I guess one other option to explain it (not saying its likely only possible) due to the damage done would be an accident in an ammo magazine. Most (if not all) ships would be destroyed by such an event.

 

Yes, that would do it. Although the Cheonan does not appear to show any signs of a massive internal explosion, and the ship broke it half right where the engine room/propulsion plant would have been.

Yeah, the top post on page two of this thread indicates that an external explosion is thought to be the most likely cause.

From Chosun Ilbo

 

May 9, 2010

Torpedo Gunpowder Found in Cheonan Wreckage

 

Traces of gunpowder found in the wreckage of the Navy corvette Cheonan, which sank in an explosion in the West Sea on March 26, came from a torpedo, a government official said Friday.

 

"Explosive traces found in the Cheonan's chimney and the seabed on which the stern's broken-off side had been lying were all confirmed as those of the high explosive RDX, which is more powerful than TNT," the official told the Yonhap news agency. "This explosive is used in torpedoes, not sea mines." The tiny amount of gunpowder ingredient was detected in the Cheonan's funnel.

 

RDX stands for "research department explosive." Water is much denser than air and is capable of transferring energy more quickly, but also dissipates faster, with the power of a blast being limited to just between 5 to 6 m, so gunpowder in torpedoes and mines is produced to maximize the power of the blast.

 

The gunpowder was discovered in the funnel of the vessel, which is unusual given that the Cheonan was split in half in a blast from underneath. Investigators believe traces of gunpowder on the stern and bow of the vessel may have been washed off when the sections shifted position due to the strong currents. But the funnel remained stationary, thereby allowing traces of gunpowder left inside to remain intact.

 

Investigators have also identified four pieces of aluminum alloy found at the scene as part of a torpedo. The official told Yonhap the material is an alloy of aluminum and magnesium commonly used in a torpedo's casing.

 

The pieces were discovered both inside and near the split section of the ship. X-ray and neutron diffraction techniques could determine the manufacturer of the aluminum alloy, making it possible to identify the source of the weapon.

 

The ministry says another two weeks will be needed to complete the analysis and that an announcement could be made around May 20. The team, which consists of South Korean and U.S. investigators, has been working aboard the South Korean ship Dokdo isolated from contact with the outside. But starting on Friday, investigators are moving to a Navy base in Pyeongtaek, and a number of personnel are expected to leave.

 

There are rumors that U.S. experts have already reported their findings to American military commanders and government officials and that the probe will be wrapped up soon.

 

[CV32: Most Soviet/Russian and Chinese manufacture torpedoes use Torpex warheads. Torpex is 42% RDX].

[CV32: Most Soviet/Russian and Chinese manufacture torpedoes use Torpex warheads. Torpex is 42% RDX].

 

What do Western torps use?

What do Western torps use?

 

A wider variety of explosives, including Torpex, HBX-1, HBX-3, and PBXN-103.

This last finding sembles conclusive, but a open retaliatory strike is useless and only can complicate more the situation.

I suppose the answer is near a decapitation strike, the Great Leader and his ancestors are experiended and worth of it:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bak_Jeong-hee...Blue_House_Raid

 

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Decapitation_strike (curiously, mentionated Debt of Honor as seminal work, and also this work, previouly unknown for me: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Cuban_Mis...econd_Holocaust )

 

And far out of this topic, very interesting and colorfull the recent Korean History, cars, electronics and movies aside :

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category:Assa...ean_politicians

The weapon used to kill Ahn was a wooden club inscribed with the words, "Justice Stick". Ahn was 79-years old at the time.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ahn_Doo-hee

From DefenseNews

 

05/10/2010

N. Korea’s Recon Brigade Suspected in Attack on Ship

BY WENDELL MINNICK 



 

TAIPEI — Growing evidence points to the likely involvement of North Korea’s elite special operations Reconnaissance General Bureau in the sinking of the South Korean corvette Cheonan on March 26.



 

The Pohang-class corvette was destroyed in the western waters off the disputed sea border with North Korea by the force of an explosion that apparently came from below the boat, sometimes referred to as bubble-jet effect or a non­contact explosion, Seoul officials have said. The focus of the investigation now appears to be narrowing to either a “human torpedo” or a torpedo launched from a midget submarine or semi-submersible under the command of the bureau.



 

The Reconnaissance General Bureau is North Korea’s lead intelligence collection and covert action arm. Not only does it include infiltration operations into the south, but it conducts covert operations such as assassination, kidnapping and sabotage.



 

Joseph Bermudez, who wrote “North Korean Special Forces,” the definitive book on the subject, said the bureau has a long history of doing Pyongyang’s dirty work and has recently been growing in influence and power.



 

“Up until recently, the North Korean agencies involved in intelligence and special operations were divided between the Army and the party,” Bermudez said. However, with the rise of the military within North Korea, the bureau has been “assuming greater and greater power.” 



 

Expanding Power 



 

Intelligence agencies and assets have recently undergone a reorganization in North Korea, Bermudez said. “The Reconnaissance Bureau became the Reconnaissance General Bureau and has assumed the responsibilities of many of the intelligence operations that were formerly under the control of the party.”

 

The bureau has naval, ground and air elements. It was responsible for the grounding of a Sango-class midget submarine off the east coast of South Korea in 1996. The occupants committed suicide.



 

If the recent attack on the Cheonan was most likely the handiwork of the bureau, then the lead actors behind the attack were most likely O Kuk-ryol, vice director of the National Defense Commission, which oversees the bureau, and Kim Kyok-sik, the Fourth Corps commander. O is a confidant of North Korea’s “Supreme Leader” Kim Jong-il.



 

“He is very aggressive, very dedicated, very firm supporter of Kim Jong-il. He knows his job and knows how to cause pain and suffering,” Bermudez said.



 

If it was a bureau-initiated attack, it means the attackers probably operated out of ports in the Fourth Corps area of operation, said Bruce Bechtol, author of the book “Red Rogue.”

 

“If the attack was conducted by the Recon Bureau, it could have been a San­go or Yugo [midget submarine],” Bechtol said. “It also could have been a semi-submersible or a human-driven torpedo,” he said.



 

Bermudez agrees that given the shallow depth of the water in the area, a torpedo attack might have come from a semi-submersible vessel rather than a submarine. 


 

“I would certainly rule out a Romeo submarine; however, a Sango or Yugo are within the realm of possibility. The vast majority of the Navy’s and intelligence agencies’ submarines are capable of carrying torpedoes and sea mines as are some of the intelligence agencies’ semi-submersible infiltration landing craft,” he said. “Torpedoes carried by these smaller craft would necessarily be smaller in size.” 



 

North Korea’s Midget Subs 



 

North Korea has an unknown number of operational 260-ton Sango-class midget submarines and 90-ton Yugo-class midget coastal submarines used for infiltration, anti-surface warfare and mine laying. Both can carry torpedoes. A Sango was captured in 1996 off the east coast of South Korea, and several Yugos have been lost in operations against the South, the most recent in 1998.



 

There are about 100 high-speed semi-submersible infiltration crafts of different sizes and shapes at North Korea’s disposal. They have a low radar cross section and squat in the water at high speeds.



 

Some of the most famous are locally built Cluster Osprey-class semi-submersible saboteur infiltration launches. In service since 1985, the vessels are used for sabotage and infiltration teams.



 

North Korea also has seven U.S.­built high-speed racing boats procured from U.S. shipbuilder Fountain Powerboat Industries in 1993. The agent handling the sale was subsequently indicted in 1998 under the Trading with the Enemy Act. The boats have a maximum speed of 100 knots with 2,000 break horsepower engines and are used for infiltration missions.



 

Earlier this year, South Korea’s military intelligence warned of the threat of human-torpedo attacks from North Korea, Bechtol said, “which was pledging revenge for its defeat in a sea skirmish in November last year.”

 

“Human torpedoes are underwater suicide squads who operate torpedoes equipped with a mini motor or engine to sneak up to a target and blow it up,” he said. 



 

Assassination Attempt 



 

Although the bureau’s involvement in the Cheonan attack is still in question, there is no question the bureau sent two men to Seoul to assassinate a North Korean defector this month.



 

South Korea announced April 19 that it had arrested two North Korean agents working for the Reconnaissance General Bureau who had been sent to Seoul to assassinate Hwang Jang-yop, a former secretary of the North Korean Workers’ Party who defected to the South in 1997. He is the most senior North Korean official ever to defect.



 

South Korea’s National Intelligence Service identified the men as Kim Myong-ho and Dong Myong-gwan, both majors in the bureau. Both were under orders from Kim Yong-chol, a high-level bureau official, to assassinate Hwang. They entered South Korea from Thailand earlier this year posing as defectors.



 

“Killing Hwang has been a long­time goal on North Korea’s part. They will continue trying to get him. That won’t change,” Bermudez said.



 

The assassination attempt and the Cheonan incident point to the possibility North Korea will conduct additional covert operations against South Korea in the coming months, Bermudez said.



 

And despite the increase in violence, there are few who believe Seoul will launch a punitive strike against Pyongyang, fearing an escalation in violence.



 

“One plausible scenario is that they do nothing since neither the U.S. nor South Korea has ever taken military action in response to previous armed NK attacks due to the fear of the situation escalating to a war,” said Bruce Klingner, a Korean military specialist at the Heritage Foundation.



 

“An alternative to not doing a military response but doing ‘something’ is to take it to the United Nations to demand actions” against North Korea in the form of more sanctions, he said.

 

NORTH KOREAN PROVOCATIONS

 

1968: A platoon of North Korean soldiers is stopped short of reaching the Blue House, the South Korean presidential residence, and after an intense fire fight only one North Korean soldier survives.



 

1968: North Korea captures the Pueblo, a U.S. Navy reconnaissance ship.



 

1972: A North Korean bomb detonates prematurely at South Korea’s National Cemetery before the scheduled arrival of the South Korean president.



 

1976: A U.S. soldier is killed in Panmunjom by North Koreans wielding ax handles.



 

1983: A North Korean bomb kills several members of the South Korean presidential Cabinet in Rangoon.



 

1987: A North Korean bomb detonates on KAL flight 858 killing 115 people.



 

1996: A North Korean mini­submarine is captured along the east coast of South Korea.


From Defense Aerospace

 

Lee Plans Defense Posture Overhaul

(Source: Republic of Korea Ministry of National Defense; dated May 6, issued May12, 2010)

 

Strongly insinuating that North Korea was behind the sinking of a Navy warship, President Lee Myung-bak announced major changes in the way South Korea’s military will defend the country.

 

“It has now become clear that the Cheonan did not sink from a simple accident,” Lee said in an opening address at an unprecedented meeting of military commanders on May 4. “As soon as the incident happened, I realized that it was a grave international issue, that included inter-Korean relations, and made an order to the defense minister to lay bare the cause through international cooperation.”

 

Lee hosted the meeting of 150 commanders at the Defense Ministry, and the opening speech was broadcast live nationwide. He also announced a plan to create a presidential team to review the national security posture.

 

“After the cause [of the Cheonan sinking] is revealed, I will take a resolute and stern countermeasure,” Lee said. “But even before the probe outcome comes, we have an immediate task. It is a complete review of our national security posture.”

 

“Taking into account the peculiar situation of the world’s only divided nation amid hostilities, we must reshape our military’s capabilities,” Lee said. “We must especially check on our readiness against asymmetric capabilities, including special warfare.”

 

Asymmetric warfare is a strategy used by weaker adversaries against stronger ones that emphasizes small, mobile, elusive and inventive fighting methods. Nuclear weapons, missiles, chemical weapons, special operation units, cyber warfare and submarine offensives are components of asymmetric warfare, in contrast to conventional capabilities such as tanks and artillery.

 

The North has reinforced its asymmetric armed forces to boost its capability to launch surprise attacks and create mass destruction. The South has been working to deter such an evolution of the North’s capabilities.

 

Lee also said that South Korea has a strong military, but the people’s readiness and awareness of the country’s dangerous security situation have relaxed through the years.

 

“There were some external factors that have clouded the aim of our security awareness, and the military probably had some internal confusion,” Lee said. “The people also have forgotten the fact that long-range artillery of the most hostile forces is aimed at us from only about 50 kilometers [31 miles] away. The Cheonan’s sinking has reminded us of the reality.”

 

Lee’s remarks quickly fueled speculation that the country may revive the concept of “the main enemy,” and a senior Blue House official said there is a high possibility, although no final decision has been made yet.

 

After North Korea threatened in 1994 to turn Seoul into a “sea of fire,” the South named the North its “main enemy” in a defense white-paper in 1995. The practice, however, was halted in 2004 during the Roh Moo-hyun administration.

 

Urging the military to improve its contingency readiness, reporting and command systems, intelligence capabilities and discipline, Lee also said his administration will create a presidential team to check on the national security posture, crisis management system and military reforms.

 

According to a senior Blue House official for security affairs, the team is tentatively named the Commission for National Security Review. While some of its duties will overlap with those of the National Security Council, the main focus will be an overhaul of the military and improvement of the government’s security posture, he said.

 

“About 10 will be on the commission, and the members will include military experts and retired generals,” the source said.

 

While the commission will not be a permanent organ, Lee will appoint a special adviser for national security and reshape the crisis-monitoring center to upgrade the Blue House’s oversight of national security issues. The source said a former military official will likely become the adviser.

 

At the meeting, Defense Minister Kim Tae-young reported to Lee that March 26 will be remembered as a day of disgrace for the South Korean military, and the armed forces will shift their focus following the Cheonan’s sinking. “We admit that the military has been relatively vulnerable to infiltration and limited provocations, and we must redirect the focus of our capabilities,” Kim reported to Lee.

 

According to the ministry, monitoring and deterrence against North Korea’s submarine operation and special warfare units will be the military’s top priority, a change from the strategy of preparing for an all-out war against the North. Operations strategies in the Yellow Sea near the inter-Korean border, where the Cheonan sank, will also be improved, the ministry said.

 

North Korea is known to have about 100 submarines and 180,000 special warfare forces. Investments in improving sonar, radar and attack helicopters are expected to be made to counter the asymmetrical warfare of the North, the ministry said.

 

The ruling and opposition parties were split over the commanders’ meeting and Lee’s plan.

 

While the Grand Nationals said the president made the right decision to revamp the national security posture, the Democratic Party called it a political show.

 

“We are worried about the Lee administration’s overt attempt to politically abuse the military and exploit national security issues,” said DP spokesman Woo Sang-ho. “The commanders were made to take responsibility for the recent incident, and we are infuriated.”

 

Woo said 46 sailors died but no one has taken responsibility, demanding the defense minister and others under the chain of command to be reprimanded immediately.

From Korea Times

 

05-18-2010 14:15

 

Pieces of torpedo screw found

 

The joint investigation team has reportedly found screw pieces of torpedo, probably causing the sinking of the Navy patrol ship Cheonan, near the border waters in the West Sea where the incident took place in late March.

 

The Korea Broadcast System (KBS) reported Tuesday that the team has launched close checking of the findings in a non-destructive testing. "The manufacturers of the screw are shortlisted to two countries Russia and China," KBS reported, quoting government officials who were not identified.

 

The screw, which is a part that creates power to propel the torpedo in the tail, has been regarded as a decisive clue to the cause of the incident as it does not destruct in general even during an explosion.

 

The government is ready to make it clear that the corvette was sunk by the torpedo and North Korea will be responsible for torpedo attack as the government has already secured pieces of material evidence, including screw part, when it announces investigation results May 20.

The formal report of the cause of the Cheonan sinking, which by now everyone probably knows, has been blamed on a North Korean torpedo, can be found here:

 

Investigation result on the sinking of the Cheonan (PDF, via BBC)

 

To summarize it and other reports, it seems a few small submarines and a support mothership supporting them left a North Korea naval base in the West Sea (Yellow Sea) 2-3 days prior to the attack.

 

The 'shooter' is believed to have been a Yeono (Salmon) or IS 120 class midget sub (like the Iranian Ghadir), and the weapon, a CHT-02D heavyweight torpedo.

 

The sinking is said to have occurred in approx 6-9 meters depth, and that the explosion occurred about 3 meters left of the Cheonan's gas turbine engine room.

 

I am not familiar with the CHT-02D, but it is described as a North Korean manufactured 21 inch (533mm) heavyweight torpedo utilizing "acoustic/wake homing and passive acoustic tracking". It is apparently 7.35 meters in length, with a weight of 1.7 tons and a net explosive weight of up to 250 kg. I expect it is probably a copy or modified copy of a Chinese or Soviet design.

Defense Aerospace has reproduced the report ...

 

Investigation Result on the Sinking of ROKS "Cheonan"

(Source: South Korean Ministry of National Defense; issued May 20, 2010)

 

The Joint Civilian-Military Investigation Group(JIG) conducted its investigation with 25 experts from 10 top Korean expert agencies, 22 military experts, 3 experts recommended by the National Assembly, and 24 foreign experts constituting 4 support teams from the United States, Australia, the United Kingdom and the Kingdom of Sweden. The JIG is composed of four teams--Scientific Investigation Team, Explosive Analysis Team, Ship Structure Management Team, and Intelligence Analysis Team.

 

In our statement today, we will provide the results attained by Korean and foreign experts through an investigation and validation process undertaken with a scientific and objective approach.

 

The results obtained through an investigation and analysis of the deformation of the hull recovered from the seabed and evidence collected from the site of the incident are as follows:

 

The JIG assesses that a strong underwater explosion generated by the detonation of a homing torpedo below and to the left of the gas turbine room caused Republic of Korea Ship (ROKS) "Cheonan" to split apart and sink.

 

The basis of our assessment that the sinking was caused by a torpedo attack is as follows:

 

-- Precise measurement and analysis of the damaged part of the hull indicates that a shockwave and bubble effect caused significant upward bending of the CVK(Center Vertical Keel), compared to its original state, and shell plate was steeply bent, with some parts of the ship fragmented.

 

-- On the main deck, fracture occurred around the large openings used for maintenance of equipment in the gas turbine room and significant upward deformation is present on the port side. Also, the bulkhead of the gas turbine room was significantly damaged and deformed.

 

-- The bottoms of the stern and bow sections at the failure point were bent upward. This also proves that an underwater explosion took place.

 

-- Through a thorough investigation of the inside and outside of the ship, we have found evidence of extreme pressure on the fin stabilizer, a mechanism to reduce significant rolling of the ship; water pressure and bubble effects on the bottom of the hull; and wires cut with no traces of heat. All these point to a strong shockwave and bubble effect causing the splitting and the sinking of the ship.

 

We have analyzed statements by survivors from the incident and a sentry on Baekryong-do.

 

The survivors made a statement that they heard a near-simultaneous explosion once or twice, and that water splashed on the face of a port-side lookout who fell from the impact; furthermore, sentry on the shore of Baekryong-do stated that he witnessed an approximately 100-meter-high "pillar of white flash" for 2~3 seconds. The aforementioned phenomenon is consistent with damage resulting from a shockwave and bubble effect.

 

Regarding the medical examination on the deceased service members, no trace of fragmentation or burn injury were found, but fractures and lacerations were observed. All of these are consistent with damage resulting from a shockwave and bubble effect.

 

The seismic and infrasound wave analysis result conducted by the Korea Institute of Geoscience and Mineral Resources (KIGAM) is as follows:

 

--Seismic wave intensity of 1.5 degrees was detected by 4 stations.

--2 infrasound waves with a 1.1-second interval were detected by 11 stations.

--The seismic and infrasound waves originated from an identical site of explosion.

--This phenomenon corresponds to a shock wave and bubble effect generated by an underwater explosion.

 

Numerous simulations of an underwater explosion show that a detonation with a net explosive weight of 200~300kg occurred at a depth of about 6~9m, approximately 3m left of the center of the gas turbine room.

 

Based on the analysis of tidal currents off Baekryong-do, the JIG determined that the currents would not prohibit a torpedo attack.

 

As for conclusive evidence that can corroborate the use of a torpedo, we have collected propulsion parts, including propulsion motor with propellers and a steering section from the site of the sinking.

 

The evidence matched in size and shape with the specifications on the drawing presented in introductory materials provided to foreign countries by North Korea for export purposes. The marking in Hangul, which reads "1번” (or No. 1 in English), found inside the end of the propulsion section, is consistent with the marking of a previously obtained North Korean torpedo. The above evidence allowed the JIG to confirm that the recovered parts were made in North Korea.

 

Also, the aforementioned result confirmed that other possible causes for sinking raised, including grounding, fatigue failure, mines, collision and internal explosion, played no part in the incident.

 

In conclusion,

 

The following sums up the opinions of Korean and foreign experts on the conclusive evidence collected from the incident site; hull deformation; statements of relevant personnel; medical examination of the deceased service members; analysis on seismic and infrasound waves; simulation of underwater explosion; and analysis on currents off Baekryong-do and collected torpedo parts.

 

ROKS "Cheonan" was split apart and sunk due to a shockwave and bubble effect produced by an underwater torpedo explosion.

 

The explosion occurred approximately 3m left of the center of the gas turbine room, at a depth of about 6~9m.

 

The weapon system used is confirmed to be a high explosive torpedo with a net explosive weight of about 250kg, manufactured by North Korea.

 

In addition, the findings of the Multinational Combined Intelligence Task Force, comprised of 5 states including the US, Australia, Canada and the UK and operating since May 4th, are as follows:

 

The North Korean military is in possession of a fleet of about 70 submarines, comprised of approximately 20 Romeo class submarines(1,800 tons), 40 Sango class submarines (300 tons) and 10 midget submarines including the Yeono class(130 tons).

 

It also possesses torpedoes of various capabilities including straight running, acoustic and wake homing torpedoes with a net explosive weight of about 200 to 300kg, which can deliver the same level of damage that was delivered to the ROKS "Cheonan."

 

Given the aforementioned findings combined with the operational environment in the vicinity of the site of the incident, we assess that a small submarine is an underwater weapon system that operates in these operational environment conditions. We confirmed that a few small submarines and a mother ship supporting them left a North Korean naval base in the West Sea 2-3 days prior to the attack and returned to port 2-3 days after the attack.

 

Furthermore, we confirmed that all submarines from neighboring countries were either in or near their respective home bases at the time of the incident.

 

The torpedo parts recovered at the site of the explosion by a dredging ship on May 15th, which include the 5x5 bladed contra-rotating propellers, propulsion motor and a steering section, perfectly match the schematics of the CHT-02D torpedo included in introductory brochures provided to foreign countries by North Korea for export purposes. The markings in Hangul, which reads "1번” (or No. 1 in English), found inside the end of the propulsion section, is consistent with the marking of a previously obtained North Korean torpedo. Russian and Chinese torpedoes are marked in their respective languages.

 

The CHT-02D torpedo manufactured by North Korea utilize acoustic/wake homing and passive acoustic tracking methods. It is a heavyweight torpedo with a diameter of 21 inches, a weight of 1.7 tons and a net explosive weight of up to 250kg.

 

Based on all such relevant facts and classified analysis, we have reached the clear conclusion that ROKS "Cheonan" was sunk as the result of an external underwater explosion caused by a torpedo made in North Korea. The evidence points overwhelmingly to the conclusion that the torpedo was fired by a North Korean submarine.

 

There is no other plausible explanation.

From Defense Aerospace

 

Torpedo Hit Confirmed. What Now?

(Source: Forecast International; issued May 20, 2010)

 

SEOUL --- The international investigation team delving into the sinking of the Korean corvette Cheonan has produced irrefutable evidence that the ship was sunk following a hit by a North Korean heavy torpedo. The torpedo had a warhead from 200-300 kilograms of RDX and produced an under-the-keel explosion at a depth of 6 to 9 meters, roughly 3 meters left of the center of the ship’s gas turbine room. The concussion literally tore the ship apart, killing 46 of the 104 sailors on board the stricken vessel.

 

The key evidence was the recovery of parts from the torpedo, including a propulsion motor with propellers and a steering section, according to Yoon Duk-yong, co-head of the investigation team. "They perfectly match the schematics of the CHT-02D torpedo included in introductory brochures provided to foreign countries by North Korea for export purposes," he said. The CHT-02D is a heavyweight passive acoustic homing torpedo measuring about 53 centimeters in diameter and weighing 1.7 tons with a net explosive weight of about 250 kilograms. Just to screw the identification down tight, the recovered torpedo wreckage had the North Korean serial number still marked on it.

 

It appears that the torpedo was fired from a 130-ton Yeono-class midget submarine. A few such submarines and a mother ship supporting them left a North Korean naval base in the West Sea two to three days prior to the attack and returned to their port two to three days after the attack. The South Korean Navy has confirmed that all submarines from neighboring countries were either in or near their respective home bases at the time of the incident.

 

A good guess at this point is that the midget submarines were spread out across the area patrolled by the Cheonan and one of them found itself in a position to take the shot. It is believed that the submarine in question identified its target at night and mounted the attack at close range. After the attack, the submarine appears to have swiftly moved away from the scene and returned (to its home port) using the same infiltration route that it used to get in.

 

The question now becomes, what will happen next? North Korea responded to the revelations by issuing a bellicose statement that if anybody tried to institute any sanctions or retaliation over the attack, the North would immediately launch an "all-out war." This may be a bluff, but the North is expected to raise the level of aggression against the South, possibly by firing artillery from its coasts or testing short-range missiles. North Korea might also attempt a second provocation in a concealed manner using its special forces.

 

South Korea plans to announce countermeasures against North Korea, including taking the issue to the U.N. Security Council, which many believe will accomplish nothing. More forcefully, the South also proposes stopping all inter-Korean economic cooperation and exchange projects except for the joint venture in Gaeseong, resuming frontline propaganda, and prohibiting North Korean vessels from passing South Korean waters.

 

The fact that the sinking of the Cheonan has been confirmed as a deliberate North Korean attack will have a major impact on the South Korean local elections, now just two weeks away. It is widely viewed to work in favor of President Lee Myung-bak?s Conservative Party in the elections, which will serve as a mid-term test for Lee and remap the political topography ahead of the 2012 presidential vote. Dubbing North Korea?s attack "an unforgivable crime," Chairman Chung Mong-joon of the ruling Grand National Party said, "North Korea has clearly violated our armistice and betrayed our faith. It is time for our nation to unite and work with the international community in coming up with a rightful measure that will show North Korea the weight of what it has done."

 

Backing these presumptions, recent polls show the number of floating voters has decreased rapidly, with elderly conservative voters increasingly expressing their favoritism toward the ruling party candidates. The fact that many of the ruling party candidates are incumbent district chiefs hoping for a second or third term - such as the case in Seoul, Incheon and Gyeonggi - is another advantageous factor for the GNP.

The more you hear about this, the worse it gets. If I lived in Seoul right now I would seriously consider moving south in a hurry.

 

What the world doesn't want to admit, but obviously the DPRK is keenly aware of is that the Korean Conflict (it was a war, btw) still isn't resolved. DPRK apparantly has no problem with shooting, so what's the world going to do about it? Is the UN going to be just as useless in this as it has been all along? I doubt sanctions will have any effect at all.

No easy solution here. Like you, I'm skeptical of a UN solution, which typically leads to a package of sanctions with less than satisfactory results.

 

Spank the DPRK a little harder (i.e. militarily), and you run a serious risk of giving the nut job hardliners a reason to make a real mess of the Korean peninsula.

I don't think there's any chance of a satisfactory solution here, from a Western perspective. Diplomacy won't solve anything, and if the South does anything militarily, the Norks start a war. That's not something they could win on their own, but China won't stay out of it unless the US makes them, and the US just doesn't have the muscle right now. This whole thing might even be a Chinese effort to persuade South Korea to shift patrons ...