From Defense Aerospace

 

China Could Potentially Defeat U.S. In Conflict Over Taiwan By Limiting Military Access, Rand Study Finds

(Source: Rand Corporation; issued Mar 29, 2007)

 

China could potentially defeat the United States in a future military conflict over Taiwan by using strategies designed to limit U.S. military access to the area, according to a report issued today by the RAND Corporation.

 

The report examines scenarios in which China might employ what are known as “antiaccess” strategies – actions that would impede the deployment of U.S. forces into a combat zone, limit the locations from which American forces could operate, or compel the U.S. military to conduct operations farther from the conflict than it would prefer.

 

RAND researchers have identified a number of measures that U.S. forces can take in order to neutralize possible antiaccess strategies. These include: deploying air and missile defense systems near critical facilities; moving vulnerable ships out of port at the first sign of conflict; and reducing vulnerabilities in communications and computer systems.

 

Since China could also use political and diplomatic strategies aimed at jeopardizing access to forward bases in places such as Japan, researchers also recommend that U.S. strategists strengthen both the alliance relationships with such countries and their military and technological capabilities.

 

“The most likely conflict between the United States and China would be over Taiwan,” said lead study author Roger Cliff. “Although the United States currently has an overwhelming conventional military advantage, China could accomplish the objective of forcing Taiwan to surrender by employing an antiaccess strategy of preventing enough U.S. forces from getting to the region in time.”

 

Cliff and his fellow researchers noted that, since the end of the Cold War, U.S. strategists have become increasingly concerned that an adversary might adopt and attempt to employ strategies designed to interfere with the U.S. military's ability to deploy or operate in overseas conflicts.

 

Potential foreign adversaries like China are likely to use such strategies because it is improbable they could defeat the United States in a traditional military combat, the study says. Additionally, the absence of a single dominant adversary means the United States will have relatively few forward-deployed forces in the vicinity of a conflict before it erupts.

 

The study says potential Chinese antiaccess strategies include:

 

- Pressuring American allies such as Japan to limit or deny the United States the use of bases on their territory in a conflict.

- Striking or jamming information and computer systems to delay the deployment of U.S. military forces or to deny the United States access to information about enemy locations.

- Disrupting U.S. logistics systems to prevent the timely delivery of supplies and delay the arrival of critical reinforcements.

- Attacking air bases and ports to prevent or disrupt an influx of forces and supplies.

- Attacking naval assets such as aircraft carriers to limit the U.S. ability to launch aircraft from the sea.

 

“The net result of these strategies is that China could actually defeat the United States in a conflict — not in the traditional sense of destroying the U.S. military, but in the sense of China accomplishing its military and political objectives while preventing America from achieving some or all of its objectives,” Cliff said.

 

“The Chinese People's Liberation Army is well aware of its own shortcomings and the United States' military superiority,” Cliff said. “Instead of engaging U.S. forces head-on, they would attempt to take advantage of what they perceive to be American weaknesses – including the need to deploy and operate forces thousands of miles from home.”

 

Researchers for RAND, a nonprofit research organization, examined Chinese military publications to determine what types of antiaccess strategies Chinese military analysts are considering employing. Most previous antiaccess studies relied on “mirror imaging” techniques, in which American analysts simply imagine what they would do if they were in China's position.

 

The research was sponsored by the United States Air Force and conducted by RAND Project AIR FORCE, a federally funded research and development center for studies and analysis aimed at providing independent policy alternatives for the U.S. Air Force.

 

Click here for the full report, “Entering the Dragon's Lair: Chinese Antiaccess Strategies and Their Implications for the United States,” on the Rand website.

Brad, very interesting read so far. I look forward to the entire report. The subject matter ties in with your earlier post about the feeling over the Belgrano. It's a rhetorical question I suppose, but will the US population have the same reaction if this anti-access strategy works. Will it be 'trechery" (sp?) in the eyes of Americans, if the PRC strikes at satellites to blind us and impede our communications, diplomatically isolate us so our "allies" choose to forbid us from using their host-nation bases, and conducting TBM strikes or commando-type actions on traditional staging areas such as Guam and Okinawa?

 

What a continued decent, not a complete free fall yet I hope, from grace if we allow ourselves from being so diplomatically isolated that "allies" would abandon us.

Brad, very interesting read so far. I look forward to the entire report. The subject matter ties in with your earlier post about the feeling over the Belgrano. It's a rhetorical question I suppose, but will the US population have the same reaction if this anti-access strategy works. Will it be 'trechery" (sp?) in the eyes of Americans, if the PRC strikes at satellites to blind us and impede our communications ... and conducting TBM strikes or commando-type actions on traditional staging areas such as Guam and Okinawa?

 

The Chinese have been studying "asymmetrical warfare" for quite a while. They know they can't hope to go toe to toe, so like any street fighter, it only makes sense that they would look to exploit any perceived weaknesses, including the satellites. I don't think we should expect any less from them or any other potential foe, for that matter.

 

... diplomatically isolate us so our "allies" choose to forbid us from using their host-nation bases ... What a continued decent, not a complete free fall yet I hope, from grace if we allow ourselves from being so diplomatically isolated that "allies" would abandon us.

 

I think this is a real danger. (Amplified today, unfortunately, by the surprising comments of the Saudi King on the "occupation" of Iraq). Just try running a USA/PRC/Taiwan scenario where the US cannot make use of forward bases in Japan or the ROK. Guam is a LONG ways off.

Guam is a LONG ways off.

 

hehe, I violated the cardinal rule, and did not break out my map.

No worries, and I certainly didn't intend to imply that strikes on Guam aren't possible. Knocking out Guam would be a major coup if the Chinese were intending on taking back Taiwan in the face of American objections, and while I don't expect they would be using ballistic missiles (i.e. the kind that might make Los Angeles nervous), its certainly possible they could employ long range cruise missiles (the kind they're developing and fielding now for their bombers) or commandos (perhaps deployed from submarines). The point is that without Guam, US Air Force bombers, tankers and recon aircraft would be at a severe disadvantage in opposing PRC actions (the geography makes it difficult enough as it is now).

No worries, and I certainly didn't intend to imply that strikes on Guam aren't possible. Knocking out Guam would be a major coup if the Chinese were intending on taking back Taiwan in the face of American objections, and while I don't expect they would be using ballistic missiles (i.e. the kind that might make Los Angeles nervous), its certainly possible they could employ long range cruise missiles (the kind they're developing and fielding now for their bombers) or commandos (perhaps deployed from submarines). The point is that without Guam, US Air Force bombers, tankers and recon aircraft would be at a severe disadvantage in opposing PRC actions (the geography makes it difficult enough as it is now).

 

I was under the "most likely uninformed" impression that there was a move afoot to re-deploy (how fashionable was that word a few months back), much of the force on Okinawa to Guam - both bowing to host nation pressures and placing these forces at arms length from those who may like to do them harm with little to no warning.