HG S2 (Intel Bot)

Oh, he's only a 20-yr BM1. Didn't even graduate from High School. Snuck in to the Navy at 16 even.Really? Define "only."What more can I say but what is in his Medal of Honor citation? JAMES E. WILLIAMS BOATSWAIN'S MATE FIRST CLASS UNITED STATES NAVY U.S. Navy, River Section 531, My Tho, RVN Mekong River, Republic of Vietnam 31 October 1966 for service as set forth in the following Citation: For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty. BM1 Williams was serving as Boat Captain and Patrol Officer aboard River Patrol Boat (PBR) 105 accompanied by another patrol boat when the patrol was suddenly taken under fire by 2 enemy sampans. BM1 Williams immediately ordered the fire returned, killing the crew of 1 enemy boat and causing the other sampan to take refuge in a nearby river inlet. Pursuing the fleeing sampan, the U.S. patrol encountered a heavy volume of small-arms fire from enemy forces, at close range, occupying well-concealed positions along the river bank. Maneuvering through this fire, the patrol confronted a numerically superior enemy force aboard 2 enemy junks and 8 sampans augmented by heavy automatic weapons fire from ashore. In the savage battle that ensued, BM1 Williams, with utter disregard for his safety exposed himself to the withering hail of enemy fire to direct counter-fire and inspire the actions of his patrol. Recognizing the over whelming strength of the enemy force, BM1 Williams deployed his patrol to await the arrival of armed helicopters. In the course of his movement he discovered an even larger concentration of enemy boats. Not waiting for the arrival of the armed helicopters, he displayed great initiative and boldly led the patrol through the intense enemy fire and damaged or destroyed 50 enemy sampans and 7 junks. This phase of the action completed, and with the arrival of the armed helicopters, BM1 Williams directed the attack on the remaining enemy force. Now virtually dark, and although BM1 Williams was aware that his boats would become even better targets, he ordered the patrol boats' search lights turned on to better illuminate the area and moved the patrol perilously close to shore to press the attack. Despite a waning supply of ammunition the patrol successfully engaged the enemy ashore and completed the rout of the enemy force. Under the leadership of BM1 Williams, who demonstrated unusual professional skill and indomitable courage throughout the 3 hour battle, the patrol accounted for the destruction or loss of 65 enemy boats and inflicted numerous casualties on the enemy personnel. His extraordinary heroism and exemplary fighting spirit in the face of grave risks inspired the efforts of his men to defeat a larger enemy force, and are in keeping with the finest traditions of the U.S. Naval Service. Only a BM1. Only the most highly decorated Enlisted Sailor in our history - worth a good name.'Nuff said. Hat tip P. View the full article

... in the Navy, we have something kind-of like that when LT Murphy has the conn.Looks like all that CYA hiding of INSURV reports, "optimal manning" and "transformational" concepts about the skills ships company need to have vice workers ashore is working like gangbusters. Maybe that had something to do with it ... maybe not. Either way - just a good thing no Sailors were hurt. Crews assessed damage on a U.S. Navy assault ship and a refueling tanker that collided in the Pacific Ocean off California, after the steering apparently went out on one of the vessels, the military said. The Wednesday morning accident between the amphibious assault vessel USS Essex and the oiler USNS Yukon occurred about 120 miles off the coast of Southern California as the Essex was approaching the Yukon to be refueled, said Cmdr. Charlie Brown, a spokesman for the 3rd Fleet. ... Brown said the steering apparently stopped working on the 844-foot-long Essex, which was carrying 982 crew members on its way to San Diego for scheduled maintenance. It had spent the past 12 years based in Sasebo, Japan, as command ship for the Navy's Expeditionary Strike Group 7. The Essex was traveling with a new crew that came aboard for the trip to California. The ship recently underwent a crew swap with another amphibious assault ship, the Bonhomme Richard, as part of a standard procedure in the Navy to keep its ships operating. ... the 844-foot-long Essex, which was carrying 982 crew members on its way to San Diego for scheduled maintenance. It had spent the past 12 years based in Sasebo, Japan, as command ship for the Navy’s Expeditionary Strike Group 7. ... "They were probably so close there was no time to respond when the steering went out," said Allen, who served 30 years in the Coast Guard. Steering going out in the middle of UNREP?Neptune is not happy with someone. View the full article

First - I am not happy that Galrahn scooped me on this message ... but hey, no one's spies are perfect ... ahem ....... but, this is not a shock to the front porch. 2. SENIOR INSPECTOR COMMENTS: USS FREEDOM (LCS 1) IS EVALUATED AS A "NO-GO" AND IS NOT RECOMMENDED TO PROCEED WITH THE SCHEDULED SPECIAL TRIAL (ST). FREEDOM'S CREW AND CONTRACTORS WERE NOT PREPARED FOR THE INSPECTION. BOTH ENTITIES WERE UNFAMILIAR WITH THE CONDUCT OF INSURV MATERIAL CHECKS. EXECUTION OF THE SOE WAS VERY POOR . THERE WAS CONFUSION BETWEEN CONTRACTOR AND CREW RESPONSIBILITIES FOR THE PERFORMANCE OF EQUIPMENT CHECKS. THE INSPECTION EXPERIENCE LEVEL FOR THE MAJORITY OF THE CREW IS LOW ALTHOUGH THEY DID DEMONSTRATE A GOOD POSITIVE ATTITUDE. THE CREW AND CONTRACTORS NEED TO CONTINUE TO FAMILIARIZE THEMSELVES WITH THE SHIP'S EQUIPMENT, OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES, IMPROVE IN PRESENTATION/DEMONSTRATIONS AND AGGRESSIVELY MANAGE/COORDINATE SOE. THE SHIP WAS CLEAN. SEVERAL AREAS REQUIRE PRESERVATION. SAFETY PROGRAMS ABOARD THE SHIP ARE NON-EXISTENT. THE SHIP DID DEMONSTRATE THE ABILITY TO SELF-ASSESS. HOWEVER, THEY ARE NOT AGGRESSIVELY REPORTING AND PURSUING RESOLUTION OF THE DEFICIENCIES THEY HAVE IDENTIFIED. This isn't a "first in class" issue and I do not fault the CO, XO, CMDCM or the crew. These are excellent men and women - and good Sailors.Here is why most of the problems above exist - there isn't time. There is only a 24-hr day. Even when properly manned, a ship has a challenge getting the basics done.LCS is undermanned. As a result it will always have preservation problems, safety problems, poor procedures and execution, and not enough hours to resolve identified problems inside their lifelines - much less look for new ones.It is baked in the cake. They have been set up to fail by bad theory and happy talk. Oh, and 10-month deployments rotating crews? You'll wear that ship down even more.While we are on the topic of INSURV - if you don't follow DODBUZZ on twitter, you need to.You remember the hissy-fit I threw about the CYA classification of INSURV by the present CNO when he was doing ADM Roughead's bidding?LOLZ! INSURV classification trips up even Navy on LCS conference call -- speakers say they want reporters to see it, but PAO backs off that. — dodbuzz (@DoDBuzz) May 9, 2012 <script src="//platform.twitter.com/widgets.js" charset=iso-8859-1utf-8"></script> Murdoch said he expects INSURV acceptance report on LCS 3 by Friday & urged reporters to read it to see high quality of ship. But no dice — dodbuzz (@DoDBuzz) May 9, 2012 <script src="//platform.twitter.com/widgets.js" charset=iso-8859-1utf-8"></script> View the full article

New think tank papers on Asian security in China’s lengthening shadow: China and Iran [RAND], Defending the Philippines [CNAS, PDF]. The Washington Times looks at the size of the Pentagon’s civilian workforce which seems to move only in one direction. The latest CrossTalk features a series of articles on how to get the speed that comes with agile software development while retaining a healthy level of stability over the long run. (more…) View the full article

U.S. Army Gen. Martin E. Dempsey, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, receives a mountaintop brief from U.S. and Afghan special forces on Camp Morehead, Afghanistan, April 23, 2012. DOD photo by D. Myles Cullen View the full article

Mark Steyn is painfully hilarious as always in his take down of the Secret Service and the general culture of entitlement to taxpayer money that is killing us. Unlike the government of the United States, I can’t claim any hands-on experience with Colombian hookers. But I was impressed by the rates charged by Miss Dania Suarez, and even more impressed by the U.S. Secret Service’s response to them. Cartagena’s most famous “escort†costs $800. For purposes of comparison, you can book Eliot Spitzer’s “escort†for $300. Yet, on the cold grey fiscally conservative morning after the wild socially liberal night before, Dania’s Secret Service agent offered her a mere $28. Twenty-eight bucks! What a remarkably precise sum. Thirty dollars less a federal handling fee? Why isn’t this guy Obama’s treasury secretary or budget director ? Or, at the very least, the head honcho of the General Services Administration, whose previous director has sadly had to step down after the agency’s taxpayer-funded public-servants-gone-wild Bacchanal in Vegas.... What we know so far is this: All eleven Secret Service men and all ten U.S. military personnel staying at the Hotel Caribe are alleged to have had “escorts†in their rooms that night. All of them. The entire team. Twenty-one U.S. public servants. Twenty-one Colombian whores. Unless a couple of the senior guys splashed out for the two-girl special. “Some of them were saying they didn’t know they were prostitutes,†explained Congressman Peter King, chairman of the House Homeland Security Committee. “Some are saying they were women at the bar.†Amazing to hear government agents channeling Dudley Moore in Arthur : “You’re a hooker? I thought I was doing so well.†It turns out U.S. Secret Service agents are the only men who can walk into a Colombian nightclub and not spot the professionals. Are they really the guys you want protecting the president? There is more, much more, and it is all this spot on, deadly, side-splittingly brutal. View the full article

CENTCOM has asked for and will be getting some money for increased capabilities specific to Iran. In a “couple of cases,†Iran improved capabilities “faster than we anticipated,†he said. The Command requested the additional funds because “our growing reliance on our maritime forces requires an ability to project power against asymmetric threats, particularly in the confined and crowded sea lanes†of the Strait of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf, Major David Nevers, spokesman for the Central Command, said in an e-mailed statement. Funds were shifted from Pentagon biological and chemical weapons defensive programs and Navy and Air Force shipbuilding, satellite and aircraft programs deemed to have excess funds or experiencing delays. Congress approved a $28 million shift to provide six U-2 spy planes with upgraded satellite links that increase their capability to “provide real-time, high bandwidth video feeds to ships, ground forces and command and control centers,†according to the reprogramming documents. The article goes on to cover many, many of the reprogramming changes. Here are a few more. Congress also backed the shift of $10 million to increase funding for a joint Navy-National Reconnaissance Office program to equip the service’s new anti-radar missile -- the Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missile made by Alliant Techsystems Inc. (ATK) - - with a “Special Target Engagement†capability that includes a broadcast receiver... An additional $4.8 million was approved for integrating new sensors on a Navy underwater vehicle “for very shallow water- mine countermeasures missions,†according to the documents. The Central Command also won congressional approval to shift $3.7 million to developing a defense against drone attacks. The system will cover “vulnerable areas below typical air-defense radar coverage areas,†according to the documents... Congress also approved plans to accelerate installation on coastal patrol craft of the “MK 38 Mod 2†system, which includes the laser-tracker for precision aiming of machine guns. Lawmakers rejected the planned source of $4 million in funds so the Comptroller is looking to other sources, a document said. As described by BAE Systems Plc (BA/) and subcontractor Boeing Co. (BA), the tactical laser system “brings high precision accuracy against surface and air targets such as small boats and unmanned aerial systems. The system also provides the ability to deliver different levels of laser energy, depending on the target and mission objectives.†Interesting stuff. The Iranian Navy fights with a mix of low tech and high tech, and uses their low tech capabilities to hopefully disorient and distract US naval forces so that their high tech capabilities have a chance of success. The US Navy is trained and equipped to fight both, but US Navy warships are better optimized to fight the high tech threats than the low tech. It is not difficult to interpret what the CENTCOM folks are thinking with each request. The U-2 modifications are intended to give the best information for strike packages. The Anti-Radiation missiles are to knock out radar systems that would be used from Iranian truck mounted and other mobile missile systems against ships within range from the Iranian coast (or islands). The Gatling Guns and other point defense system modifications like laser pointers are intended to increase capabilities dealing with low flying drones or small boat swarm attacks. The swarm attacks are particularly challenging, because fighting them is much easier said than done. Iranian swarm tactics are designed to negate the LOS defensive weapon systems used on US Navy ships, which would allow the swarm to close to target rapidly at high speed - how high of speed depending upon sea state and other factors. From about 8 miles out, the Iranians use 107mm rockets to create LOS obstructions between their target and the swarm - essentially a wall of water - that makes it very difficult for precision targeting the obstructed small boats of the swarm - largely because speed and distance become difficult to track. Once within very close range - say less than a mile - many of the larger defensive weapons have difficulty hitting very fast boats on the water due to their close range, which is exactly what the small boat swarm wants - an old fashion gunfight. The laser targeting systems on US Navy guns should help US Navy sailors target more efficiently in that close range gunfight where boats could potentially be moving around the ship at speeds of up to 60 mph. Finding the swarms and preventing them from getting too close to US Navy warships is the desired course of action in any naval war against Iran, but it is much easier said than done. In many cases even today, US Navy ships may not even small, fast smugglers in the confined waters of the strait or other locations in the Gulf until they are already within that 8 mile zone. The small boats are stealthy and fast, and all kinds of various environmental or geographic conditions can make them very difficult to pick up on radar. Even during the recent high profile transit of the USS Carl Vinson into the Persian Gulf earlier this year, reporters noted that small boat smugglers were able to get remarkably close to the US Navy ships. It can be a tough problem, particularly if the warships are dealing with anti-ship missile attack from more high tech capabilities fielded by Iran at the same time. I don't know about you, but if I was the CO of a destroyer in the Persian Gulf when war breaks out, I'd want to have as many Marines on the ship as I could safely berth (including extra corpsman) with as many big guns as they can operate (and a few spares). When at sea my DDG would have the silhouette of a WWII destroyer with as many muzzles as possible sticking out of the ship. It might create more work for the safety officer, but based on all tactical writing I have seen related to Iranian low tech naval tactics, one can never have too many guns when fighting the Iranians. View the full article

Sea Shepherd appears to have executed another successful anti-whaling campaign in the Southern Ocean. "Japan's Fisheries Agency said the fleet was on its way home from the Antarctic 'on schedule', but admitted that at 267 the catch was way down on expectations. Whalers killed 266 minke whales and one fin whale, the agency said, well below the approximately 900 they had been aiming for when they left Japan in December." The Agency official goes on to blame bad weather and "sabotage acts by activists," as the reason for the lower than expected haul. At USNI's blog, LCDR Claude Berube, a Naval Academy professor and one of the subject matter experts on non-state maritime actors, has posted an interesting interview with former Navy Surface Warfare Officer and Sea Shepherd sailor, Jane Taylor. If you want to understand what motivates these activists to risk their lives for animals, the video is worth a watch. A few weeks ago, I was privileged to have an opportunity to talk a bit about Sea Shepherds and other maritime IW issues with Claude's Capstone class and brief another group of bright Midshipmen and faculty at the Forum on Emerging and Irregular Warfare Studies. One of the students there asked me something along the lines of how the SSCS could continue to be so operationally incompetent. As we've discussed here before, their tactics are controversial and direct actions like throwing rancid butter might seem largely ineffective when viewed through the lens of Whale Wars. But my response to this Mid was basically to say that it is quite possible to fail at the tactical level while still meeting a campaign's operational or strategic objectives. Sea Shepherds have demonstrated that truism time after time. Of course in warfare, the opposite situation is also possible. In places like Afghanistan, our ground forces often execute brilliantly, but the results don't materialize because of strategic factors that are beyond the control of even the highest level military officers working the problems. Regardless of what you think of their methods or motivation, SSCS provides the most transparent case study in non-state maritime actors today. As I told Claude's students, it is worthwhile to pursue an understanding of the way these NSMA's operate because many of them -- Al Qaeda, LeT, pirates, and narco-traffickers, to name a few -- have more nefarious motivations than saving the whales and pose direct risks to global security and the maritime economy. The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency. View the full article

"Finally caught up with Matt. It was like trying to find Santa on Christmas Eve." - Uncle Ben, good friend (and reader) of Blackfive, on St. Patrick's Day in Chicago 2004 I may try to live blog St. Patrick's Day with my Irish Smart Device (photo below - patent pending...). Of course, the quality of posts may go down to Jimbo standards by the late afternoon... View the full article

China is officially announcing that its 2012 budget is increasing by 11.2% to about $106B. It is broadly agreed that this significantly understates total military spending. After about 25 years of double-digit growth China is now clearly the second biggest defense spender behind the US, with a budget that more than doubled in the last 5 years alone. There is more to it than just new kit though: some of that money is spent on improving quality of life for sailors to ease recruitment and retention, as China is facing serious demographic constraints and deep socioeconomic shifts. Associated Press | Bloomberg. The US DoD Inspector General is reviewing the F-35’s quality assurance system, while the Air Force is looking at where to locate its training site. Meanwhile the UK is reportedly researching whether they should stick to F-35Cs or switch to F-35Bs. Deputy Secretary of State William Burns told Brazilians last week, about the LAS travails: (more…) View the full article

All you old Cold Warriors ... remember those innocent "tattletales" that always seemed to want to collect "Electronic Intelligence" on our HVU? What's a few torpedo tubes between friends? This was in dry dock in St. Petersburg in the middle of last decade. I am pretty sure this was just a test and development ship - at least that is what a quickie search about the hull number says. I tend to believe that - because I really don't see how you could hide that for long. Remember what part of the world they were found in more than not? You see the underside of every hull eventually. Still though .... Innocent? Sure they were! Hat tip RS and other dudes in email. View the full article

This yahoo feels entitled to spout his nonsense, and I feel just as entitled to respond: Star of TV’s Parenthood , Dax Shepard , compared the pro-U.S. military film that stars actual Navy SEALs, Act of Valor to Adolf Hitler’s Triumph of the Wil l . On his Twitter feed the one time Ashton Kutcher prank boy from Punk’d wrote: “Saw ‘Triumph of the Will’ tonight, oh wait, I mean ‘Act of Valor’ great action.†Apparently the reaction to Shepard’s obnoxious tweet, comparing this week’s #1 movie starring active duty Navy Seals to a Nazi propaganda movie was immediate, as he attempted to walk back his comments. Shepard lamely claimed he was: “not comparing our military to Nazis. Pointing out the exceedingly high level of propaganda in both.†Yeah, and Hollywood never puts out propaganda, do they dimbulb? Froggy made the prediction some time ago that this would be the reaction to the movie by the Hollywood set and critics. He was right on. (The critics hate it – 30%, the people love it – 86% and oh, by the way, it owned the box office this past week) Jackwagons like this goob are always ready to pitch their edgy comments because, you know, they’re cool. Or at least they think they are. They’ve been in a movie or something and are considered a “star†by others. Of course, they couldn’t hold a Navy SEAL’s jock or in anyway understand the reality the film actually brings to the screen vs. his career of stupid pranks he calls acting. He has no idea what is or isn’t “propaganda†in a film or he’d condemn half of what Hollywood produces. But because his reality (and mindset) is so far removed from that which those men and their families in “Act of Valor†live everyday he feels entitled to dismiss the film as comparable to Nazi propaganda? Well, this is the land of the free and the home of the brave and the sheepdogs welcome and defend the right to free speech. In fact, the very men he denigrated by his immature and thoughtless remark are out there guaranteeing it right now. That doesn’t change the fact that he’s a consummate dumbass and a D-list actor of marginal talent though, does it? ~McQ Twitter: @McQandO View the full article

Activists, in all their forms, are an interesting sub-species of non-state maritime actors. We’ve discussed the Sea Shepherds here extensively, who have the closest thing to a fleet of any of the non-state maritime actors. Greenpeace, the Sea Shepherds' older, but slightly more docile sister organization, has also engaged in aggressive tactics throughout its history. Greenpeace's most recent campaign is designed to stop Arctic drilling. The involvement of Lucy Lawless, actress-turned-boarding officer, demonstrates how these direct action organizations have embraced celebrity endorsers to promote their cause, which is no different than many other political or environmental NGOs. These deliberate acts are designed primarily to draw attention to a cause. In some cases, they are meant to invoke an intentional reaction, or better still, over-reaction, by corporate entities or maritime law enforcement agencies, coast guards, or navies. Here, a dozen or so Greenpeace small craft mix it up with a Deutsche Marine CB-90 and RHIBs at the 2007 G-8 Summit. Given their fleets and scope of activities at sea, Greenpeace and Sea Shepherds might best be characterized as non-state navies. At the other end of the maritime activists’ spectrum are less organized, ad-hoc demonstrators. Some of these are . Many years ago, I was caught in a such an event while on a ferry crossing Galveston Bay. A large group of shrimpers sortied their vessels to surround and block the Bolivar Ferry for several hours, in protest of new laws requiring turtle exclusion devices on their nets. At best, it was an inconvenience to those involved, but certainly not violent. Other protests at sea devolve into more lethal and chaotic events such as the May 2010 Gaza Flotillas. The ferry protest I experienced was a crude form of non-violent flash mob. As yet, we haven’t seen self-organizing violent or criminal flash mobs at sea like these on land or the more protracted Occupy movements. But it’s probably only a matter of time until we do. How would a navy or coast guard deal with such an event? The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency. Note, the author does not endorse or otherwise support any of the organizations discussed in this post. View the full article

The transnational police agency Interpol has done tremendous work making sure that criminals cannot simply escape justice by moving out of one country's jurisdiction. But if the following is true, they may have become just another group afraid to cross the Islamists. Hamza Kashgari, a 23-year-old columnist, stands accused of blasphemy in his homeland of Saudi Arabia for tweets he posted on Islam’s prophet Mohammed that many of his countrymen find insulting to Islam. In his postings on the occasion of Mohammed’s birthday last week, Kashgari imagined a skeptical discussion with the founder of Islam. Many Saudis are enraged, demanding that he be arrested and put to death, in accordance with Saudi sharia. As the New York Times reported , “more than 13,000 people [the number now tops 14,000] have joined a Facebook page titled ‘The Saudi People Demand the Execution of Hamza Kashgari.’â€.... The British Guardian is now reporting that Kashgari was caught after Interpol, the 190-country-member international police agency based in Lyon, France, issued an alert for him at the request of Saudi Arabia. If true, this violates the Article 3 neutrality clause of Interpol’s constitution, which states that it is “strictly forbidden†for the organization to undertake any intervention of a religious character. If this is allowed to become a precedent, the longtime goal of Saudi Arabia — and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation — of a universal law punishing “defamation of Islam†will essentially be realized. Just lovely eh? Might be time for another Draw Mohamed Day. View the full article

Navy Secretary Ray Mabus, former U.S. Rep. Gabrielle Giffords of Arizona and her husband, retired astronaut Mark Kelly, attend a ceremony at the Pentagon, Feb. 10, 2012. Mabus announced the naming of the U.S. Navy's newest next variant littoral combat ship, USS Gabrielle Giffords, at the ceremony. Giffords was critically wounded in 2011 by a gunman in Tucson, Ariz. DOD photo by U.S. Navy Petty Officer 1st Class Chad J. McNeeley --------------------------------------------------------------------- While I'm glad that Congresswoman Giffords is doing better than expected, I'm not sure why the Navy would name a ship after her. She seems like a great lady, but she's not connected to the Navy. A lunatic gunman shot her. Why not name a ship after one of the soldiers that were MURDERED at Fort Hood? And, as Jonn Lilyea points out, it's not like there isn't any Fallen Navy personnel to name the ship after... View the full article

The following speech was delivered by RADM Joseph F. Callo, USNR (Ret), to the Society of the War of 1812 in the State of New Jersey and Jamestowne Society at the Nassau Club of Princeton, New Jersey on 29 October 2011. It also appears in the Fall 2011/Winter 2012 issue of “Pull Together.” The bicentennial of the War of 1812 is approaching, and after 200 years it’s time to change how we think about that war. To support that proposal, I’m going to explore what I believe the narrative of that war has been and how we might change it to make it more accurate and more relevant to our own lives and times. http://www.navyhistory.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/NH-43575-KN-edited-300x157.jpgBattle of Lake Erie (Mural in U.S. Naval Academy, NH 43575-KN) In the past there have been heated—and mostly partisan—arguments about who won. Then in recent years, it became fashionable to claim that the war was a stalemate, with the further claim that it was simply a horribly stupid waste of life. Those two latter conclusions are easy to slide into if one simply concentrates on the war’s military actions. For example, of 25 noteworthy naval actions, the U.S. Navy won thirteen and the Royal Navy won twelve. And along the Canadian borders there were bloody battles won and lost but no major change in the border. Then on the one hand the U.S. Navy won the critically important fleet actions on Lake Erie and Lake Champlain and American privateers had a significant effect on Britain’s vital sea lines of communication. But on the other hand, the Royal Navy was able to apply a punishing blockade and a series of successful expeditionary warfare raids against America’s Atlantic coast. And so the discussions have rolled on. But while it’s true that there was no unconditional surrender by either side, and in a compilation of the results of individual actions there was no clear winner, there were indeed some very important, bottom line gains and losses for each side. And those gains and losses had long term, geopolitical implications for both the United States and Great Britain—and in fact for the world. But I’ll come back to that particular point towards the end of my remarks. One of the biggest problems with the current narrative of the War of 1812 is, I believe, that there has been a tendency to focus on the main events as if they were free standing, rather than parts of a stream of interconnected campaigns, battles, policies, and decisions. And the corollary of seeing the War of 1812 as a series of free-standing events is that tactical matters inevitably overshadow strategic matters. There is a very interesting new book out. Some of you may have read it already. The book’s title is 1812—The Navy’s War, written by George Daughan. Towards the end of the book there is, for me, a particularly enlightening passage. The passage quotes from a letter from the Duke of Wellington to the British prime minister at the time, Lord Liverpool. The prime minister had suggested that Wellington go to Canada and take over leadership of the land war along the Canada-U.S. border. At that point Wellington had a deserved reputation as a successful field commander in the Peninsula Campaign against Napoleons’ army. Wellington’s response focused on an important point. This is what he said: “That which appears to me to be wanting in America is not a general, or a general officer and troops, but a naval superiority on the Lakes….The question is, whether we can obtain this naval superiority….If we cannot, I shall do you but little good in America.”[i] Wellington understood the continuing strategic issues of the War of 1812, in this case the question of whether or not the British could take control of the communication and supply routes represented by the Great Lakes and Lake Champlain. Wellington wasn’t thinking tactically. He was confident that he could dominate in the field in most situations with his experienced troops. He was instead emphasizing the kind of strategic issue that gives context to individual actions and decisions. And the importance of context is nowhere more important than when trying to establish the true causes of the War of 1812. The American declaration of war in June 1812 is generally attributed to America’s need to assure “free trade and sailors’ rights.” In the book Sea Power—A Naval History edited by E.B. Potter and Admiral Chester Nimitz, the circumstances behind that battle cry are spelled out succinctly: “In the post-Trafalgar period the intensifying commerce warfare between Britain and France left the United States the only major neutral trader on the high seas. American merchant shippers enjoyed unprecedented prosperity both in the general carrying trade and as exporters of American wheat, tobacco, and cotton. At the same time American merchantmen and even naval vessels, caught between Britain’s Orders in Council and Napoleon’s retaliatory Decrees were subjected to increasing interference that eventually grew intolerable.”[ii] That’s fine as far as it goes, but in reality there was more—much more—to the story than a simple desire for free trade and sailors’ rights. As the war approached, there were also strong, emotionally- laden political and diplomatic cross currents that shaped the decisions of President Madison and then-British Prime Minister Spencer Perceval. And politics, as we know, is often a force unto itself. http://www.navyhistory.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/KN-10921-236x300.jpgPresident James Madison (by Asher Durand after Gilbert Stuart, KN-10921) While Madison was the leader in the House of Representatives, he steadfastly resisted the pressure of those in Congress who were inclined towards war with Great Britain. Those advocating war were mostly from the South, along with expansionists from the then-western states of Kentucky, Tennessee, and Ohio, who were anxious to push the United States’ borders to the west. Notwithstanding the pressures coming from those inclined towards war with Great Britain, Madison acted on his belief that he could avoid armed conflict by convincing Prime Minister Perceval that a major clash was inevitable, unless Britain dealt with the issues of free trade and impressment. Madison was further convinced that Great Britain’s preoccupation in Europe with Napoleon would make Britain reluctant to open up a new global warfront. Madison was wrong on all of the above. In fact Perceval believed that the regional political divisions within the United States, along with America’s obvious military weakness would force America to accommodate Britain’s maritime policies, no matter how onerous or economically damaging. In addition Perceval and many around him believed that U.S. complaints could be quieted with a limited application of military pressure. All of the foregoing created perceptions on the part of the British leadership that were as important as the actual circumstances involved. There was another important psychological factor among much of the British leadership. As a result Prime Minister Perceval and his successor, Lord Liverpool, who became Prime Minister in May 1812, had a desire to settle scores with the United States. In the first chapter of his book, Daughan is blunt: “The Treaty of Paris…hardly reconciled the king or his people to colonial liberty. Bitter about their humiliating defeat, the British watched with satisfaction as the thirteen states floundered without a central government….Many in London expected the American experiment in republican government to fail.”[iii] The Evening Star in London put things in more colorful terms: “England shall not be driven from the proud pre-eminence, which the blood and treasure of her sons have attained for her among nations, by a piece of red, white, and blue striped bunting flying at the mastheads of a few fir-built frigates manned by a handful of bastards and outlaws.”[iv] As we know the feelings were mutual, and it’s difficult to overemphasize the importance of sentiments such as those when discussing the reasons for the War. Yet they usually get little emphasis, if any. The miscalculations on both sides that contributed to the U.S. declaration of war continued into the armed conflict. For example the British leadership failed to recognize the importance of the U.S. Navy’s early, morale-boosting, tactical victories in the early single-ship actions. Those stunning single-ship actions were shrugged off at the Admiralty and Whitehall as embarrassing but basically non-determinants in the war, when they were in fact hugely important in sustaining a fighting spirit in the U.S. Navy. And of greater importance, those early naval victories sustained the will of the American political leadership and the public to fight on in the war. The British were not alone in this pattern of miscalculations. For example the U.S. political leadership constantly misjudged the determination of most Canadians to remain part of the British Empire. A month into the war, then-former-president Jefferson, famously opined: “[T]he acquisition of Canada this year, as far as the neighborhood of Quebec, will be a mere matter of marching.”[v] The serious misjudgments were still evident—not surprisingly at this point—during the peace negotiations that began at Ghent in August 1814. In the early phases of those deliberations, for example Madison doggedly believed that the British were anxious for a negotiated peace. When in truth Prime Minister Liverpool was convinced that with the pressures of Britain’s blockade and expeditionary warfare raids—particularly the presumably devastating psychological impact of the burning of Washington—the United States would not, could not, sustain the war for much longer. So we see that the War of 1812 was launched and sustained to a significant degree by one false impression after another and a high degree of emotion on both sides. It wasn’t until the connected Battles of Lake Champlain and Plattsburg that the direction of the negotiations at Ghent finally changed. And at that point they changed radically. With Commodore Macdonough’s victory over a British fleet on Lake Champlain on 11September 1814 and U.S. Brigadier General Alexander Macomb’s accompanying repulse of British General Prevost at Plattsburgh—along with the subsequent withdrawal of Prevost’s army to the north—the strategic nature of the War of 1812 was suddenly altered. http://www.navyhistory.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/NH-51480-KN-300x205.jpgBattle of Lake Champlain (Edward Tufnell, Navy Art Collection NH 51480-KN) The Battle of Lake Champlain became the main tipping point by stopping a British thrust down Lake Champlain and the Hudson Valley and into the commercial heart of America. Such a campaign, if successful, would in all probability have shattered the United States geographically and ended the nation then and there. The coincidental repulse of the British attack on Baltimore was the exclamation point on the new strategic equation. Let’s shift focus now to assess the outcome of the war. On the positive side for Britain, the period of relative peace that followed the war allowed Britain to benefit economically from her foreign trade and to firmly establish her de facto dominance of the seas. The latter would prove to be an unchallenged and immeasurable geostrategic benefit to Britain for a century. The end of the war also helped Britain to focus on the Industrial Revolution’s early stages and to quickly become the world’s largest economy. These were obviously important and very positive outcomes of the War of 1812 for Great Britain. It should be noted, however, that notwithstanding those positives, there were many in Britain who felt that their nation had conceded too much at Ghent. On the positive side for the United States, the dominant position of America in Florida and Louisiana was confirmed and the possibility of a massive buffer Indian nation in the territories that would become Ohio, Indiana, and Michigan was eliminated. And U.S. foreign trade was once again able to contribute to America’s burgeoning economic might. In addition and arguably most important of all, the United States gained international stature that did not exist before the war. The companion to that new stature was the recognition in the United States that a strong, standing military was an essential component of national security, and both the U.S. Army and U.S. Navy emerged from the War of 1812 as more professional military services. Many—perhaps most—would agree that at the center of that new American global stature was the U.S. Navy, a force that had established emphatically that it not only would fight against the best, but it also could win decisively at that level. And it could win not only in a tactical context but in a strategic context as well. Frequently the War of 1812 is referred to as America’s second war of independence, and it was that. It was also the validation of the implausible vision of John Paul Jones who wrote in 1778: “Our Marine (Navy) will rise as if by enchantment and become, within the memory of persons now living, the wonder and envy of the world.” [vi] Representative of the new U.S. Navy that was shaped during the War of 1812 was a group of officers referred to as “Preble’s Boys.” They were named for Commodore Edward Preble, who noted the youth of his officers when he was in command of a squadron in the Mediterranean during the Barbary Wars. All his captains were less than 30 years old—some were in their early 20s. After a few months of action in the Mediterranean, however, “Preble’s Boys” established themselves as exceptional warfighters, officers who were forward-leaning if not downright aggressive in their combat doctrines. Among the “Preble’s Boy’s” who went on to distinguish themselves in the War of 1812 were William Bainbridge, victor in the action between USS Constitution and HMS Java; Stephen Decatur, who defeated HMS Macedonian while in command of USS United States; Isaac Hull, victor over HMS Guerriere while captain of USS Constitution; Thomas Macdonough, victor at the Battle of Lake Champlain; David Porter, who, as captain of USS Essex captured HMS Alert, the first British ship captured in the War of 1812; and Charles Stewart, who captured HMS Cyane and HMS Levant in a single extended action. “Preble’s Boys” were part of the new breed of professionals who bridged the gap between the inward-looking and basically defensive attitudes that followed the American Revolution and the global sea power concepts that came to maturity at the beginning of the twentieth century with President Teddy Roosevelt and Admiral A. T. Mahan. In a book by Allan Westcott titled Mahan on Naval Warfare—Selections from the Writings of Rear Admiral Alfred T. Mahan, the Introduction includes the following: “[T]he historian of sea power (Mahan) had much to do with the emergence of the United States in 1898 as a world power, with possessions and new interests in distant seas. And no one believed more sincerely than he that this would be good for the United States and the rest of the world.”[vii] It was “Preble’s Boys,” along with those who fought with them and paid a heavy price in blood, who connected ideas of liberty with the steady progress of globalization that continues up to our own times. In his book On Seas of Glory, former Secretary of the Navy John Lehman wrote at the beginning of his chapter on the War of 1812: “Before the War of 1812 the young republic did not have an organized naval service in the truest sense. Gradually, the need to defend the commerce of the fragile new nation against warring European powers, Barbary pashas and pirates created the foundation of the U.S. Navy in fits and starts.”[viii] At the end of the chapter Lehman’s focus is far reaching: “The early efforts of Adams, Jones and Barry to establish institutional permanence were now accomplished, complete with a rich store of custom and tradition, borrowed liberally from the British and French navies, but very distinctly American….The new republic now had a formidable instrument to build a global commerce, enforce a Monroe Doctrine, and when the test came, to preserve the Union from rebellion.”[ix] At the beginning of my remarks, I said there were a lot more than tactical victories and defeats during the War of 1812 and that there were very important gains and losses at the end of the war that had long term implications for both the United States and Great Britain—and in fact for the world. To that point and in closing, I suggest that what the victories and defeats, mistakes on both sides, and the good and bad luck of the War of 1812 all added up to was a happening that is still playing out. That happening was the emergence of the United States as a global—eventually preeminent—naval power. Our security and prosperity, as well as that of much of the world, is to a significant extent based on U.S. naval power, a global force that came forth in a brilliant flash of history between 1812 and 1814. It was a marriage of democratic political concepts to sea power. It was a phenomenon that harks back to Themistocles and the triremes of the Athenian empire of the fifth century BC. The conjunction of American theories of liberty with global sea power in 1814 is, in my opinion, the single most important outcome of the War of 1812. And it was an enormously important—and mostly positive—outcome that has born heavily on world history. We ignore that message from history at great risk. [i] 1812—The Navy’s War, George C. Daughan (New York, Basic Books, 2011), 356 [ii] Seapower—A Naval History, edited by E.B. Potter and Admiral Chester Nimitz (Englewood Cliffs, NJ, Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1960), 207 [iii] 1812—The Navy’s War, George C. Daughan (New York, Basic Books, 2011), 1, 2 [iv] The Perfect Wreck—“Old Ironsides and HMS Java—A Story of 1812 , Steven Maffeo (Tuscon, Fireship Press LLC, 2011), iii [v] Perilous Fight—America’s Intrepid War with Britain on the High Seas, 1812-1815, Stephen Buduansky (New York and Toronto, Alfred A. Knoff, 2010), x [vi] John Paul Jones: America’s First Sea Warrior, Joseph Callo (Annapolis, Naval Institute Press, 2006), 62 [vii] Mahan on Naval Warfare, Alan Westcott (Mineola, NY, Dover Publications, 1999), xviii, xix [viii] On Seas of Glory, John Lehman (New York, The Free Press, 2010), 103 [ix] Ibid., 140, 141 The post Blog first appeared on Naval Historical Foundation. View the full article

I'm not drinking my breakfast ... yet ... but I've read this twice and all I can think of is a need to say, "BINGO!" Booz Allen Hamilton, Norfolk, Va., is being awarded a not-to-exceed $20,000,000 modification to previously awarded indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity, cost-plus-fixed-fee, firm-fixed-price pricing provisions contract (N00189-08-D-0022) to increase funded amount. The total contract value inclusive of all modifications is estimated at $184,103,663. The contract will provide leadership teams, providing expertise in change management, barrier identification and removal, and key enterprise performance metrics. The contractor will focus efforts on applying the key tenets of a structured, process-focused, metrics-driven enterprise approach to determine required output, identify and remove barriers, develop and analyze measures of performance, and manage the cultural changes necessary to reach enterprise objectives. It is the primary role of the contractor to work with naval personnel, active, reserve, civilian, and other government contractors, to accomplish the goals of the enterprise. Work will performed on-site at government sites (72 percent) and off-site contractors sites (28 percent). Work will be completed by Sept. 30, 2012. Funding will be operations and maintenance, Navy provided by the individual Fleet Readiness Enterprises and will be placed on individual task orders. Contract funds in the amount of $20,000,000 will expire at the end of the current fiscal year. The requirement was issued on a sole-source basis utilizing other than full and open competition procedures. NAVSUP Fleet Logistics Center, Norfolk, Va., is the contracting activity (N00189-08-D-0022). View the full article

Those who aren't convinced that UAS will change warfare permanently need to watch this video, posted yesterday: Pardon the cliche, but this technology is truly transformational. For some interesting commentary on swarms, check out John Robb. The naval applications are there, too. How could AEGIS, RAM, ESSM, CIWS, or any other envisioned air defense system defend against a lethal "suicide" drone swarm aimed at a ship, especially when they come in from all directions and mass before attack? Jamming might work to some degree, but there are countermeasures for countermeasures. What about swarming surface or undersea weapons? The fact that this technology was developed by a university, not by DARPA, NAVSEA, or a major defense contractor, demonstrates that open source systems such as these will soon be available to non-state actors, some of them with malevolent intent. The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency. View the full article

Raise your hand if you might have tracked either of these ..... The Transshelf semi-submersible open dock vessel has delivered two decommissioned Victor III class nuclear submarines from a Russian Pacific Fleet base in Kamchatka to the Zvezda shipyard in the town of Bolshoi Kamen in Russia’s Far East for scrapping. View the full article

Rocket parts: check. Fishing plans: check. DVR programmed: check. Hmmmm .... what else ... Full story here. Before everyone laughs about tricky rivers ... all those who remember Naval Base Charleston raise your hand! View the full article

http://www.navyhistory.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/CivilWarMonitor-copy-216x300.jpgLast fall we learned about an exciting new publication about the American Civil War. This brand new quarterly magazine is called the Civil War Monitor, and it looks to bridge the gulf between academic and popular history. According to the magazine, it is “devoted to the belief that popular history need not be superficial or sentimental.” It features richly illustrated and originally researched articles written from a variety of angles—military, political, social, and economic—by the country’s leading historians and authors. The first issue was published in September, and is available online to read for free. The second issue hit newstands in December, with the digital version online and available to subscribers. Issue 3 will be out in February. The good news for those who love naval history is that this publication will feature frequent coverage of the naval aspects of the war. While many books and magazines about the Civil War seem to focus exclusively on activity ashore, the Civil War Monitor will not overlook action on the oceans and rivers. One recent story on their website addresses that very issue. “Bolting on the Civil War Navy” considers some of the reasons why the importance of naval action during the Civil War is often overshadowed by events ashore in both popular memory, and historical study. In addition to their print publication, the Civil War Monitor offers a robust website featuring a blog and photo essays. These online tools allow them to expand on the content of the print magazine, and explore other aspects of the war. The website features photographs and artwork from the Civil War, and frequently these are items with a naval slant. A good example is a transcription of this letter from Rear Admiral Samuel Francis Du Pont, USN, recounting the successful 1861 Union assault on Port Royal. Their blog also features book reviews on The Bookshelf, updated regularly. The post Blog first appeared on Naval Historical Foundation. View the full article

I do this just enough to irritate some of you - but it is my blog and I can tap in to my academic background now and then if I want - so there.Drudge has this at the lead this AM, but there is more than the 1.5% that you need to focus on.Facts and numbers are important, they are critical to cut through all the smoke, dazzle, and white noise of a political season. Here is the executive summary you need to let soak in. Via the governments Bureau of Economic Analysis: 2011 GDP Real GDP increased 1.7 percent in 2011 (that is, from the 2010 annual level to the 2011 annual level), compared with an increase of 3.0 percent in 2010 . The increase in real GDP in 2011 primarily reflected positive contributions from personal consumption expenditures (PCE) , exports, and nonresidential fixed investment that were partly offset by negative contributions from state and local government spending, private inventory investment, and federal government spending. Imports, which are a subtraction in the calculation of GDP, increased. The deceleration in real GDP in 2011 primarily reflected downturns in private inventory investment and in federal government spending and a deceleration in exports that were partly offset by a deceleration in imports and an acceleration in nonresidential fixed investment. The price index for gross domestic purchases increased 2.5 percent in 2011, compared with an increase of 1.5 percent in 2010. Current-dollar GDP increased 3.9 percent, or $561.2 billion, in 2011, compared with an increase of 4.2 percent, or $587.5 billion, in 2010. During 2011 (that is, measured from the fourth quarter of 2010 to the fourth quarter of 2011), real GDP increased 1.6 percent. Real GDP increased 3.1 percent during 2010. The price index for gross domestic purchases increased 2.5 percent during 2011, compared with an increase of 1.4 percent during 2010. Real GDP growth is contracting. Cost of goods is increasing. Imports are increasing greater than exports. People are spending more, but out of savings. Frankly, I expected better. In macro - we need to watch 2012 close. To let politics sneak in - this plays in to Romney's strengths. This is a gift if he is willing and able to use it. View the full article

For those interested in the seamanship aspects of the Costa Concordia disaster, this may be interesting: Reconstruction of the Costa Concordia Tragedy, Narration by John Konrad from gCaptain.com on Vimeo. Narration by John Konrad, CEO gCaptain.com and USCG Licensed Master Mariner Unlimited. View the full article

The DOT&E FY2011 Annual Report (PDF) is out, and I noted that Wired is focused on the LCS report (PDF). The reason the Wired article on LCS reads like it's reaching for straws to find news in the LCS report is because the DOT&E FY2011 Annual Report on LCS lacks new information. The DOT&E report basically details exactly what ADM Pandolfe told everyone at Surface Navy Association conference - in January of last year (in 2011). Hard to get worked up about issues openly discussed over a year ago. What I did find interesting about the report is that the report heavily focuses on the MIW module problems, but only one aspect of the module - the airborne pieces expected to be used on the MH-60R helicopter (AN/AQS-20A and ALMDS). Does that mean the rest of the MIW module is doing well? I don't know what the absence of concerns for the SUW and ASW modules means either. Does that mean the program components of those modules aren't mature enough to evaluate, or does it mean they don't have any concerns right now with those components? I don't know. About the only thing I learned in the LCS DOT&E report is that DOT&E is still actively sounding the bell on the survivability issues of LCS, and the Navy is still not ready to discuss that issue about LCS with anyone. Everything else in the DOT&E report reads like first in class ship stuff. I still think Austal should have seen the corrosion issue coming, and I don't like that there has already been a crack in LCS1, but these are issues where Navy folks involved appear comfortable with the corrections made to address those issues. While LCS is likely to get lots of attention early (the program is the Navy's attention whore these days), there really isn't much in the DOT&E report on LCS that was new, and certainly nothing worth getting worked up about. If you want to see what a truly damning report in the DOT&E FY2011 Annual Review looks like, check out LPD-17 (PDF). The report uses several hundred words to detail how the class is "assessed as capable of conducting amphibious operations in a benign environment, but not operationally effective, suitable, or survivable in a hostile environment due to significant reliability deficiencies on major systems affecting communications, propulsion, and self defense." LCS has nothing even remotely close to damning as that assessment. View the full article

Yesterday around 6.00 CET pirates in a fishing vessel attacked the MV Flintstone 93NM north east of the island of Socotra. The pirates in their dhow where seen coming and the crew of the Flintstone went into hid in a special compartment of the ship. Meanwhile the Dutch Vessel Protection Detachment, consisting of marines, prepared for the arrival of the skiff that came from the dhow, that was being used as a mother ship. At first the VPD fired flares at the coming ship, in which they could see several weapons including a RPG. When this RPG was aimed at the Flintstone the marines answered with direct fire, forcing the skiff to return to the dhow. What I don't understand is the choice of the pirates to attack the MV Flinstone. Their intelligence must be lacking. After the report of the Wijkerslooth Commission, the Dutch decided to make 50 VPDs available to protect vulnerable, Dutch owned, vessels. And they sometimes announce names of ships which will have a VPD on board. And yes, from 2 weeks ago: the Flintstone will have a VPD on board. View the full article