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Analysis: How plans that don’t add up hurt fleet By Christopher P. Cavas - Staff writer Posted : Tuesday May 27, 2008 11:18:34 EDT When Navy officials tell Congress they have confidence in their shipbuilding cost projections, lawmakers don’t believe them. When flag officers say they’ve got enough money for maintenance, fleet sailors wonder why high-tech warships aren’t combat-ready. When top admirals say they have a new maritime strategy, analysts struggle to match it with the shipbuilding plan. When business strategies override operational needs, officers wonder whether they are war fighters or executives. Navy leaders are suffering from a credibility gap — with Congress, with industry and, increasingly, with the fleet. In discussions with dozens of naval professionals over several months, few questioned the Navy’s commitment to fielding an effective fighting force. But on a wide range of issues, the ability of Navy leaders to manage programs and explain service direction is being questioned, doubted and, in some cases, challenged outright. “They need to take a hard look at themselves,” one former senior officer said. An element of denial is apparent in many service calculations, which typically are based on perfect-world scenarios to make everything come out right. “They’re constantly using optimistic cost and schedule assumptions,” said Bob Work, a retired Marine Corps artillery colonel who is a top naval analyst with the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments in Washington. “This continual optimism, the continually rosy assumptions, the effort to go too fast” have so eroded the service’s credibility in Congress, Work said, that House lawmakers have difficulty even listening to the Navy. One congressional source said he can’t, at times, rule out deliberate deception. “It’s more a feeling rather than specific things,” the source said. “An accumulation of a lot of little things which, in and of themselves, are perfectly explainable, but when you add them up, it doesn’t work.” Disagreement abounds on where the primary problem lies, when it began and what the key symptoms are. Some cite the new Maritime Strategy, kicked off in spring 2006 by then-Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Mike Mullen and viewed by some as an indication of a naval identity crisis. Others point to unrealistic expectations for overly ambitious shipbuilding programs. This covers both the Littoral Combat Ship program, developed under Mullen’s predecessor, Adm. Vern Clark, and spurred on by former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld’s transformation movement, and the decadelong effort to produce the advanced DDG 1000 destroyer. The Navy, which has had trouble defining that ship’s purpose, says each DDG 1000 will cost about $3.3 billion, but independent estimates peg the costs at $5 billion or more. A growing number of professionals also sense a leadership vacuum, particularly at the service’s top levels. Some wonder whether Mullen’s advancement to the nation’s top military job — chairman of the Joint Chiefs — has kept his successor as CNO, Adm. Gary Roughead, from more assertively taking the service’s wheel. There are reports of forceful behind-the-scenes discussions in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, the part of the Navy reporting directly to the CNO. But when Navy leaders speak in open forums, their support for programs and philosophies lacks conviction and a clear sense of purpose. “They’re not even fighting hard for their own shipbuilding plan anymore,” a retired senior officer said. Navy Secretary Donald Winter has led efforts to force shipbuilders to modernize and become more efficient, and the Hill has applauded the efforts. But Winter has made enemies among his supplier base. For the third straight year, he castigated shipbuilders at March’s Navy League Sea-Air-Space Symposium in Washington for failing to control costs and boost quality. This time, industry’s groans were somewhat stifled when Northrop Grumman announced a month later that it would eat at least $320 million in charges to redo poor work on a Navy assault ship it is building. Navy leaders resist the notion that there are leadership issues and insist steady hands are at the wheel. But they declined requests to comment for this article. Littoral combat ships Early last year, LCS acquisition turned from problematic to fiasco, as an ambitious plan for concurrent design and construction, a tight building schedule and a cost cap of $220 million crashed headlong into the rocks of reality. Navy officials admitted the price was going to be far higher — and that they had no real idea how high it would go. Winter tried to force competitors Lockheed Martin and General Dynamics to switch from cost-plus contracts to fixed-price agreements for subsequent ships, shifting the financial risk to the contractors. But both companies declined, and the second ships were canceled for both. Costs for the initial LCS hulls are now forecast at around $500 million each, and the building schedule for subsequent ships, still planned to number 55, has been slowed. But lost behind the acquisition debacle is the absence of cultural preparation to allow the fleet to help develop the LCS concept — something commanders, crews and shore establishments will need years to embrace. The ship’s new features include heavy dependence on networked data, extensive use of modular weapons and sensors, an abundance of off-board vehicles requiring doctrinal development and unique maintenance, and extensive development on concepts of operations. Command structures will need to be perfected for how the core 40-man crews interact with mission-specific detachments of 15 sailors. No navy operates ships like these, and it will take years of development, testing and training to make the new concepts function smoothly. “They’re not going to get full capability out of that puppy for 20 years,” said Robbin Laird, a Washington-based defense analyst. Maintenance issues Recently, more thinkers are worrying how the small crews will keep the 2,800-ton ships in fighting trim, given the maintenance problems now vexing far larger crews. The 30-year fleet plan depends on keeping today’s ships in service longer than originally envisioned. But recent material inspections of surface warships have revealed what some fear are fleetwide maintenance problems. In March, the cruiser Chosin and the destroyer Stout, among the world’s most sophisticated ships and fitted with the Aegis combat system, were found by inspectors to be “unfit for sustained combat operations.” The Navy tied their condition to recent deployments, but the 5-year-old Fleet Response Plan requires ships to remain deployable for some months after a cruise. Moreover, service leaders have long insisted that ships kept steaming after the end of a deployment would be in better condition than if they were laid up for rest and repairs. But that’s not proven true. In a message to the fleet April 18, Navy Surface Forces chief Vice Adm. D.C. Curtis said “course corrections” might be necessary to fix maintenance shortcomings. One problem some believe needs attention: The limited hands-on training sailors now get before arriving aboard ships. Sailors in many technical ratings are learning their trade with computer-based simulations. “There is absolutely no substitute for a wrench in a young sailor’s hand,” thundered the former senior officer. “You can’t learn that on a computer. We are losing technical skills rapidly in the junior ranks.” 313-ship plan Before moving on to become chairman of the Joint Chiefs, then-CNO Mullen succeeded in one of his top priorities: setting a definitive number of ships for the future fleet. The 313-ship, 30-year fleet plan — which is revised each year — emerged in February 2006, designed to quiet critics who decried the practice of Clark and previous Navy Secretary Gordon England of advocating not a specific number but a range. The Navy admitted the plan wasn’t perfect. Among other problems, in order to make the number of surface combat ships add up, the service had to extend the ships’ planned life spans. Arleigh Burke-class destroyers, for example, are now slated to sail for 40 years rather than 35. Real-life experience, however, indicates that could be costlier and more difficult than this rosy projection allows. The 14-year-old Stout is considered by maintenance officers to be an old ship, yet it is barely one-third of the way through its 40-year career. The Chosin is 17 years old and needs to remain operational for 18 more years. “The maintenance strategy is absolutely critical to being able to execute the 313-ship, 30-year fleet plan,” the congressional source said. The service has little if any credibility in Congress when predicting the budget necessary to buy its future fleet. The Navy did not help its case by insisting for two years that the shipbuilding plan would cost an average of $15 billion a year, despite critics who said the real price would be at least $20 billion. This year, the service quietly revised its estimate to $20 billion per year. “But they never discussed that in testimony, they never offered any explanation,” the congressional source declared. “That isn’t incompetence, that isn’t a mistake. That’s sort of a willful and deliberate omission. It’s not lying, but it’s leaving out an evident truth.” Work said the Navy really wants many more ships — many officers still wistfully dream of the Reagan-era “600-ship Navy” — and the unaffordability of its plan creates a culture of unrealistic optimism. “Roughead said 313 is a ‘floor’ number,” Work said. “The Navy wants a bigger fleet, but they’re stuck with a budget of no more than about 300 ships, and the Navy has had to be extremely creative in its plan, using optimistic assumptions, ships in the out-years that never come about. Unable to convince people they need the resources to build this fleet, they’re constantly using optimistic cost and schedule assumptions.” The Maritime Strategy The fleet plan was meant to furnish stability, a response to shipbuilders who complained they couldn’t plan if the Navy kept changing its mind each year about the number of ships it would build. Ironically, the Navy completed work on its new Maritime Strategy some two years after it settled on the fleet size, reversing the logical order in which a strategy would dictate the tools needed to carry it out. There were high hopes for the strategy when planning began in April 2006, but for the next 16 months, discussion was limited by a rigid adherence to how the strategy was being developed rather than the issues at hand, squelching open exchanges. Finally unveiled last October, the completed strategy incorporated Mullen’s oft-stated visions of a 1,000-ship international cooperative effort, humanitarian missions and stationing of more U.S. ships in foreign lands. But it added little to the debate over the Navy’s roles and was criticized for avoiding discussion of what kind of fleet the Navy needs. “It is not compelling, not tied to a force structure,” said a second retired senior officer, now in industry. “So what?” Enterprise approach Aviation is not immune to these and other related problems. Navy leaders talk about a “fighter gap” beginning around 2016, but many listeners view this as a scare tactic rather than a realistic prediction. Critics argue the Navy just wants to adjust its plans and buy more aircraft, or that the claim reflects internal disputes over whether to buy more F/A-18E and F Super Hornets or the more expensive, but more modern, F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. “The ‘gap’ is a bean-counter approach that is not putting you at the heart of strategic relevance,” Laird said. “The F/A-18 is yesterday’s aircraft.” Another issue stretching the Navy’s credibility is the effort to reduce the number of helicopter models in the fleet to the MH-60S and R models. The approach makes business sense, but the absence of medium- and heavy-lift capabilities means that many missions must be split into more individual sorties — which will wear out aircraft and aircrews at a faster rate. The Navy last year exacerbated the issue when it all but ignored congressional inquiries into the helicopter plan, annoying lawmakers who might be itching to order the service to purchase or develop heavy-lift helos. The continued emphasis on applying business practices to fleet problems disturbs many naval professionals. “We’re not a business organization. We’re war fighters,” the first former senior officer said. “We’re not here to waste money, but we’re not here to make a profit.” Clark epitomized the MBA-admiral, the former officer said, with discussions of human capital management and other business-speak. “All the flag officers have these titles that mirror a corporate board structure. I just want to throw up,” the former senior officer said. “Where’s the warrior culture? We’re not a board of directors, it’s the Navy. It should be about standards and accomplishing the mission.” The second retired senior officer lamented today’s risk-averse naval culture, and bemoaned the lack of a strong Navy leader. That should be the CNO, he said. “But what does he think? What does he believe? Usually there’s a champion, someone who picks people up from the malaise. Where’s the champion?” Find Navy Times article here.

Campaign Day 2, Mission 3, Target 9 Armored Forces. Libyan armored force moving along their costal highway. As I needed a cream puff, this was it. Target will cause Stress +2 and reduce weight points by 1. Wing Intel describes the enemy defenses as: West/SA-14(L); South/SA-13(L); East/SA-7(L); North/37mm(H/L); and the target area has SA-14(L) and SA-8(L). It asppears that a high level approach with stand off weapons would be rewarded. 4 Hornets are detailed. Big Red (no stress) 2x AIM-9, 2x AGM-65, 1x Mk20 CBU. White Bread (no stress) 2x AIM-9, 2x AGM-65, 1x Mk20 CBU. Wedge (+1 Stress) 2x AIM-7, 2x AIM-9, and 1x Mk20 CBU. Fox (+1 Stress) 2x AIM-9, 2x AGM-65, 1x Mk20 CBU. Target Bound Event Card: Bad Day - Rack Failure. Randomly, Big Red loses 1x AIM-9. Pre-Approach: Big Red SW; Wedge and Whitebread south; Fox south. All aircraft at high altitude. Turn 1 (Fast Hornets) Wedge fires an AIM-7 and uses the Locked-on card from previous mission to down the eastern MiG-23. (Bandits & Sites) Western MiG-23 attacks the evading Big Red who takes on +2 Stress. (Slow Hornets) Big Red misses an AIM-9 shot on the MiG-23. (Movement) All Hornets move to Southern Approach Area. Target Area MiG-21 remains in target area. Turn 2 (Fast Hornets) Wedge knocks down the western MiG-23 with an AIM-9. (Bandits & Sites) None. (Slow Hornets) Big Red +1 AtG gets two hits employing two AGM-65 counters. Whitebread gets three hits with two AGM-65's. Fox +1 AtG gets three AGM-65 hits...target destroyed. Homebound Event Card: Air War - Recon. Next mission draw an extra target card. Whitebread is now promotable, but already on his average side...so no promotion? Campaign Points earned so far: 5 "Good Evaluation" with one more mission to fly.

Mission 2 (two missions per campaign day required) saw VMF-666 flying against Target # "Lucky" 13 a Libyan Command Bunker. Mission called for 8 hornets but after the lumps that I took this morning, only the six ready hornets went up. Target was located in mid-Libya, south of Surt. Mission completion would automatically cause +2 Stress on the pilots and due to range the target reduces Weight Points by 2. Wing Intel describes target defenses as following: North/SA-13(L); East SA-11(L); South/SA-8(L), West/37mm(HL). Target had a ZSU-23/4, 2x SA-14, and 1x SA-7. One SA-14 was removed randomly due to intel gained as a result of the mornings mission. Mission Roster: Wedge (Fast) 2x AIM-7, and 4x AIM-9. Bullseye (Fast) 2x AIM-7, 2x AIM-9, and 1x Mk83. Fox (Slow) 2x AIM-9 and 2x Mk83. Topo (Slow) 2x AIM-9 and 2x Mk83. Package (slow) 2x AIM-9 and 2x Mk83. Inbound Event Card: Bandits. I opted to exped the 4x AtA assets to negate the bandits "jumping" the strike. Hornets enter board from East and Northeast. Site Adjustment Event Card: Human Factor: Intel goffed slightly and the northern SA-13 and the southern SA-8 are flip-flopped. Bandits Placed: South/MiG-23 and MiG-25; East/MiG-21 and "No Bandit"; North/2x "No Bandit"; West/MiG-29 and "No Bandit". Target Area received MiG-21, MiG-25, and 3x "No Bandit". Turn 1: (Fast) Wedge misses the MiG-25 over the target area with an AIM-7. Bullseye downs the MiG-21 in the Eastern Approach Area. (Bandits & Sites) Target Area MiG-25 targets the evading Bullseye who suffers damage to boot, +3 Stress and drops his ordnance. (Slow) None. Turn 2 (Fast) Wedge downs the MiG-25 with 2x AIM-9. (Bandits & Sites) Target Area MiG-21 targets an evading Fox, +1 Stress. Wedges fails to suppress the southern MiG-25 targeting Bullseye, whoi suffers an additional +1 Stress. MiG-29, formerly from the western approach area, shoots down Topo (Slow) Package avenges Topo by downing the MiG-29. Fox downs a MiG-25. Turn 3: (Fast) Wedge downs a MiG-29 with an AIM-9 (Bandits & Sites) MiG-23 formerly of the southern Approach Area attacks Joker, but Fox suppresses the attack. ZSU-23/4, and SA-7 miss. SA-14 causes +1 Stress to Fox. (Slow) Joker misses with both of his sticks of Mk83. Package gets two hits, subtracted to 1 hit due to the target being underground. Fox scoring 4 hits with 2 sticks of Mk83's, reduced to 2. Target sill operational. During Egress, Wedge downed the final MiG-23 that was attempting to trail the strike package. Home Bound Event: Coordination. Save card, allows single AtA adjustment of 2. SAR: 2-2WP+2 = "Topo" Captured.

After some initial questions, today I re-set and re-started the 2-Day Skirmish with Libya in 1986. Todays target for VMF-666 is Tart #17 a supply depot deep in southern Libya. The mission calls for 6 Hornets, each of which will incur 3 Stress Points upon completion, and due to the distance traveled the nornal 8 Weight Points drops to 5 to account for the additional fuel required. Intel advises that the Approach Defense is made up of SA-15 sites in the South and East. An SA-7 MANPAD in the West and an SA-2 site in the North. Target Defenses consist of SA-2 and SA-6 sites. Based on the number of SAM sites, I opt to spend all 3 Option Points open the availability for 3x AGM-88's. Pilots detailed to this mission are: Big Red: AGM-65, Mk82, 2x AIM-9 Wraith: 3x AGM-88, 2x AIM-9 Griffin: AGM-65, 2x Mk82, 2x AIM-9 Whitebread: Mk82, Mk83, 2x AIM-9 Hammer: 6x AIM-9 Cowboy: AGM-65, 2x Mk82, 2x AIM-9 Target Bound Event Card: Team Work, allows for adjusting a single suppression roll by -2 which I promptly forget to employ. Wraith (High Alt), Hammer (High Alt), Whitebread (Low) and Griffith (Low) approach from the NE. Big Red and Cowboy, both at Low, approach from the North. Site Adjust Event Card: Carrier Life, no applicable changes. Bandits drawn: Three "No Bandits"; South MiG-21; East MiG-25; North MiG21, West Mig-21 and Mig-29. Target Mig-21 and MiG-23. Turn1: Wraith, my only "fast" pilot plinks an SA-15 site. Eastern MiG-25 targets Griffin but Hammer suppresses the MiG with an AIM-9, cancelling the attack. SA-2 targets Wraith who evades incurring +1 Stress. The missile roll causes an additional +1 Stress. A northern MiG-21 attacks Big Red who attempts to suppress The suppression attempt and the MiG's attack both end up No Effect. Western MiG-29 targets Big Red, who evades causing +1 Stress. The MiG's attack also causes +1 Stress. Southern Mig-21 targets Wraith (while randomly rolled - see a pattern developing?) who sppresses the attack at the expense of an AIM-9. "Slow" Pilots now are cleared to engage. Cowboy shoots down a MiG-21 with a sidewinder. Big Red conducts an unsuccessful AGM-65 attack on an SA-2 site. Whitebread downs the MiG-25 with a volley of two sidewinders. Griffin destroys the SA-2 site with an AGM-65 strike. Hornets now move one zone, Hammer descends to Low. Bandits can move but do not since all still have potential targets in range. Turn 2 Fast Wraith destroys the target area SA-6 site Target SA-2 targets Hammer who evades the flying telephone pole at a cost of +1 Stress. Wraith suppresses an attempted MiG-23 attack. A MiG-21 attacks an evading Griffith causing +2 Stress. Southern MiG-21 targets Wraith, Hammer fails in his suppression attempt, the attack causes Wraith Damage causing him to drop all remaining ordance and +2 Stress. Southern SA-15 launches at but misses Wraith. Western MiG-29 and MiG-21 unsuccessfully attack the evading Cowboy causing a total of +4 Stress. Slow Hornets Attack! Hammer and Griffin down a MiG-21 and Mig-23 respectively. Big Red and Cowboy each hit the target with one Damage Point via AGM-65's. Hornets and Bandits move. Wraith now descends to Low. Hornets are now over the target area. Turn 3 Fast Hornets - none. Bandits and Sites attack: Southern Mig-21 misses the evading Whitebread for +1 Stress. Western MiG-21 targets Cowboy, who attempted suppression, each pilot missed. Western MiG-29 targets the suppression attempting Hammer who incurs +1 Stress. Slow Attacks Big Red scores a Hit on the target via a Mk82. Cowboy misses with both of his Mk82. Whitebread causes the target areas 4th hit (remember the two AGM-65's earlier) with one hit by a Mk82, the Mk83 missed. Griffin applied the coup de grace with three hits by two sticks of Mk82. All Hornets begin egress to the Eastern Approach Area. MiG's give chase. Turn 4: Hammer suppresses an attack by the southern MiG-21 on Wraith. Former western Mig-21 attemptsd an attack on Cowboy, that Griffin suppresses. The MiG-29 now attacks the evading Griffin, causing +2 Stress Egress Event Card; no effect as there is no remaining AtG ordance. Final Tally: 3 Victory Points Awarded Big Red: +5 Stress Wraith: Damaged, +8 Stress Points, he'll need a rest. Griffin: +7 Stress Whitebread: +4 Stress Hammer: +5 Stress Cowboy: +7 Stress Each pilot received 1 Experience Point for accomplishing the mission, plus one experience point for not losing an aircraft. Luckily the squadron has six more pilots who were cooling their heels in their state rooms, and who now will have to carry the torch; Fox, Bullseye, Wedge, Topo, Package, and Joker. Next mission to follow.

They show up in the expansion Carrier Air Wing, which I am the proud papa of as well. Here they did their darndest to clear the target area. Too bad there was nobody home.

Ran through one mission of this campaign today, attacking Target #18, an Oil Refinery. The target area is defended by randomly drawn ZSU-23/4 and an SA-14 MANPAD. Pilots selected for the mission are: Veteran "Wraith" flying air cover with 2x AIM-7 and 2x AIM-7 and an ALQ-119(v) EW pod; Average "Griffen" flying air defense suppression with 2x AGM-65, 2x AIM-9, and an ALQ-119(v) EW pod; Skilled "Fox" and average "Bullseye" flying as the strikers with 2x Mk83, 2x AIM-9, and an ALQ-119(v) EW pod The Ingress Event Card drawn is "Bad Weather - Ground Clutter" which will require a -2 Air to Ground DRM from High Altitude. Wraith and Griffen approach the target from the south while the strikers approach from the northeast. The Target Event Card dawn is "F-14 Tomcats" while provides for drawing one less bandit counter for the target area during the Determine Bandits Present step. [That was for you Tony...too bad there are no bandits called for over the target area - too bad it did not apply to the approach] 2x Bandit chits are drawn for each of the four approach areas. 3 "No Bandit" markers are drawn , two in the east and one in the north. That appears good for the strikers, providing them with a clear path to the target area. During the four turns of the actual attack 4/7 AIM-9's and 1/2 AIM-7's hitting their targets destroying an Su-24, Su-25, MiG-21, MiG-23, and MiG-27. Griffin took out the ZSU-23/4 with a maverick, while the target is peppered with six Mk83 hits whereas only 4 hits were required to destroy the target. The MANPAD made one ineffectual SA-14 attack on the low-level strikers. A quick and fun game that is available through vassal and .pdf from the designer at dvg.com and I understand as a PC product available from Matrixgames.

On a related note I cringed while reading The Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle: Over Budget, Behind Schedule, and Unreliable when despite the troubling report from the United States House of Representatives Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, they identified the EFV as an amphibious "tank". Well it does have tracks. Just the "carrier" Missouri floated in the water. I would however like to expect more my government than the AP.

Brooklyn Navy Yard gets a makeover By Richard Pyle - The Associated Press Posted : Monday May 19, 2008 7:11:34 EDT NEW YORK — Audrey Lyons was a $40-a-week parts inspector at the Brooklyn Navy Yard in 1944 when Margaret Truman was invited to christen the brand-new carrier Missouri. “We all took time off to see it,” recalls Lyons, now 84 and retired in Essex, Conn. But the daughter of Sen. (and soon-to-be-president) Harry S. Truman needed help to break the champagne bottle on the third try — a less than sparkling debut for the “Mighty Mo,” the last famous warship among hundreds produced at the yard since 1801. The Pentagon closed the Brooklyn Navy Yard in 1966, an obsolete facility awash in history but torpedoed by time. Yet behind the nondescript facade visible to motorists rushing past on the Brooklyn-Queens Expressway, the 40-plus buildings of the former shipyard have become a modern beehive of activity. Its old machine shops and warehouses hum with small entrepreneurs — makers of furniture, clothing, industrial equipment, theatrical sets and computer software — as well as medical suppliers, fashion designers, printers, carpenters and artists, altogether employing 5,000 people. Andrew Kimball, president and CEO of the Brooklyn Navy Yard Development Corp., a nonprofit that manages the city-owned site, said current plans call for spending $250 million to add 1.3 million square feet of space and 1,500 more jobs by 2009. In a decade, he said, there should be 5,000 more jobs. “The Brooklyn Navy Yard has added another chapter to its rich history by becoming a thriving hub of industrial business,” Kimball said. The continuing expansion will emphasize “green” construction. Hospital buildings and an overgrown cemetery that once held 1,500 bodies await transformation into a 20-acre “media campus” focused on entertainment, TV and graduate educational programs. (The bodies were reburied in a cemetery in Queens.) Some of the six dry docks remain in use for maintenance. On a recent day, one held a large Singapore-based oil products tanker. The Coast Guard tug Sturgeon Bay occupied another. “Maritime is still part of what we do,” Kimball said. The yard’s biggest tenant is Steiner Studios, a Hollywood-style operation in a cavernous former machine shop with sound stages where large pieces of vessels were once assembled. It, too, is expanding. There is a fish wholesaler to fancy restaurants, a shroud-maker for Orthodox Jewish funerals and a factory producing coffee-sweetener packets. At Ferra Designs Inc., partners Robert Ferraroni and Jeff Kahn use a powerful water jet to cut steel for custom-designed furniture and sculpture. They found space at the Navy yard after rising rents forced a move from the nearby Williamsburg neighborhood. “The Navy yard is a great resource for networking with other businesses,” Kahn said. “I feel like we’re in a community here. We do business together, and it reinforces the feeling that we are in the right place.” It didn’t happen overnight. With the Navy gone, the dry docks and cranes that helped win seven wars fell into disrepair. The carved eagles on pillars guarding the main gate vanished, and it became a police department auto pound, where citizens pay $200 or more to reclaim stolen and towed vehicles. At the old naval hospital, a marble ghost dating from 1837, the wide corridors and patient wards echo with emptiness. On Admiral’s Row, six graceful turn-of-the-century mansions once occupied by top officers and still owned by the federal government, are falling into ruin, their future unclear. The first ship built there, in 1798, was the frigate Adams, burned by its crew in 1812 to avoid British capture. The last, the amphibious transport Duluth, slipped into the East River in 1965. Other noteworthy vessels included the Fulton II, the first U.S. steam-powered warship to go to sea, in 1837; the frigate Niagara, which helped lay the first trans-Atlantic undersea cable; and the Civil War ironclad Monitor, built elsewhere but commissioned at the yard in 1862. Within weeks, it faced the Confederates’ CSS Virginia in history’s first clash of ironclads — a standoff, but a death knell for wooden warships. The battleship Maine was commissioned in 1889 and exploded at its dock in Havana in 1898, triggering the Spanish-American War, which recast the U.S. as a world power. The battleship Arizona, launched in 1915, remains the best-known symbol of America’s entry into World War II. Moored near its sunken hulk at Pearl Harbor is the Missouri, now a floating museum symbolizing the Allied victory in 1945. In interviews, Kimball and Daniella Romano, the Navy yard’s resident archivist, said development will give that past its due, to include oral histories of former workers such as Lyons, as well as guided tours and an exhibit of photographs and artifacts at a building near the main gate. The gate itself is to be restored as nearly as possible to its turn-of-the-20th century look — with public parking in place of the police auto pound. Navy Time article

I was about to ask angrily where is the USMC Lightning F-35B was, but alas, the final one shared with navy and chair force variants.

After a cursory look here, I posted. You know...I did not look there. Delete all this if you wish.

USS Russell DDG-59

You seem to be firing on all cylinders...I'd watch your back at the office.

I believe Brad mentioned that Evgeni Malkin was in his office pool, if so nice start to the 3rd Round.

Terry, Since you bumped the French/UK one to public before I had a shot, I'll move this one up for the weekend and provide whatever feedback I come across.

Being my blood pressure is back down, and that I have no vested interest going forward, Let's get it ON!

Alright beta-newbie question, what build/version should I use if I were to take this out for a spin this weekend and report back?

It does not seem to be a good year for any of us on this thread, does it? Pretty sure that we have done this for three years now...fun to co-missurate. "was it over when the germans bombed pearl harbor"

Well, sound Taps, Rangers done in 5.

Hope not ... Rangers were my fav team when I was a kid, and I still kinda like them. BTW, you are up WAY too early on a Sunday morning, dude! Mom is away so when 4 year awakes at 0630 and says come on daddy, lets go downstairs, I complied. However, just warned her that Noggin' goes off at 2pm for Ranger Game. She agreed since the alternative is the dreaded "you can always go in for a nap".

Ranger may be the next "Dead Man Skating" this afternoon at 2pm EDT. We'll see how they come out.

So I guess today is not the day to ask for some outlandish request for the HCDB... Well there's alway next year..., no wait that's some sorry baseball team's fan by June each year.

From the you did what file...I participated in a traditional game of Kriegsspiel with a number of enthusiaists located outside of Kansas City, MO, by way of a mode that could never have been envisioned when first written in the "dark days" following the final fall of Napolean, the internet. The multi-player game is umpired, and double blind. The scenario brief is extremely vague, and was played on the long fought over map centered on the City of Metz, along the Moselle River. We, RedFor, (consisting of me and the force commander, an army officer currently stationed in Hawaii) were told that we had cleared the enemy of our side of the river, and the river line was being held by cavalry forces. Our force had also cleared the city of Metz except for a few dead-enders in some outlying forts. The time was around 1905. Our mission was to clear the remaining enemy forces from Metz. Our opponent commander was the third person hooked up by IRC, playing from Vermont. His subordinates, two others, and the umpire and two assistant umpires were colocated in MO, which was ok, because friendly commanders can only communicate with each other in the scope of the game. The units representing those commanders would have to either colocate or as in my case along the rail lines issue a 10 word message via the wire comms located at a railroad station. Aside from that, a player knows where his units begin, then provides orders and intent to the assistant umpires who pass that info on to the umpire who adjusts his map and adjudicates any combat per the rule set. This along with the delay in the effects of orders leads to some interesting situations. The Red CO commanded those red forces already fighting in and around Metz. My 8x Bn, 4x Cavalry Squadrons, and an artillery battery were entrained and made its way on may along a rail line leading toward Metz. The Red CO made an assumtion that the enemy was holding Metz by a thread, and that made be holding on for a relief force. Red CO wanted to seize a bridge crossing to the SW from Metz called Ars sur Moselle, and rush my force across to intercept any such relief force. As it turned out Red Forces were rebuffed by Blue Forces at Ars sur Moselle, however both sides initially withdrew. Then Blue Forces attack from the extreme north after crossing the river at a fording site. My forces are odered off train and to advance to contact to the north. With cavalry squadrons screening to the front, my battalions advanced in an echelon right formation hoping to meet the enemy the then flank him to his left. At this time the initially checked souhtern Blue force makes itself known on our side of the river. Hey, this could be some type of little Stalingrad. Two battalions are stripped from me to move southwest to make a stand against the southern enemy force. It was about at this point the nature of 1905-ish communications and how the game replicates that takes its toll. The is a dictated 30min delay in having orders acted upon. Think an event causes the change in orders, the order is expressed, given to a runner/messenger, who then makes his way to the subordinant, probably under fire. The subordinant commander receives the order, and then has to act upon that order. No small feat in reality. As for my advance/attack. My force's screen quickly made contact with what would turn out to be two squadrons of Blue cavalry, my forces further to my right continued to advance and eventually, yet ineffectively flanked the enemy. In the end, my main force was hung up on the enemy's flank screen. He did dilute his force somewhat by peeling two infantry battalions to hold off my two marauding cavalry squadrons in the extreme north. During all this, the nemy continued to push relatively unimpeded against Metz, just as in the south. It was a fun game, interesting. In the end, the force ratio was 18 Blue inf BNs to 12 Red, 9 Blue cav squadrons to 6 Red, 2 arty batteries to 2 arty batteries. Here is an image of the end of the battle as it appeared on the umpires map. End photo

C'mon Brad..."I'm listening to the ...er...SONG!" Slapshot

rgr...I'll be kriegsspieling with some folks tomorrow then.

RL apparently jumped up and bit Matt. He will not be running the CPX tomorrow. If anyone here is interested, I can do the same thing he intended. It would benefit all invovled, players playing and me hosting.