pmaidhof

Are you sure of your use of the word "nuclear" here? I've yet to employ them in harpoon, and doubt that it will change. I'm hoping that you meant gravity, dumb, laser guided...something like that. My focus is usually more tactical/operational power projection.

Good idea, I'll try that as well.

Ok Broke out counters, dice, and rulers this morning. 1x EA-6B (5x ALQ-99) and 2x A-6E (12x M82 500lb GP Bombs each). They begin at Low altitude, traveling at 570kts. They start 100nm from their intended target – a Coastal Defense Missile Battery, defended by an Sa-15 Tor1 battery. There is also a GCI Radar (P-35 Bar Lock A) 100nm from the strike package and 56nm from the intended target. The Bar Lock A will detect a medium target at 133, which is lowered to 39nm due to the RLOS of a horizon-Low contact. Sa-15’s Dog Ear Acquisition Radar will detect a medium target at 8.5nm. Weather Determined randomly. 2D10 = 82 = Clear Night, Half Moon. Air visibility reduced to 20%. Sigma was 1.5, D10 = 4 = no modification. Ground will spot medium aircraft at 5nm *20% = 1nm. Strike Package streaks in at 28.5nm per tactical turn. The EA-6B’s 3rd Gen detects the Dog Ear. 42nm from target EA-6B emits, reducing the Dog Ear’s 8.5nm to 2.1nm. It has no effect on the Bar Lock A as the RLOS is 39nm. Engagement Turns declared. Whether A-6E FLIR is 2nd or 3rd Generation, it will detect the target, even if considered stealthy at 2-3nm. Package crosses over the target before they can detect and fire. Each Mk82 = 17DP. Target 5DP per vehicle, 8 vehicles, or 40DP’s Dive-Bombing with a computing bombsite, from Low Altitude gives a .23 pH. 8x 2D10 results in 8 hits. 8*17DP = 136DP. Target destroyed. Lessons: erroneously placed my GCI too far away, RLOS eliminated it from being a factor.

As was spoken about the other day, Mag Web is an option as it has every Sitrep going back to #1 and not overly expensive.

Direct from Larry Bond. " I hadn't thought of using 7.6 for missile attacks but yes, it should work and appears to in this case. Intuitively, the answer seems right, although it always seems a little off when an entire side is wiped out. But that does happen in air warfare, and you can always use the aircraft damage rules to who's just hurt and who is sincerely dead. I'll add a note in 7.6 about using it for missiles." Good gaming, Pete

Think I may have found it staring me in the face, top of page one, top of right hand column. Apparently there are now two, one for surface, and one for air contacts. Surface Contacts: Large 100%/ Medium 56%/ Small 32%/ VSmall 18%/ Stealthy 10%. Air Contacts: Large 100%/ Medium 63%/ Small 47%/ VSmall 20%/ Stealthy 6%.

High Tide Annex S Land Surface -to-Air Missiles provides Acquisition Radar and Acquisition Range vs Large (nm). After a limited check it does not appear that the radar data found in both High Tide and the Smarter Radar article meet the Percentage of large formula found in 4.2.2.1 Size of Contacts. That formula was multiple the Large 100%; Medium 62%; Small 40%; Very Small 18%; Stealthy 10%. Anyone aware of the formula, if there is one? Thanks

Thinking more about IRST and their relative short range, I suppose that their use would be more in conjunction with non-radar emitting fighters/interceptors under the direction of either Ground Control Indercept (GCI) or airborne early warning radars. These emitting radar assets would direct the "emcon" fighters/interceptors to ranges at or close to that of IRST detection, allowing for possible previously-undetected engagement, and possible surprise benefits. Tracking?

It turns out that I searched for and found a question and answer thread which included IRST. The most revealing answer was one by Dave S. yahoo AT "The way I read it, the AAQ-28 Litening II pod does have FLIR (4.6.2), IRST (4.6.3), and LRMTS (4.8.3) capability. I would use the system like this: When it is being used as an IRST, it has a 60 degree search arc and can provides all aspect detection out to the ranges listed, it also has classification capability. When used as FLIR, it would have the 12 degree limitation." NICE.

Paul K chimed in that math-wise it should not matter and we worked through the formula, where I once again displayed my math skills, with my specifics. The missile index should have been 1.5 which in turn becomes a pK of 45% for both AA-12 and AIM-120, so 12 (Su-35) * 2 (AA-12 attacks) * .45 = 10.8. I then used the 10.5 row on the multiple air-to-air chart (exact name escapes me). The F/A-18's were calculated at 6 (F/A-18C) * 2 (AIM-120) * .45 = 5.4. I resolved on the 5.0 row. Using the 2D6 rolls from the other night of US "10" and FSU "5" resulted in 9x (overkill, only 6 in the air) hits on F/A-18C's while 7x Su-35's are downed. Paul did go into detail on some of the finer points of speed, missile range, individual aircraft evasion, and the ability to trade distance/time for more shots outside of an enemy's effective missile range. With his assistance, I should be able to more closely depict the hypothetical fighter sweep to provide for open skies so that the An-12 Cubs and Su-25 Grach's can do their evil work.

Even for the new Admiralty Trilogy Air Rules!!!! (BTW, what does that emoticon ph34r stand for?)

New episode: Jets vs Jets tonight at 9:00 (repeat of Kamikazes at 8:00).

of interest Gives a bunch of designations with affiliated aircraft.

What generation might that be so I can swag some others given the fact that the Yahoo AT group has apparently hit the "horse latitudes" of summer. Thanks

Ok gang, While discussing the effects of offensive electronic jamming, and possible air defenses last night in chat - up came the topic of IRST. After reading the very brief passage toward the end of "Detection" (Chapter 4 of H4.1) I was able to gleen that IRST's are relatively short ranged, and that there are multiple generations, 1-3, with increasing passive detection capabilities with each. Can anyone point me to where the actually game effects can be found, primarily at what range does the generational IRST detect other objects. Thanks again, Pete

Clipped from here. is one, I suppose, of the definitions of all-weather capability. "Before the requirement areas are described, it is essential to have a firm understanding of the all-weather attack mission. To a large extent, mission dictates the requirements that each individual type of aircraft must meet. The all-weather attack mission includes many different tasks which are emphasized differently by the Navy and the Marine Corps. The Navy describes the all-weather mission as the destruction of moving and fixed sea and land targets in all-weather conditions and during darkness. (6:1) While land targets are included in that mission statement, the Navy naturally puts more emphasis on sea control tasks such as anti-ship operations, open-ocean interdiction, aerial-mining, surface surveillance and aerial refueling missions. (3:34) On the other hand, the Marine Corps' number one task is to conduct close air support under all-weather conditions. While the capability to deploy and operate from aircraft carriers is mentioned, the majority of Marine tasks deal with power-projection missions such as supporting the infantry scheme of maneuver and destroying land targets. (9:36-37) Although difficult to combine all these tasks into one mission statement, it is clear that the replacement aircraft will have to operate at sea and over land, be capable of performing a variety of high and low altitude attacks during conditions of darkness and bad weather, and operate in both the sea control and power projection roles. The requirements established for the replacement aircraft must reflect that mission in order for the aircraft selected to successfully perform all required tasks." It also goes on, when discussing survivability, that these aircraft will rely of electronic countermeasures carried by accompanying aircraft - such as the unamed EA-6B. Time to break out data on one of those - remember there is a Sitrep out there with revisements to the effectiveness of electronic jamming. I will post that issue information later today.

Jan M pointed me here "At the end of the 1970s, the United States military introduced its first FLIR for an attack aircraft on the A-6E Intruder. The Target Recognition/Attack Multi-Sensor (TRAM) debuted in 1979. TRAM incorporated a chin turret with a FLIR, a laser designator, and a laser receiver. (18) TRAM was used for the delivery of unguided and guided munitions. The FLIR turret was gyro-stabilized and aligned with the laser, allowing the laser to precisely update target range just prior to unguided munitions delivery. (19) The gyro-stabilized FLIR allowed the weapon's system operator to precisely track the target after ordnance release for guided munitions delivery. This gave the A-6E the capability to maneuver after a weapon's release while at the same time continuing to guide the bomb. (20) The combat capabilities of PAVE TACK and TRAM came to fruition with Operation E1 Dorado Canyon. In April 1986, following a terrorist bombing in Europe, the United States responded by attacking Libya's ability to support and conduct such terrorist activity. For the first time in history, the United States military possessed a robust armada of precision night attack aircraft, namely the A-6E Intruder with its TRAM capability, and the FB-111 with its internal PAVE TACK system. (21) A night attack was authorized for two distinct reasons. The first was that the Libyan MIG-25 pilots had a limited night time capability and would likely be unable to engage United States warplanes post-strike. The second was that the risk for collateral damage was minimized by striking at night because most of the civilian populace would be at home asleep. IR sensors onboard the strike aircraft, as well as laser-guided bombs, also contributed to minimizing collateral damage. Using TRAM technology, the A-6Es evaded enemy surface-to-air missiles and antiaircraft artillery, destroyed their targets, and recovered safely home to their respective ships. FB-111s, flying at 150 meters and 834 kilometers per hour, employed GBU-10s (laser-guided 2,000 pound bombs). (22) Guiding these weapons with the PAVE TACK IR targeting and laser system, the first FB-111 dropped four bombs within 50 meters of the Libyan leader's headquarters. (23) Despite the loss of two American pilots, Operation E1 Dorado Canyon was a huge success. Tactical advantage and surprise were achieved by operating at night. IR sensors in military aircraft were now expected, and American industry would work hard to make the next generation of IR sensors even better than TRAM and PAVE TACK." [Me] The H4.1 A-6E TRAM still needs to acquire the target.

Thank Brad, I suppose that its only real benefit is 3.3.4.2 Low Altitude Flight Over Land: "Aircraft in the low altitude band over land must have some way to steer around and over terrain. This can be by the naked eye (in vis over 25%), by imaging infrared system (such as FLIR in clear weather vis 10%+) or by terrain-avoidance or terrain-following radar in any vis. Use of radar can be detected by ESM. Failure to avoid terrain eliminates the aircraft due to its interaction with the earth/air interfaceand its infinite coefficient of friction" Which the TAD Tactical Altitude Director would account for?

This may be of assistance, we'll have to see. Naval Aviation News Sept-Oct 1997

The following link discusses a TAD, Tactical Altitude Director which assists in terrain avoidance in conjunction with low-level navigation which I suppose would allow for better V/Low flight performance in Harpoon. Still need a compelling explanation of the "All Weather" aspect.

Ok, back from lunch with even more questions than answers. First and foremost, was gives the A-6E TRAM its "all weather attack" capability in Harpoon when its Annex B data gives it the APQ-156 Surface Search Radar, Forward Looking Infra Red which is degraded 50/75/100% due to moisture in the air, and a Laser Range-Marked Target Seeker (LRMTS) capabilitywhich can establish target range and track targets designated by other forces/platforms? Help please

ausairpower.net you all may have seen this...but.

Todays foul weather coupled with my 40 minute commute that took 2.5 hours gave me plenty of time to think about All Weather Attack Squadrons. What a capability to launch, seek out, and attack an enemy while they are beset by such aweful weather. Luckily I had my data annexes etc on the passenger seat so I was able to glance, while idle, at High Tide Annex B and its entry for the A-6E TRAM. Since I also mounted two 1/6000 A-6's on a single mount last night, I may need to give some more attention to a foul weather strike using the most glorious A-6 in my harpoon gaming. Since I'm still on this GCS kick as well, perhaps individual combat boxes (perscribed to be about 10x10km and smaller) could be grouped together into kill boxes where sections of A-6's can be assigned to hunt down the enemy. hmm....

U.S., Iran do Persian Gulf squeeze The stakes are big and the waterway is small, so communication between the two sides is a must to keep a lid on tensions. By Borzou Daragahi Times Staff Writer July 11, 2007 ABOARD THE USS JOHN C. STENNIS — Iran and the United States remain so far apart on so many issues that they refuse to talk about them. But in the cramped sea routes of the Persian Gulf, U.S. and Iranian warship sailors and fighter pilots speak to each other daily. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- FOR THE RECORD: U.S. warship: A photo caption accompanying an article in Wednesday's Section A about U.S. and Iranian warships in the Persian Gulf said a fighter jet was lifting off from the U.S. nuclear-powered carrier John C. Stennis. The plane, a French naval jet, was flying over the warship. The photo was taken in April, when the carrier was participating in exercises with a French carrier in the Indian Ocean. — -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- They have to. They're practically jostling one another in courteous games of surveillance, counter-surveillance and geopolitical posturing. "We are operating very close to their territorial waters in a very confined space with a tremendous amount of traffic, be it the small dhows, be it the supertankers going up to the oil platforms," said U.S. Navy Capt. Sterling Gilliam Jr., commander of air operations for this nuclear-powered supercarrier and its associated ships. "The margin of error is smaller in that the space is more confined. That would be the case even if anyone was your ally, just because of the sheer small size of the Arabian Gulf," Gilliam said, using an alternative name for the body of water. Even mundane changes of direction require chitchat with Iranian counterparts. When sedate gulf winds fade to a whisper, for example, this 100,000-ton carrier whips up to the 25 knots required to hurl jets into flight from the 1,092-foot flight deck. But first the vessel alerts nearby forces of Iran's Revolutionary Guard and the organization's navy. "We would do the standard international maritime measures," said Capt. Bradley Johanson, commanding officer of the aircraft carrier. "We would call them on their radio and say, 'Sir, I just wanted to let you know that we're going to be turning to port and be coming to this course so that we're into the wind in support of our flight operation." The Iranians respond professionally and courteously, Johanson said: " 'Thank you very much for the information. We will move off to the starboard position. We very much appreciate the heads-up.' " Nearly half of the U.S. Navy's 277 warships are stationed close to Iran, alongside most of Tehran's estimated 140 naval surface ships and six submarines, according to GlobalSecurity.org. More than five dozen aircraft are aboard the Stennis, along with dozens more aboard the Nimitz, another U.S. aircraft carrier in the gulf. -- Multiple roles Crew members on the Stennis say they are here to provide aircraft for peacekeeping and counterinsurgency missions in Iraq, Afghanistan and Somalia. But few doubt they are also here to send a message to Iran, which the U.S. accuses of pursuing a clandestine nuclear weapons program and supporting anti-American militants from Lebanon to Afghanistan. "My feeling here is we're here to show our resolve, and to protect our friends," said Cmdr. Marcus Hitchcock, the Stennis' executive officer. A flotilla of nine U.S. warships steamed through the Strait of Hormuz two months after the United Nations Security Council passed the last round of sanctions against Iran for continuing with its uranium enrichment program and Iranians seized 15 British sailors and marines in disputed waters off Iraq. Positioning two aircraft carrier groups in the gulf gives the United States the capability to operate 24 hours a day and potentially conduct about 180 daily bombing and surveillance operations over Iran. It also means the United States may be deploying nuclear weapons, believed to be aboard some of the ships in the aircraft carrier groups, within 10 miles of Iran's shores. -- Big targets But the aircraft carriers, each accompanied by four or five other ships, could become big targets for Iran in the event of a war. "It's going to be very hard to defend U.S. ships against small ships and volleys of missiles in the confines of the Persian Gulf," said Joseph Cirincione, a security analyst at the Center for American Progress, a Washington think tank. "This is not an ideal situation for the Navy." Tensions between Iran and the U.S. lie barely beneath the surface of the delicate maritime protocol. Both Iran and the U.S. regularly dispatch spy planes to watch each other. A photograph of an Iranian T-12 reconnaissance plane is posted outside the intelligence office of the Stennis. "Image of the day," says the caption. "We would take a picture of an Iranian navy warship to see if they've made any changes," said Vice Adm. Kevin J. Cosgriff, commander of the Bahrain-based U.S. 5th Fleet. "They do it too. We pay attention and want to know where they are. Is their action routine or are they getting ready for an exercise?" Each country accuses the other of bad behavior. Iran says the U.S. plays a disruptive role in the gulf and destabilizes the region. U.S. officials say the Iranians behave like bullies, sometimes getting on the radio to order Americans to leave what the Iranians claim as territorial waters. Americans also complain that Iranians don't do enough to clear sea lanes before conducting missile tests in international waters and that their aircraft fly too close to U.S. planes. "They're overt about it," Cosgriff said. "They're communicating." Operating an aircraft carrier is a task that requires precision and stamina even in the most spacious waters. Stumbling into a hot conflict with the Iranians remains a constant concern in the overcrowded gulf, where nearby oil wells glow orange in the steamy night, and wooden dhows, steel-hull freighters and warships navigate the waterway by day. On the ship's computer maps, a thick black line delineates Iranian coastal waters from the rest of the gulf. Shades of gray mark the waters off Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, allies of the United States. U.S. pilots are told to stay well away from Iranian airspace. "We do worry about miscalculations," Cosgriff said. "That's one of the reasons we want to be transparent on the radio and be talking to them a lot." -- LA Times article

Can multiple Long Range Anti-Air Missile Engagements be resolved on the Large Air Attack Resolution Table? I calculated the missile index (1.0) and thereby determined the pK, in this case 40%. There were 12x Su-35's that had launched 24 AA-12 Adders. I calulated 12 aircraft * 2 attacks * .40 Does anyone else believe that this jives? I hope to have a quasi-official response sometime soon. Thanks