How the U.S. could lose a war with China over Taiwan

World Tribune

 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Peter Pace inspected the honor guard during a welcome ceremony at the Defense Ministry in Beijing in late March. Pace was in Beijing to hold talks with China 's top military leaders. (AFP/Elizabeth Dalziel)

 

The Rand Corp., a leading consultant to the Pentagon and the intelligence community, has assessed that China could defeat the United States in a war over Taiwan.

 

Rand said Beijing has developed a strategy meant to deny the U.S. military access to the Straits of Taiwan.

 

In a report that contrasted sharply with the optimism of several U.S. military chiefs, Rand said China could pressure Japan to deny the United States the use of bases in a conflict, strike computer systems to delay the deployment of U.S. military forces, or attack air bases and naval assets to prevent an influx of forces and supplies.

 

"Although the United States currently has an overwhelming conventional military advantage, China could accomplish the objective of forcing Taiwan to surrender by employing an anti-access strategy of preventing enough U.S. forces from getting to the region in time," said Roger Cliff, the lead author of the report.

 

In a study sponsored by the U.S. Air Force, Rand has recommended such measures as deploying air and missile defense systems near critical facilities, remove vulnerable ships out of port at the first sign of conflict as well as bolstering communications and computer systems.

 

Entitled "Entering the Dragon's Lair: Chinese Anti-Access Strategies and Their Implications for the United States," the Rand report reflects the thinking of much of the Pentagon as well as the national strategic community. Many researchers said China and other adversaries have long explored strategies to block the U.S. military from operating in overseas conflicts.

 

Among China's options, the report said, was pressuring Japan and other Asian allies to deny the United States the use of bases on their territory in a conflict. China could also jam U.S. communications and computers, disrupt logistics and attack air bases to prevent supplies to the military.

 

"The Chinese People's Liberation Army is well aware of its own shortcomings and the United States' military superiority," Cliff said. "Instead of engaging U.S. forces head-on, they would attempt to take advantage of what they perceive to be American weaknesses—including the need to deploy and operate forces thousands of miles from home."

 

The Rand study differed from others by and for the Pentagon regarding Chinese strategy. Unlike previous studies, Rand examined Chinese military publications to determine Beijing's anti-access options. This contrasted with previous studies that relied on "mirror imaging" techniques, in which U.S. analysts imagined a Chinese offensive.

 

The report was released on the eve of the visit by a high-level Chinese Navy delegation to Washington. The talks were said to have focused on bilateral cooperation and Taiwan.

 

"The Chinese are shifting from a land-centric force to an air-centric and naval-centric force, and clearly that force and capability have the potential to focus very much on the United States Navy," said Adm. Michael Mullen, chief of naval operations.

 

Mullen told the Brookings Institution on April 3 that the Chinese Navy has met its goals in modernization and deployment. The admiral said the U.S. Navy was required to revise methods after a Chinese diesel submarine tracked and intercepted the U.S. Navy aircraft carrier Kitty Hawk off Okinawa in late 2006.

 

"They [the Chinese Navy] predicted they were going to do certain things, build at a certain rate, have certain capabilities, and they're living up to their own expectations with respect to that as they continue to evolve," Mullen said.

China Could Use "Antiaccess" Strategies to Counter U.S. Military Superiority

Rand

 

China could employ “antiaccess” strategies to prevent U.S. military forces from deploying or operating overseas. These actions could result in defeat for the United States, in the sense that China would accomplish its military and political objectives while preventing the United States from accomplishing some or all of its objectives. The United States can take short- and long-term steps to mitigate the Chinese antiaccess threat.

 

U.S. defense analysts are concerned about the possibility that China — a potential U.S. adversary in a conflict over Taiwan or South Korea — could employ an “antiaccess” strategy to prevent U.S. forces from deploying to a combat theater or to limit the locations from which they could operate. Such a strategy would be more attractive to China — and potentially more effective — than a force-on-force battle against the U.S. military, which remains superior to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in technology, doctrine, training, and experience.

 

A RAND Project AIR FORCE (PAF) study of Chinese military doctrinal writings finds that China could employ several types of antiaccess strategies in a future conflict with the United States, including

 

* pressuring such countries as Japan to limit or deny the United States the use of forward bases

* striking or jamming information systems to delay the deployment of U.S. military forces or to deny the United States access to information on enemy whereabouts

* disrupting U.S. logistics systems, thereby preventing the timely delivery of supplies and delaying the arrival of additional forces

* attacking air bases and ports to prevent or disrupt the deployment of forces and materiel

* attacking naval assets, such as aircraft carriers, to limit the United States’ ability to launch aircraft from the sea.

 

These actions could result in defeat for the United States — not in the sense that U.S. military forces would be destroyed but in the sense that China would accomplish its military and political objectives while preventing the United States from accomplishing some or all of its objectives.

 

The United States can do much to mitigate the Chinese antiaccess threat. The following near-term measures could be taken using existing capabilities:

 

* Strengthen passive defenses at air bases.

* Deploy air and missile defense systems near critical facilities.

* Diversify basing options for aircraft.

* Strengthen defenses against covert PLA operations.

* Reduce the vulnerability of naval forces to attack while in port.

* Reduce the vulnerability of command, control, communications, computer, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems.

* Take steps to deter and to mitigate the potential effects of high-altitude nuclear detonations, which could be used to disrupt U.S. information systems.

* Bolster allied capabilities to defend against attacks by missiles, aircraft, or special operatives.

 

Taking measures such as these would strengthen deterrence of potential aggression by China.

 

In the longer term, the United States should consider investing in new or improved capabilities, such as the following:

 

* improved ballistic missile defenses

* better capabilities for detecting, identifying, and attacking mobile, time-sensitive targets

* improved land-based and advanced shipborne cruise missile defenses

* improved antisubmarine warfare capabilities

* improved minesweeping capabilities

* an antisatellite capability and counters to antisatellite attack

* improved extended-range air defense capabilities

* more-effective counters to long-range surface-to-air and air-to-air missiles

* early strategic and tactical warning capabilities.

 

These measures and capabilities would help ensure that U.S. forces remain capable of responding rapidly and effectively to potential crises in the region.