CV32

A couple of more pics of the mayhem, destruction and chaos wrought by the USS Pollack (SS-180) in the South China Sea. (It was the Permit, but I seem to have lost my earlier save game, and so now all reports will come from the USS Pollack).

Time for me to rant a little more about gun control. The VT shootings are more tragic madness, I'm afraid, which will undoubtedly be exploited in ridiculous, despicable fashion by the gun haters. They'll have much less success in the United States, I'm sure, which by most measures is far more advanced in its gun laws than the rest of us poor sods, but it will be milked to the hilt by the liberals up here in Canuckistan. To summarize how I feel, if it wasn't obvious to you already, is what I think constitutes a properly worded online poll question: "If a mass killer was executing you and your friends one-by-one, would you prefer to have a properly-trained and licensed, gun-carrying civilian, present in the room ?" Rant off.

From DefenseNews Posted 04/17/07 15:40 Iranian Navy Says It Will Launch Iran-Built Destroyer By REUTERS, TEHRAN Iran’s navy plans to launch the first Iranian-built destroyer soon, the official IRNA news agency quoted a naval commander as saying on April 17. The announcement in the Gulf port of Bandar Abbas comes at a time of growing tension between Iran and the West over Tehran’s nuclear program, which Washington and others suspect is a cover for making atom bombs. Tehran denies the charge. "Soon the first Iranian-made destroyer will be launched ... and will surprise the world’s military community with its facilities, equipment, capabilities and technology," commander Darioush Ebrahimnejad told a news conference. He called it one of the most modern ships of its kind in the world, but did not give details or say when it would be officially unveiled. Destroyers are fast warships with guns and torpedoes used to protect other ships. Last month, state television said Iran’s navy had held more than a week of war games in the Gulf using tactical submarines and small vessels carrying missile launchers. The exercises were the latest in a series of maneuvers staged by Iran’s military in the Gulf, where the United States has deployed two aircraft carriers in recent months, a move widely seen as a warning to Tehran over its nuclear ambitions. Although Iran may not have the technology to match that of U.S. forces, experts say it could still cause trouble for shipping in the Gulf and disrupt flows of crude in the waterway, through which 40 percent of the world’s traded oil is shipped. Washington has said it wants a diplomatic solution to the nuclear row but has not ruled out using of force if that fails. Iran, which insists its atomic plans are peaceful, says it will target U.S. interests in the region if it comes under attack.

From Stratfor Geopolitical Intelligence Report 04.17.2007 The Coming Era of Russia's Dark Rider By Peter Zeihan Russian opposition members rallied in Moscow's Pushkin Square on April 14. The so-called Dissenters' March was organized by Other Russia, an umbrella group that includes everyone from unrepentant communists and free-market reformers to far-right ultranationalists whose only uniting characteristic is their common opposition to the centralization of power under President Vladimir Putin's administration. Minutes after the march began, the 2,000 or so protesters found themselves outnumbered more than four to one by security forces. They quickly dispersed the activists, beating and briefly detaining those who sought to break through the riot-control lines. Among those arrested were chess-champion-turned-political-activist Garry Kasparov and Maria Gaidar, the daughter of Russia's first post-Soviet reformist prime minister. Former Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov only avoided arrest because his bodyguards helped him to escape. A Reuters crew was permitted to capture the events and disseminate them to the West. A day later, another protest, albeit far smaller, was broken up in a similar way in St. Petersburg, though Kasparov was detained before the protest even began. What gives? The protests were insignificant in both numerical and political terms. Moreover, with all that is going on in the world right now, the last thing the Putin government needs is to attract negative attention to itself. The answer becomes apparent when one considers Russia's point in its historical cycle and the mounting pressures on Putin personally that have nothing whatsoever to do with "democracy." The Russian Cycle At the risk of sounding like a high school social studies teacher (or even George Friedman), history really does run in cycles. Take Europe for example. European history is a chronicle of the rise and fall of its geographic center. As Germany rises, the powers on its periphery buckle under its strength and are forced to pool resources in order to beat back Berlin. As Germany falters, the power vacuum at the middle of the Continent allows the countries on Germany's borders to rise in strength and become major powers themselves. Since the formation of the first "Germany" in 800, this cycle has set the tempo and tenor of European affairs. A strong Germany means consolidation followed by a catastrophic war; a weak Germany creates a multilateral concert of powers and multi-state competition (often involving war, but not on nearly as large a scale). For Europe this cycle of German rise and fall has run its course three times -- the Holy Roman Empire, Imperial Germany, Nazi Germany -- and is only now entering its fourth iteration with the reunified Germany. Russia's cycle, however, is far less clinical than Europe's. It begins with a national catastrophe. Sometimes it manifests as a result of disastrous internal planning; sometimes it follows a foreign invasion. But always it rips up the existing social order and threatens Russia with chaos and dissolution. The most recent such catastrophe was the Soviet collapse followed by the 1998 financial crisis. Previous disasters include the crushing of Russian forces in World War I and the imposition of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk; the "Time of Troubles," whose period of internal warfare and conspiracy-laden politics are a testament to the Russian predilection for understatement; and near annihilation under the Mongol occupation. Out of the horrors of defeat, the Russians search desperately for the second phase of the cycle -- the arrival of a white rider -- and invariably they find one. The white rider rarely encapsulates what Westerns conceive of as a savior -- someone who will bring wealth and freedom. Russian concerns after such calamities are far more basic: they want stability. But by Russian standards, the white rider is a rather optimistic fellow. He truly believes that Russia can recover from its time of trial, once a level of order is restored. So the Russian white rider sets about imposing a sense of consistency and strength, ending the free fall of Russian life. Putin is the current incarnation of Russia's white rider, which puts him in the same category as past leaders such as Vladimir Lenin and, of course, Russia's "Greats": Catherine and Peter. Contrary to portrayals of him by many in the Western media, Putin is not a hard-nosed autocrat set upon militarization and war. He is from St. Petersburg, Russia's "window on the West," and during the Cold War one of his chief responsibilities was snagging bits of Western technology to send home. He was (and remains) fully cognizant of Russia's weaknesses and ultimately wanted to see Russia integrated as a full-fledged member of the Western family of nations. He also is pragmatic enough to have realized that his ideal for Russia's future and Russia's actual path are two lines that will not converge. So, since November 2005, Putin has been training two potential replacements: First Deputy Prime Ministers Dmitry Medvedev and Sergei Ivanov. At this point, nearly a year before Russia's next presidential election, determining which one will take over is a matter of pure guesswork. Also unclear is what role, if any, Putin will grab for himself -- up to and including a continuation of his presidency. The question of who takes over in March 2008 is generating much interest and debate among Kremlinologists. It clearly matters a great deal both politically and economically, though geopolitically the discussion misses the point. The real takeaway is that Russia's current white horse period is coming to an end. Putin's efforts to stabilize Russia have succeeded, but his dreams of Westernizing Russia are dead. The darkness is about to set in. The Dark Rider In the third phase of the Russian cycle, the white rider realizes that the challenges ahead are more formidable than he first believed and that his (relative) idealism is more a hindrance than an asset. At this point the white rider gives way to a dark one, someone not burdened by the white rider's goals and predilections, and willing to do what he feels must be done regardless of moral implications. The most famous Russian dark rider in modern times is Josef Stalin, of course, while perhaps the most consuming were the "Vasilys" of the Vasily Period, which led to the greatest civil war in Russian medieval history. In particularly gloomy periods in Russia's past (which is saying something) the white rider himself actually has shed his idealism and become the dark rider. For example, Ivan the IV began his rule by diligently regenerating Russia's fortunes, before degenerating into the psychotic madman better known to history as Ivan the Terrible. Under the rule of the dark rider, Russia descends into an extremely strict period of internal control and external aggression, which is largely dictated by Russia's geographic weaknesses. Unlike the United States, with its deep hinterland, extensive coasts and lengthy and navigable river networks, Russia's expansive barren landscape and lack of maritime transport options make trade, development and all-around life a constant struggle. Russia also lacks any meaningful barriers to hide behind, leaving it consistently vulnerable to outside attack. Understanding that this geographic reality leaves Russia extremely insecure is critical to understanding Russia's dark periods. Once the dark rider takes the state's reins, he acts by any means necessary to achieve Russian security. Internal opposition is ruthlessly quashed, economic life is fully subjugated to the state's needs and Russia's armies are built furiously with the intent of securing unsecurable borders. That typically means war: As Catherine the Great famously put it: "I have no way to defend my borders except to extend them." After a period of unification and expansion under the dark rider, Russia inevitably suffers from overextension. No land power can endlessly expand: the farther its troops are from core territories, the more expensive they are to maintain and the more vulnerable they are to counterattack by foreign forces. Similarly, the more non-Russians who are brought under the aegis of the Russian state, the less able the state is to impose its will on its population -- at least without Stalin-style brute force. This overextension just as inevitably leads to stagnation as the post-dark rider leadership attempts to come to grips with Russia's new reality, but lacks the resources to do so. Attempts at reform transform stagnation into decline. Stalin gives way to a miscalculating Nikita Khrushchev, a barely conscious Leonid Brezhnev, an outmatched Mikhail Gorbachev and a very drunk Boris Yeltsin. A new disaster eventually manifests and the cycle begins anew. Why the Crackdown? The April 14-15 protests occurred at an inflection point between the second and third parts of the cycle -- as the white rider is giving way to a dark rider. Past Russian protests that involved 2,500 total people at most would have been allowed simply because they did not matter. The Putin government has a majority in the rubber-stamp Duma sufficient to pass any law or constitutional change in a short afternoon of parliamentary fury. All meaningful political parties have been disbanded, criminalized or marginalized; the political system is fully under Kremlin control. The Kasparov/Kasyanov protests did not threaten Putin in any meaningful way -- yet in both Moscow and St. Petersburg a few dozen people were blocked, beaten and hauled off to court. This development was no accident. Roughly 9,000 riot police do not spontaneously materialize anywhere, and certainly not as the result of an overenthusiastic or less-than-sober local commander. A crackdown in one city could be a misunderstanding; a crackdown in two is state policy. And one does not send hundreds of batons swinging but allow Reuters to keep filming unless the objective is to allow the world to see. Putin chose to make these protests an issue. Putin, then, is considering various groups and rationalizing his actions in the context of Russia's historical cycle: * The West: Putin certainly does not want any Western capital to think he will take exiled oligarch Boris Berezovsky's recent threats of forcible revolution lying down. Berezovsky says violence is a possibility -- a probability even -- in the future of regime change in Russia? Fine. Putin can and did quite easily demonstrate that, when it comes to the application of force in internal politics, the Russian government remains without peer. * The people: Putin knows that governance is not so much about ruling as it is about managing expectations. Russians crave stability, and Putin's ability to grant that stability has earned him significant gravitas throughout Russia as well as a grudging respect from even his most stalwart foes. He is portraying groups such as the Other Russia as troublemakers and disturbers of the peace. Such explanations make quite attractive packaging to the average Russian. * The opposition: It is one thing to oppose a wildly powerful and popular government. It is another thing when that government beats you while the people nod approvingly and the international community barely murmurs its protest. Putin has driven home the message that the opposition is not just isolated and out of touch, but that it is abandoned. * The Kremlin: Just because Putin is disappointed that his dreams are unattainable, that does not mean he wants to be tossed out the proverbial airlock. Showing any weakness during a transition period in Russian culture is tantamount to surrender -- particularly when Russia's siloviki (nationalists) are always seeking to rise to the top of the heap. Putin knows he has to be firm if he is to play any role in shaping Russia during and after the transition. After all, should Medvedev and Ivanov fail to make the grade, someone will need to rule Russia -- and the only man alive with more experience than Putin has a blood-alcohol level that precludes sound decision-making.

Oh, I know. But I was seriously suggesting (prodding, actually) that you pick up SH3 rather than SH4.

Get SH3 first, Pete. It should be in the bargain bins by now. I know its available for $19 around here. Its much less demanding graphics wise than SH4 (which requires minimum 1 GB) and you can play with all three of us (me, Tony, Brains). Always great fun.

From Defense Aerospace John C. Stennis Completes Operations with French Carrier Charles de Gaulle (Source: US Navy; issued April 17, 2007) USS JOHN C. STENNIS, At Sea --- USS John C. Stennis (CVN 74) completed month-long operations with the French nuclear powered aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle (R 91) in the North Arabian Sea on April 16. Since Charles de Gaulle’s arrival in the region March 16, the two nuclear-powered aircraft carriers have been operating together in support of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). Both ships are providing support to the International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) on the ground in Afghanistan as well as conducting bilateral exercises at sea and personnel exchanges between the strike group ships. “Our interaction with the French task force has been spectacular,” said Rear Adm. Kevin Quinn, Commander, Carrier Strike Group 3. Although this marks the end of coalition operations between the two carriers in the region, Stennis will continue to operate in the U.S. 5th Fleet area of operations in support of OEF and conduct maritime security operations (MSO). “The opportunity to do that side by side with another nuclear powered aircraft carrier from a coalition nation shows that the mission is essential and that it is universally recognized as one of the very highest priorities for security and stability,” Stennis Commanding Officer Capt. Bradley Johanson said. “Working with the French in support of OEF strengthens the coalition as a whole and helps further our relationship with the French military,” said Lt. Joe Capalbo, a pilot with Strike Fighter Squadron (VFA) 146, embarked aboard Stennis. Capalbo conducted touch-and-go landings on Charles de Gaulle on April 13. The previous day, two French Super-Etendards, two Rafales and an E-2C Hawkeye conducted touch-and-go landings on board Stennis. For Stennis, this was the first opportunity to work with coalition forces in a maritime environment during the ship’s current deployment. Up to six Sailors from each ship cross-decked each day to see what the daily routine is like on the other ship, totaling more than 200 people. Stennis Training Officer Lt. Cmdr. Andrea Cameron is in charge of coordinating the personnel exchanges aboard Stennis. Cameron said there are several reasons the ship took advantage of this opportunity. “One is to learn how the French navy works in general,” said Cameron. “The other is to learn how another navy might do each of their jobs differently. It’s a learning experience and professional development.” Quinn said the John C. Stennis Carrier Strike Group has gained invaluable experience and insight during its operations with Charles de Gaulle. “Through the exchange of personnel between Charles de Gaulle and Stennis, the people-to-people interaction has strengthened our strong ties between the two countries,” said Quinn. “I have been incredibly impressed by the professionalism, dedication and level of cooperation experienced during our interaction with the entire French task force,” said Johanson. “They are our teammates and we are honored to have served with them here in the North Arabian Sea.” Stennis and its strike group entered the U.S. 5th Fleet area of operations Feb. 19 to provide support for ground forces operating in Afghanistan as well as conduct MSO in regional waters. MSO help set the conditions for security and stability in the maritime environment, as well as complement the counter-terrorism and security efforts of regional nations. These operations deny international terrorists use of the maritime environment.

There's certainly something to be said for the MEKO and Stanflex designs, but I'd say what will be telling for the program will be whether the General Dyamics/Austal are able to keep their costs manageable.

10 December 1941: Had been assigned command of the Porpoise class USS Permit (SS-178) in the Asiatic Fleet, stationed in the Philippines. Departed this morning enroute to patrol in the Sulu Sea. Weather fair. Early in evening received radio message that Japanese had sunk the British battleships HMS Repulse and HMS Prince of Wales in the South China Sea, but morale aboard the boat was still high. Later that evening COMSUBPAC advised that we were to engage enemy merchant shipping in the vicinity of the Philippines. USS Permit underway on 10 Dec 41 11 December 1941: Arrived in patrol area before dawn. At midday came under attack from a Japanese H6K search plane, which bracketed the boat with a pair of bombs before our inexperienced gun crew could engage. Sustained damage to some bulkheads and the main pump, as well as a diesel engine. On the second pass our boys brought down the Japanese plane with 20mm AA. Damage mostly repaired. 12 December 1941: At midday, having seen no Japanese activity this sector, we turned for home. While enroute, received reports of an enemy invasion force headed for the Philippines. USS Permit lurking submerged 13 December 1941: Heading north along the western coast of Luzon. Attacked by two more H6K search planes, but evaded both. Numerous reports of enemy convoys and task groups, but none in our vicinity. 14 December 1941: Continuing to conduct searching patrol northwest of Luzon. No enemy seen. 15 December 1941: Early in the evening we came upon a Japanese flagged medium split freighter. First torpedo missed. Second struck her amidships, sunk. Empty lifeboat observed. The Japanese freighter shortly before the attack that sank her. 16 December 1941: Early morning, northwest of Luzon, spotted a Japanese task group steaming west. Comprised at least five Asashio destroyers, two Takao heavy cruisers and one Mogami heavy cruiser. Perhaps one other cruiser further to the north. Approached silently and allowed two lead Asashio DD to pass. Fired two torpedoes at each of the Takao cruisers from less than 1000 yd. All were hits. The Mogami passed aft less than 100 yd, too close for a torpedo. But a trailing Asashio also passed aft, and this received one torpedo hit. One of the Takaos blew up almost immediately, and the other moved off to the west, at speed but trailing smoke and fire. The wounded Asashio was dead in the water, on fire but not sinking. Escaped cleanly to the east. The scene after the attack on the task group. Wounded Asashio in the foreground, with another offering assistance, sirens blaring. The wounded Takao can be seen in the background. Later that morning came upon a Japanese flagged passenger carrier that appeared to have sustained some damage and was barely making steerage. Hit her with one torpedo and then two or three rounds of 4 inch gunfire. She sank quickly. USS Permit clearing datum after sinking the Japanese passenger carrier. 17 December 1941: Returned to base. Came under attack by a G6M Betty but evaded, having damaged the enemy aircraft.

From BBC News 17 April 1961: Exiles invade Cuba at Bay of Pigs Reports from Cuba say the island has been invaded by counter-revolutionary forces trying to overthrow the country's leader, Fidel Castro. The only news coming out of Cuba is broadcast by the government-run radio station. All other communications with the island have been cut. THe first landing is reported to have taken place in the early hours of this morning. Broadcasts from Cuban government radio appealing for medical help indicate that the raiders have successfully penetrated 25 miles (40km) inland. They appear to have come ashore on an area of the coast known as the Bahía de Cochinos, or Bay of Pigs, south-east of the capital, Havana. There is no indication as to the size of the invasion force, but Dr Castro, in a speech on Cuban government radio, said they are supported by aircraft and warships. "The glorious soldiers of the revolutionary army and the national militia are battling the enemy at all the points where they have landed," he said. High alert The Cuban military have been on high alert for an imminent invasion for some days. In a speech yesterday, Fidel Castro told the Cuban people he intended to resist such an attack with "an iron hand". Cuban exiles based in the United States, who are organising the attempt to overthrow the Castro regime, say thousands of Cubans have joined the rebel forces. However, there is no independent confirmation of the level of support for the invasion from within Cuba. The leader of the Cuban exile movement in the US, Dr Miro Cardona, said the battle had begun "to liberate our homeland from the despotic rule of Fidel Castro". Dr Cardona played a part in Fidel Castro's revolution against the dictatorship of President Batista in 1959, and was prime minister for 45 days before Dr Castro himself took over. US denial In a statement in Washington, the US Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, has again denied US involvement in the invasion of Cuba. He said the United States had not, and would not intervene in Cuba, with armed forces or otherwise. Strong suspicions that the United States is sponsoring an offensive against the Castro government have been fuelled by the bombing of three of Cuba's military air bases two days ago. The US denied all knowledge of the episode, saying Cuban Air Force pilots defecting to Florida were responsible. But reporters who watched one of the planes land in Miami after carrying out the attack described features which indicated it was American-made.

From Defence Talk Unusual activity seen around NKorea reactor Agence France-Presse | Apr 17, 2007 SEOUL: US satellites have spotted unusual activity around North Korea's nuclear reactor, South Korea's intelligence service said Tuesday, and news reports said Pyongyang may be preparing to shut it down. Dong-A Ilbo newspaper said the US images obtained Monday have been shared with South Korea. "The US took satellite images which captured unusual movements of people and vehicles around the cooling tower and parking lot in the Yongbyon nuclear facility," the paper said. It said Washington and Seoul believe it is likely the activities are part of operations to close down the reactor. The National Intelligence Service said it was aware of the activity but did not say what it might mean. "There were some unusual movements there and we are now following and analysing them," a spokesman told AFP. Yongbyon is at the centre of a stalled six-nation nuclear disarmament process. The United States, China, the two Koreas, Japan and Russia reached an agreement in February that North Korea disable its nuclear programmes in exchange for a million tons of fuel oil or equivalent aid, plus security and diplomatic benefits. Under the first phase it was supposed by April 14 to have shut down and sealed its reactor, which produces the raw material for plutonium to make bombs, in the presence of UN atomic inspectors. But the deadline slipped without action due to delays in freeing up 25 million dollars in North Korean funds which had been frozen in a Macau bank at US instigation. The United States said the money at Banco Delta Asia was made available last week.

From Defence Talk Jimmy Doolittle: famed airpower pioneer US Air Force | Apr 17, 2007 SAN ANTONIO: The man the "Doolittle Raiders" are named for may not be a household name today, but James H. "Jimmy" Doolittle was once one of the most famous celebrities in America, even before the raid, and remains one of the most remarkable figures of the 20th Century. Born in Alameda, Calif., on Dec. 14, 1896, Doolittle spent his youth in Nome, Alaska where he earned a reputation as a "scrapper." He left Alaska with his mother settling in Los Angeles, and attending Manual Arts High School. Though a good student, his early life hardly harkened the greatness to come. His first career was as a prize fighter, frequently fighting under the name Jimmy Pierce. At five-foot-six and 105 pounds, Doolittle was described as a strong boxer, but he often fought with "rage rather than restraint," according to Dick Alan Daso, who wrote "Doolittle: Aerospace Visionary." Eventually becoming an amateur champ, Doolittle frequently regressed into street brawls, including one which landed him in the Los Angeles County Jail. His mother reportedly left him there for the weekend to teach him a lesson. After graduating high school in 1914, he spent a year with his father in Alaska, but wound up broke, returning to Los Angeles as a stowaway on a transport ship. He eventually attended the University of Berkley, where he was on the boxing and gymnastics teams. He dropped out of Berkley in 1917 to join the Army's Signal Corps to attend pilot training. Although World War I ended before he could fly in Europe, Doolittle blossomed quickly into an accomplished pilot. He was, however, also gaining an unwanted reputation as a "stunter," and was perceived to be reckless. He once flew his plane through the open doors of a hangar to help mechanics sweep it out. He would also ride on the struts, wing walk, and once, thinking he was playing a practical joke on a friend, roared his motorcycle down the runway, playing "chicken" with the landing aircraft, forcing the pilot to abort his landing. He repeated the stunt a second time. It was then that he realized that the pilot wasn't his buddy, but was his commander. That was one of several stunts that got the young Lieutenant Doolittle grounded. Despite that rocky beginning, Doolittle matured, settled into family life, and became one of the best pilots in the world. In September 1922, he made the first of his many historic aviation feats, flying the first-ever cross-country flight, from Pablo Beach, Fl. to San Diego in 21 hours and 19 minutes, making only one refueling stop at Kelly Field, Texas. In July 1923, after serving as a test pilot and aeronautical engineer at McCook Field, Ohio, Doolittle entered the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, earning his master's degree in 1924. He went on to get the first Ph.D. in Aeronautics awarded by MIT. Over the next several years, Doolittle racked up a string of aviation speed and endurance records that made him the equivalent of rock star in his days. He won the coveted Schneider Cup race in a Curtiss R3C in 1925, with an average speed of 232 miles per hour. For that feat, Doolittle was awarded the Mackay Trophy in 1926. He was also the first pilot ever to perform an outside loop, a stunning achievement at the time. He also helped develop the "artificial horizon" and directional gyroscope and made the first flight completely by instruments. He attracted wide newspaper attention with the "blind" flying feat and later received the Harmon Trophy for his experiments that made all-weather airline operations practical. In 1930, Doolittle left active duty, but remained a reservist. In 1931, he won the Bendix Trophy Race from Burbank, Calif., to Cleveland in a Laird Super Solution Biplane. In 1932, he set the world's high-speed record for land planes at 296 miles per hour in the Shell Speed Dash. Later, he took the Thompson Trophy Race at Cleveland in the notorious Gee Bee R-1 racer with a speed averaging 252 miles per hour. After having won the three big air racing trophies of the time, the Schneider, Bendix and Thompson, he officially retired from air racing saying, "I have yet to hear anyone engaged in this work dying of old age." Later, it was reported that Doolittle was incensed to learn that news photographers had staked locations to catch the reaction of his wife and children if he'd crashed the Gee Bee, which had killed many other pilots who had tried to fly it, including the aircraft's designer. During World War II, Doolittle returned to active duty. By then, he was known as the master of the "calculated risk," applying skill and science to pull off feats that seemed reckless and daring to others. Doolittle was chosen by Gen. Hap Arnold to lead what was known as "Special Mission No. 1," a secret bombing attack on Japan just four months after the attack at Pearl Harbor. The group launched 16 B-25 bombers from the aircraft carrier USS Hornet in the Pacific -- itself an amazing and first-ever feat -- and attacked several Japanese cities before ditching their aircraft in China or the sea. Of the 80 men who took part in the raid, three were killed during the mission, five were interned in Russia and eight became prisoners of war in Japan. After he had bailed out, Doolittle landed in a field of "night soil," -- dirt mixed with human waste. He tried to take cover from the cold night air in a farm house, but the occupants wouldn't let him in. He eventually escaped the cold and wind by climbing into a coffin waiting to go into the ground. The coffin was occupied. He received the Medal of Honor for leading the raid and was promoted from lieutenant colonel to brigadier general, skipping the rank of colonel. After commanding 8th Air Force at the end the European campaign, General Doolittle was moving his command to Okinawa to finish the fight with Japan when the war ended. It's hard for today's generation to realize how famous Doolittle was, but once, while making a bond drive campaign in Los Angeles, more than a million people lined La Cienega Boulevard from the airport to the Hollywood Bowl to welcome the returning hometown hero. After the war, General Doolittle, now a civilian and the first president of the Air Force Association, devoted his energies to lobby for an independent Air Force. His goal was accomplished in September 1947 when President Truman signed the law, establishing the Air Force and the new Department of Defense. In March 1951, Doolittle was appointed a special assistant to the Air Force chief of staff, serving as a civilian in scientific matters which led to Air Force ballistic missile and space programs. He retired from Air Force duty in 1959 but continued to serve as chairman of the board of Space Technology Laboratories and devoted his time to many other civic and industry endeavors. He died September 27, 1993. He remains the only American to receive both the countries highest military and civilian honors - the Medal of Honor and the Medal of Freedom. When Doolittle accepted his Medal of Honor after the raid, he did so reluctantly, saying he would accept it on behalf of all the men who took part in the raid, and vowed to spend the rest of his life living up to the honor. For more information on General Doolittle, you can read the following: -- I Could Never Be So Lucky Again, by James H. Doolittle, ISBN 0-88740-737-4, ISBN-10: 0553584642 -- "Calculated Risk," by Jonna Hoppes Doolittle, ISBN-10 1891661442 -- "Doolittle: Aerospace Visionary," by Dick Alan Daso, ISBN I-57488-669-X

From Air Force Times Doolittle Raiders mark 65th anniversary The Associated Press Posted : Monday Apr 16, 2007 7:00:50 EDT SAN ANTONIO — A band of aging survivors of the Doolittle Raiders will gather in San Antonio this week to celebrate the 65th anniversary of their famed World War II bombing raid on Japan. Seven survivors of the April 18, 1942, raid are expected to attend the five-day reunion, which starts Tuesday. Of the 80 pilots and crewmen who took part, 14 are still alive. Lt. Col. James Doolittle led the 16 B-25B Mitchell bombers that embarked from the aircraft carrier Hornet on a risky mission that was credited with buoying American spirits in the aftermath of the attack on Pearl Harbor. “One thing was to prove to the Japanese people that their leaders were misinforming them about their vulnerability,” said Dick Cole, now 91, who was Doolittle’s co-pilot in the lead plane. “The other was to give America a morale boost it hadn’t had since Pearl Harbor was attacked.” But the raid came at a cost. A Pacific Ocean encounter with a Japanese boat prompted the bombing crews to depart earlier than planned, at the risk of running out of fuel before reaching landing strips in China. Four crews crash-landed, resulting in the deaths of three men. Eleven crews bailed out. Three crewmen were executed, and one died as a prisoner. Cole, who lives in Comfort, still has the compass he used during the mission. He carries it when he goes hunting. “It served me well in China, and it serves me well now,” he said. Doolittle became a general after the raid and sponsored the raiders’ first reunion in 1947. He died in 1993. Bob Gardner, media spokesman for the reunion, said it’s an important chance to refocus attention on the raid and give people an opportunity to meet the surviving participants. “This is history that’s not being taught in schools,” he said. “We have a generation that’s lost contact with some of our history.” David Jones, a bomber pilot in the raid, said interest in the group increased after the terrorist attack of Sept. 11 and the Iraq war. “The interest has come and gone in cycles,” said Jones, 93, a retired Air Force major general living in San Antonio. “We do represent a time in history when we were engaged in pretty heavy activity.” The reunion includes several public events to support college scholarships, vintage aircraft preservation and a local children’s charity.

From Navy Times Ceremony remembers Thresher disaster The Associated Press Posted : Monday Apr 16, 2007 5:40:49 EDT KITTERY, Maine — Forty-four years after it sank off Cape Cod, the submarine Thresher and its crew were remembered at a ceremony during the weekend near the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard. The nuclear sub sank during sea trials out of the yard on April 10, 1963, killing 129 men. A mechanical error caused the submarine to lose power, causing it to sink below crush depth in the Atlantic. Saturday, Irene Harvey, widow of Capt. John Harvey, the sub’s commander, dropped a wreath into the Piscataqua River to remember the crew. To honor each man, a bell was rung as their photographs were displayed on a screen. “They are on eternal patrol,” said Gary Hildreth, commander of the Thresher Base, during the memorial service at R.W. Traip Academy. John Cook, a former crew member, remembers the sinking as “devastating.” Cook had left the Thresher three months before the accident to attend nuclear power school. He remembers the constant phone calls his mother received from worried friends after the news broke. “There’s no closure for the families, no grave to visit,” said Cook. “This is the closest thing you’re going to get to that.” Navy officers told those at the memorial that the Thresher accident has made submarines safer for the sailors who followed. “We vowed that the great patriots that died that day would not go down in vain,” said Capt. Gregory Thomas. Thomas added that since the Thresher tragedy, the Submarine Safety Program was created and the Navy has not suffered a loss like that of the Thresher.

Pete, I am pretty sure you can sign up to read the articles without any cost.

Kinda chilly for a long ocean swim this time of year.

Nice AAR, Ralf. Thanks for sharing it. Tony's scenario is a real treat.

From Defense Aerospace Protection the Top Priority with Tank Acquisition (Source: Canadian Department of National Defence; issued April 12, 2007) Canada has reversed an earlier decision to retire its tank force, and will deploy Leopard IIs in Afghanistan this summer. (Dutch MoD photo) QUEBEC CITY, Quebec --- The ongoing commitment of Canada’s New Government to the safety of Canadian Forces members engaged in deployed operations was front and centre today when the Honourable Gordon O’Connor, Minister of National Defence, the Honourable Michael Fortier, Minister of Public Works and Government Services, and General Rick Hillier, Chief of the Defence Staff, confirmed plans to renew the Canadian Forces’ tank capability. To replace the Canadian Forces’ 30-year old Leopard 1 tanks, the Government will purchase up to 100 Leopard 2 tanks, as well as securing the loan of 20 Leopard 2A6 tanks for use in Afghanistan this summer. The Leopard 2 tanks are newer, more heavily armoured and more technologically advanced than Canada’s Leopard 1s. Their advanced features include significantly increased personnel protection against explosive devices and landmines, an ability to travel considerably faster in difficult terrain, more powerful engines, and stronger firing capabilities. “Equipping Canada’s soldiers with the best protection is my top priority. By immediately acquiring stronger and more heavily protected tanks, our soldiers in Afghanistan have the best equipment possible to offer them protection during this mission,” said Minister O’Connor. “This government is committed to providing our Canadian Forces with the equipment they need to do the very demanding jobs we have asked of them.” Minister Fortier said: “This announcement demonstrates Canada’s New Government’s commitment to procure critical operational equipment as quickly as possible for the Canadian Forces, while getting the best value for Canadian taxpayers.” When examining the surplus tank option, Canada approached six allied nations to enquire about availability and thoroughly evaluated all formal proposals. “Simply put, tanks help save lives and provide soldiers the right tools for the mission while enhancing their protection,” said General Hillier. “In Afghanistan, Canada’s Leopard 1 tanks have provided close direct fire support and mitigated the threat of mines and improvised explosive devices. This acquisition will further enhance the protection available to our soldiers.” The 100 Leopard 2 tanks will be purchased from the Netherlands for the long-term requirements of the Canadian Forces, and should be delivered to Canada soon after completion of the government-to-government agreement, anticipated by end of summer 2007. They will be upgraded in Canada to final Canadian Forces standards. The 20 combat-ready Leopard 2A6 main battle tanks will be loaned by Germany for short-term requirements and will be deployed to Afghanistan this summer with the next rotation of Canadian troops. In addition to being newer, more heavily protected and more technologically advanced, the Leopard 2A6s will generate significantly less heat than the hydraulic systems of Canada’s 30-year-old Leopard 1 fleet. The Leopard 1 tanks were first deployed in Afghanistan fall 2006 to meet new operational requirements of the Canadian Forces. (ends) Sale of 100 Leopard Tanks to Canada (Source: Netherlands Ministry of Defence; issued April 12, 2007) (Issued in Dutch only; unofficial translation by defense-aerospace.com) Defence has sold hundred Leopard fighting tanks to Canada. The agreement was confessed made during the visit of the Minister of Defence, Eimert van Middelkoop, to Canada. It concerns twenty Leopard 2A6s and eighty Leopard 2A4s. Disposal of the tanks is a result of an earlier decision to reduce the main battle tank inventory of the Dutch Army. The Netherlands will retain 110 operational Leopard 2 A6 tanks. Canada will upgrade and modernize the Leopards at its own expense. The Netherlands will provide training for Canadian instructors as part of the agreement. Training will begin in May. Defence minister Eimert van Middelkoop was in Canada to attend the Regional Command South Ministerial meeting in Quebec. Fact Sheet: Renewing the Canadian Forces' Tank Capability (Source: Canadian Department of National Defence; issued April 12, 2007) THE REQUIREMENT The heavily protected direct fire capability of a main battle tank is an invaluable tool in the arsenal of any military. The intensity of recent conflicts in Central Asia and the Middle East has shown western militaries that tanks provide protection that cannot be matched by more lightly armoured wheeled vehicles. Simply put, tanks save lives, providing soldiers with a high level of protection. In Afghanistan, the Taliban’s use of lethal and readily available anti-armour weapons, such as improvised explosive devices (IEDs), is a clear threat. Canada’s Leopard 1 tanks have provided close direct fire support and mitigated the threat of IEDs, as well as landmines. The tanks have also provided the Canadian Forces (CF) with the capability to travel to locations that would otherwise be inaccessible to wheeled light armoured vehicles, including Taliban defensive positions. Renewing Canada’s tank capability will enable the CF to meet current operational needs in the short and long term. Canada’s 30-year old Leopard 1 tanks are due for replacement, and Leopard 2 tanks offer more protection against IEDs and landmines; and are technologically more advanced than their predecessor. Furthermore, by 2012 there will no longer be logistics support and spare parts for the turrets of Leopard 1s, resulting in complete obsolescence by 2015. THE PROCESS A number of options for renewing the tank capability were considered, ranging from refurbishment to surplus to new. Refurbishing the tanks is not an option as the 30-year old Leopard 1 turrets will be obsolete in 2015. It is also unsuited to operations in hot climates. Acquiring new tanks off a production line was also examined, but delivery would not occur for a few years and the individual tank cost is approximately three times as expensive as procuring and upgrading the same capability that exists on the surplus market. When examining the surplus tank option, Canada approached six allied nations to enquire about availability. Formal proposals from three nations were thoroughly evaluated by Public Works and Government Services Canada and the Department of National Defence (DND) in terms of price, upgrade costs, delivery schedule, operational performance, survivability and through-life operating and maintenance costs. Based on this evaluation, the decision was taken to acquire up to 100 surplus Leopard 2 tanks from the Netherlands and negotiate a short-term loan arrangement with Germany to borrow 20 combat-ready Leopard 2A6 main battle tanks to address immediate operational requirements. This decision represented the most balanced and affordable approach for both short-and long-term requirements. Canada is negotiating government-to-government agreements for both borrowing and acquiring the Leopard 2 tanks. The total project cost of the loaned tanks, the acquisition of 100 surplus tanks from the Netherlands, the requisite upgrades and enhancements to this new Leopard 2 fleet, and an initial acquisition of spare parts is $650 million, which will be funded from existing departmental allocations. DEPLOYING COMBAT-READY TANKS The tanks being loaned from Germany are fully operational, and will be deployed to Afghanistan in conjunction with the next rotation of personnel this summer. These tanks are able to operate in intense heat as their electric turret systems and more powerful engines generate significantly less heat when operating than the hydraulic systems of Canada’s 30-year-old Leopard 1 fleet. They will also be fitted with climate control systems once in theatre. ACQUIRING A PROVEN, MODERN MAIN BATTLE TANK The surplus, modern Leopard 2 tanks being acquired from the Netherlands represent a unique opportunity to acquire proven, effective main battle tanks at a fraction of the cost of a similar, new tank. These tanks have been well maintained and stored in climate-controlled facilities. Due diligence has shown that these tanks will serve Canada effectively, well into the future. In addition, surplus Leopard 2 tanks have been acquired by a number of nations in recent years and have been put into operational service very successfully. This is a proven capability. Their advanced features include significantly increased personnel protection against explosive devices and landmines, an ability to travel considerably faster in difficult terrain, more powerful engines, and stronger firing capabilities. CANADA’S NEW LEOPARD 2 FLEET The acquisition of 100 tanks represents the minimum fleet size to support a deployed tank squadron. These 100 vehicles would be broken down into operational and supporting squadrons as follows: - For deployed operations, the Canadian Forces need two combat-ready squadrons of approximately 20 tanks each: one for deployment and a second for rotation into theatre to allow for depot repair and overhaul of the first. - An additional two squadrons of 20 tanks each are required for collective and individual training in Canada. - Individual tank training would be conducted by the squadron based at the Combat Training Centre at CFB Gagetown in New Brunswick - The squadron based at CFB Wainwright at the Canadian Manoeuvre Training Centre would conduct collective unit training to prepare for deployments. - The final 20 vehicles will consist of key support vehicles such as armoured recovery vehicles, armoured bridge-laying vehicles and armoured engineering vehicles (i.e. dozer, plough, excavator). BENEFITS FOR CANADIANS This acquisition represents a significant opportunity for Canadian industry. Once negotiations are complete, the Dutch Leopard 2 tanks will be transported to Canada where they will receive the necessary upgrades to final Canadian Forces standards. In the coming months, the Government of Canada will conduct one or more fair, open and competitive processes for the long-term in-service support of this fleet. The Canadian Industrial Benefits policy will apply as appropriate. In this context, it may apply to future support, repair or upgrade contracts. The Canadian Industrial Benefits policy is the Government of Canada’s way of leveraging benefits to the Canadian economy as a result of our defence procurements. THE FUTURE The Canadian Forces have always planned to retain a direct-fire capability and recent conflicts have confirmed the importance of retaining a tracked tank capability. The Leopard 2 main battle tanks will bring strength, added protection and the ability to access difficult terrain that a wheeled vehicle cannot provide. This acquisition is a further demonstration of Canada’s New Government’s commitment to renew and transform the Canadian Forces, providing them the equipment they need to do the demanding jobs we as Canadians ask them to do. (ends) EDITOR’S NOTE: The Canadian press has reported that: - Canada will pay a total of C$ 650 million over five years for its new tanks, including the cost of the loan agreement with Germany, the purchase of the Dutch tanks, spare parts and upgrades. - The German tanks will be fitted with extra floor plating and blast-resistant seats before being deployed to Kandahar this summer to replace the old Leopard 1s. - The purchase is a change of direction for the army and in particular for Chief of Defence Staff Gen. Rick Hillier, who only a few years ago described the Leopard tanks as "millstone around the neck" of the forces. [A badly overdue decision, imho. There was talk of either buying Mobile Gun Systems or withdrawing the Leopard 1's altogether without replacement, which would have decimated our armored element, but with this investment, the Conservative government is gaining a lot of friends in the military for sure].

From Defense Aerospace Navy Terminates Littoral Combat Ship 3 (Source: US Department of Defense; issued April 12, 2007) Secretary of the Navy Donald C. Winter announced today that the Department of the Navy is terminating construction of the third Littoral Combat Ship (LCS 3) for convenience under the Termination clause of the contract because the Navy and Lockheed Martin could not reach agreement on the terms of a modified contract. The Navy issued a stop-work order on construction on LCS 3 in January following a series of cost overruns on LCS 1 and projection of cost increases on LCS 3, which are being built by Lockheed Martin under a cost-plus contract. The Navy announced in March that it would consider lifting the stop-work order on LCS 3 if the Navy and Lockheed Martin could agree on the terms for a fixed price incentive agreement by mid-April. The Navy worked closely with Lockheed Martin to try to restructure the agreement for LCS-3 to more equitably balance cost and risk, but could not come to terms and conditions that were acceptable to both parties. The Navy remains committed to completing construction on LCS 1 under the current contract with Lockheed Martin. LCS 2 and 4 are under contract with General Dynamics, and the Navy will monitor their cost performance closely. The Navy intends to continue with the plan to assess costs and capabilities of LCS 1 and LCS 2 and transition to a single seaframe configuration in fiscal year 10 after an operational assessment and considering all relevant factors. General Dynamics’ ships will continue on a cost-plus basis as long as its costs remain defined and manageable. If the cost performance becomes unacceptable, then General Dynamics will be subject to similar restructuring requirements. “LCS continues to be a critical warfighting requirement for our Navy to maintain dominance in the littorals and strategic choke points around the world,” said Winter. “While this is a difficult decision, we recognize that active oversight and strict cost controls in the early years are necessary to ensuring we can deliver these ships to the fleet over the long term.” (ends) Lockheed Martin Expresses Disappointment Over U.S. Navy Termination of Littoral Combat Ship Contract (Source: Lockheed Martin Corporation; issued April 12, 2007) BETHESDA, Md. --- Lockheed Martin Corporation today expressed disappointment over the U.S. Navy's decision to terminate its contract for construction of the second of two new Littoral Combat Ships (LCS), a radically new class of surface combatants. The Navy announced the action at the expiration of a 90-day stop work order imposed on the second ship in January to allow the service time to review costs associated with construction of the first LCS. On March 15, Navy Secretary Donald Winter announced that the stop work order would be lifted only if Lockheed Martin agreed to accept a fixed price incentive contract for its second ship. "As a team of men and women who hold ourselves accountable for our actions, we are greatly disappointed by the cost growth experienced on the first LCS and by our inability to reach a satisfactory conclusion with our Navy customer on a path forward for the second ship," said Lockheed Martin Chairman, President and Chief Executive Officer Bob Stevens. "We committed to a course of action that was intended to break the long-standing cycle of first-in-class ship cost growth and, while achieving several important program objectives, did not meet that goal. Although we successfully maintained the ship's schedule and improved on its design, cost growth also occurred. “Our team is understandably frustrated that, having invested nearly three years of dedicated effort and significant corporate resources to bring LCS 1 to within 20 percent of completion, we will not have the opportunity to apply lessons learned to a second ship, see this program through to conclusion and deliver a superior capability to sailors as they meet unique challenges defending our nation's interests in the coastal waters battle space where the U.S. Navy will increasingly face challenges in the future." Stevens said a Lockheed Martin team worked diligently over the past month to develop a proposal that responded to the Navy's request to restructure the contact for the second LCS ship. "We believe that our proposal was fully consistent with the Secretary's stated desire to bring the benefits of increased competition to shipbuilding while holding the Navy's industrial partners accountable for cost performance within their control," he stated. Lockheed Martin's LCS team -- including naval architect Gibbs & Cox and shipbuilders Bollinger Shipyards and Marinette Marine -- was one of two industry groups competitively selected in May 2004 to each design and build two ships for evaluation by the Navy. The Lockheed Martin team was cleared to commence detailed design and construction of the first ship in December 2004; the keel for LCS 1, FREEDOM, was laid in June 2005 at Marinette Marine in Wisconsin, where the ship was christened and launched in September 2006. In June 2006, the Navy awarded the Lockheed Martin team a cost plus incentive fee (CPIF) contract to commence work on its second ship, LCS 3, at Bollinger Shipyards in Louisiana. Headquartered in Bethesda, Md., Lockheed Martin employs about 140,000 people worldwide and is principally engaged in the research, design, development, manufacture, integration and sustainment of advanced technology systems, products and services. The corporation reported 2006 sales of $39.6 billion.

From Aviation Week Chinese ASAT strike was third try; had mobile element Amy Butler/Web Exclusive COLORADO SPRINGS, Colo. - U.S. Marine Corps Gen. James Cartwright says the Chinese made two unsuccessful attempts at an anti-satellite intercept before the successful test in January. During those earlier tests, at least one of which took place last year, the Chinese interceptor boosted into space but missed the target. The re-entry vehicles later fell back to Earth, an intelligence official says. Cartwright says the test was a pivotal moment for the U.S.'s presence in space, but he cautioned against an overreaction. "This is not in my mind the defining moment for our relationship," Cartwright says. "This is a good wake up call." His comments came during a speech at the National Space Symposium here Apr. 12. The debris field left by the interceptor's collision with an aging Chinese weather satellite continues to orbit Earth above the paths followed by satellites in low-Earth orbit. National Reconnaissance Office Director Donald Kerr says it has not affected any of his satellites in low-Earth orbit. Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. T. Michael Moseley says the launch system used by the Chinese incorporated a mobile platform, displaying a worrisome level of flexibility on the part of this potential adversary. The two earlier attempts also used a mobile launch system, the intelligence official added. Meanwhile, U.S. missile defenses continue to develop. Last year, during N. Korea's salvo of ballistic missile firings, the U.S. enacted an unprecedented shift of the U.S. ballistic missile defense system to an alert for about 90 straight days, Cartwright says. Operators at Strategic command manned the system on alert status during the period around the test, and U.S. officials had warning the test would occur before it took place. The system, being developed by the Missile Defense Agency (MDA), can shift from operational status to a test mode when needed. In testing mode, MDA can experiment new software modes that haven't been proven. But, when shifted to an operational status the system is reverted to its last validated configuration.

From Stratfor The Limitations and Necessity of Naval Power By George Friedman It has now been four years since the fall of Baghdad concluded the U.S. invasion of Iraq. We have said much about the Iraq war, and for the moment there is little left to say. The question is whether the United States will withdraw forces from Iraq or whether it will be able to craft some sort of political resolution to the war, both within Iraq and in the region. Military victory, in the sense of the unfettered imposition of U.S. will in Iraq, does not appear to us a possibility. Therefore, over the next few months, against the background of the U.S. offensive in Baghdad, the political equation will play out. The action continues. The analysis must pause and await results. During this pause, we have been thinking about some of the broader questions involved in Iraq -- and about the nature and limits of American military power in particular. We recently considered the purpose of U.S. wars since World War II in our discussion of U.S. warfare as strategic spoiling attack. Now we turn to another dimension of U.S. military power -- the U.S. Navy -- and consider what role, if any, it plays in national security at this point. Recent events have directed our attention to the role and limits of naval power. During the detention of the 15 British sailors and marines, an idea floated by many people was that the United States should impose a blockade against Iran. The argument was driven partly by a lack of other options: Neither an invasion nor an extended air campaign seemed a viable alternative. Moreover, the United States' experience in erecting blockades is rich with decisive examples: the Cuban missile crisis, barring Germany's ability to trade during World War II or that of the American South during the Civil War. The one unquestionable military asset the United States has is its Navy, which can impose sea-lane control anywhere in the world. Finally, Iran -- which is rich in oil (all of which is exported by sea) but lacks sufficient refinery capacity of its own -- relies on imported gasoline. Therefore, the argument went, imposing a naval blockade would cripple Iran's economy and bring the leadership to the negotiating table. Washington never seriously considered the option. This was partly because of diplomatic discussions that indicated that the British detainees would be released under any circumstances. And it was partly because of the difficulties involved in blockading Iran at this time: 1. Iran could mount strategic counters to a blockade, either by increasing anti-U.S. operations by its Shiite allies in Iraq or by inciting Shiite communities in the Arabian Peninsula to unrest. The United States didn't have appetite for the risk. 2. Blockades always involve the interdiction of vessels operated by third countries -- countries that might not appreciate being interdicted. The potential repercussions of interdicting merchant vessels belonging to powers that did not accept the blockade was a price the United States would not pay at this time. A blockade was not selected because it was not needed, because Iran could retaliate in other ways and because a blockade might damage countries other than Iran that the United States didn't want to damage. It was, therefore, not in the cards. Not imposing a blockade made sense. The Value of Naval Power This raises a more fundamental question: What is the value of naval power in a world in which naval battles are not fought? To frame the question more clearly, let us begin by noting that the United States has maintained global maritime hegemony since the end of World War II. Except for the failed Soviet attempt to partially challenge the United States, the most important geopolitical fact since World War II was that the world's oceans were effectively under the control of the U.S. Navy. Prior to World War II, there were multiple contenders for maritime power, such as Britain, Japan and most major powers. No one power, not even Britain, had global maritime hegemony. The United States now does. The question is whether this hegemony has any real value at this time -- a question made relevant by the issue of whether to blockade Iran. The United States controls the blue water. To be a little more precise, the U.S. Navy can assert direct and overwhelming control over any portion of the blue water it wishes, and it can do so in multiple places. It cannot directly control all of the oceans at the same time. However, the total available naval force that can be deployed by non-U.S. powers (friendly and other) is so limited that they lack the ability, even taken together, to assert control anywhere should the United States challenge their presence. This is an unprecedented situation historically. The current situation is, of course, invaluable to the United States. It means that a seaborne invasion of the United States by any power is completely impractical. Given the geopolitical condition of the United States, the homeland is secure from conventional military attack but vulnerable to terrorist strikes and nuclear attacks. At the same time, the United States is in a position to project forces at will to any part of the globe. Such power projection might not be wise at times, but even failure does not lead to reciprocation. For instance, no matter how badly U.S. forces fare in Iraq, the Iraqis will not invade the United States if the Americans are defeated there. This is not a trivial fact. Control of the seas means that military or political failure in Eurasia will not result in a direct conventional threat to the United States. Nor does such failure necessarily preclude future U.S. intervention in that region. It also means that no other state can choose to invade the United States. Control of the seas allows the United States to intervene where it wants, survive the consequences of failure and be immune to occupation itself. It was the most important geopolitical consequence of World War II, and one that still defines the world. The issue for the United States is not whether it should abandon control of the seas -- that would be irrational in the extreme. Rather, the question is whether it has to exert itself at all in order to retain that control. Other powers either have abandoned attempts to challenge the United States, have fallen short of challenging the United States or have confined their efforts to building navies for extremely limited uses, or for uses aligned with the United States. No one has a shipbuilding program under way that could challenge the United States for several generations. One argument, then, is that the United States should cut its naval forces radically -- since they have, in effect, done their job. Mothballing a good portion of the fleet would free up resources for other military requirements without threatening U.S. ability to control the sea-lanes. Should other powers attempt to build fleets to challenge the United States, the lead time involved in naval construction is such that the United States would have plenty of opportunities for re-commissioning ships or building new generations of vessels to thwart the potential challenge. The counterargument normally given is that the U.S. Navy provides a critical service in what is called littoral warfare. In other words, while the Navy might not be needed immediately to control sea-lanes, it carries out critical functions in securing access to those lanes and projecting rapid power into countries where the United States might want to intervene. Thus, U.S. aircraft carriers can bring tactical airpower to bear relatively quickly in any intervention. Moreover, the Navy's amphibious capabilities -- particularly those of deploying and supplying the U.S. Marines -- make for a rapid deployment force that, when coupled with Naval airpower, can secure hostile areas of interest for the United States. That argument is persuasive, but it poses this problem: The Navy provides a powerful option for war initiation by the United States, but it cannot by itself sustain the war. In any sustained conflict, the Army must be brought in to occupy territory -- or, as in Iraq, the Marines must be diverted from the amphibious specialty to serve essentially as Army units. Naval air by itself is a powerful opening move, but greater infusions of airpower are needed for a longer conflict. Naval transport might well be critically important in the opening stages, but commercial transport sustains the operation. If one accepts this argument, the case for a Navy of the current size and shape is not proven. How many carrier battle groups are needed and, given the threat to the carriers, is an entire battle group needed to protect them? If we consider the Iraq war in isolation, for example, it is apparent that the Navy served a function in the defeat of Iraq's conventional forces. It is not clear, however, that the Navy has served an important role in the attempt to occupy and pacify Iraq. And, as we have seen in the case of Iran, a blockade is such a complex politico-military matter that the option not to blockade tends to emerge as the obvious choice. The Risk Not Taken The argument for slashing the Navy can be tempting. But consider the counterargument. First, and most important, we must consider the crises the United States has not experienced. The presence of the U.S. Navy has shaped the ambitions of primary and secondary powers. The threshold for challenging the Navy has been so high that few have even initiated serious challenges. Those that might be trying to do so, like the Chinese, understand that it requires a substantial diversion of resources. Therefore, the mere existence of U.S. naval power has been effective in averting crises that likely would have occurred otherwise. Reducing the power of the U.S. Navy, or fine-tuning it, would not only open the door to challenges but also eliminate a useful, if not essential, element in U.S. strategy -- the ability to bring relatively rapid force to bear. There are times when the Navy's use is tactical, and times when it is strategic. At this moment in U.S. history, the role of naval power is highly strategic. The domination of the world's oceans represents the foundation stone of U.S. grand strategy. It allows the United States to take risks while minimizing consequences. It facilitates risk-taking. Above all, it eliminates the threat of sustained conventional attack against the homeland. U.S. grand strategy has worked so well that this risk appears to be a phantom. The dispersal of U.S. forces around the world attests to what naval power can achieve. It is illusory to believe that this situation cannot be reversed, but it is ultimately a generational threat. Just as U.S. maritime hegemony is measured in generations, the threat to that hegemony will emerge over generations. The apparent lack of utility of naval forces in secondary campaigns, like Iraq, masks the fundamentally indispensable role the Navy plays in U.S. national security. That does not mean that the Navy as currently structured is sacrosanct -- far from it. Peer powers will be able to challenge the U.S. fleet, but not by building their own fleets. Rather, the construction of effective anti-ship missile systems -- which can destroy merchant ships as well as overwhelm U.S. naval anti-missile systems -- represents a low-cost challenge to U.S. naval power. This is particularly true when these anti-ship missiles are tied to space-based, real-time reconnaissance systems. A major power such as China need not be able to mirror the U.S. Navy in order to challenge it. Whatever happens in Iraq -- or Iran -- the centrality of naval power is unchanging. But the threat to naval power evolves. The fact that there is no threat to U.S. control of the sea-lanes at this moment does not mean one will not emerge. Whether with simple threats like mines or the most sophisticated anti-ship system, the ability to keep the U.S. Navy from an area or to close off strategic chokepoints for shipping remains the major threat to the United States -- which is, first and foremost, a maritime power. One of the dangers of wars like those in Iraq and Afghanistan is that they soak up resources and intellectual bandwidth. It is said that generals always fight the last war. Another way of stating that is to say they believe the war they are fighting now will go on forever in some form. That belief leads to neglect of capabilities that appear superfluous for the current conflict. That is the true hollowing-out that extended warfare creates. It is an intellectual hollowing-out.

From Air Force Times Israeli jets come close to firing on airliner Staff reports Posted : Wednesday Apr 11, 2007 16:57:10 EDT Israel air force fighter planes scrambled Wednesday to intercept a U.S. airliner after it lost communications with air controllers, security officials said. The Continental passenger plane was flying in from the U.S. when it lost contact. Following anti-terror procedures, two Israeli warplanes intercepted the plane and guided it back over the Mediterranean Sea until communications were restored, Channel 10 TV reported. When it was determined that there were no problems on board and the pilot was in control, the plane was allowed to land at Israel’s international airport, the officials said. It was the closest that the Israeli Air Force has ever come to shooting down a civilian airliner, according to a report in the Jerusalem Post. The Associated Press contributed to this report.

From Stratfor The Maneuvering Before the Storm: Second Quarter Forecast 2007 The second quarter of 2007 will brim with fury and froth as two states attempt to challenge the geopolitical order imposed by others to stem their expansion, in hopes of regaining their long-lost position as major powers. Throughout the quarter, these two states will seek a louder voice and a stronger hand. The real conflicts, however, will come later. For the first country -- Iran -- the more aggressive tone is part and parcel of the diplomatic dance with the United States. Both countries realize that their ideal for Iraq -- unified and pro-American for Washington, unified and pro-Iranian for Tehran -- has slipped from the realm of possibility. The two will now negotiate furiously to keep their respective worst-case scenarios -- for the United States, a shattered Iraq in which Iran controls the south; for Iran, a Sunni-run and American-armed Baghdad -- from becoming reality. In these negotiations, neither side has a particularly strong hand. The Bush administration suffers from a lack of mandate and an overstretched military that is flat-out incapable of imposing security on Iraq. Iranian goals are utterly dependent upon the Iraqi Shia -- who, were they able to unify for any purpose, would have at least at some point in Iraq's history been in charge of their own region (they have never been). Tehran and Washington both can wreck Iraq to ruin each other's plans, but neither wants to live with the consequences. Both can work toward a compromise but are afraid of the domestic backlash of being seen publicly talking to one another. And of course there is that niggling detail that their national interests on this issue really are very close to incompatible. The result is that each side is trapped at the negotiating table, threatening the other and hoping that something will change on the ground to give them a decisive advantage. Of course, when something appears to be that key event, the other feels obliged to change the equation. Thus the United States seizes an Iranian Consulate in Iraqi Kurdistan, or Iran detains 15 British marines and sailors. Such events will proliferate throughout the quarter as the two powers position and reposition for best effect versus each other. Expect other powers to attempt to leverage Washington's preoccupations to their own advantage -- with the Russians, by dint of influence in Iran and opportunities in Ukraine, likely to achieve the most. This struggle will not resolve itself in the coming quarter. However, it not only will dominate the news, but also regularly will put Washington and Tehran on an equal footing in the public mind. This will not be a permanent feature (indeed, it is not even remotely accurate once one looks past the headlines) but it undeniably entrenches Iran's return as a major regional power that must be reckoned with. Yet while Iran's rise is not guaranteed -- the negotiations with the United States could yet take a disastrously wrong turn -- the second state returning to the status of great power will be far more successful than Iran. That country is Germany. For the past 60 years, French ideology has demanded that Paris play the pre-eminent role in European events and use that control to project power globally. Yet in late April and early May, the French will choose from among a battery of candidates one who will be their next president. For the first time since the 1940s, there is not a single candidate on the list who subscribes to the principles of former President Charles de Gaulle. For those same 60 years, Germany has been locked in to the structures of the European Union and NATO, and has been flatly disallowed from holding nationalist ambitions independent from Europe (which in Paris' mind translates as "independent of France"). That time has passed and Germany has re-awakened. For now, its interests do continue to parallel broadly those of its neighbors, but there are clearly changes in tone and objective that identify Germany as a European yes-man no longer. With elections in France, the period of French exceptionalism will end -- this is not simply the changing of a president, this is a change of regime -- and Germany will formally take over as the leading political and economic power in Europe. This German rise is independent of Germany's continuing terms as president of the European Union and chair of the Group of Eight -- positions that enable Berlin to set the agenda both on a regional and global level. Such institutions, which have rotating leadership, are not the true source of Germany's return to the limelight. But the government of German Chancellor Angela Merkel is using them to pole vault Germany to prominence. Yet, even should Germany fail disastrously in these leadership positions and squander the opportunity, the fact that Germany is back is undeniable. And should Merkel and her team succeed, Germany will have its cake and eat it too. Elsewhere, the world -- while not sleeping -- might seem strangely quiet (except Afghanistan, of course, which is always noisy in the second quarter of the year). For most of the world, the second quarter will be one of introspection and consolidation. The long internal transition struggles in Nigeria, France and the United Kingdom will finally conclude with new leadership even as South Africa, Russia and China begin wrestling with similar changes. Thailand, Mexico, Bolivia, Venezuela and Ecuador will all seek major constitutional changes, while governments of both Pakistan and India will attempt to shore up support after last quarter's setbacks. The renegade Serbian province of Kosovo -- after eight long years in the political wilderness -- seems set to achieve a final status that will look more or less like independence. Even the global economy is in transition as the United States struggles -- we predict, successfully -- to throw off a looming recession. The second quarter will not be the window in which the major conflicts erupt. It will be a time for preparing, positioning, maneuvering. The real fights will come after all concerned emerge from their cocoons.

No bright side here. Bad guys in control of Pakistan would be a bad scene all around.

From Jane's Defence Weekly 10 April 2007 Cluster weapons ban leaves gap in UK inventory By Robert Hewson Editor, Jane's Air-Launched Weapons London On 20 March UK Defence Secretary Des Browne announced that all of the UK's remaining 3,650 RBL 755 cluster bombs and their 536,550 submunitions would be immediately withdrawn. M26 rockets for the British Army Royal Artillery's Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) batteries are also being scrapped - 43,200 rockets containing 27,820,800 submunitions. The army will retain its AT2 MLRS anti-tank rockets, which are classed as 'smart' weapons because each submunition is fitted with a self-destruct fuze. However, the UK Royal Air Force (RAF) now has no area weapon for the close air support role that has become a crucial tasking for the deployed fast jet fleet. The RAF has undertaken suppression of enemy air defences tactics development using a mix of Brimstone air-to-surface missiles and Air-Launched Anti-Radiation Missiles. RAF sources have told Jane's that the Brimstone's millimetre-wave radar seeker (which images targets to classify them into vehicle types) lacks the required discrimination against more regular targets to be employed within current rules of engagement.