Herman

I found the explanation given in "Blind Man's Bluff" to be pretty good, too. It concurred with the Navy's official assessment.

Local author exposes Cold War cover-up May 7, 2007 By David Angier Tom Needham / The News Herald Ed Offley holds his recently published book, Scorpion Down, which examines the sinking of the USS Scorpion in May 1968. Twenty-five years ago, Ed Offley stumbled into a story that ultimately could rewrite the way history views the Cold War. The USS Scorpion nuclear submarine sank in the Mediterranean Sea in May 1968 with the loss of all 99 men on board. For decades, the sinking was considered to be one of the great unsolved naval mysteries of all time. On May 27, 1968, the Scorpion failed to arrive in port at Norfolk, Va., at its scheduled time. The Pentagon immediately launched a massive search operation, which concluded a week later with the presumption that the submarine was lost with all hands. “When I tripped over the topic 15 years later that’s what I thought,” Offley, a Panama City Beach resident and News Herald reporter, said Thursday. “At that time, it was an all but forgotten story about 99 sailors that had died mysteriously.” The Scorpion’s wreckage was found months later in the Mediterranean Sea. A board of inquiry reviewed available information and concluded that it didn’t know what caused the sinking. In 1983, Offley was preparing an anniversary retrospective of the Scorpion for the Norfolk Ledger Star when he lined up an interview with retired Vice Adm. Arnold Schade, who gave him his first clue that this was a much bigger story. “I set up this telephone interview and I went into it with not a suspicion,” Offley said. “Because I believed it was an accident, I wasn’t trying to trip him up into telling me a lie. It was very nonconfrontational. He warmed up to me and walked me through this horrible week that happened in May 1968.” But during the interview, Schade let on that the search for the Scorpion was under way five days before the official search began. Five days before the government set in motion a very public search, a very private one had been on for some time. Before Offley wrote his retrospective, he got confirmation of Schade’s account and broke that in his story. A year later, after gaining access to declassified documents, Offley broke another story saying the Scorpion was sunk by its own malfunctioning torpedo. “We published this major story and I was feeling pretty good about myself,” he said. “The next day, the newspaper’s production supervisor came up to me with this malicious grin on his face. He told me it was a great story, but too bad I got the wrong cause for the sinking.” The production manager was in his second career at that point, after spending 20 years in the Navy. In 1968 he was the admiral’s flag yeoman with access to all the top-secret documents at that time. “He told me the Russians sank the Scorpion,” Offley said. The sinking was in retaliation, Offley said, for a mid-sea collision between U.S. and Soviet subs that resulted in the sinking of a Russian submarine. Offley wasn’t able to confirm that for another 14 years. He’d always thought he would put this information together for a book and was meticulous in keeping his records. Last year, a publisher agreed to the project and Offley spent nine months writing the book. He didn’t have the final piece in place, however, until February, when he got confirmation of the most significant evidence of the sinking so far. Since the 1950s, Offley learned, the government has had underwater tracking stations set up around the world. The technicians who monitor these recordings not only can distinguish submarine sounds, but pinpoint the exact submarine they’re listening to. The Scorpion’s last minutes were recorded and Offley got access to two people who had analyzed the recordings. They told him the recordings showed an underwater confrontation between the Scorpion and a Soviet sub that ended with the Russians firing a torpedo. For five minutes, the Scorpion dodged the torpedo, but couldn’t escape. Offley said the government can, and probably will, refute his findings. “I don’t care. I don’t care,” he said. “I have dozens of sailors — people who were there for key moments in that story — and supportive proof that makes up a counter narrative that I am more confident in as the truth than the ‘we don’t know what happened’ that is the official government position.”

Here's a great geo-political situation for those interested in creating new scenarios. New Protectors for Iceland By GERARD O’DWYER, HELSINKI DefenseNews Norway and Denmark have signed separate defense cooperation agreements with Iceland that provide cover for the North Atlantic island’s land, national airspace and sea defenses in peacetime. The two pacts, signed April 27, fill the void left by the September 2006 withdrawal of U.S. troops and F-18 fighters from Iceland, which has no military. Iceland signed with Norway a broad-ranging memorandum of understanding (MoU) on peacetime security policy cooperation. Iceland’s security needs will remain covered by its bilateral defense agreement with the United States and NATO security guarantee accords. The MoU includes provision for military exercises and other sea- and air-based defense activities. Norway can station aircraft at Iceland’s Keflavik airbase, and its fighters and reconnaissance aircraft can operate in Icelandic airspace. The cooperation also covers air-rescue services and civil emergency preparedness. “The additional associated costs will be met by Iceland and by Norway,” Oslo’s Jonas Gahr Støre said. “This will not mean that more funds will be sought by the military. The costs can be covered by the existing defense budget.” Denmark’s defense agreement with Iceland also covers visits by Danish naval, air and land forces, and joint exercises with Iceland’s security agencies. Iceland also is making facilities at Keflavik available to the Danish military cost-free. “The defense accord is of great importance and mutual benefit to both Iceland, its Nordic neighbors and NATO allies,” Støre said. “Norway and Iceland have a common interest to maintain security stability in the North Atlantic. The agreement should be viewed as part of the Norwegian government’s High North Atlantic Defense Strategy.”

The 255th NEW Harpoon scenario of the year! MATRIX SIEGE An exercise between the USN and Baltic naval forces. The passages of the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom [GIUK] Gap remain an intense focal point even in time of peace. The GIUK Gap is THE single most significant choke point for Russian merchant and naval shipping. These waters are also rich with abundant fishing areas and valuable mineral deposits and disputes regarding them are common. The resources that Russian once counted on are no longer guaranteed and a hungry Bear is a dangerous thing, indeed. At the same time, the Western Democracies are scrapping their naval assets faster than they built them in the 1980s. The potential for armed conflict remains very real. The choke-point nature of the geography dictates that the GIUK will remain a very busy place in terms of submarines and ASW operations with land-based aircraft playing a major role. The ubiquitous Tu-95 Bear and the omnipresent P-3 Orion remain prominent and, with the proximity of numerous land bases, you will also find the Atlantique, the May, and the Nimrod; each a major player in either closing or holding open the door to the Atlantic. Author: Herman Hum Harpoon3.6.3 users can get the Complete Harpoon 3.6.3 Library [PlayersDB-7.4.7] The HDS II GIUK Battleset is available at: Harpoon Designer Series II GIUK Battleset Just unzip the file(s) into your Harpoon3 folder normally found at C:\...\Harpoon3 Scenarios can also be loaded individually at: http://www.GameSquad.com/forums/downloads....o=cat&id=36 This scenario requires the latest release of the PlayersDB v7.4.7 Get it via: ughHQ, GameSquad, HarpGamer, SimHQ, PlayersDB Depot, Matrix, SubSim, or Frugal's World of Simulation. Home of the Harpoon3 PlayersDB FilesOfScenShare

Looks like Israel is getting the General Purpose side of the equation filled.

The IAF vs Iran's Nuke Complex

Underwater hide-and-seek Deeper sections of the Baltic in the Archipelago Sea offer an excellent hideout for foreign navy submarines HELSINGIN SANOMAT By Tommi Nieminen The Finnish Navy's Rauma-class fast attack craft Porvoo picks up a Helsingin Sanomat journalist and photographer from a small jetty tucked away in Lappohja, not far from Hanko. It feels a little strange, to be honest, that this compact Navy warship is able to use a little marina like this. Just next door there are a couple of dozen small boats on a sandy beach, still face down in their winter hibernation. The freighter Metallica is tied up at the quay attached to the local steelworks at Koverhar. The master of the FAC Porvoo Captain-Lieutenant Ville Suominen follows my gaze towards the moored cargo vessel and makes a crack about having overheard radio traffic between the Metallica and another freighter with a rock-inspired name. Then he shows me over the missile ship under his charge, currently on a week-long patrol along the coast of the Gulf of Finland. The 23-man crew are made up primarily of permanent members of the Finnish Navy, and not conscripts. "We are still in Finnish waters here", explains Suominen, when we are out at sea off the Hankoniemi peninsula. "It's about six nautical miles [11 km] to international waters from here." The holiest of holies in the missile craft is the control centre below decks, from where the vessel can monitor traffic in the Gulf using radar and sonar measurements. Three crew members sit at the display screens, headphones wedged over their ears. It is a slight surprise to see on the back wall of the cramped space a photo portrait of Marshal Carl Gustav Emil Mannerheim. Wartime Commander-in-Chief he might have been, but Mannerheim was very much a cavalry man, who seldom got his feet wet. In the normally gentle swell of the Baltic, people are happily taking their booze cruises on the ferries from Helsinki to Travemünde, from Tallinn to Gdansk, and from Uumaja up in the Gulf of Bothnia down to Copenhagen. The alcohol flows free, on the Bottlic Sea. But under the surface, everything is very different. It is the realm of fish, wrecks, plankton, and right now around 30 submarines. Beneath the waves it is easier to hear things than to see them. To some extent, what is happening down there is anybody's guess. The golden age for submarines in the Baltic was in the 1980s, when the countries of the Warsaw Pact bloc alone had around a hundred of them in service. When the Soviet Union collapsed, so did the numbers of subs operating in the Baltic. For a while, people thought their time had come and gone. But now submarines are back in vogue. Russia aspires to control its Baltic mercantile routes from St. Petersburg to Western Europe and to keep access open to the exclave of Kaliningrad, a useful ice-free port now sandwiched between new EU members Poland and Lithuania. For this reason the country is building at least five new Lada-class diesel-electric submarines. The first of them, the 72-metre St Petersburg, was launched in 2004. For now, Germany is the Baltic region's top dog underwater. It has 12 submarines, some of which are in service in the Baltic. Sweden has five modern subs. Poland has five rather older ones, stationed in Gdansk. The three Baltic States do not have their own submarine fleets, but if the need arises they can call on help from their NATO partners in Poland and Germany. Finland does not have any submarines of her own, although there would no longer be anything - save the steepling costs - to prevent it. According to the 1947 Paris Peace Treaty, Finland was prohibited from having submarines, but when the Soviet Union came crashing down the Finns declared unilaterally that the military restrictions imposed by the Treaty were no longer valid. Is it possible that others in the region are taking advantage of Finland's lack of an underwater naval arm? Are they making clandestine visits into Finnish territorial waters? Frequently, submarines just sit on the bottom of the sea, keeping quiet, keeping their ears open. For intelligence gathering and for surveillance of the movements of other submarines, they are are a more efficient tool than surface vessels. "They can be down there motionless, engines practically shut down, for several days. It is an ideal state for a sub: on the bottom you can hear other sounds clearly, because the submarine itself is not producing any audio interference of its own", says Lt. Commander Patrik Lillqvist of the Archipelago Sea Naval Command. "From a position down there they can monitor the naval exercises of other countries' fleets if they so wish." Lillqvist knows the submarines of the Baltic region. He spent a week on one of them, the Swedish Navy's HMS Västergötland, during an exercise in 2004. But he doesn't breathe a word about that week, since the "silent service" fraternity tend to be discreet, to say the least, about their activities. And neither he nor anyone else in the Finnish Defence Forces is telling what and how much Finland knows about the sub-surface operations of its neighbours. "Those are intelligence matters." It is likely, for instance, that Russian submarines operate in Finnish waters. It is perfectly well known that at least in the coastal corridor between Porkkala [the headland jutting out into the Gulf of Finland just west of Helsinki] and the island of Utö, in the outer islands south-west from Turku, there are any number of ideal hideout spots in deeper-water locations. On the other hand, there is little sense in submarines going exactly where they are expected to go. "We have reported quite openly on our suspected sub sightings, but there has not been one absolutely open-and-shut case", says Lillqvist. There are a number of submarine bases along the Baltic coast: the Poles keep their vessels in Gdansk, the Russians in Kaliningrad and St. Petersburg. The German submarines are stationed in Eckernförde in the Bay of Kiel, while the Swedes base theirs in Karlskrona. Sometimes a British or Dutch submarine can slip through the Kattegat into the Baltic basin. There may also be some top-secret smaller installations along the Baltic coastline about which little or nothing is known. The Swedes, for instance, also use midget submarines. "They are even more secret. According to public record there are not many of them, but it is not something people talk about", says Lillqvist. Because the Baltic is a shallow sea (the average depth is only 55 metres, and the maximum recorded depth is less than 500 metres), for the most part the submarines used here are coastal vessels of around 55-70 metres in length. "When the Cold War came to an end it looked as if there was no future for submarines. But they haven't gone away anywhere in the years since then", says Lillqvist. And what about the other submarine countries in the Baltic, are they going to increase the size of their underwater fleets like the Russians are? Sweden? "I don't believe they have any such decisions on the table", Lillqvist replies. Poland? "No decisions." Germany? "The Germans are planning to get two new large Type 212A-class subs." The Baltic Sea is a difficult area for submarine-hunting. "The sea-bed topography is uneven. There are a lot of blind-spot areas where a submarine can hide and remain undetected", comments Lillqvist. He opens up a chart and points to depth readings in the Gulf of Finland: the numbers range from less than ten metres to 110 metres. This is enough to allow the passage of a sub - and quite a sizable one, too - since coastal submarines generally require a depth of "a good 40 metres", but they can operate in shallower water than this. It is a relatively common sight on the narrow international sea lanes of the Gulf of Finland to see Russian submarines travelling openly on the surface. Only they are Russian-built subs and not ones belonging to the Russian Navy. They have been assembled at the giant shipyard in St. Petersburg and are destined for export to India or China. Sea trials are routinely carried out in the Gulf. "When they are on the surface they are ships like any other. They have lights fore and aft and all", says Lillqvist. The conditions for the crews on the Baltic fleet submarines are nothing much to write home about. The quarters are cramped in the extreme, since the whole idea is to make the vessels as compact as possible. "One way of saving space is to use the ‘warm-bunk' principle - in other words, two crew members share the same bunk. One is at work while the other is off-duty", explains Lillqvist. On the Helsinki island of Isosaari, off-limits to civilians as a restricted military area, is a coastal artillery battery and a fixed maritime surveillance station, in a cavern blasted from the bedrock. The underwater monitoring at the station keeps tabs on sub-surface sounds day and night. A network of passive sonar hydrophones - sound-to-electricity transducers that pick up and transmit ambient noise - has been set up on the bed of the Gulf of Finland, and the signals it captures are transmitted back to the station on Isosaari. "The locations of the hydrophone sensors are understandably not for public consumption, as they can each monitor only a relatively limited area. And they can be moved around as necessary", says Lillqvist. Hydrophones have certainly been installed alongside the major maritime arteries and offshore from the country's harbours. If, for instance, the Russians were to know of the precise locations of the devices, it would be easy for their submarines to move around out of reach of listening ears. Suspicious sounds that are picked up in Finnish territorial waters are examined at the Navy's research establishments in Espoo and Turku. And if the technicians in Espoo suspect that the noises might be coming from a submarine, the Navy are sent to intercept the intruder. In the control room of the FAC Porvoo, three operators watch the goings-on in the Gulf of Finland from their display monitors. "A awful lot of cargo traffic heading east towards St. Petersburg", says Captain-Lieutenant Suominen. "The traffic in and out of there has grown practically exponentially in recent years." And it is precisely to safeguard this mercantile traffic that Russia is upgrading its submarine fleet. The Porvoo cruises past a rocky islet, Långskär by name. Out in the international channel a cargo vessel can be seen making its way westwards. One of the officers on board the missile ship scans the horizon through binoculars, but there are no submarines or periscopes to be seen. The last time a suspected submarine was sought off the coast of Helsinki was in August 2006, but thus far Finland has not once managed to bag a sub from its waters to the point where the vessel type and its flag could be determined. "Last year we trained in sub-hunting with a submarine from the Swedish Navy. It is not an easy business", admits Suominen. A crackling sound over the tannoy system reports to the bridge of the warship that the Porvoo is going to battle stations. The ship's master Ville Suominen orders his men into place for the routine drill - the control centre, the engine room, the anti-aircraft missile launcher, and the ASW mortars. A towed array sonar device is lowered into the water off the stern, with the intention of capturing the hydroacoustic pattern emanating from a possible submarine. "The problem is that the submarine can hear the sounds of our sonar and will take steps to avoid detection", explains Suominen. Three men sit hunched in the control room with headphones glued to their ears. Since this is a combat drill, some of the crew are up on deck ready to launch anti-submarine grenades into the deep. But the Gulf of Finland is as quiet as the grave. "The first times out looking for a submarine are really, really difficult. Things get a little easier when you gradually learn to understand the way a submarine thinks", says Suominen. A sub goes where nobody would expect it to go. When the crew of a submarine understand that the vessel may have been spotted or compromised, the reaction is to make rapid turns and short bursts of acceleration, in an attempt to shake off the hunters. Or alternatively, to dive deeper, in order to reduce the chance of signals being picked up by sonar. It is only on rare occasions that a submarine will actually come close to the surface and raise its periscope, for then it runs the risk of being discovered. Captain-Lieutenant Suominen, have ever seen with your own eyes a submarine in Finnish waters? Have you ever got a fleeting glimpse of a periscope? Have you ever even seen one as a blip on the radar screen? "If there were information about a violation of our territorial waters, then I would not be divulging it to you", replies Suominen politely but firmly. It is perfectly clear that mid-ranking serving officers are not in a position to talk about politically sensitive matters. But do not the Finns have a right to hear openly about it, in the case that a warship of a foreign power intrudes into our waters? Just like in 2004 and 2005, when Russian aircraft strayed into Finnish airspace over the Gulf of Finland on at least 11 occasions. Finally the Prime Minister Matti Vanhanen was obliged to admit that the government had hushed the matter up. "Fortunately I don't have to think about such things and come up with an answer", says Suominen, and he remains tight-lipped. The newly-appointed Defence Minister Jyri Häkämies (National Coalition Party) does not want to comment on the subject of submarines. His predecessor in the job, the Centre Party's Seppo Kääriäinen, says that after the airspace violations of 2005 the government changed its policy on discussing such matters in a "noticeably more transparent" direction. "At that point, it was decided that incontrovertible frontier violations would be made public. And this cannot be limited only to airspace violations", notes Kääriäinen. As recently as the 1980s and 1990s, the publication of details on such violations was sparing in the extreme, or as Kääriäinen puts it, "a matter of discretion". In Soviet times they occurred more often than than they do today. The former Commander of the Archipelago Sea Area Coast Guard Raimo Tiilikainen recalls that in the 1980s in particular there were cases where submarines were detected, but it was not possible to determine any details of the vessels or their origin. In other words, the Navy or Coast Guard never actually found out whose subs they were, but it would be odd if it had been anything other than a Swedish or Russian vessel. "There were some observations of periscopes on the surface, up as far north as the Gulf of Bothnia. The policy back then was not to go public over unsubstantiated or uncertain claims of incursions. Generally the observations went unreported", Tiilikainen says. Perhaps it might have been better to report them. For there has been no shortage of submarine blunders in and under the Baltic. In April 1963, a Soviet nuclear submarine collided with a Finnish-registered freighter, the M/S Finnclipper, in the Denmark Straits (see earlier article from April 2007). After the collision, which took place in thick fog, the captain of the Soviet sub and an interpreter came aboard the Finnish vessel - and they were not best pleased, according to Jaakko Varimaa, who was 2nd Officer on the Finnclipper at the time. Though damaged, both vessels were able to continue on their way, and not a word was breathed in public about the affair for the next 44 years. But this incident pales alongside the most famous case, from 1981, which was a mishap that DID cross the international news threshold. Well, it had to, really. In October of that year, U-137 - an elderly Whiskey-class submarine belonging to the Soviet Navy - hit an underwater rock and ran aground only a few kilometres off the large Swedish naval base of Karlskrona. The vessel was stuck there for several days in the glare of publicity, and a flotilla of Soviet warships and tugs eventually took it away. In 1992 the submarine's master Capt. Anatoli Mihailovich Gushchin revealed that the vessel had been carrying nuclear-tipped torpedoes. Gushchin also reported that when the vessel returned to base in the Soviet Union after the accident, he got a severe roasting: "I would not want even my worst.enemy to have to undergo what I went through then", he commented in 1992. Unfortunately he did not elaborate on the subject, but it is believed he was reduced in rank, though he kept his naval commission. There have been foreign submarines in Finnish waters, too. In June 1982 a submarine was detected to the west of the Åland Islands. Warning grenades were dropped into the deep, after which the sub cut and ran into international waters. In August 1991, the Finnish Navy made a confirmed observation of a submarine off the coast at Porkkala. When the crew noticed that they had been spotted, the vessel fled. Just a couple of months later, there was another confirmed detection of a submerged submarine not far from Hanko. This was quite possibly a Russian sub that had been despatched to monitor a Finnish naval exercise at the time. The list goes on. There was a "probable" sonar hit on a submarine in November 1995. In August 2001, there were two searches inside a week following unusual sonar observations in the Porvoo and Emäsalo areas east of the capital. Once again, a naval exercise was in progress at the time. In April 2004 there was the mysterious case of the blip on the radar of the Eckerö lines car-ferry Roslagen, travelling between the Åland Islands and Sweden. And not just a blip: crew on the bridge of the Roslagen claimed to have seen two conning tower masts protruding above the surface, not far away. The ferry took abrupt evasive action, and whatever it was down there beat a hasty retreat. The most recent published incident took place in August last year, when suspicious sound sources were picked up by the monitoring centre on Isosaari. The missile ship Rauma and the Coast Guard patrol vessel Merikarhu were ordered into action, but the submarine - if that is what it was - had already vanished. And no wonder. Chasing a submarine with the Navy's surface vessels is a fairly thankless task. The Baltic Sea is of pivotal importance to modern-day Russia, since it offers the country's only direct sea route to the markets of Western Europe. "Securing the maritime links between St. Petersburg and Kaliningrad, safeguarding its commercial and military interests in the Baltic", lists Janne Helin, a Russian expert at the Ministry of Defence, when he is probed on Russia's objectives. But Helin cannot or will not say whether Russia is spying on Finland from submarines off the coast. "That sort of information is kept within the Defence Forces, and it is classified and not for the public domain. What one can say, nevertheless, is that Russia - just like other countries with Baltic Sea coastlines - carries on intelligence operations", comments Helin obliquely. Then there are also the eager-beaver rearmament types, a group of their very own. In March, Alpo Juntunen, a researcher at the National Defence College, resurrected the idea that Finland should have her own submarines. He argued that only with a submersible naval arm would it be possible to provide an effective response and deterrent to submarines from other countries. Juntunen himself admitted, however, that the price tag of at least EUR 200 million meant that such an investment was out of the question at present. It is both a blessing and a curse that our Baltic Sea is no deeper than its 55-metre average depth. The curse is that a shallow sea - and one with poor circulation - is more easily polluted than a deep ocean. But the blessing is that for reasons of space, there can be little by way of really big submarine traffic. For all that, the catastrophe that occurred in the Barents Sea in August 2000 - when the Russian nuclear-powered submarine Kursk took all 118 of its crew to the bottom, could recur in the Baltic - at least in principle. In July 2003, a Russian Navy officer named Ivan Dygalo implied that the Russians might have used submarines with nuclear propulsion units in their naval exercises in the Baltic. News like that is unsettling. It would be a confidence-building move towards the neighbours if there were not one single Russian reactor chugging away beneath the surface of our common sea. Helsingin Sanomat / First published in print 29.4.2007

My part in sinking of the Belgrano BRIAN BRADY WESTMINSTER EDITOR (bdbrady@scotlandonsunday.com) Scotsman A REMARKABLE first-hand account of the hours leading up to one of the most controversial episodes of the Falklands War has emerged from a Scottish police constable. Steve McIntosh was a 17-year-old Royal Navy submariner when he helped hunt down and torpedo the General Belgrano, an action that cost the lives of 300 Argentinian sailors and remains hotly debated 25 years later. McIntosh, now a community beat officer with Strathclyde Police, was in the control room of HMS Conqueror, the submarine that sank the Belgrano, working in the key role of contact evaluation plotter. The veteran, in what is believed to be the first personal account of events leading up to the attack, makes a number of extraordinary revelations, including: • HMS Conqueror was earlier in position to sink the Argentinian aircraft carrier Veinticinco de Mayo - a mission that could have shortened the war - but the British government refused permission to engage; • The submarine tracked the Belgrano for a week, unsuccessfully seeking permission to fire on several occasions before they were finally given the go-ahead on May 2, 1982; • The crew's initial euphoria at sinking the Belgrano turned to horror when it emerged Argentinian support ships had fled, leaving sailors to drown; • The captain of HMS Conqueror, Commander Chris Wreford-Brown, led his crew in a service to pray for the enemy dead only hours after two of their torpedoes had ripped the Belgrano to pieces. McIntosh told Scotland on Sunday: "I'll always remember the countdown to impact, the captain saying: "Up periscope, hit right of stern, hit centre," and then feeling the explosion. "It was like a thud and a hollow clap, and a weird tinkling, which was the metal of the ship breaking up. There was also the smell of cordite, the explosive substance coming back up the torpedo tubes." McIntosh, who was hand-picked by the captain to help the vital tracking operations, added: "We tracked it [the Belgrano] for a considerable period. All the information was getting relayed back to the government in London. We did ask permission to engage her and we were knocked back several times." After the sinking "the elation was phenomenal", he said. "We had done what we were trained to do. Everything was textbook, even the evasive action we took afterwards was perfect. "It was only afterwards that we realised that the Belgrano's escort, that was supposed to pick up survivors, had done a runner. You could tell from the captain's face when he looked through the periscope... He was thinking that shouldn't have happened." After the impact, Wreford-Brown led his crew in a service. "It wasn't just to pray for forgiveness," McIntosh explained, "but to pray for those who were dead and injured. As a churchgoer, that was normal behaviour to me." More than 300 of the 1,000-plus sailors on board the Belgrano were killed when the ship was controversially hit outside the 200-mile exclusion zone imposed after the British Task Force arrived to retake the Falklands from the Argentinians. On the vexed question of whether the Belgrano was moving away from the exclusion zone when it was sunk, an issue which has provoked heated arguments over the past 25 years, McIntosh is tight-lipped. But he maintains the ship was a legitimate target. McIntosh, a father of four, insists that everyone on his vessel was convinced they had done the right thing in order to protect thousands of colleagues on the surface from mortal danger. He said: "Warships don't go in a straight line, to avoid torpedoes. It was a threat to the Task Force and we had to engage her for the sake of our troops. "On the sub, it was very clear. I thought it was a shame that people lost their lives but I still thought it was either them or us. I felt sorry for their sailors because they were conscripts and there was no way they were as good as we were." Then, after a little thought, he added: "If I'm in a war on land and I'm standing in front of the enemy, I don't wait for them to shoot before deciding whether to use my gun." McIntosh also revealed that the submarine had locked on to an even bigger target, the Veinticinco de Mayo, before the Belgrano finally drifted on to their radar screens. "I don't know why we weren't allowed to engage her," he said. "Without a doubt we could have taken her out, but London said no." McIntosh served on Royal Navy submarines for another five years before leaving and immediately taking a job as an officer with Strathclyde Police. 'I thought expedition was April Fool' The historic expedition began in inauspicious circumstances. "It was April 1 or the day after and my brothers, who were also submariners, joked that one of us was going to be called up," said Steve McIntosh. "I went to church and when I got back my dad told me the police had been to tell me to report back to the submarine. I thought he was joking. "When I got back to Faslane, where the sub was based, we had to wait a while, because a few of the other lads thought it was an April Fool's joke as well." The brothers' father served in the army and their sister followed suit. But McIntosh became the only member of his family to serve in the conflict, because military rules prevented an entire family of brothers being put in harm's way. "As soon as they knew I'd been called up, they were very happy, because they knew they wouldn't have to go," he said.

The 254th NEW Harpoon scenario of the year! Re-Take - EC2003 MEDC Battleset Ukraine's "Orange Revolution" has failed. The pro-Russian party which had won the last elections has used its renewed power to move the country back towards Russia and an autocratic regime. Russian forces were invited to "secure" Ukraines borders against "potential aggressors". There has been a massive inflow of Russian naval aircraft and Ukraine is now "guarded" by Russian warships and subs too. Few hours prior to that parts of Ukraines armed forces declared they will not follow any orders of the new regime dominated by Russia. They have taken side for "Free Ukraine" - a political movement of those still believing in the "Orange Revolution". The "Free Ukrainian Forces" (FUF) have joined a US carrier group which has arrived in order to protect Romania against any Russian attack out of Ukraine. Stakes are high and an epic clash is about to begin. Author: Ralf Koelbach This scenario has been tested for compatibility with the HC_Euro_DB (edited by Rene Haar) which can be found at HarpGamer.com Home of the Harpoon3 PlayersDB FilesOfScenShare

The 253rd NEW Harpoon scenario of the year! INGRESS PROJECT PENINSULA 94 Peninsula 94 is a series of 4 related scenarios (Recon, Ingress, Strike Ops, and Egress) representing different phases of a US multi-carrier battle group attack on the Kola Peninsula. From the Russian perspective, this is the mission the navy has trained for since its beginning: defense of the homeland. These scenarios are related by a common order of battle and a concurrence of mission. Any discrepancies can be attributed to poor bomb damage assessment and better than expected damage control. They should be played in order and from the same side to appreciate the developing momentum an operation of this magnitude has. Strike Operations This is pay dirt for US forces: conduct large-scale strike operations against the home of the Red Banner Fleet. While the mission is straight-forward, this scenario promises to be a case study in contingency planning as situations change quickly in a high-threat environment. Asset allocation and formation rotation is the key to survival for surface elements in this scenario. To be successful in the strike arena of this scenario, solid adherence to the fundamentals is vital. Any deviation may have catastrophic effects on the overall plan as a carrier is useless without its aircraft. From the Russian perspective, coastal defense has been the heart of fleet planning since its inception, though it was always expected that more high-value assets would be available for the task. The player will be expected to focus remaining assets in defense of land-based facilities. The nuclear option is available. Since no single group has the striking power to penetrate a CVBG defensive screen, coordination is the key in offensive operations. Original author: BI Hutchison Author: Herman Hum Harpoon3.6.3 users can get the Complete Harpoon 3.6.3 Library [PlayersDB-7.4.7] The HDS II GIUK Battleset is available at: Harpoon Designer Series II GIUK Battleset Just unzip the file(s) into your Harpoon3 folder normally found at C:\...\Harpoon3 Scenarios can also be loaded individually at: http://www.GameSquad.com/forums/downloads....o=cat&id=36 This scenario requires the latest release of the PlayersDB v7.4.7 Get it via: ughHQ, GameSquad, HarpGamer, SimHQ, PlayersDB Depot, Matrix, SubSim, or Frugal's World of Simulation. Home of the Harpoon3 PlayersDB FilesOfScenShare

PRC navy faces issues with carrier protection By Cheng Ta-chen Taipei Times Tuesday, Apr 24, 2007, Page 8 Advertising Advertising The media have begun to hype up news of plans by China to obtain a new aircraft carrier. This kind of attention has its precedents, such as recent rumblings that China was in the process of building a nuclear-powered carrier, or that it planned to deploy two carrier groups in the Sea of Japan and the South China Sea. It is difficult to know what to make of all these developments. A carrier group requires effective integration of fighting forces in the air, on the water and below the surface. Even if China could overcome the technological difficulties inherent to manufacturing and outfitting a large carrier, it would still have a long way to go to to put together a complete carrier group. Although China's navy has imported many new platforms, it still lacks an integrated information management system, leaving it unable to coordinate battle plans with the other branches of its military. China's navy still relies heavily on foreign imports and technical guidance, especially on matters such as propulsion, navigation, detection and other major systems. This presents a serious challenge to force integration. China also has many problems with its submarines. The Federation of American Scientists said that Chinese submarines have only gone out on patrol 49 times over the past 25 years, or about once every three years per submarine. Only two patrols are known to have taken place last year and none the year before. This underutilization raises the possibility that there might be some serious problem with China's submarines. If they have difficulty completing simple routine patrols, how are they supposed to accompany an aircraft carrier? The Chinese navy also clearly lacks the aerial surveillance system required for modern air defense on a carrier, and also lacks the required data capabilities and sufficient military personnel to effectively carry out regional air defense missions. In addition, China has imported Russian Kilo-class submarines, which it could perhaps one combine with its indigenous Type-093 submarines. But without anti-submarine aircraft and surface vessels to provide advanced detection, not only will it be difficult for the submarines to repel attacks when confronted with superior enemy ships, but they might in turn be destroyed by anti-submarine forces. Although China has been actively improving the structure of its rear logistical support, its command systems and rear support systems are completely incompatible, which makes it difficult to provide resupplies. This is a major setback for carrier groups, which are heavily dependent on effective rear support. Although China's dream of deploying an aircraft carrier is not unfeasible, there are still many difficulties standing in the way of forming an effective fighting force. A recent report by the Rand Corporation said that if war broke out between China and the US, China could use guided missile destroyers, bombers, anti-radiation cruise missiles, attack submarines or even land-based missiles to attack US ships. These are clearly the more immediate threats facing the US and Taiwan. Cheng Ta-chen is an independent defense analyst.

Navy set to keep 30-year-old ships in service over £3.6bn carrier delays JAMES KIRKUP POLITICAL EDITOR (jkirkup@scotsman.com) Scotsman.com THE Royal Navy could be forced to delay the retirement of Britain's ageing aircraft carriers because of delays in the programme to order replacement vessels, the Ministry of Defence has admitted. The decision would mean the mainstay of Britain's naval power in the next decade will be two ships which are both more than 30 years old. The prospect of prolonging the life of HMS Illustrious and HMS Ark Royal will only heighten concerns about the state of the Royal Navy. Commanders led by the First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir Jonathon Band, have warned ministers they must spend more on the navy if Britain is to remain a global military power. The next generation of navy ships will be built around two new aircraft carriers, which at 65,000 tonnes and 230-metres long will be the biggest military ships Britain has ever built. But the £3.6 billion Future Carrier project has been hit by delays and bureaucratic haggling. The formal decision to place the contract to build the ships was first scheduled for 2003, but has yet to be made. The carriers would be built in pieces, at yards including Govan on the Clyde and Rosyth in Fife, with the contracts securing thousands of Scottish jobs for up to a decade. But despite suggestions from Labour ministers campaigning ahead of the Scottish Parliament elections next week, it is unlikely that the "main gate" contract decision for the new carriers will be made before the summer. Some fear the decision could even be delayed until after the Treasury's comprehensive spending review in October or November. Gordon Brown, the Chancellor, is said to be putting growing pressure on the MoD to curb the costs of the project as he tries to manage tightening public finances ahead of his expected appointment as prime minister in July. Earlier this year, the House of Commons' Defence Committee warned Britain could be left without a working aircraft carrier due to hold-ups in the carrier procurement process. The first of the new carriers is officially due to enter service in 2012, but Navy officers and defence industry officials believe that is now impossible. Now, a defence minister has conceded that the government may have to delay the retirement of the two existing Invincible-class aircraft carriers until the new vessels are available. Illustrious, the flagship of the Navy fleet, has been in service since 1982 and, according to the MoD's current timetable, is due to retire or "pay-off" in 2012. The Ark Royal entered service in 1985 and is due to retire in 2015. Now Lord Drayson, the defence procurement minister, has said those pay-offs may be put back because of problems with the Future Carrier problem. "Our intention is for there to be, at all times, at least one ship operating in the carrier strike role until the first of the new carriers enters service," Lord Drayson writes in an MoD document seen by The Scotsman. "It is too early to say whether this will require Illustrious or Ark Royal to remain operational beyond present pay-off dates." Lord Drayson also suggests the MoD is preparing to revise the delivery timetable for the new carriers. He states delaying the current ships' retirement "does not need to be addressed until we have determined in- service dates of future carriers". Last night, the MoD said the "working assumption" for the delivery of the new carriers was 2012 and 2015, but conceded that a delay was possible. • Britain and France should share the construction of the two new UK carriers and one for the French navy, Thales, a French defence firm, said yesterday. The MoD said it was waiting for defence firms to agree a deal on carrier work before placing the final order. MoD CHIEFS LOOK TO SCOTLAND FOR HOME PORT BRITAIN'S next generation of aircraft carriers could sail from Scotland, Royal Navy commanders believe. During an internal Ministry of Defence review of Britain's major naval bases, Faslane on the Clyde has emerged as a possible dock for the two new aircraft carriers. The two serving aircraft carriers currently sail from Portsmouth, but the Naval Bases Review has sparked speculation that the English port, the traditional home of the Royal Navy, could be closed. That speculation will be fuelled by the review's provisional conclusion that it would be possible for the carriers to dock at Faslane, already the home base of the navy's nuclear submarines. However, Faslane, officially called HM Naval Base Clyde, would require "changes in infrastructure" to accommodate the 280-metre, 65,000-tonne vessels. The suggestion is likely to inflame the simmering political row over the future of the Royal Navy's UK facilities. The Naval Bases Review, started earlier this year, could see one of Britain's bases - Faslane, Portsmouth, or Devonport, near Plymouth - closed or downgraded.

The 251st NEW Harpoon scenario of the year! Last week, we released 120 New scenarios. This week, we return you to our regular programming schedule. RESCUE A SAILOR On March 23, 2007 Fifteen Royal Marines were captured by Iranian patrol boats while on routine inspection of an Indian freighter. The UK must look for options, through political or military means, to get its people back. At the same time, US presence in the Gulf is at a high with two CVBGs amidst great tension over Iran's nuclear program. Author: Freek Schepers This scenario has been tested for compatibility with Harpoon ANW. Harpoon ANW users can get them at: Complete Harpoon ANW Library [PlayersDB-7.4.7-ANW] Just unzip the file(s) into your ANW Databases folder normally found at: C:\Matrix Games\Harpoon 3 Advanced Naval Warfare\Databases Scenarios can also be loaded individually at: http://www.GameSquad.com/forums/downloads....=cat&id=118 This scenario specifically requires the PlayersDB v7.4.7-ANW which can be found: http://www.GameSquad.com/forums/downloads....=cat&id=119 Harpoon3.6.3 users can get them at: Complete Harpoon 3.6.3 Library [PlayersDB-7.4.7] Just unzip the file(s) into your Harpoon3 folder normally found at C:\...\Harpoon3 Scenarios can also be loaded individually at: http://www.GameSquad.com/forums/downloads....o=cat&id=36 This scenario specifically requires the PlayersDB v7.4.7 which can be found: http://www.GameSquad.com/forums/downloads....o=cat&id=51 Home of the Harpoon3 PlayersDB FilesOfScenShare

Navy faces 'losing its ability to be a force' IAN BRUCE, Defence Correspondent April 18 2007 The Herald Britain's strategic safety and the national ability to design and build warships are at risk because a "dysfunctional" Ministry of Defence has gone to war with a peace-time accountant's mentality, according to a former deputy chief of the defence staff. Vice-Admiral Sir Jeremy Blackham, who edits Naval Review and is vice-president of the Royal United Services' Institute, says the Royal Navy is on the brink of "losing irretrievably" its ability to act as a decisive force in world events for the first time since Nelson's day. Writing jointly in the April issue of the prestigious RUSI journal, Admiral Blackham and Professor Gwyn Prins of Columbia University and the London School of Economics argue that the UK's armed forces are in deepening crisis because of overstretch and chronic under-investment. advertisement They also claim that it is now "a credible possibility" that it could take a British military defeat in Iraq or Afghanistan to change Whitehall's penny-pinching mindset. Their accusations add to a list of high-profile public warnings from leading military officers and the Commons Defence Committee in recent months that there are too few service personnel and too little equipment for the tasks they have been given. General Sir Richard Dannett, the chief of the general staff, said in December that the tempo of military commitments was close to breaking the covenant between armed forces and government. His predecessor, General Sir Mike Jackson, marked his retirement last year by accusing the MoD and successive governments of being responsible for "a generation of neglect". And Admiral Sir Jonathon Band, the First Sea Lord, called in January for an extra £1bn to pay for fuel, accommodation and an overdue wage boost for his sailors. He also warned that looming cuts threatened "to turn the Royal Navy into the Belgian Navy". Admiral Blackham said in the RUSI article that the Navy has been its own worst enemy, displaying a can-do attitude "which has disguised the accumulating crisis of the last decade from the public". Despite the government line that 28 ships had joined the fleet since it was elected in 1997, only four of these vessels were destroyers or frigates at a time when holding a basic line on essential naval tasks required the construction of one a year. Prime Minister Tony Blair's government had, in fact, ordered just eight ships since it came to power. There was no expectation of major new construction after the two planned aircraft carriers and the last of the Clyde-built Type 45 destroyers are launched in the middle of the next decade, leaving a gap which would see the fleet decline steadily in numbers and capability. The consequent dependence on other nations for construction would then expose the UK to "significant sovereign risk which it has not run for centuries".

Showdown Ends in Cancellation U.S. Navy Scraps LCS 3 After Dispute With Lockheed By CHRISTOPHER P. CAVAS DefenseNews The U.S. Navy’s abrupt decision to cancel construction of a Lockheed Martin Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) leaves many wondering what it means to Lockheed, the LCS program, shipbuilders, service acquisition and the fleet itself. Navy Secretary Donald Winter, who has pledged to use any method at his disposal to hold down shipbuilding costs, has repeatedly urged industry to modernize and find new ways to build ships. But shipbuilders are digging in, tired of the badgering from Navy officials and lawmakers alike. They say too little attention is given to shipboard equipment and other things that are sending ship costs skyrocketing. “Both sides are sending messages that they need to change the way they do business,” said Byron Callan, a defense industry analyst. The decision capped a month of negotiations in which the Navy sought to change the contract for LCS 3, the second Lockheed ship, from a cost-plus to a fixed-cost-plus-incentive model. On March 15, Winter declared that unless a “meeting of the minds” on a new contract could be reached, the Navy would cancel construction. On April 12, he made good on that threat. The cancellation of LCS 3 was only the latest setback to the program, which envisions a 55-ship fleet of small, fast warships designed to counter threats in contested coastal waters. At its inception in 2002, the program was viewed as a prime example of the transformational concepts envisioned by then-Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld. Adm. Vern Clark, Rumsfeld’s chief of naval operations, championed the LCS, promising a low-cost warship that would depend largely on a family of mission-specific “modules” of weapons, sensors and vehicles. “I need it yesterday,” Clark told lawmakers, reporters, contractors and sailors alike. When Adm. Mike Mullen succeeded Clark in 2005, he became just as emphatic in his support. But lately, “yesterday” is looking further off. At the beginning of this year, the Navy had four LCS ships under contract and was authorized to buy two more. But in March, Winter said that more than $400 million authorized for the fifth and sixth ships would be used to cover cost overruns on the first four. The cancellation of LCS 3 means there are only three ships under construction. Further, the Navy will scale back plans to ask for three ships in 2008 and six in 2009 to a likely two ships in ’08 and three in ’09. That means that by 2010, when the service will decide on a single design for the remainder of the fleet, a total of eight ships will be in service, under construction or under contract, rather than the 15 envisioned just three months ago. Winter’s cancellation decision follows an April 3 address at a Navy League symposium in Washington where he declared a policy of “tough love” with shipbuilders to hold down costs. The secretary has been deeply involved in the LCS program since the end of the year, when the Navy discovered that costs had grown unexpectedly on the USS Freedom (LCS 1), Lockheed’s first ship. The ship, which was launched in September at Marinette Marine in Marinette, Wis., was originally planned to cost about $220 million. But design and production problems, coupled with a tight building schedule, have driven the price to between $350 million and $375 million by the Navy’s estimates. Others believe the cost could ultimately top $400 million. In January, the Navy began a deep inquiry into the program to understand what was happening with costs on both Lockheed ships and two other ships being built by General Dynamics to a competing design. On Jan. 12, Winter issued a 90-day stop-work order on LCS 3, which was to be built at Lockheed’s second shipyard, Bollinger, in Lockport, La. The stop-work order itself was an indication of the tough approach Winter is taking. Several industry sources said a less-formal move — even a phone call — would have had the same effect pending the Navy’s re-evaluation of the program. A ‘Disastrous’ Decision? “At first glance, this appears to be a disastrous decision by the secretary,” said Bob Work, an analyst with the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments in Washington who has long followed the LCS program. “This obviously is part of the secretary’s tough-love approach to shipbuilders,” Work said. “But whether this is the program he should be putting so much uncertainty into is a really big question. It’s a blow to the program.” Cancellation of the ship wasn’t the only option available to Winter. Other options included giving in on some of the negotiation points or restructuring the program to account for higher costs and longer building times — at least for the first ships. Accounts of the failed negotiations varied, but sources said the primary sticking points revolved around price, assignment of risk and intellectual property issues. The price gap at the break-off point in contract talks also was disputed, with some sources claiming the difference was $50 million to $60 million and others claiming a gap of only about $10 million. The Navy’s leadership expressed confidence in the soundness of their actions. “While this is a difficult decision, we recognize that active oversight and strict cost controls in the early years are necessary to ensuring we can deliver these ships to the fleet over the long term,” Winter said in a statement announcing the decision. Bob Stevens, Lockheed’s president and chief executive officer, said in a statement released following Winter’s announcement that Lockheed was “greatly disappointed” and “frustrated” in the decision and sorry the company “will not have the opportunity … to see this program through to conclusion.” Investment analysts generally applauded the decision for both the Navy and Lockheed. “While losing the contract is clearly a disappointment, we do applaud the company for its financial discipline and in walking away from a fixed-price contract that could have been detrimental to shareholder value,” Merrill Lynch analyst Ron Epstein said in a note to his clients. Callan agreed. “Companies are saying they’re not going to take contracts their shareholders won’t tolerate,” he said. “For the Navy, they’ve got only so much to spend on their 313-ship fleet and they’ve got to hold the line on cost if they’re to meet their goal of recapitalizing the fleet.” Many questioned Lockheed’s future in the program, which now puts the company one ship behind competitor General Dynamics. But Rear Adm. Chuck Goddard and Allison Stiller, the Navy’s top ship acquisition officer, speaking to reporters from the Pentagon about the decision, stressed that the number of ships would not affect the Navy’s ability to evaluate the designs. “We hope and expect that both Lockheed Martin and General Dynamics will compete for … future LCS procurements,” Goddard said. And while the cancellation decision doesn’t affect the General Dynamics ships, the Navy continued to put GD on notice. “We will continue to monitor General Dynamics’ performance on LCS 2 and 4,” Goddard said. “If GD experiences comparable growth, we will use a similar process to seek to restructure the contract.” But the nature of Lockheed’s participation in shipbuilding programs — the company owns no shipyard — brings into question the future of integrators as lead ship contractors rather than shipbuilders like Northrop Grumman and General Dynamics. Winter, in his April 3 address, said he wanted to do away with the lead system integrator approach to shipbuilding. “The Navy should be the lead integrator,” he said. Analyst Epstein noted the development in his note to clients. “We believe the termination points to a potential weakness in the system integrator model and suggests that domain expertise is of vital importance,” he wrote. The Effect on the Fleet Beyond the hard dollars-and-cents nature of the acquisition decisions lie further questions on how the cutback in LCS procurements will affect the Navy’s ability to integrate the ships into the fleet and develop the concept to maturity regardless of which design is ultimately built. The questions include proving the Navy’s concept of operations, how the multi-ship manning system will function, how the mission modules will integrate into the ship, the simultaneous operation of multiple off-board manned and unmanned vehicles, the efficacy of a networked command-and-control system and the ability of the logistics train to keep the ships and their modules at peak combat efficiency. The Navy is well aware of these issues and has spent a great deal of effort building simulation trainers and developing plans. But until the ships are in service, those concepts remain theoretical. “The ships are a prototype for an entirely new type of battle-networked combatant,” Work said. “They have a host of operational innovations that we won’t be able to determine until we get the ships in the water.” Further, the LCS ships comprise the biggest chunk — one sixth — of the Navy’s planned 313-ship fleet. “What has this move done to the Navy’s plan?” Work asked. “It appears to me the entire LCS program is now up in the air, and that means the entire 313-ship fleet is up in the air.”

Here's some scary scenario fodder. India fighting a nuclear war on two fronts. After Testing China-Specific Missile, India Eyes ICBMs By AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, NEW DELHI DefenseNews Buoyed by the successful test of a missile that can hit China, India says it can extend its nuclear range beyond Asia, but experts say it is unlikely to take such a step for fear of upsetting the West. The launch on April 12 of the intermediate-range Agni-III missile capped New Delhi’s drive to produce a device capable of striking targets 3,500 kilometers (2,170 miles) inside China, which has an unresolved border dispute with India. The government’s Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) now says it now has the technology to build Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM) that would extend nuclear-armed India’s reach beyond Asia. “We have achieved the capability to make missiles with a range of 5,500 kilometers but the decision to develop an ICBM has to be taken by the political leadership,” DRDO chief M. Natarajan told reporters in New Delhi on April 13. Natarajan, India’s chief military scientist, said a day after the Agni-III’s test flight that the DRDO, which launched India’s guided missile development project in 1983, had already begun to design an ICBM. “DRDO scientists are working on miniaturising systems of Agni-III so that a third stage can be squeezed into the 16-meter-long missile to enable it to go up to 5,500 kilometers with the same 1.5-tonne payload,” he said. Agni-III project chief Avinash Chander told AFP that a second test of the intermediate-range missile would take place either in August or October. DRDO sources said the agency, which is also jointly developing a supersonic cruise missile with Russia, would seek New Delhi’s clearance before it actually began building an ICBM prototype after the second Agni-III test. India started working secretly on nuclear weapons after China conducted its first atomic test in 1964 — two years after Beijing fought a brief but bloody border war with its neighbor. New Delhi detonated its first atom bomb in 1974 and, 24 years later, declared itself a full-fledged nuclear weapons state following a series of tests including that of a 46-megaton-yield thermo-nuclear device. Former DRDO chief K. Santhanam said while India was capable of building an ICBM, production of one “would unnecessarily affect ties” between India and the United States, which in 2005 agreed on a historic civilian nuclear energy deal. “Even in its wildest dreams, India does not plan to be a global superpower but in the regional perspective a 3,500-plus-kilometer range IRBM is enough to deter adventurism from across our two borders,” Santhanam said, referring to Pakistan and China. Since the subcontinent’s 1947 independence, India has fought three wars with Pakistan, which declared itself a nuclear weapons state after carrying out copycat tests in 1998. “Given our robust economic growth, resurgent markets and our nuclear-tipped stockpile of (1,000-kilometer-range) Agni-Is and (2,000-kilometer) Agni-IIs, we should be satisfied as a leading regional power,” Santhanam said. Kapil Kak, director of the independent Centre for Strategic Studies think-tank, agreed. “Given the international security situation and emerging power configurations, a program to develop ICBMs is definitely unsuited for India’s interests,” he said. “It would raise hackles in the U.S.,” said Kak, a former air marshal. Sources say the DRDO’s most treasured dream — denied in public — remains the development of an ICBM with a range of 15,000 kilometers, already christened Surya or sun, to match Chinese DF-3 ICBMs that can hit U.S. cities.

I agree. This is an excellent scenario. I tried it and managed to smash everything while losing 18 aircraft. I dealt with the Long-Ranged SAMs by first hitting them with Standard or Shrike and immediately sending in the bombers while they were recovering. It seemed to work well enough for me. It didn't leave much for the bases, but I figured that I could leave the bases to the B-52s! Great scen, Tony.

The 251st NEW Harpoon scenario of the year! Last week, we released 120 New scenarios. This week, we return you to our regular programming schedule. INGRESS PROJECT PENINSULA 94 Peninsula 94 is a series of 4 related scenarios (Recon, Ingress, Strike Ops, and Egress) representing different phases of a US multi-carrier battle group attack on the Kola Peninsula. From the Russian perspective, this is the mission the navy has trained for since its beginning: defense of the homeland. These scenarios are related by a common order of battle and a concurrence of mission. Any discrepancies can be attributed to poor bomb damage assessment and better than expected damage control. They should be played in order and from the same side to appreciate the developing momentum an operation of this magnitude has. Ingress: This phase of the operation is probably the most nerve-wracking on a battle group command staff. Discovery now could mean fighting all the way to the target area and facing an alert enemy, or the cancellation of the mission, altogether. Emission control and long-range ASW operations are the order of the day. Russian search activity can be expected to increase as you close on the target. This scenario is primarily an escort mission and an exercise in staging. All capital ships must make it to their assigned operating area with time-on-station requirements. From the Russian perspective, this is an offensive submarine operation. Any battle group attempting an attack on the Kola Peninsula has to enter very heavily travelled submarine routes and should be susceptible to detection. A creditable air component will be available to prosecute any surface contacts, although particular attention should be given to support groups. This scenario is designed to illustrate that there is more than one way to skin a cat. The Russian will be tempted to attack the first contact which will be heavily defended. The key here is the support group. Get to them and the operation is over. Original author: BI Hutchison Author: Herman Hum Harpoon3.6.3 users can get the Complete Harpoon 3.6.3 Library [PlayersDB-7.4.7] Just unzip the file into your Harpoon3 folder normally found at C:\...\Harpoon3 Scenarios can also be loaded individually at: http://www.GameSquad.com/forums/downloads....o=cat&id=36 This scenario requires the latest release of the PlayersDB v7.4.7 Get it via: ughHQ, GameSquad, HarpGamer, SimHQ, PlayersDB Depot, Matrix, SubSim, or Frugal's World of Simulation. Home of the Harpoon3 PlayersDB FilesOfScenShare

China Could Use "Antiaccess" Strategies to Counter U.S. Military Superiority Rand China could employ “antiaccess” strategies to prevent U.S. military forces from deploying or operating overseas. These actions could result in defeat for the United States, in the sense that China would accomplish its military and political objectives while preventing the United States from accomplishing some or all of its objectives. The United States can take short- and long-term steps to mitigate the Chinese antiaccess threat. U.S. defense analysts are concerned about the possibility that China — a potential U.S. adversary in a conflict over Taiwan or South Korea — could employ an “antiaccess” strategy to prevent U.S. forces from deploying to a combat theater or to limit the locations from which they could operate. Such a strategy would be more attractive to China — and potentially more effective — than a force-on-force battle against the U.S. military, which remains superior to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in technology, doctrine, training, and experience. A RAND Project AIR FORCE (PAF) study of Chinese military doctrinal writings finds that China could employ several types of antiaccess strategies in a future conflict with the United States, including * pressuring such countries as Japan to limit or deny the United States the use of forward bases * striking or jamming information systems to delay the deployment of U.S. military forces or to deny the United States access to information on enemy whereabouts * disrupting U.S. logistics systems, thereby preventing the timely delivery of supplies and delaying the arrival of additional forces * attacking air bases and ports to prevent or disrupt the deployment of forces and materiel * attacking naval assets, such as aircraft carriers, to limit the United States’ ability to launch aircraft from the sea. These actions could result in defeat for the United States — not in the sense that U.S. military forces would be destroyed but in the sense that China would accomplish its military and political objectives while preventing the United States from accomplishing some or all of its objectives. The United States can do much to mitigate the Chinese antiaccess threat. The following near-term measures could be taken using existing capabilities: * Strengthen passive defenses at air bases. * Deploy air and missile defense systems near critical facilities. * Diversify basing options for aircraft. * Strengthen defenses against covert PLA operations. * Reduce the vulnerability of naval forces to attack while in port. * Reduce the vulnerability of command, control, communications, computer, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems. * Take steps to deter and to mitigate the potential effects of high-altitude nuclear detonations, which could be used to disrupt U.S. information systems. * Bolster allied capabilities to defend against attacks by missiles, aircraft, or special operatives. Taking measures such as these would strengthen deterrence of potential aggression by China. In the longer term, the United States should consider investing in new or improved capabilities, such as the following: * improved ballistic missile defenses * better capabilities for detecting, identifying, and attacking mobile, time-sensitive targets * improved land-based and advanced shipborne cruise missile defenses * improved antisubmarine warfare capabilities * improved minesweeping capabilities * an antisatellite capability and counters to antisatellite attack * improved extended-range air defense capabilities * more-effective counters to long-range surface-to-air and air-to-air missiles * early strategic and tactical warning capabilities. These measures and capabilities would help ensure that U.S. forces remain capable of responding rapidly and effectively to potential crises in the region.

How the U.S. could lose a war with China over Taiwan World Tribune Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Peter Pace inspected the honor guard during a welcome ceremony at the Defense Ministry in Beijing in late March. Pace was in Beijing to hold talks with China 's top military leaders. (AFP/Elizabeth Dalziel) The Rand Corp., a leading consultant to the Pentagon and the intelligence community, has assessed that China could defeat the United States in a war over Taiwan. Rand said Beijing has developed a strategy meant to deny the U.S. military access to the Straits of Taiwan. In a report that contrasted sharply with the optimism of several U.S. military chiefs, Rand said China could pressure Japan to deny the United States the use of bases in a conflict, strike computer systems to delay the deployment of U.S. military forces, or attack air bases and naval assets to prevent an influx of forces and supplies. "Although the United States currently has an overwhelming conventional military advantage, China could accomplish the objective of forcing Taiwan to surrender by employing an anti-access strategy of preventing enough U.S. forces from getting to the region in time," said Roger Cliff, the lead author of the report. In a study sponsored by the U.S. Air Force, Rand has recommended such measures as deploying air and missile defense systems near critical facilities, remove vulnerable ships out of port at the first sign of conflict as well as bolstering communications and computer systems. Entitled "Entering the Dragon's Lair: Chinese Anti-Access Strategies and Their Implications for the United States," the Rand report reflects the thinking of much of the Pentagon as well as the national strategic community. Many researchers said China and other adversaries have long explored strategies to block the U.S. military from operating in overseas conflicts. Among China's options, the report said, was pressuring Japan and other Asian allies to deny the United States the use of bases on their territory in a conflict. China could also jam U.S. communications and computers, disrupt logistics and attack air bases to prevent supplies to the military. "The Chinese People's Liberation Army is well aware of its own shortcomings and the United States' military superiority," Cliff said. "Instead of engaging U.S. forces head-on, they would attempt to take advantage of what they perceive to be American weaknesses—including the need to deploy and operate forces thousands of miles from home." The Rand study differed from others by and for the Pentagon regarding Chinese strategy. Unlike previous studies, Rand examined Chinese military publications to determine Beijing's anti-access options. This contrasted with previous studies that relied on "mirror imaging" techniques, in which U.S. analysts imagined a Chinese offensive. The report was released on the eve of the visit by a high-level Chinese Navy delegation to Washington. The talks were said to have focused on bilateral cooperation and Taiwan. "The Chinese are shifting from a land-centric force to an air-centric and naval-centric force, and clearly that force and capability have the potential to focus very much on the United States Navy," said Adm. Michael Mullen, chief of naval operations. Mullen told the Brookings Institution on April 3 that the Chinese Navy has met its goals in modernization and deployment. The admiral said the U.S. Navy was required to revise methods after a Chinese diesel submarine tracked and intercepted the U.S. Navy aircraft carrier Kitty Hawk off Okinawa in late 2006. "They [the Chinese Navy] predicted they were going to do certain things, build at a certain rate, have certain capabilities, and they're living up to their own expectations with respect to that as they continue to evolve," Mullen said.

We've released a new version of the Harpoon3 PlayersDB. Today’s date is 07-04-07, so the new edition is PlayersDB 7.4.7 Why have we done this? Why not just continue to add new platforms to previous PlayersDB editions like we've always done? This release is to accommodate changes implemented in the Harpoon3 ANW game engine that were causing problems for PlayersDB users. Incompatibility issues arose and have now been rectified with this new release and through the use of the Official AGSI Harpoon ANW Database editor. The main problem between H3 and ANW was the fact that diesel submarines behaved differently in the new ANW game engine. As subs changed depths, their engines would shut down and they would stop moving. A solution has been found that is compatible with both versions. Rather than run the risk of messing up someone's prior work, we've released a new version. Just continue to use the PlayersDB version specified by the scenario designer and everything will run exactly as written by the author. Get the PlayersDB 7.4.7-ANW on Gamesquad, HarpDB, or PlayersDB Depot. Get the PlayersDB 7.4.7 on Gamesquad, HarpDB, or PlayersDB Depot. The unique features and advantages of the PlayersDB remain unchanged and include: A design philosophy of "Never delete - only append" . No more crash concerns due to rock-solid stability. Ships, planes, and subs have been indexed by country for your convenience Players can now see the launch altitude of the weapons. No more guessing at the launch parameters. Numerous special weapons and special platforms for designers. If you would like to see a special capability or platform for your scenario, let us know and it will be added for you. There is ample room for specialty units and player requests. One player has already been accommodated. He wanted to try Soviet Sub-Launched Land Attack missiles from Charlie-class SSGNs so we modified the torpedo tubes to allow him to test this new feature. Old versions of the DB will be retained. This is the only certain way to guarantee compatibility. Once a scenario is built, IT STAYS BUILT unless or until the author decides that he wants to adapt it to a newer version. This means that the scenario will play EXACTLY as the author intended. Comprehensive descriptions. Detailed text for subs, ships, aircraft, and weapons. Comprehensive mine model. Mines can now be swept by minesweepers and helicopters. Home of the Harpoon3 PlayersDB FilesOfScenShare

120 MORE Harpoon scenarios! A total of 250 releases this year! On January 28, 2007, David Ennis released 117 of his personal scenarios for the Harpoon community to enjoy. At the time, this was the record for the single greatest publication of Harpoon scenarios in a single day. As records are wont to do, this one stood for just 66 days. Today, after getting permission and full consent from AGSI, we proudly release 120 Harpoon 3 scenarios for the PlayersDB. These scenarios were originally made for Harpoon2 and have now been re-made for compatibility with Harpoon3 and the PlayersDB with the consent of AGSI. With this release, more functional scenarios are currently available for the PlayersDB than for any other database in existence. For your convenience and playing enjoyment, all of these scenarios have been organized by Battleset and can be downloaded accordingly. Or, you can grab the COMPLETE library of scenarios for the PlayersDB. With a single click, you can download over 200 scenarios and install them so that they are all arranged according to Battlesets. Many thanks to Frans Koenz and PlayersDB Depot for moving mountains to get these files hosted. Harpoon ANW users can get them at: Complete Harpoon ANW Library [PlayersDB-7.4.7-ANW] Cold War Battleset [PlayersDB-7.4.7-ANW] Global Conflicts 1 Battleset [PlayersDB-7.4.7-ANW] Global Conflicts 2 Battleset [PlayersDB-7.4.7-ANW] Global Conflicts 3 Battleset [PlayersDB-7.4.7-ANW] Regional Conflicts 1 Battleset [PlayersDB-7.4.7-ANW] Regional Conflicts 2 Battleset [PlayersDB-7.4.7-ANW] Tutorial Battleset [PlayersDB-7.4.7-ANW] WestPac Battleset [PlayersDB-7.4.7-ANW] Just unzip the file into C:\Matrix Games\Harpoon 3 Advanced Naval Warfare\Databases Scenarios can also be loaded individually at: http://www.GameSquad.com/forums/downloads....=cat&id=118 These scenarios specifically require the PlayersDB v7.4.7-ANW which can be found: http://www.GameSquad.com/forums/downloads....=cat&id=119 Home of the Harpoon3 PlayersDB FilesOfScenShare

120 MORE Harpoon scenarios! A total of 250 releases this year! On January 28, 2007, David Ennis released 117 of his personal scenarios for the Harpoon community to enjoy. At the time, this was the record for the single greatest publication of Harpoon scenarios in a single day. As records are wont to do, this one stood for just 66 days. Today, after getting permission and full consent from AGSI, we proudly release 120 Harpoon 3 scenarios for the PlayersDB. These scenarios were originally made for Harpoon2 and have now been re-made for compatibility with Harpoon3 and the PlayersDB with the consent of AGSI. With this release, more functional scenarios are currently available for the PlayersDB than for any other database in existence. For your convenience and playing enjoyment, all of these scenarios have been organized by Battleset and can be downloaded accordingly. Or, you can grab the COMPLETE library of scenarios for the PlayersDB. With a single click, you can download over 200 scenarios and install them so that they are all arranged according to Battlesets. Many thanks to Frans Koenz and PlayersDB Depot for moving mountains to get these files hosted. Harpoon3.6.3 users can get them at: Complete Harpoon 3.6.3 Library [PlayersDB-7.4.7] Cold War Battleset [PlayersDB-7.4.7] Global Conflicts 1 Battleset [PlayersDB-7.4.7] Global Conflicts 2 Battleset [PlayersDB-7.4.7] Global Conflicts 3 Battleset [PlayersDB-7.4.7] Regional Conflicts 1 Battleset [PlayersDB-7.4.7] Regional Conflicts 2 Battleset [PlayersDB-7.4.7] Tutorial Battleset [PlayersDB-7.4.7] WestPac Battleset [PlayersDB-7.4.7] Just unzip the file into C:\Harpoon3 Scenarios can also be loaded individually at: http://www.GameSquad.com/forums/downloads....o=cat&id=36 These scenarios specifically require the PlayersDB v7.4.7 which can be found: http://www.GameSquad.com/forums/downloads....o=cat&id=51 Just unzip the file into C:\Harpoon3 Home of the Harpoon3 PlayersDB FilesOfScenShare

Here's an excellent After Action Report by Ralf Koelbach. It is re-printed here with at the request of the author. „Project Peninsula 94: Reconnaissance“ Scenario designed by Herman Hum Based on an original Harpoon Classic HDS-II-scenario Database: Players DB 6.4.9 A. Foreword: Herman likes to rebuild HC scens, especially those of the HC HDS-II-Battleset, with AGSIs permission. “Reconnaissance” is part of a group of scenarios which belong thematically together. The Nato side has eight first line subs and a very difficult mission: First to get six subs in designated search areas. Second, keeping them six hours there – weapons tight. After that weapons are free and the subs have to kill Soviet HVUs. Scenario duration is 36 hours. B. My experience It all starts on January 3rd, 1993, at 10:53 PM. I set course for six subs to the designated areas, some of them being already close to it. Therefore I set my subs to deep and speed to cruise at most. Soon it becomes clear that there are lots of Soviet ships and subs underway. This is a grave problem for SSN Omaha, already being in shallow waters without much space to hide. 11:17 PM Bogie over SSN Dallas. Dallas detects several support vessels crawling around. Nearby is the CVHG Adm. Gorshkov, another target. 11:54 PM Phibs detected. So now I had contacts on several targets to sink after the six hours period of waiting. January, 4th, 1993 00:25 AM The first subs, SSN Dallas and SSN Augusta, have reached the search zones. I send them deep, crawling. 08:00 AM For subs are now on station. Still underway are SSN Omaha and SSN Groton (this one has about 150nm to go and a lot of ships and subs nearby). 09:35 AM SSN Cincinatti has a visitor only 5 nm away – a red sub. Has he got me? Another skunk closing in. I decide to shoot. Both killed with torpedoes. 11:20 AM SSN Omaha has reached its search zone – at least. 11:37 AM SSN Birmingham reports torpedo contact. No problem. Contact fades out. 08:00 PM SSN Groton detects a sub right in front. Evade! 40nm left to go to designated area. 09:23 PM Ships over SSN Dallas! Has the sub been detected? What to do? Too many skunks to sink…. January, 5th, 1993 00:36 AM SSN Groton has reached its search zone. Now all six subs have made it. From now on six hours weapons tight. Then the duck shoot can start. Sometime between 01:00 AM and 02:00AM SSN Dallas has been sunken. Just did not notice it. Six subs, six search areas – hard to handle. Anyway: Dallas had been on station for more than six hours. Thus it is not so bad. 02:03 AM SSN Augusta has been detected! Several ships and subs closing it. No chance to evade, I guess. Ok – head to head. What marvellous subs these 688s are! The Augusta sinks several ships and at least one sub with MK48s. Then the path is clear and she evades. 06:36 AM The last six hours period ends – weapons free! The subs get new courses and start prosecuting the HVUs. I am rather sure I´ll get the targets. 10:53 AM Defeat! Game time is over. 36 hours are gone. C. Resume I missed my chance winning this one by losing too much time with the SSN Groton heading for its search area. I had to risk more and accelerate the sub to cruise or full speed. That could have saved me some hours and therefore the game. All in all this is a real nice remake of the original scenario. I really had a lot of fun. Thank you for rebuilding it, Herman! Ralf Home of the Harpoon3 PlayersDB FilesOfScenShare

Argentina planned to blow up warship in Gibraltar during the Falklands War By Graham Keeley in Barcelona Published: 04 April 2007 TheIndependent It was a spy story with a plot out of James Bond. During the Falklands War, Argentina planned to blow up a British warship in Gibraltar. The main protagonist was a former left-wing guerrilla turned spy who specialised in mine attacks on warships. A Spanish film-maker, Jesus Mora, has made a documentary about Operation Algeciras. For many years, no one in authority would admit the plot existed but Mora got the former Spanish prime minister Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo and the chief of the Argentine navy at the time, Admiral Jorge Anaya, to confirm it. Mora tracked down the leader of the spy team, Maximo Nicoletti, a former member of the left-wing Argentinean guerrillas Los Montoneros. Nicoletti, whose father served in the Italian navy's underwater demolition team during the Second World War, had been involved in a mine attack on the Argentine navy destroyer Santisima Trinidad in 1975. He was arrested after the military coup in 1976 and sent to the Navy Mechanics School in Buenos Aires. He co-operated with the military rather than face torture. After the Argentine invasion of the Falklands in April 1982, Nicoletti was recruited to attack a British ship in Gibraltar, the point of departure for the task force. On 11 April 1982, he and two former guerrillas travelled to Spain on false passports made by the Montoneros. The men travelled under the command of a spy, a former navy officer, Hector Rosales. Admiral Anaya says: "My instructions were that they not do anything that could harm Spain and to attack only warships flying the British flag." A contact at the embassy in Madrid provided explosives. Nicoletti said: "Every time we saw a potential target, Hector phoned Buenos Aires to request authorisation. On 2 May, a missile frigate and a military transport ship entered the port, but they did not give us the green light because they were negotiating at the time." That same night, however, the British submarine Conqueror sank the cruiser General Belgrano, killing 323 sailors. On 30 May, a British corvette entered Gibraltar and the Argentine saboteurs decided to attack the next day. But on the day of the planned attack, the men were arrested by police looking for Argentine bank robbers,with the team's rental of three vehicles on a weekly basis having raised suspicions.