CV32

From Navy Times Kitty Hawk visits Sydney on farewell tour By Meraiah Foley - The Associated Press Posted : Thursday Jul 5, 2007 9:05:49 EDT ABOARD THE USS KITTY HAWK — The Navy’s oldest ship in full active service pulled into Sydney Harbor on Thursday for a farewell visit, following its final military exercises before being decommissioned. The carrier Kitty Hawk, based in the Japanese port city of Yokosuka, and its crew of more than 5,500 sailors, docked at the Garden Island naval base along with support ships from its battle group. Thousands of spectators lined the shores of Australia’s biggest city to catch a glimpse of the massive vessel, as a half-dozen television helicopters buzzed overhead. Onboard, eager American sailors snapped photos and pointed as the white peaks of Australia’s iconic Opera House came into view. The 46-year-old ship — the only U.S. aircraft carrier permanently deployed abroad — recently took part in Talisman Sabre exercises off Australia’s northeast coast that involved more than 30 ships, more than 100 planes and almost 30,000 U.S. and Australian troops. The ship’s current voyage in the western and central Pacific Ocean was expected to be its last major mission before it is replaced next year by the carrier George Washington. Navy Capt. Todd Zecchin said he will mourn the day next year when the Kitty Hawk is sent back to the U.S. to be decommissioned. “When you’re sailing onboard a vessel and you go to sea with 5,000 other human beings and you share that entity and that experience, there really is a bond there that can’t be broken,” he told reporters. “This is our home and this is our way of life, so when you put her to bed for the last time, it’s a big deal and there’s a lot of emotion.” Meanwhile, Australia and a top U.S. military official expressed concern Thursday that China’s rapid military buildup and use of a missile in space could add to instability in the Asia-Pacific region and backed a greater role for Japan in regional security. “Certainly we are a bit wary of China,” said Rear Adm. Rick Wren, the commander of the Kitty Hawk’s battle group. “They seem to be fairly opaque in communicating what they intend to do with this large military buildup. “Certainly we need them to be a stabilizing force in this region,” he added. “But until we can actually define that, we will continue to practice our skills and be ready for whatever the president calls on us to do.” Commissioned in 1961, the Kitty Hawk played a key role in the early part of the Vietnam War and was among two carriers in the Persian Gulf that sent planes to launch the Iraq war in 2003. The diesel-powered ship was deployed to Yokosuka, Japan, in 1998, and will be replaced with the nuclear-powered George Washington as part of the U.S. military’s effort to modernize its forces in East Asia, an area of potential flashpoints with North Korea or China. The vessel’s replacement has sparked a backlash in Japan — the only country to suffer a nuclear attack — where critics oppose the basing of a nuclear-powered warship in domestic waters. Japan’s government says the George Washington would boost regional stability.

From Jane's North Korea - going ballistic again? 04 July 07 Several recent reports emanating from East Asia have suggested that North Korea is preparing for a ballistic missile test exercise. These reports further speculate that the upcoming test may occur on 4 July, the anniversary of its wide-ranging July 2006 missile test. However, these reports have not been confirmed by sources within Japan, South Korea or the US. The most significant ballistic missile development since the 1998 launch of the Paektusan space launch vehicle has been the July 2006 test. On 5 July (4 July and Independence Day in the US), North Korea conducted its largest and most comprehensive ballistic missile test to date, launching seven ballistic missiles - one Taepodong-2 and six Scud C/ER and Nodong missiles. While the majority of the systems were launched from transporter erector launchers in the Kittaeryong area of Kangwon Province, the long-awaited Taepodong-2 was launched from the Musudanni Missile Launch Facility on the northeast coast. Shortly after a successful lift-off there was a catastrophic failure of the first stage, which resulted in the system's destruction. While the 2006 test demonstrated the viability and reliability of North Korea's Scud- and Nodong-class systems, it left open the status of the three ballistic missile systems that the Korean People's Army (KPA) recently placed, or is placing, into service. These are the KN-02 short range ballistic missile (a variant of the Soviet 9K79 Tochka/SS-21 SCARAB); the Musudan intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) (a variant of the Soviet R-27/SS-N-6 SERB); and the Taepodong-2 intercontinental-range ballistic missile (ICBM)/SLV. All three systems require, even by KPA standards, further developmental testing to validate their designs.

From DefenseNews Posted 07/04/07 11:12 Indonesian Minister Says Singapore Trying To Scuttle Defense Pact By AGENCE FRANCE-PRESS, JAKARTA Indonesia’s defense minister has accused Singapore of trying to scuttle a bilateral defense pact so it will not have to sign an extradition treaty as part of the deal, reports said Wednesday. The defense pact and landmark extradition treaty were signed in April between the two nations, but still need to be ratified by their parliaments to be put into effect. A scheduled signing of three implementing agreements (IAs), detailing specific areas of cooperation, was delayed at the last minute because Indonesia requested changes, Singapore has said. Speaking to the National Defence Institute, Juwono Sudarsono said that Singapore had upped the number of days it wants for military training in Indonesian territory as the two sides thrash out the IAs. “They intentionally raised the figures so that the DCA [defense cooperation agreement] and its IAs get deadlocked so that the extradition treaty also gets deadlocked,” he said, according to the Media Indonesia daily. Sudarsono said that Singapore wanted to use Indonesian territory for military exercises 15 days per month, but this was “just crazy. Indonesia only wants four or six times per year.” Indonesia has been negotiating an extradition treaty for years with the city-state as it seeks to prosecute corrupt officials and business executives who allegedly fled there with millions in state funds in the wake of the 1997 Asian financial crisis. The state-run Antara news agency also quoted Sudarsono as saying that Singapore had benefited from the hot money brought in by wanted Indonesians and their extradition would “hurt the image of Singapore as a clean country”. Singapore has denied the wealthy city-state has been used by Indonesian criminals to launder money and says it has adequate protections in place. Indonesia’s parliament had demanded a fine-tuning of the implementation agreements, saying the original agreement was overwhelmingly in favor of Singapore and put Indonesia’s territorial sovereignty at a disadvantage. Singapore’s foreign ministry in June warned Indonesia that the DCA could fall through if Jakarta were to insist on making last-minute changes to the text of the three IAs. The two deals had been hailed as a sign of improved diplomatic relations between the two nations. [ "Thirst for Victory" is a HC scenario featuring a clash between Singapore and its neighbours].

From Defence Talk AESA Radar Enters Full-Rate Production US Navy | Jul 4, 2007 The U.S. Navy’s next-generation aircraft radar system was approved for full-rate production June 25. Following extensive review by the office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development and Acquisition), PMA-265 was granted authorization to enter into Full Rate Production for 437 next-generation APG-79 Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radars. “Super Hornet Block II and EA-18G aircraft equipped with AESA’s revolutionary war fighting capability makes Naval Aviation more relevant than ever in our history to the joint combatant commander. Our Super Hornets and Growlers - with cutting edge radar technology, precise and networked enabled weapons in combination with joint interoperable and open architectures - increases the combat effectiveness of all those operating in the battle space,” said Capt. “BD” Gaddis, PMA-265 Program Manager. This major program milestone marks the end of a Low Rate Production (LRIP) period of 84 radars that began with delivery of the first LRIP 1 unit in July 2003. The AESA program started in 1999 and the radar had its first flight in July 2003. The program completed an operational evaluation in December 2006 and will commence follow-on test and evaluation later this summer in preparation for first deployment in 2008. “With more than 8200 flight hours on LRIP hardware in the past 2 years, AESA system hardware has been extremely reliable and maintainable,” said Shirley Franko, AESA program co-lead. “With its highly advanced built-in-test capability and no moving parts to fail, the system boasts an operational availability of 96 percent.” To date the AESA radar has proven to be seven times more reliable than the legacy system it replaces, and program officials expect this figure to increase in the future. AESA systems are currently flying in four Fleet squadrons and have impressed aircrew and maintenance users on both coasts, said Franko. “This cutting-edge radar is a critical enabler for Block II Super Hornets,” said Cmdr. John Green, AESA program lead “A total of 437 Block II Super Hornets will have AESA radars, bringing advanced capabilities and improved reliability to the Fleet.” Australia is also procuring 24 F/A-18F Block II Super Hornet equipped with AESA, Green added. Advanced capabilities include cruise missile defense, an enhanced SAR-mapping capability, extended air-to-air range, and an interleaved mode capability that allows air-to-air and air-to-ground modes to be used simultaneously, a particularly useful mode in two-seat aircraft, said Green. VFA-213, in Oceana, VA, was the first operational unit to stand up as an AESA-equipped F/A-18F squadron in October 2006 and VFA-22, in Lemoore, CA, is currently transitioning to AESA-equipped F/A-18F aircraft. Both squadrons have initiated a training regimen that will prepare them for deployment with AESA in 2008.

I'm not sure if Kelly makes a good Tokyo Rose, but he sure plays a mean propaganda game.

From The Virginian-Pilot Nuclear ships: Millions to build, and now millions to trash By JACK DORSEY, The Virginian-Pilot © July 4, 2007 For more than two decades, the Hyman G. Rickover plied the North Atlantic and other oceans, stealthily traveling the equivalent of 26 times around the world. The nuclear-powered sub and its crew of 160 sailors packed torpedoes and missiles to help keep Cold War foes in check and support ground troops in the war on terror. The Rickover will soon face its demise when it is shredded into millions of pounds of recyclable steel and lead, plus lesser bundles of aluminum, brass, bronze, copper and zinc. Only its radioactive “heart” will be spared the cutting torch, instead being shipped west to be buried for at least the next 600 years beside 115 other nuclear core reactors. The Rickover cost $900 million to build; it will cost another $30 million to discard. It is among a number of seasoned nuclear vessels the Navy has decided, mainly for cost reasons, to replace, and the sea service will have to spend hundreds of millions of dollars to do so. The Navy has designated 18 nuclear-powered ships it wants to scrap over the next 10 years at a cost of about $30 million each. The most expensive will be dismantling the carrier Enterprise, scheduled for 2012. It could cost more than $1 billion. It is the first nuclear-powered carrier, commissioned in 1961. Ditching the aging nuclear fleet creates a budget drain on the Navy, which has an ambitious – and expensive – plan to modernize the fleet with high-tech war ships. Congress gave it $15 billion to spend on the program next year. Deactivated in a ceremony in Norfolk on Dec. 14, the 362-foot Rickover sailed to Portsmouth Naval Shipyard in Maine to begin a long demise. For traditionally powered ships – those with oil-fired steam plants or diesel engines – it’s relatively easy to cut them up, sink them or sell them to another nation’s navy. Not so with a nuclear-powered ship or submarine. The Navy has been authorized 224 nuclear-powered vessels through March 2006. For the crew of the Rickover, dismantling their home – removing still useful equipment – is a hard and humbling task. “There is some amount of sadness, as I certainly have poured my blood, sweat and tears into forming the crew,” said Cmdr. Robert E. Cosgriff of Chesapeake, the Rickover’s commanding officer prior to his recent relief. Speaking by phone from the Maine shipyard where about 85 crew members remain with their ship, Cosgriff said the crew remains proud of the Rickover even as it gets torn apart. “We are off loading 23 years worth of things that have gone onto the ship, including tremendous amounts of supplies and logistics,” he said. Refrigerants, oils, pots, pans, mattresses and everything reusable will be recycled to other submarines or returned to the supply system. Removal of valuable gear, including nuclear fuel, is scheduled to be finished in November or December. The Rickover will be towed in early spring 2008 through the Panama Canal to Puget Sound Naval Shipyard in Bremerton, Wash., Deb White, a shipyard spokeswoman, said in an e-mail. There, the Rickover will be moored at the Inactive Nuclear Ship Storage Facility until the disposal process begins. Fifteen other defueled nuclear-powered ships are in floating storage at Puget Sound, White said. Once the ship is dry-docked, workers will cut the 33-foot diameter submarine shell into three sections . The reactor compartment – the middle section – is a hulk measuring 42 feet long and weighing 1,680 tons. Tracks with rollers are installed beneath the submarine to allow the sealed reactor package – containing cobalt-60, lead and PCBs – to be slid away from the ship once it is cut free. The two ends not containing the reactor will be cut up and sold for scrap. Standard cutting equipment – torches, hand-held saws, pipe-cutters and grinders – is used to sever the several feet of steel in front of the shielded reactor compartment. Three-quarter-inch -thick steel end bulkheads will be welded in place to protect the radioactive core. Once the safety measures have been completed, the entire assembly, containing low-level radioactive waste, is placed on a reinforced barge and towed by an ocean tug 310 miles through Puget Sound, then down the Washington coast to the Columbia River and to the Port of Benton at Richland, Wash. The trip takes about three days. That worries Jim Puckett, a spokesman for the Basel Action Network, which works to prevent chemical crises. “We are not happy to see this type of shipment over water,” he said. “If we had our preferences, it would be to very carefully manage them over land.” The Navy said a barge wreck is unlikely because of the strong barge and other safety factors, such as the use of two tugs, one as a backup; experienced crews; and a Coast Guard escort. Also, welds attaching the reactor compartment to the barge are designed to withstand maximum wind forces, and the strong exterior of the package can withstand severe accidents, according to the Navy. If a barge did sink, a buoy would float to the surface along with an emergency locating beacon. Then the sunken reactor compartment could be retrieved, the Navy said. There are no reports of a barge sinking with a reactor aboard, according to the Navy. When a reactor has reached its destination, it is transported over land about 26 miles to a trench at a Hanford Nuclear Reservation site burial lot. The lot is on a plateau about seven miles from the Columbia River. Hanford is 586 square miles of flat desert. Eight burial sites are located on 518 acres. It received its first reactor core in 1986. The burial trench is 30 feet deep. The reactor package, when buried, must be designed to resist corrosion for at least 300 years, according to regulatory requirements the Navy says are demanded by a number of agencies, including the Department of Energy, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Washington State Department of Ecology and the Puget Sound Air Pollution Control Agency. The Navy says its reactor packages are designed to last at least twice that long. “After burial, direct radiation at the land surface will be insignificant (i.e. below detectable levels) due to the low contact radiation fields on the package and the shielding effect of the soil cover,” the Navy said in a 1999 document titled “U.S. Naval Nuclear Powered Ship Inactivation, Disposal and Recycling.” The overall plan for disposing of radioactive material at Hanford is under frequent review by officials in Washington state and Oregon. Issues associated with Hanford include leaking, non military underground storage tanks and the site’s active nuclear power plant, said Diana Enright, a spokeswoman for Oregon’s Department of Energy. “We have to have safety drills because if there was ever an accident there, it potentially would affect two of our counties in the northeast part of the state,” Enright said. For more than 40 years, the government produced plutonium for nuclear weapons at the Hanford site, generating enormous amounts of radioactive and chemically hazardous wastes, according to a report by the Oregon Energy Department that was updated in July 2006. Hanford’s 177 waste storage tanks now hold more than 53 million gallons of highly radioactive waste. Sixty-seven of these tanks have leaked an estimated 1 million gallons into the soil, with some reaching the groundwater . The waste eventually will reach the river, which flows through the Hanford site, the report said. The Navy realized in the late 1970s that it would need a deactivation program for its nuclear-powered ships, according to the 1999 report by the Navy Sea Systems Command. It evaluated two basic options: one using its current method and the other sinking the entire defueled submarine in the ocean. While the Navy has lost two nuclear submarines – the Scorpion and Thresher – in accidents, it says it never intentionally disposed of them on the ocean’s floor. The former Soviet Union secretly disposed of about 16 submarines by sinking them in the northern oceans, said White, the Navy’s spokeswoman in Maine. “After the end of the Cold War, Russia simply parked many older submarines in floating storage without any effort to remove nuclear fuel or radioactive material,” White said. Several other published reports tend to agree with the Navy’s statements. The United Kingdom, Canada, Norway, Japan, Germany, Australia and the United States are helping to pay for Russian nuclear submarine dismantlement. Russia now has a plan that follows the U.S. policy of cutting out the reactor core and placing it in a storage facility ashore. However, fuel may be “mothballed” afloat too, according to a Feb. 28 report in the Russian Defense and Security that said reactor compartments are not cut out but are filled with air. In France, the reactor compartment from the first French nuclear-powered submarine has been removed and placed in a storage building next to the dry dock at the Cherbourg shipyard, White said. The French plan is to let the radioactivity decay for 20 years, then further dismantle the reactor compartment and ship the pieces to a French radioactive waste site, she said. In the U.K., the government has not been able to reach national agreement on what to do with the nation’s decommissioned nuclear-powered submarines, White said. The nuclear fuel has been removed and the ships inactivated, similar to the work on the Rickover, she said. Still, critics are wary. “You’ve got a nuke Navy so you will have difficult disposal issues,” Puckett, of BAN, said, “and they are all coming home to roost.” Researcher Ann Kinken Johnson contributed to this report.

From Defense Aerospace Navy Ship $840 Million Over Budget and Still Unfinished (Source: The Virginian-Pilot; published June 30, 2007) By Louis Hansen NORFOLK, VA --- The highly touted nerve center of the new, $1.8 billion amphibious ship San Antonio is fraught with computer hardware crashes that could cripple operations. The ship lacks basic safety equipment, such as hand rails and reliable guns to battle close-in attacks. In all, Navy inspectors found 30 major flaws aboard the San Antonio, according to an internal report obtained by The Virginian-Pilot. Despite the deficiencies, the Navy has earmarked $13 billion to purchase nine amphibious ships in the San Antonio class. The report reflects some of the same problems disclosed by The Pilot in July 2005. Two years later, the San Antonio is still incomplete and $840 million over budget. The LPD-17 class of ships, or landing platform dock, replaces older amphibious ships used to deliver Marines and their equipment, including aircraft, into combat. The San Antonio is the first ship in the new class. Secretary of the Navy Donald Winter criticized shipbuilder Northrop Grumman Ship Systems for substandard work and, in a letter last week, questioned the future of amphibious and destroyer ship programs under contract with the company. “By taking delivery of incomplete ships with serious quality problems, the Fleet has suffered unacceptable delays in obtaining deployable assets,” Winter wrote to Ronald Sugar, Northrop Grumman’s chief executive officer. Two years after accepting the San Antonio, “the Navy still does not have a mission capable LPD ship,” Winter wrote. Bill Glenn, a spokesman for the company’s shipbuilding division in Mississippi, said in a statement that the San Antonio is a “revolutionary first-in-class U.S. Navy amphibious ship.” Responding to the myriad problems found by Navy inspectors, he said the amphibious class “continues to improve and mature as lessons learned on early ships are rolled into follow ships.” Capt. Bill Galinis, the Navy’s program manager for the LPD-17 class, said in an interview that engineering problems are common for the first ship built in a new class. “Lead ships are difficult,” he said. Despite the equipment failures, he said the ship is “absolutely safe.” “It would not have been accepted by the Navy if the ship was not safe,” he said. One veteran naval analyst, Norman Polmar, said other first-in-class amphibious ships have never been so flawed when they joined the fleet. “These are basically troop transport ships,” he said in an interview. “We’ve been building these ships for 65 years.” The Navy accepted the San Antonio from the shipbuilder in July 2005. Two other ship manufacturers worked on the vessel before the companies were consolidated into Northrop Grumman. When it reached the fleet, Navy inspectors found “poor construction and craftsmanship standards,” according to an earlier report. In March 2006, chief of naval operations Adm. Mike Mullen also attacked Northrop Grumman over its work quality. The average cost per ship has risen 50 percent over original estimates, according to the Navy. Polmar said “the entire program should be stopped right now.” The San Antonio spent most of last year at sea, although it has not left for a full, six-month deployment. It is undergoing $36 million in previously scheduled Navy-funded repairs at local shipyard BAE Systems. Officials from the Navy Board of Inspection and Survey met the ship March 26 to 30 for its final trials in Norfolk . The ship was unable to leave its pier because of a steering failure caused by an electronic malfunction, the report said. Inspectors detailed their observations and test results in a 45 -page report. The worst problems were in the propulsion, auxiliary and aviation systems. Nearly two-thirds of those serious problems were discovered during an earlier inspection, reported as fixed, but still existed during the later check. Fluid leaks, tangled wires and broken hardware were found across the ship, the report said. In fact, inspectors wrote that the “San Antonio remains an unfinished ship” – almost two years after it joined the fleet. About 15 percent of the spaces aboard the ship need additional work in the yard, with no completion dates set. The computer network that allows the crew to operate the ship from almost any terminal on board is common in commercial vessels but new to Navy amphibious ships. Inspectors discovered hardware and software failures. The system sometimes crashes, hindering the crew’s ability to command and control the ship and launch Marines on air, land and sea assaults. Replacement parts for the computer network were made by a company that has gone out of business. Often, repair parts are costly and need to be custom-made, the report said. Serious problems also exist in the well deck, where amphibious vehicles are kept and launched. The ship suffered from a faulty communication link between pilots and landing officers. The report recommends suspending all helicopter and tilt-rotor Osprey flight operations until the deficiency is fixed. The ship’s crew told inspectors that flight safety had been a concern for more than six months. Inspectors also paint a picture of an uncomfortable and unsafe ship for the 360 San Antonio sailors and 700 troops that would embark on amphibious missions. A live, ungrounded cable was discovered in a berthing area; 124 of 156 auto-inflatable life preservers were missing for topside crew; equipment failures meant the ship could not make enough fresh water at sea for the crew; and the galley could struggle to cook enough food. Galinis said many problems have been fixed since the inspection. Life preservers have been properly placed, gun mounts repaired and faulty computer parts replaced. Other issues, he said, were less serious than the report spells out. The ship-wide network will make the ship more efficient and easier to operate, he said. The network has been overhauled and upgraded. “We knew we were going to see some premature failures,” Galinis said. “It is in very good shape now.” The Navy is sympathetic to the sailors aboard the San Antonio, he said. The equipment failures have “probably made a hard job more difficult,” he said. The second ship in the amphibious class, the New Orleans, has fewer problems but was still incomplete when accepted by the Navy, Winter wrote to Northrop Grumman. The company’s “inefficiency and mismanagement of LPD 17 put the Navy in an untenable position,” according to Winter. He has assigned a deputy to perform quarterly reviews on the shipyard and all ships under contract with Northrop Grumman. Polmar suggested that the Navy use more established ship designs used by other navies to upgrade its amphibious fleets. The Navy also should hold the contractor and the project leadership accountable for the failures, he said. “The Navy leadership should have laid down the law,” he said.

Though I count myself among those who believe the F-14's day in the sun is over, and <cough>, probably should be over, I take no pleasure in seeing these fine aircraft chopped into pieces.

From Air Force Magazine, July 2007 A top airpower analyst looks back at the greatest air war that never was. How the West Would Have Won By Christopher J. Bowie Driving through Germany these days, one frequently encounters abandoned runways surrounded by huge, camouflaged, and “hardened” aircraft shelters. Their concrete walls and heavy sliding doors typically are painted a dark green, matching the colors of the surrounding countryside. Future generations may well wonder how and why these relics came to be scattered across Europe. What was their purpose? The answer is that, in the 1980s, those massive shelters housed and protected thousands of sleek fighters that lay at the core of United States Air Force strategy in Europe. Nuclear forces formed the backbone of US deterrent power, but the tensest Cold War flashpoint was Europe—in particular the Central European region. Exactly what would cause the Soviet Union to attack Western Europe was never clear. What was only too clear, however, was that the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact had deployed powerful offensive forces along the inner German border, held a huge numerical advantage, and kept improving its capabilities. The airpower community spent a lot of time in the 1980s planning for a war in Central Europe, because airpower would play the key role in the outcome of an East-West conflict. In 1988-89, I produced a classified study for RAND Corp. titled, “Basing Uncertainties in the NATO Theater.” It was recently declassified, and some of the material presented here comes from it. NATO sought to deter an attack by maintaining powerful military forces that could, if deterrence failed, blunt the thrust close to the border (a German priority) while keeping the conflict at a conventional level. NATO reserved the option to “go nuclear” to further complicate Warsaw Pact decision-making and bolster deterrence. The greatest concern was the inner German border. Defending the border region was a daunting prospect. Land forces usually prefer to fall back and trade territory for time, but West Germany could not accept any strategy that accepted a Soviet thrust—however brief—into its national territory. Many of the contemporary computer combat simulations were based on a metric that used as its primary objective the amount of friendly area lost or friendly area regained. Strategists rated positively those strategies and forces that minimized the area lost. Vulnerable to Sheer Mass NATO forces arrayed along the border possessed very little operational depth, particularly after France withdrew from the Allied military command in 1966. The distance from the inner German border to Belgium, Holland, and the English Channel was, at its shortest points, only about 350 miles. NATO ground forces, though they were rated as superior to pact units in quality and capability, nonetheless were vulnerable to the sheer mass of the land armies the East could generate. Soviet doctrine held that, in a conflict, waves of armored echelons would advance across Eastern Europe, enter the main battle area, and exploit weak spots to break through and shatter the NATO defenses. To help redress this imbalance of land forces, the United States pre-positioned huge masses of equipment and war materiel on the continent. Commercial airlifters would fly in troops to link up with this equipment. Commanders planned to bolster the forward forces with three divisions in the first week, followed by a division a week after that. Air forces, the most strategically agile forces, were to form the primary tool for providing additional firepower during these first critical weeks as the ground forces built up strength. The first goal of the allied air forces was to gain control of the air, which would enable military and civil airliners to bring reinforcements to the theater. Control of the air would also enable airmen to re-role their flexible fighter forces to conduct ground attack operations aimed at blunting the Soviet armored spearheads and reducing the flow of enemy forces to the front. In addition, some elements of the airpower fleet could be held in reserve to execute nuclear strikes should NATO choose to escalate. In contrast, the Soviet and Warsaw Pact air armies’ primary objective was to deny NATO control of the air by striking airfields, radar sites, and missile sites while also shooting down air defense fighters and AWACS aircraft. By denying NATO control of the air, Warsaw Pact ground forces could utilize their larger mass of armor to smash through the outnumbered NATO ground forces and drive to the English Channel. Allied air forces in the Central Region fielded a force of approximately 115 fighter squadrons, for a total of about 2,000 operational aircraft in the 1980s. USAF added approximately 20 squadrons, comprising 700 combat aircraft. Most were based in the Central Region and Britain. In comparison, US Air Forces in Europe today maintains a fleet with fewer than 200 fighter and attack aircraft. The Central Region air forces were divided into two Allied Tactical Air Forces or ATAFs, established in 1952: 2 ATAF in the northern half of West Germany and 4 ATAF in the southern half. The RAF dominated 2 ATAF, which was always commanded by a British air marshal. It featured the Royal Netherlands Air Force, the Belgian Air Force, elements of the German Air Force, and those USAF aircraft based in the 2 ATAF area. Meanwhile, 4 ATAF featured USAF, Canadian, and German forces and was commanded by an American and, later, a German general. The division of the airspace into two zones might have made sense for slow-moving ground operations, but for air operations, it was a serious weakness. A seam ran down the middle between the two ATAFs, which one senior commander characterized as “a brick wall.” Many commanders expressed the fear that the Warsaw Pact air armies would penetrate along this seam to sow confusion. Planners also believed the 2 ATAF region would suffer the most violent thrusts by Warsaw Pact forces because of the nature of its terrain—flat plains ideally suited for armor operations. But trying to vector 4 ATAF assets into the 2 ATAF region was rendered more difficult by the invisible line separating the two commands. There were force imbalances as well. USAF F-15s scheduled to reinforce central Europe were dedicated to 2 ATAF, and, within 2 ATAF, they were concentrated in the Netherlands. The better solution would have been a single ATAF with a single area under a single commander, but this ran afoul of interservice and Alliance politics. American concern over the divided command of airpower led to creation of a coordinating body, but the real power remained with the ATAFs. As a result, the dangerous seam endured and would no doubt have been exploited by the adversary. Doctrinal differences were also present on both sides of the “brick wall.” British airmen believed communications channels would be disrupted very quickly in the opening phase of the war, and the individual air bases would have to operate independently. Aircraft would have to rely on low-level flying to evade defenses and reduce losses. As a result, 2 ATAF believed in a more decentralized approach and an operational style that required minimal coordination. The assumptions in 4 ATAF differed due to USAF experience in Vietnam. Vietnamese anti-aircraft guns had taken a terrible toll on fighters operating at low level, which led to an emphasis on medium-level penetration and unpleasant encounters with surface-to-air missiles. The Air Force accordingly embraced operations with integrated defense suppression, and so 4 ATAF placed a greater emphasis on centralization and coordination. The search for the right approach—low level, or medium altitude with defense suppression—sparked endless debates among Allied airmen around the theater. Passive and Active To stymie Warsaw Pact efforts to cripple Allied airpower, NATO embraced a two-pronged strategy—use of passive defense and use of active defense. Passive defense comprised measures to reduce airbase vulnerability. Following the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, when the Israeli Air Force caught the Arab air forces on the ground in a well-coordinated attack, NATO air forces made the decision to “harden” their airfields. Concrete was deemed much cheaper than aircraft. The pace of this effort always lagged behind objectives, but, over time, NATO air forces devised a vast array of aircraft shelters at dozens of airfields across Europe. The Alliance added additional taxiways and runways, “toned down” buildings with camouflage paint, installed air and ground crew shelters, and purchased rapid runway repair equipment. Planners feared Soviet use of tactical ballistic missiles to pin down air defense aircraft, followed by a wave of attack aircraft to wreak further havoc on the airfields. Additional threats included chemical attacks and Soviet Special Forces. NATO believed the latter would be inserted before the Warsaw Pact offensive to sow confusion and attack key facilities on airfields. Loss of Allied airpower was viewed as a recipe for disaster, and so, to reduce the risk, NATO attempted to increase the number of sites that could be turned into airfields in an emergency. Each nation provided spaces for deploying USAF aircraft at what were called co-located operating bases, or COBs. Over time, shelters and other passive defenses were added to some of these fields. Every year, USAF conducted so-called “Rapid Reactor” exercises to familiarize US-based squadrons with wartime beddown locations. For example, F-15Cs from Eglin AFB, Fla., would proceed to Soesterberg Air Base in the Netherlands, while the new F-15E Strike Eagles out of Seymour Johnson AFB, N.C., would use Lahr AB, Germany, as their combat base. The RAF added an additional facet with its Harrier force, which during a mobilization would deploy to rapidly developed air bases to complicate enemy targeting efforts. In terms of active defenses, NATO forces fielded thousands of short-range surface-to-air missile batteries and guns in the forward area with longer-ranged Patriot, Hawk, and other SAMs farther in the rear. Interspersed within the longer-range missile engagement zones were fighter engagement zones manned by both dedicated air superiority aircraft and multirole fighters. The general concept allowed the forward missiles and guns to shoot at anything that flew, in a huge concentration of firepower. Any incoming Warsaw Pact fighter would first have to penetrate the dense forward defenses, evade Patriot shots, and then push past combat air patrols. It no doubt would have been an eventful sortie for any Warsaw Pact aircrew. After a time, the air defense forces would be told to go “weapons tight” to avoid shooting down any NATO aircraft that may have been streaming across the border. A complex network of corridors, altitudes, aircraft speeds, and identification, friend or foe (IFF), electronic systems would be used to prevent so-called “friendly fire” incidents. How well the forward forces’ firing discipline would hold, however, was a major concern. A similar problem would occur in trying to deconflict Patriot missile and fighter engagement zones. Patriot batteries had extremely lethal missiles with a very high kill probability, and most fighter crews did not believe their operators would hold back a missile shot in case of a question regarding the true identify of an aircraft. Most airmen, in fact, thought that fratricide levels would be very high. USAF planned to augment its forward-based forces with Stateside aircraft. In the plan, USAF’s total fighter force—approximately 3,700 operational aircraft, or more than 50 wings—would be allocated to various regions in the event of a general European conflict. Seven hundred combat aircraft were in the European Theater, and USAF would reinforce this with an additional 1,800 fighter aircraft. The Air Force planned to move 1,600 of these fighters in just 10 days—more than two wings per day. This would have been an aerial movement of unprecedented proportions. These aircraft would be added to the 2,000 or so combat aircraft that NATO Allies kept in the Central Region to fight the thousands of Warsaw Pact aircraft. The encounter would no doubt have been the most epic air battle in history. Looking back two decades later, what conclusions can we draw from what might have happened if “the balloon” had gone up? The key unknowable was the opening move. Post-Cold War disclosures of the details of Soviet war plans reveal Soviet intent to launch an early nuclear strike against Western Europe. Typically, however, the plans show the Warsaw Pact assuming a NATO “first use” of nuclear weapons, meaning that the pact strike would be classified as retaliatory—and thus less controversial to include in a war plan. Would the Soviets have actually gone first—that is, have launched a surprise strike with nuclear weapons as the opening move? If so, all the vast array of planning, force buildup, and so on for conventional conflict could have been largely immaterial as nuclear weapons detonated across the European continent. If Moscow had gone nuclear, would NATO have responded with its own nuclear riposte? NATO fighters were armed with so-called “dual key” nuclear weapons provided by the United States, while Britain, France, and the US maintained their own independent nuclear forces. Would a responding nuclear strike have hit Eastern Europe or extended to Soviet territory? Strategists and planners spent countless hours weighing the imponderables. But let’s assume that nuclear deterrence held and the Soviets elected to conduct a conventional-force-only campaign. What then? Whacking the Pact The Warsaw Pact air forces would have suffered grievous losses. Western air forces have consistently excelled at air-to-air combat, and NATO believed its equipment and training were superior to the Soviets’ rigid procedures. NATO’s ground-based missile systems were extremely effective — some aircraft would have gotten through the missile defenses, but the toll on Soviet aircraft from Western guns, missiles, and air defense fighters would have been brutal. Warsaw Pact losses would not permit more than a few days of such operations. No doubt the NATO air forces would have suffered attrition as well, from both enemy and friendly fire, but not to the same degree as that suffered by the pact. NATO would likely have gained control of the air quite quickly. Some enemy aircraft would have penetrated successfully to hit air bases, as would Soviet ballistic missile strikes, and the result would have been serious indeed. The “Salty Demo” exercises in the mid-1980s, in which USAF tried to simulate the effect of strikes on its air bases, were scripted and artificial. The true damage was never really calculated. Moreover, the Pentagon never provided resources sufficient for hardening bases to ensure air base operability. Although enemy strikes would certainly have disrupted NATO operations at several locations for a period, the Warsaw Pact would have been unable to generate the weight of effort required to cripple NATO air operations. At this point, NATO air commanders would have focused on offensive operations. Planners initially targeted Warsaw Pact airfields and air defense sites in what was termed the offensive counterair mission. The goal was to seize control of the air. Commanders would have had to judge how much effort to put against these targets and how much to enemy ground force targets. When it came to ground targets, the decision would be further complicated by issues concerning the depth of the strike operation. Should NATO airpower strike deep to interdict enemy forces approaching the battle area, or strike closer to the border against forces engaged with NATO’s ground forces? The allocation would also depend heavily on how well NATO’s land element was able to weather the initial onslaught. One has to question the actual effectiveness of NATO air strikes against airfields and armored forces, given what we have learned from later wars. In the Gulf War, for example, the real difference-makers were the aircraft delivering precision weapons—F-117s and F-111s. Unfortunately, only a small portion of the USAF combat force in Europe could deliver precision guided bombs, and the Allies possessed even fewer. The Dilemma Close-in delivery was the only way to reliably hit targets with unguided ordnance—and the loss rates would no doubt have been eye watering. By trying to get close, the NATO forces would lose aircraft, but, by trying to stand off, fighter effectiveness would have decreased. The dilemma was indeed great. The Western air strikes would still have disrupted significant parts of the Soviet follow-on armored echelons. From the battles of World War II to operations in Iraq, armored forces that have come under air attack were severely degraded. Actual tank losses may not be high, but the disruption caused by fear, road blockages, and running for cover dislocates time tables severely and undermines morale. In the 1980s, the United States began developing concepts and forces to improve the conventional balance in the Central Region. Airborne radar carried by the E-8 Joint STARS battle-management aircraft would locate and characterize enemy forces deep within the Warsaw Pact. Commanders could then allocate long-range fires—missile systems and fighter aircraft equipped with precision guided weapons—to strike at key locations. By interdicting onrushing armor formations, pressure on NATO ground forces could be kept in check, enabling the Allies to defend the border. Elements of these new systems were just being deployed when the Soviet Union collapsed. And in the end, if the NATO front lines had held—or at least minimized the penetrations—what then? What would Kremlin leaders do next? Our forces were never put to that test. The analysis of the air campaign produced several lessons. First, control of the air was the linchpin of any successful strategy in a theater conflict. Without control of the air, NATO would have been defeated because airpower could not have been brought to bear against Warsaw Pact armored forces. The same will hold true for any future contingency. Second, modern airpower was the most strategically and operationally agile element of US military power and was the only element that could be brought to bear quickly from American territory. The Air Force planned to deploy 25 fighter wings in the same amount of time that its airlift force moved only three United States Army divisions. Once in theater, these aircraft could also be shifted from one battlespace sector to another (providing that the 2 ATAF and 4 ATAF split did not get in the way). USAF’s airlift and Civil Reserve Air Fleet also provided strategic agility to the Army. Third, airpower offered great flexibility. Significant numbers of NATO fighters could have shifted from air defense to ground attack, to nuclear strike, and back, depending on the situation. Fortunately for all involved, the Allied military forces were never put to the test, but the odds of success probably were better than even, perhaps much better. Christopher J. Bowie has held a variety of positions with RAND Corp., the aerospace industry, and the Air Force. He served recently as USAF’s deputy director for strategic planning and today is director of strategic studies for Northrop Grumman Integrated Systems. This is his first article for Air Force Magazine.

One of the big advantages of a towed array is to get below the "layer" but as Peter has pointed out, there may not be thermocline in shallow waters and H4 assumes this. Also, I would think streaming a towed array in especially shallow water would be a difficult (and risky from the point of view of snagging, dragging or otherwise losing an expensive piece of gear) task.

From Air Force Magazine, July 2007 “Enemy troops 75 meters away. ... I need guns only!” The Art of Strafing By Richard B.H. Lewis Modern fighter pilots risk their lives every day performing the act of strafing, which to some may seem like a tactic from a bygone era. Last November, an F-16 pilot, Maj. Troy L. Gilbert, died strafing the enemy in Iraq, trying to protect coalition forces taking fire on the ground. My first thought was, “Why was an F-16 doing that mission?” But I already knew the answer. In the 1980s, at the height of the Cold War, I was combat-ready in the 512th Fighter Squadron, an F-16 unit at Ramstein AB, Germany. We had to maintain combat status in air-to-air, air-to-ground, and nuclear strike operations. We practiced strafing occasionally. We were not very good at it, but it was extremely challenging. There is a big difference between flying at 25,000 feet where you have plenty of room to maneuver and you can barely see a target, and at 200 feet, where the ground is rushing right below you and you can read the billboards screaming by. The only aircraft required to strafe in the Cold War was the A-10, and for good reason. It was the only aircraft built to endure the hazards of strafing against Warsaw Pact forces. We have all seen aircraft in the movies, diving at the ground, guns blazing, while people on the ground are running to take cover. That’s not how it really is. Once the fighter enters the low-altitude environment, the pilot is subject to multiple threats; he faces not only surface-to-air missiles and anti-aircraft artillery but also handheld heat-seeking missiles and automatic gunfire. In “No Man’s Land”—that is, below 5,000 feet—the chances of being hit go up astronomically. However, for many aircraft, the limitations of the gun require the pilot to fly lower, below 1,000 feet, if he or she hopes to consistently hit the target. When you get down that low, bad things can happen. The Pentagon defines strafing simply as “the delivery of automatic weapons fire by aircraft on ground targets.” The term itself has an interesting pedigree. It is derived from the German word “strafen,” meaning, “to punish.” In World War I, a popular German Army catch phrase was “Gott strafe England” (“God punish England”). The term caught on. In the World War I Battle of St. Mihiel, Capt. Eddie Rickenbacker once strafed eight German artillery pieces, each drawn by a team of six horses. Horses and wagons scattered everywhere, the great pilot later recounted. The physical damage was not great, but the disruption of the horse train worked. Among World War II strafing aircraft, few if any were more effective than the American B-25 Mitchell bomber. In the Pacific, it was used frequently on treetop-level missions against Japanese airfields and shipping, with great impact. In both World War II and the Korean War, 12.7 mm guns were the real workhorses. The 20 mm gun has been the weapon of choice for most US fighters over the past 50 years. Its key attributes have been its high rates of fire and muzzle velocity. During the Vietnam War, we lost large numbers of aircraft, many as a result of getting down low and in the range of lethal fire. This made it a priority to build a ground attack aircraft dedicated to close air support. The design of the A-10 is unlike any other aircraft. It was built with unparalleled emphasis on simplicity and survivability. For instance, it features a titanium “bathtub” to protect the pilot from direct hits from armor-piercing and high-explosive projectiles in sizes up to 23 mm. Beyond that, it has redundant flight controls and a 30 mm Gatling gun. I have seen the aircraft return from combat with one engine and major parts of a wing and flight controls blown off. Unquestionably, the A-10 is the ultimate strafing machine. Strafing in other fighter aircraft, though done more and more often, is extremely dangerous. To be effective on the battlefield, a pilot must be able to perform low-altitude passes in the face of the enemy. Each party is blazing away at the other. In fighter aircraft other than the A-10, the pilot must make very low passes if he is to deliver accurate fire from the gun. Doing this, though it might sound easy, requires intense concentration. This is critical if the pilot is to avoid flying through the up-thrown debris from exploding targets or flying into ground objects. For most fighter pilots, strafing well in combat is no simple task. Holding wings level while tracking a target for more than 10 seconds is considered too predictable for enemy fire. One has to visualize the point in the battlespace where one needs to be to start the strafing pass, and yet still maintain awareness of the target’s location. This dual task can best be carried out using a five- to 15-degree dive angle. Altitude, airspeed, and wind direction must also be considered. Imagine yourself flying down a large funnel that ends at the target. One finds lots of room to maneuver at the top of the funnel; you can do that and still hit the target. However, at the bottom of the funnel, you run out of maneuver room. One needs to place the aircraft’s aiming symbology short of the target such that it drifts up to the target as the gun comes within firing range. It is difficult to keep the gun sight on the target for more than two seconds while flying at 552 mph. One can’t just stare, zombie-like, at the target. This causes target fixation, which can become a fatal experience. We know from Gilbert’s death what such concentration can cause. (See “Aerospace World: F-16 Pilot Awarded the DFC,” June, p. 14.) The official accident report blamed the accident on Gilbert’s “channelized attention,” which was “manifested by his desire to maintain a constant visual positive identification of targeted enemy vehicles, and subsequent target fixation on these vehicles.” These circumstances, the report went on, caused the F-16 pilot “to begin and then press his attack below a recoverable altitude.” On Gilbert’s second strafing pass, he came in at an extremely low altitude and simply could not recover. He flew the airplane into the ground. Then there is the risk of being brought down by the “Golden BB”—the single, lucky but lethal shot that finds its mark. That risk exists for virtually any fighter whose cockpit can be easily penetrated by ground fire. That is why, after the pilot has strafed the target, he pulls up hard. A wings-level pullout, producing at least four Gs in two seconds, is required for survival in most cases. We’re using the gun quite a bit in the Iraq and Afghanistan operations. The fighters are using lots of 20 mm off F-15Es and F-16s and 30 mm off A-10s to hit ground targets. Why is that? For individuals, the gun is probably one of the most accurate weapons, with the least collateral damage. That 20 mm will end the bad guy’s life, but stray rounds will just drive into the ground, and that’s it. In Iraq, the adversary uses both road networks and riverine networks. There have been a number of occasions where boats have been identified carrying insurgents on the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers, and we’ve used 20 mm and 30 mm guns to destroy those boats. A moving target is hard to hit with a bomb. With a gun, it’s no big deal. In one instance, the enemy was getting ready to move people somewhere to do something later that night, but we removed them from the fight. The same thing happened in Balad, where we found people going to get roadside bomb supplies. We have been using the gun against single persons who have been planting improvised exposive devices. You’ll have an individual with a truck, and a couple of other individuals; you’ll see them get out and move around, trying to dig a hole, and you’ll bring in an F-16 or an F-15E, or maybe an A-10, and you’ll use 20 or 30 mm and go kill them. If you have troops in contact, or you have individuals in buildings, you do the same thing. Some pilots are expanding the strafing envelope, so to speak. Earlier this year, the Secretary of the Air Force, Michael W. Wynne, told this story: “About a year ago, our F-15 airmen were thinking about how they could execute night strafing. It seemed hard, maybe undoable. Last month, I learned it was being done in daily ops in the fight. ... Actually, it is now called easy.” The F-15 community had programmed F-15 simulators at Seymour Johnson AFB, N.C., where you could, through practice, work a night strafe from “hard” to “easy” in a matter of months. A-10s probably will be here until they fall out of the sky, but can they always get the job done when our ground troops call 911? They cannot be all places, all the time. The A-10 will sometimes be too slow to respond across large areas and it is vulnerable to SAMs and enemy fighters. That is why all of USAF’s fighters now train for strafing. Often, our ground troops are in desperate situations and are so close to the enemy they are in danger of being hit by friendly weapons. In Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan, for instance, USAF combat controller SSgt. Gabriel Brown, under fire, called out to approaching F-15E pilots, “We have enemy troops 75 meters away. ... I need guns only!” (See “The Airpower of Anaconda,” September 2002, p. 60.) I don’t see the F-22 doing much strafing; its mission is to hit the targets in denied airspace at strategic locations in front of our ground troops. Its gun is optimized to shoot down enemy aircraft. Usually the gun is needed for air-to-air combat because you are inside the minimum range of an air-to-air missile or it is the only weapon left. In the development of the F-22, there was a debate about whether we should take out that gun. I’m glad we didn’t, because, in combat trials, we have already had gun kills. The gun was required to complete the mission. Even so, the F-22, like all other fighters, can strafe when it has to. And it will probably have to. Few would have thought, 20 years ago, that the F-15E would one day play the role of classic strafing machine. Yet the Strike Eagle did a great job strafing al Qaeda fighters during the March 2002 battle on Takur Ghar, one of the main engagements of Anaconda. Of course, it should be noted that the F-15E pilot had long, deep experience flying the A-10. The F-35 Lightning II fighter, which is set to enter service in 2013, has a special gun, better for strafing ground targets than the gun found in the F-22. The F-35 is specifically designed to have the sensors and weapons needed to support ground operations. It will go deep, but it will also thrive in CAS engagements. Its gun will carry special shells powerful enough to penetrate armored targets, unlike the F-22, whose gun ammo is specially designed to blow up an airplane. The F-35’s gun will be a weapon of last resort, though, because of the extreme vulnerability of the pilot during a strafing mission. With the advent of small, low-collateral-damage weapons, the tactic of strafing may well begin to fade out once more. Weapons boasting 10-foot accuracy allow a pilot to reliably drop ordnance close to our troops, but with scant risk of fratricide. Such weapons can get much closer to a target than is the case with strafing. These weapons could fill the strafing niche. Of course, strafing often happens for fighters like the F-16 when A-10s are not available or when all other ordnance has been expended. There will always be a possibility that you have to protect that guy on the ground with your last bullet. That part of the job will never completely disappear. Richard B.H. Lewis recently retired as an Air Force major general. He flew the F-4, F-16, and F-111, and served as assistant to the director of campaign plans during Operation Desert Storm.In the period 2002-06, he was program executive officer for the F-22 fighter. He is now an executive of Burdeshaw Associates Ltd. This is his first article for Air Force Magazine.

From Marine Corps Times EFV setbacks concern House panel By Kimberly Johnson - Staff writer Posted : Saturday Jun 30, 2007 8:20:19 EDT House lawmakers expressed shock over program delays and cost overruns plaguing the Corps’ Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle program at a recent hearing, but Marine officials said it’s still a necessity for the service. The EFV, designed to replace the Corps’ aging amphibious assault vehicle, was initially slated to hit the fleet in 2010. However, earlier this year the vehicle’s launch was pushed back five years so designers could improve its reliability. Early test vehicles frequently broke down, and operators weren’t able to steer when accelerating in water. Early estimates said each EFV would cost about $6 million, but those costs have risen to about $17 million per vehicle, making it “the most expensive ground combat vehicle in the history of the U.S. military,” said Rep. Gene Taylor, D-Miss., chairman of the House Armed Services subcommittee on seapower and expeditionary forces, during a June 26 hearing. “This program is going to cost more than three times what Congress was originally informed,” said Rep. Roscoe Bartlett, R-Md., ranking subcommittee member. “If all goes well from here on out, system development and demonstration is going to take nearly twice as long as originally planned.” Taylor said he was concerned about the EFV prototype’s poor performance in early testing and cited reports that the vehicle can operate only four to 10 hours before breaking down. “I want to be very clear what this kind of reliability problem can mean for the Marines who will operate these vehicles: Going into combat in an armored vehicle that floats is dangerous enough, but if that same vehicle gets ashore — far from most maintenance support — and breaks down, the Marines on that vehicle could be extremely vulnerable,” Taylor said. “I’m concerned that you continue to still have mechanical problems, that after [$2.3 billion] in taxpayer money, we have nine vehicles to test that break down,” Taylor said. “I haven’t heard anything today that gives me a degree of confidence that you’re addressing these problems.” The program’s lackluster performance was brought on by funding decisions made more than a decade ago, defense officials said. The program was not fully funded in the 1990s, said Roger Smith, deputy assistant secretary of the Navy for expeditionary warfare. “The lack of systems engineering that was not performed was one of the main factors that caused the reliability to be so poor,” he said. “In order to have successful execution of the certified EFV program, it is contingent upon receiving full funding requested in the president’s FY 2008 budget,” said David Ahern, the Pentagon’s director of portfolio systems acquisition. Price overruns are a result of a broken acquisition system, one Corps official said. “The process requires you to come up with the estimate before you even build the vehicles,” Col. William Taylor, program executive officer for Marine Corps Land Systems, told reporters after the hearing. “They have to use analogies,” he said, such as with legacy vehicles like the AAVs and the M60 tank. “That’s like comparing a V-22 to a regular ol’ helicopter. The EFV is so much more complex than the existing combat vehicles. They underachieved in that estimate, by a significant amount.” Designers probably would have “been better off comparing the complexities of this vehicle to an aircraft,” instead of other combat vehicles with simpler designs, Taylor said. Lawmakers pressed Corps officials to justify the need for such a vehicle. “It’s been a long while since Marines en masse stormed a beach,” Bartlett said. “Why do we need the EFV? The EFV is essential to the nation’s forcible entry capability,” said Lt. Gen. Emerson Gardner, deputy commandant for programs and resources. “Without the EFV, the U.S. does not have the ability to conduct surfaced assaults from ships over the horizon.” The EFV is one piece of the service’s vehicle portfolio, he said, explaining that the Corps decided to cut its EFV requirement from more than 1,000 vehicles to 573 as it increased requests for armored wheeled vehicles. “We have to be organized, trained and equipped to do a multitude of missions,” Gardner said. Without the EFV, the Corps must rely on antiquated amtracs, which must be launched about 5,000 yards from shore, Gardner said. “You’re taking risks with those ships coming in that close, so the Marine commander has to persuade the naval commander that he needs to take that risk with those ships to push those vehicles out,” he said. Lawmakers balked at the EFV’s flat-bottom design and urged the Corps to pursue a heavily armored V-shaped hull, similar to the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles the service is pushing out to Iraq as Humvee replacements. “I am having some trouble understanding why making it with a V-bottom would make it less like a boat,” Bartlett said. “Most every boat I’ve seen going fast on the water has a V-bottom, rather than a flat bottom.” The EFV’s flat bottom — a necessity for getting the vehicle up on plane for high-speed water maneuvering — is not ideal for armoring against roadside bombs, Gardner explained. “However, the side protection of the vehicle does provide the kind of force protection we’re seeing with vehicles today,” he said.

Good point. And welcome to the HarpGamer forums, Peter.

From DefenseNews Posted 06/29/07 08:08 India to Announce Huge Fighter Jet Contract AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, NEW DELHI Indian defense officials were meeting June 29 before handing out a contract for 126 war planes potentially worth up to $9 billion, officials said. Indian defense ministry officials and industry sources said the choice appeared to have narrowed down to Russian-built MiG-35 and MiG-29, Lockheed Martin’s F-16 and Boeing’s F-18. The contract, described as the world’s biggest arms purchase in 15 years, will be the first time India’s huge defense establishment has bought fighters after evaluating rival bids through a global tender. “Defence Minister A.K. Antony is heading the meeting of the decision-making Defence Acquisition Committee which will finalize the tender notice today,” a top ministry official told AFP. “The choice of the manufacturer and all other details will be announced shortly.” Indian air force sources also told AFP that the contract would be open-ended — giving India room to order 60 additional jets from the same vendor or vendors. India is the biggest arms purchaser among emerging nations. Also in the race to replace a chunk of India’s aging fleet of 700 MiG-21s are Eurofighter’s Typhoon, Saab’s Gripen and Dassault’s Rafale and Mirage — although price considerations have left these contenders at a disadvantage, defense officials and industry sources said. But with U.S. offerings in the running, the deal could also mark a shift away from dependence on Russian hardware. Ties between Moscow — which meets 75 percent of India’s military needs — and India are now bumpy due to a delay in the delivery of a Russian aircraft carrier and acrimony over escalating Russian export costs, others said.

From DefenseNews Posted 06/28/07 19:18 Russia Carries Out Successful Missile Test By AGENCE FRANCE-PRESS, MOSCOW Russia has carried out a successful test of a sea-based intercontinental missile from a nuclear submarine, the military said Thursday. The test on the new Bulava ballistic missile was conducted in the White Sea off Russia’s northwest coast, military spokesman Igor Dygalo told AFP. “The missile warhead arrived in the foreseen deadline” in the Kura test range in the Kamchatka region of Russia’s Far East, the spokesman added. The missile was fired from the submarine Dmitry Donskoi, which was used for a test which failed last October. Two other tests have failed in recent years. The test comes amid Russian anger at U.S. plans to locate a powerful missile-tracking radar in the Czech Republic, as well interceptor missiles in Poland to combat what it says are threats to global security. Bulava missiles have a range of 8,000 kilometers (5,000 miles) and can be equipped with up to 10 individually targeted nuclear warheads. According to the Russian press, Moscow first tested a Bulava in September 2005 and conducted a first successful test in December of that year. At least 10 more Bulava tests are in the pipeline for 2008, Russian news agencies said. Bulavas are designed to stock Russia’s new Borei class of submarine and Moscow has spoken of their ability to pierce any potential missile shield. On May 29, Russia announced a successful test of the RS24, another new intercontinental missile with multiple warheads that Moscow has presented in response to Washington’s missile defense shield ambitions. Russia has also begun mass production of Topol-M strategic missiles, the land-based equivalent of the Bulava, the country’s First Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov said on Tuesday. “We are now moving on to a new and very important rearmament stage for both our nuclear strategic forces and our tactical complexes,” he was quoted as saying by the Interfax news agency. “These are not prototypes but mass production,” he said. “I am talking of stationary Topol-M missile complexes but also of mobile ones which can be fitted with different types of warhead, as well as Iskander-M missiles.” The Topol-M is known to NATO as the SS27 and is a three-stage intercontinental ballistic missile with a range of 10,000 kilometers (6,200 miles) which can be deployed on both stationary and mobile launch platforms. It is 22.7 meters (74 feet) long with a diameter of 1.95 meters and weighs 47 tons. The Iskander-M is a short range tactical missile known to NATO as the SS26. Ivanov announced in July 2006 that by 2015 the Russian armed forces would be equipped with 69 Topol-M missiles and about 60 Iskander-M weapons.

Hurry, Herr Kapitan. Every day you tarry is another day the Allies get a precious convoy across the big pond.

Long gone by now aren't they - thought that was 2003? Hehe, right you are. I am going to shut up now.

You must not be utilizing our spacious U-boats wisely. Note that crew bunks make excellent torpedo spaces .. they can sleep standing up. Also, a little birdie told me that SH3 has arrived on the doorstep of one Dora the Explorer fanboi.

Remember, if you haven't taken note already, the Perrys are having their SM-1 launchers hauled too.

From Marine Corps Times Last survivor of first Iwo flag raising dies By Chris Williams - The Associated Press Posted : Monday Jun 25, 2007 18:43:18 EDT EDINA, Minn. — Charles W. Lindberg, the last survivor of the six Marines who raised the first American flag over Iwo Jima during World War II, has died. He was 86. Lindberg died Sunday at Fairview Southdale hospital in the Minneapolis suburb of Edina, said John Pose, director of the Morris Nilsen Funderal Home in Richfield, which is handling Lindberg’s funeral. Lindberg spent decades explaining that it was his patrol, not the one captured in the famous photograph by Joe Rosenthal, that raised the first flag over the island. In the late morning of Feb. 23, 1945, Lindberg fired his flame-thrower into enemy pillboxes at the base of Mount Suribachi and then joined five other Marines fighting their way to the top. He was awarded the Silver Star for bravery. “Two of our men found this big, long pipe there,” he said in a 2003 interview. “We tied the flag to it, took it to the highest spot we could find and we raised it. “Down below, the troops started to cheer, the ship’s whistles went off, it was just something that you would never forget,” he said. “It didn’t last too long, because the enemy started coming out of the caves.” The moment was captured by Sgt. Lou Lowery, a photographer from the Corps’ Leatherneck magazine, but three of the six men never saw his photos. They were among the 5,931 Marines killed on the island. Lindberg’s patrol was back in combat, crawling through the black volcanic rock of the island, when a group of five Marines and a Navy hospital corpsman raised a second, larger flag about four hours later. By Lindberg’s account, his commander ordered the first flag replaced and safeguarded because he worried it would be taken by someone as a souvenir. AP photographer Joe Rosenthal’s photo of the second flag-raising became one of the most enduring images of the war and the model for the U.S. Marine Corps memorial in Washington. Rosenthal always denied accusations that he staged the photo, and he never claimed it depicted the first raising of a flag over the island. Lindberg was shot through the arm March 1, 1945, and evacuated. He learned about the second flag-raising a week later while recovering from the wound, which earned him a Purple Heart. After his discharge in January 1946, Lindberg — no relation to Charles Lindbergh the aviator — went home to Grand Forks, N.D. He moved to Richfield in 1951 and became an electrician. No one, he said, believed him when he said he raised the first flag at Iwo Jima. “I was called a liar,” he said. Official recognition eluded him, too. In 1954, Lindberg was invited to Washington for the dedication of the Marine memorial; it carried the names of the second group of flag-raisers but not the first. He spent his final years trying to raise awareness of the first flag-raising, speaking to veterans groups and at schools. He sold autographed copies of Lowery’s photos through catalogs. Lindberg was part of a groundbreaking for the Honoring All Veterans memorial — which include a bronze bust of the war hero — in Richfield on Memorial Day and had recently been active in various war memorials around the state, said Travis Gorshe, who organized the Richfield event. Gorshe, who said he worked with Lindberg on the memorial for the past two years, said Lindberg has been hospitalized since June 10. A back room in his neat house was filled with souvenirs of the battle, including a huge mural based on one of Lowery’s photos. Prints of the photos were kept handy for visitors, and Lindberg’s Silver Star and Purple Heart were in little boxes on a side table. The Minnesota Legislature passed a resolution in Lindberg’s honor in 1995. His face appears on a huge mural in Long Prairie of the battle for Iwo Jima, and his likeness is etched into the black granite walls of Soldiers Field in Rochester.

From Defence Talk Israel air force training for distance missions: report Agence France-Presse | Jun 25, 2007 Jerusalem: Israel's air force is training for long distance missions, after agreeing a timetable with the United States for sanctions against Iran's nuclear programme to work, a report said on Friday. Israel's tabloid-style Maariv daily, which said the military censor had authorised its report, said the training included long-range strikes as well as in-flight refuelling. The newspaper gave no further details of the flights but said Israel and the United States would hold joint assessments at the end of the year of the effectiveness of economic sanctions against Iran. A new package of tougher sanctions was drawn up in Tuesday's talks between Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and President George W. Bush, including pressure on European governments to cancel guarantees worth 22 billion dollars a year to firms trading with Iran, the paper said. The draft package also includes sanctions against banks working with Iran and measures to stop the OPEC cartel's number two producer of crude from maintaining its oil infrastructure, the paper added. After the White House talks, Bush said he hoped to resolve the Iran nuclear dispute diplomatically but insisted that all options, including military action, remained on the table. The UN Security Council has already adopted two packages of economic sanctions against Iran after it defied ultimatums to suspend uranium enrichment. Iran insists it has the right to master the nuclear fuel cycle as a signatory of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and says its nuclear programme is for civilian purposes only. But Israel, the Middle East's sole if undeclared nuclear power, suspects -- together with the West -- that the Islamic republic's real aim is to develop a nuclear arsenal that would dramatically tip the balance of power in the region. Iran's uranium enrichment facility is near the central city of Natanz, the best part of 1,600 kilometres (1,000 miles) from the nearest Israeli air base. In between lie Jordan and Iraq, the latter still under the security control of Israel's key ally, the United States, but with a Shiite-led government that is friendly to Iran. On January 7, Israel denied a report in Britain's Sunday Times newspaper that it had drawn up plans to destroy Iran's enrichment facility with a tactical nuclear strike. Quoting several Israeli military sources, the London paper said Israel had drawn up plans to destroy the centrifuges at Natanz using low-yield "bunker-busting" bombs. It quoted the sources as saying that two of the Jewish state's air force squadrons were training to use the weapons for a single strike.

Woohoo ! Thats good news.

Brains setting up for the final kill of the night ...

Ah, A Bridge Too Far, also one of my own favorites.

Beautiful. I can hear it now, "G'day mate, you can pick up your free pass to Paradise right ere."