July 2, 200718 yr From Air Force Magazine, July 2007 A top airpower analyst looks back at the greatest air war that never was. How the West Would Have Won By Christopher J. Bowie Driving through Germany these days, one frequently encounters abandoned runways surrounded by huge, camouflaged, and “hardened” aircraft shelters. Their concrete walls and heavy sliding doors typically are painted a dark green, matching the colors of the surrounding countryside. Future generations may well wonder how and why these relics came to be scattered across Europe. What was their purpose? The answer is that, in the 1980s, those massive shelters housed and protected thousands of sleek fighters that lay at the core of United States Air Force strategy in Europe. Nuclear forces formed the backbone of US deterrent power, but the tensest Cold War flashpoint was Europe—in particular the Central European region. Exactly what would cause the Soviet Union to attack Western Europe was never clear. What was only too clear, however, was that the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact had deployed powerful offensive forces along the inner German border, held a huge numerical advantage, and kept improving its capabilities. The airpower community spent a lot of time in the 1980s planning for a war in Central Europe, because airpower would play the key role in the outcome of an East-West conflict. In 1988-89, I produced a classified study for RAND Corp. titled, “Basing Uncertainties in the NATO Theater.” It was recently declassified, and some of the material presented here comes from it. NATO sought to deter an attack by maintaining powerful military forces that could, if deterrence failed, blunt the thrust close to the border (a German priority) while keeping the conflict at a conventional level. NATO reserved the option to “go nuclear” to further complicate Warsaw Pact decision-making and bolster deterrence. The greatest concern was the inner German border. Defending the border region was a daunting prospect. Land forces usually prefer to fall back and trade territory for time, but West Germany could not accept any strategy that accepted a Soviet thrust—however brief—into its national territory. Many of the contemporary computer combat simulations were based on a metric that used as its primary objective the amount of friendly area lost or friendly area regained. Strategists rated positively those strategies and forces that minimized the area lost. Vulnerable to Sheer Mass NATO forces arrayed along the border possessed very little operational depth, particularly after France withdrew from the Allied military command in 1966. The distance from the inner German border to Belgium, Holland, and the English Channel was, at its shortest points, only about 350 miles. NATO ground forces, though they were rated as superior to pact units in quality and capability, nonetheless were vulnerable to the sheer mass of the land armies the East could generate. Soviet doctrine held that, in a conflict, waves of armored echelons would advance across Eastern Europe, enter the main battle area, and exploit weak spots to break through and shatter the NATO defenses. To help redress this imbalance of land forces, the United States pre-positioned huge masses of equipment and war materiel on the continent. Commercial airlifters would fly in troops to link up with this equipment. Commanders planned to bolster the forward forces with three divisions in the first week, followed by a division a week after that. Air forces, the most strategically agile forces, were to form the primary tool for providing additional firepower during these first critical weeks as the ground forces built up strength. The first goal of the allied air forces was to gain control of the air, which would enable military and civil airliners to bring reinforcements to the theater. Control of the air would also enable airmen to re-role their flexible fighter forces to conduct ground attack operations aimed at blunting the Soviet armored spearheads and reducing the flow of enemy forces to the front. In addition, some elements of the airpower fleet could be held in reserve to execute nuclear strikes should NATO choose to escalate. In contrast, the Soviet and Warsaw Pact air armies’ primary objective was to deny NATO control of the air by striking airfields, radar sites, and missile sites while also shooting down air defense fighters and AWACS aircraft. By denying NATO control of the air, Warsaw Pact ground forces could utilize their larger mass of armor to smash through the outnumbered NATO ground forces and drive to the English Channel. Allied air forces in the Central Region fielded a force of approximately 115 fighter squadrons, for a total of about 2,000 operational aircraft in the 1980s. USAF added approximately 20 squadrons, comprising 700 combat aircraft. Most were based in the Central Region and Britain. In comparison, US Air Forces in Europe today maintains a fleet with fewer than 200 fighter and attack aircraft. The Central Region air forces were divided into two Allied Tactical Air Forces or ATAFs, established in 1952: 2 ATAF in the northern half of West Germany and 4 ATAF in the southern half. The RAF dominated 2 ATAF, which was always commanded by a British air marshal. It featured the Royal Netherlands Air Force, the Belgian Air Force, elements of the German Air Force, and those USAF aircraft based in the 2 ATAF area. Meanwhile, 4 ATAF featured USAF, Canadian, and German forces and was commanded by an American and, later, a German general. The division of the airspace into two zones might have made sense for slow-moving ground operations, but for air operations, it was a serious weakness. A seam ran down the middle between the two ATAFs, which one senior commander characterized as “a brick wall.” Many commanders expressed the fear that the Warsaw Pact air armies would penetrate along this seam to sow confusion. Planners also believed the 2 ATAF region would suffer the most violent thrusts by Warsaw Pact forces because of the nature of its terrain—flat plains ideally suited for armor operations. But trying to vector 4 ATAF assets into the 2 ATAF region was rendered more difficult by the invisible line separating the two commands. There were force imbalances as well. USAF F-15s scheduled to reinforce central Europe were dedicated to 2 ATAF, and, within 2 ATAF, they were concentrated in the Netherlands. The better solution would have been a single ATAF with a single area under a single commander, but this ran afoul of interservice and Alliance politics. American concern over the divided command of airpower led to creation of a coordinating body, but the real power remained with the ATAFs. As a result, the dangerous seam endured and would no doubt have been exploited by the adversary. Doctrinal differences were also present on both sides of the “brick wall.” British airmen believed communications channels would be disrupted very quickly in the opening phase of the war, and the individual air bases would have to operate independently. Aircraft would have to rely on low-level flying to evade defenses and reduce losses. As a result, 2 ATAF believed in a more decentralized approach and an operational style that required minimal coordination. The assumptions in 4 ATAF differed due to USAF experience in Vietnam. Vietnamese anti-aircraft guns had taken a terrible toll on fighters operating at low level, which led to an emphasis on medium-level penetration and unpleasant encounters with surface-to-air missiles. The Air Force accordingly embraced operations with integrated defense suppression, and so 4 ATAF placed a greater emphasis on centralization and coordination. The search for the right approach—low level, or medium altitude with defense suppression—sparked endless debates among Allied airmen around the theater. Passive and Active To stymie Warsaw Pact efforts to cripple Allied airpower, NATO embraced a two-pronged strategy—use of passive defense and use of active defense. Passive defense comprised measures to reduce airbase vulnerability. Following the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, when the Israeli Air Force caught the Arab air forces on the ground in a well-coordinated attack, NATO air forces made the decision to “harden” their airfields. Concrete was deemed much cheaper than aircraft. The pace of this effort always lagged behind objectives, but, over time, NATO air forces devised a vast array of aircraft shelters at dozens of airfields across Europe. The Alliance added additional taxiways and runways, “toned down” buildings with camouflage paint, installed air and ground crew shelters, and purchased rapid runway repair equipment. Planners feared Soviet use of tactical ballistic missiles to pin down air defense aircraft, followed by a wave of attack aircraft to wreak further havoc on the airfields. Additional threats included chemical attacks and Soviet Special Forces. NATO believed the latter would be inserted before the Warsaw Pact offensive to sow confusion and attack key facilities on airfields. Loss of Allied airpower was viewed as a recipe for disaster, and so, to reduce the risk, NATO attempted to increase the number of sites that could be turned into airfields in an emergency. Each nation provided spaces for deploying USAF aircraft at what were called co-located operating bases, or COBs. Over time, shelters and other passive defenses were added to some of these fields. Every year, USAF conducted so-called “Rapid Reactor” exercises to familiarize US-based squadrons with wartime beddown locations. For example, F-15Cs from Eglin AFB, Fla., would proceed to Soesterberg Air Base in the Netherlands, while the new F-15E Strike Eagles out of Seymour Johnson AFB, N.C., would use Lahr AB, Germany, as their combat base. The RAF added an additional facet with its Harrier force, which during a mobilization would deploy to rapidly developed air bases to complicate enemy targeting efforts. In terms of active defenses, NATO forces fielded thousands of short-range surface-to-air missile batteries and guns in the forward area with longer-ranged Patriot, Hawk, and other SAMs farther in the rear. Interspersed within the longer-range missile engagement zones were fighter engagement zones manned by both dedicated air superiority aircraft and multirole fighters. The general concept allowed the forward missiles and guns to shoot at anything that flew, in a huge concentration of firepower. Any incoming Warsaw Pact fighter would first have to penetrate the dense forward defenses, evade Patriot shots, and then push past combat air patrols. It no doubt would have been an eventful sortie for any Warsaw Pact aircrew. After a time, the air defense forces would be told to go “weapons tight” to avoid shooting down any NATO aircraft that may have been streaming across the border. A complex network of corridors, altitudes, aircraft speeds, and identification, friend or foe (IFF), electronic systems would be used to prevent so-called “friendly fire” incidents. How well the forward forces’ firing discipline would hold, however, was a major concern. A similar problem would occur in trying to deconflict Patriot missile and fighter engagement zones. Patriot batteries had extremely lethal missiles with a very high kill probability, and most fighter crews did not believe their operators would hold back a missile shot in case of a question regarding the true identify of an aircraft. Most airmen, in fact, thought that fratricide levels would be very high. USAF planned to augment its forward-based forces with Stateside aircraft. In the plan, USAF’s total fighter force—approximately 3,700 operational aircraft, or more than 50 wings—would be allocated to various regions in the event of a general European conflict. Seven hundred combat aircraft were in the European Theater, and USAF would reinforce this with an additional 1,800 fighter aircraft. The Air Force planned to move 1,600 of these fighters in just 10 days—more than two wings per day. This would have been an aerial movement of unprecedented proportions. These aircraft would be added to the 2,000 or so combat aircraft that NATO Allies kept in the Central Region to fight the thousands of Warsaw Pact aircraft. The encounter would no doubt have been the most epic air battle in history. Looking back two decades later, what conclusions can we draw from what might have happened if “the balloon” had gone up? The key unknowable was the opening move. Post-Cold War disclosures of the details of Soviet war plans reveal Soviet intent to launch an early nuclear strike against Western Europe. Typically, however, the plans show the Warsaw Pact assuming a NATO “first use” of nuclear weapons, meaning that the pact strike would be classified as retaliatory—and thus less controversial to include in a war plan. Would the Soviets have actually gone first—that is, have launched a surprise strike with nuclear weapons as the opening move? If so, all the vast array of planning, force buildup, and so on for conventional conflict could have been largely immaterial as nuclear weapons detonated across the European continent. If Moscow had gone nuclear, would NATO have responded with its own nuclear riposte? NATO fighters were armed with so-called “dual key” nuclear weapons provided by the United States, while Britain, France, and the US maintained their own independent nuclear forces. Would a responding nuclear strike have hit Eastern Europe or extended to Soviet territory? Strategists and planners spent countless hours weighing the imponderables. But let’s assume that nuclear deterrence held and the Soviets elected to conduct a conventional-force-only campaign. What then? Whacking the Pact The Warsaw Pact air forces would have suffered grievous losses. Western air forces have consistently excelled at air-to-air combat, and NATO believed its equipment and training were superior to the Soviets’ rigid procedures. NATO’s ground-based missile systems were extremely effective — some aircraft would have gotten through the missile defenses, but the toll on Soviet aircraft from Western guns, missiles, and air defense fighters would have been brutal. Warsaw Pact losses would not permit more than a few days of such operations. No doubt the NATO air forces would have suffered attrition as well, from both enemy and friendly fire, but not to the same degree as that suffered by the pact. NATO would likely have gained control of the air quite quickly. Some enemy aircraft would have penetrated successfully to hit air bases, as would Soviet ballistic missile strikes, and the result would have been serious indeed. The “Salty Demo” exercises in the mid-1980s, in which USAF tried to simulate the effect of strikes on its air bases, were scripted and artificial. The true damage was never really calculated. Moreover, the Pentagon never provided resources sufficient for hardening bases to ensure air base operability. Although enemy strikes would certainly have disrupted NATO operations at several locations for a period, the Warsaw Pact would have been unable to generate the weight of effort required to cripple NATO air operations. At this point, NATO air commanders would have focused on offensive operations. Planners initially targeted Warsaw Pact airfields and air defense sites in what was termed the offensive counterair mission. The goal was to seize control of the air. Commanders would have had to judge how much effort to put against these targets and how much to enemy ground force targets. When it came to ground targets, the decision would be further complicated by issues concerning the depth of the strike operation. Should NATO airpower strike deep to interdict enemy forces approaching the battle area, or strike closer to the border against forces engaged with NATO’s ground forces? The allocation would also depend heavily on how well NATO’s land element was able to weather the initial onslaught. One has to question the actual effectiveness of NATO air strikes against airfields and armored forces, given what we have learned from later wars. In the Gulf War, for example, the real difference-makers were the aircraft delivering precision weapons—F-117s and F-111s. Unfortunately, only a small portion of the USAF combat force in Europe could deliver precision guided bombs, and the Allies possessed even fewer. The Dilemma Close-in delivery was the only way to reliably hit targets with unguided ordnance—and the loss rates would no doubt have been eye watering. By trying to get close, the NATO forces would lose aircraft, but, by trying to stand off, fighter effectiveness would have decreased. The dilemma was indeed great. The Western air strikes would still have disrupted significant parts of the Soviet follow-on armored echelons. From the battles of World War II to operations in Iraq, armored forces that have come under air attack were severely degraded. Actual tank losses may not be high, but the disruption caused by fear, road blockages, and running for cover dislocates time tables severely and undermines morale. In the 1980s, the United States began developing concepts and forces to improve the conventional balance in the Central Region. Airborne radar carried by the E-8 Joint STARS battle-management aircraft would locate and characterize enemy forces deep within the Warsaw Pact. Commanders could then allocate long-range fires—missile systems and fighter aircraft equipped with precision guided weapons—to strike at key locations. By interdicting onrushing armor formations, pressure on NATO ground forces could be kept in check, enabling the Allies to defend the border. Elements of these new systems were just being deployed when the Soviet Union collapsed. And in the end, if the NATO front lines had held—or at least minimized the penetrations—what then? What would Kremlin leaders do next? Our forces were never put to that test. The analysis of the air campaign produced several lessons. First, control of the air was the linchpin of any successful strategy in a theater conflict. Without control of the air, NATO would have been defeated because airpower could not have been brought to bear against Warsaw Pact armored forces. The same will hold true for any future contingency. Second, modern airpower was the most strategically and operationally agile element of US military power and was the only element that could be brought to bear quickly from American territory. The Air Force planned to deploy 25 fighter wings in the same amount of time that its airlift force moved only three United States Army divisions. Once in theater, these aircraft could also be shifted from one battlespace sector to another (providing that the 2 ATAF and 4 ATAF split did not get in the way). USAF’s airlift and Civil Reserve Air Fleet also provided strategic agility to the Army. Third, airpower offered great flexibility. Significant numbers of NATO fighters could have shifted from air defense to ground attack, to nuclear strike, and back, depending on the situation. Fortunately for all involved, the Allied military forces were never put to the test, but the odds of success probably were better than even, perhaps much better. Christopher J. Bowie has held a variety of positions with RAND Corp., the aerospace industry, and the Air Force. He served recently as USAF’s deputy director for strategic planning and today is director of strategic studies for Northrop Grumman Integrated Systems. This is his first article for Air Force Magazine.
July 7, 200718 yr an interisting article Brad, a good occasion for a flashback. the author sounds a bit too enthusiatic about allied capabilities to obtain the air supremacy after saying that they were basically lacking of coordination (differents doctrines, administrative "brick wall" between ATAFs,) and that soviet forces would focus heavily on disabling the allied air bases with strong means (for exmple, as far as i know, in Europe, only the swedish have developped a credible answer to the threat of Spetnaz and opening strikes on AB). it would have been interisting to detail a bit more the soviet threat and the homogeneousity of the allied hardware and such important factors to evaluate realisticaly the situation at that time. by the way, i'm definitely as qualified as the authror but i'm neither the kind of guy that would say "look, they are no longer so our hardware/doctrine/soldiers were definitelly better and would hav eated them in one week)
July 8, 200718 yr only the swedish have developped a credible answer to the threat of Spetnaz and opening strikes on AB). What is that answer?
July 8, 200718 yr Author Dispersed basing. http://www.canit.se/~griffon/aviation/text...sed_basing.html
July 8, 200718 yr Dispersed basing. Marines often trained using FARPs and operating AV-8B's from hard-ball roads such as Lyman Road aboard Camp Lejeune. description.
July 9, 200718 yr sorry for not answering sooner but the sun knocked me down for the weekend. Brad is right, that's what i was talking about: road basing and mobile support units. Their fixed air bases were only for peace time. Swedish, and finnish, had also sine the '70 an operationnal data link network. About the Harrier, like any other VTOL platform it would have been unproductive to do it in another way, mostly for an expeditionary unit. would anyone have details about soviet plans or would know a book like Vego's "Soviet Naval Tactics" but talking air warfare? cheers, Jan
July 9, 200718 yr Author would anyone have details about soviet plans or would know a book like Vego's "Soviet Naval Tactics" but talking air warfare? I can't think of a single authoritative text, but I have found that there are many reputable books that speak to specific Soviet aircraft and weapon systems in the Cold War era, many of them in the Red Star series from Specialty Press. Find a book about a platform that performed close air support (i.e. Su-25 Frogfoot), deep strike (i.e. Su-24 Fencer), or air-to-air combat (i.e. MiG-29 Fulcrum), and you'll likely find lots of info about tactics and strategy. Website here: http://www.specialtypress.com/vstore/showp...bjectGroup_ID=8
July 10, 200718 yr thanks for the link Brad, it remind me that i still have to read the book Sukhoi Su-25 Frogfoot: Close Air Support Aircraft by Gordon Yefim and Alan Dawes that i received when is subscribed to AFM cheers, Jan
August 11, 200718 yr it seems that things are still evolving: NATO's integrated air command and control system advances to next stage According to UK Royal Air Force doctrine: "A central theme of the history of air power has been 'centralised control and decentralised execution', which enables unified air action and ensures that scarce air assets are used in the most effective way."NATO is taking advantage of the advances in communications and networking technology to turn this doctrinal goal into an integrated, responsive, flexible and deployable reality. [Jane's International Defence Review - first posted to http://idr.janes.com - 05 July 2007] cheers, Jan
September 18, 200718 yr Published Aerospace Power Journal - Summer 1987 Fighting From the Air Base Lt Col Price T. Bingham SINCE THE 1960s, Soviet military doctrine has focused on the ability to win a theater war at the nonnuclear level.1 The Soviets believe this goal is feasible if their theater offensive has surprise, speed, concentrated effort, aggressiveness, cooperation of arms and services, and depth.2 One of the most important components of such an offensive is what the Soviets call the air operation. The air operation derives its importance from respect that the Soviets have for our technology and particularly for our air capabilities. They realize how much our ground forces depend on protection and support provided by air power. Similarly, they are well aware that Soviet ground forces also depend heavily on support provided by air power to attain and maintain a high-tempo advance. As a result, the Soviets realize that their ability to conduct a successful theater offensive depends on whether their air operation is able to neutralize quickly our theater-based air capabilities.3 Now it appears that Soviet military leaders are increasingly confident that a successful air operation is possible. Their confidence is due largely to recent technological developments, particularly in surface-to-surface missiles, which these leaders believe have "revolutionized" warfare.4 If a theater war occurs with the Soviets, it is very likely that they would attempt to achieve surprise by providing us with as few clear warning indicators as possible of a pending attack. One way they might try to do this is by beginning their air operation suddenly with a barrage of surface-to-surface missiles delivering improved conventional munitions (some possibilities are mines, bomblets, incendiaries, and fuel-air explosives) and chemical munitions against our time-critical air defense capabilities. These missile attacks would be required to disrupt our air defenses only long enough to prevent us from generating and controlling the sorties needed to defend effectively against the waves of Soviet aircraft that would begin attacking within hours after the first missile impacts. At the same time that they would begin launching missiles, the Soviets would also begin the more overt actions needed to generate large numbers of sorties for their follow-on wave air attacks. Accompanied by electronic jamming, their wave air attacks would be the main method for delivering intense blows to our air bases and other vital theater air installations. However, the Soviets' air operation would also include attacks by special purpose forces (SPETSNAZ), as well as airborne, airmobile, and even amphibious assault forces against air bases, communications nodes, radars, and headquarters. The Soviets believe that the use of this wide variety of methods in their air operation also increases their chances of confusing and ultimately overwhelming our defenses, preventing us from regaining the initiative in the air.5 As this review shows, rather than trying to beat us in the air, the Soviets think-that the key to defeating our Air Force is to take the fight to our air bases and other theater installations. By preventing us from generating large numbers of timely and effective sorties, they will ensure that we have little opportunity to use our superior training and technology to fight in the air. It is because of this possibility's immense dangers that we must reassess our current capability to fight from the air base, specifically to defend the base while continuing flying operations despite enemy attacks. We begin our reassessment by briefly reviewing where we have been. In World War II we first became concerned with defending the air base when we saw how the Germans and Japanese made air bases a key objective in their surprisingly successful offensives. As a result, our early war plans called for 296 air base security battalions, but by 1943 the threat had failed to materialize (except in China in 1944-45). So we began to inactivate units already formed. At the end of the war, the little air base defense capability we had was lost.6 When the Air Force became a separate service, air base defense remained an area of concern; but because of the lack of firm guidance regarding service responsibility, we continued to have little capability until the Korean War. During that war, the Air Force developed a doctrine and limited defense capability by organizing and equipping airmen not directly involved in flight operations like infantrymen, using the Air Police as a cadre. However, as in World War II, our air bases were not seriously threatened. And so, with a reduced postwar budget, the Air Force was especially hard-pressed to justify why it needed more manpower to defend our installations than the other services needed to defend theirs. The result was a decrease in manpower and a lower priority for air base defense.7 Events in Vietnam again restored attention to the need to defend the air base. Gen Hunter Harris, commander in chief of the Pacific Air Forces (CINCPACAF) in 1965, noted that US air bases in Vietnam lacked reasonable protection and that there was a reduced likelihood of dedicated Army protection. He recommended that the Air Force adopt an approach similar to that of the British Royal Air Force, where all airmen had defense duties under the training and leadership of a cadre—the Royal Air Force Regiment. Although his recommendation was not accepted, the Air Force was forced to assume responsibility for internal air base defense when our Army units were used offensively instead of being tied down in passive air base defense duties. To meet this responsibility, we expanded our security police authorizations. Despite this action, our ability to fight from our air bases remained marred throughout the war by poor training policies, as well as by gaps in our doctrine that allowed new bases in Vietnam to be sited and constructed without consideration for making the air base more defensible.8 After Vietnam our emphasis on fighting from the air base did not decrease as it had after World War II and Korea. This was because the successful Israeli attacks in 1967 on Egyptian air bases, Warsaw Pact measures to harden their own air bases, and the growing Soviet threat all showed us the importance of making our air bases more survivable. Initially we devoted much of our energy to building aircraft shelters, but over time our effort was broadened. Now we have reached agreements with our allies and the Army that clarify responsibilities for air base defense. The Royal Air Force Regiment will provide air defense protection for US bases in Britain, and a similar agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany will apply to our bases there.9 Elsewhere the Army has begun identifying forces that will be dedicated to providing ground and point air defense protection for our air bases.10 In still another important action, the Air Force conducted a comprehensive exercise to demonstrate the air base survivability capability of a generic Air Force tactical fighter wing. This exercise, called Salty Demo, took place in the spring of 1985 at Spangdahlem Air Base, Germany. Profiting from this exercise and other activities, in December 1986 the Air Force published Air Force Regulation 360-1, Air Base Operability Planning and Operations. This regulation summarizes our current program for fighting from the air base. It outlines required organizational structures, assigns basewide responsibilities for planning and training, and provides guidance for carrying out the air base operability program. In the category of active defense measures, the regulation establishes planning factors for both air and ground defense. It makes the wing commander or equivalent responsible for local ground defense and puts forces of other services assigned to local ground defense duties under his control. To reduce the ability of an enemy to identify desired targets and to minimize damage from enemy attacks, the regulation requires the implementation of a variety of passive defense measures, including hardening, dispersal, redundancy, camouflage, concealment, deception, and nuclear, biological, chemical (NBC) defense. After an attack, it will be vital to assess and repair damage rapidly in order to return the air base to maximum operational status as quickly as possible. Under base recovery, the regulation establishes the organization and policy needed to accomplish these tasks. Yet, despite the great progress we have made in planning and programming to improve our ability to fight from the air base, much more still needs to be done. We cannot afford to wait until after we develop and procure the aircraft that fly from the air base to begin thinking about the requirements for fighting from that air base. Instead, we must recognize that a complex interrelationship exists between aircraft and air base design and that the characteristics of one often greatly influence the combat capability of the other. Full recognition of this interrelationship would result in air base operability considerations receiving the same degree of attention as in-flight performance when we design our aircraft. The requirement for the advanced tactical fighter to have short takeoff and landing (STOL) and rough/soft field capabilities is evidence that the Air Force is now aware of the need to address air base operability considerations during an aircraft's design phase. Unfortunately, the low priority the Air Force currently assigns to developing aircraft with short takeoff and vertical landing (STOVL) capabilities is cause for concern, given the growing possibility that Soviet air base attacks would include the use of chemicals and mines. If either of these are used, particularly in combination with immediate-effect munitions, it is very likely that the only way to recover and reestablish effective, high-sortie-rate operations will be to change operating locations, moving to an uncontaminated area to generate sorties. Compared to STOL, STOVL technology makes such movement far more feasible because of greatly decreased operating surface requirements. STOVL technology would also significantly enhance our ability to use mobility, concealment, and deception measures, which in turn would make it much more difficult for an enemy to find an operating location. And eve" if an enemy is able to find such a location, the increased dispersion that STOVL technology makes possible could make the operating location a much less lucrative target.11 Since we must be able to fight from our air bases in a theater war with the Soviets, we need to design and build all overseas theater bases as field fortifications, thereby making combat effectiveness, not peacetime operating efficiency, the only acceptable criterion. Furthermore, this criterion must apply not only to facilities directly supporting flight operations but also to mess and medical facilities and quarters. Besides giving attention to hardening, dispersal, camouflage, and concealment, we also need to design our buildings so they can be easily defended by including weapon positions that are sited to assure mutually supporting fields of fire. Training is the area where we need to make our greatest effort. While we can hope the Army or host-nation forces will be available to defend our air bases, we cannot afford to depend on them. As we saw in Vietnam, theater commanders in wartime may become reluctant to tie down combat troops in defensive roles. Nor can we afford to field our own army of security police whose sole duty is air base defense. Instead, we need to follow Winston Churchill's advice and make the theater air base the "stronghold of fighting air-ground men, and not the abode of uniformed civilians in the prime of life protected by detachments of soldiers."12 This means that, like the Army and Marine Corps, we must demand that everyone in the Air Force who serves or could serve in a theater position, officer and enlisted alike, achieve competence in the use of weapons, medical aid, and field craft. Requiring competence in these traditional military skills not only will significantly improve our ability to fight from the air base, it will also make an important contribution to esprit de corps by removing all doubts some may have as to whether the Air Force is a combat organization or a nine-to-five "blue suit" business. Given the nature of the threat, we should not limit weapons training to small arms but also must require that some personnel be capable of using heavier weapons like antiaircraft and antiarmor weapons and mortars. Assignment of specific weapons in a theater would be based upon individual and unit roles in the air base's defense plan. By arming everyone in uniform, installation commanders would be able to make more effective use of their limited number of security police. Besides serving as cadre, these highly trained personnel could also be used for more demanding active defense roles such as patrolling and counterattacks. We must recognize that fighting from an air base that is attacked by missiles and large numbers of aircraft, let alone SPETSNAZ and airborne forces, will result in casualties and in some cases very heavy casualties. For example, a sudden Soviet missile reattack might catch many personnel in the open as they perform rapid runway repair activities. In such a situation, we cannot count on there being enough specially trained medical personnel readily available to treat all the wounded immediately. Therefore, if we are to avoid having many of our wounded die unnecessarily, everyone must be required to know basic first aid so they can care for themselves or others until medical personnel are available. Not all casualties will involve physical wounds. Many will be psychiatric casualties of what we more commonly call battle fatigue. According to Army experience, intense combat, indirect fire inadequate sleep, and surprise (conditions that are likely to be present during fighting from the air base) all lead to psychiatric casualties. In 1973 the Israeli military experienced 30 psychiatric casualties for every 100 who had physical wounds. They also found that if these psychiatric casualties are not correctly treated, they will not be able to return to combat and will often be chronically disabled.13 Given this threat, we need to take the same professional approach to the unique psychiatric dangers of war that we now take, through physiological training, to the dangers associated with flying. Therefore, to reduce the number and severity of psychiatric casualties, all commissioned and noncommissioned officers in leadership positions, as well as all medical personnel, need to be trained to know what causes battle fatigue, what is symptoms are, how to prevent it, and how to treat it.14 In addition, like the Army we must be prepared to reconstitute those units that experience heavy casualties. This means we must determine ahead of time what losses require what kind of actions. We need to decide whether we will replace individuals or units and then make appropriate plans. Currently most Air Force personnel at an air base rely on others for food and shelter. However, the destruction that will occur while fighting from the air base will result in many of these services being interrupted or been terminated. Restoring these services will not have as high a priority as assuring flight operations. Therefore, Air Force personnel must be trained in field craft and be appropriately equipped so that even if fighting deprives them of heated shelters with running water, electricity, food, and other amenities that we are accustomed to in peacetime, their fighting performance will not be unnecessarily impaired. Clearly, preparing to fight from the air base requires changes that will not be popular with some. They will argue that money is better spent in other areas or that we cannot afford to make more demands on already limited amounts of training time. We must realize that these views are shortsighted because they are a product of our past experience when we needed little capability to fight from our air bases in order to fight in the air. Unfortunately, the threat we face today is dangerously different. As a result, success in a future theater war, particularly one with the Soviets, is likely to depend on whether we can make significant changes in our priorities by putting fighting from the air base on an equal plane with fighting in the air. Maxwell AFB, Alabama Notes 1. For a detailed discussion of this development, see John G. Hines, Phillip A. Petersen, and Notra Truclock III, "Soviet Military Theory from 1945-2000: Implications for NATO," Washington Quarterly, Fall 1986, 81-137; and Mary C. Fitzgerald, "Marshal Ogarkov on the Modern Theater Operation," Conflict Quarterly, Summer 1986, 39-58. 2. C.N. Donnelly, "The Development of Soviet Military Doctrine," International Defense Review, December 1981, 1596. 3. Phillip A. Petersen and Maj John R. Clark, "Soviet Air and Antiair Operations," Air University Review, March-April 1985, 36-54. 4. Brig John Hemsley, "The Influence of Technology upon Soviet Operational Doctrine," RUSI, June 1986, 25; and Dennis M. Gormley, "A New Dimension to Soviet Theater Strategy," Orbis, Fall 1985, 537-69. 5. Petersen and Clark, 42-49. 6. Roger P. Fox, Air Base Defense in the Republic of Vietnam, 1961-1973 (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1979), 2-4. 7. Ibid., 4-7. 8. Ibid., 8-9, 25-28, 63. 9. Giovanni de Briganti, "The Defense of NATO's Air-bases," Armed Forces Journal International, June 1985, 144. 10. Col Charles D. Cooper, "Joint Force Development--Wave of the Future?" The Retired Officer, October 1986, 19. 11. For further discussion of STOVL technology and air base survivability, see John W. R. Taylor, "Jane's Aerospace Survey, l987," Air Force Magazine, January 1987, 58-59; Lt Col Price T. Bingham, "Air Base Survivability: An Essential Element of Theater Air Power," Air Force Journal of Logistics, Winter 1987, 2-5; "Air Base Survivability and V/STOL Aircraft: A Gap in Air Force Doctrine?" Air University Review, January-February 1986, 51-57; and "Improving Force Flexibility Through V/STOL," Air University Review, January-February 1985, 72-87. 12. Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War, yet. 3, The Grand Alliance (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1950), 776-77. 13. Lt Col Gregory Lucas Belensky, USA; Lt Col Shabtai Noy, Israeli Defense Force; and Maj, Zahava Solomon, Israeli Defense Force, "Battle Stress: The Israeli Experience," Military Review, July 1985, 29-30. 14. Maj Greg Lande, "Emotional First Aid," Infantry, November-December 1986, 40-41. Contributor Lt Col Price T. Bingham (USAFA) is the chief of the Airpower Doctrine Division, Airpower Research Institute, Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education Maxwell AFB, Alabama. Previously he served in the Doctrine and Concepts Division, HQ USAF. He has flown fighters in TAC, USAFE, and Southeast Asia. He also served as fighter and tanker duty controller in the MACV/USSAF tactical air control center. He was a frequent contributor to the Air University Review. Disclaimer The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.
December 8, 200817 yr I had an idea for an art film some friends and I have been toying with for a while about this. I'll be reading this more throughly.
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