HG S2 (Intel Bot)

Man I miss this guy. When I was in the Army and people asked me what I do, I used to say "I work for Ronald Reagan". He was glinting in the sun today and so I risked the ire of the airport cops to stand in the road and take this shot. He led from the front, and along with the Iron Lady and John Paul II stared down and shut down the Soviets, We could use some of that today. View the full article

Not really wading into the debate on the 2nd Amendment (let's keep it), but going after some of the morons who think they have the moral authority and bright ideas to change it/eliminate it. Take this supposedly retired LTC, Bob Bateman, writing in Esquire about how true gun control might be brought about... For starters, this retired LTC living in England is embarrassed by our country when among the Brits. There's plenty to be embarrassed about - first, I'd start apologizing to Her Majesty for Bruno Mars, the POTUS, and what we did with plaid in the 70s. But they owe us because that bumbling idiot, Piers Morgan, lives here. Anyway, I digress...you should read the Esquire piece, but keep in mind that I have never met anyone who claims to manage violence for a living that actually did so. Here are some of "Bob's" MENSA-like suggestions: 1. The only guns permitted will be the following: a. Smoothbore or Rifled muzzle-loading blackpowder muskets. No 7-11 in history has ever been held up with one of these. b. Double-barrel breech-loading shotguns. Hunting with these is valid. c. Bolt-action rifles with a magazine capacity no greater than five rounds. Like I said, hunting is valid. But if you cannot bring down a defenseless deer in under five rounds, then you have no fking reason to be holding a killing tool in the first place. 2. We will pry your gun from your cold, dead, fingers. That is because I am willing to wait until you die, hopefully of natural causes. Guns, except for the three approved categories, cannot be inherited. When you die your weapons must be turned into the local police department, which will then destroy them. (Weapons of historical significance will be de-milled, but may be preserved.) 3. Police departments are no longer allowed to sell or auction weapons used in crimes after the cases have been closed. (That will piss off some cops, since they really need this money. But you know what they need more? Less violence and death. By continuing the process of weapon recirculation, they are only making their jobs -- or the jobs of some other cops -- harder.) 4. We will submit a new tax on ammunition. In the first two years it will be 400 percent of the current retail cost of that type of ammunition. (Exemptions for the ammo used by the approved weapons.) Thereafter it will increase by 20 percent per year. 5. We will initiate a nationwide "buy-back" program, effective immediately, with the payouts coming from the DoD budget. This buy-back program will start purchasing weapons at 200 percent of their face value the first year, 150 percent the second year, 100 percent the third year. Thereafter there will be a 10 year pause, at which point the guns can be sold to the government at 10 percent of their value for the next 50 years. 6. The major gun manufactures of the United States, less those who create weapons for the federal government and the armed forces, will be bought out by the United States of America, for our own damned good. For a seriously epic fisking/verbal-judoing of Bob, do yourself a favor check Michael Z. Williamson (yeah THAT Mike Williamson) for a suitable reply. Even Uncle Jimbo would be jealous of this takedown... #DouchebagHashtag Update: Our friends at Ranger Up have something to say about Bob too. Jackass. View the full article

I don't know more than anyone else here, but I think that some are getting a little too excited over what happened with the USS CHANCELLORSVILLE (CG-62). Sometimes a cigar is just a cigar; a training incident is a training incident. Most you need to know will come out in the investigation - but for those who need a refresher; An aerial target drone malfunctioned and struck guided missile cruiser USS Chancellorsville (CG 62) off the coast of Southern California at approximately 1:25 pm local time today, Nov. 16, while the ship was conducting a radar tracking exercise during routine training at sea. Our friend Galrahn over at ID really got a bone in his teeth on the incident the week after; Based on where the rogue drone hit the ship, had it been a real ASCM - it could have easily been a mission kill for the ship. This is a very serious incident involving the most advanced AEGIS warship in the US Navy, and the Navy has started the incident with a press release that intentionally omits a critical detail - that the ship tried to defend itself and the specific technology designed to defend the ship for this specific situation failed. This incident is a big deal, and on the first day there is already a deception effort underway to conceal key details of the incident - an omission that only serves to cast doubt upon the reputation of sailors for purposes of protecting the reputation of a piece of technology. Why did the Navy conceal from the public that the point defense system of the most advanced AEGIS ship in the US Navy failed to protect the ship from a direct hit from a rogue drone? He raises some good points, but I hesitate to see any kind of malicious deception going on. I am willing to give everyone the benefit of the doubt and there could be very good reasons why there is conflicting information out there. We don't know what we shouldn't know. Training accidents happen all the time - I've been in the middle of them as have many of you - accidents where people die or are disfigured. That didn't happen here and I don't see the upside to hide anything, especially with so many people who will eventually know the truth. I'm going to go with my favorite cliche mash-up on Occam's Razor: don't contribute to conspiracy what is best explained by human incompetence. David Axe over at WiB decided to pick at the scab a bit too; But there’s a more frightening possibility. BQM-74 drones are tailored to simulate different kinds of enemy anti-ship missile. If Chancellorsville’s Phalanx did indeed fully fire at the robot and failed to hit, it could mean the drone—either by design or by accident—found a gap in the gun’s fire control. Perhaps the drone was moving too fast, too slow or too low. Any enemy missile matching the drone’s physics could dodge American ships’ defenses. I may owe someone beer over this, but let me put this out there; everyone take a powder. This isn't frightening, it is interesting. I'll say here what I said SEPCOR to a few people after the pics came out, specifically the one above. Look where it hit and how it hit. I looks just like a perfect early-MOD Harpoon targeting algorithm hit. The drone hit wings level. Odds are this was a controlled hit. Wasn't planned by the humans to do that - but the drone thinks it did everything perfectly. Now, all sorts of questions come up from here, many really don't need to be discussed or answered on this medium. First up; where was range control? Was that link down? Second, we don't know what profile this was programmed for .... or they thought it was programmed for, and that deserves more thought than most. Even drones are subject to human error either in their programming or their maintenance. Third, so what if this were a live fire exercise? Let's discount that this might just be a standard-issue human screw up. Not all offensive and defensive weapon systems work as advertised all the time. Nothing is perfect or 100% guaranteed. Even if you have everything working, everyone qualified, and not a single CASREP on the ship - there is always blind stupid luck; good or bad. Sometimes you can make it through the SM-2, the ESSM, and CIWS on a clear, calm, beautiful day. If this was a just a TRACKEX, when things start to go sideways with seconds to react, you really cannot expect a ship to respond as if they expected a regiment-sized formation of Tupolev Tu-22M3 coming over the horizon. It just doesn't work like that. Either way - I don't think there are any larger lessons here about our defensive capabilities that we didn't already know. I'm not willing to place any bets on the cause right now - but I do like this effect; it is causing people to think again if we are doing what navies have done since the threat first appeared from the air; shortchanging defensive systems and defense in depth due to money issues and a faith in "magic bullet" technology that in peace promises easy war. After WWII started in earnest, shipyards festooned all ships with as many anti-air weapons as possible - as in peace it was determined they weren't needed. In San Carlos Water four decades later, in addition to Sea Dart, Sea Wolf, Sea Cat, and 4.5" guns - the rails were full of Sailors and even civilians with all manner of side-arms, crew served weapons, and long guns shooting at A-4 and Mirage aircraft scooting down the sound. Why? Because, you see, modern systems were so good that you didn't need all those messy extras. We all know that SM-2/3/6 are not really perfect even with RAM, 5" guns, ESSM, CIWS, and others backing them up. Very good and almost without peer? Sure - but not perfect. Shoot-Shoot-Look-Shoot; Shoot-Look-Shoot etc all are based on nice pretty assumptions in peace and the right things packed in the MK-41 VLS tubes when you need them. In war, WINCHESTER will be heard a lot. SHOOT-SHOOT-LOOK-OHSHIT-SHOOT-SHOOT-HOLYSHITIDONTCAREKEEPSHOOTING will happen; just ask the ASW Commander in the Falkland Islands Battle Group. Does any of the above have anything to do with the CHANCELLORSVILLE? No, not really - but - it is a good excuse to ponder if our "perfect" systems really are that perfect. Before they were needed in war, did the homing torpedo, depth charge, 30-cal guns on aircraft, or AAA on the CV really worked as advertised? No. Is our AAW - untested in combat BTW - as good as our PPT say? No. Not even close; you can take that to the bank. Even when systems in the past were honed to almost perfection after years of war - did they still fail? Of course, as the crew of the USS FRANKLIN (CV-13) can tell you. This is a tough business where things can go wrong even when you do everything right. If you can learn something from those occasions without anyone getting killed - like we did here - then be happy. In the final evaluation, you really can't buy training like that. I look forward to reading what the investigation finds - even if I can only read the low side now. Hopefully, we will have something of value to come out of it. View the full article

How much faster would it be, and how much more range would it have. That was my first thought; what is your first tactical application? BM1 have some thoughts? View the full article

This is the official press release by the US Navy. PACIFIC OCEAN (NNS) -- An aerial target drone malfunctioned and struck guided missile cruiser USS Chancellorsville (CG 62) off the coast of Southern California at approximately 1:25 pm local time today, Nov. 16, while the ship was conducting a radar tracking exercise during routine training at sea. No Sailors were seriously injured, but two Sailors were treated for minor burns. The ship remains capable of operations, however it did sustain some damage and will return to its homeport of San Diego to have the damage assessed. The Navy is investigating the cause of the malfunction.That is very vague, so what if we add a bit of factual detail? PACIFIC OCEAN (NNS) -- A BQM-74 aerial target missile drone malfunctioned and struck a direct hit in the port side of the guided missile cruiser USS Chancellorsville (CG 62) off the coast of Southern California at approximately 1:25 pm local time today, Nov. 16, while the ship was conducting a radar tracking exercise of the BQM-74 during routine training at sea. USS Chancellorsville (CG 62) is currently conducting Combat System Ships Qualification Trials for Baseline 9 of the AEGIS combat system - the most advanced version of the AEGIS combat system. USS Chancellorsville is currently the only US Navy ship certified with the latest version of the AEGIS combat system. No Sailors were seriously injured by the direct hit of the missile tracked all the way into the hull of the cruiser, but two Sailors were treated for minor burns. The ships officers and crew may or may not have bravely and intelligently attempted to defend itself from the rogue drone, but what's really important enough to mention is that the ship and technology on the ship remains capable of operations. However it did sustain some damage from the direct hit that put a two foot hole in the port side of the ship, and as a result USS Chancellorsville (CG 62) will return to its homeport of San Diego to have the damage assessed. The Navy is investigating the cause of the malfunction.So how is it exactly that the one ship on the planet with the most advanced version of the worlds best anti-missile combat system took a direct hit from a rogue missile drone? The Navy tells us the drone malfunctioned, and apparently the combat system on the ship had no problems if the ship remains capable of operations, so based on those details of the press release the officers and crew of the USS Chancellorsville tracked the target missile drone - during the radar tracking exercise - apparently as it scored a direct hit into side of the ship. But the ship was unable to defend itself? I get it that the safety systems were probably engaged that would prevent the full capabilities of the AEGIS combat system from being employed against the rogue drone, but what about the independent close-in point defenses of the cruiser? The official story, based on the details as released officially, is that the most advanced AEGIS warship in the world tracked a direct hit by a missile drone and was apparently unable to defend itself successfully. Did the ship even try to defend itself from a rogue drone? We don't know, because the press release focuses on telling the public the technology of the ship is sufficient enough for the ship to conduct normal operations, but tells us no details at all regarding what the crew did or did not do to defend the ship from a direct hit. There is a detail that is omitted in the official press release, and because it is a detail of the incident known at the time of the press release, we can only assume the omission is intentional for purposes of protecting a reputation. The ships officers and crew apparently did try to defend the ship. The CIWS apparently fired at the BQM-74 but was unsuccessful in defending the ship. That detail matters, because the omission of that detail is the difference between protecting the reputation of the ships officers and crew who tried to defend the ship, or protecting the reputation of a piece of technology that was unsuccessful - for unknown reasons - in performing the technologies primary role as the last line of defense for the ship. Let's hope that while the Navy investigates the drone malfunction they also look into why the CIWS was unsuccessful in engaging the rogue drone in defense of the ship. It seems to me the CIWS investigation is much more important than an investigation into the malfunction of a target drone. Based on where the rogue drone hit the ship, had it been a real ASCM - it could have easily been a mission kill for the ship. This is a very serious incident involving the most advanced AEGIS warship in the US Navy, and the Navy has started the incident with a press release that intentionally omits a critical detail - that the ship tried to defend itself and the specific technology designed to defend the ship for this specific situation failed. This incident is a big deal, and on the first day there is already a deception effort underway to conceal key details of the incident - an omission that only serves to cast doubt upon the reputation of sailors for purposes of protecting the reputation of a piece of technology. Why did the Navy conceal from the public that the point defense system of the most advanced AEGIS ship in the US Navy failed to protect the ship from a direct hit from a rogue drone? View the full article

The fact that operating fixed wing aircraft has a long and bloody learning curve is no news to readers here - but this stuff coming out of Chinese state media is interesting. Via our friend Wendell Minnick over at DefenseNews; In an unusual departure for mainland Chinese-language media, the Beijing-based Sina Military Network (SMN) criticized the capabilities of the carrier-borne J-15 Flying Shark as nothing more than a “flopping fish.†... What sounded more like a rant than analysis, SMN, on Sept. 23, reported the new J-15 was incapable of flying from the Liaoning with heavy weapons, “effectively crippling its attack range and firepower.†The fighter can take off and land on the carrier with two YJ-83K anti-ship missiles, two PL-8 air-to-air missiles, and four 500-kilogram bombs. But a weapons “load exceeding 12 tons will not get it off the carrier’s ski jump ramp.†This might prohibit it from carrying heavier munitions such as PL-12 medium-range air-to-air missiles. To further complicate things, the J-15 can carry only two tons of weapons while fully fueled. “This would equip it with no more than two YJ-83K and two PL-8 missiles,†thus the “range of the YJ-83K prepared for the fighter will be shorter than comparable YJ-83K missiles launched from larger PLAN [People’s Liberation Army Navy] vessels. The J-15 will be boxed into less than 120 [kilometers] of attack range.†Losing the ability to carry the PL-12 medium-range air-to-air missiles will make the J-15 an “unlikely match†against other foreign carrier-based fighters. “Even the Vietnam People’s Air Force can outmatch the PL-8 short-range missile. Without space for an electronic countermeasure pod, a huge number of J-15s must be mobilized for even simple missions, a waste for the PLA Navy in using the precious space aboard its sole aircraft carrier in service.†Maybe they're taking lessons from the American maritime blogosphere. The flopping fish comment is exemplary. Perhaps this is a push for the construction of a super-carrier like the Americans have ... or a pushback by proponents of land-based air? Who knows, but interesting nonetheless. Hat tip thinkdefence. View the full article

U.S. sailors lift a missile on the flight deck of the aircraft carrier USS Nimitz in the U.S. 5th Fleet area of responsibility, Aug. 31, 2013. The sailors, ordnancemen, are assigned to Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 323. U.S. Navy photo by Seaman Apprentice Kelly M. Agee View the full article

Our buddy Galrahn tweeted yesterday, For the fifth time in a week, a very serious defense person described Hagel to me in private as "an idiot" or "stupid." That is chilling. — Raymond Pritchett (@Galrahn) August 22, 2013 Not the first time I have heard that, but the guy was elected to quite a few offices. So, who am I to judge his IQ - though there are lots of brilliant idiots out there and very smart people who don't know squat about what they should - or know a lot of what is just wrong. SECDEF Hagel was hired for one reason; to preside over the more rapid decline of the US military so that the next President doesn't have enough to really do anything overseas - and Hagel is doing a find job in that respect. No, I prefer to evaluate someone by the company they keep and the causes they support. For me, Hagel was unqualified for the position he now holds for one reason; his association with "Global Zero." Quick backgrounder: Hagel is a vocal supporter of Global Zero, a group formed in Paris in 2008 that promotes eliminating nuclear weapons. Made up of political, civic, and military leaders, the group calls for deep cuts in US and Russian nuclear arsenals. Hagel has said that he does not believe in unilateral disarmament - a sticking point with right-wing policymakers. He has also said he does not believe that eliminating the weapons will happen in the short-term. In a press release on the Global Zero website, Hagel, with co-authors, wrote: "We support bilateral, negotiated, verifiable U.S.-Russian arms reductions, to be followed by multilateral negotiations, bringing other key countries into a serious, verifiable process of reductions." "...the suggestion that we naively believe that the elimination of nuclear weapons can be achieved easily or in short order is likewise false." At best, Global Zero is just another posturing place for self-appointed intellectuals to make statements that make themselves feel good and be in a proper light with the "right" people. At worst, it follows in the long tradition of people so enamored by their importance that they think they can eliminate war, conflict - and have found just the way to do it. See the Washington Naval Treaty, Versailles, etc, etc, etc. Here is a cold fact; it is simple mid-20th century technology to create a nuclear weapon. Almost all modern, non-nuclear nations from The Netherlands, Japan, Singapore, Taiwan, Australia, Korea, and more could - turnkey - create a nuclear weapon of their own if they wished. But they don't. Why? Simple, they don't have a reason to. The domestic politics, international environment, cost, and most importantly - a relationship with the United States of America in one way or another, keeps the needle in the "don't build" area. So - what if we went to Global Zero? In a 4-Phase operation, we end here; PHASE IV (2024 - 2030) The phased, verified, proportionate dismantlement of all nuclear arsenals to zero total warheads is complete by 2030. The comprehensive verification and enforcement system prohibiting the development and possession of nuclear weapons is in place to ensure that the world is never again threatened by nuclear weapons. OK, let's be adults here. How long, given human nature, will that last? The world has "zero" and then some player is found to have kept 50. The USA says, "no" it won't build more bombs, but will instead negotiate. What do mature nations do? Without a big-friend's nuclear umbrella for the Worst-Case COA - the math changes. Simple - some will build their own, and off we go. That or a few cities get nuked and nations blackmailed ... and there you go. Right now, no one does that because there is still the feeling of some kind of nuclear umbrella. No one fears that a bad actor will be able to click off a nuke and keep the USA, GBR, FRA, or even RUS from responding in kind. Like chemical weapons, most believe that even in a shooting war between most nuclear nations listed above, no one would use the nukes just like in WWII no one used chemical weapons. PAK and IND? Well, that is something different. Rogue nations? They may - but as long as we have a strong nuclear capability and seem to be willing to use it - that should keep it contained. All depends upon leadership - but right now I have little doubt that if someone nuked NYC, that in time we would find out were it came from and if needed respond in kind - at least I hope so. I recommend you spend some time on the Global Zero site - look at their "leaders" and think a bit. Think hard, think historically, think critically - and find your inner neo-Realist. Personally, I like the fact that our President has access to our nuclear "crazy Aunt in the basement," who can advise him on how to vaporize entire cities in short order - and the fact that we have people trained, equipped and ready to do so. The world is a nasty place, all cultures are not the same, and now and then good people have to do what they need to do in order to keep chaos and barbarism on their side of the border. As the world was, is, and will be. In 1386, he marched again. The destination was the city of Isfahan, noted at that time, as it is today, for its beauty as well as its magnificent monuments and learned people. The city offered no resistance and opened its gates. Timur promised not to plunder the city if a ransom was paid. Out went the noblemen of Isfahan to collect the demanded booty. All was quiet for a day. Then, in the darkness of night, some of the townsfolk attacked Timur’s guards. In retrospect, it is not clear what happened, but the result was a disaster for the city. In the morning, Timur gave a general order for a massacre. The inhabitants of the city were hunted down and a mountain of skulls was created in the main bazaar. This was the first of the general massacres that Timur is noted for, something that he was to repeat later in Lahore, Delhi, Damascus and dozens of lesser cities. Almost 100,000 Isfahanis was killed. In living memory, as a nation we have intentionally slaughtered hundreds of thousands of people - mostly women and children - in a fortnight - and one day we will have to again. We should openly and soberly maintain a national Mattis Doctrine; Be polite, be professional, but have a plan to kill everybody you meet. - General James Mattis, USMC (Ret.) A bad actor using a nuke and good nations do nothing? That is a world I would not want to live in. When Rome lost the ability to "go Roman" - we all know how that worked out. Well, I assume everyone knows ... but at the rate our leaders seem to study history, perhaps not. View the full article

This June, the Naval Historical Foundation once again had the opportunity to engage with young scholars at the National History Day Awards Ceremony in College Park, MD. On hand to represent NHF was life member and volunteer Dr. Charles Chadbourn of the Naval War College. We were very pleased to present the Captain Kenneth Coskey National History Day Prize for the best entry on naval history to high school junior Maria Sutton of Padua Academy in Wilmington, DE. Her paper was titled “The Sinking of the USS Maine: A Turning Point in American Foreign Policy.” Each year since 1999, we have awarded a $500 prize to the high school or middle school history project that best captures an appreciation for naval history. Judging is conducted by the organizers of National History Day. The prize is named for retired Navy Captain Ken Coskey, a Vietnam War combat aviator and Prisoner of War, and former Executive Director of the Naval Historical Foundation. Maria’s interest in naval history was formed at an early age, and heavily influenced by her grandfather, EN3 Robert E. Harrison, who served in the U.S. Navy during the Korean War. The stories he shared about his service fostered a fascination in young Maria, and a desire to learn more about the Navy. She says that “because of him, I automatically knew I wanted to research a Naval topic for my History Day paper.” The theme for this year’s National History Day was “Turning Points,” and Maria decided to study the 1898 explosion of the battleship Maine in Havana Harbor, an event that led to war with Spain, and to the first steps of American overseas imperialism. She worked closely with teachers Daniel Mahler, Robert Gabrick, and Dr. Colleen Hall, and in particular with Barbara Markham, the lead teacher who assisted Maria throughout the History Day process. Her research was extensive, including traditional sources such as books and magazine articles, but also included multimedia sources such as documentaries, websites, and even music. The end result was a well written, well conceived paper that examines the transformation of American foreign policy. Maria “enjoyed being able to research without preconceived notions and discover the history on my own – it was an experience I will never forget.” Painting of the wreck of USS Maine, by A. Melero, 1898. NHHC image KN 10967. National History Day Prize Awarded for Paper on the Sinking of USS Maine was published by the Naval Historical Foundation and originally appeared on Naval Historical Foundation on July 3, 2013. View the full article

Haven't tried the game, but the trailer is awesome: Haven View the full article

Are you reading Norman Polmar's posts over at navyhistory.org blog? Well shame on you if you aren't classics like this; After dozens of letters and many hundreds of manuscript pages exchanged between us, we finally met in March 1969 when Genda visited the United States. He was invited to the United States in part to participate in the Naval Institute’s distinguished visitor program. (I had been assistant editor of the Naval Institute Proceedings from 1963 to 1967.) During his visit Genda spoke at the Naval Academy to an audience of Naval Academy midshipmen and faculty, and area USNI members. When asked if the Japanese had possessed the atomic bomb, did he believe they would have used it against the United States, he replied, “I think so.†When in a later conversation I raised the subject to him, he responded, “Why wouldn’t we have?†(He also spoke at the Smithsonian Institution while in the Annapolis-Washington area.) That week Genda and I had a lengthy, private session at his Annapolis hotel. His English was excellent, his views candid, and his personality overwhelming. During our discussion of the Battle of Midway (June 1942), we spoke of the failure of the Japanese to detect in a timely manner the three U.S. carriers that arrived in the area unbeknown to the Japanese. One of the Japanese search planes had developed engine trouble and had not been immediately replaced. It was in that plane’s search sector that the U.S. carriers were located. When I asked Genda if another scout plane from the carriers or one of the accompanying cruisers or battleship should have quickly been launched to cover that sector, he responded, “Of course.†Not really thinking, I asked whose fault it was that a replacement plane was not immediately dispatched. Without hesitation, he pointed to his own chest and said: “Genda!†Genda sent me a very kind letter when he received a copy of our book—Aircraft Carriers: A History of Carrier Aviation and Its Influence on World Events, published in 1969. The title page listed me as author “In collaboration with†General Minoru Genda, Captain Eric M. Brown, and Professor Robert M. Langdon of the Naval Academy. We exchanged notes over the next few years, albeit with far less frequency than when we were working on the book. He retired from the upper house in 1986 and passed away three years later, the day before his 85th birthday. That stuff is solid gold. View the full article

Click on this link (right click, save as) to see the actual signed memorandum by SecDef Hagel. Here is the text. Statement by Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel on the Distinguished Warfare Medal The Department of Defense announced on Feb. 13 the establishment of the Distinguished Warfare Medal to recognize the achievements of a small number of service men and women who have an especially direct and immediate impact on combat operations through the use of remotely piloted aircraft and cyber operations. I agree with my predecessor Leon Panetta that such recognition is justly warranted for these men and women and thank him for raising the level of awareness of their hard work and critical contributions. When I came into office, concerns were raised to me about the Distinguished Warfare Medal’s order of precedence by veterans’ organizations, members of Congress, and other stakeholders whose views are valued by this department’s leadership. After consulting with the service secretaries, along with Gen. Dempsey and the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I directed them to review the Distinguished Warfare Medal. The medal was originally conceived to be awarded only to those men and women who, while serving off the battlefield, have an extraordinary impact on combat operations. While the review confirmed the need to ensure such recognition, it found that misconceptions regarding the precedence of the award were distracting from its original purpose. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, with the concurrence of the service secretaries, have recommended the creation of a new distinguishing device that can be affixed to existing medals to recognize the extraordinary actions of this small number of men and women. I agree with the Joint Chiefs’ findings, and have directed the creation of a distinguishing device instead of a separate medal. The Joint Chiefs also recommend further consultation with the service secretaries, the service senior enlisted leaders, and veterans’ organizations regarding the nature of the device as well as clear definition of the eligibility criteria for award of the device. I have directed that within 90 days final award criteria and the other specifics of the distinguishing device be developed and presented to me for final approval. The service men and women, who operate and support our remotely piloted aircraft, operate in cyber, and others are critical to our military’s mission of safeguarding the nation. I again want to thank my predecessor, Leon Panetta, for raising the need to ensure that these men and women are recognized for their contributions. Good on SecDef Hagel for listening to the various constituents about this idea. Lots of people voiced their concerns. RE: The Burn Pit and The Burn Pit (Q&A with the DoD) RE: BlackFive - And Son, This Medal Is For... And of course...DOCTRINE MAN! View the full article

It is all still here - and we're on a Russia kick today. On top of that ... it is the details, details that I like. Wearing a tie, and an ill-fitting one at that, on the bridge. Old school CRTs. Paper and crayons. What looks like very unsanitary Bakelite handsets ... but besides that ... they do have some nice lines those Russian ships. View the full article

Hey ... via the latest issue of Proceedings, this should ring a bell on the Front Porch; The Littoral Combat Ship is overpriced and underperforming, yet the Navy continues to support it. It’s time to abandon the LCS and replace it with a comparable vessel that costs the same, but is far more capable. There are several great candidates in other navies, but one we might consider is the Danish-built Iver Huitfeldt –class frigate. Welcome aboard for Plan Salamander since ~ 2005, though we have often offered up from the Swedish VISBY, Norwegian NANSEN, Dutch SEVEN PROVINCES, or the other Danish ship ABSALON - anything but the Little Crappy Ship ... but IVER HUITFELT is new for 2012 ... and it sounds like a player. ... a Huitfeldt carries 16 Harpoon missiles, with a range of 124 kilometers, and a warhead of 227 kilograms. It also has two 76-mm guns that reach 16 kilometers. One of the 76-mm guns can be replaced with the U.S. 127-mm gun, which has a range of 24 kilometers. For close-in defense, each ship also has a 35-mm Oerlikon Close-In Weapons System and four 12.7-mm machine guns or two 20-mm cannon. For air defense, each Huitfeldt has 32 standard SM-2 missiles with a range of 167 kilometers in a Mark 41 VLS launcher. This system is backed up by 24 Evolved Sea Sparrow RIM 162B anti aircraft missiles with a range of 16 kilometers and four Stinger missiles. For ASW, each Huitfeldt carries two twin-torpedo tubes for the Eurotorp MU 90 active-passive homing torpedoes with a range of 15 kilometers. Like the LCS, the Huitfeldt has a hangar that can house two light helicopters or a mix of helos and drones. The Huitfeldt can sail 9,000 nautical miles at 15 knots, compared to the LCS’s 3,500 nautical miles at 14 knots. Crew sizes are similar. In short, today’s Huitfeldt outclasses all three versions of the 2017 LCS in every category. The Danish ships provide vastly superior antiaircraft, long-range strike, and ASUW capability, while also providing equivalent ASW capability and the flexibility inherent in 65 additional billeting spaces. You should read his summary takedown of LCS's failures, simply exceptional. Nothing we haven't done here, but good to hear from some like Hammes, and to see it done so cleanly. It’s time to cancel the LCS program and build ships of comparable cost and capability to those of our European allies. If Denmark can figure it out, the U.S. Navy can, too. Can we have an amen? Oh, one wee snark - Denmark has a population of 5.5 million and they can do this (a little more than Minnesota). Ponder that. Oh, and if you didn't catch Hammes when he was a guest on Midrats last December - give it a listen. View the full article

He copped to some of the charges against him. FORT MEADE, Md. – A military judge on Thursday accepted guilty pleas by Army Pfc. Bradley Manning to 10 lesser charges against him, leaving the ex-intelligence analyst to face 12 other counts for allegedly leaking hundreds of thousands of government documents to the WikiLeaks website. The acceptance of the "naked guilty pleas" -- meaning there is no agreement between the government and the defense that would limit the sentence – at a pre-trial hearing means that Manning faces up to 20 years in prison, even if he is ultimately acquitted of the most-serious charges against him. Col. Denise Lind, the military judge presiding over the case, also accepted Manning’s “not guilty†pleas to the remaining charges, including "aiding the enemy." His court martial on those charges, which carry a maximum sentence of life in prison, is scheduled to begin on June 3. But let's be clear. This is not a plea bargain, because the government didn't promise him any sentencing breaks. He just admitted he did some of the things, and will fight the more heinous charges. like aiding the enemy. This pretty urantees he will be spending quite a while behind bars, and if he is convicted of the serious charges, most of his life there. Let's hope so. He may be pathetic, but a pathetic traitor is no less dangerous. View the full article

I've been in a grumpy, snarky mood all week - why stop now? I always thought that San Francisco was a bad place for Starfleet Headquarters - so Brussels is not bad by comparison. Look. NATO Headquarters Brussels. When Anders Fogh Rasmussen drives to his office in the Schaerbeek neighborhood of Brussels in the morning, he gazes longingly at a large construction site across the street. The site, where construction cranes jut into the sky, will eventually be the home of the new, 250,000-square-meter (2.7-million-square-foot) NATO headquarters. Price tag: more than a billion euros. In 28FEB13 Dollars - that comes to over $1.31 billion. That is a lot for an organization that really doesn't need something that big. Really. It doesn't. It should have something that is both more reasonable, to scale - and artistically ... well ... more something else than a modernist masturbatoreum found in a dusty B-roll from Tomorrowland. Our friends over at NATOSource ask nicely; The revelation comes as NATO is pushing to slash its costs and streamline its bureaucracy against a backdrop of savage defence cuts in practically all member states. ... I'll be a bit more blogg'y. OK serfs ... errrr ... I mean taxpayers. As European economies sag under austerity plans, the USA pretends it is Greece spending wise as it stumbles through a 4th year without a budget - the NATO militarizes are fading in to gendarmerie level of capability; here is the NATO staff's response; Nations recognised that the current facilities were inflexible and had reached saturation point. (The current HQ was constructed on a temporary basis in 1967 and has now been in service for 41 years). Put simply, the need for a new Headquarters is overwhelming. The revision of NATO's working methods, launched under NATO +, must be underpinned by modern, flexible, user-friendly facilities which provide a pleasant and effective working environment for all staff. The new Headquarters will be designed around staff needs. A state-of-the-art building will ensure maximum flexibility so that working space can be configured in different ways to suit individual and collective needs. New restaurant, leisure and support facilities (shops, banks) will bring working and living conditions closer together and provide staff with better overall services on site. In consequence, nations agreed that NATO needed and deserved a new building for the new millennium to reflect its success as an organisation and its new missions and activities. A comfortable Staff building in NATO is about as important as the Flags-to-Post outcome. Actual expenditures in to capability too by our European friends? Child please. According to an internal breakdown by Rasmussen, the American share of the NATO budget has increased from 63 to 72 percent in the last decade, a development the Americans have long deplored. Joseph A. Harriss over at TheAmericanSpectator isn't all that impressed either; ... the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has just begun construction of a splendiferous new $1.38 billion headquarters on a 100-acre site in Brussels. Designed by Chicago architects Skidmore, Owings & Merrill, renowned for luxurious commercial buildings including the tallest in the world, the Burj Khalifa in Dubai, the futuristic new NATO offices will feature eight sweeping wings covering 2.7 million square feet. Glass-walled elevators overlooking cavernous atriums showering natural light. Ecologically correct grass growing on the roof. Seventeen conference rooms. A range of amenities from cafeterias, restaurants, and banks, to shopping, sport, and leisure facilities. ... Today about 4,500 staff are at the Brussels headquarters. Along with thousands of others in its multifarious agencies and strategic and regional commands, they engage in a giddy flurry of activities. Many have only an imaginary relation to security. For example: • The Academic Affairs Unit runs a fellowships program and organizes conferences, seminars, and visits for academics and think tank researchers to “project the Alliance’s point of view and strengthen information on its goals.†In other words, a glorified PR operation with academic pretensions. • The Science for Peace and Security Committee “contributes to NATO’s mission by linking science to society,†whatever that means. Concretely, it funds grants for research on soft, fashionable subjects like civil science and environment. • The NATO Undersea Research Center in La Spezia, Italy, has a vast program including Marine Mammal Risk Mitigation that studies the effects of sonar on marine animals, “to counter the threat from quiet submarines.†• Then there’s the NATO Multimedia Library with its more than 18,000 books and subscriptions to 155 newspapers and magazines. And its annual Manfred Wörner Junior Essay competition with a $6,800 prize. And the NATO photo competition for young shutterbugs who learn that, for example, “Taking photographs of random strangers can be risky.†To keep the snark going strong; those who have done NATO tours know that the 4th billet is the most important for the new HQ. The facilities will comprise : up-to-date conference facilities; office accommodation for Delegations, Military Representations, International Staff (IS) and International Military Staff (IMS), Agencies and Partner Missions; modern, up-to date communications and IT facilities. a variety of support services such as: restaurants, banking, shopping, leisure and sports facilities; Look at it closer and then think of all the metal and glass structures that has blighted the landscape since WWII. They don't age all that well, do they? This will be different, yes? If we are spending over $1.31 billion on a building, then we plan to have it last a long time, right? Responsible with other people's money, correct? ... the requirement for an austere, sober and functional building with the need for a reasonable level of comfort and the provision of modular, flexible space, which can be systematically reconfigured and/or extended. The facilities must also guarantee value for money (a sensible level of cost over a 30 year life cycle ) as well as long term soundness. Also, putting on my red hat; give me an Airbus and three guys who want to die; unlike the Pentagon, this doesn't have a stone anywhere nor all that much concrete to get in the way. Easy target. I know, I'm just being a cynic - but honestly; I'm not all that impressed. Mostly, it is because I prefer neo-Classical, Romanesque, and neo-Gothic architecture - with stone. But, that is just me. Here, let these guys explain themselves. As per the DD1390, in the 2013 DoD budget, we are spending $26.969 million, representing DoD's 60% of the USA contribution. DoS is covering the other 40%. - 2012 it was $24.118 million. - 2011 $31.863 million. - 2010 $41.4 million. That gives you a running average. Construction started in 2009, and the land came gratis from The Kingdom of Belgium. So, there you go. Here is a shot of the old building. Just another clapped-out modernist 1960s building ... which is what this will be in 30-years. One would think that a modern organization such as NATO would go for a much smoother, smaller, more nimble HQ - especially when you consider that SHAPE is just down the road in Mons ... but this is a largely European run bureaucracy - hence it must grow, and we have Starfleet Headquarters. Other people's money and all. Good positive things here in one way; NATO orders are simple outstanding both professionally and for the family ... so a chance to live in Europe for Americans. Got to get you money's worth. View the full article

Introduction Every spring semester, the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce at the University of Kentucky launches a 24-hour policy crisis simulation. Thirty-five or so students are divided into 6-8 teams, each led by a faculty member or program graduate. Simulation Control, normally involving myself and one or more graduates or faculty members, manages the sim with a combination of remote and direct contact. The University of Kentucky School of Journalism coordinates with the Patterson School during the simulation, independently operating at least two news websites that cover the events in-sim. This year's simulation involved thirty-three students, five faculty members, three graduates, and a massive criminal conspiracy to steal defense-related intellectual property from U.S. firms. The design philosophy of the Patterson School simulation concentrates on developing difficult decision-making scenarios for students. Students make decisions under conditions of time pressure, asymmetric information, inter- and intra- group dynamics, and exhaustion. Each scenario begins with a realistic premise, and the teams have realistic motivations and goals. Simulation Control feels free to abstract from reality, however, in order to facilitate this decision-making environment. In this case, abstraction was doubly necessary because of the highly technical nature of the subject matter, as well as the secrecy that normally accompanies policy work on the question. Obviously, we could not ask students to develop worms or conduct DDoS attacks against other teams, although some did employ innovative techniques for stealing passwords, such as observing and recording carelessly placed post-it notes. The primary architect of the 2013 simulation was Patterson graduate Trevor Sutherland. Trevor was also my primary partner in conducting the simulation, and enabled the success of the project through his familiarity with the subject matter. We were also assisted by Dr. Alex Vacca of Northrup Grumman, who contributed in his capacity as a scholar of international affairs and cyber-security subject matter expert, and played an in-sim role as the head of the cyber-security firm "Germanicus." Teams The teams in this exercise fell into three categories: State actors, private firms, and non-governmental organizations. Teams included: United States government (subdivided into departments) Israeli government (subdivided into departments) Green and Company Financial Services: A large American bank and financial services company, with significant interests in Canada and Israel Smith, Smith, and Smith LLP (Smith3): A major New York law firm representing a wide variety of corporate clients, including Green and Co. and a number of defense contractors Force Orange: A hacktivist collective that develops around the #opFreeEnoch movement. An unnamed Russian criminal organization (RICO): An experienced and well-connected cyber-crime organization focused on the expropriation and sale of intellectual property Websites associated with the simulation included: International News Network: This is an international competitor to CNN, FNC, and the BBC. BluWired: This is a tech and media oriented magazine. Social Media Proxy (password protected): This site served as a proxy for general social media discussion of the ongoing crisis Course of Simulation The setting for the simulation involved an attempted terrorist attack (using an overcharged laptop battery) on an El Al flight. After the plane successfully landed, the terrorist explained that he had developed the idea for the attack by watching YouTube videos. As a consequence, the Israeli government attempted to ban a variety of similar videos from domestic distribution. This move sparked international controversy, which was exacerbated by the Israeli decision to arrest Enoch Moses Kaplin, an Israeli man who had disseminated software for evading the ban from his personal website. In response to this arrest, a movement developed around the hashtag #opFreeEnoch, targeting Israeli private and public institutions with a series of sustained DDoS (Dedicated Denial of Service) attacks. As news emerged that these attacks had spread to an Israeli branch of the U.S. financial services firm Green and Company, our simulation began. The Israeli team quickly ascertained that many of the #opFreeEnoch attacks were coming from the United States, and placed pressure on the U.S. government to arrest perpetrators. The U.S. government followed through on this, while also monitoring the situation with Green and Company. Green and Company took the step of shutting down Israeli operations completely, although the Force Orange attacks subsequently spread to the U.S. headquarters. As these attacks proceeded, RICO took the opportunity to launch a prepared, sophisticated "spearfishing" attack against Smith3, targeting information about Smiths' defense contractor clients. RICO had previously come to an arrangement with a Russian defense company wherein the latter would make implausible claims about American intellectual property holdings, in the hopes that U.S. contractors would enter into sensitive communications with their legal representation. The Russians also launched an attack on Green and Co. just for the fun of it, managing to acquire some credit card, account, and password information. These actions proceeded as planned until early Friday evening, when Force Orange determined that Smith3 represented Green and Co.'s Israeli interests and launched a DDoS attack. This, combined with the previous Russian efforts, completely crashed Smith3's computer system, temporarily immunizing them from the Russian attack. This had additional effects, including making Smith3 aware of their vulnerability, and making the defense contractor clients nervous about the firm's reliability. However, as the US government was focused on the Green and Co. situation, it paid little attention to Smith3's plight. In order to restore and improve access, RICO carried out a daring kidnapping of a Smith3 associate, prying out computer information that would assist with later attacks. Late on Friday evening (early morning Israeli time), the Israeli government announced that most charges against Enoch Kaplin would be dropped, and that he would shortly be released from prison. The Israeli government also announced that it had received sufficient assurances from Google to allow full access to YouTube videos. This announcement substantially ended the #OpFreeEnoch operation, and slowed attacks on both Green and Co. and Israeli state institutions. However, disquiet at Smith3 persisted. Force Orange revealed that it had rejected entreaties from what it suspected to be a Russian criminal organization, although few took this revelation at face value. After restoration of Smith3's servers, the Russian attack resumed. In consultation with the firm Germanicus, Smith3 noted an unexplained bump in .html activity, but undertook no immediate steps beyond contacting the U.S. government. The U.S. government, having just apprehended a member of Force Orange, paid little attention to this contact. Force Orange responded by renewing its attacks on Green and Co., as well as by launching an SQLi attack against BluWired, a tech magazine and website. Israeli intelligence (in contact with some Russian assets) warned the United States that a security breakdown might be in progress, but the U.S. misinterpreted this signal by focusing on Pentagon defenses. In the final hours of the simulation, Smith3 contracted with a private company to give advice on tracking the lost information. Although this took several hours, technicians eventually traced the loss to Liaoning, China, then to Tallinn, Estonia, where the trail went cold. Meanwhile, RICO began attempting to sell data to potential customers. A prior arrangement with a Russian state defense firm broke down over a price disagreement. The Russians pushed feelers towards Brazil and Israel before coming to an initial agreement with a Chinese defense firm for part of the information. At this point the simulation ended. Lessons Learned This section borrows heavily from Dr. Vacca's account of the simulation, as his views are largely in accord with my own. Communication Breakdown: Perhaps due to the subject matter, paranoia set in early at the simulation. Teams became reluctant to communicate with one another, and reluctant to convey their genuine concerns even while communicating. Organizations which had suffered attacks were reluctant to reveal the full extent of those attacks, believing that a true account would undermine the credibility of their security. This was especially true of Smith3, for which a reputation for security was a central asset. Asymmetric Information: Communication breakdown enhanced the problem of asymmetric information, which is one of the hallmarks of these simulations. The United States was unable to draw together the disparate information it received about the security attacks, in no small part because the information was difficult to decipher and came in small, seemingly discrete packets. Creativity Pays: The RICO team had a great deal of freedom of action, and used it to good effect. In order to make up for their lack of legitimate presence, the team (on its own initiative) developed a series of shell identities, which it used in collaboration with Germanicus to acquire intelligence about the other teams. RICO also responded in nimble fashion to the loss of access to Smith3, carrying out the high risk, high reward kidnapping of a Smith3 executive. Although Smith3 managed the damage as well as it could, this helped accelerate RICO's theft efforts. Similarly, Force Orange took advantage of the lack of political constraints by engaging the other teams in a public manner: People Make Mistakes: As noted above, the simulation is designed to mimic an environment in which decision-makers choose poorly. As the simulation stretched into the early morning, the ability of students to process information and to maintain composure waned. The teams demonstrated much greater energy and acuity after a short break allowed for some rest and recuperation. Although seemingly obvious, this is a critical lesson for any organization; even crises that don't involve explosions can tax the wetware. Consultants Will Outlast Us All: Germanicus, in the person of Dr. Vacca, received substantial (imaginary) cash payments from every team. Given the contradictory nature of team goals, this obviously meant working both sides of a problem at the same time. In this exercise Germanicus acquired the veneer of respectability through his association with simulation management, but even in the real world the vetting of consultants and other third party actors can be difficult, especially in technologically challenging environments. Conclusions At the Patterson School we normally only run each simulation once; unlike the Army War College negotiation scenarios, we lack the opportunity to retool and tweak the scenario each time in order to improve outcomes. Were we to rerun this scenario, we would undertake some simple administrative changes, such as improving the access that each team had to information about the other (public) teams. In retrospect, I would not have paused the simulation at 2am, instead pushing forward with some additional events to keep the teams awake, interested, and paranoid. Altogether, however, the simulation represented a valuable use of our time. Students became familiar with a wide swath of terminology just as major concerns over cyber-security hit the New York Times and the Washington Post. The architect and the participants should all feel proud of their achievements. Next week Patterson will release a podcast giving some personal accounts of the simulation, as well as greater detail regarding the course of events. View the full article

LT B .... gird your loins. View the full article

Today is the day to let a vital part of American society know that we appreciate them. Mostly for the tasty, albeit overpriced cofee, but also for not caving in to anti-gun zealots. Many people who love guns and coffee particularly appreciate Starbucks. In the 12 states with unfettered rights to “open carry†a gun, including Virginia, and the 16 others that are mostly open carry, Starbucks has rebuffed attempts by gun control activists to keep guns out of the national coffee shop chain. So on Friday, 2-22 (for the Second Amendment), gun rights supporters are holding “Gun Owners Support Starbucks Day,†and will be drinking their joe while openly packing their heat. In Northern Virginia, this is being organized by Ed Levine, who already has an “I Love Guns and Coffee†website (there are two) and mints a guns and coffee challenge coin, seen above. He wants 2-22 to be an annual day of support for Starbucks by gun owners. I think this is more of a business gesture than a show of support for guns. If they cave on this they will be open to protests about every soleth of the politically correct left. But it is still good to see them stand up on a principle that local laws mean something. Starbucks CEO Howard Schultz told ABC News in 2010, “I’m not a politician. I run a coffee company and we’re trying to abide by the laws in which we do business.†Keep it up sir, the pressure is not likely to lessen. View the full article

U.S. Marine Corps 1st Lt. William Kavanagh uses the optic lens on his M4 carbine to scan the area in the Kajak district of Afghanistan's Helmand province, Feb. 8, 2013. Kavanagh, a company executive officer, is assigned to Echo Company, 2nd Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment, Regimental Combat Team 7. U.S. Marine Corps photo by Cpl. Kowshon Ye View the full article

Hat tip ThatGuy. View the full article

I am going to anonomize this as I don't want every to tease this COS. Those who have been in the rodeo awhile will be able to narrow down who this is .... but .... Shipmate has to be thinking to himself, "I am a senior Captain in the world's largest navy. I have a respectful record of service at peace and war. I am the Chief of Staff at a significant command with oversight of thousands ... nay ... tens of thousands if you count in right ... and ... sigh ... sequestration can bite me." From: [redacted] CAPT [redacted] , N01Sent: Wednesday, January 30, 2013 17:30 To:[redacted] _ALL_[redacted] Subject: STAFF BUDGET REDUCTION Staff, I am sure that you all have been hearing quite a bit about sequestration recently. With that, we have been directed to reduce our admin costs and limit our travel to Mission Essential only. Below is a summary of what we are currently doing, and what I am expecting from every employee. Reduce Printing: - Be mindful of what you are printing. Where possible, review the document/data electronically. PowerPoint presentations should also be reviewed electronically and only be printed when finalized. - If you print, ensure that for documents/emails that you are printing on both sides of the page, front and back. For PowerPoint presentations, you should print two slides to a page on both the front and back page. - If you attending a brief that will be presented on a large screen, printing of the brief should be limited to only those that are briefing. - Effective immediately, if [redacted] is going to be briefed with a PowerPoint brief that is greater than four (4) slides, the Flag Conference room should be reserved to brief [redacted] utilizing the large screens. Only one copy of the brief should be printed, which will be used by the briefer for notes. N6 and the Flag Secretary will coordinate the logistics of the brief. Government Vehicles: - I have directed a 50% reduction in the number of vehicles that we are leasing. To support this effort, we will be developing a pool of vehicles that will support all of our codes. The process for this will be provided in the near future. Blackberries, Cell Phones, and Air Cards: - We are currently reviewing individual requirements for communication needs, and we will possibly reduce staff blackberries, cell phones, and air cards. Mission Essential Travel: - We must reduce travel immediately to Mission Essential only. Travel is authorized for requirements that would negatively impact [redacted] ’s mission, if not executed. All travel should be discussed with COS via your ACOS/SA prior to entering the Authorization Request into DTS. Admin Supplies: - Funding for admin supplies has been reduced. Admin supplies that will be provided will be limited to basic requirements; we will not be providing any specialty type of items. Information about sequestration is coming out regularly, and I will provide you all with an update when appropriate. Thank you all for your hard work and dedication in supporting our ships, units, and sailors. Together we will get through this. Regards, COS View the full article

The Navy just released an interesting video of Raytheon's Griffin missile testing from USS Monsoon (PC-4) off VACAPES last month. Although relatively short-range (about 5km), Griffin brings some much-needed offensive firepower to the PCs. The $45k a pop Griffin has proliferated in the U.S. military in the past few years, with roll-on installations on Marine Corps C-130s and other aircraft. Monsoon's testing also represented a successful demonstration of laser designation and targeting at sea (albeit on a clear day). The dual quad-pack Griffin set up onboard Monsoon is very compact and lends itself to installation onboard even smaller vessels such as the MK VI. The Patrol Coastal Griffin Missile System, the addition of remotely-operated MK 38 MOD 2 25mm chain guns onboard other combatants, and a few other programs are part of the Navy's rapid deployment efforts to counter the fast inshore attack craft/fast attack craft swarm threat. View the full article

View the full article

Oh goodness. I really don't want to make it a habit of Fisking Flag Officers, but if you are going to put your by-line out there, well, welcome to the scrum of the marketplace of ideas. VADM Copeman, again, "With all due respect ... but ..." - you brought up the subject. Out of nothing but love ... we must engage on ... the Little Crappy Ship. BEHOLD The alternative universe of the Potomac Flotilla! Sigh. Here we go, paragraph by paragraph. By Vice Admiral Tom Copeman I'll afford you the same benefit of the doubt as I do all VADM, I really don't think you penned it all, someone on your staff got it started and you got a chop on it. Well, I don't know, maybe you did. If you did, I don't think your Staff served you well if you let them chop on it. Twenty-five years ago, then CNO Admiral Trost looked into the future and began our shift from a Cold War focus to dealing with regional and littoral conflicts in the years to come. So we started down the path to where we are now—working through various iterations, starts and stops, and plenty of ideas on ship types and classes to deal with unknown future threats. 25 years ago was JAN 1988. I'm sorry, no one in 1988 was seeing the end of the Cold War, much less shifting away from it. We were both JOs then ... come on, you remember. Heck, Hunt for Red October wasn't even in movie theaters yet. Future without the Red Banner Fleet as our primary threat? Future where we would need more smaller ships? (actions of the next decade+ tell a different story as the legacy Riverine forces in the reserves were killed in the late '90s, PHMs were sent packing, PG gone, OHPs castrated, etc). I don't see 1988's Admiral Carlisle A. H. Trost, USN (PBUH) having any of the LCS stink on him. As a matter of fact, dig around the good Admiral's tenure as CNO and most of what will be found is about physical fitness, the IOWA turret explosion, spanking Lehman, women at sea (he was not a fan). Here is the WSJ from OCT of '87. Lots of talk about the meeting of the Supreme Soviet and their next 5-yr plan. You brought Admiral Trost in to it ... so ... what was he writing about in 1987? Here, read it yourself from JAN 87's Proceedings; Let's go to 1989, 24 years ago. What was Admiral Trost saying? Oh, hey .... let's let the newspaper of record tell us. From the DEC 89 NYT; Despite rampant revisionism in Washington on the changing scope and nature of the Soviet threat, he continues to base his analysis of the Navy's needs on a belief that the Soviet Union is just as dangerous as ever. I'm sure I am missing something. Can anyone here give me something with a '87-89 date stamp where Admiral Trost sees the decay of the Soviet Union and the need in 2012 to have a corvette that can't even get its 57mm and 30mm guns to work right? Sigh. VADM Copeman; you need a historian on your Staff ... pronto, if for no other reason than to say, "You may want to reference that comment." Now, back to the article. Now we have assets in place to operate in the littorals and we have new ways of delivering troops and equipment to the beach. OK, soooooo ..... the gun line off Vietnam was not in littorals? 5-inch Friday off Al-Faw in 2003 was not the littorals? LCS is actually and asset we can, in 2013, fight in the littorals? "Now"? No we don't. Not now.We have a lot of "hope" and "will" and "plan" but no there-there. It will be years until we know if LCS will be able to do squat ... and until then the best thing to do is to keep it far away from any possible threat until we figure out exactly what it can or cannot do. Right now, we know mostly what it cannot do - which is all of its primary mission areas. How many of us saw the expansion of C5ISR? Or, who knew in the late 1980’s that there would even be UAVs, much less see the ubiquity of their use? Which is the sticking point about the future—it is wholly unknown. And for those who say past is prelude. That may be, but the past isn’t a plot. Well, only the cynic would have said, "Oh, come on. We went from C2, to C4I, to another NCM for C4ISR. What more can they do - make it C5ISR? Please, everyone will think it is an old air-force cargo plane doing ISR ... no one will make that acronym .... we'll be stuck with C4I or C4ISR ... you can bank on it." Oops. That is what you get for not being cynical enough. By 2020, what more can we add to it? But yes, a lot of people saw the future of UAVs .... the military had been using them for decades and as technology, communications, and everything else advanced, so did their utility. Good googly moogly .... don't engineers read science fiction if not their own history? The past isn't a plot ... but it is the best reference point to the future. Only a few thousand years show us that. I'm still not sure what "...past isn't a plot." is trying to address. While I nood'l that, let's get back to VADM Copeman; The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) is an important addition to the Battle Force and is exactly the ship we envisioned 11 years ago to fill a capability gap in the Littorals in Surface Warfare, Mine Warfare and Anti-submarine Warfare. It is here now and we fully expect it to be an important an integral and substantial part of our future force. Exactly? Define soon? Not that important right now ... or in the next few years. I'll take that bet. Well, that mention of a year is fun. 11 years ago was what .... 2002. What was being said in 2002? The Defense Planning Guidance in May 2002 directed the Navy to pursue a new class of small, stealthy "Littoral Combatant Ships" to support troops ashore and to conduct anti-mine, intelligence and reconnaissance operations. The Navy planned to build two "Flight Zero" LCS vessels to refine the new class' concept of operations. More detailed mission modules are to be developed for the Flight One LCS that was hoped would appear soon after 2007. The Navy wanted to buy eight of these ships through 2009, with the first in 2005. No, go back to RADM Don Loren's 2002 article; nothing has changed. It is still think'n, hope'n and plann'n. In twice the time it took to fight WWII, LCS isn't PMC in any of its primary mission areas. One could argue ASUW. One could, but I wouldn't. Back to VADM Copeman; It’s a high speed, shallow draft, multi-mission workhorse full of technology that is our future. As we decommission different ships of various classes, LCS will step up and fill multiple roles. It is far more automated than previous class ships, and with lower manning, requires us to adapt our training and operations to meet that reality. A ship that cannot deploy for more than 4-months due to crew burnout and habitability issues is not a work horse. Show pony, perhaps .... but not a workhorse. It is not multi-mission. It is at best uni-mission. You cannot take a training time out and swap out mission modules when a brace of Houbei come around the inlet you are hunting mines in. Also, you cannot use the present tense. I like optimism ... but that is for the future when all the pixie dust takes root. Not now. It cannot today, tomorrow or until at earliest mid-late decade even partially fill in for anything. So, let me get to my priorities: 1. Warfighting. It’s what we do – A large part of that will be with LCS. LCS must get into the Fleet and fully integrated where we will use both variants and the mission modules to their best effect. 2. Readiness. The world is a dynamic place and the Navy has to have the best trained Sailors who will operate the best equipment possible. In many ways what we operate will determine the number, type and training of Sailors needed. That support trail begins now for what we will require in the decades to come. 3. Building the future fleet. What will the world look like in another decade. That’s a question which forces us to make assumptions about future resources, alliances, bases and strategies. The concepts, design outlines, support requirements—training, simulators, supply chain and dollars—required to operate in 2025 have to get underway soon. No, we won't do much warfighting with LCS. Its best utility will be presence operations in peacetime. Warfighting will be with DDG and up. LCS will be kept far away from significant warfighting, if it can avoid it. It simply is not ready, and won't be for awhile. The points about readiness and the future fleet are spot on. VADM Copeman is also spot on about the need to focus on 2025 now (where have we heard that before .....). This is the point of the article where I am actually starting to pay attention and am leaning in to read what he has to say. It sounds right and reflects sound reasoning one would expect from a USN VADM. Looking to the next paragraph; No matter what news you see or hear about our budget, as of today, we get to steam around the world as part of the most powerful Navy in history. We have the best people, representing the best nation, with the best ships ever known. Let’s keep it that way… tell the Surface Navy story wherever you go. The oceans aren’t getting smaller and the world isn’t getting safer. A maritime nation needs a worthy maritime capability. NOOOOOO! Tease! I feel robbed. Ending the article with output from the Random Flag Officer Speech Generator? I feel like for most of the article I was reading a press release from industry and then the start of an actual article of interest starts .... only to be cut off at the knees by a paragraph by the RFOSG. If I may humbly make a request to VADM Copeman .... take Priority 3, flavor it with Priority 2, and flesh that out to about 3,000 words or more. Submit it to Proceedings and use that as a conversation starter. Heck, do that and I'll extend an apology for being a snarky and immature smarta55, and offer you a full hour on Midrats to discuss it. View the full article