pmaidhof

I've been on a Vietnam weasel kick of late, any input that you can legally give would be appreciated. The whole theory of the WW aircraft detecting the radiating SAM site, to launching the Shrike, and its guiding itself to the target. I find it all very interesting. What a job to have been on the tip of that spear. They have our honor and respect.

Looks good, thanks Nic

Route Pack 6 By Walter J. Boyne Air Force Magazine Nov 1999 It was the most dangerous of the "Route Packages," taking airmen into the deadly defenses around Hanoi. In every war, there is a place that comes to symbolize its most ferocious moments. For airmen in the Vietnam War, it was Route Pack 6, taking the battle to the heart of Hanoi-"going downtown." A relatively small band of US pilots fought a long and valiant war under conditions that rarely made sense to them. Handicapped by onerous-foolish might be the better term-rules of engagement, they nonetheless flew into battle every day, delivering bombs on the most well-defended targets in history. Many brave men died in the process, and more suffered the fate of imprisonment by a cruel enemy. With its dogleg outline, North Vietnam had a long border with China in the north, Laos in the west, and the Gulf of Tonkin to the east. The long narrow extension to the south-the Republic of Vietnam, or South Vietnam-was separated from the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, or North Vietnam, by a narrow demilitarized zone, a buffer about four miles deep and 47 miles wide. As a result of its geography, North Vietnam was subject to air attack by Navy Carrier Task Force 77 from the east and by the US Air Force from bases in South Vietnam and Thailand. Rolling Thunder In February 1965, USAF and the Navy were given approval to begin Rolling Thunder, an operation with goals established by President Lyndon B. Johnson and his Secretary of Defense, Robert S. McNamara. Rolling Thunder had many conceptual flaws, but the most egregious was that of "graduated escalation." The planners called for Rolling Thunder attacks to begin at a relatively low level in southern North Vietnam. If the enemy did not react "properly"-that is, with the realization that the United States was so strong that the idea of conquering South Vietnam had to be given up-the program was to be moved northward and increased incrementally in intensity. The stated goals of Rolling Thunder were as follows: Create a viable state in South Vietnam. Prevent an armed conflict with either the Soviet Union or China. Allay the concerns of the US public about the air campaign. Raise morale in South Vietnam. Stop the infiltration of men and materiel from North Vietnam to the Viet Cong forces in South Vietnam. It is worth noting that none of these goals called for the physical destruction of the enemy's capability to wage war. The Air Force and the Navy found it difficult to conduct joint operations and instead competed for resources and targets. As a result, an Air Force-Navy coordinating team in December 1965 divided North Vietnam into six sectors. The zones were given the name "Route Packages" and were designated as 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6. (See map) The term Route Package was quickly shortened to "RP," "Pack," or "Pak." In April 1966, Adm. Ulysses S. Grant Sharp, commander in chief of US Pacific Command, added a seventh area by dividing RP 6 into two sections, 6A and 6B. The Navy's Carrier Task Force 77 was assigned RPs 2, 3, 4, and 6B, as these bordered on the Gulf of Tonkin. The Air Force was given responsibility for air operations in RP 1, RP 5, and 6A. The lines, drawn so precisely at CINCPAC, served reasonably well for planning purposes. However, during actual operations, both USAF and Navy crews crossed them at will in pursuit of their missions. Because RPs 6A and 6B contained targets in Hanoi and Haiphong, respectively, they were the most heavily defended at all times. The other Route Packages were dangerous and consumed many aircraft and aircrews, but there was no question that Pack 6 was the toughest of all. Going downtown required the utmost planning, skill, and courage from the American aircrews, and it required it again and again. A combat tour was considered completed when 100 "counters"-missions to North Vietnam-had been flown. By 1966, F-105 pilots commented, "By your 66th mission you'll have been shot down twice and picked up once." For most of the war, the odds against completing a tour of 100 missions ranged from impossible to very high. The RPs Grow Tougher The North Vietnamese were far too serious about their war and far too good as soldiers to be taken in by the unrealistic goals of Rolling Thunder or the policy of graduated escalation. Their reaction was to redouble their efforts and to obtain from both Red China and the USSR much more assistance in the form of advisors and materiel. In 1964, the aerial defenses of North Vietnam were relatively primitive, consisting of 22 early warning radars, four fire-control radars, and 700 anti-aircraft guns. By the time President Johnson called a bombing halt on Nov. 1, 1968, this had grown into an integrated air defense system comprising 400 radar systems, 8,050 anti-aircraft guns, 150 fighters (including reserves based in China), and 40 SA-2 Guideline missile sites. The bombing halt would be used to further increase the defenses so that the area around Hanoi and Haiphong became the most heavily defended in the world. In addition, the halt allowed North Vietnam to deploy heavier anti-aircraft guns and Surface-to-Air Missiles much further to the south, particularly along the Ho Chi Minh Trail. At its peak strength, North Vietnam would deploy more than 200 SA-2 launchers, supplemented by much smaller numbers of the more sophisticated SA-3, which was intended for use against fighters. The growth in numbers and sophistication of the North Vietnamese weapons was more than matched by American technology. Unfortunately the advances in US technology were somewhat offset by the relatively static USAF tactics. This made sorties into North Vietnam far more dangerous than they should have been. The first leg of the North Vietnamese defense triad was composed of Anti-Aircraft Artillery systems, which grew much more numerous over time. This was especially true of the larger caliber, radar-guided guns. The 37 mm and 57 mm guns were always very good at medium altitudes, sometimes erupting so furiously that they seemed to lay a sudden overcast in the sky. The North Vietnamese anti-aircraft fire was comprehensive. It started with the "People's Air Defense" in which average citizens fired government-provided rifles and machine guns in barrages. The array of armament went on to include heavy machine guns and 20, 23, 37, 40, 57, 80, and 100 mm cannons, covering an altitude range from 1,500 to 45,000 feet. By 1967, North Vietnam was firing 25,000 tons of anti-aircraft ammunition a month, almost all of which was brought either by land transport from China or sea transport from the Soviet Union. Accuracy increased when radar-controlled tracking became common in 1968. Flying Telephone Poles The second leg of the triad was the SA-2 Guideline (NATO designation), known to the Soviet Union as the V75 Dvina. In the course of the war the North Vietnamese would fire more than 9,000 SA-2s and shoot down approximately 150 US aircraft with them. Looking like a rocket-powered telephone pole in flight, the SA-2 was 35 feet long but only 20 inches in diameter. It had a top speed of Mach 3.5 and a ceiling of more than 90,000 feet. It could be defeated in flight by a "SAM break" if the aircrew was warned of its approach or happened to see the dust signature of its launch. They would turn into it and maneuver so that the SA-2 was unable to follow, stalling to fall out of control or break up in flight. The SA-2's high-flying capabilities forced the US aircraft to fly at lower altitudes where the anti-aircraft fire was heavier. Introduction of better Electronic Countermeasures and the use of "Wild Weasel" air defense suppression teams kept the SAM kill rate down. The SAM's kill rate fell from its initial 20 percent level to about 1.8 percent by 1968. The third leg of the enemy triad comprised the MiG fighters-old but effective MiG-17s and -19s and the modern delta-wing MiG-21s. The MiGs operated under strict guidance from a central ground control. They were all equipped with cannons, and the MiG-21 had Atoll heat-seeking missiles as well. USAF fought the war under severe handicaps. Political constraints had brought about an inversion of tactics in which the B-52 strategic bomber was dedicated to tactical operations in South Vietnam, while the two tactical fighters, the F-4 Phantom and the F-105 Thunderchief, were tasked with strategic bombing in North Vietnam. Neither fighter had been designed for this mission, the Phantom being originally designed as a Navy fleet defense fighter and the "Thud" as a USAF tactical nuclear bomber. The fighters were handicapped by the limitations of their radar-guided AIM-7 Sparrow and heat-seeking AIM-9 Sidewinder missile armament, neither of which had been designed for fighter vs. fighter combat. The great advantage conferred by the Sparrow, its ability to engage the enemy from any angle at up to 12 miles, was nullified by a rule of engagement which called for visual identification of the enemy before firing. The Sidewinder could be fired from up to one mile, but only from the rear, in a 30-degree cone that led to the engine's heat. Both missiles were limited by their reaction to g forces, and both required a set up time that was difficult to effect in air combat. The F-105 had a 20 mm multibarrel cannon that could be used for close-in fighting. The Phantom did not get a cannon until SUU-16/A cannon pods were fitted as external stores in 1967. The cannon pods were not as accurate as the internal gun of the F-105, and some felt that it was a net disadvantage, as it induced drag and displaced other stores. Some also thought it might induce the Phantom pilot to attempt to dogfight with the more maneuverable MiGs-not good practice. Later, the F-4E arrived, modified to carry an M-61A1 rotary 20 mm cannon internally. The F-105 was the fastest aircraft in the theater at the low altitudes at which its missions were flown, but it was not maneuverable. The F-4 had to use its speed and energy to offset the MiG's greater maneuverability by fighting in the vertical plane. Measures, Countermeasures The air war over North Vietnam saw the advantage swing from one side to another. Washington permitted this because of its fixation on limiting the war and sending signals to North Vietnam. If they had had the political will to do so, they could have had sufficient airstrikes to crush North Vietnam from 1965 on-a fact demonstrated in the December 1972 Linebacker II attacks. For their part, the North Vietnamese worked as hard and as effectively as they could to use the ever-growing assistance of China and the Soviet Union. China was particularly pleased with a war that placed two of its enemies in conflict, for it had no love for North Vietnam, either. Aerial combat started inauspiciously for the United States when MiG-17s attacked and shot down one F-105 and damaged another on April 3, 1965. The demands of flying safety had greatly degraded fighter pilot training in the pre-Vietnam War years. Many F-105 pilots lacked realistic air combat maneuver training. It seemed incredible that an obsolete 700 mph derivative of the Korean War­vintage MiG-15 could defeat modern Mach 2.1 cannon armed fighters, yet such was the case. The smaller MiGs had an advantage at low speeds and higher altitudes, while the F-105s and F-4s were superior at higher speeds and lower altitudes. The MiG-17's two 23 mm and one 37 mm cannon were slow firing and had ammunition for only about five seconds of action, but each heavy shell constituted a potential "golden BB" for any aircraft it hit. Fortunately for the US, the MiG sighting system was inferior and it was a poor gun platform. Offsetting this was its dazzling maneuverability and its ability to turn in an amazingly short radius. Maximum performance of US aircraft was found in the energy maneuverability concept, in which their powerful engines were used to obtain advantages in altitude, airspeed, or both. This enabled the US fighter to fight in a vertical plane, using excess energy to climb, turn, or accelerate as required. It was a demanding tactic, however, requiring experience on the part of the US pilot and, in addition, good vision, for at the speeds and altitudes at which they were operating, the MiGs could disappear in an instant. The task of the US force was to get bombs or missiles on designated targets; shooting down MiGs was a secondary goal. F-4s would fly missions equipped with both bombs and missiles. If no combat ensued, bombs were put on target. If the MiGs warranted an attack, the bombs were jettisoned and the MiGs engaged. In a similar way, the MiGs were not primarily interested in gaining aerial victories; they could achieve their objective by simply making the fighter­bombers jettison their bombs, and for this the threat of an attack was sometimes enough. The North Vietnamese advantage in radar grew as the war progressed and was not matched by the United States until 1972, when sufficient airborne warning and control aircraft became available at last. Curious, but typical of the war, was the fact that one of the duties of the EC-121s was to report US violations of the Chinese buffer zones. Pilots sometimes turned off their identification, friend or foe system to have a better chance of not being identified and reported by their own people. Rivals Among Thuds To offset the inherent advantages of the North Vietnamese defenses, USAF began to operate in far more complex formations. The F-105s operated out of Thailand, with the 355th Tactical Fighter Wing based at Takhli RTAB and the 388th at Korat RTAB. Oddly enough, the two F-105 wings evolved different tactics and styles of fighting. The 388th generally flew at higher altitudes while the 355th typically came in low. The two units were true rivals, and each one claimed that its method was the best. Two-seat F-105Fs served as Wild Weasel aircraft out of both Takhli and Korat, using the AGM-45 Shrike anti-radar missile. The Shrike carried a receiver tuned to known enemy radar frequencies; when it picked up a transmission, the missile could be fired and would track on the enemy radar. The fighter­bombers were supported primarily by F-4s from the 8th TFW operating out of Ubon RTAB and to a lesser degree by F-4s based in South Vietnam. Combat operations were further augmented by EB-66 aircraft also based at Takhli. The EB-66s would gather real-time intelligence and do standoff jamming. They usually operated in orbits that were outside of SAM range and protected by a MiG combat air patrol of F-4s. One EB-66, piloted by Capt. John Fer, was shot down by MiGs; he became a prisoner of war. KC-135 tankers were absolutely essential to all operations, and a series of tanker orbits were established along the Thai­Laos border and in the Gulf of Tonkin. Both valuable and vulnerable, the KC-135 aircrews had strict orders not to venture close to North Vietnam, but, as the war progressed, they often went in to meet returning fighters that were critically short on fuel. Doing so laid their careers on the line, for they were controlled by Strategic Air Command, and a violation of orders, no matter how worthy the result, could get a crew fired on the spot. The large and complex formations of many different kinds of aircraft required detailed planning, immense logistic effort, and sometimes no little subterfuge, as in Operation Bolo on Jan. 2, 1967. In Bolo, the 8th TFW tailored its F-4s electronically to fly as a simulated F-105 strike, then flew the routes and altitudes used by the Thuds. The ruse successfully provoked a response by MiG-21s, and seven of the enemy were shot down in the most successful single action of its type in the war. The technological developments of the war often caused some surprising results. Electronic reconnaissance pods had been introduced as early as 1966, but when the SAM threat seemed to be at a peak and rising, an additional effort was put into Electronic Countermeasures. Although they were in short supply initially, the QRC-160 ECM pod became more readily available. When flown in the specified formation (four aircraft flying with a 1,500-foot lateral separation and vertical separation of 500 to 1,000 feet) the QRC-160 pods' jamming patterns overlapped and were very effective against the SA-2's Fan Song radar and AAA radars. North Vietnam responded to the success of the QRC-160 pods by introducing more MiG-21 fighters, equipped with the Atoll heat-seeking missile, a knockoff of the AIM-9. The Atoll was effective when used with new tactics. In these, the MiGs would approach low and from behind a US formation, pop up and fire an Atoll, then break off for the sanctuary of their home base. The home bases, incidentally, were for most of the war off-limits to US attack. Going Downtown The geography of North Vietnam and the establishment of sanctuary and off-limits areas combined to limit the number of approaches to the targets available to US aircraft. This was compounded by the tendency of US high-level planners to repeat the use of the same times, routes, and altitudes for the attacks. As a result, North Vietnam was able to concentrate its formidable defenses in the most effective manner, including the installation of anti-aircraft and SAM sites in areas known to be off-limits to the Americans. There was much to defend, for 80 percent of the enemy's war materiel arrived by two rail lines that ran from China to Hanoi, while a similar percentage of the materiel for North Vietnam's civilian economy came through the port of Haiphong. Going downtown has been eloquently and vividly described by some of the pilots who did so-Jack Broughton, Mark Berent, Ken Bell, G.I. Basel, and Robin Olds, an ace from World War II and Korea who also flew fighters in Vietnam. Olds has said that none of his missions over Germany in World War II were as bad as any one of his missions over Hanoi during the Vietnam War. As the commander of the 8th TFW, Olds selected a "first team" from his veterans to go into Route Pack 6. Less experienced pilots were given 10 or more missions in less dangerous regions, such as Pack 1, before being allowed to go to Hanoi. Over time it came to be a generally accepted practice that the first 10 missions would be given in "easy" areas, and so would be the last 10, for by the time a pilot had flown 90 missions North he was approaching his limits of stress. The extreme difficulty of the Pack 6 mission is more obvious when one analyzes just how inherently hazardous any combat mission was. Just taking off in a heavily loaded aircraft on a typical hot Southeast Asia day was dangerous in itself, as were the multiple in-flight refuelings. Missions to the other Route Packages and to Laos became increasingly hazardous. North Vietnam continually moved Anti-Aircraft Artillery south, particularly along the Ho Chi Minh Trail, and a careless pilot could easily and quickly become a dead pilot. Yet Pack 6 was of another order of magnitude of danger. From the long, hot flight from Thailand to Thud Ridge, the karst mountain outcrop northwest of Hanoi, to the short, flak-filled flight into the center of Hanoi, and back out again, the Thuds and Phantoms were exposed to a constant barrage of anti-aircraft fire, SAMs, and, when their opportunity arose, MiGs. No Good End The flight had to be performed with cohesion, so that ECM coverage was maintained, but with sufficient flexibility to be able to detect either SAMs or MiGs. The moment of truth came with a headlong plunge into the sea of flak so that ordinary iron bombs could hit a target that was often picked in the Oval Office and which might have been of doubtful value. In the process the pilot might see a comrade hit by flak or a SAM and then watch anxiously for the parachute. Sadly, a bailout over Hanoi had no good ending. It featured one or more of the following: injury, death, captivity, torture. There was little time to relax on the flight back if the aircraft had suffered battle damage or was running low on fuel. Even after a final refueling there was often the prospect of thunderstorms to penetrate before a final landing. Broughton has noted that, despite the stress and the hazards of Pack 6, it was a letdown to be "fragged" for one of the easier zones and even worse if a mission to Pack 6 was scrubbed and you were diverted to a target in the easy packs. There was not so much an addiction to danger as an addiction to the sense of pride of doing a near-impossible job well. In Linebacker II, joint operations were conducted and the rules of engagement were relaxed to permit simultaneous attacks on airfields. There was adequate ground controlled intercept support from EC-121s and ships. New ECM were applied, including the use of the old standby, chaff. New F-4E Phantoms made their appearance. The B-52s were used in force although the initial tactics of their employment were inadequate and had to be changed. Pressure was kept on night and day, with precision guided munitions hitting many targets previously held off-limits. SAM sites were destroyed, as were SAM stockpiles. In short, the last trip to Pack 6, Linebacker II, was a signal that North Vietnam could understand. Disarmed, defeated, and unable to resist further attacks, North Vietnam returned to the peace table in Paris and agreed to the terms that would allow the United States to at last disengage from the Vietnam War. The same net result could have been done easily and with less exposure to danger eight years and more than 47,000 lives earlier.

Here, Here.

I would never discourage someone from doing the math olympics required to conduct mission planning from take-off to target and back because some day curiosity may eventually get to you, or you may be involved in a campaign or MBX that you will have to. I felt the need when I first started solo'ing H4 feeling that not too I would be missing soemthing. What I missed was getting to the point that I really wanted to in the first place, putting "ordnance on target." When conducting the actions described above, it would certainly be ok to pixy dust the mission planning to presume that the aircraft is on station with the fuel and the loadout you intended in developing the scenario and conduct the actions from just beyond detection. Gets to the battle portion sooner. Should you really want to do the mission planning, there is a mission planning spreadsheet on the Clash of Arms website here. where you can plug in all the numbers, determining if the mission is possible, or whether you would need to foresake ordance for "yet another" drop tank. To Tony's question about the procedure for taking off a land airbase despite it not being discussed, I'd go with 3.3.5.4.2 Fly Off. At the end of the launch movement phase, either the first or second, the aircraft is at 165kts (25% FMP) and 100m altitude. There are "Official Rules Changes" revised Aircraft Climb Rates found in Naval SitRep #26 April 2004 explained that the ones in H4.1 based upon further research are "too restrictive". For this discussion, at full military power, the turbo fanned F-15E will climb 250m per phase (250m x2 Low Altitude= 500. 500/2 fully loaded=250m). I will not get into Tony's acceleration and fuel consumption math as he is the smart guy here, and the NY Jets game will start soon.

Thanks for your efforts Brad. Comments in no particular order. Notwithstanding the standard response to just about every tactical question is “it depends”, would there be any rational reason to place a very capable AAW ship, in your example the USS Leyte Gulf (shameless plug), in the 0-8nm ring along with the high value target(s)? Or was the formation editor constructed to allow for a tidy, step-by-step construction of the circular formation? Do platforms within a particular sector within a “ring” move about arbitrarily within that sector. Can sectors be “merged” in order to broaden the anticipated threat axis? In your AAW example, could the AAW threat axis of Leyte Gulf be expanded from the apparent 45 degrees to an axis of 90 degrees should the player not have a warm an fuzzy on the most threatening axis, or distances may be so confined that a 45 degree threat axis may not be practical. Stating the obvious, the size of one’s formation may become problematic in confined areas in that out ring platforms may run aground.

I believe that the riddle within this situation is that as soon as the seeker goes active, it can be detected by the target who can in turn take evasive action and/or counter measures. It goes back to having a well developed TMA solution and setting the EP so tha tit gives minimal chance of the target to take any action with the time for it to be effective. Just my thoughts, but hey, I was infantry.

I started the thread...I'm in.

My original intent was a siloed approach to the various and distinct naval warfare disciplines. Those familiar with TacOps, see scenarios Gallagher 1-8. While not a demo or other training tool, the TacOps example of a singular unit facing escalating opponent unit size, equipment, and time constraints over the course of the 8 scenarios. for example, it could be something like US Army Mech Bn vs BTR-60 Bn; vs BTR-60 Bn with Tank support; vs BMP-1 Bn; vs BMP-1 with Tank support; vs BTR-60 Regiment, etc. Each scenario could be self contained, however each subsequent scenario would bring on a greater "tactical puzzle".

Nor I,...continue.

Never heard of this. Perhaps it's already "out there".

Kneecaps, H4 paper rules are currently 4.1 with development to a H5 standard in the works and which is supposed to tie in all the systems of the Admiralty Trilogy (WWI's Fear God and Dread Not, WWII's Command at Sea, and modern day Harpoon). I believe the intent is to play via miniatures/counters. I have a number of 1/2400 and 1/6000 ships. Space quickly becomes a glaring issue. Therefore, most of my solo H4 gaming has been using pencil/graph paper/ruler/eraser/calculator combo. There is no map board or hex board included within the game. Scale is variable but usually 1cm=nm, 1"=nm, or 2"=nm. As you can see the ship models will be hopelessly out of scale, but still nice to look at given the models, a blue sheet to delpoy them on and above all else...time.

Has there been much thought to creating a number of extremely introductory scenarios to give new players, or recently-returned "strangers" an opportunity to step through various naval warfare disciplines? They could be created in a form that would step up in complexity much akin to how TacOps has a number of similar scenarios where your forces remain the same but the enemy's gear gets enhances while time limits are shortened or the building block scenarios from the H4 Quick Start Rules. Topics could be things as ASW, take in somewhat restricted waters, a 1990's Perry and conduct ASW seaches against a noisy D/E sub, then progressively better equipped opposing subs. Again for E/W, have a carrier launch strikes against poorely defended point targets, then medium, then more modern defenses (S-60/SA-6/SA-11) in order to give the user a better feel for the different effects and combinations of electronic warfare. Start with something similar to A-4's, then A-7's, then A-6/EA-6B combos against the various defense scemes. Just a thought. I'm essentially SE illiterate so...

He'll have to chime in on that. Once I starting going through it I realized that I had to make some assumptions in order to continue. All in the spirit of theAAR of course. KC...are you out there? Hope all is well. We need more H4.1 talk here.

Intended to zip around in an A-7 vs a relatively lightly defended bridge and a MiG-17 Fresco, but ended up somehow, (yes,it was me) in what I thought to be the "wingman" F-4J Wild Weasel flinging AGM-88 HARMS at the bridge, mostly to no avail. Did have the opportunity to use the flight model somewhat. Still need to get a timely grip on the keyboard and joystick button commands. Which button to press...and when.

Cool, I'll need to get re-acquainted and modestly proficient at controlling my aircraft. Looking forward to trying to hook up with you all again and preferrable not watch from the ground in my hide position waiting for the Spads and Jolly Green Giants to come and get me.

Give it a whirl and please let me know when you are ready. I have not had a chance to start yet either.

I have the utmost faith and confidence in you.

Have longed for, and now successfully searched for and located Disk 1, Disk 2 (not co-located), Reference Card, and Users Manual. Dug out SW Pro, dusted and hopefully calibrated. Hope to get in some mid 60's to early 70's SEA missions in sometime soon. Maybe some multiplayer early in 09? Start digging boys.

Wow, will miracles never cease. Too bad most, if not all, of the ours are both late and overbudget.

Old missile sites hold Cold War mystique By Jeff Martin - USA Today Posted : Thursday Dec 4, 2008 6:43:24 EST Merle Paaverud was raised on a farm near a nuclear missile site outside Finley, N.D. He remembers how missile sites in the area were “shrouded in mystery.” “Here we were farming around them, raising kids and going to school, and we were sitting in one of the most powerful areas in the world as far as nuclear weapons,” Paaverud, 59, says. “We never really knew what was going on, but it was life and death, part of the chess game that was going on in the world.” Today, Paaverud is the director of the State Historical Society of North Dakota. Next summer, he will oversee the opening to the public of the former Oscar Zero missile silo and launch facility near Cooperstown, N.D. The museum, set to open next July, is one of several new uses being found for missile sites, ranging from homes and businesses to recreation and tourist attractions. There is increasing interest in these sites, as Americans who came of age during the Cold War want to learn more about the history of the era, Paaverud and others say. “A lot of the people who grew up and lived through it are coming back and sort of re-experiencing that time,” says Chris Wilkinson, an interpretive park ranger at the Minuteman Missile National Historic Site in western South Dakota. Since January, 21,000 visitors have toured the Minuteman site near Philip, S.D., which is operated by the National Park Service, Wilkinson says. The Cold War, he says, had “a defining and pervasive influence” not only on Americans but on people throughout the world. The South Dakota site includes artwork that missile crewmembers drew on walls to pass the time. One painting, made to look like a pizza company’s logo, is a reminder that Minuteman missiles travel more than 15,000 mph and could reach Russia in a half-hour. “Worldwide delivery in 30 minutes or less or your next one is free,” someone wrote beneath the artwork, recalls retired Air Force captain David Blackhurst of Black Hawk, S.D. Blackhurst, 67, was a crew commander in the mid-1970s at a Minuteman site near White Owl, S.D. When an alarm sounded, he says, “we never knew whether something was for real, or whether it wasn’t.” Many of the sites are in the Dakotas, Wyoming, Nebraska, Kansas, Texas and other central and western states, says Edward Peden, who operates a Kansas real estate business selling former missile sites. An area near Plattsburgh, N.Y., was home to the only Intercontinental Ballistic Missile sites east of the Mississippi River, Peden says. The 12 Atlas F sites near Plattsburgh were decommissioned in 1965, he says. Peden says there are more than 100 sites across the U.S. that housed the first generation of missiles, which included the Atlas series. These sites were decommissioned in the mid-1960s, Peden says, and the Air Force upgraded to missiles including the Minuteman. Today, there are about 450 Minuteman missiles operational in central and western states, Wilkinson says. Peden lives underground in an Atlas E complex outside Topeka, where he operates his missile-base real estate firm. He and his wife have closed 48 sales, he says, and buyers have used the sites for homes, offices and as investment properties. “These are some of the strongest structures ever built on the planet,” Peden says. “They are historic sites much like the castles of Europe and forts that exist around the country.” Elsewhere: * The National UFO Reporting Center plans to move from the Seattle area to a former missile base between Davenport and Harrington in eastern Washington state. Director Peter Davenport says he bought the site in 2006 and is cleaning it up. * Near Abilene, Texas, divers can explore a water-filled missile silo known as Valhalla during tours given by Family Scuba Center. The 130-foot-deep water gradually seeped through 4-foot-thick concrete walls over several years, the company’s Web site says. * About 60 miles west of Grand Forks, N.D., David Morken is trying to sell property once used as the India-Zero missile complex. It is listed at $40,000. Morken, a 52-year-old farmer, says he hopes it might offer opportunities as a hunting lodge or bed-and-breakfast. * Bruce Townsley’s home near Abilene is a former Atlas F site. The former social worker says he paid $99,000 for it in 1997. “It seemed like a cool idea — nothing more complicated than that,” Townsley says. Find AirForce Times article here.

Going through the Java IRC Chat link on the upper left hand side of the HG main page will get you there automatically, transparent to the user I presume?

He'll have to chime in on that. Once I starting going through it I realized that I had to make some assumptions in order to continue. All in the spirit of theAAR of course.

I would play it that one opposing units enter detection range using Intermediate or maybe even Tactical Turns, I'd back out then switch to the shorter respective turn. As you acknowledged seems to be against the spirit of the rule, but your playing solo so your mileage may vary. I am fairly certain the TMA solutions are attempted once per Tactical Turn. These are apparently slow, methodical, tedius, bordering on mind-exploding processes. My High Tide Annex has the Project 941 Akula [Typhoon] SSBN having anechoic coating so there would be an Active Sonar Special Modifier of x.5 range modifier. That sounds like establishing an Enabling Point. Once the seeker is active it would result in a Target Correlation Modifier found with the Passive Sonar Classifications on Page 4-11. I would suspect that a better TMA solution would counter act some of the drawback of going active, but I would need to look into that situation a little further. Think Brad already answered that, only at periscope depth with the periscopes or other masts above the surface. While the torpedo is moving yes, the turn that it reaches the target, it is resolved in that Tactical Turns Movement Phase, before the Detection Phase. You would want the wires for guidance. Wires possibly break upon launch, and again if the firing sub takes some type of evasive action, it may choose to cut the wires. Much to the detriment of the pH of that torpedo. But a very good way to get many of the procedures down without over complicating the situation. I'm no expert, but all and all, very good, thorough job.

Well for the sake of argument, my High Tide Data Annex shows Los Angeles Class SSN with BQQ-5C/D, TB-16D and TB-23 towed arrays. Also, Improved Los Angeles Class SSN with BSY-1, TB-16D and TB-23 Towed Arrays. So with a base passive sonar range of 5.1nm I'd say that you were most likely using the TB-16D/E VLF-LF High Speed, short towed array found on either the LA or LAi. Sounds good so far...to me at least. The note below the table says higher ratios should be extrapolated, but I understand that in a solo learning exercise 1.0 is good enough to get the procedure down.