HG S2 (Intel Bot)

Reviewed by CDR Brian Emory, USN Chief Warrant Officer Kevin P. Gilheany has done a wonderful job delivering a memoir of his service in the Coast Guard. His writing style is easy to read and always engaging in a book that’s can be completed in one sitting or over a weekend. His story begins in his youth where he developed two key goals that would stay him throughout his life. The first happens while watching the annual St. Patrick’s Day parade near Fifth Avenue in New York City. It was there that he fell in love with the sound of bag pipes and dreamed of being able to play them someday. The second event happened during the Bicentennial Celebration in 1976 when his mother took all three children to tour USCGC EAGLE at Pier 17 in the Seaport District of NYC. After waiting for hours to get onboard, it was on her decks that Kevin decided he wanted to join the Coast Guard when he grew up. It would be 7 years later that he would report to Coast Guard boot camp and begin his 20 year career. Kevin shares honest stories about his life in the Coast Guard beginning in the 1980’s when things were a lot different than today. All of these “sea stories” come across as honest and inviting as the reader has the chance to share is the many adventures experienced by a young Quartermaster growing up in the sea service. What makes this book better than just a collection of stories is how Kevin reveals his personal philosophy on determination and achieving his goals. Though a first time author, he is able to bring out principles and leadership lessons the same way an old high school friend would share how he got to be successful while at your twentieth high school reunion. There is a sense of friendship between the author and reader as Kevin imparts how he handled hardships and kept his eye on what he wanted most in life. The events aren’t sugar coated and during those times when Kevin made mistakes, he shares them as freely as the successes. The constant drive throughout the book is his desire to be the best Guardsman he can be in the Coast Guard. Instead of being upset at whatever circumstances he’s given, Kevin’s philosophy to do his best always comes out. And from that it becomes obvious to the reader how determination and hard work allowed him to quickly move up the enlisted ranks and retire as a Chief Warrant Officer at 20 years in 2003. But a year before that day, Kevin describes how he brought about accomplishing his second goal of learning to play bag pipes and founding the U.S. Coast Guard Pipe Band in 2002. After reading the book it’s hard to say what the author is most proud of accomplishing. The second part of the book’s title is “An Unlikely Career in the U.S. Coast Guard” and harkens back to what an outsider would have said when looking at recruit Gilheany heading to boot camp, but the message of the book and internal character of Kevin reveals the dichotomy of that title. Chief Warrant Officer Gilheany knew what he wanted to accomplish in life and shares with the reader how a poor, overweight, non-swimming and alcoholic kid can make a difference for himself and those around him by becoming the best Quartermaster, Chief and Warrant Officer in the Coast Guard. In addition, he is credited with founding an enduring tradition with the establishment of the USCG Pipe Band. This book is a great read for everyone from a Coast Guard veteran to anyone interested in funny stories and life of someone that made a difference. Minding the Helm: An Unlikely Career in the U.S. Coast Guard, by Kevin P. Gilheany. University of North Texas Press, 2019. 269 pp. CDR Brian L. Emory, USN (Military Faculty, Joint Forces Staff College) Purchase your copy of Minding the Helm today! The post Blog first appeared on Naval Historical Foundation. View the full article

Reviewed by Jon Middaugh, Ph.D. Donald Stoker, a Professor of Strategy and Policy for the U.S. Naval War College’s Monterey Program at the Naval Postgraduate School from 1999-2017, has written a tightly argued case for improving the approach American leaders use for fighting wars. The recommendations and insights in Why America Loses Wars deserve widespread circulation among strategists. But despite the author’s background, his focus falls on military and political considerations writ large and offers few insights tailored to the Navy. The work stems from a premise that American and Western leaders have, since World War II, failed to clarify when the country is at war or what victory looks like. As a result, they have struggled to apply an appropriate strategic approach and sufficient resources to win. Their misguided analysis of ends, ways, and means created confusion and produced unnecessary setbacks in Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria. According to Stoker, many leaders and theorists have become accustomed to losing and even suspicious of winning “limited wars.” Readers might question the title’s implication that the United States (and South Korea) lost in Korea or that the United States (and Iraq) lost in Iraq, but the analysis of how these and other wars were conceived and fought exposes a clear pattern of weak strategical thinking emanating from Washington. To find their way, national leaders must focus squarely upon the political objective(s) each war participant is pursuing. Then, after assessing constraints that usually affect combatants and their allies—time; national or political will; geography; and economic factors—a strategy can be determined and resourced appropriately. The dynamism and unpredictability of war, however, mean that the “value of the [political] object” must be reassessed whenever significant factors change. Regularly citing classic strategists such as Carl von Clausewitz and Sun Tzu, Stoker illustrates the importance of his own recommendations by also examining a host of international conflicts including the Russo-Japanese War and the ongoing India-Pakistan maneuvering over Kashmir. These examples and the theoretical framework they support appear quite helpful for explaining successes or failures in the past, but how might they apply currently to the tensions between the United States and Iran? Are missile exchanges, drone strikes, and the resulting casualties indicators of war? If so, then what would each side and its allies’ political objective(s) be? In addition, one of the few naval examples appears only in the last two pages, but it is quite relevant in 2020: Chinese leaders assess that “a limited military conflict in the maritime domain” constitutes their most likely military engagement. A bit more analysis of this point could broaden the appeal to a naval audience, but as written the book still offers many valuable insights for all. Review of Donald Stoker, Why America Loses Wars: Limited War and US Strategy form the Korean War to the Present (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2019) Jon Middaugh works full-time as a historian for the Naval History and Heritage Command in Washington, D.C., where he co-authored a pamphlet on the Navy’s role in Operation Torch (2018), and previously served as a historian at the U.S. Army Center of Military History. His most recent publication is “Integrating the Components: the Army National Guard within the Army,” in Jason Warren, ed., Landpower in the Long War (University of Kentucky Press, 2019). He holds a Ph.D. in history and is a graduate of the Army War College. Purchase your copy of Why America Loses Wars today! The post Blog first appeared on Naval Historical Foundation. View the full article

Using his own phrase, John L. McCrea was a fly on the wall at the White House during the first months of the War in the Pacific when naval affairs dominated Franklin Roosevelt’s interest. Working under Admiral Harold “Betty” Stark in the office of Chief of Naval Operations, McCrea had a front row seat as the U.S. entered the war. When Ernest J. King replaced Stark, he learned to adjust his behaviors to cope with the cold, hot-tempered, hardnosed, and pugnacious top admiral. Captain McCrea desperately wanted a cruiser command, but Stark and King both felt he would be of greater use as naval aide to the President; furthermore, they wanted a trusted aide that could keep them informed of Roosevelt’s mind and who was influencing him. The loyal sailor quietly put his own desires aside for the good of the country, and was offered an unparalleled view of the inner workings of the White House. FDR’s Chief of Staff, Major General Edwin (Pa) Watson instructed McCrea that he was to provide twice daily briefings of Naval Affairs, and quietly stand in the corner while discussions took place among the President, Secretary of Navy Frank Knox, Pa Watson, and others such as Harry Hopkins and the President’s wife, Eleanor. With speed and a modicum of trepidation the Captain found himself to be the only person with immediate access to the Oval Office that was not of Flag rank. He rapidly learned what was essential for presidential attention and what was of lesser importance; however, he also identified Roosevelt’s sharply keen interest in certain ships or personnel that warranted FDR’s awareness. He often retained these bits of information or gossip for Sunday mornings while the valet dressed the President. The Captain discovered an unused room and initiated the Map Room with large maps acquired from the Navy, Army and the National Geographic Society. This center, staffed daily, became one of the most crucial rooms during the war. FDR was tickled, and McCrea moved up a peg for his actions. Effective and conscientious, McCrea quickly gained a personal and affectionate friendship with FDR who became more and more dependent on the 4-striper. McCrea recognized Roosevelt’s partiality for viewing sundry maps of wartime theaters. When the President went on a two-week train ride around America, he insisted that McCrea accompany him, and used the strong arm of the sailor to hold himself erect when stopping for speeches. Roosevelt, understanding history and the Navy, recognized that despite his own dependency on McCrea, the Captain deserved a command. The President released him from duty and allowed him to be the first Commanding Officer of America’s biggest battleship, the USS Iowa upon which the former aide bombarded islands of Japan and eventually earned Task Force command in the North Pacific. While this book may lack historical significance, it is important in understanding FDR, the wartime White House, and the events surrounding significant leaders of the era. McCrea did not keep a diary during his war years for security reasons; but immediately after his retirement he commenced creating an oral history. His stepdaughter organized the several dozen tapes and started editing them for this book. The “yarns”, as McCrea called them, are fascinating and fun to read. One of his stories includes a meeting with notorious Admiral Ernest King. King told McCrea that he had the making of a good admiral but he wasn’t a son-of-a-bitch, and a good admiral had to be a SOB. The Captain, lying through his teeth and with a straight face, said that he had never heard anyone ever call King a SOB. King was so upset that he stormed out of the room slamming the door behind him. Julia C. Tobey edited these stories with a sharp eye for interesting tidbits. Assisted by the highly lauded historian, Craig Symonds, Tobey crafted a wonderful book. Readers with a perspective on print size and fonts will find that Skyhorse Publishing issued a quality edition that is easy on the eye. Anyone with an interest in World War II will find this book well worth the $25, if for no other reason than for the “yarns”. Captain McCrea’s War: The World War II Memoir of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Naval Aide and USS Iowa’s First Commanding Officer By John McCrea, edited by Julia C. Tobey, Skyhorse Publications, New York City, NY. (2016). Reviewed by Stephen D. Regan, Ed.D. Dr. Stephen D. Regan is a former professor and academic dean at Upper Iowa University. His passion is naval history and maritime affairs. He wrote the biography of Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher. Buy Captain McCrea’s War now! View the full article

By Rick Campbell, St. Martinâs Press, New York, NY (2017) Reviewed by William H. White Having read and reviewed one or two of his previous tales, Cdr. Rick Campbell’s latest, BLACKMAIL is in my opinion, his best by a long shot. And unfortunately, it is, in large part, the most credible. While Campbellâs background is in submarines, they are only a part of the action in this book, augmenting both the land-based and carrier portions of this action-packed thriller. The premise, without giving too much away, is essentially World War III set mainly in the Arabian Sea â at least for the ship and battle scenes. The action moves logically and fluidly ashore when necessary, aiding and augmenting the plot. Politics, behind-the-scenes guerilla warfare, and international intrigue all turn up and are well done. The story unfolds with an âaccidentalâ attack on a U.S. carrier patrolling in WestPac; the United States is not in a position to retaliate immediately due to the weakened state of our forces, the result of a prolonged war with China. Political unrest in Europe allows Russia to move troops into large portions of what used to be the Soviet Union, more or less unopposed. Then Russia announces they have sabotaged the worldâs major oil pipelines which, if their explosives are activated, will essentially shut down the industrial worldâs economies. The conundrum for the United States is what to do about it, and who to ask for help. Any obvious course of action seems to offer dire consequences. Of course, Russia is out there bribing those same nations NOT to help. Campbell brings back several of his earlier characters, including National Security Advisor Christine OâConnor, who readers met in his previous book, Ice Station Nautilus. Several of the presidentâs staff reappear as well. The story is clever, with credible dialogue, and without the overbearing professional knowledge the author possesses. I suspect Commander Campbell had fun writing this story; I know I certainly had fun reading it. As I was provided an advance proof, there were no maps or tables in it which will surely help future readers. I highly recommend Blackmail to any who fancy the action/political thriller genre; it will not disappoint. William H. White is a noted naval historical fiction writer who resides in Rumson, NJ. BOOK REVIEW – BLACKMAIL was published by the Naval Historical Foundation and originally appeared on Naval Historical Foundation on June 30, 2017. View the full article

The Russian supercavitating torpedo, the Shkval, has been with us for decades. Partly because it has not been used in combat and partially because we just don't think it is all that much of a threat because of our own biases and understanding of the technology, we have not given it all that much thought. We are very focused on defending against threats from the air, A2AD and all that jazz, and for those below, we have nifty little countermeasures and anti-torpedo defenses we are trying out - but those are focused on what we know and am comfortable with - traditional torpedoes. Via The Economist, I'm not quite sure we are that ready for this; WHEN introduced 40 years ago, the Soviet Shkval (“Squallâ€) torpedo was hailed as an “aircraft-carrier killer†because its speed, more than 370kph (200 knots), was four times that of any American rival. The claim was premature. Problems with its design meant Shkval turned out to be less threatening than hoped (or, from a NATO point of view, less dangerous than feared), even though it is still made and deployed. But supercavitation, the principle upon which its speed depends, has continued to intrigue torpedo designers. Now, noises coming out of the Soviet Union’s successor, Russia, are leading some in the West to worry that the country’s engineers have cracked it. ... In October 2016 plans emerged for a new supercavitating torpedo, Khishchnik (“Predatorâ€). Few details have been released, except that the work is being carried out by Elektropribor, a design bureau specialising in high-precision systems for submarines. Combining a General Dynamics-style sonar with a better motor could, however, result in a weapon that the world’s navies would truly have to fear. Such a motor is possible, according to Georgiy Savchenko of the Institute of Hydromechanics at Ukraine’s National Academy of Sciences. His supercavitation-research group estimates that with the right fuel (perhaps lithium, which packs more energy per kilogram than magnesium) a new torpedo could have ten times the range of Shkval. It would still be noisy, but, added to its speed, such a combination of range and tracking ability would make it hard to evade. Moreover, there is no theoretical reason why Khishchnik should not travel quite a lot faster than Shkval does. In laboratory tests, supercavitating projectiles have clocked more than 5,000kph. That means you need to kill the archer if you can't do anything against the arrow. Yea, about that ... View the full article

The Economist in the last six months published a series of interesting articles on the challenges of anti-submarine warfare. As long time readers may have figured out, I love - from a professional perspective - ASW. Neglected and unloved by most, but to me a passion. Though few really cared outside fellow fetishists, I was actually damn good at it - for an officer. It is all math and a little bit of instinct built by experience, but since I got too old to play tactical and was needed elsewhere - and then after leaving AD totally out of it - I've had to nibble what I can off of open source. For those of you who share this passion, one thing we are always looking for is where technology is going. ASW is hard and is always getting harder in the Darwinian measure/counter-measure hide-n-seek that defines this warfare area. You cannot sit still and expect to win. Though some 100# heads tell you they have "war winning" technology - even when briefed in you soon realize that, well, ... there are holes in the tactical applications. That being said, the more tools the better - and operational experience tells us that you need lots of different tools in order to successfully prosecute enemy submarines through search, localization, track, and attack. Not everything works everywhere against all targets - so bring a big toolbag. As such, this little bit had me reaching for the circular slide rule; ...modern submarines are very quiet, and neither side has gained a definitive upper hand. There are other options. Submarine-spotting aircraft carry “magnetic anomaly detectors†(MAD) which pick up disturbances in the Earth’s magnetic field caused by a submarine’s metal hull. Those disturbances are tiny, which means MAD is only useful at ranges of a few hundred metres. There may, though, be a better way. Thanks to something called the Debye effect, it might be possible to hunt submarines using the magnetic signatures of their wakes. Seawater is salty, full of ions of sodium and chlorine. Because those ions have different masses, any nudge—such as a passing submarine—moves some farther than others. Each ion carries an electric charge, and the movement of those charges produces a magnetic field. The Debye effect has been known since 1933, but its effects were thought to be tiny. The American navy set out to explore it nonetheless in 2009 , giving research grants to three firms to check whether it could be used for submarine detection. One, Cortana Corporation of Falls Church, Virginia, found a significant effect. Cortana was given a second grant in 2011 to continue the work, which was expected to produce a sensor which could be deployed from a ship. Since then the navy has continued to award Cortana grants for hush-hush jobs. Neither Cortana nor the navy will discuss exactly what they are up to. But it is likely that the technique can only detect certain submarine movements in some situations. Submarines produce many different types of wake. As well as the familiar V-shaped wake they leave underwater disturbances known as “internal wavesâ€, flat swirls called “pancake eddies†and miniature vortices which spin off from fins and control surfaces. These all depend not only on speed and depth but also on the submarine’s hydrodynamics (the underwater version of aerodynamics). Read it all. Exciting stuff. Add to it some of the things ... well ... things still locked away, and I like new ways to work the early part of the kill chain ... as long as those sneaky bastards keep moving ... As a side note, why does The Economist keep putting stuff out about ASW? One has to remember, the island nation was twice in the last hundred years almost starved to death by submarines. She knows. View the full article

GBU-12 Paveway II Paveway II kits convert standard Mk 80 family free-fall bombs into laser-guided weapons. Each guidance kit consists of a computer control group (CCG) guidance system with a semi-active laser seeker and pneumatically-controlled guidance canards for the front-end of the bomb, plus an air foil group (AFG) on the back end that provides lift and stability. Once a target is designated, laser guidance is more accurate than GPS, but it can be foiled by obscurants like fog, sandstorms, etc. At the beginning of August 2011, the US government issued a contract worth up to $475 million… “Paveway” is actually a US government designation for laser-guided bombs, but the term has been the subject of global legal battles between Raytheon and Lockheed Martin, with Raytheon claiming it as a trademark, and Lockheed Martin claiming it as a generic term. A number of courts have ruled in favor of the generic argument. Updates May 11/16: Lockheed Martin Missiles and Fire Control and Raytheon Missile Systems have been awarded a combined not-to-exceed $649.7 million modification contract for Paveway II production. The modification provides a five year extension for Paveway II missile production with work completion expected for July 27, 2023. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) of the munition in 2015 included a $1.29 billion sale of muntions to Saudi Arabia, which included 1,000 GBU-12 Paveway II laser guided bombs. Aug 1/11: Lockheed Martin Corp. in Archbold, PA (FA8213-11-D-0008), and Raytheon Missile Systems of Tucson, AZ (FA8213-11-D-0007) receive a $475 million contract for Paveway II laser-guided bomb computer control groups (seekers), and GBU-12 air foil groups (tail kits) for 500 pound bombs. Both elements are needed, in order to create a GBU-12 laser-guided bomb. The Ogden Air Logistics Center/GHGKA at Hill Air Force Base, UT manages the contract. Discussions with Hill AFB confirm that this is a single 5-year firm-fixed-price, multiple-award contract. The 2 firms will compete for purchase orders, as the USAF issues them. View the full article

My recent post on how to counter Chinese anti-shipping capabilities between the First and Second Island Chains was heavily influenced by CAPT William Toti’s seminal article in last June’s Naval Institute Proceedingson the need to tackle anti-submarine warfare from a theater-wide, threat-tailored, combined arms campaign construct. If you haven’t read his article (which is outside the paywall), do so. It is a foundational work. Toti observes that the dramatic sensor advantages that allowed the U.S. Navy to thoroughly dominate Soviet submarines throughout much of the Cold War no longer hold. Our ability to detect and attack an approaching adversary submarine before it can shoot first is uncertain at best. Yet, as Toti points out, “real ASW is not about detecting the submarine, it’s not about killing the submarine, it’s about defeating the submarine.â€The ability to win a close-in “knife fight†against a submarine, while important, represents just one of many opportunities to prevent the submarine from executing an effective attack. The submarine in wartime must, after all, have a safe haven in port for resupply, must break out of port, must transit through marginal seas or the open ocean to its patrol station, must be cued into patrol stations or intercept positions from which it would have the greatest opportunity for encountering prey, must detect and correctly classify a target (or receive targeting-quality cues from external surveillance and reconnaissance assets), must approach the target to weapons release range, and must land a blow with its weapon salvo. Most conceivable adversaries of the U.S. have the added geographical challenge of pushing their submarines through chokepoints such as straits in order to access the open ocean or return to port from patrol. Toti observes that there are exploitable vulnerabilities in each of these steps that can deny the submarine a chance to attack effectively and perhaps even lead to the submarine’s own destruction. Toti also notes that if a potential adversary’s leaders became convinced that the U.S. would be able to defang any submarine offensive, they might opt not to employ their submarines—or go to war—in the first place. In rereading Toti’s article the other week, it occurred to me that there are remarkable parallels between what he suggests could be done to wage a wartime theater anti-submarine campaign and what could be done to wage a campaign to defeat an adversary’s wartime use of theater-range conventionally-armed ballistic and cruise missiles. His recounting of the Navy’s “full-spectrum ASW†doctrine provides an excellent model for tying together a combined arms “full-spectrum anti-theater missile campaign†concept along the lines of what Deputy Secretary of Defense Bob Work dubbed “raid breaker†earlier this year.[ii] Just as ASW doesn’t depend entirely on destroying the submarine, theater missile defense doesn’t depend entirely on destroying the inbound theater missile. With this in mind, we see that each of Toti’s “ten threads of full-spectrum ASW†has an anti-theater missile analogue: Full Spectrum ASW Full Spectrum Anti-Theater Missile Warfare Defeat submarines in port Suppress missile-armed mobile platforms’ basing and logistical support infrastructure Defeat the submarines’ shore-based command and control capability Defeat the systems-of-systems that missile-armed mobile platforms rely upon to attack effectively Defeat submarines near port, in denied areas Defeat missile-armed mobile platforms as they break out of bases/garrisons towards their firing positions Defeat submarines in choke points Defeat missile-armed air and naval platforms in choke points Defeat submarines in open ocean Defeat missile-armed mobile platforms in their patrol or firing areas Draw enemy submarines into ASW “kill boxes,†to a time and place of our choosing Induce missile-armed mobile platforms to fire at false targets and perhaps expose themselves to attack Mask our forces from submarine detection or classification Mask our forces from the adversary’s local reconnaissance and targeting efforts Defeat the submarine in close battle Defeat missile-armed air and naval platforms in close battle Defeat the incoming torpedo Defeat the inbound missile Create conditions where an adversary chooses not to employ submarines Create conditions where an adversary chooses not to employ theater missiles Let’s go through the anti-theater missile “threads†in turn. As we proceed, note that I implicitly discard the option of engaging in war-opening preemptive attacks against an adversary’s theater missile forces. With the exception of certain types of electronic or cyber operations, I work under the assumption that most of the below types of attacks would only be authorized by a U.S. President after a war has already started. Suppress Missile-Armed Mobile Platforms’ Basing and Logistical Support Infrastructure Theater missile-firing platforms include aircraft, submarines, naval surface combatants, and Transporter Erector Launchers (TEL). All of these platforms require logistical support including rearmament, refueling (with the exception of SSNs, of course), replenishment of stores, corrective maintenance, and damage repair. In war, the bases in which they normally reside, receive servicing, and operate from can be attacked (assuming authorization from political leadership, which I’ll discuss in more detail below). Nevertheless, not all of these platforms need to always return to a permanently-fixed base for all forms of servicing. For example, many missile-firing platforms can operate from and be serviced to some extent in austere locations such as seaports, airports, “satellite†airbases or ad hocairstrips, or relocatable logistical depots. Some missile-firing platforms can have fuel, stores, repair parts, and even certain types of munitions brought to them in the field: replenishment ships can resupply surface combatants and sometimes submarines at sea, trucks or transport aircraft can resupply strike aircraft at austere airbases/airstrips, and trucks can resupply TEL units. All of these means for logistical support in the “field†can be directly attacked given sufficient intelligence, surveillance, or reconnaissance to know when and where to strike. Moreover, the depots and other fixed infrastructure that logistics forces inevitably pull from can also be identified and attacked. There’s an important caveat, though: the heavy wartime demands on U.S. strike-capable platforms and the finite size of their guided munitions inventories suggests that (politically authorized) targeting lists would have to be prioritized based on a particular logistical asset’s or site’s importance in the adversary’s combat logistics chain, plus the operational and tactical difficulties/risks in attacking that target. This leads to a key point: an intelligent adversary could employ many forms of deception and concealment to heavily complicate U.S. and allied targeting efforts against a logistical asset/site or the missile-armed platforms it was servicing. Nevertheless, many forms of concealment would require that the adversary reduce its missile forces’ operational tempos somewhat in order to reduce the risk of detection, classification, and attack. This might relieve some pressure on friendly air and missile defenses by suppressing the frequency and sizes of missile raids on the margins; this can have a significant effect on a given defense’s probability of annihilating a raid. In turn, this suppression might provide friendly forces increased temporary localized margins of operational freedom in a theater—not to mention possibly alleviate some margin of pressure on allied populations and their governments (and by extension on U.S political leaders). Attacking an adversary’s theater missile forces’ bases along with much of their supporting logistical infrastructure would require strikes against the adversary’s home soil. U.S. political leaders would undoubtedly weigh the escalatory risks of such strikes against the consequences of allowing the adversary to enjoy operational sanctuary for its missile forces. Some critics suggest these escalatory risks would—and should—bar the U.S. from ever attacking a nuclear-armed adversary’s soil. Such critiques however do not recognize the high probability that if the adversary valued certain political objectives highly enough to opt for major war, those objectives would force him to commit the escalatory precedent of conventionally striking a treaty ally’s territory—and perhaps also sovereign U.S. territories—first. This is of immense strategic significance. For one thing, an adversary’s conventional first strike against U.S. or allied territories would almost certainly ignite the popular passions of the victims’ citizens. The pressure on a U.S. President to retaliate in scope if not in kind would be intense. For another, the adversary’s first strike would allow the U.S. and its ally to invoke unassailable legal as well as moral justification for retaliation. These factors would not offset the nuclear risks of non-nuclear retaliation, but it should be noted that there is an enormous difference between selectively striking conventional forces that might carry theater nuclear weapons and striking distinct nuclear forces. In many cases, the bases and logistical infrastructure supporting conventional forces are distinct from those used by nuclear forces. For example, China’s theater nuclear forces (in the form of its DF-21 medium-range ballistic missile force) are distinct (and often geographically segregated) from its conventionally-armed short-range ballistic missile and long-range cruise missile forces. None of this is meant to minimize questions of escalation risk facing a U.S. President, but they most certainly do not present a “checkmating†barrier that prevents operations to deny the adversary’s theater missile forces sanctuary. It bears observing that potential adversaries wouldn’t be investing heavily in integrated territorial air defenses, base hardening, and deception and concealment technologies to protect their conventional theater missile forces if they didn’t accept the reality that those forces might be attacked in war.[iii] Defeat the systems-of-systems that missile-armed mobile platforms rely upon to attack effectively I’ve previously written about thesekindsofoperationsat length. Suffice to say, an adversary must be able to either provide correct targeting-quality tactical pictures to its firing units or be able to cue those “shooters†into positions from which they can use their own sensors to build local targeting pictures. The U.S. and its allies can use deception and concealment to prevent the adversary from being able to effectively attack protected mobile forces. This can also be done to some extent for fixed bases and military or civil infrastructure, as deception and concealment can be used to make unimportant sites look important and vice versa. Deception and concealment might additionally be used to induce the adversary to waste precious weapons (and expose firing platforms) in attacks against false or low-value targets. The U.S. might additionally attack the adversary’s surveillance and reconnaissance assets, precision navigation and time systems that allow the construction of an accurate situational picture, command and control sites where firing decisions are made, and data relay pathways that form the “backbone†of the entire apparatus. These attacks can be physical, but in many cases it might be more effective as well as carry less escalation risk to use electronic or (as technically plausible) cyber attacks. Nor do these attacks need to have permanent effects (though that would certainly be the ideal), as friendly forces could greatly capitalize on even temporary localized degradation of the adversary’s surveillance-reconnaissance-targeting infrastructure. This “thread†would not prevent an adversary from using its conventionally-armed theater missiles in terror bombardment campaign against an American ally’s cities. Even so, history suggests such a campaign would be far more likely to further ignite the ally’s popular passions and deepen its resolve to prevail—and retaliate—than it would to than it would to coerce the ally into submission. In other words, it would be a strategically self-defeating move by the adversary. Defeat missile-armed mobile platforms as they break out of bases/garrisons towards their firing positions As Toti observes, this “thread†would largely occur within “denied†areas such as the adversary’s own soil, any friendly or neutral territories occupied by the adversary’s forces, the airspace above or adjacent to these territories, or the waterspace adjoining these territories. This would accordingly complicate offensive anti-air, anti-submarine, anti-surface combatant, and anti-TEL operations. Nevertheless, friendly submarines could lurk offshore to intercept the adversary’s submarines and surface combatants. Offensive sweeps by theater-range fighters might be used when and where feasible to attack the adversary’s outbound aircraft. Standoff strike aircraft cued by penetrating scouts might be used to attack the adversary’s surface combatants. If adequate air superiority is present, maritime patrol aircraft might be used to search for and attack adversary submarines. Special forces might be used to cue attacks using penetrating aircraft or long-range guided munitions against TELs (though if the First Gulf War is any indication, probably without a great deal of success). Destroying missile-firing platforms would of course be ideal, but the real goal of this “thread†would be to make breakout more time-consuming and resource-intensive than it might otherwise be for the adversary. This might result in further suppression of his operational tempo. It might also prevent him from seizing or maintaining the operational initiative. Defeat missile-armed air and naval platforms in choke points I covered this with respect to aircraft and submarines lastweek; the threats facing an adversary’s surface combatants would be even steeper. This forms part of the argument for deploying land-based anti-ship missiles alongside straits. Land-based surveillance assets bordering a strait can also cue anti-ship strikes by friendly aircraft operating from more distant bases. Similarly, these surveillance assets can provide other friendly forces with tactically-actionable indications and warning of a strike aircraft raid transiting through a choke point towards its targets or back to its airbases. Lastly, defensive minefields could be laid as geographically practical to complicate transits by the adversary’s surface combatants or submarines. Defeat missile-armed mobile platforms in their patrol or firing areas I also covered this with respect to aircraft and submarines lastweek. In the absence of persistent tactical air cover, an adversary’s surface combatants would not be able to hold out for long against U.S or allied anti-ship onslaughts. TELs present the hardest target to engage in the adversary’s firing areas, bar none. They not only can hide within the broad expanse (and defense-in-depth) of the adversary’s territory, but can also blend into their surroundings on par with the quietest submarines at sea. They can shift quickly and frequently between prepared firing positions, or can hunker down heavily camouflaged for protracted periods. There is no existing or technically-plausible weapon system that could offer a high kill probability against TEL units that were smartly employing deception and concealment. Nor is there an existing or technically-plausible strike aircraft that could persistently perform TEL hunts deep within a capable adversary’s airspace unless the adversary’s territorial air defenses had been comprehensively rolled back. This does not mean that TEL hunting, if the tactical environment allows it, would be fruitless. The situation-dependent use of U.S. aircraft to hunt TELs using cheap weapons with low kill probabilities would still put TEL units on the defensive, which in turn might contribute to suppressing TEL firing rates and salvo sizes. The most effective means of defeating ground-launched missile forces is to physically occupy the territory they are operating within. This is a principle that has been proven time and time again, from the allies’ Second World War efforts to defeat the German V-1 and V-2 bombardment campaign, to the Israelis’ efforts to break up Hezbollah and Hamas rocket bombardment campaigns over the past decade. It’s also the most costly in treasure and blood, as it requires the use of sizable ground forces. This is plausible and probably necessary if the adversary is operating TELs on the overrun soil of a U.S. ally; liberation of the ally’s territory would normally be a U.S. war objective in any case. It may also be plausible, albeit possibly far more costly, if a relatively small adversary country is operating TELs on its own soil. It is not plausible at all, whether militarily or politically, against TELs operated on the soil of a regional or great power. However, if a regional or great power is operating TELs relatively close to its border or coastal areas, and especially if those areas are somewhat geographically isolated, it might be plausible to dispatch special forces on brief raids aimed at destroying them directly, flushing them for attack by other friendly forces, or temporarily suppressing them by inducing them to go into hiding. Expeditionary forces might also be used to raid a regional power’s TELs in these kinds of areas; this would not be possible politically or militarily against a great power. Induce missile-armed mobile platforms to fire at false targets and perhaps expose themselves to attack I’ve written about this one extensivelyin the past as well. Every theater missile wasted is one less in the adversary’s finite inventory, with concomitant impacts on his campaign plans. This is especially true if a wasted missile cannot be readily replaced off the production line during wartime. Similarly, an adversary platform or grouping that is seduced into attacking false targets will be incapable of attacking valid targets elsewhere at the same time. U.S. and allied forces can obviously exploit this operationally. At maximum, a submarine, surface combatant, or aircraft that shoots a theater missile gives away its general presence and sometimes even its approximate position. False targets might thus be used to set up reactive intercepts against the attackers, or perhaps even to lure them into prepared ambushes. It isn’t a stretch to imagine the kinds of enduring (and exploitable) psychological effects that might be imposed upon previously-overconfident adversary crews that wasted ordnance against decoys—or managed to survive an ambush. Mask our forces from the adversary’s local reconnaissance and targeting efforts This is another “thread†I’vecoveredpreviouslyelsewhere. It is just as crucial to the use of false target tactics in the previous “thread†as it is to defending actual U.S. and allied forces from attack. The adversary must not be allowed to properly classify, let alone detect if at all practical, actual U.S. and allied forces until it is too late to matter. Toti hits the nail on the head in his piece when he notes “…it is about increasing the fog of war by making the real targets look like anything but a real target†and that it “must be a continuous process.â€[iv] Defeat missile-armed air and naval platforms in close battle This is self-explanatory: destroy them or induce them to retreat before they can shoot at friendly forces. This demands either long-range weaponry that can be fired from the “inner zone†against the adversary’s inbound missile-armed platforms or the placement of persistent outer layer defenses in the adversary’s path. The latter is almost always preferable as the adversary can easily field strike missiles that outrange any weapon the defender might fire from the inner zone. As its title makes clear, this “thread†is not applicable to TELs. Defeat the inbound missile This is also self-explanatory. Missile defense sensors, kinetic weapons, and electronic warfare systems all factor here. So does damage recoverability (e.g. use of redundant systems, rapid repair of damaged runways, hardening of a base’s critical infrastructure, shipboard damage control, etc). No single measure offers a panacea: some combination of active and passive measures is necessary to maximize defensive effectiveness. A subtle variation of this “thread†involves the dispersal of forces not just to enhance their survivability, but also to force the adversary into an inventory management dilemma. The adversary could concentrate strikes over a specific period of time against a small number of force dispersal sites in order to overwhelm the missile defense systems protecting those sites, but that would leave the U.S. and allied forces positioned in other dispersal sites free to operate. The adversary could alternatively strike the maximum number of dispersal sites possible within a specific time period, but that would result in relatively few missiles attacking any single site—and thereby greatly simplify the jobs of each site’s missile defense systems. Also recall that theater missiles are not easily produced, especially in war. This means every missile fired would reduce the number available to the adversary for the duration of the conflict. As such, the adversary would probably have some threshold limit to the number of missiles he’d be willing to use in a concentrated or “spread†attack. U.S. and allied forces could adapt to capitalize on whichever attack type the adversary selected, and by doing so defeat the adversary’s theater missiles at the operational level of war. Create conditions where an adversary chooses not to employ theater missiles Full-spectrum anti-theater missile warfare signifies denying the adversary conventional escalation dominance in a crisis or war. The cumulative effect of convincing an opportunistic potential adversary that each of its “threads†are combat-credible—and that U.S. political leaders would be willing to deny the potential adversary’s forces operational sanctuary on their own soil if the adversary struck first—will generally be successful conventional deterrence. The ideal state of deterrence would obviously be prevention of war outright, and Cold War-era theories regarding how this can be achieved between two competing nuclear-armed powers remain applicable. But even if a conventional war did erupt, the credibility of full-spectrum anti-theater missile warfare might help induce an adversary with modest political objectives to keep the conflict limited to a brief localized clash along a land border or at sea involving only the shortest-range missiles in both sides’ inventories. While tragic and hardly desirable, it would still be vastly preferable to a ruinous general war. CAPT William J. Toti, USN (Retired). “The Hunt for Full-Spectrum ASW.†Naval Institute Proceedings 140, No. 6, June 2014, 39. [ii] I define “theater missile†to include short and medium range ballistic and cruise missiles that can strike targets on land or at sea. [iii]This point is made abundantly clear in Elbridge Colby. “Don’t Sweat Air Sea Battle.†The National Interest online, 13 July 2013, accessed 5/24/15, http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/dont-sweat-airsea-battle-8804?page=show [iv] Toti, 43. The views expressed herein are solely those of the author and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not reflect the official positions of Systems Planning and Analysis, and to the author’s knowledge do not reflect the policies or positions of the U.S. Department of Defense, any U.S. armed service, or any other U.S. Government agency. CAPT William J. Toti, USN (Retired). “The Hunt for Full-Spectrum ASW.†Naval Institute Proceedings 140, No. 6, June 2014, 39. [ii] I define “theater missile†to include short and medium range ballistic and cruise missiles that can strike targets on land or at sea. [iii]This point is made abundantly clear in Elbridge Colby. “Don’t Sweat Air Sea Battle.†The National Interest online, 13 July 2013, accessed 5/24/15, http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/dont-sweat-airsea-battle-8804?page=show [iv] Toti, 43. View the full article

A very neat poster. Very neat. (click for larger) Where is one for the surface forces? View the full article

What was that about not being able to fight once knocked down in plate armor again? View the full article

An F-22 Raptor takes to the sky during a demonstration of air dominance over Tyndall Air Force Base, Fla., April 11, 2015. The event featured members of the F-22 Raptor Demonstration Team, the Air Force aerial demonstration team, the Thunderbirds, and the U.S. Army Parachute Team, the Golden Knights. U.S. Air Force photo by Tech. Sgt. Javier Cruz View the full article

The Chinese navy has long been accused of not showing enough transparency. While that has certainly really improved in the recent year, there are still plenty of areas that's hard for a blogger like myself to follow. Certainly, most of the surface combatants are easy to track, since many photos are released of them. Most of the subsystems and weapon systems on these ships are also quite transparent with some version of them offered for exports. There are some many news reports giving even more information on various naval ships and their subsystems. So which programs are noticeably absent from all these photos and news releases? The most obvious answers would be their strategic platforms. Certainly, CV-16 is a strategic platform, but it also happens to be one of the more transparent programs due to how it has captured the imagination of the ordinary people. At this point, I don't see them introducing any significant secrecy to CV-16 or aircraft carriers in general due to the excitement it has generated. Certainly, the nuclear submarine programs are probably the most secretive platforms amongst all of the naval ships. We very rarely see pictures of under construction nuclear submarines, but we do get some pictures of them at the naval bases and out on patrols. Also, 093 was officially declassified a few years ago, which allowed for some more pictures to come out. As shown in my previous blog entry, we get enough information about 093 and 094 from China themselves and Google Earth photos in addition to ONI reports to make some educated guesses on where they are at. So, what else are really hard to get any kind of useful information on? The first would be the ASBM project. I've written numerous articles on it back in 2009. Such articles were written based on work already done by Chinese bloggers on the same topic. Even though numerous articles were written by people like myself, Andrew Erickson and numerous other PLA followers, much of what we gathered were based on our observations of various support systems that were developed. Certainly, we get more information on China's satellite programs, ELINT programs and UAV programs than DF-21D missile itself. We know that it is an active program, but the actual operational status is unknown at this point. It certainly makes sense that such secrecy is given to this program because of its strategic nature against US aircraft carriers. Due to the amount of attention I've seen USN given to this program, it seems like China would be wise to continue the secrecy here. Secondly, What caused me to write this blog is the secrecy in China's torpedo programs. First thing to note is the different levels of transparency given to light and heavy torpedoes. We have not only seen many photos of Yu-7 carried by helicopters and launched by naval ships, but we've also seen export versions (ET-52) of Yu-7 and pictures of the Yu-7 seeker. It would make sense for Yu-7 to be more transparent since it's unlikely to be very helpful against nuclear submarine and more likely to be used to counter conventional submarines. At the same time, its kinetic performance can be estimated based on that of MK-46 and A244-S. Basically, the Chinese navy don't have as much to loose by giving Yu-7 greater transparency. It will be interesting to see if the next generation of light torpedo will be given the same level of transparency. It certainly seems like they are not investing as much in them. Heavy torpedo on the other hand have been extremely secretive. In the past 5 years, we've seen photos of Yu-6 and Yu-3A loaded onto conventional submarines. There have been no export versions of 533 mm torpedoes anywhere. There have been little to no articles on the usage and test firings of 533 mm torpedoes. Even the status and performance of a rather old torpedo like Yu-3A is completely off limits. Since the wide introduction of Yu-6 is the past decade, there have apparently been 2 new heavy torpedoes in development that are either in service of close to service Yu-9 and Yu-10. In case you are wondering, I just read them off reasonably reliable Chinese bbs sources that these torpedo programs do exist and have gone through test firings. Considering that there have not been any photos of them anywhere, I certainly don't have any details on their kinetic performance. So, the question is why there are so much secrecy toward 533 mm torpedoes. I think China has correctly identified USN nuclear submarines as their biggest threat. After all, Chinese submarines cannot leave their naval bases without getting tracked by USN subs. Considering that the top speed and operating depth of USN subs are classified, China really needs something like MK-48 ADCAP that can sustain high speed over long range to chase down a modern nuclear submarine. The actual performance of something like the MK-48 mod 7 CBASS is classified (as is its advanced processing capability), but i would imagine it's capable of chasing down and destroying Russian and Chinese nuclear submarines that are within certain range. And considering that a USN aircraft carrier is extremely fast and well protected against strikes for anti-ship missiles, such heavy torpedo development would also have double strategic value in attacking carriers. Now, I'm not saying the Chinese nuclear submarines are quiet enough to get within torpedo launching distance of a USN carrier, but maybe an ambushing conventional submarine could get lucky. Either way, advanced torpedoes have high strategic value, so that's why there is so little information on them. Another torpedo system that we have very little information on is China's version of ASROC. There were so little information on them that I did not know the 054A VLS could launch it until one of the PLAN commanders mentioned 054A could launch such torpedoes (given possible designation Yu-8) in a TV interview. At this point, it seems like both 052D's new VLS and 054A's VLS could launch some type of ASROC. I have not seen any picture of such missile nor do I have any idea of its performance parameters, but just heard that it does exist. On top of the classified nature of torpedoes, information on the new sonar system that China has developed for its surface combatants and submarines are also classified, but we've at least seen their photos and export versions of towed array sonar. I think it's clear that the Chinese Navy sees ASW as its biggest weakness. They have spent a lot of money in developing sensors to track advanced submarines, but more resources is spent on the weapons against them. View the full article

Over to you. View the full article

Over the past two years, the debate over U.S. military options for defending East Asian allies from potential Chinese aggression has primarily been between proponents of the Air-Sea Battle operational concept and proponents of the Offshore Control strategic concept. The conventional wisdom appears to be that the two concepts are mutually exclusive. Such a view makes no sense. Simply put, there is no reason why key elements from both cannot be integrated within a single holistic strategic concept that provides circumstance-based flexibility in covering the entire spectrum of potential Sino-American conventional conflict. In order to see why this is so, let’s first examine how the two concepts are defined in their authoritative source materials and then summarize both sides’ main arguments (with a few linked representative examples). Air-Sea Battle Air-Sea Battle is a U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) operational conceptthat outlines the Joint combined arms capabilities, doctrinal tenets, and Command, Control, and Communications (C3) approaches necessary for maintaining U.S. forces’ access to and freedom of maneuver within opposed theaters. Air-Sea Battle’s present contents flow from the unclassified, clearly-articulated, and widely-overlooked January 2012 Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC). DoD leadership, senior service leaders, and Air-Sea Battle Office personnel have been consistently explicit in stating Air-Sea Battle is not a strategy in its own right (or even a campaign plan), and that it is not specifically targeted against any particular country. Nevertheless, manyAir-Sea Battle proponents outside DoDassertthat the concept is highly applicable to deterring—and if that fails, then waging—a Sino-American war. This school largely believes it would be impossible to prevent a major Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) fait accompli against a U.S. ally in East Asia, let alone have a chance at eventually inducing China to restore the geostrategic status quo ante should a major conflict erupt, if U.S. and allied militaries were incapable of (at minimum) quickly bogging down a PLA offensive and then rallying to restore key defensive ‘facts on the ground.’ Given the region’s geography, the most important of these ‘facts’ would arguably be the security of the trans-oceanic and intra-theater maritime lines of communication America’s allies depend upon for military reinforcement and economic sustenance. Air-Sea Battle proponents therefore argue that U.S. forces must be capable of performing conventional, cyber, and electronic attacks against PLA infrastructure and forces in order to protect friendly maritime lines of communication as well as arrest PLA offensive operations. While most such attacks would likely occur within the contested maritime zone, the proponents assert U.S. forces would also need to be capable of striking PLA infrastructure and non-nuclear forces on the Chinese mainland if strategically necessary. Lastly, while this school generally believes Air-Sea Battle would be incapable of winning a war on its own, they also believe the success of any grand strategy for deterring aggression against allies on China’s doorstep (and defending them if need be) would depend in large part upon the latent availability (and selective use) of the concept’s tools and methods. Many critics of Air-Sea Battle argue strikes against mainland China would carry unacceptable risks of triggering inadvertent or accidental escalation to the nuclear threshold. Some of the concept’s critics believe these strikes would be automaticallyexecuted regardless of the conflict scenario, or that they could only be practicably executed in the form of an escalation precedent-setting preemptive strike by the U.S. Other critics assert Air-Sea Battle’s allowance for land-attack strikes implies the concept embraces a strategy of coercively bombarding an opponent into submission. Additional critics declare that such strikes reflect a deterministicand techno-centricway of war in which the means employed are disconnected from the ends sought. Lastly, a number of critics point out that Air-Sea Battle is not directly applicable to countering China’s ongoing ‘salami tactics’ campaigns in the East and South China Seas. Offshore Control Unlike the official Air-Sea Battle concept’s adversary-agnostic focus on the operational level of war, Offshore Control is an unofficial strategic concept conceived by defense academiaspecifically to address the Sino-American military competition. Offshore Control consists of two main thrusts, both of which are intended to deter war through the latent threat of their credible implementation. The first would be a distant blockade of China’s sea lines of communication that would be primarily achieved by U.S. or allied militaries’ control over Indo-Pacific maritime chokepoints lying beyond the PLA’s effective reach. This blockade would be aimed at compelling conciliation through economic punishment, namely by reducing China’s access to oil and other vital raw materials (and possibly forcing it to pay higher prices on the margins for what it imports overland), as well as by reducing China’s ability to sell its wares in major overseas markets. Offshore Control’s other element would consist of traditional campaigns by the U.S. to prevent effective PLA control of the East and South China Seas, directly defend threatened allies’ territories, and secure control of the maritime lines of communication connecting these allies with the world—all without engaging in any kind of strikes into China. Offshore Control’s advocates assert that their concept would be more scalable in terms of intensity and controllable in terms of escalationthan Air-Sea Battle to match up to the nature of the Chinese acts of aggression that precipitated a given conflict. They also assert that Offshore Control is built around a coherent theory of victory: the raising of Chinese leaders’ costs to an intolerable level by preventing them from militarily attaining their political objectives, as well as by coercively—yet reversibly—economically punishing the Chinese people. While critics of Offshore Control typically agree that maritime blockades can play strategically useful supporting roles in a conflict, they caution that any embargo is inherently dependent upon the cooperation (or coercion) of neutralsincluding other great and regional powers, might be too permeable or insufficiently painful to effectively coercethe targeted nation’s leaders and citizens, and is not devoid of horizontal or vertical escalation risks. Other critics argue that the global economic repercussions of a blockade of China would risk catastrophic international political blowback against the U.S. Just about all critics of Offshore Control’s blockading element argue against the belief that the leaders of a great power as large and resourceful as China could be compelled to concede primarily through blockade or any other strategy of political-economic coercion. A few go further to cautionthat allocation of forces and their supporting infrastructure (e.g. surveillance, reconnaissance, logistics) to blockade enforcement would in many cases trade off against allocation of forces and infrastructure to the primary effort: direct defense of allied territories and lines of communication. Indeed, these critics note that the aforementioned defensive tasks would be made incredibly difficult by virtue of allied countries’ close proximities to mainland China; PLA forces’ ever-increasing reach in the form of theater ballistic missiles and standoff-range missile-armed aircraft; and the PLA’s unquestionable in-theater quantitative superiority. These critics conclude that allowing PLA forces to strike from mainland China with impunity against allied territories and lines of communication—and thus cause U.S. and allied defensive forces deployed on or operating from those territories (not to mention any allied populations) to wither on the vine—would be strategically ruinous. The same would be absolutely true in a conflict of any scale with respect to allowing the PLA’s mainland-located surveillance resources to observe the contested zone unhindered. It should be noted that a variation on Offshore Control exists that discards the concept’s coercive blockading element while retaining its maritime denial element and its foreswearing of strikes into China. However, the above critiques regarding the concept’s ability to handle scenarios in which the PLA employed mainland-based aerospace strike forces or mainland-located maritime surveillance resources still apply, and thus I do not assess it separately. Synthesis Several truisms can be derived from the preceding arguments. Regarding Air-Sea Battle, it would be illogical and ahistorical to assert that any kind of U.S. coercive strike campaign against Chinese economic or civil infrastructure could successfully defend embattled allies at an acceptable level of risk. It would also be illogical and ahistorical to assert that U.S. forces’ abilities to conduct wartime operations in the East Asian maritime would inherently depend upon them executing preemptive conventional strikes against PLA infrastructure and forces located in mainland China, or that ‘high-end’ operations in general would be appropriate for all conceivable scenarios. That said, it ought to be observed that no authoritative DoD source or credible Air-Sea Battle advocate has ever publicly made such assertions. Turning to Offshore Control, it would be unsound to assert that a notional U.S. campaign to defend an ally (or restore freedom of maneuver within East Asian waters) could succeed under all conceivable scenarios without ever having the need to conduct any form of strikes against the PLA inside China’s borders. It would also be quite deterministic to assert that an economic blockade would assuredly induce China to restore the status quo ante within a politically acceptable amount of time without hazarding Chinese escalation. Once we discard these problematic assertions, it becomes quite obvious that much of Air-Sea Battle and Offshore Control actually overlap to a remarkable degree. It is therefore impossible to escape the impression that there is no reason why specific elements from both concepts cannot be unified within a single coherent strategic concept. In fact, their integration where logical and appropriate creates a range of incrementally-intensifying options for responding to notional Chinese acts of aggression. This merger’s logic becomes readily apparent when we consider several variables that thus far have been largely overlooked in the debate: the belligerents’ characterization and valuation of their political objectives, and a confrontation’s unique political and strategic circumstances. As Clausewitz tells us, these variables combine to directly influence the means the belligerents choose to employ and the scale of their clash. This becomes evident when we examine plausible scenarios along the spectrum of Sino-American conflict. Tomorrow, addressing high-end salami tactics and limited war scenarios. View the full article

A few weeks ago I published aseriesofpostsanalyzing Maksim Tokarev’s outstanding Naval War College Review article that detailed the Soviet Navy’s 1980s-era doctrine for employing combined arms against U.S. Navy battleforces. At the end of my first post, I suggested that: With a finite number of bombers, missiles, and trained crews, it is reasonable to think Soviet commanders would have been somewhat hesitant to dispatch such irreplaceable forces into battle unless they had some degree of confidence in their situational picture’s accuracy; the operational-strategic penalties that would be incurred if they ‘got it wrong’ simply seem too high for this not to have been the case. Accordingly, it will be extremely interesting to someday learn the criteria that had to be satisfied for SNAF commanders to order a raid. In the comments section to my final post in that series, Maksim graciously shared many new observations to address multiple aspects of that very question. As before, I’m going to quote his key points and then add my commentary. I’ve lightly edited his remarks; the wording changes I made are in brackets. Maksim first notes that the Soviet Naval Air Force’s organizational ethos, much like that of most air forces and service air arms, was rooted in the ‘spirit of attack.’ Detailed mission planning was less important than seizing upon fortuitous opportunities to deal the enemy a severe blow: Courage, brisk battle, blaze of glory, fair uniform first – and at least moderate careful planning [only] then. The heroes, the warriors, don’t hesitate to fight and die, bird's souls in the human’s bodies. The staff work is always something neglected, too boring to be the good job… sometimes “the good enough decision now is better than the brilliant one tomorrow.†The consequence was that, as Maksim puts it: The commanders who share that ethos can send the strikes against [ambiguous or low-confidence] target, hoping to receive definite targeting enroute, or counting on the strike’s inherent recco and targeting abilities. This is a crucial (and quite obvious in hindsight) point that I’ve previously failed to consider. It is applicable not only within the context of the Cold War naval competition, but also to any attacker’s calculus. Attack opportunities against a highly capable opponent’s maneuvering forces are generally fleeting. A brief intercept of the opponent’s radio or active sensor emissions, or perhaps a scout’s brief (and perhaps sacrificial) direct contact with what seems to be an element of the opponent’s force, might be the only targeting cue the prospective attacker ever receives. The next detection of the opponent’s force might be when it is too late to derail or defeat the opponent’s operational plan. In fact, the next attack opportunity might not arise until after the opponent has already achieved his operation’s main objective(s). Maksim alludes to this dilemma from Soviet Navy commanders’ perspective: Look, they [examined] the Northern Weddings’ logs hard, every minute of evolutions, every launch and landing, every word on radio and so on. They understood that when the carriers came in the Norway fjords, it [would be] just too late to try to hit them [with] air assets. So the time slot to decide could have been very narrow. It’s better to make a wrong decision than suspend the good one. Individuals make opportunity cost decisions based upon how they subjectively value their available options. A prospective attacker must choose between withholding scarce strike assets in hopes of a future opportunity to attack with a higher degree of targeting confidence, or otherwise expending those assets in the present with low targeting confidence under the assumption that there may be no future opportunity. When an attack-embracing organizational ethos within belligerent “A’s†forces mixes with a paramount objective of preventing belligerent “B†from attacking first, there will likely be intense psychological pressures on belligerent “A’s†operational commander to order a strike. The implication is that a careless and perhaps overconfident “B†who does not employ effective concealment (with some supporting deception for good measure) risks falling victim to a bold “A†who capitalizes on the most limited of targeting cues. Conversely, an intelligent “B†who understands “A’s†opportunity cost calculus well enough might be able to craft a deception and concealment plan that lures “A†into expending precious ordnance (and perhaps platforms and crews) for naught. There is no way to determine the outcome of either of these two scenario types in advance; circumstances and chance during battle matter greatly. Maksim makes an additional point, though, in that the destruction of an opposing force may be far less important within a campaign context than its disruption or suppression: The key success is not the sinking of the carriers. Just stop [their] launch, recovery, any air activity; it’s enough to weaken the NATO ASW along the Norwegian coast and give the SSBNs the possibility to reach launching positions in [the] Atlantic, making nuclear war very costly for both parts, [and therefore] evaporating the political will to start it. At the same time the tank armies will be in Berlin, Paris, Brussels and so on. In other words, he is referring to one of the Soviets’ chief maritime strategic objectives for the early phases of a conventional European war: degradation of potential offensive ASW efforts by NATO navies against Soviet SSBNs. His assertion is consistent with the intelligence assessments that shaped the U.S. Navy’s development of the 1980s Maritime Strategy. The Soviets viewed the correlation of wartime-fielded nuclear forces as a key factor in deterring NATO’s escalation to the nuclear threshold. NATO would likely only have contemplated crossing that threshold, though, if the Red Army had routed NATO’s forward defenses along the inter-German front. From the Soviet perspective, then, any measures that increased the likelihood that mutual intra-war nuclear deterrence would hold also increased the likelihood that they could achieve their war objectives via conventional means. It was additionally recognized that if the Soviets had been able to effectively protect their SSBN force during a conventional war, they would have possessed a stronger position for war termination negotiations. Consequently, effective disruption or suppression of U.S. carrier battleforce operations along the Soviet maritime periphery could have prevented NATO navies from attaining the margin of local sea control necessary for combined arms prosecutions of older Soviet SSBNs, such as the Yankee-class, that had to break through the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom gap in order to reach their Western Atlantic patrol stations. Similar disruption/suppression efforts against U.S. carriers operating somewhat deeper within the Soviet maritime periphery could have delayed or prevented destruction of the Soviet surface combatants performing defensive ASW in support of the ‘boomer bastions’ used by later generation Soviet SSBNs such as the various Delta-classes and the Typhoon-class. All this would be in addition to—and possibly more important to the Soviets than—preventing U.S. carrier air wings’ conventional strikes against military targets in Soviet coastal areas. Another key observation by Maksim is that Soviet maritime strike capabilities should be viewed holistically, or rather that the Soviet Naval Air Force was not necessarily the primary combat arm for the anti-carrier mission: There were also surface and [submarine] components of the Anti-Carrier Doctrine, and it is extremely hard to say which one was main and which one [was] complementary. It depended on who, when, [and] how [the carriers were found] and where the [soviet maritime] forces [were] deployed at the moment. Naturally it does mean that [the entire] air component could have been used as the decoy, three whole air divisions of expendable planes and people – if the surface combatant or subs needed [that kind of support in order to be able to attack effectively], [whether they were]in better [attack] positions in the staff’s opinion or by chance. The idea that an entire combat arm could be used as an expendable decoy is quite incredible from a Western perspective, but in light of the aforementioned Soviet maritime strategic priorities it makes perfect sense. If the Soviets believed it was unlikely that a conventional conflict would be protracted, and that nuclear deterrence/bargaining therefore predominated, the opportunity cost of expending these platforms and crews in such a way could be quite acceptable. Coordination between two or more combat arms for a single near-simultaneous attack would have been incredibly difficult based on the issues Maksim identifies in his article and that I’ve addressed in some of my prior writings. Nevertheless, these issues would not have necessarily precluded Soviet Navy commanders from burning up one combat arm in an attempt to knock a U.S. battleforce off-balance in preparation for a later attack by another combat arm. When the implications of Maksim’s aforementioned observations are combined, we come to see what he means when he says: That is why my article is in general about kamikazes. It was one-way navy. No one expected to return, [had] the war been declared. Continental powers’ concepts regarding the combat employment of naval forces have historically been quite different than those of maritime powers. U.S. naval strategists and operational planners, not to mention those of us in the armchair analysis community, would be wise to bear in mind that courses of action that seem rash or potentially self-defeating from our perspectives could be quite rational from a potential adversary’s perspective. Jon’s sidenote: this refers to the U.S. Navy’s 1980s concept for creating carrier operations bastions in Norwegian fjords. For more details, see Commodore Jacob Børresen, Royal Norwegian Navy (Retired). “Alliance Naval Strategies and Norway in the Final Years of the Cold War.†Naval War College Review 64, No. 2 (Spring 2011): 97-115. View the full article

Note: I was originally planning on publishing a series of articles this week on the large-deck aircraft carrier's doctrinal roles, but I'm shifting that to next week as I need a little more time to make final edits. As a result, I'm moving up my series analyzing the DF-21 arsenal. Both series touch on my theme for the first part of this month: the implications of guided munitions inventory management and producibility. The Chinese People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) Medium Range Ballistic Missile (MRBM) arsenal’s traditional primary role is supporting theater nuclear deterrence. China’s first generation DF-3 series (NATO Designation CSS-2) MRBMs were tasked with holding Indian and Russian targets, as well as major U.S. military forward deployed force concentrations within East Asia, at nuclear risk. As such, they were neither produced in great numbers nor required the terminal accuracy necessary for conventional long-range strike tasks.[ii] Although some DF-3s remain in service, roughly twenty years ago the PLA began replacing them with the DF-21 (NATO Designation CSS-5) missile series. Unlike its liquid-fueled predecessor, the solid-fueled DF-21 series can be rapidly readied for launch and are therefore harder to interdict when deployed in the field on their Transporter Erector Launchers (TEL). More significantly, while the ‘original’ DF-21 (CSS-5 MOD 1) and its longer-range DF-21A (CSS-5 MOD 2) variant assumed the historical theater nuclear deterrence role, the more recent DF-21C (CSS-5 MOD 3) and DF-21D (CSS-5 MOD 5) variants were designed specifically to deliver conventional munitions against point targets on land and large ships at sea respectively.[iii] There are two hypothesized roles for conventionally-armed DF-21s. First, there is a general scholarly consensus that PLA doctrine allows for if not embraces the use of conventionally-armed theater-range ballistic missiles in war-opening/escalating strikes aimed at decisively neutralizing a superior adversary’s forward forces and military infrastructure. This doctrinal tenet is almost certainly independent of the military strategy, doctrine, or force structure and posture options the U.S. might employ for defending its East Asian allies and interests. Beijing’s paramount declared military-strategic objective—the prevention of effective American military intervention on the behalf of an embattled ally in a major East Asian contingency—simply cannot be accomplished with a high degree of confidence absent a PLA first strike. It is resultantly noteworthy (and generally overlooked) that the PLAdoctrinal works and professional journal articles advocating conventional first strikes predated the U.S. Air-Sea Battle operational concept’s 2010 introduction.[iv] Within this context, the conventionally-armed DF-21C’s and -21D’s advantages in range, speed, field-deployed survivability, and defense penetration capabilities relative to PLAstrike aircraft make them ideal for maximizing the damage that can be inflicted upon an opponent’s in-theater Command and Control (C2) nodes, military bases’ critical infrastructure and logistical stores, and highest campaign-valueforces while minimizing tactical warning of attack.[v] Further, these missiles’ abilities to distract, suppress, or damage the opponent’s most important theater air and missile defense nodes could help support other elements of a PLA first strike, as well as bash down the door for follow-on strikes by PLA assets that would otherwise be quite vulnerable to those defenses. If it is solely configured to perform these war-opening/escalating missions, the peacetime conventional-capable DF-21 inventory only needs to be as large as what would be necessary to create a high probability of successfully neutralizing the relatively small set of high-priority targets assigned to a first strike’s opening waves. This sizing would be possible because surviving and lower-priority targets would likely be assigned to other combat arms for follow-on attacks. DF-21C and 21D inventory sizing along these lines would be consistent with the PLA’s apparent sizing of its SRBM inventories for Taiwan contingencies.[vi]Additional margin might be built into the inventory to provide backup rounds in case some missiles were unavailable for maintenance reasons when a crisis erupted, failed to launch when ordered, or failed to successfully strike the highest priority targets. The operative force-sizing question would be whether the inventory would be earmarked specifically for Sino-American/Japanese contingencies, or whether Sino-Indian or Sino-Russian contingencies would also need to be covered. The second possible conventionally-armed DF-21 role is performing long range strikes throughout a protracted conflict. These could include preemptive or suppressive strikes against major force groupings as they assemble for an operation, opportunistic strikes against fleeting high campaign-value targets, or direct/indirect fires—including possible feint attacks—in support of PLA Joint combined arms operations. It has been suggested, in fact, that the DF-21D might be used in war for land-based ‘artillery support’ of PLA maritime operations.[vii] Much like shore-based heavy artillery prior to the mid-20th Century, this kind of fire support would be exceptionally difficult for an opposing Navy to counter directly. Whereas coastal guns could only cover localized waters, however, the DF-21D possesses a theater-wide coverage area that not only includes China’s immediate periphery but also the maritime approaches to East Asia—and U.S. treaty allies’ homelands. A conventional-capable DF-21 inventory sized for the campaign-waging role would need to be rather large given the modern historical evidence advanced ordnance expenditure rates would be quite high in a conflict.[viii] This would be accentuated if Chinese leaders believed any notional conventional war would be intense but short, and resultantly opted not to take the extremely cost-inefficient and expensive step of structuring the DF-21C and -21D industrial production and test infrastructures such that they could readily replenish the PLA’s arsenal under combat conditions. Additionally, the more effective the defender’s surviving active and passive missile defenses might be in combat—especially after the first strike’s shock and surprise fades—the more missiles the attacker must launch per salvo to achieve a desired probability of target neutralization. Not only would this probabilistic effect push the PLA’s peacetime inventory size requirements even further upward, but it would also influence PLA combined arms campaign-level contingency planning enormously.[ix] Tomorrow, unpacking the DF-21 inventory. In this article, a MRBM is defined as possessing a range between 1000-3000km. This conforms to the range niche presently filled by the DF-21 series within the PLA’s arsenal. PLA theater ballistic missiles roles beyond 3000km are filled by Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles, and those beneath 1000km are performed by Short Range Ballistic Missiles. [ii] “DongFeng 3 (CSS-2) Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile.†Sinodefense.com, 27 February 2009, accessed 8/21/14, http://web.archive.org/web/20131029184838/http://www.sinodefence.com/strategic/missile/df3.asp [iii]See 1. “Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat.†(National Air and Space Intelligence Center, 2013), 14, 17; 2. Mark Stokes. “China’s Evolving Conventional Strategic Strike Capability.†(Washington, D.C.: Project 2049 Institute, September 2009); 3. “DongFeng 21 (CSS-5) Medium-Range Ballistic Missile.†Sinodefense.com, 04 June 2010, accessed 8/21/14, http://web.archive.org/web/20131209000115/http://sinodefence.com/strategic/missile/df21.asp 4. “DongFeng 21C (CSS-5 Mod-3) Medium-Range Ballistic Missile.†Sinodefense.com, 03 October 2009, accessed 8/21/14, http://web.archive.org/web/20131029225158/http://www.sinodefence.com/strategic/missile/df21c.asp. Of note, authoritative publicly-released reports, Congressional testimony, and the like from the U.S. Department of Defense as well as the U.S. Intelligence Community do not call out a CSS-5 MOD 4 variant. This contrasts with the bulk of English-language open source materials on the DF-21 series, which associate DF-21D with CSS-5 MOD 4. This essay will defer to the authoritative U.S. Government products in associating DF-21D with CSS-5 MOD 5. That said, Western observers of the Chinese ballistic missile arsenal should take note of the apparent U.S. Government reporting jump from MOD 3 to a MOD 5 in terms of operational deployments of DF-21 variants. [iv]For detailed explanations of publicly-available PLA doctrine’s apparent advocacy of first strikes, see 1. Dean Cheng. “Chinese Views on Deterrence.†Joint Forces Quarterly, No. 60 (1st Quarter 2011), 92-101; 2. Ron Christman. “Conventional Missions for China’s Second Artillery Corps.†Comparative Strategy, Vol. 30, No. 3, 198-228; 3. Roger Cliff, et al. Entering the Dragon’s Lair: Chinese Antiaccess Strategies and Their Implications for the United States. (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2007), 13-15, 23, 28-43, 47-50; 4. James C. Mulvenon, et. al. “Chinese Responses to U.S. Military Transformation and Implications for the Department of Defense.†(Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2006), 46-47; and 5. Larry Wortzel. China’s Nuclear Forces: Operations, Training, Doctrine, Command, Control, and Campaign Planning. (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army Strategic Studies Institute, May 2007), 8-14, 36. For a compelling description of reasons why Chinese leaders might be willing to accept the escalatory risks inherent in unleashing conventional first strikes against core U.S. bases in Japan and Guam, see 1. David Shlapak. “Projecting Power in a China-Taiwan Contingency: Implications for USAF and USN Collaboration.†in “Coping with the Dragon: Essays on PLA Transformation and the U.S. Military.†(Washington D.C.: Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University, December 2007), 91-92; 2. Toshi Yoshihara. “Chinese Missile Strategy and the U.S. Naval Presence in Japan: The Operational View from Beijing.†Naval War College Review 63, No. 3 (Summer 2010): 52-57. [v]The term “campaign-value†is defined in Jonathan F. Solomon. “Maritime Deception and Concealment: Concepts for Defeating Wide-Area Oceanic Surveillance-Reconnaissance-Strike Networks.†Naval War College Review 66, No. 4 (Autumn 2013): 109. [vi] David A. Shlapak, et al. “A Question of Balance: Political Context and Military Aspects of the China-Taiwan Dispute.†(Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2009), 127-128. [vii] See James R. Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara. “Mao’s Active Defense is Turning Offensive.†U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 137, No. 4 (April 2011): 24-29. [viii]See for example 1. “Lessons of the Falklands.†(Washington, D.C.: Office of Program Appraisal, Department of the Navy, February 1983), 3, 11, 34, 36; 2. Barry Watts. “The Evolution of Precision Strike.†(Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2013), 14-17, 20-23. Note Watts’s observation of the dramatic tradeoff between a precision-guided munition’s combat range and procurement affordability, with obvious implications for inventory sizes. [ix]Solomon, “Maritime Deception and Concealment,†94-95. View the full article

Eric Lindsey of CSBA published an excellent monograph last month examining how the U.S. Army might field land-based anti-ship missiles and rockets, not to mention air and missile defense systems, to defend forward U.S. allies from aggression. I strongly agree with the concept in principle. Such capabilities would be extremely useful for constraining an adversary’s wartime use of the waters and airspace adjacent to a U.S. ally’s territory. They would definitely increase the adversary’s potential costs and risks of hazarding transits through maritime chokepoints controlled by the ally, conducting close blockades against the ally, or executing amphibious/airborne assaults against the ally. They would provide valuable layers for defense-in-depth against an adversary’s attempts to strike forces and infrastructure located on the ally’s territory or in nearby areas at sea. They could certainly help with carving out temporary ‘pockets’ that support friendly air and naval operations within a contested zone. There are a few key details, however, that I think require more analytical attention. First, the use of anti-ship missiles for over-the-horizon engagements depends upon scouting. Surveillance could be performed using land-based radiofrequency direction-finding systems or over-the-horizon radars, but neither can positively and confidently verify that a given contact is in fact something worth expending scarce missiles. Reconnaissance assets such as fishing boats, submarines, aircraft, or unmanned vehicles are better suited for the tasks of classifying contacts and cueing missile attacks, but this raises the question of whether their information would be processed through a fusion center that generates a shared situational picture for the entire defense or whether it would be provided directly to the missile units. There are advantages and drawbacks for each that ought to be weighed; my own preference is that missile units would be supported by dedicated scouts (example: light UAVs that are organic to those units) that can also provide their information to a shareable situational picture. All this says nothing of the challenges of preventing the adversary from detecting, interpreting, and exploiting the communications between scout and shooter. The bottom line is that looking at maximum missile ranges alone is insufficient; one must also consider maximum effective scouting range and networking architecture. Second, while land-based missile systems do have some on-station endurance advantages over warships and aircraft, they are entirely dependent upon the security of the sea and air lines of communication that provide sustenance for their crews, repair parts, and replacement rounds. Hardened, peacetime-prepositioned stockpiles of materiel near these units’ operating areas can help with this, but during wartime these supplies will likely be consumed at a fast rate and certainly will not hold out any longer than they were sized to. The lines of communications problem is less pressing for continental allies who, by virtue of territorial depth (or friendly neighbors), can access airfields and ports far from the adversary’s effective reach. However, this is a campaign-critical issue for defending allies who are not blessed with that strategic gift. As archipelagoes, Japanese and Filipino lines of communication are solely maritime. Given that they lie within a few hundred miles of continental Asia, their sea lines are inherently vulnerable to interdiction by submarines, and their airfields and ports are inherently vulnerable to aerospace bombardment. The situation is much the same with South Korea, a peninsular country whose hostile northern sibling denies it overland lines of communication. Taiwan’s circumstances should be self-explanatory. Whereas China’s military clout is not yet sufficient to heavily degrade logistical flows to and then amongst the main Japanese and Philippine islands, there should be no illusions that these flows will be unpressured in a major war. The imposed degree of pressure would likely be greater on the margins for flows from Japan to South Korea. Flows from Japan (or from across the Pacific) to and amongst the central and southern Ryukyus could conceivably be at grave risk. I strongly support emplacing land-based defensive missiles in the Ryukyus as a means of reinforcing conventional deterrence, but unless these weapons are intended to be a wasting asset much more thought needs to be dedicated towards how they would be sustained throughout a protracted conflict. Lines of communication protection would be a central role for naval and land-based air forces; in a Western Pacific contingency it might be their most strategically important task in the aftermath of war initiation. I’ll be writing about this issue again in a few weeks. Third, some thought needs to be dedicated towards when and how these missile forces would be deployed to the field. Using the Japanese example, let’s say the bulk of such forces were maintained in garrison in the main Japanese islands (or further to the rear in U.S. territories) for deployment to the Ryukyus only in a crisis. This would raise questions of whether crisis deployments could be done quickly and how the Chinese might interpret and react to such movements once they were detected. I would prefer permanent forward garrisoning of missile units on the islands they would be defending, but this would be not be inexpensive and would require significant political capital and resolve. Indeed, as is already evident with our existing forces in Okinawa, it might mean basing U.S. units in localities that may not be thrilled about serving as indefinite hosts. None of this should be interpreted as hits against what I believe to be a very important tool for strengthening our extended conventional deterrence, and if necessary for defending embattled allies. I do believe, though, that if Army maritime missile force concepts are to gain the traction they deserve the issues above will need to be addressed. View the full article

For previous installments, see Parts I, II, and III Ingredients of Counter-Deception How could a U.S. Navy battleforce then—or now—avoid defeats at the hands of a highly capable adversary's deceptions? The first necessary ingredient is distributing multi-phenomenology sensors in a defense’s outer layers. Continuing with the battleforce air defense example, many F-14s were equipped during the 1980s with the AN/AXX-1 Television Camera System (TCS), which enabled daytime visual classification of air contacts from a distance. The Navy’s F-14D inventory later received the AN/AAS-42 Infrared Search and Track system to provide a nighttime standoff-range classification capability that complemented AN/AXX-1. Cued by an AEW aircraft or an Aegis surface combatant, F-14s equipped with these sensors could silently examine bomber-sized radar contacts from 40-60 miles away as meteorologically possible. As it would be virtually impossible for a targeted aircraft to know it was being remotely observed unless it was supported by AEW of its own, and as the targeted aircraft’s only means for visually obscuring itself was to take advantage of weather phenomena as available, F-14s used in this outer layer visual identification role could help determine whether inbound radar contacts were decoys or actual aircraft. If the latter, the sensors could also help the F-14 crews determine whether the foe was carrying ordnance on external hardpoints. This information could then be used by a carrier group’s Air Warfare Commander to decide where and how to employ available CAP resources. It follows that future U.S. Navy outer layer air defenses would benefit greatly from having aircraft equipped with these kinds of sensors distributed to cover likely threat axes at extended ranges from a battleforce’s warships. Such aircraft could report their findings to their tactical controllers using highly-directional line-of-sight communications pathways in order to prevent disclosure of the battleforce’s location and disposition. Given that the future air threat will not only include maritime bombers but also strike fighters and small unmanned aircraft, it would be enormously useful if each manned aircraft performing the outer layer visual identification role could also control multiple unmanned aircraft in order to extend their collective sensing reach as well as covered volume. This way, the outer layer would be able to investigate widely-dispersed aircraft approaching on multiple axes well before the latter’s sensors and weapons could be employed against the battleforce. The same physics that would allow the U.S. Navy to disrupt or exploit an adversary’s multi-phenomenology maritime surveillance and reconnaissance sensors could be wielded by the adversary against a U.S. Navy battleforce’s outer layer sensors, however, so the side that found a way to scout effectively first would likely be the one to attack effectively first. A purely sensor-centric solution, though, is not enough. Recall Tokarev’s comment about making actual attack groups seem to be “easily recognizable decoys.†This could be implemented in many ways, one of which might be to launch readily-discriminated decoys towards a defended battleforce from one axis while vectoring a demonstration group to approach from another axis. Upon identifying the decoys, a defender might orient the bulk of his available fighters to confront the demonstration group. This would be a fatal mistake, though, if the main attack group was actually approaching on the first axis from some distance behind the decoys. If there was enough spatial and temporal separation between the two axes, and if fighter resources were firmly committed towards the demonstration group at the time it became apparent that the actual attack would come from the first axis, it might not be possible for the fighters to do much about it. An attacker might alternatively use advanced EW technologies to make the main attack group appear to be decoys, especially when meteorological conditions prevented the CAP’s effective use of electro-optical or infrared sensors. This leads to the second necessary ingredient: conditioning crews psychologically and tactically for the possibility of deception. During peacetime, tactical competence is often viewed as a ‘checklist’ skillset in that crews are expected to quickly execute various immediate actions by rote when they encounter certain tactical stimuli. There’s something to be said for standardized immediate actions, as some simply must be performed instinctively if a unit or group is to avoid taking a hit. Examples of this include setting General Quarters, adjusting a combat system’s configuration and authorized automaticity, launching alert aircraft, making quick situation reports to other units or higher command echelons, and employing evasive maneuvers or certain EW countermeasures. Yet, some discretion may be necessary lest a unit salvo too many defensive missiles against decoys or be enticed to prematurely reveal its location to an attacker. The line separating a fatal delay to act from a delayed yet effective action varies from circumstance to circumstance. A human’s ability to avoid the former is an art built upon his or her deep foundational understanding of naval science and the conditioning effects of regular, intense training. Only through routine exposure to the chaos of combat through training, and only when that training includes the simulated adversary’s use of deception, can crews gradually mentally harden themselves against the disorienting ambiguity or shock that would result from an actual adversary’s use of deception. Likewise, only from experience gained through realistic training can these crews develop tactics that help them and other friendly forces reduce their likelihoods of succumbing to deception, or otherwise increase the possibilities that even if they initially are deceived they can quickly mitigate the effects. It follows that our third ingredient is possessing deep defensive ordnance inventories. A battleforce needs to have enough ordnance available—and properly positioned—so that it can fall for a deception and still have some chance at recovering. It is important to point out this ordnance does not just include guns and missiles, but also EW systems and techniques. During the Cold War, a battleforce’s defensive reserves consisted of alert fighters waiting on carrier decks to augment the CAP as well as surface combatants’ own interceptor missiles and EW systems. These might be augmented in the future by high-energy lasers used as warship point defense weapon systems, though it is too early to say whether their main ‘kill’ mechanism would be causing an inbound threat’s structural failure or neutralizing its terminal homing sensors. If effective, lasers would be particularly useful for defense against unmanned aircraft swarms or perhaps anti-ship missile types that trade away advanced capabilities for sheer numbers. Regardless of its available defensive ordnance reserves, a battleforce’s ability to receive defensive support from other battleforces or even land-based Joint or Combined forces can also be quite helpful. The final ingredients for countering an adversary’s deception efforts are embracing tactical flexibility and seizing the tactical initiative. Using Tokarev’s observations as an example, this can be as simple as constantly changing CAP and AEW cycle durations, refueling periods, station positions, and tactical behaviors. A would-be deceiver needs to understand his target’s doctrine and tactics in order to create a ‘story’ that meshes with the latter’s predispositions while exploiting available vulnerabilities. By increasing the prospective deceiver’s uncertainty regarding what kinds of story elements are necessary to achieve the desired effects, or where vulnerabilities lie that are likely to be available at the time of the planned tactical action, it becomes less likely that a deception attempt will be ‘complete’ enough to work as intended. A more aggressive defensive measure might be to use offensive counterair sweeps well ahead of a battleforce to locate and neutralize the adversary’s scouts and inbound raiders, much as what was envisioned by the U.S. Navy’s 1980s Outer Air Battle concept. The method offering the greatest potential payoff, and not coincidentally the hardest to orchestrate, would be to entice the adversary to waste precious ordnance against a decoy group or expose his raiders to ambush by friendly fighters. All of these concepts force the adversary to react, with the latter two stealing the tactical initiative—and the first effective blow in a battle—from the adversary. Tomorrow, some concluding thoughts. View the full article

Since the news broke, there have been a number of people working to use the sad news to try to reach out to troops/veterans that were at risk, as well as to educate about depression, stigma, and related issues. I could rant about ignorant posts and posters, but I'd rather focus on what's important: reaching out to those at risk, because if even one stops and thinks, and chooses not to follow... The new social media manager for Mission: VALOR, Army veteran Jennifer Wilkins Perminas, sent me a post yesterday that she wasn't satisfied with. I thought it bloody marvelous, and said so. Here's a small taste: His death brings me to a larger epidemic that I believe we need to discuss. Some folks believe that suicide is a selfish and a cowardly act- and they are entitled to their opinion. However, depression is not a condition to which one wakes up to and shouts “depression; come and get me!†It is invasive and relentless in its goal of permanently demoralizing an individual. You can look at depression as a parasite; once it finds a host, it will progressively deprive the miracle fiber called courage (as George Patton liked to say). Critics labeling suicide as a selfish and cowardly act is not only insulting the deceased; but are adding to the ignorance that depression does not discriminate. Go read this wonderful post, at Mission: VALOR or on Facebook. If you are one of those thinking about leaving this way, please reach out. There are options, and there are people who care. There are links to resources, please follow them. Do not go. View the full article

By Rick Campbell, St. Martins Press, New York, NY (2014) Reviewed by Capt. Roger F. Jones, USN (Ret.) Retired Navy submarine officer and author Rick Campbell offers an exciting story of how a US Navy Trident nuclear sub, the USS Kentucky, is given falsified orders to launch all twenty-four of its nuclear missiles at Iran. However, these orders are fraudulent. They were not issued by the President of the United States, but by a cabal of rogue agents in Israel and America instead. The work of these agents extends to the Kentucky, whose communication equipment was altered to prevent a recall order, in the almost certain event that the deception will be uncovered before the actual launch. The Kentucky is in Hawaiian waters when it receives its mission orders and must proceed westward to reach launch range. This requires her to maneuver past U.S. Pacific Fleet subs, planes, and surface ships, which, to the crewâs surprise, are trying to stop or sink her. Some parts of the storyline here are necessarily condensed, but the suspense continues to build. A senior COMSUBPAC officer is then sent to Australia to plead for help and winds up on board Australian Navy diesel-powered submarine assigned to the chase. Heightening the emotional impact, the SUBPAC captainâs son is an officer and crewmember on the Kentucky; if his mission to stop the Kentucky is successful, his son will likely die. In the meantime, some of the Kentuckyâs crew is having serious misgivings about carrying out a mission that would literally destroy an entire nation and its population of 75 million. The Commanding Officer of Kentucky has to confront the distinct possibility that some key crewmembers may refuse to carry out their ordersâ¦or even mutiny. In the meantime, things happening in the U.S. and Israel gradually peel back the cover of the disloyal Israeli and American agents. These individuals are carefully monitoring the progress of Kentuckyâs strike, and taking action to ensure that the mission is carried out, regardless of the consequences to both countries. This reviewer is loath to tell much more about the plot for fear of spoiling the excitement for prospective readers. Campbellâs audacious plot and storyline are reminiscent of the late Tom Clancyâs earlier works, filled with continuous action and suspense, as well as unexpected twists and turns in the plot. Campbellâs submarine experience is put to good use when it comes to conveying the feel of being aboard a nuke, particularly when it comes to making difficult and critical repairs while under way. The author has a knack for keeping the reader continually wondering just what will happen next! He is able to convey a genuine feeling of what it would be like serving on a submarine under stressful conditions, such as how the Kentucky crew dealt with the emotional aspects of its mission to inflict mass destruction â in effect, Iran and its people would no longer exist after the strike â all the while evading interception. There are nearly 100 characters that appear in the book, but only 26 are principal figures. The author thoughtfully provides two listings that are a great help to the reader in keeping whoâs who straight. This is a book that will be very hard to put down until you have finished reading it! Captain Jones is a frequent contributor to Naval History Book Reviews. BOOK REVIEW – The Trident Deception was published by the Naval Historical Foundation and originally appeared on Naval Historical Foundation on May 29, 2014. View the full article

Well ... I think it is more of a Syrian colloquialism. When on the receiving end of a MIG-29's 30-mm gun. View the full article

OK all you history buffs, all you former and active Harpoon players - all those who love their Navy and a good video game at the same time. Think about what, in even a modest manner, you would like to see for the official US Navy's first mobile gaming product. Let that warm and excited feeling soak in for a bit. Now, brace yourselves and head on over to my post at USNIBlog for the details. Gird your loins. As a side note, if you read this blog and are not also a member of the US Naval Institute, you should really consider joining. Look on the right side of the page for the widget, give it a click and find a few shekels. View the full article

Prototype No. 2011 of the J-20 project had its maiden flight last weekend. As previously discussed, No. 2011 has significant changes to the previous J-20 prototypes that we've seen in flight testing (No. 2001 and No. 2002). There were probably 2 more prototypes similar to 2001/2002 for the purpose of static and RCS testing. It seems like 2001/2002 are more like the demonstrator prototypes whereas 2011 is the first pre-production prototype. It's likely that the production version of J-20 will not see any major differences unless major problems are found in testing. The pictures below show prototype 2001 vs prototype 2011 from different view point with Chinese labels on parts that changed in the first 2 pictures. Generally speaking, CAC appears to have taken much greater care for the LO properties of No. 2011 compared to 2001/2002. Quite a bit of type elapsed from 2002 to 2011 and it looks like they really tried to address a lot of issues from RCS testing. The workmanship and fit/finishing of 2011 all appear to be better. Some of the more obvious changes include Clipped corners on canard/v-tails Redesign slender intakes with bump larger or protruding more F-22-style light-grey colour scheme Larger weapon bay and smaller wing actuators Straightened leading edge Inner canopy frame like F-35 Redesigned front landing gear door New EOTS-like sensor and holographic HUD display Redesigned rear fuselage around the engines and nozzles moved further in with longer tail sting. It seems like more care is put into all-aspect stealth as the clipped canards has decreased returns from some angles and the ventral fins now seem to completely block engine nozzles from the sides. Looking at the inner edge of the canard, they are modified to conform nicely around intake so as to not create gaps. Here is a good side view of the front part of the prototype. Comparing to other 5th generation projects, I think PLAAF had a higher LO design requirement for J-20 than PAK-FA, while still trailing F-22/35. Compared to PAK-FA, it looks like everything conform to the body a lot better leaving fewer gaps and deflecting surfaces all around. Compared to F-22, it still has some areas like engine nozzle (which is covered by thrust vectoring plates on F-22) that are just not as well shielded even after the treatments. This is all from my extremely untrained eyes, so feel free to give me insights. Project 310, China's other next-gen project, at this point still has not received official PLAAF designation. It looks to be in the flight demonstration stage and would probably need to become an offical PLAAF program before proceeding further to where J-20 is right now. View the full article

The most frustrating thing about watching events unfold in the Ukraine is the realization that the United States apparently learned nothing from the Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008. If you recall the invasion of Georgia in 2008 by Russia, you will also recall it took place right in the middle of an American election. It would appear that timing favored Russia, because lessons were apparently not learned, indeed there is scant evidence the issue was truly studied. Today, in nearly every avenue of action, tactical options are being discussed on how to 'react' to Russia's occupation of Crimea. For the last 5+ years, time has been lost that could have been used developing a policy that included strategic options for how to deal with aggressive Russian military behavior. Many of those options are finally being explored (like working the region towards energy independence from Russia) but they are years away from being employed, and lack value in dealing with the current crisis. In 2007 the United States Navy developed the Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower in which the strategic object of preventing war was elevated to a primary mission statement of the US Navy. There was some hope that the DoD would adopt this stance as part of it's lexicon of capabilities provided. In rhetoric, the DoD demonstrated some appreciation for the concept of preventing war, but there is scant evidence the strategic object has been developed into an actual capability. Planning and rhetoric aside, the United States right now needs to prevent a war in the Ukraine. Yes, Russia has invaded the Crimea, and is using military power - but this is not a war, yet. Should the shooting start inside the Ukraine, the distinction between the non-violent occupation by the Russian military and an all out shooting war will be made evident, so no need to parse definitions. As of Tuesday March 4, 2014, success for President Obama's soft power diplomacy policy depends entirely on preventing a war inside the Ukraine. I have been observing two starting assumptions represented in the mainstream assumptions of many "experts." I guess I am naïve to reject the prevailing wisdom of experts, time will tell. First, I do not underestimate Putin, and I believe too many important people in this process are underestimating Russia right now. I have seen a number of media and political folks who talk to the White House regularly speak as if they believe Putin is acting from a position of weakness, and that Putin has somehow lost control of the situation and is improvising. Please stop. The EU is who lost control of the situation, and everyone has been scrambling ever since as Russia has set the parameters for the conditions inside the Ukraine to date. This administration has a history of underestimating Putin right up to the point where they get kicked sideways and told what the end game is - which seem to always favor Russia and leaves the US in a poker game holding a pair of twos trying to save face. This Rice/Kerry/Hagel team has yet to win on the field of play in foreign policy has no business underestimating this or any opponent, and has every reason to continuously expect the unexpected. The US must shape conditions favorably when given any opportunity, and right now I do not see the United States taking this kind of full court press approach to suggest we are in it to win it. Second, I believe we are overestimating our ability to shape the outcome. Today NATO met and started discussing the situation, and tomorrow the EU will meet and start discussing their options. The US really needs the assistance of both NATO and the EU to prevent a war and shape the outcome favorably to our interests, but I am unsure the US will ultimately get much assistance from either the EU or NATO. It didn't even take 24 hours for both Germany and Great Britain to fold on economic and trade sanctions as a form of diplomatic coercion, and with the constant reinforcement in rhetoric by Senior US officials that there are no military options, I think it is absolutely clear that the study of strategy is completely dead in the DoD today. The effectiveness of the President's preferred soft power approach to crisis resolution depends on a single condition - that war inside the Ukraine is prevented. I am unclear how the US or Europe can guarantee that war is prevented inside the Ukraine without deterring the further use of Russian military power, and even though the situation might not escalate into a war, diplomatic success depends on the guarantee that war is prevented. The US needs to shape conditions towards a favorable diplomatic solution, and I am not convinced the US is doing this today. I believe Russia's primary objective is to take Crimea without using violent military force. Russia believes they can play a long game, wait out the Ukrainian military forces still inside Crimea, and eject those forces from the region. I am not one of those who believes Russia will simply annex Crimea, rather Russia will establish an autonomous state like they did in Georgia with South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Just like in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Russia is the only country that wins that arrangement. The US needs to be thinking right now how to handle this outcome - because this is the best case outcome right now and we know it. History shows US policy over time does nothing but punish the people inside those regions, not Russia, so the US clearly needs to start the hard work of developing a new policy that addresses the situation more realistically. I believe President Obama and the United States could potentially soon be standing alone against Russia on the issue of the occupation of Crimea in the Ukraine. I am not convinced the US can apply sanctions unilaterally without serious blowback by Russia, but maybe we can? It seems to me the US needs to define exactly what our national interest is in the Ukraine before we apply sanctions, because there are ways that Russia can put pressure on other, well defined, national interests in a game of diplomatic warfare against one another. I have no idea if President Obama sees the Ukraine situation as a national interest to the US, because I am yet to hear him articulate his argument why the crisis in Ukraine unfolding is a national interest of the US. If we assume the occupation of Crimea represents a threat to our national interests, and I do believe it is, the US must guarantee that we do everything possible to prevent escalation of hostilities. To do so, the US must deter Russia from taking any further territory with military force. I am of the opinion that if 1) Russia starts facing a violent confrontation in any form, including insurgency, or 2) if our diplomatic warfare activities actually hurt Russia, that Russia will seek to occupy more territory in the Ukraine with hard military power, and will not hesitate to create a refugee problem with hard power. Ukrainian authorities continue to observe, every day, that Russia is massing more troops on the Russian border side of the Kharkov, Luhansk and Donetsk regions. If things start to go unfavorably for Russia, as of today nothing exists that will stop Putin from drawing a line from Kharkov to Odessa and occupying all points East. I don't think Putin is interested in a prolonged occupation, but that territory would given Russia several key advantages in diplomatic negotiations - including not just the territories, but a forced relocation refugee problem that would make everything inside the Ukraine considerably more complicated for any nation attempting to support the Ukraine with economic packages. Obama has several military options to prevent a war. First, NATO could establish a air defense zone over Ukraine. If NATO is conducting the anti-air defense of Ukraine, the Russian military is not going to find success advancing in the Ukraine while being bombed from the air by the Ukrainian Air Force while also fighting the Ukrainian Army on the ground. NATO support for the Ukraine towards Air Superiority over the Ukraine would add significant assurance to the situation on the ground inside the Ukraine that Russia would not further advance militarily. I do not understand why the US DoD hasn't already been out front with this military option, diplomacy depends on the prevention of further hostilities, and the US is often quick to discuss setting up no-fly zones over enemy states, but is somehow slow in providing the same level of support to people we call friends? NATO should also start mobilizing MIW capabilities just outside the Black Sea in case they are needed, because if the port in Odessa gets blocked by Russia, logistics is going to get very difficult for the Ukraine quickly. The railroads in the region are not that great, and cannot support Ukraine if - for any reason - access to the port of Odessa becomes restricted. Bryan discussed the need for more US seapower, but in my analysis of the kind of seapower the US would use in a situation like this given the various treaty obligations and operational challenges, the US Navy doesn't really field the kind of naval capabilities most needed for this type of conflict prevention strategic objective with the exception of the Littoral Combat Ship. The capabilities at sea needed are those for operating in the littoral, functional for electronic warfare and ISR, and capable of MIW. A CVN in the Eastern Med could sink the entire Black Sea Fleet in a day if it came to that, but this is about sea control without hostilities - soft power at-sea capabilities, not hard power like aircraft carriers. I'm not convinced even the LCS is a good fit for this crisis, but a combat capable corvette certainly would be. Other NATO nations have that capability, so perhaps US Navy logistics is the best capability for the US Navy to bring to this type of war prevention engagement. Finally, NATO should commit some special units for military training and Ukrainian Army readiness inside the Ukraine - and do it starting today. The presence needs not be large, but the need to prevent war demands reassurance to the Ukrainian military to reinforce professionalism and maintain preparations towards the prevention of escalation of conflict with Russia. Sending ground forces in gives the US and EU escalation control, and does not represent escalation of tensions in and of itself - in fact it stabilizes tensions. The cost of these type of engagement activities in prevention of war pales in comparison to the costs of a refugee crisis on the border of yet another NATO nation, and one look at the refugee crisis coming from Syria should be a reminder that preventing a war before it starts is an excellent investment by NATO compared to reacting to the conditions of war after the the shooting starts. It is incredible to me that the DoD has offices like Air-Sea Battle and the Office of Strategic Landpower and yet the DoD seems incapable of offering what I see as obvious military options that help deter Russia from further conflict. My biggest concern is that these military options have been presented to the President, and the Obama Administration (Susan Rice?) rejected these options, because I believe rejecting such options would represent nothing short of faith based foreign policy absent the serious substance necessary to control conditions in the real world; a political decision that, in my opinion, would justify every criticism related to weakness and incompetence of the administration and the people in it made to date. As of today there are no obvious efforts being made towards preventing escalation of the crisis in the Ukraine by Russia if they choose to do so, even though US diplomatic activities will - by intent and presumably by effect if effective - escalate the crisis by imposing costs on Russia. Hard power in the form of forward deployed military presence represents the deterrence capability necessary to empower the effectiveness of diplomatic solutions by the Obama administration, and has the capacity to contain crisis through the stabilization of conditions that work favorably for our diplomatic soft power. If the US is unwilling to set conditions for US diplomacy to work, expect the conditions to be changed by Russia in a way that works unfavorably against our diplomatic activity. View the full article

LCDR Michael “Pyscho” McLeod, USN (Ret) adjusts the FJ-4B Fury model during its installation in the Cold War Gallery. The first thing visitors see when they walk through the doors of the Navy Museum’s Cold War Gallery is the massive Trident I C-4 Missile. Looking left, an impressive glass case sits right next to the Ready Room Theater. The case houses a wide array of 1:48 scale models of aircraft developed and flown during the Cold War era. Once complete, this collection will include nearly forty models that highlight the history and achievements of modern naval aviation.World-class model builder and retired naval aviator LCDR Michael âPsychoâ McLeod recently added four new aircraft models to the case. All of the models were researched, designed, and built by McLeod. NHF volunteer Captain Ted Bronson, USN (Ret), the coordinator of this aircraft model project, was also on hand to help âPsychoâ organize and place the models into the case. âPsychoâ is extremely humble about the craftsmanship of his long time hobby. The Melbourne, Florida resident and Delta Airlines pilot works hard to ensure every iota of detail is included with each aircraft, often with little photographic evidence. The level of care taken to construct the scaled planes is impressive, even for the unassuming visitor. Enthusiasts of history and model making will marvel at his ingenuity for years to come. McLeod wants to be clear: he does not build toys. He builds MODELS. In part, they are much more than that. Most military models, like tanks and ships, represent a specific series or class of machines manufactured in times of war and peace. Most planes in any Revell model kit are exactly the same. What makes McLeodâs models so significant and unique are the touches of personalization. Like the pilots that flew them years ago, there is a unique story to every aircraft in the model case. Each model is individually matched to the man or woman that sponsored or dedicated the plane to be built by âPsycho.â It is the men and women that fly the planes, not the planes itself, that make the story. He is not only making models, he is making miniature monuments. F-11F Tiger “Blue Angel,” sponsored by RADM William A. Gureck in honor of Captain Robert L. Rasmussen The most recognizable of the four planes added last month is the F-11F Tiger, dedicated in honor of Captain Robert L. Rasmussen. The plane is painted in the likeness of Captain Rasmussenâs plane during his 1956 tour with the flight demonstration squadron, the Blue Angels. The Blue Angels flew the Grumman Tiger for approximately 12 years. Prior to his tour with the Blue Angels, Captain Rasmussen flew F-8 Crusaders. A long time friend to the arts and education world, Rasmussen serves as the director of the National Naval Aviation Museum in Pensacola, Florida. F7U-3 Cutlass, sponsored by RADM James M. Gleim The F7U-3 Cutlass, sponsored by RADM James M. Gleim is by far the most unusual and short-lived aircraft. RADM Gleim flew the plane with the VA-34 âBlue Blastersâ in 1956. The version he flew, the F7U-3, is considered the best version of its various prototypes. The plane was seen as a mechanical blunder for the Navy, as several of its test pilots and pilots died while in the cockpit of the aircraft. The Navy produced 192 of the F7U-3 type in the early to mid 1950s. FJ-4B Fury, sponsored by VADM Gerald E. “Jerry” Miller in honor of LCDR Richard King The FJ-4B Fury sponsored by VADM Jerry Miller was created in honor of LCDR Richard King. King was the skipper of VA-214 (âVolunteersâ) in the mid 1950s. The Fury is a very distinctive aircraft. The specific FJ-4 Fury single seat model is a fast fighter-bomber powered by a 7,700 lb. turbojet engine. The Navy and Marine Corps used Fury aircraft extensively during its service in the 1950s and 1960s. F4D-1 Skyray, sponsored by Captain Thomas Wimberly The final model, the F4D-1 Skyray, is sponsored by Captain Thomas Wimberly. During 1957, Wimberly and his Skyray flew with VF-141 aboard the USS Bonhomme Richard (CVA-31). Captain Wimberly, among other career accomplishments, was the XO of VF-74 (âBe-Devilersâ) flying F-4 Phantoms during the 1967 fire aboard the USS Forrestal (CV-59). âPsychoâ McLeod conducted extensive research to make sure the Skyray was set to its 1956-1957 specifications.Special thanks to LCDR McLeod for his hard work and dedication in making these models. Visit the âFly Navyâ page of the Cold War Gallery website to see photos of the other aircraft models now on display. New Aircraft Additions to the Cold War Gallery was published by the Naval Historical Foundation and originally appeared on Naval Historical Foundation on February 11, 2014. View the full article