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broncepulido

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Everything posted by broncepulido

  1. The test and practical use is based in the active radar seeker capability of SM-6: http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/here-another-big-reason-why-americas-mighty-missile-defenses-19795
  2. I think we need mostly introductory videos for aid new gamers.
  3. More urgent is probably the update of the SPY- series of radars, mainly the ranges and matching platforms (SPY-1 are all PESA radars, HF and SS capables), but many data are scarce or doubtful: SPY-1A: range stated as 175 nm in the DB (a typo, as commented), probably should be 275, or at least 250 as in the Smarter Radars article. Employed by: Ticonderoga-class cruisers up to CG-58, with SPS-49(V)1-3 as long range back-up. SPY-1B: range stated as 175 nm in the DB, probably should be 275. Employed by: Ticonderoga-class cruisers from CG-59 (USS Princeton), with SPS-49(V)7-8 as long range back-up. SPY-1B(V): range probably should be 275. Upgrade to -1B version, retrofitted to CG-59 and up. Employed by: Ticonderoga-class cruisers from CG-59 (USS Princeton), with SPS-49(V)7-8 as long range back-up. SPY-1D: range stated as 175 nm in the DB, probably should be 275, as stated in SITREP 47, page 12 (In relation to Japanese warships of Senkaku crisis). Employed by: Burke-class up to DDG-90 (USS Chafee). Kongo-class (Japan, in the DB equipped with the older SPY-1B). The first four of Alvaro de Bazan-class (Spain, in the DB equipped with older SPY-1B). SPY-1D(V): Add new entry. Improved variant, range stated in some sources as a 10-15% more, perhaps 316 nm, but I don't find now the reference: https://mostlymissiledefense.com/2012/08/03/ballistic-missile-defense-the-aegis-spy-1-radar-august-3-2012/ Employed by: Burke-class from DDG-91 (USS Pinckney) onwards to DDG-123 (USS Lenah H. Sutcliffe Higbee). Atago-class (Japan, in the DB equipped with older SPY-1B). King Sejong the Great (KDX-III)-class (South Korea, in the DB equipped with older SPY-1B). The fifth ship (F-105 Cristobal Colon, in the DB equipped with older SPY-1B) of Alvaro de Bazan-class (Spain). Hobart-class (Australia, Spanish-designed). Aegis Ashore (In the DB equipped with older SPY-1B). SPY-1F: probably no changes on its 185 nm ranges, but modes should be HF/SS as the rest of SPY-1 types, and not HF/AS. Range is stated as 54% of SPY-1D. Employed only by Norwegian Nansen-class (Spanish designed). SPY-3 MFR/DBR X-band: range stated in the DB as 344 nm, and in SITREP 50, page 8 as 113 nm. Has HF and SS modes, but not simultaneously. Is AESA. Only three faces, all the other SPY- have four faces. Employed by Zumwalt and Gerald Ford classes. Link not so easy to find: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AN/SPY-3 SPY-4 VSR (previously SPY-2 VSR) S-band: range stated in SITREP 50, page 8 as 239 nm. Has HF and SS modes. Is AESA. Employed only by Gerald Ford-class (discarded its use in Zumwalt because budgetary reasons). SPY-6(V) AMDR: range stated in the DB as 250 nm, and in SITREP 50, page 8 as 522 nm. Has HF and SS modes. Is AESA. To be employed by Burkes Flight III from 2023 (First boat and proposed sometimes by CG(X). http://defenseph.net/drp/index.php?topic=170.0;wap2(States range of SPY-1(D) as 400 nm, and SPY-6 as 945 nm).
  4. A not very transcendent type, but discovered working on the USS Porter/Sea Shield 2017 scenario: Romanian IAR-330 Puma Naval (2008+), only three delivered from 2008. The Puma Naval is equipped with RDR-1500B radar, RWR (Or ESM), FLIR, BAE-1 UMTohan 45 Kg deep charges, SIN-100 dipping sonar and Stingray ASW torpedoes (Torpedoes added from September 2015). Sources: http://www.rumaniamilitary.ro/radarul-de-pe-puma-naval http://www.rumaniamilitary.ro/un-elicopter-antisubmarin-puma-naval-prima-varianta http://www.rumaniamilitary.ro/iar-ghimbav-livreaza-joi-ultimul-elicopter-iar-330-puma-naval http://www.aripi-argintii.ro/aparatdezbor.php?p=52
  5. Notes: Yugoslavian G-4A Super Galeb represents Romanian IAR-99C. German MiG-29G represents Bulgarian MiG-29. North Korean Su-25K represents Bulgarian Su-25. Yemeni Tarantul I PTG represents Romanian Tarantul I PTG. Russian Natya I Mod MCM represents Romanian Musca-class MCM. UK Wildcat HMA.1 represents Romanian IAR-330 Puma Naval (2008+), the Puma Naval is actually equipped with RDR-1500B radar, RWR (Or ESM), FLIR, BAE-1 UMTohan 45 Kg deep charges, SIN-100 dipping sonar and Stingray ASW torpedoes (Torpedoes added from September 2015). MiG-21MF-75 LanceR A of Romanian Air Force represents MiG-21UM LanceR B, as Lancer A were retired from near 2014.
  6. Some sources (Spoiler alert!): -------------------- SPOILER ALERT-------------------------- NATO: https://news.usni.org/2017/02/17/video-nato-black-sea-exercise-sea-shield https://news.usni.org/2017/02/14/uss-porter-buzzed-russian-planes-black-sea https://turkishnavy.net/2017/02/04/sea-shield-2017-naval-exercise/ http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=98777 http://gonavy.jp/VP_Deploy71f.html http://www.rumaniamilitary.ro/agenda-incarcata-pentru-fortele-navale-in-anul-2017 Crimea: https://www.rt.com/news/373583-s-400-deployed-crimea/ http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/russias-scary-s-400-air-defense-system-now-protecting-the-19070 https://informnapalm.org/en/russia-deploys-s-300vm-sam-launchers-crimea-eve-ukraine-missiles-tests-black-sea/ https://www.bellingcat.com/news/uk-and-europe/2015/11/03/russia-jumped-s-300-from-hvardiyske-airbase/ http://defence-blog.com/army/russia-deploys-advanced-s-400-and-s-300ps-air-missile-systems-to-crimea.html http://in.rbth.com/news/2016/03/03/squadron-of-russias-newest-su-30sm-fighters-formed-in-crimea_572711 https://sputniknews.com/military/201612141048535618-black-sea-fleet-su30sm/ http://www.defense-aerospace.com/articles-view/release/3/179556/russian-navy-stands-up-su_30sm-squadron-in-crimea.html Su-30M2: https://warisboring.com/russias-new-air-force-is-a-mystery-af28abb0be7d#.7e81lohw6 Russia: https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%9A%D1%80%D1%8B%D0%BC%D1%81%D0%BA_(%D0%B0%D1%8D%D1%80%D0%BE%D0%B4%D1%80%D0%BE%D0%BC) http://take-off.ru/news/107-news-1-2-2011/561-su-27sm3-02-2011 https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/1-%D1%8F_%D0%B3%D0%B2%D0%B0%D1%80%D0%B4%D0%B5%D0%B9%D1%81%D0%BA%D0%B0%D1%8F_%D1%81%D0%BC%D0%B5%D1%88%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%BD%D0%B0%D1%8F_%D0%B0%D0%B2%D0%B8%D0%B0%D1%86%D0%B8%D0%BE%D0%BD%D0%BD%D0%B0%D1%8F_%D0%B4%D0%B8%D0%B2%D0%B8%D0%B7%D0%B8%D1%8F Romania: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/oct/27/uk-to-deploy-hundreds-of-troops-and-aircraft-to-eastern-europe(RAF Typhoon to be deployed at Mihail Kogalniceanu Airbase, Romania, from near May 2017). https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2016/03/07/cana-m07.html(And also Canadian CF-18 Hornet). http://www.romaniajournal.ro/update-the-uk-to-deploy-typhoon-fighter-jets-in-romania-canada-intends-to-deploy-f-18s/ http://www.ridder.aero/blog/lancer-dawn-romanias-last-mig-21s/ http://www.aripi-argintii.ro/pagina.php?p=16 http://www.aripi-argintii.ro/aparatdezbor.php?p=52 http://www.rumaniamilitary.ro/radarul-de-pe-puma-naval http://www.rumaniamilitary.ro/un-elicopter-antisubmarin-puma-naval-prima-varianta http://www.rumaniamilitary.ro/iar-ghimbav-livreaza-joi-ultimul-elicopter-iar-330-puma-naval http://www.iar.ro/naval.html
  7. The building of this scenario began as a simple and introductory scenario showing only USS Porter buzzed by Russian naval Su-24M, as usual in the Black Sea, but later I discovered more recent, extensive and opportune sources on the Black Sea theatre of operations, and the thing came to life on its own ...
    • 410 downloads
    Porter, Black Sea and Sea Shield 2017, February 2017. Historical/Alternate History Scenario. A Harpoon Commander's Edition scenario for EC2003 Battle for the Mediterranean Battleset and the HCDB2-170326 new standard 1980-2025 Platform Database. This scenario is designed with advanced Scenario Editor and to be run with HCE 2015.008+ or later. Image: Number 6305, A Romanian MiG-21MF-75 Lancer C firing S-5 air-to-ground rockets during a training exercise in June 18, 2010. Photo by Miha Zamfirescu, took from Wikipedia Commons. This scenario is designed to be played from the Blue/NATO side or from the Red/Russian side. To avoid a few spoilers you should play a few times first the Blue side, and only later play the Red side. With the world on the brink of an open war after four years of impending Second Cold War, just after the take of possession and first days of mandate of Donald Trump from January 20, 2017, another repeated point of naval and military operations popped-up again, diverting in the headlines the situation in Eastern Ukraine. After a new intensification of the Russian operations supporting with GRAD rockets bombardment the separatist actions from January 31, 2017 in the Avdiivka sector, from February 1 to 11, 2017, NATO executed exercise Sea Shield 2017. The exercise was probably combined with isolated Freedom of Navigation (FON) operations by USS Porter (DDG-78), first of the only four SeaRAM equipped Burke-class destroyers of CTF-64, tasked with Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) and forward based in Naval Station Rota, Spain, from April 2015. As usual in FON operations, USS Porter was buzzed those days by probably Russian Naval Aviation Su-24M, and the exercise finished without notable incidents, in spite of the international and regional situation in Crimea and Ukraine. This scenario explores the possibilities of something going wrong as consequence of the buzzing by Russian aircrafts, perhaps an autonomous response of SeaRAM at incoming Russian warplanes, and of a limited military conflict with the present forces: components of Sea Shield 2017 exercise, a few other Turkish elements because the internal problems and international posture of Turkey (Perhaps about change sides, after the fake failed 15 July 2016 anti-Erdogan coup, and the subsequent rarefied relations with NATO, US and Russia), Russian naval and aeronaval forces in the Black Sea, units defending the Russian-Occupied Crimea, and a few Russian Air Force elements. Worth of remembering is, after the full of naval, military and security incidents year of 2014 the World was beginning the so-called Second Cold War. Mostly as result of President of Russia Vladimir Putin (ex-KGB lieutenant colonel) actions, provoking in succession the Crimea, Ukraine, Donetsk, Baltic States, October 2014 Swedish submarine incursion, G-20 Brisbane meeting naval crisis, November 2014 Faslane submarine incident, frigate Yaroslav Mudryy February "Channel Dash", April 2015 Finnish submarine incursion (for many observers causing the pre-mobilization of Finland reserve forces), Russian intervention in Syria from 30 September 2015, shoot-down by Turkish F-16 fighters equipped with AIM-120 AMRAAM on 24 November 2015 of a Russian Su-24M as consequence of the repeated unlawful overflights of Turkey by Russian warplanes based in Latakia, and after two months of repeated warning, March 2016 detection by the French of a Russian submarine near Bay of Biscay and the SSBN base, the propaganda stunt of the de ployment of the only one Russian aircraft carrier Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Kuznetsov steaming (a lot, literally) from Kola Bay towards Eastern Mediterranean from October 15, 2016, and with constant and multiple Russian overflies with military warplanes entangled in potential incidents with commercial flights in Europe, so far as at the Portuguese shores. That without counting in other unrelated naval incidents aside the upcoming Second Cold War, just as the Iranian seizure of the merchant Maersk Tigris in 28 April 2015, the shore-based anti-ship missile attacks against the catamaran transport ex Swift (HSV-2) and US destroyers on the Red Sea in October 2016 and the ulterior retaliation, the first military operation of the Trump Administration on January 28, 2017, the MV-22B tiltrotor raid of SEAL Team 6 operating from USS Makin Island (LHD-8) against Houthi Yemen, and later on January 30, an Al-Madinah-class Saudi frigate was attacked and damaged probably by a Houthi suicide or drone boat off Al Hudaydah, Houthi Yemen. (and neither counting in great landlocked actions, as the counter-Daesh operations in Middle East). And meanwhile, more towards Far East a less perceived and growing problem was China, as reflected in the transfer of the 60% of the USN and USAF combat forces to the Pacific Theatre of Operations from 2012, move to be completed by 2020. In this scenario the opposed forces are limited, and in a short time must achieve an overwhelming victory against the other side, to prevent extension of the conflict showing their superior capabilities, or failing it. The depicted Russia and NATO regional orders of battle are the most historical accurate possible at February 2017. Enrique Mas, 12 March 2017.
  8. File Name: Porter, Black Sea and Sea Shield 2017, February 2017. Historical/Alternate History Scenario. File Submitter: broncepulido File Submitted: 12 Mar 2017 File Category: MEDC Porter, Black Sea and Sea Shield 2017, February 2017. Historical/Alternate History Scenario. A Harpoon Commander's Edition scenario for EC2003 Battle for the Mediterranean Battleset and the HCDB2-170326 new standard 1980-2025 Platform Database. This scenario is designed with advanced Scenario Editor and to be run with HCE 2015.008+ or later. Image: Number 6305, A Romanian MiG-21MF-75 Lancer C firing S-5 air-to-ground rockets during a training exercise in June 18, 2010. Photo by Miha Zamfirescu, took from Wikipedia Commons. This scenario is designed to be played from the Blue/NATO side or from the Red/Russian side. To avoid a few spoilers you should play a few times first the Blue side, and only later play the Red side. With the world on the brink of an open war after four years of impending Second Cold War, just after the take of possession and first days of mandate of Donald Trump from January 20, 2017, another repeated point of naval and military operations popped-up again, diverting in the headlines the situation in Eastern Ukraine. After a new intensification of the Russian operations supporting with GRAD rockets bombardment the separatist actions from January 31, 2017 in the Avdiivka sector, from February 1 to 11, 2017, NATO executed exercise Sea Shield 2017. The exercise was probably combined with isolated Freedom of Navigation (FON) operations by USS Porter (DDG-78), first of the only four SeaRAM equipped Burke-class destroyers of CTF-64, tasked with Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) and forward based in Naval Station Rota, Spain, from April 2015. As usual in FON operations, USS Porter was buzzed those days by probably Russian Naval Aviation Su-24M, and the exercise finished without notable incidents, in spite of the international and regional situation in Crimea and Ukraine. This scenario explores the possibilities of something going wrong as consequence of the buzzing by Russian aircrafts, perhaps an autonomous response of SeaRAM at incoming Russian warplanes, and of a limited military conflict with the present forces: components of Sea Shield 2017 exercise, a few other Turkish elements because the internal problems and international posture of Turkey (Perhaps about change sides, after the fake failed 15 July 2016 anti-Erdogan coup, and the subsequent rarefied relations with NATO, US and Russia), Russian naval and aeronaval forces in the Black Sea, units defending the Russian-Occupied Crimea, and a few Russian Air Force elements. Worth of remembering is, after the full of naval, military and security incidents year of 2014 the World was beginning the so-called Second Cold War. Mostly as result of President of Russia Vladimir Putin (ex-KGB lieutenant colonel) actions, provoking in succession the Crimea, Ukraine, Donetsk, Baltic States, October 2014 Swedish submarine incursion, G-20 Brisbane meeting naval crisis, November 2014 Faslane submarine incident, frigate Yaroslav Mudryy February "Channel Dash", April 2015 Finnish submarine incursion (for many observers causing the pre-mobilization of Finland reserve forces), Russian intervention in Syria from 30 September 2015, shoot-down by Turkish F-16 fighters equipped with AIM-120 AMRAAM on 24 November 2015 of a Russian Su-24M as consequence of the repeated unlawful overflights of Turkey by Russian warplanes based in Latakia, and after two months of repeated warning, March 2016 detection by the French of a Russian submarine near Bay of Biscay and the SSBN base, the propaganda stunt of the de ployment of the only one Russian aircraft carrier Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Kuznetsov steaming (a lot, literally) from Kola Bay towards Eastern Mediterranean from October 15, 2016, and with constant and multiple Russian overflies with military warplanes entangled in potential incidents with commercial flights in Europe, so far as at the Portuguese shores. That without counting in other unrelated naval incidents aside the upcoming Second Cold War, just as the Iranian seizure of the merchant Maersk Tigris in 28 April 2015, the shore-based anti-ship missile attacks against the catamaran transport ex Swift (HSV-2) and US destroyers on the Red Sea in October 2016 and the ulterior retaliation, the first military operation of the Trump Administration on January 28, 2017, the MV-22B tiltrotor raid of SEAL Team 6 operating from USS Makin Island (LHD-8) against Houthi Yemen, and later on January 30, an Al-Madinah-class Saudi frigate was attacked and damaged probably by a Houthi suicide or drone boat off Al Hudaydah, Houthi Yemen. (and neither counting in great landlocked actions, as the counter-Daesh operations in Middle East). And meanwhile, more towards Far East a less perceived and growing problem was China, as reflected in the transfer of the 60% of the USN and USAF combat forces to the Pacific Theatre of Operations from 2012, move to be completed by 2020. In this scenario the opposed forces are limited, and in a short time must achieve an overwhelming victory against the other side, to prevent extension of the conflict showing their superior capabilities, or failing it. The depicted Russia and NATO regional orders of battle are the most historical accurate possible at February 2017. Enrique Mas, 12 March 2017. Click here to download this file
  9. Also #43487 EL/M-2032 radar is flagged as LDSD/AS, and it should be LDSD/SS (ranges stated in the official guide as AS=80, SS=160; I usually use as rule of thumb this: AS is the half of the SS range): http://www.iai.co.il/sip_storage/files/0/38030.pdf
  10. Aside the range issues commented some weeks ago on the SPY series of radars, I see now #43403 SPY-1F is flagged as HF/AS, I think it should be HF/SS, as the other radars of the type.
  11. I see entry 8850 S-79B1 HS.23 03 (Spanish Navy Seahawk 2003+) has not radar and sonar (a typo obviously). Also, older entry 10702 Seahawk HS.23 88 (Spanish Navy Seahawk 1988-2002) should have not FLIR, as showed in this photo (last photo, ID 53097): http://www.helis.com/database/cn/2908/
  12. F-35 never will fight alone (and apparently in Red Flag a single F-35B has leaded 100 other combat aircrafts): http://finance.yahoo.com/news/us-air-force-general-describes-171115721.html
  13. At last apparently clear good news? https://theaviationist.com/2017/02/28/red-flag-confirmed-f-35-dominance-with-a-201-kill-ratio-u-s-air-force-says/
  14. The Turkish F-16C/D are converted (probably all converted by now, from 2007, program to be concluded in 2016) to a Common Configuration Implementation Program (CCIP) with APG-68(V)9, AIM-9X and AIM-9X Block 2, AIM-120C5/C7/D, AGM-65G2/H/J/K/X, AGM-84K SLAM-ER, AGM-84L, CBU-105, AGM-154A-1/C, GBU-31, GBU-38, CBU-103, AGM-88B3/C/D, EGBU-10/12 (perhaps not all the cited weapons): http://www.f-16.net/f-16_users_article21.html https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_modern_weapons_of_the_Turkish_Air_Force
  15. Basically you should to manoeuvre manually and individualy each ASW helicopter or aircraft in range over the enemy submarine estimated position. Both to accurately find her position (usually stopping the ASW platform over the estimate submarine position, as a sonobuoy will be dropped or a dipping sonar will be lowered), and later, to lauch torpedoes (in few cases deep charges) against the enemy submarine, positioning your ASW platform the nearest possible to the enemy submarine.
  16. Some fighter-bomber airborne radars are flagge as LDSD and AS(airborne), when very probably should be LDSD and SS(airborne), I think is a typo keeped for long time. Also another few qualified as RO I think should be AS. I think this is a complete list: 40977 APG-63(V)1 AESA 43483 APG-63(V)2 AESA 43670 APG-63(V)3 AESA 43311 APG-66(V)2 43335 APG-66(V)3 43220 APG-68(V)5 43300 APG-68(V)10 43555 APG-82(V)1 AESA 43425 APQ-104 (For F-8E(FN) and F-8P Crusader, is flagged as RO, I think it should be AS). 43361 APQ-113 (For F-111E, is flagged as RO and SS, I think it should be AS and SS). 43497 APQ-161 (For F-111F, is flagged as RO and SS, I think it should be AS and SS).
  17. Romanian Air Force F-16AM/BM Block 15 MLU (One of the more similar in the DB is Bahraini F-16). - 12 second hand from US and Portugal, 8xF-16A, 4xF-16B (7xEx Portuguese F-16A, 2xEx Portuguese F-16B, 1xEx US F-16A, 2xEx US F-16B) - First six delivered from September 29, 2016, last three to be delivered October 2017. Searching in the second hand market for other 12. - Also purchased 60xAIM-9M, 30xAIM-120C, 10xGBU-12 Paveway II, 18xAGM-65H/K, and 3xALQ-131. - Probably with APG-66(V)1 or APG-66(V)3 radar. - QRA capability expected to be reached in October 2017, full operative capability by 2019. - Employed by 53rd Fighter Squadron, based at Borcea-Fetesti. Sources: Air International January 2017. http://www.airforcesmonthly.com/2016/10/02/romanian-air-forces-first-six-f-16abs-delivered-from-portugal/
  18. The link links to the own post, not to the article!
  19. Another recent article: http://www.businessinsider.com/f-35-vs-j-20-j-31-pak-fa-t-50-russia-china-fifth-generation-2017-2/#the-f-35-lightning-ii-1 The cited video:
  20. I found this reference on SITREP 47 on Liaoning sensors: - Type 346 APAR phased array (visually confirmed). The complete designation is H/LJG-346 (improved H/LJG-346A is installed in Type 052D). - Type 382 Sea Eagle (confirmed in my own notes, similar to Russian Top Plate and many times confussed both types, employed also in Types 054A, 051B and 051C. Is a Type 381 Sea Eagle derivative. FRESCAN type). - Type 364 Seagull C anti-sea skimmer missile radar, emplaced inside a spherical radar dome. - Navigation radar? - SJD-9 hull sonar.
  21. A very minor issue: 16433 AA-2 Atoll C (R-3R) should be the semi-active radar homing version, not an IR guided variant as depicted in the DB (employed in the DB only by MiG-23MS, in the real world also by many MiG-21 variants). Yes, I know ALL the DB is in overhaul! (Thanks!). (Liaoning and her radars also need revision).

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