pmaidhof

From the navel-technology website provided by PeterG, the take aways are: "In a typical four-hour 'relocation on call' operation, the helicopter would take: 35 minutes to reach the area of operation; 20 minutes releasing sonobuoys; two hours on surveillance in the area of operations; 30 minutes releasing torpedoes; and 35 minutes to return to ship and land, with 20 minutes in reserve. In a typical four-hour 'screening' operation, the helicopter would take: 15 minutes to reach the area of operation; three hours and 30 minutes in the operations zone carrying out 11 consecutive cycles of ten-minute sonar dipping; and 15 minutes to return to the ship and land, with 20 minutes reserve."

Noted. Just the commentary is, for the most part, all you. Come on D, we wanna root, root, root for the home team. If they don't win it's a shame.

Peter Grining chimed in over on the Yahoo AT Group. I will plug in his ideas, continuing a change I made earlier, making a using a Type 212 which is rated "Very Quiet". I'll be sure to post what I find out. Tony's Combat Plotter mod will be credited with an "assist" (think hockey). Birthday Boy...out.

Dewayne needs to hire a Minister of Propaganda to get word of his battlefield successes, real or contrived, out there for us onlookers. Perception is reality, I think I may be checking out the local Berlitz Language School if you aren't able to show some results in slowing down the "rays" of the rising sun.

Well that that about explains why the Marines didn't board. I must admit the charge when grabing the "fast rope" and peering out the back of a CH-46 and all you see is the white water behind the ship you intend to land on. Plus the weight of all the ammo and comm gear that you are carrying really puts the "FAST" into fast roping.

During my time afloat in the Mediterranean, we practiced continually for the "Reinforcement of Unarmed Shipping" mission (RUSEX). It was reactive to the Palestinian Hijacking of the Achilli Lauro cruise ship, and subsequent murder of a wheelchair bound US citizen on board. Seems like the current “Maritime Interdiction†mission is somewhat similar. I wonder how it would have played out had a reinforced patoon of Marines fast-roped onto the ship by helo, while it was still in international waters. "Get a little, or get a lot, but definitely get some."

Wahoo!

yep MH-60R, my bad. Thanks, maybe I'll post to Yahoo AT, see if we can get a Bond edict...sounds worthy enough.

In layman's terms what would be the sequence of action for a MH-60B dropping sonar buoys in search of an anticipated, not necessarily suspected diesel electric sub. I'm solo'ing part of that HNR03 LCS scenario again. Right now, the convoy is reaching a choke point and Red diesel electic boat is missing from the port it was last seen. An MH-60B has been punched out. Scale at the moment is 1"=1nm. I have set up a 10x10 square inch box (using 1" square graph paper, with 10 sub-divisions per "box"). I roll a D10 to come up with which box the DE boat is in, then roll 2D10 to come up with a four digit grid coordinate for its exact location. I then do the same for the MH-60B. This gives me arbitrary start points. The MH-60B will then drop one of its SB's at the start point. It would be a Passive SB at this point - correct? Once they detect something, I assume that the helo would then drop an active one to try and bracket the sub. Are there some general search patterns - like a lazy figure 8 or something like that? How often, or far apart from the previous, would the helo drop a passive SB while it is still drawing straws? Finally, rules indicate that SB's can be dropped into Shallow or Intermediate I depth. Would it be correct to assume that an SB would only be able to detect contacts within its current depth level only. Thanks, Pete

Now will they have the "de Gaulle" to use them? Will we - is it in the HCDB? LCAC, Gazelle, did you notice what type of helo is used for assault support? Some type of PUMA? I could see it in an H4 scenario when the new GCS rules come out.

Mideast Militants Gain Footholds Lebanon Standoff Shows Spread Of al Qaeda-Style Extremism By Bill Spindle and Cam Simpson The standoff in Lebanon between a group of armed extremists and the Lebanese military, now in its second week, vividly shows how political turbulence in the Middle East has helped a new breed of al Qaeda-style militants gain footholds where they had rarely been active on such a scale. In Lebanon, the Fatah Islam militant group now holed up inside a Palestinian refugee camp has capitalized on the crosscurrents of conflict in the region -- from Iraq to Lebanon and the Palestinian territories -- to recruit followers, cultivate support and establish bases of operation. Similar groups are doing the same from the Sinai Desert to the Gaza Strip and Jordan. Shakir al-Abssi, the leader of Fatah Islam in Lebanon, is wanted in Jordan for allegedly helping to assassinate a U.S. diplomat in 2002, and was released from a Syrian jail last year. He established a base in northern Lebanon under the nose of a U.S.-friendly government, then attracted hundreds of fighters from Lebanon and as far away as Saudi Arabia, Yemen and Morocco. Dozens of them have been hardened in Iraq, according to government and security officials, refugees from the camp where the group was based and community leaders. Now the siege inside the camp threatens Lebanon's political stability. Yesterday, the Lebanese government continued trying to broker a peaceful end to the showdown after it received an emergency shipment of military hardware from the U.S. to equip Lebanese soldiers for a final confrontation. At least 30 Lebanese soldiers and intelligence officials have been killed so far. The expanding activities of dozens of groups such as Fatah Islam across the region have alarmed traditional powers, from the Israeli government to establishment Muslim religious leaders. "Every day a new movement is born. This presence is an expansion of the al Qaeda movement," said Fathi Yakan, a Tripoli cleric. Israeli and Palestinian security chiefs, although they disagree on much, have grown deeply concerned as they have watched the spread of al Qaeda-inspired militants in the Palestinian territory of Gaza, as well as in Jordan and the Egyptian-controlled Sinai Desert. Last week, a militant faction linked to one of the largest and most powerful clans in Gaza issued a statement pledging support to the leader of Fatah Islam and denouncing Lebanese Shiite Muslim groups in language echoing al Qaeda rhetoric. The statement followed a string of violent activities by shadowy organizations in Gaza, including firebombings of Internet cafés, libraries, cultural centers and other businesses and organizations denounced by these extremists as impure or potentially corrupting. Two weeks ago, extremists rallied against a children's festival held in an elementary school run by the United Nations, denouncing the event as anti-Islamic. A melee erupted, the school was bombed, and a gunfight ensued when protesters tried to enter by force. "These ideas... are endangering the whole situation in the region," said Jabril Rajoub, the chief security adviser to Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, adding that the spread of al Qaeda's ideology in the Palestinian territories "should make every Palestinian worry." Al Qaeda-style cells also have been cracked in Jordan, where Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, perhaps the most notorious of the new al Qaeda militants, became radicalized. He led some of the most violent sectarian assaults inside Iraq before U.S. forces killed him there nearly a year ago. Jordanian authorities also have alleged that Mr. Zarqawi plotted with Mr. Abssi, the man leading the militants holed up near Tripoli. Mr. Abssi, a Palestinian who was trained to fly Soviet fighter jets, is a charismatic figure who once was a diehard Marxist, says Abd al-Fattah Ghanem, a former member of a previous group to which Mr. Abssi belonged. In 2001 and 2002, during a visit to Damascus, Syria, Mr. Ghanem says he noticed a change in Mr. Abssi. "He started to become more religious, in the way he spoke and in every part of his life," Mr. Ghanem recalls. Amid the rise of the terrorist group al Qaeda and its leader Osama bin Laden, he says, Mr. Abssi also was becoming increasingly frustrated with what he saw as a lack of progress by Palestinian militant groups based in Syria. Another key event in Mr. Abssi's recent evolution, according to Mr. Ghanem, appears to have been Mr. Abssi's incarceration by the Syrian government, which says it jailed the militant leader for three years beginning in 2003. The Syrians haven't said precisely why he was jailed, but Lebanese intelligence officials say they believe it was to stop him from recruiting militants to go to Iraq as the U.S. government pressured the Syrians to stem the flow of foreign insurgents. After leaving Syrian custody, Mr. Abssi went across the border to Lebanon and assembled a group of extremists who likely had been fighting in Iraq, Lebanese officials say. After a clash with residents in one Palestinian refugee camp near Tripoli, the group moved into the Nahr el-Bared camp. The camps are run by the residents as enclaves outside the control of the Lebanese authorities. The group members kept mostly to themselves, living and training on the outskirts of the camp. Many appeared to be from Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Somalia and Syria, residents said. While the fighters' goals of challenging Israel and the U.S. resonated with many, camp residents were also frightened of them and worried they would cause problems. "They're extremely militant. We asked them to leave," said Ahmad Yassin, a 47-year-old resident who fled with his family during a pause in the recent siege. But the group did make inroads, with a few residents even agreeing to marry group members, Lebanese officials and camp residents say. Lebanese government officials, who have been aware of the group since December, say they were observing members but couldn't root them out of the camp because of longstanding agreements with Palestinian factions not to enter the camps. Some of the group's activities outside the camp have convinced Lebanese government officials that Mr. Abssi had another agenda: stirring up trouble in Lebanon at the behest of Syria, especially as the U.N. Security Council considers setting up a tribunal to investigate the 2005 assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. Syria says it has nothing to do with the group's activities, and Syrian officials say their jailing of Mr. Abssi is evidence they don't support his activities. They deny all allegations that they were involved in Mr. Hariri's death. --Jay Solomon in Washington contributed to this article.

Musharraf's Grip Falters In Pakistan Nationwide protests push the U.S.-backed general into a corner. By Laura King, Times Staff Writer ISLAMABAD, PAKISTAN — When President Perez Musharraf survived back-to-back assassination attempts in 2003, he might have thought the worst was behind him. But now, after easily quelling any threat to his power during eight years of military rule, the general appears trapped in a labyrinth of his own making. His attempt 2 1/2 months ago to sideline Pakistan's independent-minded chief justice touched off nationwide protests that have coalesced into a full-blown pro-democracy movement. Islamic militants have established a firm foothold in the tribal borderlands, and vigilante-style followers of a radical cleric here in the capital have been kidnapping police officers and menacing those they consider to be promoting a licentious lifestyle. Musharraf's supporters are widely blamed for bloody street fighting this month in Pakistan's largest city, Karachi, which killed more than 45 people, many of them workers for opposition political parties. And the general's once-polished speeches and public statements lately have taken on a tone that alternates between shrill accusations and near-tearful pleas for understanding. Longtime political allies are beginning to distance themselves from the 63-year-old Pakistani leader. And although top generals appear to be standing by him, even government ministers are silent in the face of withering criticism of his rule, or offering only tepid support. "His position has become untenable, unsustainable," said author and analyst Ahmed Rashid. "I don't see how he can hang on," said journalist Zahid Hussain. Musharraf faces stark choices, analysts say. He could hunker down and try to ride out the crisis, or move to declare martial law. He could seek to strike a deal with opposition figures, who are likely to spurn him. Or he could step aside. "It's a scenario that could play out over some time, or could play out quite quickly," said Teresita C. Schaffer, director for South Asia affairs at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. "My experience is that in Pakistan, when things are in decline, they don't go down a sloping ramp; it's a series of steep stair steps." The United States is increasingly viewed as the main power propping up Musharraf in the face of calls that he resign as army chief, allow the creation of an interim government and call free and fair elections. Some observers warn that the Bush administration's continuing support for Musharraf at this crucial juncture could threaten long-term U.S. interests in Pakistan, a nuclear-armed state considered an indispensable ally in the fight against Islamic insurgents across the border in Afghanistan. "There's a huge disappointment over the American position, a real sense that it is a shortsighted one," said Samina Ahmed, South Asia project director at the Brussels-based International Crisis Group. "This didn't happen overnight. Every military government at some point loses its legitimacy." For the time being, the general appears to still have the backing of his patrons in the Bush administration, with whom he cast his lot after the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks. That relationship has been clouded, however, by allegations that Musharraf's intelligence services remain entangled with Islamic militants, including the Taliban. "Are we pulling away from Musharraf? No," said a U.S. diplomat, who spoke on condition that she not be named. "Because that would be pulling away from the government of Pakistan…. We will not draw away from this relationship." The conventional wisdom has always held that Musharraf is a bulwark against Islamic fundamentalists, and that without him, the country could slide into a chaos that extremist groups would exploit. But opposition parties insist that free and fair elections could instead empower a moderate, Western-leaning regime. Islamist parties won only about 12% of the vote in the last elections, in 2002, and many believe they would draw less support now. "There's this perception that if Musharraf goes, in come the Taliban," said Sherry Rehman, a lawmaker with the Pakistan People's Party, the political home of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, now living in exile. "That's really not the case." Although they clearly have self-interest at stake, opposition leaders insist that the groundswell of support for Chief Justice Iftikhar Mohammed Chaudhry, whom Musharraf is trying to oust, has become a larger renunciation of military rule. "I see this as a national movement. People with no previous interest in politics are saying to us, 'Keep up the pressure,' " said Ahsan Iqbal, a spokesman for the party of former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, who also lives in exile. "Over the past six or seven years, you have had so many drops of water filling a glass, and finally it spills over." Musharraf derives much of his authority from his position as commander in chief, and he has resisted repeated calls from domestic opponents and the international community — though not the United States — to relinquish his army post. In an interview last week with the BBC, he described his military uniform as a "second skin" and said he could not imagine giving it up. Senior army generals have derived enormous benefit from Musharraf's close ties to Washington, and many analysts doubt they are willing to push him aside — at least, not yet. "At the moment, they haven't turned against him. It's too early," said author Rashid, who has written extensively about Pakistani politics and Islamic extremists. But there is general agreement that if the senior military echelon were to decide at some point that Musharraf had become a liability, he would have little choice but to go. "The endgame, whatever it turns out to be, will come from the military," said Hussain, senior editor at the Pakistani magazine Newsline. Until the current turmoil erupted, Musharraf had planned to have himself reelected president by the sitting parliament, which his coalition controls, rather than waiting until after a new parliament is elected toward the end of the year. Groups including the New York-based Human Rights Watch say such a mandate would be a sham. Chaudhry, the chief justice at the center of the controversy, had signaled that he would entertain challenges on constitutional grounds to Musharraf's election plan, and to his retention of his military post if he sought reelection. Even those close to Musharraf acknowledge that splits are surfacing not only within his ruling coalition, but also within his party. Last week, longtime political ally Mir Zafarullah Khan Jamali, a former prime minister, resigned as a member of the ruling Pakistan Muslim League party without any explanation. The general's defenders, most of them in senior government posts, say he retains the support of the people. "Things are not always as bad as they seem," said Minister of State for Information Tariq Azim Khan, who also serves as a spokesman for the ruling party. "What is happening is that the opposition parties are using a purely legal issue for political purposes." Many observers believe Musharraf might have weathered this storm if not for the outbreak of violence May 12 in Karachi, when Chaudhry tried to travel to the city to address supporters. Gunmen from the Muttahida Quami Movement, a pro-Musharraf party, blockaded the road into the city and fired on opposition gatherings. The bloodshed makes it almost impossible for opposition leaders, including Bhutto, to strike any kind of power-sharing deal with the general. And opponents are growing bolder. The chief justice, making his first public statement since the start of the crisis, declared on nationwide television Saturday that "absolute power corrupts absolutely," an unmistakable swipe at Musharraf. The president, for his part, continues to make the public rounds, though usually appearing before crowds of handpicked supporters. At one such appearance last week in the northern town of Mansehra, he appeared sweaty and distraught as he accused opponents of conspiring against him. "It will be a day of supreme grief if these lies and deceptions triumph over truth and reality," said the general, who was clad in a traditional white Pakistani tunic rather than his uniform. "That would be a sad day for Pakistan, a day that would make me weep."

Jihadists Moving Into Lebanon From Syria By Christopher Allbritton, Washington Times NAHR EL-BARED, Lebanon -- Heavily armed foreign jihadists have been entering Lebanon from Syria from around the time Western authorities noticed a drop in the infiltration of foreign fighters from Syria to Iraq, Lebanese officials say. Syrian authorities, hoping to disrupt Lebanon so they can reassert control of the country, "have stopped sending [the jihadists] to Iraq and are now sending them here," charged Mohammed Salam, a specialist in Palestinian affairs in Lebanon. "They sent those people to die in Lebanon." Maj. Gen. Ashraf Rifi, commander of Lebanon's Internal Security Forces, said about half of the militants who have been battling Lebanese forces in the Nahr el-Bared refugee camp outside Tripoli for nine days had fought previously in Iraq. "They are very dangerous," he said in an interview. "We have no choice, we have to combat them." Officials traveling with Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said before Miss Rice's meeting with her Syrian counterpart in Egypt early this month that Syria appeared to be taking "positive" steps to guard its border with Iraq, resulting in a reduced number of jihadists crossing the border. But U.N. officials running the Nahr el-Bared camp told The Washington Times that a large band of foreigners carrying mortars, rockets, explosive belts and other heavy weapons entered the camp in a group several months ago. That is near the time that infiltration of militants from Syria into Iraq fell off, according to Lebanese authorities, who suspect the jihadists were simply redirected by Damascus. Several thousand residents have been trapped in the Palestinian refugee camp since fighting broke out May 20 between the army and several hundred militants of a group called Fatah Islam, which includes a large number of foreign fighters. Palestinian leaders tried yesterday to negotiate an end to the standoff, in which Lebanese army forces are ringed around the camp, but Prime Minister Fuad Siniora insisted that the militants surrender and face justice. Gen. Rifi said the foreigners began arriving in Lebanon during the war between Hezbollah and Israel last summer, when between 60 and 70 jihadists were integrated into Fatah al-Intifada, a group set up by Syrian intelligence in the 1980s. In November last year, a Palestinian with Jordanian citizenship named Shaker Youssef al-Absi broke with Fatah al-Intifada and set up a new group, Fatah Islam, based in the Nahr el-Bared camp. Gen. Rifi said Fatah Islam has about 250 fighters, of which about 50 have been killed so far. "They are parasites," the general said. "Even in Nahr el-Bared, there are not a lot of Palestinians with Fatah Islam." The original group had about 30 to 40 Lebanese members and 20 Palestinians in the leadership positions, Gen. Rifi said. The rest were made up of fighters from Jordan, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Yemen, Algeria and even from as far as Bangladesh. Residents of the camp appear to have been terrorized by the jihadists, according to interviews with Palestinians who fled for their lives over the past week. The militants "were shooting at anyone who moved," said one refugee who declined to give his name. He said he could tell they were foreign by listening to their accents, but his wife shushed him and he said no more. Gen. Rifi said there are several more cells of foreign jihadists scattered around Lebanon. Some are in the Palestinian camps, some are in Tripoli and some are in Beirut. Another government official said some were based in the Bekaa Valley. "Some [Gulf] Arabs, originally from al Qaeda, joined the group," Gen. Rifi said. "But they are false al Qaeda. Our al Qaeda is made in Syria." Money for the fighters comes from local criminal activities, such as bank robberies -- one of which sparked the current standoff -- and support from Gulf countries and "local politicians," said a senior regional military source. "They're part of the global jihad," he said. Many government supporters think the timing of this flare-up, given an upcoming U.N. Security Council vote on the formation of an international tribunal to investigate the murder of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, indicates Syria's involvement. "It's actually a Syrian-sponsored and -coordinated move to send these jihadis into Lebanon to topple the regime," said Mr. Salam. Syria has been using the militant Shi'ite group Hezbollah to advance its interests in Lebanon, but Mr. Salam suggested Damascus was worried about inflaming religious tensions with the Sunni-led government that could spill over into Syria. The Syrians "wouldn't mind demolishing Lebanon, but they didn't want to do it with a Sunni-Shi'ite war because that could cross the border into Syria. So they got Sunnis to fight Sunnis," the analyst said. [Pete's editorial comment: Has the US/West no leverage with Syria? Doesn't this article at least partly support the theory or existence of a global war on terrorism?]

Here is a map of the general area fought over today. It is a couple of klicks north of yesterdays map.

Battle of the Garagiola River – Test 2 1. OPFOR tanks changed to T-72M as in previous test. 2. Turns ran at one minute interval for the reconnaissance screen being conducted by the LAR Company 3. LAR Company reinforced with an LAV-AT section. 4. 2x TRP provided to OPFOR and LAR Company. 5. Entire Mechanized Rifle Regiment attacks toward Tragedia-Androida 6. LAR GUARDS and Co. I DEFENDS along the Garagiola between the Garagiola and Tragedia Bridges inclusive. 7. US tank company, Co. K, Co. L, TOW Section maneuver NNE in a flanking movement to attempt a single envelopment of the enemy main force. 8. Visibility 3500, Thermal 4000m. 0700-0705 US: LAR reports 2x T-72M companies at and just forward of Check Point 68. Call for artillery and air support. OPFOR: Nothing Lead elements at Check Point 68. 0706-0710 US: LAR engages lead enemy units with ATGM fire. 81mm Platoon is FIRECAP. He/ICM mix impacts on enemy lead unit. Enemy mechanized units passing Check Point 68. One airstrike aborted by enemy SAM. Dash-2 was off target. LAV-AT to displace when enemy forces reach range of 2000m. Enemy now at 2400m. Maneuvering units are making slow headway, lead unit is still 2km from Cujo Bridge. TOW Section is in position over watching Tragedia Bridge from a position 1km west of Androida. OPFOR Lead units taking heavy ATGM fire from Tragedia. Also severe artillery ICM strikes. Enemy airstrikes have been largely ineffective. Get fires onto Tragedia! 0711-0720 US: Enemy tanks open up on one of LAR’s flanking platoon, SW of Tragedia with heavy losses. Co. I is completely deployed. Lead elements of the flanking force are across the Cujo Bridge. Lead enemy units pass through Tragedia, engaged by TOW overwatch. ICM ammo runs out. No air currently available. No significant enemy forces east of Tragedia. OPFOR: Lead units emerge from east side of Tragedia, meet heavy ATGM fire from the heights on the far side of the river. Murderous ATGM fire from the heights. 0721-0725 US: LAR engaging enemy follow on forces west of Tragedia. Enemy mechanized forces about to enter Tragedia. OPFOR: The 3rd Tank Battalion has become combat ineffective. 1st Mechanized Battalion is about to enter Tragedia. Establish a defensive position there. Await 2nd Mech Battalion to pass through and capture the Tragedia Bridge. 0726-0735 US: Running low on 155mm HE Quick. ICM is long gone. The tank company has crossed the Cujo Bridge. Lead elements of the flanking force are almost in position, will need time to consolidate before striking South. LAR engages enemy mech company moving about in Tragedia. Comes of for the worse. Long-range TOW shots hammer that same mech company, but displaces after return missile fire. No losses reported. OPFOR: 1st Mech Bn establishes a defensive position in Tragedia. 2nd Mech Bn reaches the western outskirts of Tragedia. Enemy ATGM units on the heights are taking a terrible toll on anything moving in Tragedia. Ineffectual indirect fire attempts to suppress them. 0736-0745 US: A Co K platoon makes its dismount point too close and is engaged and destroyed by an enemy mech company moving along the highway west of Tragedia. OPFOR: Enemy mechanized infantry on our left flank. Immediate Action: Contact Left! 2nd MRB reports to Regiment, strong enemy forces attacking from the north along 51 Eastings. We are decisively engaged in a hasty defense. Regiment orders 2nd MRB to halt enemy attack, denying them the opportunity to interdict the east-west hardball road. 1st MRB is to hold Tragedia. Regiment reports to division that enemy forces have made a strong defensive stand at the Garagiola River. Stragglers from 1st Mechanized Battalion and 3rd Tank Battalion strung out along the MSR report that survivors indicate 2nd MRB has been defeated in the hills WNW of Tragedia. End: Elements of one MRB effectively cut off in Tragedia. Kilo Co essentially destroyed. LAR Company essentially destroyed. Tank company, 41% M60A1 losses (7 or 17). 30x T-72M and 35x BMP-2 destroyed. Lessons Learned: 1. LAV-25 did not engage T-72M, even from flank/rear. 2. LAV-AT needs to displace prior to 2km range. Both vehicles were engaged and destroyed during their displacement. 3. A TOW Section in over watch ROCKS! 4. Engaging a moving target with indirect fire is often folly. 5. 1min turns for LAR led to better results (gave the maneuver element its 20-25min) in delaying the OPFOR lead elements, allowing for the maneuver element to displace and flank the enemy forces. 6. Maneuver element moved quickly but the counter attack was disjointed – there was a lull between the lead OPFOR elements being halted and the friendly attack from the north. 7. I realize that the author indicated the enemy was headstrong and would rush forward with tanks in the lead, but advancing along the low ground without any regard for their open left flank borders on underestimating your enemy.

Again playing the reconnaissance fight only, and giving US an opportunity to give orders each 1min turn provided for more effective indirect, and ATGM fire. I was able to provide 20mins of keeping OPFOR from securing Tragedia, severely attritting the OPFOR tank battalion at the expense of 6x LAV-25 and 2x LAV-AT, and 10 salvoes of ICM. I'd like to get it up to 25-30, but will have to push the no-pen line to the river itself, bringing India 3/4 into the fight along the river line, while I see if I can effect the authors intent of swinging north, crossing at Cujo and then striking the enemy's left flankwest of Tragedia. We'll see tomorrow.

Light Armored Reconnaissance, or if improperly employed - speed bump at best.

Battle of Garagiola River Test 1 0700-0705 US: LAR push through Tragedia, Kilo, and India companies establish defensive positions along Gargaiola River, vicinity Tragedia and Garagiola Bridges respectively. India continue into Garagiola Town. OPFOR: 4th Tank Bn push forward toward Tragedia, with the Tragedia bridge and Androida as your final geographic objective. Gain contact and fix any enemy forces in zone. 1st and 2nd Mechanized Rifle Battalion follow 4th Tank Battalion, once contact established, move to flank the enemy and capture Androida. 3rd Mechanized battalion, follow in trace. You are the reserve. 0706-0710 US: LAR reports an enemy armored force of at least 2x Tank Company approaching from the vicinity of Checkpoint 68, approaching Tragedia. Calling in supporting arms. OPFOR: Nothing to report 0711-0715 US: LAR decisively engaged, absorbed a T-72M Battalion frontal assault. Supporting fire was ineffectual [Force should/would have had a fire support plan ready, also LAR should be reinforced] Tragedia abandoned. OPFOR: Enemy armored reconnaissance forces in Tragedia, approximately company strength. 4th Tank Battalion continues toward Tragedia Bridge. Lead company breaks down into platoon formations in order to cross bridge with limited delay. Artillery is called for on tree line to SE of bridge. 0716-0720 US: LAR has been defeated vic Tragedia. Kilo company engages enemy armored platoons attempting to cross at the Tragedia Bridge. Dragon team and SMAW section take their toll despite enemy artillery fire striking their unit trace. Kilo dragon team is eliminated by massed tank fire. US Tank company is ordered to attack toward Tragedia bridge. India company (Garagiola Town) establish defensive positions there. OPFOR: Enemy infantry and ATGM’s in woods on far side of bridge. 2x mech battalions in support. 3rd Mech Battalion flanks toward Garagiola Bridge. 0721-0725 US: Enemy armor is across the Tragedia bridge and moving on Androida. Tank Company redirected further east, vic Androida. Enemy armor spearhead penetrates Androida, encounters Bn COC before being eliminated. OPFOR: Tank forces have penetrated the US line. Lead units are in Androida, and are encountering support units. 0726-0730 US: The enemy is across the river with at least a battalion sized element. There is also contact vic Garagiola Town. The Tank Company counter attack failed, but only after chewing up most of two enemy tank companies on the “friendly” side of the river. Androida is in the hands of the enemy. OPFOR: Androida has been liberated. We are currently pushing reinforcing mech units across the river. Enemy forces are being engaged vic Garagiola. 0730-0735 US: Androida is now firmly in the hands of the enemy. Must begin withdrawal from Garagiola Line. Am not sure how well that will go. India company now appears to be decisively engaged vic Garagiola. Lessons: 1. Need to add LAR-AT Section to LAR Company. 2. Pre-planned artillery targets both sides. 3. More efficient employment of LAR in order to buy enough time to accomplish the flank. 4. Less defense along the entirety of the woods SE of Tragedia Bridge. 5. Thoughts about more efficient platoon crossings of bridges and regenerating combat power once across the bridge. Pass eshelons at this point?

Initial test defensive set up. Map only of the areas depicted in the first game through. There is a third twon/bridge at a town called Cujo, bout 6km north of Tragedia Bridge.

These scenarios, "Battle of the Garagiola River" and "Battle of the Garagiola River Revisited" are authored by LtCol. John F. Schmitt, USMCR and are found in his book "Mastering Tactics", Copyright 1994 by Marine Corps Association. The scenarios were originally published in the October 1992 and December 1992 editions of Marine Corps Gazette respectively. "Battle of the Garagiola River" - Map293 Situation: You are the commander of 3d Battalion, 4th Marines (reinforced) consisting of Companies I and K on assault amphibious vehicles (AAVs) near the Garagiola River, Company L on trucks at Androida, a light armored reconnaissance (LAR) company west of the river, and a tank company in reserve east of Androida. The TOW section is moving with Company L. For the last two weeks you have been facing superior enemy mechanized forces and have been forced to fall back from west to east, slowly wearing down the enemy while conserving your own combat power. You have learned that the enemy force opposing you is a mechanized regiment consisting of a tank battalion and two mechanized infantry battalions. Enemy tactics emphasize attacking aggressively upon contact and maintaining the momentum. The enemy will generally overrun resistance with tanks and prefers to dismount infantry only when necessary for close combat. Poor visibility due to heavy fog lately has obscured the enemy situation since the last engagement, after which you lost contact with the enemy. While your battalion is halted along the river, your LAR company moves west to reestablish contact. Steep banks make it unfeasible for your AAVs to swim the river. Your mission is to defeat any enemy forces in your zone or, failing that, at a minimum to delay and disrupt the enemy advance. As your LAR company passes westward through Tragedia, it reports a sizable enemy mechanized force to the west approaching Checkpoint 68. The LAR commander does not believe that he has been detected by the enemy. Your Artillery Liaison Officer (ALO) assures you that he can get massed fire support. Your Air Officer (AO) says that he can get you a couple of F/A-18 sorties. At this rate, enemy tanks will be approaching Tragedia or Garagiola in about 10-20 minutes. What are your orders Colonel? Requirement (from original Tactical Decision Game TDG): Time is critical, but since you have already been considering the possibility of a battle along the Garagiola for a couple of days now, you don't feel rushed. So go ahead and take 12 minutes to develop the orders that you would pass on to your subordinates. Make sure to include any guidance for supporting arms and a sketch of your plan. Then provide a brief explanation. Does your frag order include a mission statement? a statement of intent? a concept of operations? tasks for subordinate units? a designated main effort?

Worked. Thanks

I've been long hijacking this folder with close, but no cigar other games, might I suggest that it morph into an "other wargames" folder. Welcome, and photos, photos, photos.

Tony, Sorry, but no joy. per my interpretation of your instructions, I got "REGISTER No such nick/channel" About to fire up ebay for all of my harpoon materials.

Thanks Tony - I'll try it again tonight. Glad I can continue on with all things harpoon.

Can someone (er... Tony) please provide, in extreme layman's terms how one goes about registering, or re-registering their nickname on newnet? I for the life of me can't seem to crack the code and may need to give up all things harpoon if this cannot be remedied for this aging, knuckle-dragging grunt.