Everything posted by CV32
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A few Plane Pics
Cool pics, Pete. You should have been sticking out your tongue on the Turkey pic. Tony has a soft spot for those.
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Using missile defense as a geopolitical lever
From Stratfor GEOPOLITICAL INTELLIGENCE REPORT 06.12.2007 Russia: Using Missile Defense as a Geopolitical Lever By George Friedman Russian President Vladmir Putin threw a classic Cold War curveball during his chat with U.S. President George W. Bush at the G-8 summit. Having totally opposed the creation of a U.S. ballistic missile defense (BMD) system in Poland and the Czech Republic, Putin suddenly shifted his position, saying he might go along with a BMD system under certain conditions. The system, he said, would be acceptable if the United States used a Russian radar system placed in Azerbaijan and based its interceptor missiles anywhere else, such as on ships or in Turkey or Iraq -- anywhere but in Poland. By rejecting the proposal, Washington would look hostile and uncompromising. Accepting it would mean basing the missiles near the Iranian border, possibly too close to intercept long-range missiles fired from there. Using Russian radar -- which currently is insufficient for U.S. needs -- would make the entire system dependent on Russian cooperation. And pulling the system from Poland would be a signal to Central Europe that military agreements with the United States are subject to negotiation with the Russians. That, of course, is exactly the signal Putin wants sent. First, let's consider the BMD system itself. There are two criticisms of it, usually made by the same people. The first is that it won't work, and the second is that it is destabilizing. That the two statements are incompatible does not seem to faze most people. Therefore, it is necessary to begin by explaining the reason the BMD is such a passionate issue. The foundation of stability during the Cold War was Mutually Assured Destruction, or MAD. MAD was based on the certainty that an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), once launched, could not be blocked. With enough ICBMs, land- and submarine-launched, both the United States and Soviet Union could assure the destruction of the other side in the event of a nuclear exchange. That deterred nuclear risk-taking and stabilized the situation. The introduction of a missile defense system threatened to change this equation. If one side created such a system, its destruction would no longer be assured, and it might choose to launch a nuclear attack against another side. Even if the effectiveness of the BMD system were uncertain, its very uncertainty created an unknown factor. Neither side could be sure the system would work -- one's own or the other's. In the hall of mirrors that constituted nuclear strategic thinking, the possibility that the other side might calculate probabilities different than you might force you to strike pre-emptively. Since the other side wouldn't know what you were thinking, it might strike pre-emptively. Thus, the existence of a BMD system that might not work was seen as increasing the chance of war. The Soviets, however, had two very real fears when then-U.S. President Ronald Reagan announced the Strategic Defense Initiative, dubbed Star Wars. The first was that the United States might just create an effective BMD system. The Soviets had been burned too many times by underestimating U.S. technological capabilities to be as dismissive as Western critics. The second problem was that the Soviets could not match the system financially or technologically. If it failed to work, fine. But if the United States pulled it off, the Soviet Union would be wide open to attack without the ability to field its own system. Therefore, the Soviets went ballistic because they were uncertain about the system's effectiveness. They carried out diplomatic attacks against the system and encouraged its Western critics -- and critics of the Reagan administration in general -- to do all they could to block the system. As it was, Star Wars couldn't be made to work at the time, but if you were to have listened to the Soviets on the subject in the mid-1980s, you would have thought the United States was on the verge of annihilating the Soviets with Star Wars. By then, the Soviets' nerves were pretty well shot. They were generally on the ropes, and knew it. Since those days, the concept of a BMD system has been seen as a technical impossibility that nevertheless is dangerous and destabilizing. There might have been an element of truth to that, but it is difficult to describe a system designed to block one or two missiles fired by a rogue state as destabilizing. MAD is not in effect, for example, with an Iranian or North Korean missile launch. There is no balance to destabilize. An argument could be made that the system doesn't work. You also could argue that the cheapest and most effective solution to an Iranian missile launch is a pre-emptive strike against the Iranian missile site. But it is hard to argue that the existence of a small defensive system of uncertain effectiveness and geared to look at a third party increases the probability of an American-Russian nuclear war. But the complexities of nuclear deterrence against Third World countries with minor nuclear ambitions are not what Putin was thinking about when he made his offer to the United States. Rather, Putin was thinking about Poland, its role in Central Europe and the former Soviet Union (FSU), and its relationship to the United States. That's what really is worrying Putin, and the BMD issue is merely a lever to deal with the larger geopolitical issues. In other words, this isn't about missile defense, but about a U.S. military presence -- no matter how small -- in Poland. Ever since the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, the Russians have been shifting their foreign policy to reassert their sphere of influence in the FSU. In their view, the Andropov experiment of trading geopolitical influence for economic benefits with the West has failed. The benefits failed to solve their problems when they materialized, and the geopolitical concessions have created massive insecurity for the Russian Federation. Therefore, reclaiming Moscow's sphere of influence is the primary issue, starting with Ukraine. The Russians blamed the Americans for Ukraine, but they also have blamed Poland. Of all of the former European satellites, Poland has been the most openly anti-Russian and the most active in supporting forces in the FSU that also are resisting Russian resurgence. This was shown recently in the Baltic states, particularly Estonia, where Russians have been angered over what is portrayed as increasingly repressive moves toward the local Russian population. The relocation of a monument to the Red Army for liberating Estonia from Germany led to riots by ethnic Russians. Moscow deliberately intensified the crisis, warning the Estonians not to take actions against Russians. The Russians have a particular problem with the Baltic countries, in that they have been admitted to NATO. The Russians believed they had an understanding with NATO and the United States, dating back to the fall of the Soviet Union, that NATO would not be extended into Central Europe -- and certainly never into the FSU. Obviously, though, many Central European countries have joined NATO. The induction of the Baltic countries, which brought NATO within 60 miles of St. Petersburg, angered the Russians but was grudgingly seen as the price of the Andropov doctrine. However, it was post-Orange Revolution talk of including Ukraine in NATO that drove the Russians to reverse policy. The Poles, given their long history, are not a trustful or secure people. They view the Russians as merely recovering from a setback, not permanently vanquished. They also have no love or trust for the Germans. Historically trapped on the hard-to-defend northern European plain, equally afraid of both Russians and Germans, the Poles have always looked to an outside power as a protector. Even the experience of French and British guarantees in World War II has not soured them on this strategy, since it is the only one they've got. And that means the Poles now are relying on American guarantees. But the Poles also badly need a buffer between them and the Russians. They want independent Baltic states in NATO. They want Ukraine in NATO. If there was any way to swing it, they would want Belarus in NATO. They want the Russians kept as far from them as possible. So long as they feel they have U.S. guarantees, they will do everything they can to create blocks to a return of Russia to the frontiers of the FSU. The Russian view is that the Poles are being encouraged and emboldened by the United States. The missile defense system in Poland is not important in and of itself. It certainly doesn't affect Russia's ability to launch a nuclear strike. But as a symbol of a Polish-U.S. alliance that transcends NATO, it is absolutely vital. The Poles wanted the missiles in their country to symbolize the link, and the Americans wanted them there for the same reason. As long as that link exists, the Poles feel secure, and as long as the Poles feel secure, they will be a thorn in the side of the Russians. The Russian goal of exerting a sphere of influence in the FSU has a broader component. Russia does not expect to regain influence in most of Central Europe -- Serbia possibly excepted. It does want the Central Europeans to be sufficiently wary of the Russians as to exercise caution. Most of the rest of Central Europe tries hard not to get in Russia's way. The Russians want to solidify this posture and extend it to Poland while they redefine the status of the Baltics. If the Russians can get the Americans to withdraw the missiles from Poland, placing them in Azerbaijan, on ships at sea or in downtown Moscow, the Russians will have achieved their goal. The Russians have a lingering distaste for the BMD. But the real issue is to force a U.S. retreat from Poland. That would shake Polish -- and broader European -- confidence in the U.S. commitment, sober the rest of an already cautious Central Europe and certainly cause the Balts to rethink their posture toward Russia. If the United States refused to shift the system, this would give the Russians a lever with the Germans. Moscow could then go to the Germans (who still are smarting over a couple of brief cut-offs of natural gas from Russia) and argue that the Americans are triggering another Cold War by their inflexible commitment to basing in Poland when Russia has offered a set of workable alternatives. Whatever German Chancellor Angela Merkel's view of geopolitics, the German public does not want a replay of the Cold War -- and wants Poland to be quiet. There is also, as in all good Cold War games, a domestic political component. The United States has enjoyed meddling in Russian politics for the past 15 years or so. This gives Putin a chance at payback. At a time when the Bush administration is both politically weak and quite distracted, painting the administration as being inflexible and aggressive, courting another ill-conceived confrontation over a weapon that doesn't work anyway, is a low-risk, high-gain proposition. The New York Times already bit on the bait with an editorial praising Russian flexibility. The administration's geopolitical problem is obvious. It has too many irons in the fire and a couple of them -- Iraq and Afghanistan -- are white hot. The Russians are deliberately raising the stakes over the Polish system because they see the Bush administration's last two years as a golden opportunity to redefine their sphere of influence. If the United States resists Russia's suggestions, Russia can make inroads in Germany and the rest of Western Europe while causing more domestic political pressure on an administration that already is in the red zone when it comes to political weakness. If Washington compromises, the Russians can use that in Central Europe as evidence of the United States' lack of commitment and of a need for the Central Europeans to rethink their position. It particularly puts the Baltic states in a difficult position. Poland alone (or with the tiny Baltic states) certainly is not a sufficient counterweight to Russia. Putin's move, therefore, was brilliantly timed and conceived. He took an issue that is controversial in its own right and used it as a geopolitical lever, striking hard at a relationship that is most troubling to Moscow. The Washington-Warsaw relationship represents a serious regional challenge to Russian ambitions. If the Russians can get an American retreat on the anti-missile system in Poland, they can begin the process of unraveling the U.S. position in Central Europe. Since the Western Europeans wouldn't mind in the least, there are possibilities here. But the possibilities are not the same ones that existed during the Cold War, or even as recently as three years ago. Any region with three dozen states -- read: Europe -- is a dynamic place where governments regularly come and go. By the end of June, the three major European leaders who demonstrated the greatest affinity for Russia during their terms -- German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, French President Jacques Chirac and British Prime Minister Tony Blair -- will all be gone. Their replacements, and the replacements of similar governments throughout Europe, are largely Russo-skeptic. But they also are not instinctual European federalists. This both destroys and creates opportunities for Moscow. The Kremlin is now facing a Europe that is actually more hostile to it than a similar pan-European alignment of the 1980s. Simultaneously, the unraveling of the European project means that, though the overall region is certainly more suspicious, Russia's ability to peel off individual states from the whole, either with sweet talk or intimidation, could actually prove easier. And nowhere will it be easier than Serbia. The Russians have made it clear that they do not favor an independent Kosovo. Friendly with Serbia, and very unhappy with the way the Kosovo war was handled by the United States, the Russians could well choose to create a second confrontation over the future of Kosovo, testing both the Americans and Western Europeans at the same time. The Russians now have very little to lose and quite a bit to gain from confrontation.
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USAF seeks replacement for HE cannon rounds
From Flight Global DATE:12/06/07 SOURCE:Flightglobal.com US Air Force seeks replacement for high-explosive cannon rounds By Stephen Trimble High-explosive incendiary (HEI) rounds fired by most US Air Force fighters may soon be replaced in the inventory by inert 20mm bullets. The General Dynamics PGU-28 A/B 20mm semi-armour piercing HEI round entered service during the last decade with the M61 cannon installed on the Boeing F-15, Lockheed Martin F-16 and Lockheed F-22. As of 2001, the USAF and US Navy had stockpiled 8 million PGU-28 rounds, each of which features a pyrotechnic fuze and a pyrophoric explosive. But the USAF is now seeking a replacement round, launching a market survey on 1 June to identify potential sources for a "non-fuzed, non-explosive round with PGU-28/B [aerodynamic] performance", an acquisition notice says. The market survey is being conducted by the Joint Munitions and Lethality acquisition centre at Picatinny Arsenal, New Jersey. The current stockpile of PGU-28/B rounds "limits mission effectiveness," the notice adds. Concerns about the safety of the HEI round have surfaced involving in-bore explosions. An upgraded version of the PGU-28/B has satisfied the navy's Boeing F/A-18 community, but not the air force. Unlike the F-18, the air force's fighters have cannons mounted directly beside the cockpit, making in-bore explosions an injury risk for the pilot. Anticipating the requirement long in advance, Alliant Techsystems (ATK) has licensed manufacturing rights in the USA for a round designed by Germany's Rheinmetall. The Penetrator with Enhanced Lateral Effect (PELE) round would provide a tungsten casing that would be shattered on impact by a plastic slug. The effect is a blast of shrapnel spreading outward, or laterally, from the impact area. The 20mm round for the M61 cannon was designed with the air-to-air role of the fighter as the main focus. However, its utility in strafing runs against ground targets - an increasingly important mission for the USAF - has never been tested, says Rodney Ward, a business development director for ATK Ammunition Systems. In 2004, ATK received a USAF contract to test the air-to-air effectiveness of the PELE round, Ward says. An operational test and evaluation phase is ongoing and should be completed in the fourth quarter of this year. The market survey is an indication that the air force will seek alternatives to the PELE round to replace the PGU-28/B. Ward says the programme reflects a major change in combat capability for the air force, rather than just a straightforward replacement for a round already in the inventory. "This is a whole new capability," he says. "They [will] have a round that is effectively inert that has a lot of blast effect."
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War in the Pacific 1941-1945
The Kuriles ... hmm, that's pretty close to home, Kelly. Whatcha gonna do when the sacred cow runs wild on you ?
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Iran warns: you're in range
From Defence Talk Iran To Retaliate If Attacked From US bases Agence France-Presse | Jun 11, 2007 Kuwait City: Iran warned on Sunday that it would strike US military bases in neighbouring Gulf states if they were used as staging posts to attack the Islamic republic over its nuclear programme. "We rule out the possibility that our neighbours... will allow the United States to use their territory in attacking Iran," Iranian parliament speaker Gholam Ali Hadad Adel told reporters during an official visit to Kuwait. "But if this actually happens, we will be forced to defend ourselves... We will target those bases or points" used to attack Iran, he said. Adel said that some Gulf states, which he did not name, had assured Tehran that they would not allow their territory to be used in the event of an attack on Iran. "Yes. Some countries in the region did," he said when asked if Gulf countries had given such assurances. "Parliaments in some of these countries have even called for not allowing the United States to use its bases to attack Iran," said Adel, adding that this issue had not been discussed with Kuwaiti officials. The Iranian speaker also said that Gulf states had now "learned many lessons from the US invasion of Iraq," in March 2003, and that "officials in the region are not likely to link their fate with US mistakes." Earlier, Iranian deputy interior minister in charge of security issues Mohammad Baqer Zolghadr warned in Tehran that all US military bases in the Middle East were in range of Iranian missiles. Iran has an array of medium-range missiles and claims that its longer-range Shahab-3 missile has a reach of 2,000 kilometres (1,200 miles) which would put US bases on the Arabian peninsula within reach. Washington has always said it wants to resolve the nuclear crisis through diplomacy, but has never ruled out using military action to bring Tehran to heel.
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Iran warns: you're in range
From Defence Talk Iran warns US: your Mideast bases in our range Agence France-Presse | Jun 11, 2007 Iran has warned that US military bases in the Middle East are within the range of its missiles, amid increasing tensions with Washington over the Iranian nuclear programme, media reported Sunday. "All the American bases in the region are within the reach of our weapons," said Mohammad Baqer Zolghadr, the deputy interior minister in charge of security issues. "If the United States attacked Iran, US interests would be in danger everywhere in the world," added Zolghadr, a former deputy chief of Iran's elite Revolutionary Guards. Iran has an array of medium range missiles and claims that its longer-range Shahab-3 missile has a reach of 2,000 kilometres (1,200 miles) which would put US bases on the Arabian peninsula within reach. Washington has always said it wants to resolve the nuclear crisis through diplomacy but has never ruled out using military action to bring Tehran to heel. Dozens of US and Israeli aircraft were on Sunday due to begin week-long joint exercises in southern Israel, simulating dog-fights and bombing targets on the ground. Iran has responded by warning that it would hit back hard against any attack on its territory and said its armed forces are prepared for anything. The United States accuses Iran of seeking nuclear weapons and is pushing for a third set of UN sanctions to punish the Islamic republic for refusing to halt sensitive atomic activities. Iran insists its nuclear drive is entirely peaceful and just wants to generate energy for a growing population.
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RN unveils first Astute SSN
From thisislondon.co.uk London, Friday 08.06.07 Britain launches nuclear sub that can hear a ship from across the Atlantic 08.06.07 The first of the UK's new generation of nuclear-powered attack submarines has been unveiled in Cumbria by the Duchess of Cornwall. Due to enter service in 2009, BAE Systems' Astute is the most advanced submarine of its kind and comes bristling with the very latest in military technology. BAE said: "With a radar signature equivalent to a dolphin, it can remain undetected thousands of miles from home and hundreds of metres underwater. "In the right conditions it can detect the QE2 leaving New York harbour from the English Channel." Plated in specially-designed acoustic tiles that minimize its signature as it glides through the water the Astute is ideal for top-secret covert operations across the globe. It will be able to remain hundreds of metres under water for up to 90 days at a time while keeping its 98-strong crew safe as they sleep, eat and breath within metres of a nuclear power plant. Astute has more firepower than any previous attack sub. Its Spearfish torpedoes and Tomahawk cruise missiles are capable of delivering pin-point strikes from 2,000km (1,240 miles). It has also replaced the conventional periscope with a series of communications masts which transmit data to and from the command deck. Inside the Astute class submarine However, its key asset is its stealth. Even with a nuclear reactor and four powerful turbines propelling it through the water, less than one watt of power is radiated, making it incredibly quiet. Its nuclear reactor means that it will never need to be refuelled in its 25-year lifetime. It can also generate its own air and water so it is able to circumnavigate the globe without surfacing. The submarine - almost half as big again as the Royal Navy's current fleet of attack boats - is one of three under construction at the BAE Systems shipyard in Barrow-in-Furness. Last month, the Ministry of Defence ordered a fourth submarine at a cost of £200 million, which will be called HMS Audacious, to join Astute, Ambush and Artful. In a break from tradition, there was no "splash" as the vessel hit the water. It is actually on a huge mechanical trolley, moving at a metre a minute, and will take three hours to clear the hall and only be lowered into the water tomorrow. Camilla was also presented with a Retriever puppy - a retriever is on the crest of HMS Astute - which will be donated as a guide dog for the blind.
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Memories of 5 June 1967
From BBC News Why did Israel attack USS Liberty? By Raffi Berg BBC News For former US seaman Gary Brummett, the 40th anniversary of the 1967 Middle East war has stirred painful memories. As a 21-year-old third class petty officer, Mr Brummett was serving on board the USS Liberty off the coast of Egypt on 8 June, when, without warning, the vessel came under fire, first from fighter planes, then torpedo boats. The attack, which lasted at least 40 minutes, resulted in the deaths of 34 of Mr Brummett's fellow crewmen, at least 170 injured and catastrophic damage to the ship. Alarmingly, the assault had been carried out not by enemy forces, but by the US' closest regional ally, Israel. Israel insists it mistook the Liberty for a hostile Egyptian ship, the El Quseir, and numerous US and Israeli inquiries have concluded the attack was accidental. But for Mr Brummett and a growing body of conspiracy theorists, the authorities are guilty of a cover-up. "I have more trouble with it today than when it happened because I know more of the facts about what was going on," said Mr Brummett. "There's been an egregious wrong done here, there's been an extreme number of lies told to the American people and the American people do not know the truth about what happened." 'Sitting duck' The attack on the Liberty - the gravest incident in the history of US-Israeli relations - has been a source of controversy for the past four decades. Claim and counter-claim as to what happened have been fought out in every corner of the media, with the advent of the internet helping to reinvigorate the debate. Israel's supporters say the incident is merely being used as a tool by critics to malign the Jewish state, while accusers say the attack was a war crime which has never come to light. According to Israel, the incident was a tragic case of friendly fire occurring in the fog of war. It says it believed the ship had been bombarding Israeli forces fighting in the Sinai, and that its pilots did not see any US flags (survivors say there were three) on the vessel before they opened fire. Sceptics however claim the attack was premeditated and that the truth has been suppressed. The assertion of a cover-up was lent weight by a 2003 independent commission of inquiry which reported that the attack on the Liberty "remains the only serious naval incident that has never been thoroughly investigated by Congress". Among the most popular theories as to why Israel would take such drastic action against its superpower ally is that the Liberty, a $40m state-of-the-art surveillance ship, was eavesdropping on an Israeli massacre of Egyptian prisoners of war. Israel strongly denies its troops executed Egyptian POWs, saying those who died in an incident at that time were 250 armed Palestinian fighters killed in action. Another is that the ship had learnt of secret Israeli plans to invade Syria's Golan Heights two days later and had to be destroyed. 'US collusion' theory Perhaps the most sinister motive is that put forward by journalist Peter Hounam in his 2003 book "Operation Cyanide". Mr Hounam claims secret elements within the US and Israeli governments colluded to bomb the ship and blame the attack on Egypt and their superpower ally, the Soviet Union, triggering massive retaliation which would ensure Israeli victory. "The attack on the Liberty was pre-planned, perhaps from at least a year beforehand," Mr Hounam says. "The Liberty was sent into a very dangerous situation, where it was, in my view, placed in a position to be attacked." Mr Hounam says the intention was to sink the ship and kill everyone on board, but as the Liberty remained afloat the plan was aborted and has been hushed up ever since. 'Presidential order' Successive US and Israeli inquiries, and the declassification of thousands of pieces of information, have done little to dampen suspicions. One of the most powerful claims of a cover-up has come from retired US Navy lawyer Capt Ward Boston, counsel to the Navy Court of Inquiry into the incident conducted just days after the event. Capt Boston says the court's original findings, which he signed, were changed afterwards by government lawyers. He also claims the president of the court, Rear Adm Isaac Kidd, told him he was ordered by US President Lyndon Johnson and Defence Secretary Robert McNamara to conclude the attack was a case of mistaken identity. However, Capt Boston's version of events - and the notion that what happened was anything more than a tragic accident - are disputed by numerous academics and authors who have investigated the incident. "It was a series of blunders by both the United States and Israel that resulted in a terrible tragedy and nothing more," says Jay Cristol, a federal judge and author of the book The Liberty Incident. "All the official reports came to the same conclusion. "Unfortunately there are a number of people who are on the other side of the Arab-Israeli conflict who think this is a way to attack the otherwise very strong relationship between the US and Israel, and they keep stirring the pot. 'No evidence' It is a view with which historian Michael B Oren, a senior fellow at the Shalem Center, a Jerusalem academic research institute, concurs. "Many thousands of documents related to the Liberty have been declassified and in none of these documents will you find a scintilla of evidence to suggest any of these conspiracy theories are true," he says. "The Golan one is the easiest to disprove because of where the Liberty was, not off the coast of Israel, but Egypt. Its listening devices weren't that powerful that they could listen in on communications in Tel Aviv. "Moreover the Israelis were very upfront in telling the US that they planned to capture the Golan Heights and the Americans agreed to it. "Regarding a massacre of Egyptian POWs, there's no evidence of that. And why would the Israelis try to cover up one atrocity by committing another? He says the attack has remained a source of controversy because "it has all the ingredients of a good spy scandal. It involves espionage and it involves the Israelis, who are forever a focus of conspiracy theories. "If I could prove the Liberty was attacked in a premeditated fashion, I would write it - it would be a great historical scoop - but the truth is far more mundane."
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EFV program redrawn
From Aviation Week GD Keeps EFV, But Program Redrawn Jun 8, 2007 Michael Bruno/Aerospace Daily & Defense Report The U.S. Navy and Marine Corps will allow General Dynamics to keep the troubled Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV) program, but the Corps will dramatically scale back its future orders and restructure the contract to address award fees among other concerns, officials told reporters June 7 at the Pentagon. The program now will seek only 573 EFVs, almost halved from 1,013 units previously, and officials have built in a delay of four to five years in the schedule. Milestone C approval is slated for mid-2011, instead of last January, and full operational capability will not occur until 2025 compared with the last plan targeting 2020. The estimate for the total program acquisition cost in future dollars of the restructured EFV program is $15.9 billion, officialss said. That compares with estimates of about $8.7 billion earlier in the 11-year-old effort, according to a Government Accountability Office report in May 2006 (DAILY, March 21). The average procurement unit cost now is $21.6 million, up $4.2 million from the last Selected Acquisition Report and far more than an early $8.5 million price tag. Altogether, the Defense Department has spent $1.8 billion for research, development, test and evaluation of the EFV since 1996, officials told reporters. Officials promised increased Defense Contract Management Agency involvement in the EFV program and maintained that General Dynamics is boosting its systems engineering expertise. The Pentagon acquisition chief, the Navy acquisition chief and the General Dynamics chief executive also will meet quarterly over the EFV, they told reporters. Considering all costs and the need to deliver the EFV, officials maintained that there was no good alternative but to continue with General Dynamics. Work under a "follow-on" system development and demonstration contract should occur under a cost-plus-incentive-fee structure with "very rigid, strict targets" versus a cost-plus award fee now. "You're going to see a metamorphosis from what was previously a very autonomous program operating somewhat independently to a program that has a lot of help from DOD leadership," said Col. William Taylor, the new program executive officer for land systems. Reliability Under the restructured program, the Marines have sliced 750 pounds off the vehicle and leveraged another 1,000 pounds of "trade space" to meet reliability requirements, the cause of the EFV's troubles, Taylor said. The changes also lower the sea state in which the EFV is designed to operate, from sea state three to two. Sea state refers to the amplitude and frequency of waves. The first prototypes will be available in 2010 for testing and training. Still, technology issues did drive the Nunn-McCurdy review of the EFV, Taylor said. EFV was one of a handful of programs more than 25 percent over their first estimated cost that had to be recertified recently by the Pentagon to Congress under Nunn-McCurdy requirements. Officials said the EFV's cost breach has reached 43 percent, but the DOD vouches for the continued effort since the current Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAV), originally fielded in 1972, is aging and the Marines are trying to return to their emphasis on traditional landing-assault capabilities versus counterinsurgency operations such as in Iraq.
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Commanders in Gulf keep in touch with Iran
[Emphasis mine] I think maybe "deeper water" would have been more appropriate. There is a small patch of deeper water (max 80 m) southwest of Bushehr, but the deepest water in the Gulf (still only 90 m) is south of Kish Island and in the Strait of Hormuz. There is no real deep water (200+ m) until you get in the area of the Gulf of Oman.
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Iranian missiles pose little threat
From Defense Aerospace Experts Say Iranian Missile Program Poses Little Threat to US and Europe (Source: Voice of America news; issued June 7, 2007) WASHINGTON --- The U.S. says its proposal to base ballistic missile defense systems in eastern Europe is designed to deter what U.S. officials label as "rogue states," particularly Iran. As VOA correspondent Gary Thomas reports, Western analysts believe Iran's missile program is still far from posing any threat to Europe or the United States. Iranian National Security Council Chairman Ali Larijani labeled the U.S. assertion that the proposed missile shield is aimed at Iran as a "joke" because, he said, Iranian missiles cannot reach Europe. But the Bush Administration and its allies are not laughing. Western security analysts say that while Larijani is correct for now, at least, Iran may someday reach the stage where its missiles could strike not just Europe, but the United States as well. Ken Katzman, an Iran analyst at the nonpartisan Congressional Research Service, says the Bush Administration is taking a long view of a threat that may not develop for some time. "Iran is believed to be working on missiles of intercontinental range, which I believe is defined as over 3,500 miles [approx. 5600 km] of range," said Ken Katzman. "And [regarding] Iran, I think the latest estimate the intelligence committee made public was that they might be approaching that range by, let's say, 2015 or so, that's not infinity. That's maybe less than a decade away." But, Katzman adds, given the problems encountered by North Korea - which is believed to be farther along in missile development than Iran - he believes it will be longer than 2015. For months, U.S. plans to build a missile shield in Europe drew strong criticism - and warnings - from Russia. Tensions over the proposal seemed to ease Thursday after talks between President Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin. The Russian leader offered use of a Soviet-built radar station in Azerbaijan, which borders Iran, as part of the missile defense system. Still, Paul Kerr, an analyst at the Arms Control Association, says he is puzzled about why the Bush Administration got into a spat with Russia over an Iranian missile threat that has yet to materialize. "They haven't tested a missile, I think, that warrants putting these interceptors in Eastern Europe and that warrants the sort of attendant tension that it's caused, not only terms in tension with Russia, but it's also costing an enormous amount of diplomatic capital and effort to deal with this problem when we have a lot of other problems on our plate," said Paul Kerr. "And to do this for a threat that I think is not there now isn't worth it. It's not that there's no potential threat from Iran. But it just doesn't pass the cost-benefit test, not right now." Doug Richardson, editor of the defense journal Jane's Missiles and Rockets, says the interceptors that the U.S. proposes placing in Czechoslovakia and Poland may actually be of little use in protecting Europe from any future Iranian ballistic missile threat. The protection, he says, is for the United States. "These interceptors are meant to intercept a ballistic missile in the middle of its flight, not towards the end of its flight," said Richardson. "So you don't want to position them near the target being attacked, like you would do with an anti-aircraft missile. You want to position them ideally somewhere in between the launch point and the target so the missile can be attacked while it's still at high altitude, up near the peak of its trajectory in space." While publicly available information is sketchy, analysts generally concur that Iran's top missile is the Shahab 3, which is based on North Korea's Nodong missile. In fact, say analysts, Iran got much of its missile expertise from North Korea, but there was also help from Russia and China. Richardson says the 3A, a more advanced version, has a range of 1,500 to 1,800 kilometers, depending on the weight of the payload. That could take it as far as Turkey. It could also easily reach Israel, which Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has said should be "wiped off the map." But Ken Katzman says there are glitches with the Shahab missile program. "The problem is, Iran announced the weapon as operational and in production in 2003, I believe," he said. "But there's still questions about the reliability and the accuracy. Some of the tests are known to have been big failures. So I'm in the camp that's a little less alarmed about Iran's [missile] capabilities than others." Doug Richardson says Iranian exile opposition groups have been peddling information about what they say is a much more advanced missile in the works, but the intelligence has tended to be unreliable. The West is locked in a confrontation with Iran over Tehran's alleged bid to become a nuclear weapons power. There is general agreement that that will not happen until at least 2010. But Richardson says that does not mean Iran could have nuclear missiles right away as well because the heavy weight of rudimentary nuclear warheads tend to reduce a missile's range. "Reliable information on nuclear weapons is hard to come by," he said. "But there's a general feeling in the academic world that a nation attempting to design its nuclear bomb for the first time is likely to come up with a design that's about a ton in weight. So unless they've been particularly lucky or particularly clever, I don't think they'd get first off [right away] a nuclear weapon that could fit into the Shahab 3A." The Bush Administration says it will study Russia's surprise offer to incorporate the Soviet-built radar in Azerbaijan into the U.S. missile shield system.
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First Firing of AARGM
From Defense Aerospace First AARGM Developmental Live Firing Successfully Demonstrates Precision Long Range Time Critical Strike Capability (Source: ATK Alliant Techsystems; issued June 7, 2007) MINNEAPOLIS --- Alliant Techsystems, the U.S. Navy team of PMA-242, the Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons Division -- China Lake, and the Italian Air Force recently conducted the first Developmental Test (DT) firing of an Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missile (AARGM) from an F/A-18 aircraft on the China Lake test ranges on 25 May 2007. The test firing confirmed the effective integration of AARGM with the F/A-18 aircraft and the continued progress of fielding a long-range, precision strike capability against a wide array of time critical targets. The missile successfully achieved safe separation from the aircraft, navigated over an extended range to the designated target location, and guided to a direct hit. The successful flight test met all test objectives. "This was the most significant test in the history of the AARGM program," said Dave Wise, Vice President and General Manager, ATK Advanced Weapons. "Not only did the AARGM missile score a direct hit, it demonstrated how ATK's design offers the war planner affordable, stand-off time sensitive strike capability." "The entire international AARGM team is very pleased with the results of today's successful test," said CAPT Larry Egbert, the Department of Defense program manager for HARM and AARGM programs, "This event marks a major milestone in the AARGM SD&D program and demonstrates the positive results that a true international cooperative effort can yield. This successful test demonstrates the viability of an affordable Destruction of Enemy Air Defenses (DEAD) capability for U.S., Italian, and potentially other Allied Air Forces through the upgrade of legacy AGM-88 weapons." The recent test was the first Developmental Test firing of the AARGM System Development and Demonstration (SD&D) phase and continues the tradition of success established with the Quick Bolt Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD) and AARGM Advanced Technology Demonstration (ATD) phases of the program. During those tests, AARGM achieved seven successful test flights. The AARGM program plans a series of additional launches during the SD&D phase. ATK expects to begin Low Rate Initial Production in FY08. When fielded in FY09, it will be the only extended range tactical supersonic strike weapon in US and Italian inventory. In addition to demonstrating long-range, supersonic, GPS precision strike capability and maturity; the test also demonstrated AARGM's compatibility with ATK's Common Munitions Built-in-test/Reprogramming Equipment (CMBRE), as well as the Joint Mission Planning System (JMPS) and AWM-103. The test also demonstrated AARGM's compatibility with the F/A-18C/D 21X Software Configuration Set, and the successful integration of AARGM hardware and software with legacy AGM-88 High-Speed Anti-Radiation Missile (HARM) components. AARGM is a supersonic, air-launched tactical missile that will be integrated on the F/A-18 C/D, F/A-18 E/F, EA-18G and Tornado IDS/ECR aircraft. The missile is also being designed to be compatible with the EA-6B and U.S. and Allied F-16 aircraft. Its advanced multi-sensor system, including a Millimeter Wave (MMW) terminal seeker, advanced digital Anti-Radiation Homing (ARH) receiver and a GPS/INS, is capable of rapidly engaging traditional and advanced enemy air defense targets as well as non-radar time-sensitive strike targets. The AARGM MMW seeker can operate in concert with the ARH to counter RF shutdown tactics or in a stand-alone mode to discriminate non-emitting time sensitive targets. AARGM is a network-enabled weapon that directly receives tactical intelligence information via an embedded data link and provides near real-time Weapon Impact Assessment (WIA) reports. AARGM, the successor to the U.S. Navy AGM-88 HARM system, is a U.S. and Italian international cooperative major acquisition program with the U.S. Navy as the executive agent. ATK is a $3.8 billion advanced weapon and space systems company employing approximately 15,500 people in 21 states.
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Memories of 5 June 1967
From BBC News Syria's 1967 war goes unmentioned By Magdi Abdelhadi BBC News, Damascus Syria is not marking the 1967 war for obvious reasons. Countries do not celebrate defeats. Syria suffered its worst military defeat in living memory and lost the strategic Golan Heights to Israel. Paradoxically, however, the first week of June finds Syria in a festive mood, albeit an officially sanctioned one. An extravagant piece of pageantry is touring the country to celebrate the "re-election" of President Bashar al-Assad for another seven years in a referendum in which he was the only candidate. It is a grandiose spectacle featuring Phoenician chariots, Syrian farmers and Baath party boy scouts. The ostentatious display is nearly 2km (1.2 miles) long and is touring the whole country with huge posters of the president bearing the slogan minhebak (We Love You). The machinery that created the personality cult around the president's father and predecessor, Hafez al-Assad, shows itself to be still well oiled in this extravagant display of love and devotion to the "eternal leader". No-one here wants to hear anything about the 1967 defeat. One party member taking part in the parade in Damascus looked shocked when I suggested to him that maybe the ruling Baath party was to blame, since it was in power then and still is. "Mistake?" he retorted. "No. The party never made any mistakes." In a bizarre way, the most visible legacy of that war is not so much Israel's occupation of the Golan Heights, as that the political system that presided over the defeat has survived more or less intact. Syria's minister of defence in 1967 was Hafez al-Assad. He later became president and ruled the country for 30 years. Unfathomable defeat Here is how the war is described in a history textbook for secondary school students: "As the Arab nationalist tide of liberation grew stronger, and some Arab revolutions became victorious, the Zionist aggression on 5 June 1967 had the aim of bringing down the Arab progressive forces with the help of the United States." This is a vintage Arab-nationalist interpretation of what happened. It is almost identical to the passionate appeal by the Baathist president broadcast on the day Israel stormed the Golan Heights. President Nur al-Din al-Atasi took to the airwaves on 9 June and urged his people to turn Syria into a graveyard for "the Anglo-American Zionist invaders". The idea that British and American forces were assisting Israel's war effort was hatched in Egypt, disseminated by its popular Arab radio station Sawt Al Arab (Voice of the Arabs) and picked up by Damascus. It was a desperate attempt to justify the devastating defeat of three Arab armies in less than a week by tiny Israel. Arab leaders in Egypt and Syria had promised to wipe Israel off the map in the run-up to the war. There is an ongoing defeat because we are living under the same political and perhaps cultural structures that brought about that defeat Throwing Britain and America into the equation was clearly intended to deflect public anger. From the start of the war, the Arab public had been fed lies about their countries' military prowess on the battlefield. Enduring crisis Talk of foreign conspiracies against Syria and the wider region is still very much the official prism through which the current turmoil in the Middle East is seen in Damascus. Predictably, critics of the Baath regime disagree. Syrian writer Yasseen Haj Saleh does not dispute the role of the West in buttressing Israel but believes that 1967 was a symptom of deeper malaise in Syria and other Arab societies. Mr Saleh, who spent 16 years in a Syrian jail, says: "There is an ongoing defeat because we are living under the same political and perhaps cultural structures that brought about that defeat. That is why we are still living with it.¿ Today the majority of the Syrian population was born after 1967 and many of the young do not even remember that date. But a young Syrian student spoke for the majority of Syrians when I asked him about the occupied Golan Heights: "The Ottoman Turks occupied our land for 400, the Crusaders were here for 60-70 years but as long as there is the will, we will get what is ours back. "By war or by political means, we will certainly get it back one day." Tangled web The Syrians believe that history is on their side, that right will somehow overcome the Israeli military might. Syrians attend an independence rally near the cease-fire line with Israel Syrians can look into the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights Ethics aside, today the conflict between Syria and Israel has become caught up in a wider regional power struggle between Israel and America on the one hand, and Iran on the other. In 1967, during the heyday of the cold war, there were only two sides to the conflict, the Arabs, backed by the former Soviet Union, and the Israelis, supported by America. Today, the Arab side has fractured into rival camps. Syria has allied itself with Iran, which has ambitions to become a regional power and the standard-bearer of Muslims against Jewish Israel and the Christian West. Despite official denials, Damascus is also embroiled in the turmoil in Iraq and Lebanon. Washington is directly involved in the conflict between Israel and its Arab neighbour in ways that were inconceivable back in the 1960s. The old fault lines are now criss-crossed with new ones. Peace between Syria and Israel - if it ever happens in the near future - may have to begin by disentangling a web of regional, international and growing national, even sectarian, conflicts.
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RAF makes FSTA tanker deal
From Defense Aerospace Lord Drayson Announces Financial Solution for New RAF Tanker and Transport Aircraft Programme (Source: UK Ministry of Defence; issued June 6, 2007) The Royal Air Force will have total operational control of 14 Airbus A330-200 tanker aircraft, which will be owned and supported by AirTanker Ltd. (AirTanker artist’s impression) Defence Minister Lord Drayson has announced today, 6 June 2007, that the Government has approved a PFI solution as the most cost-effective way of replacing the RAF's fleet of VC10 and TriStar aircraft. The Future Strategic Tanker Aircraft (FSTA) PFI deal, as it is known, has been made with AirTanker Ltd., Lord Drayson said: "FSTA will provide the RAF with a modern air-to-air refuelling and strategic air transport capability which is crucial in this era of expeditionary operations. It will replace the RAF's fleet of VC10 and TriStar aircraft. A PFI solution is the best way to provide our Armed Forces with significantly improved capability. "The Ministry of Defence and AirTanker Ltd will now work together to secure financial and contractual close on a PFI deal as quickly as possible." Air Chief Marshal Sir Glenn Torpy, Chief of the Air Staff, added: "This announcement represents an enormous step forward in this vital programme for the RAF and UK Defence. Air-to-air refuelling and strategic airlift are fundamental to the UK's expeditionary capability and FSTA is a crucial part of that. "Although our current fleets of VC10 and TriStar aircraft are doing a superb job, both fleets are coming towards the end of their useful lives. I am, therefore, delighted that this key milestone has been achieved, and I look forward to getting the new aircraft and facilities into service as soon as possible." (ends) (EDITOR’S NOTE: The FSTA program has been under negotiation between MoD and the AirTanker consortium since 2004. Yesterday’s decision means that AirTanker will now be able to raise initial funding of £2 billion from commercial banks. A final contract, covering 27 years and costing about £13 billion, could be signed by year-end, leading to initial deliveries of the first operational tankers in 2011. Under the PFI deal, AirTanker will own the aircraft and provide them to the RAF as needed. Spare aircraft may be leased to commercial airlines, but details remain to be resolved as the aircraft use some sensitive US technology.) Transportation and Air-To-Air Refuelling Fleet for the RAF: Airtanker Approaching the City for Funding (Source: AirTanker Ltd.; issued June 6, 2007) In a Statement to the House of Lords today, MOD Defence Equipment and Support Minister Lord Drayson announced that the Government had approved a Private Finance Initiative (PFI) solution as the most cost-effective means of replacing the RAF’s fleet of VC-10 and Tristar aircraft. AirTanker and the MOD are therefore now working together towards financial and contractual close of the Future Strategic Tanker Aircraft (FSTA) PFI programme. AirTanker has today begun work on the Financing Competition to raise the requisite c. £2Bn capital requirement. The first stage is to alert the banking community to the main elements of the programme. Commenting on Lord Drayson’s Statement, AirTanker CEO Phill Blundell said: “This is a huge step forward for a vital project. We at AirTanker feel certain that the City will recognise the strength of the FSTA project. We are confident that the competition between potential lenders to win the business will secure the best deal for the armed forces, the taxpayer and AirTanker’s shareholders. We are working very closely with our financial advisors at Deutsche Bank to secure that outcome. We’re delighted at the MOD’s resolute support for AirTanker. We very much look forward to working with them in delivering the new service. We’re especially proud that the programme will be supporting literally thousands of jobs and that the RAF will be flying the aircraft with the greatest proportion of British content of any modern new aeroplane – around 7,500 jobs will be directly or indirectly dependent on the FSTA project and our fleet will be 50% British built.” BACKGROUND NOTES: 1 The FSTA project is designed to modernise the RAF’s vital air transport and air-to-air refuelling capability by replacing its existing fleet of VC-10 and TriStar aircraft, which have been in service for many decades. FSTA will be provided through a 27 year PFI contract, the world’s largest PFI arrangement. 2 AirTanker was selected as Preferred Bidder to operate the service in 2005. It is a UK company dedicated exclusively to providing the FSTA service to the UK Ministry of Defence. AirTanker’s shareholders are Cobham (131/3%), EADS (40%), Rolls-Royce (20%), Thales UK (131/3%) and VT Group (131/3%). Together, they will produce the equipment and support it through life. 3 AirTanker’s brand-new A330-200 aircraft and dedicated service delivery operation will provide the RAF with state-of-the-art capability in air transport and air-to-air refuelling. The AirTanker service will hugely enhance the reliability, and thus availability, of the aircraft at the RAF’s disposal. And the A330s will be significantly more capable than the aircraft they replace. In the tanker role, the A330-200 provides twice as much fuel to receiver aircraft as the VC-10. And, without any reconfiguration, in air transportation mode the A330 can fly around 300 troops and 8 tonnes of their equipment some 4700 miles in a modern, comfortable, fully equipped passenger cabin. 4 The 14 aircraft fleet will be owned and supported by AirTanker. The RAF will have complete operational control, and will fly the military missions. AirTanker will be paid according to the extent of the RAF’s use of the service. 5 AirTanker will be based at a new, purpose-built facility at RAF Brize Norton and will provide an integrated all-inclusive service which supports all operational scenarios; this will include full maintenance, flight and fleet management, ground services and state-of-the-art training for RAF FSTA personnel. The first aircraft will enter service during 2011, and will be available for both air-to-air refuelling and air transport tasks. The balance of the fleet will become available to the RAF over the following five years. 6 The funding raised by the Financing Competition will be used to fund the establishment of the business, to procure the A330-200 tanker transport aircraft fleet and to build the new facilities from which AirTanker will provide the FSTA service. 7 AirTanker and Deutsche Bank, its financial advisors, will be working hard over the coming weeks to select the lenders who will finance the project. The expectation is that we will begin negotiations with a number of potential lenders throughout the competition until the final selection is made. The goal will be to ensure that the final terms agreed with the chosen lenders transfer the risk away from the taxpayer while guaranteeing full value for money for the MOD. 8 FSTA will directly sustain around 3000 jobs in the UK, and a further 4500 indirectly. The MoD’s decision to choose AirTanker for FSTA has also had implications further afield. Both Australia and the UAE have subsequently selected the A330 tanker; this export success creates additional industrial benefit for the UK. The aircraft is also one of two being considered by the US Defence Department in a competition to determine who will provide the next generation of America’s air-to-air refuelling needs.
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H4 Sonar Buoy Employment
Since you're likely occupied with all that celebrating, I'll post what Peter Grining had to say...
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Memories of 5 June 1967
From BBC News Egyptian pilot: We felt humiliated Israel wiped out much of the Egyptian Air Force on the morning of June 5, 1967, the first day of the war. Egyptian pilot Mustafa Hafez was stationed at one of the 11 Egyptian air bases that were targeted. He told military historian and BBC website reader, David Nicolle, what happened that day. "In the build-up to war, I was sent to a squadron based at Kabrit, flying MiG-17Fs and MiG-17PF night fighters. We didn't really think that there would be a war, and if there was one, I was confident that Egypt would win. I was then a Flight Lieutenant and I was 26. Our confidence was not based on anything specific, but our morale was high. On the first day of the war, 5 June, at about 8.20am I was in the mess, since I was due to fly later that day. No particular aircraft had been allocated to me. This was normal in our air force; we flew what was available. Suddenly I heard explosions and went outside the mess; I asked people what was going on. That was when I saw an Israeli aircraft attacking, very low from south to north, coming in towards the runway. It was a Super Mystere. My first instinct was to run towards a ditch, but when I got there I thought, what am I doing here like an idiot? So I ran to the squadron bus so I could get to the squadron headquarters. I didn't have any plans, only to try to defend the airfield. I hadn't even cleared my take off with the control tower, I just took off There I found the Regimental CO who was heading for his car; so I got in too. The CO drove to the nearest available aircraft, and I helped strap him in, though we weren't absolutely sure the aircraft was ready to go. I think he took off on a sub runway as the main runway had already been hit. Then I tried to find another aircraft. They were all either damaged, or being serviced, or weren't ready to go. Then I went to a hangar. By this time the mechanics were starting to come back after having run away as the first bombs fell. That was when I took off in an available MiG-17F. I didn't even check if it was armed, but only asked if had been fuelled. I didn't have any plans, only to try to defend the airfield. Once I was up in the air I could see the smoke from other airfields which had been attacked. I hadn't even cleared my take off with the control tower, I just took off. Nor did I have any idea what the rest of the squadron were doing. Then I saw something flying very low. It was a n Israeli Mirage going west to east, so I half rolled in behind it. It was probably doing a reconnaissance as it was on its own and was not attacking targets on the ground. As I followed it I tried to cock my guns three times, but my plane was too slow to keep up and after a while the Mirage just flew off. Lack of training Of course I was angry and frustrated because I was unable to shoot down that Mirage. There was a switch in the cockpit that changed the armament from rockets to guns, but I had not been trained for that particular modification. And I wasn't the only pilot to make the same mistake. Then I landed safely. Very soon afterwards I took off again in a different aircraft. There had been no time for me to report or to be debriefed. I merely changed aircraft. As I started the engine the airfield came under attack again, for perhaps the second or third time. I was still inside the hangar, in the cockpit, when I heard the attack. I cleared the hangar doors at full throttle and afterburner. The aircraft was swerving and rocking from side to side; I was afraid the wingtips would hit the ground. I took off without a pause... the Israelis were about 100m ahead of me. I counted one, two, three, four, so I pulled up and tried to follow the last one. A MiG-17PF night-fighter plane The MiG-17PF Mustafa flew on 5 June, damaged in combat All five of us started circling, then one came at me head-on and opened fire. This made me so angry that I swore out loud. The Israeli turned to the right. I turned first to the left and then to the right to try and follow him. A head-on attack is very difficult. That was when I was hit in the right wing. We were all flying at 200-300m. My right aileron was damaged and I continued turning right, unable to straighten out, so I gained height. The Israeli couldn't keep with me as a MiG-17 is better in a climb. My aircraft juddered several times and almost went into a spin. I thought it odd that it tried to spin under those conditions. While three of the Israeli aircraft attacked our airfield, the fourth one followed me. After the three had strafed the field, the fourth one did the same, then they all flew home. Meanwhile I was still turning to the right, unable to straighten up. As I lined up on a runway I used the aileron trim to straighten out. This wasn't standard procedure. I don't know if I invented it or maybe it just came by instinct, but it worked. I had no communication with the ground, but I landed OK. Humiliated It was about twelve o'clock when I finally landed. There was no further activity after that... we were mainly concerned to disperse and save whatever aircraft we could. The air force felt very angry and humiliated by this war. Once, during the war, two of my fellow officers had to stop me banging my head repeatedly against a pair of concrete pillars at our air base. Another time, still during the war, I and some others were sent to stay in a hotel in Cairo, but the waiter in the hotel was too sympathetic and even placed his hand on my shoulder to comfort me. This was so embarrassing, we asked to be taken back to the base." This interview was conducted in Cairo in 1999. Mustafa Hafez died two years later.
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Gator gets some against pirates
From Navy Times Gator gets some against Somali pirates By Andrew Scutro - Staff writer Posted : Tuesday Jun 5, 2007 17:25:15 EDT The dock landing ship Carter Hall shot flares, fired warning bursts and unleashed a volley that set fire to three skiffs towed behind a hijacked Danish cargo ship off Somalia on Tuesday, but it could not prevent the freighter from slipping out of international waters and towards a known pirate camp, the Navy said. The Danica White, a Danish-flagged merchant vessel with a crew of five, was hijacked by pirates early Saturday in view of a French warship that could not cross into Somali territorial waters to offer help. The Danica White never radioed for assistance, but the Carter Hall called to ask if it needed help, said Lt. John Gay, a spokesman with Navy Forces Central Command in Bahrain. “They made several calls and tried to hail the ship,” he said. “They responded they were under control of pirates.” The hijacked ship then tried to get the Carter Hall to change course so it could proceed to Somali waters unobstructed, which was when American sailors spotted at least one armed man on the freighter’s bridge wing, Gay said. That’s when the amphib’s guns opened fire. “The USS Carter Hall fired flares and several shots across the bow as well as several disabling shots at the three skiffs in tow,” he said. “They shot at the skiffs and they caught on fire.” Sailors used the ship’s .50-caliber machine guns, 7.62 mm miniguns and 25 mm Bushmaster cannons in the encounter, Gay said. “As long as they’re in international waters, they can engage,” he said. But the hijacked Danica White made it into Somali waters and the Carter Hall had to back off and watch. “We’re observing them at this point,” Gay said. “It’s ongoing.” The Carter Hall, a ship designed to haul Marines and their gear, left its homeport of Naval Amphibious Base Little Creek, Va., on April 10 without a Marine contingent on what was described as catch-all “maritime security operations” in the Middle East. Gay said the Carter Hall is in the waters off eastern Africa specifically for “anti-piracy search operations.” The waters off the vast coastline of lawless Somalia has proved a hazardous passage in recent years, with several pirate attacks on commercial shipping as well as cruise ships. Combined Task Force 150, a maritime force of warships from several allied nations, patrols the Gulf of Aden, Gulf of Oman, the Red Sea, the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean against pirates and other transnational threats. Carter Hall is currently assigned to CTF-150. On Friday, a U.S. Navy destroyer is reported to have bombarded a terrorist position in Somalia, although officials would not provide any details.
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H4 Sonar Buoy Employment
I going to assume you actually mean an MH-60R. And yes, typically, you start the search with a pattern of passive sonobuoys (like an SSQ-53D/F DIFAR). The pattern is typically a grid of some sort. I do vaguely recall a discussion one time about what these grid patterns might typically look like, but in any event, you're trying to maximize the area covered given the range of your sonobuoys. I believe the SSQ-53 has a passive range of 0.9 nm. So certainly no more than 1 nm apart, and probably a lot less. And while passive sonobuoys are typically the initial tool, and ASW aircraft and helicopters usually carry more of these than the active kind, keep in mind that they are probably going to be of limited utility against a small diesel sub operating in shallow waters. A modern diesel-electric submarine moving slowly (2-3 kt) is probably undetectable by passive means beyond 1,000 yards. This will obviously influence the size and shape of your search pattern and your use of passive sonobuoys. (The SSQ-77C VLAD might be a better performer overall but I can't see it being terribly better in shallow water; I could be wrong). If and when your contact is detected by passive means, your helo might then drop a line of active sonobuoys (eg. SSQ-62D/E DICASS) to develop the contact, and to try to determine course and speed while working on a positive ID. I believe H4.1 assigns an active range of 1.7 nm to the SSQ-62. And again, while active sonobuoys might be the way to flush out a quiet diesel, you typically don't have many of them and their performance might be attenuated by local conditions (shallow water, rocky bottoms, wrecks, etc). Hmm, good question. Offhand, I would say so. I don't have my copy of the rules in front of me, but I don't recall any of them having a depth capability greater than 1,000 ft (at least as far as public sources go). The SSQ-53 series, for example, has three depth options (90, 400 and 1,000 ft) and 5 endurance options (0.5, 1, 2, 4 and 8 hours). Hope this helps.
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Midway: The Story that Never Ends
From Marine Corps Times Vets mark 65th anniversary of Battle of Midway By Audrey McAvoy - The Associated Press Posted : Tuesday Jun 5, 2007 8:04:47 EDT MIDWAY ATOLL — Holding their hands over their hearts, six elderly Battle of Midway veterans on Monday stood gingerly as a Navy band played the “Star-Spangled Banner” in honor of those who served with them in the fight that turned the tide of World War II 65 years ago. Some 1,800 people ventured to the remote atoll 1,300 miles northwest of Honolulu to remember those who perished and those who survived, and to mark the day that put Japan on the defensive for the first time the start of the war at Pearl Harbor six months earlier. “We salute the fallen warriors of the Battle of Midway. We remember their great victory and tremendous sacrifice,” said Adm. Robert F. Willard, the U.S. Pacific Fleet commander. “We honor them with our eternal vigilance and combat readiness.” William Tunstall, 87, an aviation machinist mate 2nd class on the aircraft carrier Hornet on June 4, 1942, said he felt lonesome as he sat remembering those who died. Tunstall recalled helping the pilot and gunner of the torpedo plane he maintained climb aboard for their mission to bomb Japanese carriers that were approaching Midway. But neither the pilot, Bill Abercrombie, nor the gunner, Bernie Phelps, ever returned to the Hornet. Of the 30 men in Torpedo Squadron 8 who took off June 4, only one survived. “From the time they left the carrier to today, I have no way of knowing what happened to them,” said Tunstall, of Portland, Ore. “I lost a lot of good friends.” Hawaii Gov. Linda Lingle thanked the veterans because, she said, her state likely would have been the next place invaded had Japan succeeded. The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, which now runs the atoll as a nature reserve, presented a wreath in honor the Midway veterans. A Navy rifle squad fired their weapons in salute and a trumpeter played “Taps” as several of Midway’s signature bird, the Laysan albatross, or gooney, flew overhead. Most of those who attended the ceremony arrived on a cruise ship from Los Angeles chartered for the occasion. Most of those on board were World War II veterans, military history buffs and relatives of those who died at Midway. Others arrived on a chartered plane from Honolulu. The U.S. entered the battle the underdog. It was weakened by the attack on Pearl Harbor, which destroyed most of its battleships. The Americans took eight cruisers to the battle versus 23 for Japan. Japan’s pilots were battle-hardened from campaigns in China and elsewhere in the Pacific. The U.S. pilots were still green — for example 17 of the 21 Marine pilots in the battle were straight out of flight school. But Navy intelligence got word of the attack weeks in advance by deciphering coded Japanese radio communications. In late May, the decoders intercepted messages outlining the day and time of the planned attack and the route Japan’s ships would travel to Midway. The U.S. Pacific Fleet’s commander, Adm. Chester Nimitz, had his ships ambush the Japanese fleet before it could carry out its plan. U.S. dive bombers and torpedoes sank all four aircraft carriers, mostly within the first 24 hours of battle. The U.S. achieved such a decisive victory the Americans were able to go on the offensive in the Pacific for much of the rest of the war against Japan. “After that, they didn’t have enough aircraft or pilots to effectively continue the war effort,” said Douglas Smith, a professor of strategy and policy at the Naval War College in Newport, R.I., of Japan. “After that they were not in a position to recover.” Both sides suffered large losses. The U.S. saw 307 men perish and one aircraft carrier sink. It lost 145 planes. Japan’s casualties were even higher, with 4,800 men dying. All four of the aircraft carriers Tokyo sent to Midway sank, along with a heavy cruiser and three destroyers. Japan also suffered the loss of 291 planes. “I’m very conscious of the significance if this victory at Midway. And I say that as someone who had not been born yet,” Interior Secretary Dirk Kempthorne, 55, said after the ceremony. “Today I live in freedom, my children live in freedom because of these young soldiers, sailors, Marines that gave their lives.” Japan’s navy wanted to take over the strategically important atoll to protect its homeland from U.S. air raids and to prevent the U.S. from interfering in its campaign to dominate the Asia-Pacific. Victory would have given Japan control over the patrol plane base there and possibly cleared the way for an invasion of the main Hawaiian Islands and attacks on the West Coast. Japanese Imperial Navy Adm. Isoroku Yamamoto’s plan called for sending aircraft carrier planes to bomb U.S. Marines and soldiers defending the island. Then, he would send in his amphibious invasion force to overrun the atoll. Today, Midway is part of a wildlife reserve run by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service. Hundreds of thousands of gooney birds nest there while endangered Hawaiian monk seals and threatened green sea turtles frequent the clear blue waters of its lagoon. The atoll, whose two main islets have a land area of only a few square miles, also sits on the northern end of the marine national monument President Bush created last year for the waters surrounding the Northwestern Hawaiian Islands. The cruise ship bringing veterans from Los Angeles and the chartered plane both had to obtain special permits to visit Midway because of the atoll’s location in the Papahanaumokuakea Marine National Monument.
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The F-22 ... Export Ready ?
From Flight International EXPORT READY? Once an endangered species, the US Air Force's Lockheed Martin F-22A Raptor stealth fighter is soaring on the success of its first operational deployments. A three-year contract for 60 aircraft is about to be signed, and the USAF is gearing up to seek funds to continue buying 20 Raptors a year for the foreseeable future. Now the USA must decide if it is ready to release the Raptor - winner of this year's Collier Trophy - for export. "The F-22 is healthier than at any other time. The plane is performing well and the programme is stable," says US defence analyst Loren Thompson. "There is some disagreement within the air force on whether it should be exported. It may have to await a change in administration." A Japanese team evaluating contenders for its forthcoming F-X fighter competition has been denied access to the F-22 because US legislation bars its export. But Japan's defence minister last month asked his US counterpart for data on the Raptor, raising the issue from the military to the political level, says Thompson. The interest of Japan and others has been piqued by the F-22's overwhelming performance in initial operations, including its just-concluded first overseas deployment to Kadena in Japan. "The USAF has validated its decision to declare initial operational capability," says Larry Lawson, F-22 programme general manager. When the US Air Force declared the F-22 operational in December 2005, sceptics doubted the Raptor was ready for combat. Just months before, Pentagon testers had determined the aircraft was operationally effective in the air-to-air role, but not operationally suitable because of reliability and maintainability shortfalls. Follow-on testing found the F-22 to be operationally effective on air-to-ground missions against fixed targets, but the fighter has yet to be graded operationally suitable. This has not prevented the Raptor achieving impressive results in its first deployments. Exercise Northern Edge in Alaska in June last year was the F-22's first deployment outside the continental USA and was followed by the Raptor's first Red Flag in February and the overseas deployment to Kadena. Information on the F-22's performance in Japan is still scarce, but data from Northern Edge and Red Flag show the aircraft to be both lethal and usable. "Northern Edge was not an Air Force-only test of the F-22. It was a no-kidding joint exercise," says Lawson. "The scenarios were what the F-22 would do in a real fight: escorting B-2s in, protecting the skies, and operating with and against other fighters." In contrast, Red Flag was set up to tax the F-22, he says. "It was focused on putting it at a disadvantage and trying a lot of different tactics." In Alaska, the F-22 achieved an unprecedented 144:0 kill ratio in the first week of Northern Edge. "In the first week of the fight, the preponderance of engagements were beyond visual range. In the second week they got into the merge and took a couple of shots," says Lawson, pointing out that the pilots averaged less than 100h on the aircraft. The final tally was 80:1. Northern Edge included an air-to-air mission involving a "blue" team of 24 F-15Cs, eight F-22s and two F-15Es against 40 F-16s and F/A-18s that were allowed to regenerate to produce a total "red" air force of 103 aircraft. The USAF says the blue team was able to achieve an 83:1 kill ratio, losing one F-15. Over the two-week exercise, the F-22 accounted for 30% of the blue force and 49% of kills. Specific kill ratios were not released for Red Flag, the US Air Force says, because each of the two "wars" staged every day involved different threats and objectives. "In general, compared to the last several Red Flag exercises that did not include F-22s in the blue air force mix, the overall blue air package was more than twice as effective," says the USAF. Red Flag marked the first time the F-22 was flown with coalition forces: Royal Air Force Tornado GR4s and Royal Australian Air Force F-111s. There was one simulated F-22 kill, in what Lawson describes as "peculiar" circumstances. A red fighter regenerated unbeknown to the blue force and the F-22 pilot, unaware the aggressor had re-entered the fight, did not attack the aircraft and instead took a shot. To simulate a larger red force, "killed" aggressor aircraft fly back to a line where they regenerate and re-enter the fight. The aggressor pilots found fighting the F-22 frustrating, says Lawson: "They were not getting off the regeneration point." Notwithstanding these early demonstrations of its "see first, shoot first" lethality, Raptor tactics are still in their infancy. One discovery during Northern Edge, Lawson says, was the pilot's ability to use the F-22's "incredible situational awareness" to act as a forward air controller (FAC), co-ordinating other aircraft. The four aircraft in an F-22 formation are connected by an intraflight datalink, allowing each pilot to see a picture of the battle generated by all four sets of radar and sensors. After expending its weapons, Lawson says, the F-22 was able to stay in the fight and act in a co-ordinating role using this four-ship "God's eye view". He adds: "We need to train pilots to act in the role, and we need to learn how to do it better." Because the stealthy F-22 cannot communicate via datalink beyond the four-ship formation, the FAC role has to be performed by voice, but a wideband datalink connecting the F-22 to other platforms is planned for a future upgrade. Both Northern Edge and Red Flag exercised the Raptor's air-to-ground, as well as air-to-air capabilities. Introduced during development, the ability to carry two 450kg (1,000lb) JDAM GPS-guided bombs shifted the F-22 from a focus on pure air superiority, and future upgrades will expand its air-to-ground capability. F-22s has dropped 50-60 JDAMs in Combat Hammer exercises at Hill AFB in Utah with 100% success, says Lawson. A further 26 were dropped during Northern Edge, all direct hits according to the USAF. "They are happy with the air-to-ground capability they have," he says. "The pilots are mostly F-15C, not E, drivers and the ability to do the air-to-ground mission effectively is a confidence builder." Despite concerns over the F-22's operational suitability, results from the initial deployments are positive. Twelve Raptors from the 27th Fighter Squadron flew 102 of 105 planned sorties during Northern Edge, while 14 aircraft from the 94th FS flew all 134 sorties planned for Red Flag. According to USAF data for Northern Edge, three key measures - the mission abort rate, the time aircraft were not available because of maintenance, and the percentage of aircraft fixed within an 8h period - were all better than standard. The mission capable rate of 71.9% missed the target of 74%, but was the highest yet achieved by the F-22. "We are exceeding expectations for reliability growth," says Lawson. "For this level of maturity the mean time between maintenance number is impressive and the mission capable rate is very good." At the time of initial operational testing in late 2004, the aircraft had logged 7,000h when the second phase of follow-on testing began last month, the total had risen to 27,000h. "This year we will add 25,000h," he says. "We are not at the 100,000h maturity numbers yet, but are well ahead of plan." Follow-on testing is evaluating supersonic JDAM release and defensive avionics improvements. The next upgrade, Increment 3.1, is in development for deployment in 2010 and includes the 115kg Small Diameter Bomb and air-to-ground synthetic-aperture radar and electronic attack modes for the Northrop Grumman APG-77(V)1 active electronically scanned array radar. Now in definition, Increment 3.2 will expand SDB capability to supersonic release and add new air-to-ground modes and the TTNT wideband IP-based datalink, allowing the F-22 to share the sensor data gathered as it performs its missions. Wider knowledge of the F-22's capabilities is stimulating export interest, but political and technical hurdles remain. Instead the USA has tried to steer attention towards the Lockheed Martin F-35, which shares many of the same stealth, sensor and software technologies. "The problem is there is no provision in the F-22 for technology security," says Thompson. "The F-35 was designed from its inception to protect sensitive technology." Thompson says Japan's particular interest is the F-22's capability against cruise missiles, with its supercruise performance and powerful radar allowing the fighter to intercept the weapons at long range. He expects a decision will be taken to release enough information to enable Japan to decide whether it wants the Raptor. "Northern Edge was not an Air Force-only test of the F-22. It was a no-kidding joint exercise" LARRY LAWSON, F-22 PROGRAMME GENERAL MANAGER
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A new Cold War age ?
From Defence Talk Is The World In For A New Cold Age RIA Novosti | Jun 4, 2007 Moscow: Today's strategic balance is an expression of the quantitative and qualitative alignment of forces with due account of the factors determining the strategic situation. Its parameters form a sophisticated dynamic system; nuclear, primarily strategic weapons are one of its elements. But the general condition of this system largely depends on its other elements. Thus, there is an inseparable connection between offensive and defensive arms. Both the Soviet Union and the United States acknowledged it when signing the ABM Treaty. Indicatively, this treaty and the first agreement on the limitation of strategic offensive arms (SALT-1) were signed simultaneously (in 1972). The gist of the problem is as follows: centuries-long escalation of a sword-and-shield race (offensive and defensive weapons) has always been won by the sword, but reached a fatal point with the invention of nuclear arms. A shield became useless even if it could parry 99% of all nuclear strikes. One percent would be enough to paralyze civilization. At the same time, a scientific and technical analysis of the problem shows that offensive weapons will continue leaving defensive arms far behind. No shield will parry even 90% of attacking missiles. Many factors make it impossible to consider the U.S.-declared global ABM system as an effective protection against a massive first strike. But its deployment will create an illusion that it is possible to repel a weakened retaliatory strike. The illusory advantage of the first strike is one of the main dangers inherent in a global ABM system. Any crisis will increase the impetus for a pre-emptive strike and simultaneous measures to neutralize enemy anti-missile defenses. American officials are adamantly denying the fact that their ABM system will threaten Russian security. This is what Condoleezza Rice said on this subject: "Let's be real about this," she said. "The idea that somehow 10 interceptors and a few radars in Eastern Europe are going to threaten the Soviet strategic return is purely ludicrous and everybody knows it." Indicatively, she used the Cold War term "Soviet." This is all true, but not in case of retaliation, when it will be much easier to intercept the few surviving missiles. Moreover, in perspective the Americans are going to equip their missile interceptors in Poland with hit-to-kill kinetic cassette warheads - 30 to 40 each. They will be much more powerful than 10 simple interceptors. The main goal of the United States is to create basic elements of the ABM infrastructure - it won't be difficult to build them up in the future. The planned location of the American radar in the Czech Republic is very convenient - it will allow the United States to detect all Russian ICBMs within 60-75 seconds after launch and will immediately produce a mathematical model close to the missiles' flight paths, thereby facilitating their interception. Washington's withdrawal from the ABM Treaty and particularly its intention to deploy ABM elements in Europe have been subjecting Russian-American partnership to the most serious test in the last few years. The Russian government's initial response was very reserved. It merely expressed "regret." This is quite natural considering that in the next 10 to 15 years this will be a political rather than a military problem for Russia. Today's technologies cannot produce a reliable ABM system. It will be even less effective against MIRVed ICBMs accompanied by multiple decoys in a well-orchestrated counteraction. Nonetheless, Moscow made a decision to extend the service life of RS-20 Satans and RS-18 (UR-100N UTTKh) missiles with multiple warheads. If they remain in use, it makes no sense to speed up the re-equipment of single-warhead Topol-Ms with their three-warhead versions. Be that as it may, on May 29 Moscow announced a successful test of a new MIRVed RS-24 ICBM. By the time the interceptor systems become combat-ready - in 2013, the Russian ICBMs would be capable of overcoming the American ABM system. But this is bound to create an issue of a response to offset a potential military imbalance. Prominent military and political leaders have made a number of statements about potential response measures. Generally, they are described as asymmetrical and are capable of maintaining strategic stability. In practical terms they boil down to modernizing strategic offensive arms and enhancing their ability to overcome any future ABM system in order to inflict unacceptable damage on the aggressor in a massive retaliatory strike. It is especially important to guarantee immunity of ICBMs at the boost stage when they are the most vulnerable. One of the possible options is to reduce this stage and make a missile maneuverable. Nuclear warheads should be also able to maneuver at the final stage of their flight. The first maneuverable warheads were tested in February 2005 at the Topol-M ICBMs. Judging by all, its warhead had several maneuvering slides and one ramjet. A warhead that slowed down during re-entry into the atmosphere is again propelled by this ramjet to supersonic speeds, and maneuvering slides send it into a zigzag flight with a completely unpredictable path. Apparently, Russia tested not simply a ballistic missile warhead but an independent craft that an ICBM can carry to enemy targets. Chief of the Russian General Staff Yury Baluyevsky said that missiles with maneuvering warheads would go on combat duty in 2010. Finally, the most often mentioned asymmetrical response to American ABM deployment is Russia's unilateral withdrawal from the treaty on medium and shorter-range missiles. This option is unviable both militarily and economically. It will require tremendous military expenditures on large-scale R and D, re-orientation of plants to the production of new types of weapons, construction of military bases and so on and so forth. Maybe, this is what Washington is after - to involve Russia in a new arms race and let it drop from exhaustion like the Soviet Union did in a desperate bid to catch up with the United States in strategic nuclear armaments. Contrary to the assurances of our overseas and European friends, they do not need a strong Russia, and many became concerned when it started rising from its knees. During talks with U.S. State Secretary Condoleezza Rice, Vladimir Putin emphasized once again that the deployment of American ABM elements in Eastern Europe would upset the current global balance of forces. The Russian president said that the American plans were not a problem only for Russian-U.S. relations but concerned the interests of all European countries, including non-NATO members, to a greater or lesser extent. Russia, Europe and the United States should jointly evaluate all potential strategic risks. Otherwise, we will be in for a new cold age. Yury Zaitsev is an expert of the Institute of Space Studies at the Russian Academy of Sciences. The opinions expressed in this article are the author's and do not necessarily represent those of RIA Novosti.
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A new Cold War age ?
From Defence Talk Russia ups the stakes in US missile shield row Agence France-Presse | Jun 4, 2007 Russia stepped up its Cold War rhetoric on Sunday with President Vladimir Putin warning it would point missiles at European targets if the US expands its nuclear defences near its borders. Together with Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, Putin upped the stakes in a war of words with Washington over US missile defence shield plans that have caused a sharp downward spiral in relations. "If the US nuclear potential extends across the European territory, we will get new targets in Europe," he said in an interview with newspapers from the Group of Eight industrialised nations. "It will then be up to our military experts to identify which targets will be aimed by ballistic missiles and which ones will be aimed by cruise missiles," he said. Lavrov, meanwhile, shrugged off American insistence that its plan to deploy missile defence hardware in Poland and the Czech Republic posed no threat, casting it as an attempt to encircle Russia militarily. The US plan "wonderfully fits the overall picture of American global anti-missile defence, which according to our analysis -- just look at the map -- is being deployed along Russia's perimeter, and also China's, incidentally." "If strategic components of the American arsenal appear in Europe near our borders, we are obliged to ... cut off potential threats from that deployment," Lavrov said in comments broadcast on the state-run television channel Vesti-24. After warning repeatedly that the US proposals would set off a new arms race, Moscow tested a new multi-warhead missile last week that Putin said was a direct response to US actions. The interview with Putin was due to be published on Monday but pre-released by Germany's Der Spiegel magazine. Putin and his peers are meeting for a three-day G8 summit which begins in Germany on Wednesday. "The anti-missile shield is part of a nuclear system that protects American territory. For the first time in history, elements of it are being moved to Europe," Putin said. "We want to re-balance the defence instruments with more efficient offensive equipment but we know that this could lead to a renewed arms race for which we are, however, not responsible." Tensions over the plan have contributed to sending relations between the two states to levels many analysts say haven't been seen since the Cold War. But in spite of the sharp words, Lavrov pointed to a previous avenue of Russian cooperation with the West on missile defence, saying: "It would be better to resume work within the framework of the NATO-Russia Council on creating theatre missile defence." Developing a missile defence system to protect deployed troops from missile attacks is one of several joint programmes by the NATO-Russia Council, and is scheduled to be completed by 2010. Washington says the central European shield, which foresees 10 missile interceptors in Poland and radar in the Czech Republic, would protect against potential threats from states such as Iran or North Korea. "The Cold War is over. I don't view Russia as an enemy and I've got a good relationship with Vladimir Putin and I intend to keep it that way," President George W. Bush told Bulgarian National Television (BNT) on Friday. But Putin, in the interview, rejected the claim that the missile defence was about Iran. "We are told that this defence system serves against Iranian missiles but no Iranian missile has such a capability. It therefore becomes evident that this concerns us, the Russians," Putin said.
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A new Cold War age ?
From Defence Talk Putin warns he will point missiles at Europe Reuters | Jun 4, 2007 MOSCOW (Reuters): President Vladimir Putin said Russia would go back to its Cold War stance of aiming its missiles at Europe if Washington went ahead with a plan to build a missile defence shield near Russia's borders. In an interview released late on Sunday, Putin acknowledged that Russia's response risked reviving an arms race in Europe but said Moscow would not be responsible for the consequences because Washington had started the escalation. Putin made the tough statement before what is likely to be a frosty Group of Eight summit in Germany on June 6 where, among other world leaders, he will come face to face with U.S. President George W. Bush. Russia has not specifically targeted its missiles at Europe since the end of the Cold War but, asked if it might return to that if the U.S. missile shield plan went ahead, Putin said: "Of course we are returning to those times. "It is clear that if a part of the U.S. nuclear capability turns up in Europe, and, in the opinion of our military specialists, will threaten us, then we are forced to take corresponding steps in response." "What will those steps be? Naturally, we will have to have new targets in Europe." Russia's combative response to the U.S. missile shield has prompted comparisons with the Cold War. Putin has directed angry rhetoric at the White House, last week calling U.S. policy "imperialist". Russia has test-launched a new ballistic missile in a move it tied to the U.S. missile plans, and suspended its compliance with a treaty limiting the deployment of conventional forces near Russia's western borders. POLITICAL GESTURE Putin's warning that missiles might once again be pointed at European targets carries a clear political message but has few practical implications. Even after the Cold War ended, Russia retained the capability to hit European and U.S. targets. Training ballistic missiles on a particular target is a fairly simple technical task that can be done in a matter of minutes. Putin's comments came in an interview Putin gave to selected media from G8 countries on Friday. The Kremlin released a transcript of the interview on its Internet site www.kremlin.ru at 2100 GMT on Sunday. Russia's response to the U.S. missile moves would be to develop "more effective offensive systems", Putin said in the interview. "We know that that risks restarting an arms race, for which we will not be responsible. It was not us who started altering the strategic balance." Putin added: "Today we warn: if a new missile defence system is deployed in Europe there will be a response," he added. "We are forced to ensure our security." Washington wants to locate elements of its planned shield -- including a radar station and interceptor missiles -- in Poland and the Czech Republic. It says the shield is not a threat to Russia but is designed to protect against possible missile attacks from what it calls "rogue states" such as Iran and North Korea. Putin said that was not credible. "There are no Iranian missiles with the necessary range," he said. "So it becomes obvious that this innovation is about us Russians." Putin reiterated that a military escalation was not Russia's choice. "We are not in favour of confrontation," he said. "We are in favour of a dialogue. "We want to be heard, we want our position to be understood," he said. "We do not rule out that our U.S. partners could review their decision (to build the missile shield)." "But if that does not happen, we lift from ourselves any responsibility for the steps we take in response because we are not the ones who are initiating the looming arms race in Europe."
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Navy awards contract for LHA 6
I tend to agree, Jeff. Undoubtedly the differences in military production between the era of the World Wars and today are huge, in terms of technology, economic situation and impetus. But the commercial shipbuilding industry, at least as I understand it, far outstrips the naval industry. I think there are probably more commercial ships being built now than ever before, and although the naval shipyards have attempted to implement some of the commercial practises, standards and designs, they still can't build ships as fast, and the products they are turning out have many serious problems (e.g. LPD-17 San Antonio).
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AAR: Korean Gulf [Spoiler Alert]
After Action Report: Korean Gulf [spoiler Alert] A scenario by Mark Gellis Mark Gellis, a long time scenario writer, has produced another benchmark for anyone interested in small sized but very effective and entertaining scenarios for Harpoon Classic. My Korean ship group comprised six commercial tankers and a pair of South Korean Navy warships – the Ulsan class frigate Chung Nam and the Okpo (KDX-1) destroyer Ulchimundok, and embarked with the latter, a pair of Super Lynx helicopters. The group was already assembled outside the port and airfield at Abu Dhabi and would have to transit the Strait of Hormuz and Gulf of Oman under Iranian threat. Fortunately, the government in Seoul had seen fit to send a contingent of ROK Air Force aircraft to watch over the precious convoy, and these proved invaluable. The Iranians wasted no time in carrying out their threat, launching several flights of rapidly ageing but still dangerous MiG-29 Fulcrums. These approached the orbiting Boeing 737 airborne early warning & control (AEW&C) from the Iranian airfield at Chah Bahar. KF-16C/D fighters intercepted the Fulcrums, and the Iranians made the fatal mistake of engaging first. AMRAAM shots in reply quickly brought down the Iranian MiGs. The KF-16s were easily able to deal with all oncomers during the following air battle, downing several more Fulcrums and several strike packages of F-5 Tigers and Su-24 Fencers as they attempted to penetrate across the Musandam Peninsula from the east. I made a classic mistake at this point, however, having been fixated on these attackers rising out of Chah Bahar and relying far too much on my orbiting E-737 to warn me of any other potential threat. The reminder of my failure in this respect came in the form of several Saccade anti-ship cruise missiles slamming into the commercial tanker Konda. She blew up and sank immediately, my efforts in energizing local warship radars and defensive systems coming too little too late. My P-3 Orion soon located the threat: a trio of Houdong fast attack craft approaching from the west of Kish Island. Although of little solace to the crew, owners and insurers of Konda, the frigate Chung Nam fired off five Harpoons at the three targets from near maximum range. Four of the missiles struck targets, obliterating all three Iranian missile boats. The P-3 Orion stayed airborne and in near proximity to the tanker group for the remainder of their transit, conducting sweeping low level passes in the intended pathway under the watchful eye of the escorting KF-16s. As the tankers approached the dreaded Strait of Hormuz, the P-3 again proved its worth. The magnetic anomaly detector (MAD) had picked up a subsurface object. A sonobuoy soon confirmed the threat, an Iranian Tareq (Kilo) diesel-electric submarine was lurking in the area. A Mk 46 NEARTIP lightweight torpedo was dropped, and (remarkably) homed in right away and struck the submarine. For the Noor, it was a fatal blow. With the loss of the missile craft, a submarine and numerous premier combat aircraft, the enemy’s most serious weapons were declawed, and the Persian foe did not again pose a danger to the Korean convoy. Although the P-3 continued to shadow the group, under combat air patrol (CAP) protection from the KF-16s. And, when the E-737 was unavailable, I made use of the brand new and very capable F-15K Slam Eagles, but these never saw any action. The convoy escaped to safe waters (and Minimum Victory) with approximately 14 hours remaining. Thanks to Mark for another enjoyable scenario that reminds us not to forget the basics.