File Name: Operation Attain Document III, Action in the Gulf of Sidra, Libya late March 1986.

File Submitter: broncepulido

File Submitted: 23 Jun 2013

File Category: MEDC

 

 

Operation Attain Document III, 1986. Historical Scenario.

 

A Harpoon Commander's Edition scenario for the EC2003 Battle for the Mediterranean Battleset and the HCDB-130603 1980-2015 Platform Database.

 

U.S. Navy chart showing operations of the aircraft from the aircraft carrier USS Saratoga (CV-60) during "Operation Attain Document III", 23 to 29 March 1986. "FIR" stands for (Tripoli) "Flight Information Region". The photos show a Libyan Sukhoi Su-22, a Dassault Mirage F.1 and a Libyan missile boat after having been attacked by U.S. Navy aircraft. Note: The map does not show the real geographical outlines!

Source: Wikipedia from the USS Saratoga (CV-60) 1985-86 cruise book available at Navysite.de

 

This scenario is designed to be played mainly from the Blue/US side. You should play many times first the Blue side to avoid spoilers, and only later play the Red/Libyan side. It's a complex scenario with the most historical possible OOBs.

Attain Document I, IIA and III were a series of operations executed by the US Navy during the first months of 1986 sailing the Gulf of Sidra, which Gadaffi's Libya claims as internal waters from 1973. Those operations were in support of his Freedom of Navigation (FON) program, challenging territorial claims on the world's oceans and airspace that are considered excessive by the United States (as also in the Black Sea or some Far East cases). As a precaution against possible asymmetric or dissimilar Libyan retaliations, it was planned the contingency plan Prairie Fire (nickname after changed to El Dorado Canyon), consisting of air strikes to chosen Libyan targets from which terrorist operations could be planned or executed.

After probing the Libyan response with the phases Attain Document I and IIA in January and February 1986 remaining just north of the so-called line of death, came the ultimate execution of the plan. Composed by three Carrier Battle Groups (CVBG of the USS America (CV-66), USS Coral Sea (CV-43, with the first operative F/A-18A in the USN and USMC, Attain Document III was also the first operational use of AGM-88 HARM, the Tomahawks not were yet operative) and USS Saratoga (CV-60)) TF-60 under command of Rear Admiral Frank D. Kelso II executed Attain Document III penetrating the waters of the Gulf of Sidra with a Surface Action Group (SAG) composed by USS Ticonderoga (CG-47), USS Scott (DDG-945) and USS Caron (DD-970), crossing below 32-30 North at 241100Z March 1986 (1200 Libyan time) and exiting the area at 271432Z March 1986, remaining for more than 75 hours sailing in station.

From that very moment the Libyan forces showed an aggressive behaviour towards the US Forces, ratifying the spirit and outcome of certain previous historical skirmishes. The Libyans launched long range SAM against USN planes, realized some offensive CAP and tried to approach his PTM near anti-ship missile launch range.

This scenario represents the historically present forces, and speculates about the possibility of an higher readiness grade on the Libyan forces, probable use of Pakistani, Cuban, East German and other nationalities loaned or mercenary pilots, a greater fighting will of the Libyan dictator Gaddafi, and less fear to sustain losses by the Libyan side, to later keep supporting his Saharan and Sub-Saharan campaigns.

Note: historically the F-14A Tomcat were limited to employ the AIM-7 Sparrow semi-active radar homing as medium range missile on this and most of his operations in the Mediterranean theater of operations, to avoid an AIM-54 Phoenix active radar homing missile locking accidentally on a neutral plane.

 

Unnamed places are:

AKr Lampedusa US Coast Guard LORAN-C station, Italy.

YRa Misrata AB, MRA/HLMS, Libya.

ZHa Al Bumbah North AB, -/HL68, Libya.

ZIa Al Jufra AB, -/HL69, Libya.

ZJa Marsa Brega Airport, LMQ/HLMB, Libya.

ZLa Okba Ibn Nafa AB, -/-, Libya.

ZMa Ghurdabiya-Sirte AB, SRX/HLGD, Libya.

ZNa Ghadames East AB, LTD/HLTD, Libya.

ZOa Benghazi-Benina AB, BEN/HLBB, Libya

ZVa Gamal Abdul El Nasser AB (using Sheba), -/-, Libya.

 

Enrique Mas, June 2013.

 

 

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23 June 2013: not changes in the scenario, only minor text/cosmetic changes, and added note about this issue: "historically the F-14A Tomcat were limited to employ the AIM-7 Sparrow semi-active radar homing as medium range missile on this and most of his operations in the Mediterranean theater of operations, to avoid an AIM-54 Phoenix active radar homing missile locking accidentally on a neutral plane".

Enjoying this one, Enrique. Its a challenge to come away 'clean', for sure.

I'm glad to read these comments

The scenario is based in the preliminary research of the simple and introductory scenarios developed for the USNI in the Sidra Gulf battleset (Almost three years ago!) and in the primary sources discovered then.

As matter of fact, only in that "234" document found then, or in this Attain Document III scenario (and the upcoming El Dorado Canyon scenario) we can find published the complete and historically accurate US Navy warships order of battle on these two actions.

Also, the placement of Libyan SAM batteries is historical and based in a contemporary Soviet document, into the light only after the Cold War end.

The Carrier Air Wings are historicaly accurate and published in this Takafumi Hiroe great site: http://gonavy.jp/ (I must to send some greeting mail to the site owner).

Regrettably, the Libyan Air Force, aside considerations about his operativity, it's only very aproximative on his composition.

Last, but no least, only the last few months has been possible to model this scenario with all the historically accurate platforms (mainly USN 1980's warships and submarine variants, and some Libyan aircrafts), thanks to the Brad's hard work the last two years updating the platforms, after we discovered a lot of platform types were deleted circa 1991 from the DB, of the 1980's platforms not in service from 1991. Thanks, Brad!

Took me three and a half hours game time to achieve minimum victory, and at the loss of three aircraft. The SA-5 is still a force to be reckoned with!

I have tried scenario once and lost. Gets comment on as a massive scenario in my opinion. I am stuck at staying at 1:1 time playing- some my ability, some is my PC. Most Historic OOB - I will question the Libyan some. Too may aircraft. One wish - having a F-14 loadout of 6 Sparrow and 2 Sidewinders. My errors- trying to hide under EMCON instead of going active with RADARs, and being too scrougy on Tomcats up as CAPs.

Second thought - make a scaled back "baby version"- Make Libya only base in the Benghazi-Benina & SA-5 region, drop all subs, drop USA to just 1 CVBG, and the 3 ship SAG south of the line.. - and some matching scale back the victory conditions.

Thanks a lot for your feedback, Fulton Pollywog.

First and paramount consideration, this scenario not intends to be easy, it intends to reflect a historically factible situation.

 

I think staying at 1:1 time compression is clearly a must at least the first few hours of gametime, my idea was to write about it in the scenario introduction, but I've think it was clearly evident.

The Libyan too many aircraft it's real, but the Libyan plane by plane inventory is almost historically accurate. The historical facts is Gadaffi purchased a lot of warplanes to obtain spare parts in case of embargo, and yes, the Libyan warplanes were historically without enough number of pilots, but point is explained in the scenario background (hypothetical payed pilots from DDR, Pakistan, Czekoslovakia, Soviet Unión "policital" pilots, Cuba, and other origins).

About the F-14A only with Sidewinder and Sparrow is an historical fact, but Database dependant. You can modifiy for personal use the F-14A loadouts and let it with only AIM-9 and AIM-7, as in my personal use DB.

And yes about your consideration about use EMCON is mainly an error, his use or not is dictated by the concrete scenario situation and enviroment. It should be jugded by the forces commander/Harpoon player. I think it's clearly an error in this concrete case to use EMCON, but I understood it also later, playing this concrete scenario (but I should thinked about it, mainly by the proximity of the Libyan bases and forces). That's Harpoon, a simple but I think near to real results simulation.

At last, the "baby scenarios" were those published on his day by USNI (intended to be HCE introductory scenarios), and I don't see sense on downgrade the painful developed historical scenario for easy of play, for simple and introductory play they're a lot of other scenarios.

This scenario intend to be the "worst case historical scenario", representing the complete American OOB, and speculating about the Libyan use of all his possibilities within the limits of Gadaffi historical platforms.

And it can be complex because it's big and has been developed for me by years, based on the previous research three years ago to make the USNI scenarios.

And yes, I think only on this scenario (and in the upcoming El Dorado Canyon scenario) you can find the data of the historical and concrete USN warships OOB (excluding SSN, his number and names is speculative, at least those named could be in the Mediterranean on those dates).