From The Diplomat

 

[excerpt]

 

Behind the China Missile Hype

January 20, 2012

By Harry Kazianis

 

The Diplomat’s Assistant Editor Harry Kazianis sits down with Roger Cliff of the Rand Corporation to discuss China’s much talked about anti-ship missile, the DF-21D.

In some ways I feel the DF-21 is more of a ghost or decoy - much like the balloon army Patton was assigned to command in the days before D-Day and the fake cannons constructed by the Confederate Army outside of Yorktown, during the Civil War. It sure looks impressive, but there's nothing to it. Until an operational test is ever conducted (which isn't likely to happen soon), the system will be more "wow" than now.

 

FWFS,

 

Greg Emerson, DM1(SW)USN-Retired

Renton, WA, USA

In some ways I feel the DF-21 is more of a ghost or decoy - much like the balloon army Patton was assigned to command in the days before D-Day and the fake cannons constructed by the Confederate Army outside of Yorktown, during the Civil War. It sure looks impressive, but there's nothing to it. Until an operational test is ever conducted (which isn't likely to happen soon), the system will be more "wow" than now.

 

What do you make of Adm Willard's comment a year ago that the system had reached IOC?

 

While I think a healthy skepticism is warranted - especially given my opinion of the fundamental purpose of the DF-21D - the US Navy seems to be taking it seriously. That, and a lot of developing Chinese systems that would support it, e.g. over the horizon ocean surveillance radars, long range UAVs, etc.

Heres my take of the Chi-coms system:

1. An untried missile.

2. An untried OTH OSR.

3. Experimental UAVs.

 

The navy shouldn't blow off the threat, that would be sheer folly. However, for the system to be truly accurate they need a GPS for course correction and as far as I know, the Chi-coms don't have a domestic solution. GPS tech is not a restricted item, the problem comes in inteigrating a western GPS into their missile. They would need an open architecture bridge, which as far as I know they haven't been able to obtain - yet.

 

FWFS,

Greg

2. An untried OTH OSR.

 

Curious why you say it is 'untried'?

 

However, for the system to be truly accurate they need a GPS for course correction and as far as I know, the Chi-coms don't have a domestic solution.

 

I neglected to mention the expanding inventory of Chinese satellites generally, including their version of GPS, Beidou (Compass).

It's one thing to have an emitter, which they have. It's quite another to have an OTH fire control radar (which is what they are describing). A DF-21D based solely on this is a glorified fire-and-forget, bearing only missile that would not be avery accurate in engaging a CVN. If they have a GPS, that would be a significant improvment (not a complete game-changer).

 

Greg

It's one thing to have an emitter, which they have. It's quite another to have an OTH fire control radar (which is what they are describing). A DF-21D based solely on this is a glorified fire-and-forget, bearing only missile that would not be avery accurate in engaging a CVN. If they have a GPS, that would be a significant improvment (not a complete game-changer).

 

As I understand it, the OTHSWR systems described in the OSI would be only used for target cueing, i.e. locating the carrier strike group generally.

 

The ASBM would need several other assets, the UAVs, the satellites (recce and Beidou), the Chinese fisherman with a pair of binoculars and a sat phone, etc, to work together and actually localize the target.

 

The missile would then of course need its own seeker, i.e. radar or EO/IR, perhaps, to have any chance of actually finding and homing on the carrier.

 

Come to think of it, I'm not sure the missile is entirely untested. Let's not forget the Chinese ground launched ASAT five years ago. Different, yes. Entirely unrelated? I would not be so sure.

Let's not forget the Chinese ground launched ASAT five years ago.

 

Space debris trackers certainly don't.

Space debris trackers certainly don't.

 

Heh, no they certainly do not.

Heres my take of the Chi-coms system:

1. An untried missile.

2. An untried OTH OSR.

3. Experimental UAVs.

 

The navy shouldn't blow off the threat, that would be sheer folly. However, for the system to be truly accurate they need a GPS for course correction and as far as I know, the Chi-coms don't have a domestic solution. GPS tech is not a restricted item, the problem comes in inteigrating a western GPS into their missile. They would need an open architecture bridge, which as far as I know they haven't been able to obtain - yet.

 

FWFS,

Greg

 

 

Greg, why do you say they need GPS? It has been possible to land an ICBM within a mile of the aimpoint, based purely on inertial guidance, for 50 years now. That's more than sufficient to put you into the basket for the terminal seeker. Why add another system that can be spoofed?

I don't know a lot about missile technology, but I do remember this from my ESWS (Enlisted Surface Warfare Specialist) days in Uncle Sam's canoe club - An ICBM attacks a stationary target. Your average US Navy CVN has the ability to move (and move FAST if needs be). The missile will need to have a GPS (or an equivalent system) to incorporate any type of way points or mid-course corrections, as the target CVN isn't just going to remain dead in the water, allowing the Chi-Coms to strike it.

I don't know a lot about missile technology, but I do remember this from my ESWS (Enlisted Surface Warfare Specialist) days in Uncle Sam's canoe club - An ICBM attacks a stationary target. Your average US Navy CVN has the ability to move (and move FAST if needs be). The missile will need to have a GPS (or an equivalent system) to incorporate any type of way points or mid-course corrections, as the target CVN isn't just going to remain dead in the water, allowing the Chi-Coms to strike it.

 

The FY-1C satellite that China managed to destroy in 2007 was moving at around Mach 20.

 

With the DF-21 ASBM at maximum range and moving at about Mach 10, its going to take about 12 minutes to reach the carrier strike group.

 

And even if we assume the CSG is already clipping along at 30 knots, the target is only going to move about 11 km, making for a 380 sq.km uncertainty zone. [Feel free to check my math, please. ]

 

Much will depend on the attitude, efficiency and accuracy of the ASBM's radar seeker, but its probably going to be energizing at around 80 km altitude. Even at less than 5 km altitude, the Pershing II radar from 40 years ago could supposedly scan about 35 sq.km.

 

Toss in satellite navigation, ELINT/EO satellites and the like for midcourse correction, and I don't see an insurmountable obstacle in putting missiles on target. Notice I say missiles, because the Chinese would be silly to take a single pot shot at the CSG. If they ever choose to leap off that precipice, you can likely expect multiple missiles.

 

The biggest hurdle - according to the OSI literature - appears to be perhaps related to making the transition from hypersonic ballistic flight into a geometry and attitude for an effective terminal phase.

Brad,

You make your case very well. Great discussion! Your absolutely right, the Chi-coms would conduct a salvo strike. They would probably coordinate a multi-axis strike with SSN's and SSK's. TBMD is a big thing now. The Tico and Burkes are armed with the latest SM's and there is Slick-32 on the CVN to do the jamming. Even with all that, the pucker-factor would be extremely high and it would be a freaking scary situation. I wouldn't want to be the one managing the CIC on the flattops at the time!

I believe a healthy skepticism must necessarily entail a healthy dose of "worst case scenario".

 

Even if the ASBM concept turns out to be roughly workable, I think it is much like the naval mine or a quiet conventional submarine in the sense that its the potential of the threat that makes it dangerous. You have to plan for it.

 

The Chinese need something to keep the US Navy at bay while working to accomplish their objectives inside that "string of pearls" mentioned in another thread, whether it be Taiwan, the Spratlys, etc.

 

If the threat of an ASBM helps to delay or keep a CSG at arm's length (i.e. 2,000 km), it vastly weakens its power.

 

The 'weak' spots in any ASBM system are becoming known, of course, such as the fixed OTH radar sites, but it seems to me the Chinese are looking to steadily expand and diversify its ways and means.

 

The headaches of finding and destroying mobile missile launchers are already well known.