert Storm Update, 4 March 1991. 37. "Soviets Say Saddam Had Air Chief Killed," USA Today, international edition, 26 January 1991, 3A. 38. "Gulf Peace Plan Weighed As Gulf Ground War Looms," Aviation Week & Space Technology, 25 February 1991, 22. 39. Friedman, 161. 40. Some Air Force personnel have the attitude that air base attacks are irrelevant to ultimate victory. At an airfield-attack munitions conference several years ago, when I was explaining the difficulties in cutting runways, a member of the conference interjected, "That's OK; give me enough AMRAAMs [advanced medium-range air-to-air missiles] and I'll take 'em all out." Despite total coalition air supremacy, Iraqi aircraft were still able to escape into Iranian airspace. It is doubtful that AMRAAMs would have made much difference. 41. This number does not include airfield attacks designed to destroy stockpiles of chemical/biological weapons and delivery systems or attacks against certain HABs and other air base facilities believed to store ballistic missiles. 42. Other air forces facing the possibility of going up against an air campaign like the one waged in Desert Storm are already revising their air defense and air base operability requirements. As stated by Air Commodore Jamal Hussain in Pakistan's Defence Journal, no. 8 (1991): 38-39, We must be able to bear the brunt of the first assault, absorb losses while inflicting heavy attrition on the attackers. We must be able to bounce back quickly and make the enemy pay heavily in terms of aircraft and pilots [sic] losses. From then on, our air strategy should become more offensive. Excellence in air combat, good ECM [electronic countermeasures] capability, enhanced active and passive air defence and efficient RRR [rapid runway repair] capability are areas which PAF [Pakistani Air Force] would need to constantly work at to absorb enemy offensives and retaliate strongly. Contributor Christopher M. Centner (BFA, Maryland Institute College of Art; MS, Defense Intelligence College) is an arms control negotiations adviser with the Department of Defense. He has also served as chief of the Combined Arms Branch and as a tactical threat analyst with the Air Force Intelligence Support Agency, Fort Belvoir, Virginia. Mr Centner was one of a select group of analysts who provided daily intelligence briefings to the Air Force chief of staff and the secretary of the Air Force during Operation Desert Storm. Published Airpower Journal - Winter 1992

Published Aerospace Power Journal - Summer 1987 Fighting From the Air Base Lt Col Price T. Bingham SINCE THE 1960s, Soviet military doctrine has focused on the ability to win a theater war at the nonnuclear level.1 The Soviets believe this goal is feasible if their theater offensive has surprise, speed, concentrated effort, aggressiveness, cooperation of arms and services, and depth.2 One of the most important components of such an offensive is what the Soviets call the air operation. The air operation derives its importance from respect that the Soviets have for our technology and particularly for our air capabilities. They realize how much our ground forces depend on protection and support provided by air power. Similarly, they are well aware that Soviet ground forces also depend heavily on support provided by air power to attain and maintain a high-tempo advance. As a result, the Soviets realize that their ability to conduct a successful theater offensive depends on whether their air operation is able to neutralize quickly our theater-based air capabilities.3 Now it appears that Soviet military leaders are increasingly confident that a successful air operation is possible. Their confidence is due largely to recent technological developments, particularly in surface-to-surface missiles, which these leaders believe have "revolutionized" warfare.4 If a theater war occurs with the Soviets, it is very likely that they would attempt to achieve surprise by providing us with as few clear warning indicators as possible of a pending attack. One way they might try to do this is by beginning their air operation suddenly with a barrage of surface-to-surface missiles delivering improved conventional munitions (some possibilities are mines, bomblets, incendiaries, and fuel-air explosives) and chemical munitions against our time-critical air defense capabilities. These missile attacks would be required to disrupt our air defenses only long enough to prevent us from generating and controlling the sorties needed to defend effectively against the waves of Soviet aircraft that would begin attacking within hours after the first missile impacts. At the same time that they would begin launching missiles, the Soviets would also begin the more overt actions needed to generate large numbers of sorties for their follow-on wave air attacks. Accompanied by electronic jamming, their wave air attacks would be the main method for delivering intense blows to our air bases and other vital theater air installations. However, the Soviets' air operation would also include attacks by special purpose forces (SPETSNAZ), as well as airborne, airmobile, and even amphibious assault forces against air bases, communications nodes, radars, and headquarters. The Soviets believe that the use of this wide variety of methods in their air operation also increases their chances of confusing and ultimately overwhelming our defenses, preventing us from regaining the initiative in the air.5 As this review shows, rather than trying to beat us in the air, the Soviets think-that the key to defeating our Air Force is to take the fight to our air bases and other theater installations. By preventing us from generating large numbers of timely and effective sorties, they will ensure that we have little opportunity to use our superior training and technology to fight in the air. It is because of this possibility's immense dangers that we must reassess our current capability to fight from the air base, specifically to defend the base while continuing flying operations despite enemy attacks. We begin our reassessment by briefly reviewing where we have been. In World War II we first became concerned with defending the air base when we saw how the Germans and Japanese made air bases a key objective in their surprisingly successful offensives. As a result, our early war plans called for 296 air base security battalions, but by 1943 the threat had failed to materialize (except in China in 1944-45). So we began to inactivate units already formed. At the end of the war, the little air base defense capability we had was lost.6 When the Air Force became a separate service, air base defense remained an area of concern; but because of the lack of firm guidance regarding service responsibility, we continued to have little capability until the Korean War. During that war, the Air Force developed a doctrine and limited defense capability by organizing and equipping airmen not directly involved in flight operations like infantrymen, using the Air Police as a cadre. However, as in World War II, our air bases were not seriously threatened. And so, with a reduced postwar budget, the Air Force was especially hard-pressed to justify why it needed more manpower to defend our installations than the other services needed to defend theirs. The result was a decrease in manpower and a lower priority for air base defense.7 Events in Vietnam again restored attention to the need to defend the air base. Gen Hunter Harris, commander in chief of the Pacific Air Forces (CINCPACAF) in 1965, noted that US air bases in Vietnam lacked reasonable protection and that there was a reduced likelihood of dedicated Army protection. He recommended that the Air Force adopt an approach similar to that of the British Royal Air Force, where all airmen had defense duties under the training and leadership of a cadre—the Royal Air Force Regiment. Although his recommendation was not accepted, the Air Force was forced to assume responsibility for internal air base defense when our Army units were used offensively instead of being tied down in passive air base defense duties. To meet this responsibility, we expanded our security police authorizations. Despite this action, our ability to fight from our air bases remained marred throughout the war by poor training policies, as well as by gaps in our doctrine that allowed new bases in Vietnam to be sited and constructed without consideration for making the air base more defensible.8 After Vietnam our emphasis on fighting from the air base did not decrease as it had after World War II and Korea. This was because the successful Israeli attacks in 1967 on Egyptian air bases, Warsaw Pact measures to harden their own air bases, and the growing Soviet threat all showed us the importance of making our air bases more survivable. Initially we devoted much of our energy to building aircraft shelters, but over time our effort was broadened. Now we have reached agreements with our allies and the Army that clarify responsibilities for air base defense. The Royal Air Force Regiment will provide air defense protection for US bases in Britain, and a similar agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany will apply to our bases there.9 Elsewhere the Army has begun identifying forces that will be dedicated to providing ground and point air defense protection for our air bases.10 In still another important action, the Air Force conducted a comprehensive exercise to demonstrate the air base survivability capability of a generic Air Force tactical fighter wing. This exercise, called Salty Demo, took place in the spring of 1985 at Spangdahlem Air Base, Germany. Profiting from this exercise and other activities, in December 1986 the Air Force published Air Force Regulation 360-1, Air Base Operability Planning and Operations. This regulation summarizes our current program for fighting from the air base. It outlines required organizational structures, assigns basewide responsibilities for planning and training, and provides guidance for carrying out the air base operability program. In the category of active defense measures, the regulation establishes planning factors for both air and ground defense. It makes the wing commander or equivalent responsible for local ground defense and puts forces of other services assigned to local ground defense duties under his control. To reduce the ability of an enemy to identify desired targets and to minimize damage from enemy attacks, the regulation requires the implementation of a variety of passive defense measures, including hardening, dispersal, redundancy, camouflage, concealment, deception, and nuclear, biological, chemical (NBC) defense. After an attack, it will be vital to assess and repair damage rapidly in order to return the air base to maximum operational status as quickly as possible. Under base recovery, the regulation establishes the organization and policy needed to accomplish these tasks. Yet, despite the great progress we have made in planning and programming to improve our ability to fight from the air base, much more still needs to be done. We cannot afford to wait until after we develop and procure the aircraft that fly from the air base to begin thinking about the requirements for fighting from that air base. Instead, we must recognize that a complex interrelationship exists between aircraft and air base design and that the characteristics of one often greatly influence the combat capability of the other. Full recognition of this interrelationship would result in air base operability considerations receiving the same degree of attention as in-flight performance when we design our aircraft. The requirement for the advanced tactical fighter to have short takeoff and landing (STOL) and rough/soft field capabilities is evidence that the Air Force is now aware of the need to address air base operability considerations during an aircraft's design phase. Unfortunately, the low priority the Air Force currently assigns to developing aircraft with short takeoff and vertical landing (STOVL) capabilities is cause for concern, given the growing possibility that Soviet air base attacks would include the use of chemicals and mines. If either of these are used, particularly in combination with immediate-effect munitions, it is very likely that the only way to recover and reestablish effective, high-sortie-rate operations will be to change operating locations, moving to an uncontaminated area to generate sorties. Compared to STOL, STOVL technology makes such movement far more feasible because of greatly decreased operating surface requirements. STOVL technology would also significantly enhance our ability to use mobility, concealment, and deception measures, which in turn would make it much more difficult for an enemy to find an operating location. And eve" if an enemy is able to find such a location, the increased dispersion that STOVL technology makes possible could make the operating location a much less lucrative target.11 Since we must be able to fight from our air bases in a theater war with the Soviets, we need to design and build all overseas theater bases as field fortifications, thereby making combat effectiveness, not peacetime operating efficiency, the only acceptable criterion. Furthermore, this criterion must apply not only to facilities directly supporting flight operations but also to mess and medical facilities and quarters. Besides giving attention to hardening, dispersal, camouflage, and concealment, we also need to design our buildings so they can be easily defended by including weapon positions that are sited to assure mutually supporting fields of fire. Training is the area where we need to make our greatest effort. While we can hope the Army or host-nation forces will be available to defend our air bases, we cannot afford to depend on them. As we saw in Vietnam, theater commanders in wartime may become reluctant to tie down combat troops in defensive roles. Nor can we afford to field our own army of security police whose sole duty is air base defense. Instead, we need to follow Winston Churchill's advice and make the theater air base the "stronghold of fighting air-ground men, and not the abode of uniformed civilians in the prime of life protected by detachments of soldiers."12 This means that, like the Army and Marine Corps, we must demand that everyone in the Air Force who serves or could serve in a theater position, officer and enlisted alike, achieve competence in the use of weapons, medical aid, and field craft. Requiring competence in these traditional military skills not only will significantly improve our ability to fight from the air base, it will also make an important contribution to esprit de corps by removing all doubts some may have as to whether the Air Force is a combat organization or a nine-to-five "blue suit" business. Given the nature of the threat, we should not limit weapons training to small arms but also must require that some personnel be capable of using heavier weapons like antiaircraft and antiarmor weapons and mortars. Assignment of specific weapons in a theater would be based upon individual and unit roles in the air base's defense plan. By arming everyone in uniform, installation commanders would be able to make more effective use of their limited number of security police. Besides serving as cadre, these highly trained personnel could also be used for more demanding active defense roles such as patrolling and counterattacks. We must recognize that fighting from an air base that is attacked by missiles and large numbers of aircraft, let alone SPETSNAZ and airborne forces, will result in casualties and in some cases very heavy casualties. For example, a sudden Soviet missile reattack might catch many personnel in the open as they perform rapid runway repair activities. In such a situation, we cannot count on there being enough specially trained medical personnel readily available to treat all the wounded immediately. Therefore, if we are to avoid having many of our wounded die unnecessarily, everyone must be required to know basic first aid so they can care for themselves or others until medical personnel are available. Not all casualties will involve physical wounds. Many will be psychiatric casualties of what we more commonly call battle fatigue. According to Army experience, intense combat, indirect fire inadequate sleep, and surprise (conditions that are likely to be present during fighting from the air base) all lead to psychiatric casualties. In 1973 the Israeli military experienced 30 psychiatric casualties for every 100 who had physical wounds. They also found that if these psychiatric casualties are not correctly treated, they will not be able to return to combat and will often be chronically disabled.13 Given this threat, we need to take the same professional approach to the unique psychiatric dangers of war that we now take, through physiological training, to the dangers associated with flying. Therefore, to reduce the number and severity of psychiatric casualties, all commissioned and noncommissioned officers in leadership positions, as well as all medical personnel, need to be trained to know what causes battle fatigue, what is symptoms are, how to prevent it, and how to treat it.14 In addition, like the Army we must be prepared to reconstitute those units that experience heavy casualties. This means we must determine ahead of time what losses require what kind of actions. We need to decide whether we will replace individuals or units and then make appropriate plans. Currently most Air Force personnel at an air base rely on others for food and shelter. However, the destruction that will occur while fighting from the air base will result in many of these services being interrupted or been terminated. Restoring these services will not have as high a priority as assuring flight operations. Therefore, Air Force personnel must be trained in field craft and be appropriately equipped so that even if fighting deprives them of heated shelters with running water, electricity, food, and other amenities that we are accustomed to in peacetime, their fighting performance will not be unnecessarily impaired. Clearly, preparing to fight from the air base requires changes that will not be popular with some. They will argue that money is better spent in other areas or that we cannot afford to make more demands on already limited amounts of training time. We must realize that these views are shortsighted because they are a product of our past experience when we needed little capability to fight from our air bases in order to fight in the air. Unfortunately, the threat we face today is dangerously different. As a result, success in a future theater war, particularly one with the Soviets, is likely to depend on whether we can make significant changes in our priorities by putting fighting from the air base on an equal plane with fighting in the air. Maxwell AFB, Alabama Notes 1. For a detailed discussion of this development, see John G. Hines, Phillip A. Petersen, and Notra Truclock III, "Soviet Military Theory from 1945-2000: Implications for NATO," Washington Quarterly, Fall 1986, 81-137; and Mary C. Fitzgerald, "Marshal Ogarkov on the Modern Theater Operation," Conflict Quarterly, Summer 1986, 39-58. 2. C.N. Donnelly, "The Development of Soviet Military Doctrine," International Defense Review, December 1981, 1596. 3. Phillip A. Petersen and Maj John R. Clark, "Soviet Air and Antiair Operations," Air University Review, March-April 1985, 36-54. 4. Brig John Hemsley, "The Influence of Technology upon Soviet Operational Doctrine," RUSI, June 1986, 25; and Dennis M. Gormley, "A New Dimension to Soviet Theater Strategy," Orbis, Fall 1985, 537-69. 5. Petersen and Clark, 42-49. 6. Roger P. Fox, Air Base Defense in the Republic of Vietnam, 1961-1973 (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1979), 2-4. 7. Ibid., 4-7. 8. Ibid., 8-9, 25-28, 63. 9. Giovanni de Briganti, "The Defense of NATO's Air-bases," Armed Forces Journal International, June 1985, 144. 10. Col Charles D. Cooper, "Joint Force Development--Wave of the Future?" The Retired Officer, October 1986, 19. 11. For further discussion of STOVL technology and air base survivability, see John W. R. Taylor, "Jane's Aerospace Survey, l987," Air Force Magazine, January 1987, 58-59; Lt Col Price T. Bingham, "Air Base Survivability: An Essential Element of Theater Air Power," Air Force Journal of Logistics, Winter 1987, 2-5; "Air Base Survivability and V/STOL Aircraft: A Gap in Air Force Doctrine?" Air University Review, January-February 1986, 51-57; and "Improving Force Flexibility Through V/STOL," Air University Review, January-February 1985, 72-87. 12. Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War, yet. 3, The Grand Alliance (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1950), 776-77. 13. Lt Col Gregory Lucas Belensky, USA; Lt Col Shabtai Noy, Israeli Defense Force; and Maj, Zahava Solomon, Israeli Defense Force, "Battle Stress: The Israeli Experience," Military Review, July 1985, 29-30. 14. Maj Greg Lande, "Emotional First Aid," Infantry, November-December 1986, 40-41. Contributor Lt Col Price T. Bingham (USAFA) is the chief of the Airpower Doctrine Division, Airpower Research Institute, Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education Maxwell AFB, Alabama. Previously he served in the Doctrine and Concepts Division, HQ USAF. He has flown fighters in TAC, USAFE, and Southeast Asia. He also served as fighter and tanker duty controller in the MACV/USSAF tactical air control center. He was a frequent contributor to the Air University Review. Disclaimer The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

here are some requests in SQL format that, thanks to Tony's help, i created to ease my work. QueryList_BOLWeapons it list all the weapons that can be fied with the CTRL+F1 hotkey, simulating the LOAL (Lock After Launch) mode in real life. SELECT t2WeaponCodes.ID FROM lWeaponCode INNER JOIN t2WeaponCodes ON lWeaponCode.ID = t2WeaponCodes.Code WHERE (((lWeaponCode.Description)="Bearing-Only Launch")); QueryList_HF Sonar simply list the sonar sensor working in High Frequency SELECT t2SensorSearchFreq.ID, lSensorFreq.Description FROM lSensorFreq INNER JOIN t2SensorSearchFreq ON lSensorFreq.ID = t2SensorSearchFreq.Freq WHERE (((lSensorFreq.Description)="HF Sonar")) OR (((lSensorFreq.Description)="MF Sonar")) OR (((lSensorFreq.Description)="LF Sonar")); (note the multiple conditions in the "WHERE" line ) QuerySubPassiveSignature simply listing the Subs' passive sonar signatures SELECT t2SubCrossSections.ID, t2Sub.Model, t2Sub.Name, t2Sub.Type, lCrossSection.Description, t2SubCrossSections.Front, t2SubCrossSections.Side, t2SubCrossSections.Rear FROM t2Sub INNER JOIN (lCrossSection INNER JOIN t2SubCrossSections ON lCrossSection.ID = t2SubCrossSections.Type) ON t2Sub.ID = t2SubCrossSections.ID WHERE (((lCrossSection.Description)="Passive Sonar")); QueryPlanesSignatures simply listing the complete, unlike the request above, signature (Cross Section's Radar, Visual and Infrared values) of all planes SELECT t2PlaneCrossSections.ID, t2Plane.Name, t2Plane.Model, lCrossSection.Description, t2PlaneCrossSections.Front, t2PlaneCrossSections.Side, t2PlaneCrossSections.Rear FROM t2Plane INNER JOIN (lCrossSection INNER JOIN t2PlaneCrossSections ON lCrossSection.ID = t2PlaneCrossSections.Type) ON t2Plane.ID = t2PlaneCrossSections.ID WHERE (((lCrossSection.Description)="Visual")) OR (((lCrossSection.Description)="Infrared")) OR(((lCrossSection.Description)="Radar")); cheers, Jan

imho it's nothing more than a political move to regain "influence and command posts," since on the field France is already well integrated. Hopefully, it will lead to the end of the french selfish era. Maybe that Sarkozy is not that bad after all... cheers, Jan

it's wonderfull to see how the press people seems to be born yesterday and how they have a slective memory cheers, Jan

India is definitelly not in Middle East and not more in the Pacific so, you are right Pete, a new folder would be needed, "Current Events in the Indian Ocean Rim" for exemple. cheers, Jan

Nice vid guys, about the hit, it doesn't look to me to be an aircraft that explode, the explosion is imho too small. As far as i know, the Rapier were not equipped with proximity fuse to not damage the ships so i would say that it's the missile manually triggered that we see exploding here. cheers, Jan

nice archive, i particulary noticed Tatcher's remark "one day, all the facts will be published"

impressing work Rene, keep it up! cheers, Jan

it seems that things are still evolving: [Jane's International Defence Review - first posted to http://idr.janes.com - 05 July 2007] cheers, Jan

exact Herman. i don't know if it's since ANW or former, but i noticed the same things over the water. Above the ground, the flags seems to work. cheers, Jan

hello everyone, vids showing military aircraft training at Vlow altitude and stories where drop tank have hit the sea waves or the sand dunes are both common. it's also well know that in wartime, at least over the sea, pilots had to fly very low to not be spotted by the opposition's radar too early. a famous operational exemple is the argentinian Super Etendard wich were approaching their targets at between 10 and 15m above the water. off course, it deosn't mean that they would fly so low over land or even that they would do it by night or adverse weather. thow could we simulate it correctly? as far as i know, the lowest alt at wich teh planes can fly over water is 31 meters. cheers, Jan

Hello Herman, thanks for your interest, exact, both because each situation would require it's own solution, a case-by-case action is the only wise. yes there are other solution but the fake loadout method add some flexibility by allowing the scen designer to physically have the planes ferrying. cheers, Jan

hello pooners, yesterday, in a chat about AI (un)management of iin flight refueling operations with Tony on IRC, the idea of using a special underwing tank to be inserted in the plane's loadouts to simulate that the planes refueled during the missions came on the table. the beauty of that workaround (if one can see any beauty in a workaround), is to allow the scen designer to manage the usage of that workaround by simply including, or not, the needed underwing tank. on the other side, any scen that would have used tankers would require his specific tank because the distance to cover would also be specific. another con is that it doesn't physically simulate the tanker, it can not be threatened. and a third ( and it would probably seen as major by somes) is that it require an intervention by the DB author. my humble opinion is that it can add some flexibility for scen designers (even if at least one will probably say that he lived very well without it) and is less restrictive than intermediate air bases. now please share your own cheers, Jan

nice ships Pete, to paint them one must not have a shaking hand btw, what about subs? cheers, Jan

(sorry to wake up an old thread) it seems that it was the effectively the Samson: http://www.israeli-weapons.com/weapons/mis...itald/TALD.html http://www.vectorsite.net/twuav_06.html#m2 by the way, wasn't it also the first operationnal use of UAV? cheers, Jan

a good complement to read: The Soviet Spetsnaz Threat to Nato cheers, Jan

it sounds fun, thanks for sharing it Pete. mech infantry is usually good at that game and having friendly artillery smashing the LZ as soon as the ennemy troops landed help to prevent their reorganisation btw, iirc, the doctrine is to have the paradrop closely preceded by an air strike. cheers, Jan

my mistake, sorry. i thought that it was your "What if" DB. cheers, Jan

that early 2001 project should interest you Tony: Topless n'potent - Network Centric Missile Ship http://web.archive.org/web/20030216073401/...ssel/vessel.htm cheers, Jan

thanks for the link Brad, it remind me that i still have to read the book Sukhoi Su-25 Frogfoot: Close Air Support Aircraft by Gordon Yefim and Alan Dawes that i received when is subscribed to AFM cheers, Jan

sorry for not answering sooner but the sun knocked me down for the weekend. Brad is right, that's what i was talking about: road basing and mobile support units. Their fixed air bases were only for peace time. Swedish, and finnish, had also sine the '70 an operationnal data link network. About the Harrier, like any other VTOL platform it would have been unproductive to do it in another way, mostly for an expeditionary unit. would anyone have details about soviet plans or would know a book like Vego's "Soviet Naval Tactics" but talking air warfare? cheers, Jan