pmaidhof

PG (Peter G) provided: "Only have stats for the Medium version (there is also a large antenna version) of the EL/M-2238 STAR (Surveillance, Track And guidance Radar) 3D: 108/90/64/26/8" Dave S added the following guidance. "Smarter Radars article does say that the Surface rating for 3D radars is 10% of air range. So, I would use that, which makes the ratings: SS: 10.8/9.0/6.4/2.6/0.8" Thanks guys.

Will do. I was looking for the proverbial quick fix.

Thanks Brad, interesting stuff. I guess it's a "No" from you and your big pile of H4 reference material.

Peter Grining (PG) was able to provide me with H4.1 compliant "3D" stats for the above radar set, but did not have any for "SS". Anybody have the Surface Search stats for a EL/M-2228 "Surveillance, Track And guidance Radar" set? This set was apparently installed on the Indian Navy's Type-16A Brahmaputra FF replacing the RAWS.03 when they also swapped out the failed, locally developed "Trihul" SAM for the Israeli Barak system. Thanks

It's time...and yes very helpful. Thanks again.

Hi Tony, Said "patch". When/where will it be available, Here or somewhere else? It will include all the changes/release note items you have listed up to this point? Also, really, really like the new folder in HCE uber-folder for all defect reporting, separate the wheat from the chaff - hopefully.

Second try, essentially the same set up. Played basically the same scenario again this afternoon. Started with both sides at medium speed. Germans were radiating, while the Russians were maintaining EMCON. In Turn 1, the Germans did not detect the Russians, but the Russians passively detected the German boat, identifying it as a Type 143 Albatros. Turn 2 saw the Russians turn in toward the bearing of the Type 143. During detection, the Russians joined the Germans in radiating, boths side actively and passively detect and identify each other. End of turn range is 100cm. Turn 3 Russians accelerate to Fast (25cm) Germans continued at Medium (20cm). Russians, with initiative fire their 4x SS-N-2A Styx’. Germans unleash their 4x MM-38 Exocet. Distance is 55cm, greater than 30cm so each sides missiles will arrive next turn. Turn 4 Germans accelerate to Very Fast (30cm) and both sides make turns to the north., which if both survive would have placed the Russians in position to engage the Germans with gunfire. Provided I played the 76mm auto, 57mm auto and 30mm auto being able to fire at incoming anti-ship missiles, the 57mm took out one Exocet. The Nanuchka pooped a chaff cloud, but failed to have the desired effect. The Russian’s ECM foiled two of the exocets, so one impacted on the ship. The basic damage roll was a 9 = wrecked. Subsequent damage rolls showed that the FCS, E/O, ECM, 57mm mount, SA-N-4 mount, and SS-N-2 mount were all damaged/destroyed. Speed was reduced 3 levels and Maneuverability was reduced 2 levels. The Type 143 faired little better. Three Styx missed, but all it took was one to hit causing heavy damage, including an electrical blackout. The E/O, ESM, Aft 76mm, and Exocet Launcher were all damaged/destroyed. Another basic, yet bloody engagement.

Thanks Budda, that was my original recollection, but in my youth I was more of an ETO kinda guy vice PTO.

Yes, but as Brad mentioned it is what is in the rules vice what can be found online. One caveat is that the author mentions that "...They have been designed to be played on a wargamer's standard 8x6' or 6x4' table and hence longer weapon ranges have been increasingly compressed as ranges increase..." and again "...Because of the compressed nature of the ranges it is not possible to state a definititive ground scale or duration of a turn. However, for medium range encounters the ranges and movement rates equate to approximately to a turn of 2 minutes and a ground scale of 1cm = 100m." Other ideas could be that my poor basic damage rolls could represent a dud, or even that the missile impacted with the water short of the boat, causing a somewhat less than lethal hit. I compared the MM-30 Exocet and Nanuchka in the H4.1 data annex, an no the 66 total damage points for the two exocets would obliterate a Nanuchka. Other possible results for each missile within the ruleset could have been: unmodifed <=0 No significant Damage; 1-3 Damaged (my result); 4-6 Heavily Damaged; 7-9 wrecked; and 10 sunk. Other ruleset considerations with the to hit and damage calculations are missile seeker generation, target ECM, target size, target speed, and in this case chaff. The above notwithstanding, a "Bulldogs Away" SS-N-2A minimum range is 30cm and maximum range is 75cm. No problem, I'll post more as time allows.

Gave the Fast Attack Craft rules "Bulldogs Away" a quick run through tonight with a solitary Russian Nanuchka2 confronting a German Type 143 Albatros in the Baltic. The playing area, a 6x4' table, was determined to be fairly open seas, with only 1/6 of the surface area having a 10cm (1000m) long shoal. The sea state was rolled 1, and wind was rolled for but did not play a roll in this engagement. The Russians had a trained crew and an average command quality, while the Germans had a trained crew too but an adept commander. Each combatant and a dummy started the game represented by "blip" counters, both forces rather simplistically approaching each other at fast speed 31-40kts. With both units radiating the Russians detected the Germans by both active radar and ESM, but the Germans failed at both methods - radar was out of range, ESM was simply a poor die roll. Russians would have liked to fire a volley of SS-N-2's but was still outside of the Styx' range of 7500m. Turn 2 both combatants lowered their speed to Medium, 21-30kts hoping to have better detection modifers. The Germans were using Active Radar while the Russians went passive. Germans detected the Nanuchka and its counter was replaced with a "Contact" counter. Russians did not make a successful ESM roll. The gods of War sense a momentum change. Turn 3 both sides speed up to fast again. Boths sides detect each other with both active radar and ESM. Germans with the initiative fire four MM-38 Exocets. Russian counter measures dupe 2 of them. The two that strike the Nanuchka roll poorly for basic damage, causing damage to the Fire Control Systems, Decoys, and SA-N-4 mount. On the Special hits, command confusion and a blackout are caused aboard the Russian boat. The Russians at this point decide they'd better get some distance between them and their adversary until they can conduct some damage control. They conduct a high speed turn with the Germans in fast pursuit. After firing some ineffective (high speeds) 76mm shots, the Germans powerdown and allow the Russians to clear the area. Fun game, with a lot more to it that what took place tonight, helos, fast movers, platforms from boston whalers to destroyers, mines, collisions, suicide boats, etc. Warming Online Bulldogs Away Summary

The Sa'ar 4.5 also appears in Bulldogs Away. Same same about trying it out and reporting back.

The Danish Flyvevisken makes an appearance in Bulldogs Away. I'll will have to employ it at sometime and report back its performance.

Does anyone here have any experience with Bulldogs Away rules, by David Manley? I purchased, downloaded, and printed them last night. The rules depict Modern Fast Attack Craft actions from 1950-2010, and look very interesting. The author states that the rules "are intended for very quick deadly battles fought between post war Fast Attack Craft and patrol boats". In addition to the small combattants, the rules contain data for the integration of larger ships (FFG-7 for example) helicopters, aircraft, shore targets, and mine warfare. It is designed to play as miniatures on a 8x6 or 6x4 foot table. Thanks

Alright gang, What is everyone's favorite, or most capable, modern day fast attack craft. I'm still “littoral-ly entrenched” and looking to re-invigorate my naval gaming. Please give country of origin and major weapon systems so that I could research more about them. Thanks

Analysts: Air power crucial upon new threat By William H. McMichael - Staff writer Posted : Tuesday Jan 15, 2008 6:19:03 EST If the U.S. were to face a new conventional threat, its military could not respond effectively without turning to air power, officials and analysts say. That is the ultimate upshot of the war in Iraq: a response elsewhere would consist largely of U.S. fighters and bombers — even, perhaps, some degree of nuclear strike — because so many ground troops are tied up in Operation Iraqi Freedom. And that leaves at least some senior U.S. leaders and analysts crossing their fingers. “I believe that we, as a nation, are at risk of mission failure should our Army be called to deploy to an emerging threat,” Rep. Solomon Ortiz, D-Texas, chairman of the House Armed Services readiness subcommittee, said last year, basing his assessment on classified Army readiness reports. “Iraq is sort of sucking all the oxygen out of the room,” said Tammy Schultz, who studies ground forces for the Center for a New American Security, a relatively new Washington think tank dedicated to “strong, pragmatic and principled” security and defense policies. “My huge fear is that ... we’re really putting the nation at risk,” Schultz said. “It could reach absolutely tragic levels if the United States has to respond to a major contingency any time in the near future.” The Army is bearing the brunt of the fight, and senior leaders readily acknowledge that. “We are consumed with meeting the demands of the current fight and unable to provide ready forces as rapidly as necessary for other contingencies,” Army Chief of Staff Gen. George Casey told the Senate Armed Services Committee on Nov. 15. The Congressional Budget Office reported in 2006 that Army readiness rates had declined to the lowest levels since the end of the Vietnam War, with roughly half of all Army units, active and reserve, at the lowest readiness ratings for currently available units. Casey told the Senate committee that training and readiness levels for nondeployed units have “actually stayed about the same since last summer — and it’s not good.” The Marine Corps isn’t as heavily committed in Iraq in terms of raw numbers, but leathernecks’ shorter deployments come more frequently. And as the heavy requirements of Iraq shorten the time back home to train for missions other than counterinsurgency, most nondeployed forces simply are not ready for other types of combat, be it amphibious assault or combined-arms warfare. “While the readiness of deployed units remains high, we have experienced a decrease in the readiness of some nondeployed units,” Gen. Robert Magnus, assistant commandant of the Marine Corps, told Ortiz’s subcommittee March 13. The Corps has “a limited ability to provide trained forces to project power in support of other contingencies,” Magnus said. Beyond the ground forces But readiness problems are not limited to the ground forces. Air Force operational readiness rates are 17 percent below the level before Sept. 11, 2001 — only 53 percent of Air Force units, many using aging aircraft that require more frequent repairs, were considered “green,” or fully mission-capable, as of March, according to service data. “The Air Force’s case is a lot different than the other services,” said an Air Force officer with extensive Pentagon staff experience who asked not to be identified. “This is not an air war. This is a ground war that is being fought with a lot of air power.” Only the Navy, not heavily tasked with Iraq war duties, feels like it’s ready to take on another contingency. “The Navy’s current readiness remains excellent,” Adm. Robert Willard, vice chief of naval operations, told the House subcommittee in March. But even that service’s budget has been trimmed to support the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, resulting in fewer steaming days for nondeployed forces. The Navy and Air Force also have been heavily tasked to provide individual personnel with skills uniquely suited to supporting the wars — including Seabees, medics, loadmasters, explosive ordnance disposal experts, civil affairs specialists and special operations troops. Most spec-ops specialties are chronically underfilled, according to a June CNAS report by Schultz and Michèle Flournoy, “Shaping Ground Forces for the Future.” They also note that 85 percent of all deployed Army Special Forces troops are working in the U.S. Central Command area of operations, leaving few available for other missions. National Guard and reserve forces also are getting a sustained workout that is causing major strains on what were once known as “weekend warriors.” As Casey put it: “Our reserve components are performing an operational role for which they were neither originally designed nor resourced.” The new chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Adm. Mike Mullen, agrees the U.S. lacks “full-spectrum capabilities across all our forces,” and he says he wants the military to “rebalance strategic risk.” Mullen acknowledges the U.S. has assumed a posture of higher strategic risk, but says that has been done “consciously,” given the demands of the current wars. But like his predecessor, Marine Gen. Peter Pace, Mullen is emphatic that the U.S. could effectively respond should an unexpected conflict arise. “We’ve got a lot of reserve capability and capacity in our Air Force and in our Navy,” he said while returning from an October visit to Army bases in the Midwest. “That is a big risk-reduction capability. And from a strategic reserve, that’s the case.” But ground troops are a different story. “Clearly, if we had to do something with our ground forces, a significant substitute would be a big challenge,” Mullen said, adding that the response “would obviously depend on the circumstances of what happened in what part of the world.” “But you’ve also got to think about the probabilities of [a contingency] happening,” Mullen said. “And right now, in many parts of the world, those probabilities are pretty low.” Despite the demands of the current wars, Pace insisted earlier this year that U.S. forces have “enormous power and capacity” and could defeat any potential enemy. “There’s zero doubt about the outcome,” he said at a Pentagon news conference. “It would simply take us longer than we’d like.” To some extent, the story is cyclical. Similar concerns were expressed 10 years ago during the post-Cold War drawdown, in which droves of midlevel leaders left or were forced out of service and money for equipment maintenance shriveled up. The same held true after Vietnam, when the quality of the new all-volunteer force suffered during a massive drawdown and did not significantly improve until two double-digit pay raises were approved in the early 1980s. The Navy and Air Force are shrinking once again. U.S. ground forces are growing, but slowly. Meanwhile, all are consumed to some extent with the trying and costly wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, which continue to weigh on each service’s ability to respond elsewhere. Equipment shortfalls worsen Top officials, typically reticent to admit shortcomings, have finally started to publicly highlight problems, mainly in an effort to get Congress to fund needed repairs. “Overall, we’re consuming our readiness as fast as we can build it,” Casey said. There’s also a lack of ready equipment back home on which to train. Casey said that since 2003, equipment has been used at five times the normal rate. About 40 percent of Marine and Army ground equipment is in Iraq. Over the past three years, Marine gear has been used at nine times the planned rate. And the Corps had a $12 billion equipment shortfall in fiscal 2007. The Pentagon says it needs a big chunk of change to reverse the overall situation: $46.4 billion for the Army’s next two years of “reset and reconstitution,” $10.2 billion for the Corps and $20 billion over fiscal 2008-2013 for the Guard and reserve. Providing air support for the twin wars is wearing down the Air Force, as well. Old planes are being heavily used, driving up maintenance time and costs. And 42 percent of airmen who deploy are going for six months or longer, when the standard air expeditionary force rotation is four months. Recruiting is not an issue, nor is the quality of the current crop of recruits. But airlift specialists and in-lieu-of forces, drawn from across the Air Force, are heavily deployed. “You have to rely on airlift,” the former Pentagon staff officer pointed out. “The forces have to be moved in and out of theater.” That’s keeping loadmasters, pilots and other specialists on the go. And, in the longer term, the age of the fleet is an issue. “Despite our best efforts, we face declining readiness and soaring re-capitalization rates,” said Gen. John Corley, Air Force vice chief of staff. Meanwhile, the Army National Guard and Army Reserve are trying to recover from the practice of pooling gear to equip combat forces, sometimes leaving their gear behind in the war zones for use by follow-on forces. That policy has “increased the un-readiness in our next-to-deploy forces and limits our ability to respond to emerging strategic contingencies,” Lt. Gen. James Lovelace, Army deputy chief of staff for operations, recently told Congress. “All reserve component units have been either partially or completely mobilized in support of the global war on terrorism,” Lovelace said. “Undermanned to begin with, they had to rely on volunteers and extensive cross-leveling from other units to fill their ranks.” Even backup ground forces have been consumed. “We’ve always kept one brigade of the 82nd Airborne [Division] at home — even in Korea and Vietnam,” said Lawrence Korb, a senior fellow at the Center for American Progress who served as Pentagon personnel chief during President Reagan’s first term. “That was our strategic ground reserve.” Now, he said, all four brigades in that division are deployed. The way ahead Uniformed officials speak carefully about the Iraq war’s effect on readiness because such comments could be construed as a criticism of administration policy. But others note that drawing down the Iraq war is the obvious first step in improving readiness in the short term. As that continues, and even as the Army and Marine Corps grow, Schultz said she sees three “tensions” that must be resolved to truly resolve the readiness crisis. First is the issue of quality vs. quantity. Army recruiters are signing up the required 80,000 troops each year needed to grow the force, Schultz said, but only by allowing in a larger number of less-qualified recruits with lower test scores, and by draining its delayed-entry manpower pool, raising the maximum enlistment age and making other concessions to depth and quality. “They might be getting numbers, but there’s certainly a quality issue at stake here,” she said. “The future contingencies ... are going to require more skilled soldiers, not less skilled. So if you are hitting quantity targets at the sacrifice of quality ... that could have some pretty disturbing implications.” Air Force Gen. Lance Smith, who stepped down as chief of U.S. Joint Forces Command on Nov. 9, is convinced that end-strength growth ultimately will increase dwell time and, in turn, help solve the readiness problem. “The answer ... is to grow the force so that you have sufficient time with your soldiers and your units between their deployments into theater to be able to train in all the responsibilities that you have,” Smith said. “You can’t do that adequately in 12 months for a normal combat brigade.” Unfortunately, there is no near-term fix; such growth takes time — several years, at least. “We would have had to start growing the Army and Marine Corps five years ago for it to have made a difference today,” Schultz said. The second tension Schultz said she sees is the schism between combatant commanders in the field and senior leaders in Washington. The most recent example, she said, was when Casey appeared on Capitol Hill on Sept. 26 to talk about the broader readiness issues in his service — barely two weeks after Gen. David Petraeus, who succeeded Casey as Multi-National Force-Iraq commander, talked to Congress about security improvements in Iraq and asked for more time and money for that specific mission. “Iraq requirements are demanding a large commitment of soldiers,” Schultz said. “Those in the field are being hit with different pressures of ongoing operations, while those in D.C. are really looking at the health of the future volunteer force.” The third tension lies between the need to “reset” the force — which Schultz said involves personnel as well as equipment — and the need to modernize. “When our deployments in Iraq do start going down — which they will in the spring, no matter what, because we just can’t sustain it unless we want to risk the all-volunteer force — when the supplemental [funding bills] start going down and/or away ... a lot of technology innovations are sort of tucked in those supplementals,” Schultz said. Defense officials will have to persuade Congress to approve funding for those programs in the regular annual defense budget. Even if these tensions are addressed, Schultz and Flournoy wrote that in a strategic sense, a fundamental shift in orientation needs to take place; the Pentagon needs to create a force “that is truly full spectrum — with greater capacity for irregular operations while retaining the ability to prevail in high-end war fighting against conventional or WMD-armed foes.” For the moment, Schultz said, “there is a crisis — and I think it’s only going to increase.” She talks with many officers about these issues for her studies. “All of them are terrified that we’re currently on the third rotation” in Iraq, she said. “This is unprecedented for an all-volunteer force, with the exception, I think, of the Revolutionary War.” As the new senior U.S. officer, Mullen hasn’t yet shown his hand, but he says he will not stand by and watch the force be broken. In comments after his first post-confirmation speech, Mullen told a Washington gathering that he is “eager to work with our service chiefs, our combatant commanders, as together we ... reset, reconstitute and revitalize our armed forces, especially our ground forces ... and we properly rebalance our risks around the globe.” Find Marinecorpstimes.com article here.

Noted, thanks.

I was always under the impression that the raid force had a one way ticket from Hornet to "allied" air bases on the Chinese mainland. Guess I'll have to read some more.

Exactly my point...but in conflict they do need a bit of forward movement to get aloft. In landing, they would come to a hover and just drop the land distance - guessing about 6in or less.

I was going to say, before reading the entire thread...is there such an airfield or runway not suitable for a harrier. Having observed them operate on land, and at sea, they need about nothing to land, and an extremely short distance to take off loaded. Seen them operating on a short "straight" stretch of a two lane road (Lyman Road aboard Camp Lejeune) just prior to OIF.

Budda - one beer a day, after the 90 day mark? We got just a one-time two beer alottment at the 45th consecutive day, then start marking the days again. Depending how long you were transiting/MODLOC you may have made out on the deal. Also spoke to a former Royal Marine at work today, he did not recall exactly what it was back in late 70's but said it was not what all the old salts remembered (Ah sea stories). Hopefully someone else with RN/RM experience can expound.

USN/USMC has/had a policy of 2 beers per man at the end of the 45th consecutive day at sea. I lived it twice during my 90 days cutting figure-eights into the sea of the west coast of Africa in 1990 aboard USS Saipan. The called off flight ops, opened Steel Beach, you presented your ID card and then popped the tops on two cans of beer. It had gaping holes in accountability in which the ship itself could have sailed through. You had many sailors and Marines below the "drinking age", many non-drinkers, if you wanted to get pie-eyed, you definitely could. I'm a little foggy on what course I took.

Congratulations Ralf

A Project 1123 Kondor Moskva class? Getting a little long in the tooth. aren't they. As a missile cruiser, has there been any major modification from a helo-carrier? VLS would be cool.

That's unfortunately what I thought. Where does one find such option? Thanks Herman.

First, I may be over-generalizing the screen names, so forgive me as I am not in front of my home computer. When a unit is first detected, but not classified, the icon appears in yellow on the main screen. Once detected and classified, it appears in red as a solitary icon representing any number of actual ships/aircraft/subs. In this case, lets talk surface ships. In the Pakistan Blockade scenario, the Indian group was first three, then seven, and finally eight platforms represented by the single ship icon as they were classified. Do enemy units that have been detected and classified appear individually in the more detailed upper left-hand screen? It does show individual friendly ships? And if so, is there a way to target a specific, High Value Target like a capital ship amongst the escorts? Also, when strikers get within range of the closest enemy ship, usually a picket of some sort, the player is prompted if it wants to engage. If the intended capital ship is not yet within range, by declining to attack the escort, how do you press home the attack all the way to the capital ship, should that be your intent? Thanks