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CV32

Staff Pukes
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Everything posted by CV32

  1. So, after 35 years as host of that venerable game show, "The Price is Right", Bob Baker is retiring in May. The field of candidates is narrowing, with the buzz in Hollywood indicating that Mark Steines, George Hamilton and Mario Lopez are top contenders, together with Todd Newton, John O'Hurley and Mike Richards. But now, with the end of the debacle of the British Royal Navy sailors and Royal Marines held in Iran, a new contender has emerged: Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. The return of the 15 British military personnel was a "gift" to the British people from Iran. They even departed on a first class British Airways flight, complete with new suits and other lovely parting gifts such as candy and CD's. The sheer generosity of Ahmadinejad was overwhelming, to say the least. So, what do you think ? How do you say "Come on down !" in Farsi ?
  2. From Defense Aerospace Prime Minister Welcomes News of Sailors' Release (Source: UK Ministry of Defence; issued April 5, 2007) The Prime Minister Tony Blair has welcomed the news that the 15 Royal Navy and Royal Marines personnel detained by Iranian authorities since Friday 23 March 2007 are to be released and returned to the UK. In a short statement to reporters outside No. 10 Downing Street, Mr Blair said: "I am glad that our 15 Service personnel have been released. I know their release will come as a profound relief not just to them but to their families that have endured such distress and anxiety over these past 12 days. Throughout we have taken a measured approach; firm but calm. Not negotiating, but not confronting either. "I would like to thank our allies in Europe, our allies in the United Nations Security Council for their support, and also our friends and allies in the region, who played their part; we are grateful to all of them as we are to the officials in the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Defence and here in Downing Street for the work that they have done. "And, to the Iraninan people I would simply say this: We bear you no ill will. On the contrary we respect Iran as an ancient civilisation, as a nation with a proud and dignified history, and the disagreements that we have with your government we wish to resolve peacefully, through dialogue. I hope, as I have always hoped, that we are able to do so." The 15 personnel, eight from the Royal Navy and seven from the Royal Marines, were engaged in routine boarding operations of merchant shipping in Iraqi territorial waters in support of UNSCR 1723 and the government of Iraq. The personnel are expected to return to the UK tomorrow, Thursday 5 April 2007. Secretary of State for Defence Des Browne added: "I welcome this news. It must be a tremendous relief for our people who have been held in Iran – they have acted with great dignity throughout. It is vital that we get them back home quickly and safely so they can be reunited with their families and loved ones – that is our priority now." (ends) Release of British Sailors Leaves Unanswered Questions (Source: Voice of America news; issued April 5, 2007) WASHINGTON --- The end of the standoff between Britain and Iran still leaves many questions unanswered. Chief among them is why Iran took such a deliberately provocative action as seizing British sailors and marines. Many analysts believe the heart of the matter lies in the struggle between Iran and the United States for influence in Iraq and the Middle East. In January, U.S. forces arrested five Iranian men in the northern Iraqi town of Irbil. On March 23, Iran seized 15 British sailors and marines in the Persian Gulf. On Wednesday, Iranian President announced he was, to use his term, pardoning the 15 captured British service members for what Tehran claims was a violation of Iranian territorial waters. Meanwhile, Iran's official news agency, Irna, says an envoy will meet with the Iranians detained in Irbil in January, whom the U.S. says Tehran sent to Iraq to support militants. Iran says they are diplomats. Also, on Tuesday, an Iranian diplomat held in Baghdad by unidentified gunmen was suddenly freed. U.S., British, and Iraqi officials disavow any connection between the Iranians detained in Iraq and the Britons captured by Iran, and say there is no prisoner swap. But Reva Bhalla, an Iran specialist at the private intelligence firm Stratfor, is one of those analysts who says the two events are indeed linked as part of a struggle between Iran and the United States for influence in Iraq and the Middle East. "Those incidents are very connected," said Reva Bhalla. "The U.S. kind of showed how aggressive it can get in Iraq, and that was a clear signal to the Iranians. And now this was just a way to come back. This is far from over. We're going to see more of these tit-for-tat moves. But the negotiations are certainly reaching a very intense point for Iraq." In recent months President Bush has taken a tough line against Iran, not only for its alleged nuclear weapons ambitions, but for what the administration says is Iranian support for Iraqi insurgents. Ken Katzman, an Iran analyst for the non-partisan Congressional Research Service, agrees that there is a strong linkage. Katzman believes the capture of the British sailors and marines was just one option that is part of a larger package of Iranian moves against the United States and its coalition partners in Iraq. "I think there probably was a joint decision that once President Bush announced his much more robust or assertive policy against Iran inside Iraq, I think the Iranians put their heads together and came up with some sort of a package of steps that they might take that might counter President Bush's new policy," said Ken Katzman. "And seizing coalition sailors in the Iraq waterways was probably one on the menu that they developed, and they decided to go with it." It is not known who in Iran actually ordered the operation against the British sailors and marines. But although President Ahmadinejad is a hardliner, some analysts believes the order may have come directly from Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Katzman says Iran already felt its back was against the wall with U.N. sanctions imposed on the Iranian government over its alleged bid to build a nuclear weapon. "In some ways Iran felt cornered," he said. "It's facing pressure in the Security Council. It's facing pressure in Iraq from the United States. It's facing pressure in the Gulf. It's facing pressure through sanctions, economic pressure, financial pressure, banking pressure. So I think Iran wanted to develop a package of options that would give it leverage back again. And I think this [seizure] was on that list." Wayne White, a former senior State Department Middle East analyst, says the linkage between the U.S. detention of the Iranians in Iraq and the seizure of the British sailors would seem clear to Iran. He says that once Iran saw it was not going to get a prisoner swap, officials there decided to dump the problem. "It could have been one reason why it wasn't linked overtly is that it was thought to be obvious on the part of the Iranians that there would be this link and that's why we might do something like this [iranian capture], and recognizing that there was this negative blowback for what they did in whatever waters, that they couldn't hold out for a trade," said Wayne White. White adds that the Iranian seizure has only reinforced the international image of Iran as, in his words, "irresponsible, dangerous, and unpredictable."
  3. From Defense Aerospace US Arms Package to S. Arabia Delayed Due to Israeli Objections (Source: ddi Indian Government news; issued April 5, 2007) A major arms-sale package that the Bush administration is planning to offer Saudi Arabia and other Persian Gulf allies to deter Iran has been delayed due to objections from Israel, saying the advanced weaponry would erode its military advantage over its regional rivals. Israeli officials, including the former defense minister, Shaul Mofaz, have come to Washington in recent months to argue against elements of the planned sales, the New York Times reported. In particular, the Israelis are concerned about the possible transfer of precision-guided weapons that would give Saudi warplanes much more accurate ability to strike targets, American officials told the paper. The United States has made few, if any, sales of satellite-guided ordnance to Gulf countries, several officials were quoted as saying. Israel has been supplied with such weapons since the 1990s and used them extensively in its war against Hezbollah last summer. The American officials, the paper said, would not provide a dollar figure for the planned sales. But one American defense industry executive told the Times that if all the equipment under discussion with the Saudis and other Gulf countries was eventually sold, including tanks, warships and advanced air defense systems, the deal could run from 5 billion to 10 billion dollars. The Israeli complaints have introduced a new uncertainty into the administration's plan to beef up Persian Gulf militaries as a bulwark against Iran and as a demonstration that, no matter what happens in Iraq, Washington remains committed to the Sunni Arab governments. Several officials in the State Department and the Pentagon told the paper that plans to formally notify Congress about the potential weapons sales had been delayed at least until later this month. After notification, Congress has 30 days to decide whether to block the sales. Support for maintaining Israel's military superiority remains strong on Capitol Hill, and administration officials are discussing how to allay the concerns, including the possibility of a separate arms package for Israel, the report said. Some details of the planned sales to Persian Gulf countries had been reported last month, but the paper says Israel's opposition to aspects of them had not been disclosed. The Times quoted officials as saying that Israel's concerns about the proposed American arms sales were focused primarily on precision-guided munitions and any other offensive weapons that would be provided to Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries. They said Israel did not seem intent on using its political clout in Congress to kill the entire planned sale. It's not like the Israelis are going to end up with nothing," said a senior administration official, adding "the Israelis understand that it's in our interest and their interest" that the United States try to shore up military systems for Sunni Arab allies. But Israel is also concerned that the Bush administration's ambitions for an American-Israeli-Sunni coalition allied against Iran may never materialize, or that there could be a revolution in Saudi Arabia that would leave the mostly American-made Saudi arsenal in the hands of militant Islamists, the Times said.
  4. From Defense Aerospace E-3 Sentry Celebrates 30 Years in Air Force's Fleet (Source: US Air Force; issued April 4, 2007) TINKER AIR FORCE BASE, Okla. --- It all started 30 years ago -- March 23, 1977, to be exact -- when the first E-3 Sentry touched down on Oklahoma soil. The arrival of aircraft tail number 75-0557 began a new era for the 552nd Airborne Warning and Control Wing, and for air surveillance. To celebrate the occasion, wing officials conducted an arrival ceremony the next day and invited the base and local community leaders to help welcome the new aircraft. The story of the E-3 goes back to April 1975, when a systems integration demonstration was conducted on several E-3 prototypes and the decision was made to produce the aircraft flown today. The E-3 replaced the EC-121D Super Constellation. In August 1975, four E-3 aircraft completed a 16-month test period at the Air Force Test and Evaluation Center at Kirtland Air Force Base, N.M., and engineering and test evaluations began on the E-3 aircraft at Tinker. These events led up to the E-3 achieving "Initial Operational Capability" on April 16, 1978. By the end of 1981 the wing had received 25 aircraft and had flown missions to assist in apprehending drug smugglers in Florida;, deployed four E-3As and more than 200 personnel to Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, in support of European Liaison Force-One, known as ELF-One; and while on scramble over Iceland, located and saved a lost civilian aircraft. An E-3 also completed an around-the-world mission. During the flight, the E-3 touched down in Alaska, Hawaii, Japan, Korea, Philippines, Saudi Arabia and the Azores. During the 1980s, E-3s continued to fly ELF-One missions. The final two E-3s returned from Saudi Arabia on April 16, 1989, marking the end of the ELF-One commitment. The 552nd Airborne Warning and Control Wing logged more than 6,000 sorties and 87,000 flying hours in eight and a half years during ELF-One. The E-3 achieved "Full Operational Capability" in June 1984 when Air Force officials accepted delivery of the final aircraft. The 961st AWACS at Kadena AB, Japan, was activated on May 23, 1980, and the 962nd AWACS at Elmendorf AFB, Alaska, on July 1, 1986. The 1990s took the Sentry back to Asia. On Jan. 17, 1991, Airmen began flying in support of Operation Desert Storm, the war with Iraq. Aircrews from the 552nd AWACW flew 7,314.7 combat hours during Desert Storm, with a combined 91.36 percent mission-capable rate. They controlled 31,924 strike sorties, where 88,500 tons of munitions were dropped, without losing a single Allied aircraft in air-to-air action. In addition, E-3s controlled 20,401 aerial refueling sorties. The aerial tankers off-loaded 178.4 million gallons of fuel to 60,543 receivers. Furthermore, 552nd AWACW Airmen also assisted in 39 of 41 Allied air-to-air shoot downs during Desert Storm. Throughout the 1990s, the E-3 also provided support to NATO operations Provide Comfort and Southern Watch. The first and only crash of an Air Force E-3 occurred at Elmendorf Air Force Base, Alaska, Sept. 22, 1995. The E-3, tail number 77-0354 and call sign Yukla-27, crashed during take-off and 22 Airmen and two Canadian air force crewmembers lost their lives in the crash. Air Force officials later determined that geese had been ingested into the engines of Yukla 27 during takeoff, causing the aircraft to crash. In April 2001, 552nd Air Control Wing Airmen celebrated the 10th anniversary of the signing a cease-fire agreement while patrolling the no-fly zone over the skies of Iraq. During operations Northern and Southern Watch, the 552nd ACW had more than 250 support personnel on location at any given time. On Sept. 11, 2001, 552nd ACW aircrews were directed by higher headquarters to patrol the skies over the eastern quadrant of the United States following the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center. The 552nd was one of the first units tasked by the North American Aerospace Defense Command to protect the airspace over North America. These sorties are still flown under Operation Noble Eagle. Ten days later, the wing received deployment orders to support Operation Enduring Freedom. In October, five aircraft and 180 NATO personnel deployed from Geilenkirchen, Germany, to Tinker for Operation Eagle Assist. This was the first time in the 52-year history of NATO this alliance has been used to defend the United States. In January 2002, two more NATO aircraft deployed to Tinker. By February 2002, E-3 crews had flown 14,000 Operation Noble Eagle sorties. In May, the NATO AWACS aircraft returned home. By October of that year, crews of the 552nd reached a significant milestone, logging 10,000 flying hours in support of Operation Enduring Freedom. The accomplishment was achieved by the 968th Expeditionary Airborne Air Control Squadron deployed to Central Asia. The unit has been supporting OEF since the end of September 2001. Between May 28 and June 8, 2003, 552nd ACW personnel deployed in support of OEF and Operation Iraqi Freedom returned to Tinker AFB. Sentry crews provided 24-hour surveillance of OIF and OEF battle space. They supported OEF from Sept. 27, 2001, to May 23, 2003, and flew 1,259 sorties totaling 15,713 hours. Crews flew OIF missions from March 19 to June 8, 2003, during that time they flew 313 sorties totaling 3,115 hours. The return of personnel and aircraft to Tinker ended a 13-year continuous presence in the region. For the first time in the 25-year history of the E-3, all 28 aircraft were at home station. And after almost four years on home station, E-3 crews are, once again, forward deploying in support of OEF and OIF. The mission of the E-3 continues to grow and change. Aircraft and personnel now deploy to Manta, Ecuador, to support civil law enforcement agents in stopping the flow of illegal drugs from Latin America into the United States and Canada. The E-3 also flies missions around the world to aid in the security of the president of the United States and assists federal agencies in relief efforts, such as those in the devastated areas of Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana and Texas caused by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. The wing flew 30 sorties totaling 276 flying hours coordinating relief efforts of both civilian and military aircraft. Whether surveying the skies over the United States, or over land and sea around the world, the E-3 remains America's eye in the sky. This is a mission the E-3 Sentry has done for 30 years. With continued upgrades these aircraft will continue to effectively perform for many years to come.
  5. Another equally interesting analysis piece from Stratfor: The British Detainees: Why a Rescue Attempt was Never in the Cards By Fred Burton Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad said April 4 that the 15 British sailors and marines captured March 23 in the area around the mouth of the Shatt al-Arab waterway would be released. Although it is unclear at this point just what deal was made to secure their freedom, it is apparent that Iran instigated the drama for much the same reason it held 52 American hostages for 444 days following the storming of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran by radical students in 1979. Both events were meant to demonstrate the power of Iran's hard-liners, not only to the Iranian public but also to the West and the rest of the world. As the stalemate between the British and the Iranians dragged on for nearly two weeks, many Stratfor readers wrote in to suggest that a rescue operation should be undertaken. In this case, however, seeking a diplomatic solution was always the most logical approach. Although the rescue operation authorized by U.S. President Jimmy Carter in 1979 ended badly for the United States, the British Special Air Service (SAS) and its U.S. counterparts are far better prepared than they were back then -- and they could have avoided most of the mistakes made during "Desert One." That said, however, the Iranians are experts at hiding hostages for long periods, and there certainly was no guarantee that a rescue attempt would have succeeded. Therefore, it was indeed just speculation that one would have been attempted. The SAS and American operators have conducted hundreds of successful missions in the region, both during the 1991 Gulf War and following the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. They are better equipped than ever before and, with their skills honed to a razor's edge by repeated combat deployments and many successful missions, they perhaps are at their highest level of proficiency. However, this was not the Iranians' first rodeo when it comes to holding captives, and they undoubtedly would have taken measures to thwart any rescue attempt. While some of these measures would have been military, the most important ones would have been in the realm of intelligence. The Iranians understand that intelligence drives any rescue mission and that by denying the British the required intelligence, they could prevent a rescue attempt from ever getting off the ground. Naturally, the British (and the Americans) will have focused a tremendous amount of effort and resources on determining where the British personnel were being held. While this case is reminiscent of the 1979 crisis in some ways, when it comes to thwarting intensive intelligence efforts to locate a small group of detainees, it is perhaps more relevant to look back to the Lebanon hostage-taking crisis of the 1980s. During that period, the Iran-guided Hezbollah operation thwarted intensive U.S. efforts to collect the tactical intelligence required to mount a rescue attempt for nearly a decade. Ali the Iranian Hezbollah is intimately connected to Iran. The organization was created by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in the 1980s as a vehicle to export the ideals of Ayatollah Ruholla Khomeini's Islamic Revolution to Lebanon's Shiite community. Since then, Iran has been Hezbollah's chief source of funding and weapons, and the Iranians also provide extensive training in weapons, tactics, communications, surveillance, intelligence and other methods to Hezbollah's militant wing in Lebanon. Because of this relationship, the Iranians were intimately involved in Hezbollah's operations to abduct Western hostages in Lebanon -- and to hold them for prolonged periods of time. In fact, some of the hostages were even held at locations clearly associated with Iran's IRGC, such as the Sheikh Abdullah Barracks in Baalbek, in Lebanon's Bekaa Valley. This linkage to Iran was clearly displayed in the Iran-Contra scandal, in which sales and transfers of arms to Iran led to the release of hostages, including Benjamin Weir in 1985 and David Jacobson and Father Lawrence Jenco in 1986. However, this Iranian involvement in the keeping of Western hostages in Lebanon was perhaps best personified by a Persian who came to be known as "Ali the Iranian." During the debriefings of the Western hostages held in Lebanon, it was learned that many of the hostages had seen the same short, chubby bearded chap -- a man the debriefers nicknamed "Ali the Iranian." The uncanny similarity between the sketches made of this man during the debriefing process, as he was described by hostages held at different times and in different locations, demonstrated Ali's prolonged involvement in the episode. When Ali would come to visit the locations where the hostages were being held, he was treated with great reverence and respect by the guards, and a few of the hostages even characterized his visits as "inspections." Also, due to the timing of his visits, it is believed that Ali was involved in overseeing prisoner movement, monitoring their treatment and approving the sites where they were held. Because of his function, the U.S. interagency task force assigned to locate the hostages (part of which involved debriefing former hostages) came to the conclusion that Ali was an Iranian intelligence officer who worked very closely with Imad Fayez Mugniyah, the man responsible for Hezbollah's intelligence and counterintelligence activities. Mugniyah is believed to have directed the kidnappings of the Westerners in Lebanon and to have been involved in the efforts to guard them and to thwart any U.S. rescue efforts. Tactical Lessons from Lebanon From the debriefings of the Western hostages in Beirut, much was learned about the tactics used by Mugniyah and Hezbollah to keep U.S. intelligence off balance during the decade-long hostage crisis. First, Hezbollah did not keep all of its eggs in one basket -- it kept the hostages split up. While some were kept in groups, they were never all held together in the same location. The high-value targets, such as CIA station chief William Buckley and Marine Col. William Higgins, were held and interrogated separately. Buckley was moved to the same location as one of the small groups shortly before his death, but he was gravely ill at the time of his transfer and had clearly been severely tortured and badly abused during his solitary captivity. The hostages also were kept in a number of different environments, including the basement of a military barracks, a secret compartment under a barn and an apartment in a high-rise building in the southern suburbs of Beirut. Sometimes the hostages were kept in absolute darkness, while at other times they were kept in a more congenial atmosphere where they were given light and reading material. Regardless of the conditions, however, the hostages were well-secured and carefully watched by guards armed with assault rifles and pistols. At times, the hostages were chained to the radiator in a room in an apartment building, and at other times they were locked in cells that measured just 16 square feet and were 4 feet high (which was particularly tough for 6-foot-7-inch Briton Terry Waite.) While captives Charlie Glass and Jerry Levin successfully escaped, other escape attempts were foiled and resulted in merciless beatings. The hostages were almost always held in an area surrounded by Hezbollah sympathizers -- people who could warn of surveillance by Western intelligence, provide early warning on preparation for rescue attempts and help deter escape attempts and recapture escaped hostages. Hezbollah also moved the hostages around, especially following the release of a hostage or another event that could serve to compromise their location. The hostages were nearly always moved under cover of darkness, and they frequently were bundled like mummies and wrapped in cloth or tape. This not only made escape difficult, but would also make it impossible for any accidental bystander to identify them. At times, the bundled hostages would be moved in the trunk of a car, or even hidden in trucks with secret compartments (presumably used at other times for smuggling arms and other illicit goods.) These measures (along with the U.S. government's paucity of human sources in Lebanon and over-reliance on signals intelligence) meant that the United States could never gather hard intelligence on the locations of all the hostages at any one time. Without the ability to get U.S. "eyes on" the different detention sites simultaneously, no U.S. rescue mission could be launched. U.S. eyes were needed for verification because the United States could not run the risk of being lured into a trap by bad intelligence -- a trap in which American service personnel could be killed or captured and the disaster made even worse. Tactical Reality Today One stark difference between the situations in Lebanon in the past and in Iran today is that the conditions and circumstances under which the Britons are being held is different. The British detainees are being held by an acknowledged government, not a nonstate actor like Hezbollah. Certainly, the captors moved the detainees to various locations, keeping security around them tight and compelling them to make statements to the media. The detainees, however, were not tortured or otherwise intentionally traumatized. Iran could not have afforded for its former captives to tell stories to the media about being chained to radiators and kept in tiger cages. It also could not have them relate stories about being wrapped as mummies and shoved in false compartments of trucks. Also, there was never any indication that the Iranians meant for this captivity to last for months or years. That said, while many of the specific tactics used by Iran's proteges in Lebanon could not be used during the most recent situation, many of the broad principles could have applied, and these principles would have assisted the Iranians in keeping British intelligence efforts off balance -- should they have chosen to prolong this drama. Iran is far larger than Lebanon, and Tehran is several times farther from the sea than any point in Lebanon. As witnessed during Desert One in 1979, even getting a rescue team to Tehran can be difficult. The terrain, however, was just one of the obstacles. The IRGC, which captured the British personnel, is far larger and better-equipped than Hezbollah -- not to mention the rest of the Iranian military, police and the MOIS -- and the Iranians are far better trained, equipped and organized than they were in 1979 or Hezbollah was in the 1980s. Based on these considerations, the conditions under which the detainees have been kept, the risk associated with a rescue operation and the difficulty in collecting the intelligence necessary to launch a rescue attempt in the first place -- a diplomatic, negotiated settlement to the case was always in the cards.
  6. Now that the "crisis" appears to be winding down (insert proverbial knock on wood here), here's an interesting analysis piece from the folks at Stratfor: The British Detainees: Reading Diplomatic Signals By George Friedman Last week, Iranian forces captured 15 British sailors and marines in the Shatt al-Arab area, where the territorial distinction between Iraq and Iran is less than clear. The Iranians claimed the British personnel were in Iranian territory; the British denied it. The claims and counterclaims are less interesting than the fact that the Iranians clearly planned the capture: Whatever the British were doing in the area, the Iranians knew about it and had plans to do something in response. The questions are why, and why is this occurring now? One explanation is that the British were on some sort of mission that the Iranians had to stop. A rumor circulating is that the British were involved in extracting an Iranian defector, and the Iranians were moving to block the defection. That's a possibility, but then the captured Britons hardly appeared to be operating as a covert team -- and if there was a defection under way, the secret had been blown a long time before, since the Iranians were able to amass the force used in the capture. It seems to us that the capture of the British had less to do with any particular operation than with a more general desire on the part of the Iranians to capture the personnel and thereby create an international incident. The important issue, therefore, is why they wanted an incident, and why this particular sort. By now, it is no secret that the Americans and Iranians are engaged in a complex negotiation that is focused on Iraq, but which also involves Iran's future nuclear capability. U.S. and Iranian officials met publicly in early March, and a further meeting is scheduled, but the most important discussions have taken place in private venues. It also is clear that there is a debate within Tehran, as well as within Washington, as to whether these talks should be going on, how the negotiations should be carried out and the role of force in the negotiations. We suspect that the capture of the British detainees had something to do with the U.S. negotiations and with internal Iranian politics. At this point, both sides in the negotiations are trying to impress upon each other not only that they retain some options, but also that their moves cannot be easily predicted. Both want to be seen as retaining the option of surprise. The capture of the British personnel, then, should be read not so much as the trigger for an international crisis as a diplomatic signal. If either the Americans or the Iranians believed it were possible to achieve their own ideal outcomes in negotiations, either the capture or the U.S. military surge into Iraq would not have come about. The game for each now is an effort to secure an outcome that can be lived with -- not an outright victory. U.S. Signals and Limitations The U.S. approach to the negotiations with Iran has been multifaceted. • First, by talking simultaneously with the Sunni insurgents, the Americans clearly have been letting the Iranians know that they have not been trapped into dealing only with the Iranians or Iraqi Shia when it comes to the future of Iraq. • Second, Washington has tried to keep the Iranian nuclear issue separate from the Iraq issue. Given that none of the world's great powers truly has an interest in seeing Iran get the bomb, Washington has international backing on some aspects of the Iran nuclear issue -- and does not want that confused with the question of Iraq, where support for its position is much weaker. Washington does not want to provide the Iranians with linkage between the issues; rather, it wants to maintain its ability to extract concessions over Iraq in exchange for concessions on the nuclear issue. • Third, and most important, the U.S. leadership consistently has emphasized that it has no fear of Iran and is not constrained politically or militarily. The entire objective of the U.S. surge strategy was to demonstrate that the administration retains military options in Iraq and is capable of using them. At the same time, the United States has carefully orchestrated a campaign to let the Iranians believe that it retains military options against Iran as well -- and is considering using them. The exercises by two U.S. carrier battle groups last week had been planned for quite a while and were designed to give the Iranians pause. • Finally, the United States has moved to arrest Iranian officials who had been operating quasi-diplomatic entities in Iraq. (The Iranians said they were diplomatic and the Americans said they weren't, so we will term them "quasi.") Rumors of imminent U.S. military action against Iran have swept the region. Totally uninformed sources around the world have been speculating for weeks about the possibility of unspecified U.S. action. The rumors suited the Bush administration perfectly. The administration wanted the Iranians to feel endangered, so as to shape the Iranian negotiating process. This has certainly been the case amid congressional action to set a deadline for a withdrawal from Iraq. If the Americans are going to withdraw, then Iran has no motivation to negotiate; it need only wait. The administration played off the congressional proposals to hint that the possibility of a forced deadline increases the pressure for the president to act quickly, rather than to wait. The problem for the United States, however, is the issue of what sort of action it actually can take. It is in no position to undertake a ground invasion of Iran. Iran is a big country, and occupying it is beyond the capability of any force the United States could field -- at least, not without a massive increase of ground forces that would take several years to achieve, and that certainly is not under way at the moment. The other option is an air campaign. And it is not clear that an air campaign would work. The example of Israel's failure in Lebanon last summer weighs heavily. The Israelis chose the air campaign option and failed to achieve a satisfactory outcome. The U.S. Army historically has seen the air campaign as useful only if it is followed by an effective occupation. The most successful air campaign, Desert Storm, worked in a much smaller battle-box than Iran, and was followed up by a multidivisional ground force in order to defeat the defending Iraqi force and occupy the territory. In Iran, the quantity of air power needed for an outcome similar to that in Kuwait in 1991 is substantially greater than the United States has available, and as we have said, there is no follow-on ground force capable of occupying Iran. The Iranian Signals The Iranians, like the Americans, also have found it necessary to demonstrate a lack of intimidation. And for Iran, capturing 15 British sailors and marines was an excellent device. First, it raised the specter in the United States of another Iranian hostage crisis, reminding Bush of how the Iranians handled Jimmy Carter in 1979. Second, it showed that Iran is not concerned about possible retaliation by either the United States or the United Kingdom -- which has no options independent of the United States and is not driving negotiations over Iraq. Finally, the fact that action was directed against the British, rather than the Americans, slightly deflected the intensity of the crisis; because Americans were not taken captive, there was less pressure for the United States to do something about it. But there is another dimension to this. The Iranians have shifted the spotlight away from Baghdad and to the southern region of Iraq -- to the area dominated by Shia and held by the British. The capture of the British personnel coincided with some fighting in the Basra area among Shiite militias. In this way, the Iranians have sent two signals. The first was that while the United States is concentrating its forces in Baghdad and Anbar province, Iran remains perfectly capable of whipping up a crisis in the relatively quiet south -- where U.S. troops are not present and where the British, who already have established a timeline for withdrawal, might not have sufficient force to contain a crisis. If the United States had to inject forces into the south at this point, they would have to come from other regions of Iraq or from the already strained reserve forces in the United States. The Iranians are indicating that they can create some serious political and military problems for the United States if Washington becomes aggressive. The second is a statement about the negotiations over Iraq. While they are interested in reaching a comprehensive settlement over Iraq, the Iranians are prepared to contemplate another outcome, in which Iraq fragments into regional entities and the Iranians dominate the Shiite south. In some ways, this is more than an acceptable alternative. For one thing, in holding the south, the Iranians would be in a position to impede or cut U.S. lines of supply running from Kuwait to central Iraq. Second, their forces would be in a position to bring pressure to bear on Saudi Arabia, unless the United States were to redeploy troops. In other words, the shift of attention to the south poses a worrisome military challenge to the Americans. If the Iranians or Shia were to get aggressive in the south, the United States could be forced to spread its troops even thinner, leaving operations in the north severely weakened. The maneuver could help to collapse the Americans' position in Iraq by overloading them with responsibilities. Call, Raise -- Draw? The Iranians have called the American hand and raised the stakes. Where the United States has been trying to generate a sense of danger on the part of Iran with rumors of airstrikes, the Iranians have signaled that they aren't worried about the airstrikes -- and then raised the American bet by forcing the United States to consider what its options might be if all hell broke loose in southern Iraq. Tehran is saying that it has more credible options than Washington does. There is obviously a political debate going on inside Iran. As we have argued, there is deep consensus among Iranian leaders as to what outcome they want, but there is a faction led by older leaders, like Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, that does not underestimate the resources of the United States. And there is a faction that argues that the United States, at its weakest, must be pressured until it capitulates. The capture of the British personnel could have been designed to enhance the power of the more aggressive faction. But because Iranian politics are opaque, it could be argued just as logically that the capture was designed to enhance Rafsanjani's position by setting up a game of "good cop, bad cop." In other words, Rafsanjani now can ask for concessions from the Americans to keep the other faction from going too far. Whatever the inner workings of the Iranian elite, the move strengthens Iran's negotiating position in a number of ways. By holding the British captives, the Iranians are also trying to show the limits of Anglo-American power to their own public. One of the motives behind the capture was to demonstrate to Iranians that the Americans are incapable of taking action against Iran. (The British were less important in this context because they never were viewed by Tehran as being capable of or interested in decisive action against Iran.) The capture of the detainees, then, solidifies Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei's position by revealing American weakness. If the United States and the United Kingdom don't rescue the prisoners and don't take other military action, holding the detainees increases the credibility of the Iranian leadership -- not only in relation to the Americans, but also with the Iranian public. The logic here would call for a rescue attempt. However, in order for the captives to be rescued, the following elements are required: 1. Intelligence on the captives' location must be perfect, to the point of providing information on their precise housing. 2. The hostages cannot be housed in multiple locations; otherwise, the operation becomes both more complicated and more likely to fail, unless timing is perfect. 3. There must be time to rehearse the extraction, during which the prisoners must not be moved. 4. There must be a light covering force protecting the direct guards. The involvement of heavily armed, trained and dispersed troops at the battalion level and above, equipped with anti-aircraft systems, makes a successful extraction very unlikely. The Iranians are old hands at this game. We can assume that they have: 1. Obfuscated the location of the British by communications deception and other means, while moving the detainees around. 2. Separated the detainees into at least three groups, one very small and remote from the other two. 3. Obscured the sites where the British are being held, in order to make model construction and rehearsals impossible. 4. Covered the detainees with an interior group of guards embedded in a multi-brigade matrix, with heavy anti-aircraft artillery and surface-to-air missile concentrations. Preparatory airstrikes by American or British forces would give away the extraction and force an abort. That leaves the United States with the option of either accepting the status quo or initiating air operations against Iran. Now, the Iranian countermove -- creating chaos in southern Iraq -- seems daunting, but the Iranians might not have the influence in the region they would like others to believe: The Iraqi Shia are highly fragmented. But on the other hand, the Iranians do not have to impose a stable regime in southern Iraq right now. All they have to do is create instability there in order to weaken the Americans. It comes down to the question of how lucky the U.S. leadership is feeling at the moment. Given past performance, we'd say George W. Bush is not a lucky man. If it can go wrong, it does go wrong for him. Symbolic airstrikes against Iran are conceivable, but an extended air campaign designed to smash Iran's infrastructure simply does not appear to us as a viable military option. Given Iran's size, the number of sorties designed to make a dent would be enormous. The Americans would be banking on frightening the Iranians into negotiation. Air power did that in Kosovo, against a country fighting for a peripheral interest. In Vietnam, it failed. Iran seems more like Vietnam than Serbia. Therefore, we expect the United States to signal military action against Iran but not take it. We also expect the private talks between Iran and the United States to proceed with some sobriety. The Iranians know they have a weaker hand than it appears. Taking 15 captives is, in the end, not all that impressive by itself, and the rest hasn't played out yet. Thus, the saber-rattling will continue. That's what negotiations look like in the Middle East.
  7. And did you know the British planned to fly a special forces team through Chile - possibly in a Hercules painted in Chilean Air Force markings - on a "one way" mission to attack the Argentine's Super Etendard airbase ?
  8. Umm, yeah. The "thank you" note from the British people is in the mail, buddy. I am interested in what these sailors and marines will have to say about their "gracious host" once they are safely home.
  9. Yeah, I had a chuckle at that one too.
  10. From Air Force Magazine, April 2007 issue In the South Atlantic and the Middle East, two short air wars taught some lasting lessons. The Wars of Eighty-Two By Adam J. Hebert, Senior Editor Twenty-five years ago this spring, two short and intense armed conflicts —fought in widely separated theaters—delivered a jolt to military thinking. Defense establishments the world over vigorously debated all of the “lessons learned” from the small wars of 1982. They still do. In the first, Britain and Argentina came to blows over the Falkland Islands, bleak South Atlantic outposts whose ownership had long been in dispute. This war, which ran from April 2, 1982 until Argentina’s surrender on June 14, 1982, boiled up like a sudden storm and vindicated some basic military truths. The second war played out in more familiar terrain—that corner of the Mideast where Israel, Syria, and Lebanon converge. Starting on June 9, 1982, and for two weeks thereafter, Israel’s Air Force tangled with Syrian air and ground forces. In the end, the reputation of high technology soared. ... Read the remainder of the article at the above link.
  11. From Navy Times Iranian negotiator: No need to try Britons Seeks diplomatic resolution to captured sailor crisis The Associated Press Posted : Tuesday Apr 3, 2007 6:05:57 EDT TEHRAN, Iran — Iran’s chief international negotiator said Monday that the country wants to resolve the crisis over 15 captured British sailors through diplomacy and there is no need to put the crew on trial. In London, an official said earlier that Britain has agreed to consider discussing with Iran how to avoid future disputes over contested waters in the Persian Gulf. Ali Larijani, the Iranian diplomat, said his country’s priority “is to solve the problem through proper diplomatic channels.” “We are not interested in letting this issue get further complicated,” he told Britain’s Channel 4 television news. Britain contends the sailors were in Iraqi waters, however, and has refused Iranian demands for an apology. It has also criticized the airing of footage of four of the sailors confessing so far, saying the statements appeared coerced and the broadcasting of captured military personnel violated international norms.
  12. From Navy Times Nimitz leaves for Gulf By Gidget Fuentes - Staff writer Posted : Tuesday Apr 3, 2007 8:46:59 EDT SAN DIEGO — More than 6,000 sailors left San Diego for the Persian Gulf on Monday. Nimitz, a nuclear-powered carrier based at North Island Naval Air Station in Coronado, Calif., will replace the Norfolk, Va.-based Dwight D. Eisenhower and its carrier strike group and join the John C. Stennis carrier strike group in the Persian Gulf and Horn of Africa regions. The pairing of the carriers is part of a beefed-up presence of U.S. and coalition naval forces “demonstrating the United States’ ability to build regional stability and bring long-term stability to the region,” Naval Air Forces officials said in a statement Friday. The strike group will join the broader force in maritime security operations, including the boarding of suspicious vessels. Navy Rear Adm. Terry Blake, who commands Carrier Strike Group 11, leads the force that includes the Lemoore, Calif.-based Carrier Air Wing 11 and the San Diego-based Destroyer Squadron 23. The guided-missile cruiser Princeton and guided-missile destroyers Higgins, Chafee, John Paul Jones and Pinckney, along with two detachments of Helicopter Anti-Submarine Squadron Light 49 and Detachment 15 of Explosive Ordnance Disposal Unit 11, also deployed Monday. Nimitz’s air wing includes Strike Fighter Squadrons 14, VFA-41 and VFA-81; Airborne Early Warning Squadron 117; Electronic Warfare Squadron 135; Carrier Logistics Support Squadron 30; and Helicopter Anti-Submarine Squadron 6. The deployment is Nimitz’s third to the Persian Gulf in four years. In mid-2005, Nimitz and its strike group operated in the Persian Gulf and U.S. 5th Fleet area to support operations in Iraq and the region. In 2003, the carrier flew combat missions over Iraq that spring and summer and supported combat operations during an eight-month deployment.
  13. From DefenseNews Posted 04/02/07 10:41 Is New U.S. Destroyer Unstable? Experts Doubt Radical Hull; Navy Says All Is Well By CHRISTOPHER P. CAVAS As the U.S. Navy is poised to award the first construction contracts on its new multibillion-dollar DDG 1000 Zumwalt-class destroyer, experts in and outside the Navy say the radical new hull design might be unstable. Given just the right conditions, some say, it could even roll over. At least eight current and former officers, naval engineers and architects and naval analysts interviewed for this article expressed concerns about the ship’s stability. One former flag officer, asked about DDG 1000, responded by putting out his hand palm down, then flipping it over. “You mean this?” he asked. Multimedia: Watch a video of DDG 1000 model testing Ken Brower, a civilian naval architect with decades of naval experience was even more blunt: “It will capsize in a following sea at the wrong speed if a wave at an appropriate wavelength hits it at an appropriate angle.” The Navy and the lead contractors, Northrop Grumman and General Dynamics, disagree. Officials from both contractors deferred to the Navy when asked about the design. Navy leaders say the ship is stable and that they continue to test and refine the design. “We feel very confident in the hull form,” said Allison Stiller, the deputy assistant secretary of the Navy for ship programs. “We’ve done all the modeling and testing to convince us that this is a great hull form.” Nothing like the Zumwalt has ever been built. The 14,500-ton ship’s flat, inward-sloping sides and superstructure rise in pyramidal fashion in a form called tumblehome. Its long, angular “wave-piercing” bow lacks the rising, flared profile of most ships, and is intended to slice through waves as much as ride over them. The ship’s topsides are streamlined and free of clutter, and even the two 155mm guns disappear into their own angular housings. The ship’s form was conceived in the mid-1990s as the ultimate stealth ship — exceptionally hard to find using conventional radars and search systems. Seagoing qualities were deliberately sacrificed, critics say, to create the most invisible surface warship ever built. To many observers, the thing just doesn’t look like a boat. Navy officials and engineers insist the design is safe, and point to extensive testing using computers and a variety of scaled-down models that have sailed test tanks and coastal areas such as the Chesapeake Bay. “The design is solid,” said Howard Fireman, director of the Surface Ship Design Group at Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA). “It is very mature at this point.” The Critics But the reality is that no full-scale ship using the Zumwalt’s configuration has ever put to sea — and that worries many veteran naval architects, engineers and surface warriors. Norman Friedman, a naval consultant and author of a series of design histories on naval warships, said, “This thing has a very good potential for causing a lot of problems. If all the critics are right, this thing is dangerous.” Brower explained: “The trouble is that as a ship pitches and heaves at sea, if you have tumblehome instead of flare, you have no righting energy to make the ship come back up. On the DDG 1000, with the waves coming at you from behind, when a ship pitches down, it can lose transverse stability as the stern comes out of the water — and basically roll over.” These concerns have persisted for more than a decade, said one retired senior naval engineer who, along with many interviewed for this report, spoke only on condition of anonymity. “It’s never been to sea before, and that obviously brings in a certain amount of risk,” he said. “I think the concerns are valid.” Another retired senior naval officer expressed concern that, with an all-new hull form, the modeling technologies used to predict at-sea performance may be flawed. “In conventional hulls, we have done more with model testing and design work. We have correlation with ships we’ve built and sent to sea. There’s a lot of confidence in designing a conventional hull. “We have not had tumblehome wave-piercing hulls at sea. So how would the real ship motions track with the ways we have traditionally modeled ships? How accurate is it?” Still another naval analyst said the problem is worse than that: “It is inherently unstable.” Although top Navy officials uniformly express confidence in the DDG 1000, there is no shortage of doubters within the service. “When you talk with officers inside the Navy, there is a lot of trepidation over this ship,” said Bob Work, a military analyst with the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, a Washington think tank. “I have never really come across that many ardent proponents for the ship. There are a lot of questions about the hull form, the tactical rationale for a stealth ship that’s constantly radiating, the need for the guns.” But the concerns from current surface warfare officers have not persuaded Navy leaders to re-evaluate their position, he said. From the Beginning Doubts about the radical hull form emerged as soon as the shape was revealed in the competitive stage for what was first called DD-21, then DD(X). Both bidding teams — one led by Northrop Grumman, the other by General Dynamics — presented virtually identical tumblehome designs, as dictated by the Navy’s stealth requirements. Public discussion of the shape largely ended when the Northrop team was picked. The Navy expects to award construction contracts for the first two ships in May to Northrop and General Dynamics — at a planned price of $3.3 billion each. Five more are planned, far fewer than the 32 once envisioned. Ten major technology areas, including the hull, are part of the DDG 1000 development project. In expressing their confidence in the design, Navy officials said that recent meetings and reviews have concentrated on other technology areas and not addressed any concerns with the ship’s configuration. Concerns over the hull go beyond the DDG 1000 class. The same hull form is the preferred option for a new class of missile cruisers, dubbed CG(X). The first of a planned 19 is to be ordered in 2011. The Navy is analyzing potential alternative designs now for the cruiser, which is to carry a heavier, more powerful radar and more missiles than the Zumwalt. The prospect of a new cruiser has reignited a debate over the need for stealth itself. “There’s no requirement for stealth,” said a retired senior line officer. “If you’re operating a million-watt radar, the question might be: Why invest in this hull in the first place? And why suffer the peril of an inherently instable hull form?” The naval analyst scoffed at the stealth requirement. “They’ve gone to enormous lengths in order to be stealthy. And there are serious problems with that. It’s not clear that that’s going to work,” he said. “Stealth was BS to start with and is still BS.” Critics point out that even if a stealth design is initially successful, some form of counter inevitably will be found. “They’re not invulnerable, not undetectable,” Brower said. “In a quasi-peacetime environment, they can be detected by anyone with a Piper Cub and a pair of binoculars and a Fuzz Buster.” The Damage-Control Problem “I’m sure the people involved in this have been just brilliant about it and I’m being cynical,” said the naval analyst. “I could be wrong. But I’ve got to tell you, you take underwater damage with a hull like that and bad things will happen.” The senior surface warfare officer noted numerous discussions among other surface warfare officers about the somewhat dismal history of tumblehome ships. The shape was popular among French naval designers in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, and a number of French and Russian battleships — short and fat, without any wave-piercing characteristics — were put into service. But several Russian battleships sank after being damaged by gunfire from Japanese ships in 1904 at the Battle of Tsushima, and a French battleship sank in 90 seconds after hitting a mine in World War I. All sank with serious loss of life. Both the French and Russians eventually dropped the hull form. “The Navy has tended almost subconsciously to believe that they might not get hit,” he said. “But getting hit there is just real bad. You have to figure that some of the ships are going to take hits.” The Zumwalt’s designers have developed a new automated fire-fighting system, a critical need in a ship with a crew of only 125 sailors. But fighting floods is more difficult without muscle power, and that worries surface officers. Moreover, the naval analyst said, with automated damage control, “a lot depends on how your software is written. That means if your stability goes wrong at the wrong time and you find out you’ve got a software problem, you begin to submerge.” “The Navy would say it has tested the software thoroughly and knows exactly what it is. But I personally would not like to be in that position,” he said. “It may well be that the ship will have perfectly sufficient stability most of the time. But you have to worry about conditions where software hasn’t been written correctly. People who run ships are not used to having software save them.” More Testing? “Some people have argued for years that you should have incrementally taken the propulsion, the gun, etc., and put these into later iterations of [DDG 51 Arleigh Burke-class destroyers] to get a better understanding of how they operate,” said the retired senior line officer. “You take that time and put it together in the CG(X), and that’s where you put together all the technologies.” And the Navy shouldn’t base CG(X) on the Zumwalt hull “until we get some experience with DDG 1000, or get a larger model where we can verify the performance of the hull,” he said. Other professionals would prefer to see the hull validated by an independent study group before the Navy commits to building ships. But he admitted that there is a crucial problem with his idea. “Frankly, the people best qualified to do it are the people already involved in the design and testing of the hull,” he said. “We’re in an area where we’ve never built a ship like this.” There’s another element that may be at work in criticism of the ship’s design: prejudice against an unfamiliar hull form. “There are some people who just don’t like DDG 1000,” the senior surface warfare officer said. “We’ve been assured by the senior folks that there is no problem.” Yet others say the concern goes deeper. “I don’t think it’s prejudice. I think there’s concern,” said the retired senior naval officer. The Navy Responds Those concerns are unwarranted, the Navy insists. “A one-twentieth-scale, 30-foot scale model is undergoing testing,” said Capt. James Syring, program manager for DDG 1000. “We’ve put it though various sea states to find how the ship handles in regular seas. We’ve taken it up through Sea State Eight and even Sea State Nine [hurricane-force seas and winds] in some cases to understand the hull. All the tests are successfully confirming the tank testing and design analysis we’ve done. “We can operate safely in Sea State Seven and Eight,” Syring said. “Unequivocally.” Extreme conditions are dangerous for any ship, the official said. “To say [the ship is] inherently unstable in certain sea states, there are lots of caveats to that,” Syring said. Syring and Fireman, NAVSEA’s ship design director, did say their engineers were looking closely at “a set of very unique conditions.” “What I’m trying to find out is what speeds do we want to avoid in those sea states,” Syring said. “We’re seeking to understand and quantify through our testing program the performance characteristics of the ship at extremely high sea states and heading position.” Syring and Fireman bristled at suggestions the tumblehome hull would be in danger should the ship lose power or control in high seas. “If the ship were to go dead in the water in those high sea states, the bow points into the sea and you can ride there all day because of the nature of the hull form,” Syring said. Suggestions that the ship would capsize are “not true.” Syring addressed claims that the ship was in danger in quartering seas — waves that come at the ship from behind — by saying: “There is a wide range of safe seas on a quartering heading in Sea State Eight.” The retired senior naval engineer agreed the Navy testing would take into account severe sea states. “The standard Navy requirement for stability in ships is a 100-knot wind,” he said. “They’ve modeled Hurricane Camille [a Category Five storm of 1969] and they run it through that.” “There are some sea states and conditions where you just can’t do anything you want,” said the retired senior naval officer. “A course or speed change can make all the difference in how the ship rides.” All ships may face dangerous conditions, he said. “To expect that this ship could go on any heading on any bearing in any condition is not reasonable to assume.” The Navy has built scale models to test the DDG 1000 design, including a 150-foot quarter-scale steel hull that was “extraordinarily stable,” said one industry source. The industry source said that throughout the design process, “decisions about systems to leave or replace, [changes in] weight and displacement were a continuing consideration. Whatever they shifted or removed did not affect the stability of the hull form.” NAVSEA spokesmen said the service already has an independent board to review its designs: the Naval Technical Authority, which has determined DDG 1000 is safe. Even among many critics, there are those familiar with the Navy team leading the DDG 1000 effort who don’t doubt the sincerity of the Navy’s engineers. “The very best people have been working on this thing,” said the retired senior naval officer. “If they thought there was a serious flaw, they would stop it.” But he still harbors doubts. “It all comes down to engineering and science,” he said. “I have no doubt they’ve crunched the numbers as accurately as they can. But will the actual ship follow the models? “ “These retired folks don’t have the data that I have,” Syring said. “The last thing I’d be doing right now is to award ship-construction contracts if the technical people have problems.” “The checks and balances in our system just don’t allow us to award contracts if the design is considered unsafe,” declared Fireman. The senior surface warfare officer also supported the design team. “Those folks are genuinely interested and passionate,” he said. “We do not deliberately design ships with known flaws.” But the doubts persist despite the Navy’s declarations of confidence in the design. “My sense is there’s a bit of a there there,” the senior surface warfare officer said. “It might be extremely rare for the circumstances to come together, but if you’re going to stake out that this is your hull form for the future, there could be a tremendous cost, so this is worth investigating.” One question the Navy should ask, he said, is: “Why does this question [of doubt] persist?”
  14. From DefenseNews Posted 04/02/07 16:52 Norway, Navantia Spar Over Frigate Cost, Quality By GERARD O’DWYER, HELSINKI Norway’s Ministry of Defense (MoD) says it is hopeful but not “overly optimistic” that it will soon resolve a dispute with Spanish shipyard Navantia over the cost and quality of five Fridtjof Nansen frigates ordered by the Navy, an MoD official said. At a budgeted cost of $3 billion, the five-frigate project is Norway’s most expensive naval asset contract ever. The delivery schedule, agreed in 2000, calls for Navantia to hand over one new 5,100-ton frigate to the Navy each year from spring 2006 through 2010. Each frigate is designed to accommodate a helipad for an NH90 helicopter. The frigates will replace the Navy’s Oslo-class ships. Two primary areas of contention remain. The first revolves around $103 million in supplementary expenses added by Navantia for the first frigate, which was delivered in April 2006. The MoD is disputing the additional costs, claiming an inclusive fee had been agreed. The second area of dispute, quality, follows postdelivery inspections of the ship in July 2006 that revealed evidence of rust on the hull and deck. The MoD has asked Navantia to explain the causes of the rust and guarantee standards for future deliveries. “The talks under way to resolve the outstanding issues may be resolved in 2007, but they could take longer than this,” said Birgitte Frisch, the spokesperson for the Norwegian Defense Logistics Organization, which is leading the negotiations with Navantia. “We are negotiating to obtain agreement on quality of work and costs. This means that there may be delays to the delivery of future frigates until agreement can be reached among both sides. Delays could be inevitable, and at this point we are unsure how long they may be.” Norway wants to set an all-inclusive price for each frigate scheduled for delivery, Frisch said. In communications with Navantia during the final quarter of 2006, the MoD claimed the work Navantia describes as “supplementary undertakings” were fixes to irregularities found in work carried out on the F310 Fridtjof Nansen, and as such are covered by the terms of the original contract. But Navantia spokesman Miguel Martinez Guerro said that much of those additional costs arose from demands for system and component upgrades in the frigate’s software and hardware. “The Norwegian MoD demanded higher standards than were in the original contract for the F310 Fridtjof Nansen,” Guerro said. “The upgrades that we did caused other additional costs. Much of the cost came from additional man hours. This explains the additional costs.” The MoD will look at bringing in a mediator if the current round of talks between the two sides should collapse, an MoD insider said. “There are problems at various levels with Navantia. There are issues of costs and there are issues of quality,” said the MoD insider. “We would like to think that we are making steady progress in the talks, but there are still areas of contention that could, as a last resort, require mediation. These disputes have continued for almost one year now and we are looking at unknown delays in the delivery of new frigates.” The first of the class, the F310 Fridtjof Nansen, was built at Navantia’s shipyard at Ferrol, Spain. Navantia’s bid was chosen after an eight-year competition that included bids from German group Blohm+Voss and the Norwegian NorEskort consortium. While the fifth frigate would have been delivered by 2010 under the original schedule, the MoD-Navantia disputes have made the existing delivery schedule “specula-tive,” said the MoD insider. “We never anticipated these cost problems and delays when the first of the five frigates, the F310 Fridtjof Nansen, was handed over to the Norwegian Navy on 5 April 2006,” the insider said. “Navantia responded to our concerns about quality by proposing that parts and systems produced by subcontractors here in Norway for the frigates should be quality-control-tested by the Navy before fitting-out in Spain. The frigate contract made no provision for this, which is specific that Navantia conducts all predelivery quality control.” The MoD and the Royal Norwegian Navy agree that all provisions for quality-control relating to frigate construction are contained in the original contract, said Navy Commander Per Erik Goransson. “We do not have any contract with the Norwegian subcontractors, only with Navantia,” he said. “It is Navantia’s contractual job to conduct the quality inspections, not ours.” The main mission of the frigate is anti-submarine warfare, with ships equipped for anti-air and anti-surface warfare roles. The Fridtjof Nansen class is based on Navantia’s 5,800-ton F100 Alvaro de Bazan class multirole Aegis frigates. The Nansen class also uses the Aegis combat system, incorporating the smaller SPY-1F radar as opposed to the standard SPY-1D for other Aegis ships. [i am not sure of the degree of the rust problems aboard the Nansen frigates, but I do know that rust is a fact of life here in the North Atlantic. If someone can find a way to cure it once and for all, I'd love to hear about it].
  15. From Navy Times Iran pledges not to run more sailor videos The Associated Press Posted : Monday Apr 2, 2007 7:40:02 EDT TEHRAN, Iran — Iran’s state-run radio cited what it called “positive changes” in Britain’s negotiating stance Monday and said because of those, television stations would not broadcast additional videos of British sailors’ confessions. The state-run radio did not detail what it meant by positive changes, nor quote any officials by name. A state-run TV station had said earlier Monday that all 15 British sailors and marines held captive by the country had confessed to illegally entering Iranian waters. The 15 Britons were detained by Iranian naval units March 23 while patrolling for smugglers as part of a U.N.-mandated force monitoring the Persian Gulf. They were seized by Iranian naval units near the mouth of the Shatt al-Arab waterway that has long been a disputed dividing line between Iraq and Iran. Iran has repeatedly said it was trying to determine the intent of the British personnel before deciding what to do with them, and has demanded an apology from Britain as a condition of their release. Britain contends the sailors were in Iraqi waters and has said it would not apologize. The Iran Broadcasting Company said Monday the 15 alleged confessions would not be broadcast on Iranian news stations, however, due to what it called a change in the British government’s negotiating policies. The state-run agency did not provide any further details as to what it meant by that. The British government has deplored the airing on state-run TV of four of the sailors’ confessions so far, saying they appeared to be coerced. Iran’s ambassador to Moscow had said on Sunday the sailors’ case had entered a “legal phase,” but backtracked from earlier remarks attributed to him that the sailors could be tried. The alleged admissions of intrusion into Iranian territorial waters are not new: Iran’s military chief had said the day after their capture that the sailors had confessed after interrogations to illegally entering Iranian waters. Al-Alam, Iran’s Arabic-language state television station, has also broadcast video footage of four of the 15 saying they were in Iranian waters at the time of their capture. On Sunday, that footage included two of the sailors who used maps to show the alleged location where they were surrounded and seized by Iranian military vessels. Britain says the sailors were in Iraqi waters operating under a U.N. mandate, and has released its own maps and Global Positioning System coordinates showing their locations.
  16. Hehe, I was also thinking of the LCS when I read the report.
  17. From Defence Talk US jet fighters violate Iran's airspace: military Agence France-Presse | Apr 2, 2007 US warplanes have violated Iranian airspace in the southwestern oil-rich province of Khuzestan, Al-Alam Arabic language news satellite channel quoted a local military chief as saying on Sunday. "Two US aircraft trespassed into Iranian airspace northwest of (the southwestern port city of) Abadan before flying southwest into Iraq," a local Revolutionary Guards commander in Abadan identified only as Colonel Aqili was quoted as saying on the channel's website. "The planes left white vapour trails, attracting the local people's attention," he said, without elaborating on when the alleged incursion took place. The incident happened close to Iran's border with Iraq, where the US and British military are deployed in force. The US is in a mounting diplomatic confrontation with Iran over its uranium enrichment and Western suspicions that Tehran is bent on developing nuclear weapons, a charge vehemently denied by Iran. Washington says it wants a diplomatic solution to the nuclear standoff, but it has never ruled out a military option. Tensions have spiked since Iran's seizure on March 23 of 15 British marines and sailors for allegedly entering Iranian waters. Iran says the Britons illegally entered its territorial waters while London insists they were in Iraqi waters on a anti-smuggling patrol under UN mandate.
  18. From Defense Aerospace Christening of the K130 Class Corvette ERFURT in Emden: A New Benchmark In Corvette Building (Source: ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems; issued March 30, 2007) The German Navy’s third K130 corvette, Erfurt, was launched and christened at Emden on March 29. (TKMS photo) On March 29, 2007, a new corvette belonging to the new class K130 was launched and christened ERFURT in the presence of high-ranking guests from the Federal Ministry of Defence, the Federal Office of Defence Technology and Procurement, the German Navy and industry. The wife of the Lord Mayor of the town of Erfurt, Sysann Bausewein performed the launch, which took place at ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems’ Nordseewerke Emden GmbH. In the trail of her sister ships BRAUNSCHWEIG and MAGDEBURG, ERFURT is the third K130 corvette having been launched. Two further corvettes in this class are due to follow by 2008. The German Navy entrusted the building programme to ARGE 130, a work group consisting of two of ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems’ shipyards - Blohm + Voss and Nordseewerke Emden - and the Bremen shipyard, Friedrich Lürssen Werft. Blohm + Voss, Hamburg leads the work group. The new generation of corvettes adds still further emphasis to the prominence of German naval shipbuilding. The ships set new standards in matters of range, combat power and endurance and excel in technical equipment as well as in reduced operating costs. Changes in the global security situation have occasioned new demands, also on the German Navy. The demands include an ever increasing number of foreign assignments in distant waters within the framework of multinational missions. Thanks to their unique qualities, K 130 type corvettes are set to play a highly significant role within NATO alliances. TECHNICAL CHARACTERISTICS: Overall length: 89.12 m Length DWL: 82.80 m Moulded breadth, max.: 13.28 m Breadth DWL: 12.44 m Draft DWL: 3.40 m Sea endurance without tender support:7 days Sea endurance with tender support: 21 days Range: >2500 nm (approx. >4600 km) Full-load displacement: approx. 1 840 t Speed: >26 kts.
  19. From Aviation Week JSF Juggling Engine, Cost, Schedule and Weight Issues Apr 1, 2007 By Amy Butler and Robert Wall The Joint Strike Fighter's price is expected to increase 4% due to Pentagon funding cuts. And if Congress reinstates development of a second engine for the stealthy aircraft, the cost could rise further. The increase could amount to more than $6 billion over the life of the massive, 3,000-aircraft program. But cost is only one of a flurry of issues ahead as development work moves into high gear. All three F-35 JSF versions will face key hurdles in the coming months, with program officials trying to keep the Lockheed Martin-led industrial team from losing its focus. For the conventional takeoff and landing (CTOL) F-35A, boosting the pace of flight testing is a primary concern. Key for the short takeoff and vertical landing (Stovl) F-35B are critical engine tests and a continued drive toward first flight next year. The F-35C carrier version is heading into its critical design review. Although Stovl weight stabilization remains in the spotlight, program officials are trying to avoid prioritizing just one issue. That's partly why they rejected a call by some within the Pentagon to focus Lockheed Martin's award-fee performance primarily on the Stovl first-flight milestone, set for May 23, 2008. Unintended consequences could result from imposing such narrowly focused incentives, which can "drive bad behavior," argues U.S. Marine Corps Brig. Gen. David R. Heinz, deputy program director. JSF managers prefer to see Lockheed Martin concentrate on weight control and other parameters, not just schedule, and balancing the award-fee criteria is the best strategy, he adds. The scope of the award fee has been an issue for several months between program officials and some in the Pentagon oversight chain. The latter believe Lockheed Martin's rating and resulting remuneration may have been too high. Even though the company missed the first-flight date in late August for the CTOL version, it garnered 83.9% of its performance bonus for that period, which ended in October. During that period, Lockheed Martin received $129.4 million in performance recognition. Earlier, in April, the contractor earned $123.8 million, or 87.3%, of what was available. Though the contract did not solely grade Lockheed Martin on that model's first flight, the company was under pressure because some international partners wanted to see the aircraft fly before committing to a purchase. Even without a special focus on the F-35B first flight, the Stovl version's development will be center stage in the months ahead. Fuselage mating is planned for midyear, followed by power on by year-end. At this point, Heinz is upbeat about the schedule. JSF officials are generally sanguine about program performance, although they will report to Congress soon that the aircraft's $53-million average unit cost will increase roughly 4%. That's the result of cuts the Pentagon has made to near-term procurement plans, which it's still trying to offset (see p. 30). Nevertheless, Air Force Secretary Michael Wynne doesn't see any Nunn-McCurdy breach on the horizon--referring to a U.S. law mandating that price increases of 15% or more require additional congressional scrutiny for a program to move forward. However, the cost impact could be even greater if Congress overrules a Pentagon decision to terminate the General Electric/Rolls-Royce F136 alternate engine development, but doesn't add money to pay for it. Financing the $2-billion development bill in the next five years within the current JSF program funding could force a cut of 15-30 additional fighters, which would drive up costs further, says Heinz. The Pratt & Whitney F135 is the primary F-35 engine. The U.S. Government Accountability Office argues that adding a second JSF engine could produce some long-term savings. However, the Cost Analysis Improvement Group, a Pentagon cost-estimating division, and an independent study from the Institute for Defense Analyses both say the cost benefits of a second engine would be negligible. These reports were presented to two panels of the House Armed Services Committee last month. Congress mandated the studies in the Fiscal 2007 authorization act. Total cost for a single-source engine program is pegged at $53.4 billion, with estimated increases up to $4.5 billion if the F136 survives. PROGRAM OFFICIALS HAVE BEEN providing data for each of the studies but have not expressed a preference on retaining or terminating the F136 effort. Heinz notes there are pros and cons to each argument: Eliminating the second engine would provide instant savings, although there are industrial-base considerations (in terms of sustaining a competitive fighter-engine capability) and operational concerns about an engine-induced fleetwide grounding that would favor making the investment. Meanwhile, engine development activity is moving ahead. Ongoing tests are evaluating the durability of the F135, with runs up to 7,000 hr., and of the lift fan, which is critical for the Stovl version. The lift fan has undergone about 1,000 hr. of testing. In addition, 500 engagements of the clutch that links the lift fan with the F135 engine (or F136, if it's retained) are being performed. Rig testing of the lift fan, the surrounding doors and other structural elements also is planned to assess airflow. In a prior test, the rig failed before full results could be obtained. A watchful eye also remains on weight. The Stovl version, for which increases would pose the greatest problem, remains on track. Program officials have built in weight-growth margin of around 3% during the development phase. Surprises will eat into that margin, Heinz concedes; but for now, he appears confident another weight crisis (as occurred several years ago on the program) can be averted. As for the carrier version, developers have seen a positive evolution, with "the weight constantly decreasing in the last 12 weeks," says Heinz. During that period, the basic design has shed about 90 lb. The F-35C is the last in the development sequence and should complete its critical design review by the end of July. Several subsystem reviews will precede that event, such as a look at the landing gear, which is one of the main structural elements that's different on the Navy model. For the CTOL version, test pilots are gradually expanding the flight envelope, though they've not yet exceeded 40% of design limits. Heinz says these early test flights are validating the accuracy of design models, which makes program officials hopeful that future surprises can be averted. So far, the flight testing pace has fallen short of the desired six missions per month, partly due to weather-induced delays. In one case, the test program had to be stopped because a loads measurement in the vertical tail indicated that limits had been exceeded--although further inspection showed there was no damage.
  20. CV32 posted a topic in Shore Leave
    Well, I've taken the plunge (or the crash dive, as it were) and picked up a copy of Silent Hunter IV. Just completed my first "Submarine School" mission. Now to convince my fellow submariners to also buy the sim.
  21. No worries, and I certainly didn't intend to imply that strikes on Guam aren't possible. Knocking out Guam would be a major coup if the Chinese were intending on taking back Taiwan in the face of American objections, and while I don't expect they would be using ballistic missiles (i.e. the kind that might make Los Angeles nervous), its certainly possible they could employ long range cruise missiles (the kind they're developing and fielding now for their bombers) or commandos (perhaps deployed from submarines). The point is that without Guam, US Air Force bombers, tankers and recon aircraft would be at a severe disadvantage in opposing PRC actions (the geography makes it difficult enough as it is now).
  22. The Chinese have been studying "asymmetrical warfare" for quite a while. They know they can't hope to go toe to toe, so like any street fighter, it only makes sense that they would look to exploit any perceived weaknesses, including the satellites. I don't think we should expect any less from them or any other potential foe, for that matter. I think this is a real danger. (Amplified today, unfortunately, by the surprising comments of the Saudi King on the "occupation" of Iraq). Just try running a USA/PRC/Taiwan scenario where the US cannot make use of forward bases in Japan or the ROK. Guam is a LONG ways off.
  23. I gotta tell ya, Pete, I had no idea you were a fan ... From Marine Corps Times Conway makes Chuck Norris honorary Marine By Kimberly Johnson - Staff writer Posted : Thursday Mar 29, 2007 20:35:43 EDT So you’ve got a problem with the new tattoo policy? Don’t feel like going on your third deployment? Think your crummy barracks needs renovating? Don’t complain to the commandant. Unless you want a roundhouse kick to the throat from his new friend. On Wednesday night, Commandant Gen. James Conway made legendary martial-arts ninja and action movie star Chuck Norris an “Honorary Marine” during dinner at the commandant’s residence in Washington, D.C. The honorary award was the first such given by Conway and was the result of a nominative process, said Col. Frank McKenzie, military secretary for Conway. The title of Honorary Marine “is not given lightly,” McKenzie said. In recent years, Norris’ popularity has surged with Marines. Leathernecks worldwide have been known to cite satirical Chuck Norris “facts” — unconfirmed and exaggerated declarations about the newest Honorary Marine along the lines of “There is no theory of evolution. Just a list of creatures Chuck Norris has allowed to live.” Norris has said he is aware of the circulation of the “facts,” but doesn’t take them too seriously. “The thing that is so engaging about Chuck Norris is that he’s so straightforward,” McKenzie said. “There’s no artifice about him. He represents a lot of values Marines value.” The television star of “Walker, Texas Ranger” has also been very supportive of the Corps. “He’s been very active in support of our wounded warriors,” said McKenzie, who was present at the dinner. Norris also recently took a trip to Iraq with Assistant Commandant Gen. Robert Magnus, which was considered one of the best-received visits to date, McKenzie said. “The Marines were ecstatic.” Now that Norris is an Honorary Marine, will the Corps be calling him up as part of “Every Marine Into the Fight?” “Knowing Chuck Norris, I guarantee he’ll be going back to Iraq,” McKenzie said. [Hehe. “There is no theory of evolution. Just a list of creatures Chuck Norris has allowed to live.” I kinda like that one].
  24. From Defence Talk Britain's sinking of Argentine cruiser still stirs emotions Agence France-Presse | Mar 30, 2007 LONDON: The sinking of the cruiser General Belgrano by a British nuclear-powered submarine with the loss of 323 Argentine lives still stirs controversy, 25 years after the Falklands War. Argentine lawyers have argued that the warship was outside of the 200-mile (322 kilometre) exclusion zone established by British forces around the archipelago when it was sunk on May 2, 1982. But they have failed to win their case that British committed a "war crime" when the HMS Conqueror fired conventional torpedoes into the Belgrano, a World War II-era warship. However, in July 2000, the European Court of Human Rights rejected a claim for compensation on a technicality, saying it should have been filed six months after the warship sank. It was the first serious attack on the Argentine navy by the British since the conflict began with Argentina's invasion of the disputed Falkland islands on April 2, 1982. It was also the biggest single loss of life in the 10-week war. Clive Ponting, a senior Ministry of Defence civil servant, leaked documents saying the cruiser had been moving away from the islands. He was later tried under the Official Secrets Act, but found not guilty. Retired General Jeremy Moore, who was the commander of the land forces, supported the attack during an anniversary interview with AFP. "The fact that she was steaming in that direction made not the slightest difference to the threat she posed. She could turn around at any moment. She was still posing a threat to our people," he said. But the controversy was fuelled by the The Sun mass-circulation newspaper in Britain, which ran the story about the cruiser's sinking under the banner headline: "GOTCHA." It was pulled from later editions. Historian Lawrence Freedman, writing in "The Official History of the Falklands Campaign," said the decision to sink the warship -- the first and only such incident involving a nuclear-powered submarine -- was a military one. It had been argued at the time that prime minister Margaret Thatcher had ordered the destruction of the Belgrano to sabotage a peace plan. "It is just not true, there is no evidence, " said Freedman, a professor of war studies at King's College, London. He described how the decision actually resulted from the fact that Britain was at war and felt vulnerable to an Argentine attack. He noted that Britain would have preferred to have sunk an aircraft carrier but had been unable to find one.
  25. From Defense Aerospace China Could Potentially Defeat U.S. In Conflict Over Taiwan By Limiting Military Access, Rand Study Finds (Source: Rand Corporation; issued Mar 29, 2007) China could potentially defeat the United States in a future military conflict over Taiwan by using strategies designed to limit U.S. military access to the area, according to a report issued today by the RAND Corporation. The report examines scenarios in which China might employ what are known as “antiaccess” strategies – actions that would impede the deployment of U.S. forces into a combat zone, limit the locations from which American forces could operate, or compel the U.S. military to conduct operations farther from the conflict than it would prefer. RAND researchers have identified a number of measures that U.S. forces can take in order to neutralize possible antiaccess strategies. These include: deploying air and missile defense systems near critical facilities; moving vulnerable ships out of port at the first sign of conflict; and reducing vulnerabilities in communications and computer systems. Since China could also use political and diplomatic strategies aimed at jeopardizing access to forward bases in places such as Japan, researchers also recommend that U.S. strategists strengthen both the alliance relationships with such countries and their military and technological capabilities. “The most likely conflict between the United States and China would be over Taiwan,” said lead study author Roger Cliff. “Although the United States currently has an overwhelming conventional military advantage, China could accomplish the objective of forcing Taiwan to surrender by employing an antiaccess strategy of preventing enough U.S. forces from getting to the region in time.” Cliff and his fellow researchers noted that, since the end of the Cold War, U.S. strategists have become increasingly concerned that an adversary might adopt and attempt to employ strategies designed to interfere with the U.S. military's ability to deploy or operate in overseas conflicts. Potential foreign adversaries like China are likely to use such strategies because it is improbable they could defeat the United States in a traditional military combat, the study says. Additionally, the absence of a single dominant adversary means the United States will have relatively few forward-deployed forces in the vicinity of a conflict before it erupts. The study says potential Chinese antiaccess strategies include: - Pressuring American allies such as Japan to limit or deny the United States the use of bases on their territory in a conflict. - Striking or jamming information and computer systems to delay the deployment of U.S. military forces or to deny the United States access to information about enemy locations. - Disrupting U.S. logistics systems to prevent the timely delivery of supplies and delay the arrival of critical reinforcements. - Attacking air bases and ports to prevent or disrupt an influx of forces and supplies. - Attacking naval assets such as aircraft carriers to limit the U.S. ability to launch aircraft from the sea. “The net result of these strategies is that China could actually defeat the United States in a conflict — not in the traditional sense of destroying the U.S. military, but in the sense of China accomplishing its military and political objectives while preventing America from achieving some or all of its objectives,” Cliff said. “The Chinese People's Liberation Army is well aware of its own shortcomings and the United States' military superiority,” Cliff said. “Instead of engaging U.S. forces head-on, they would attempt to take advantage of what they perceive to be American weaknesses – including the need to deploy and operate forces thousands of miles from home.” Researchers for RAND, a nonprofit research organization, examined Chinese military publications to determine what types of antiaccess strategies Chinese military analysts are considering employing. Most previous antiaccess studies relied on “mirror imaging” techniques, in which American analysts simply imagine what they would do if they were in China's position. The research was sponsored by the United States Air Force and conducted by RAND Project AIR FORCE, a federally funded research and development center for studies and analysis aimed at providing independent policy alternatives for the U.S. Air Force. Click here for the full report, “Entering the Dragon's Lair: Chinese Antiaccess Strategies and Their Implications for the United States,” on the Rand website.

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