F-35 Selected Acquisition Report (SAR), 31 December 2010

A fantastic read, thanks Brad!

 

Sadness on the combat radius range estimates...

It will be 'interesting' to see if local (Canadian) media pick up on the 2010 SAR disclosure prior to the Milestone B review due for sometime later this month, particularly as the current DND estimates of cost and schedule are based on the 2009 SAR.

 

And, moreover, if the Milestone B review proves more optimistic or, as the folks at AvWeek are calling it, a sign of "Acquisition Armageddon".

 

Yes, the drop below the threshold minimum for F-35A combat radius (to 584 nm) is disappointing.

If I understand correctly, there was no SAR specifically for the F-35 JSF in 2009 (nor for several major USAF programs), but rather a news release from DOD on April 1, 2010 that accompanied a collection of other SAR's and which included information specifically relevant to JSF, namely:

 

F-35 (Joint Strike Fighter) - The PAUC increased 57.2% and the APUC increased 57.2% to the original APB to reflect the average unit price for the restructured JSF program, as estimated by the OSD Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE)-led independent Joint Estimate Team (JET). Specifically, in 2001, the average procurement unit cost for the JSF was estimated at $50 million base year 2002 dollars or $59 million in base year 2010 dollars. This is now estimated to fall within a range of $79 million to $95 million in base year 2002 dollars or $93 million to $112 million in base year 2010 dollars. This is a 57% to 89% increase from the original baseline. The reasons for the Unit Cost Growth included larger-than-planned development costs driven by Short Take-Off and Vertical Landing (STOVL) variant weight growth and a longer forecasted development schedule; increase in labor and overhead rates; degradation of airframe commonality; lower production quantities; increases in commodity prices (particularly titanium); major subcontractor cost growth; and the impact of revised inflation indices. In addition, factors that were driven by substantially higher contractor change traffic (i.e., changes in design not resulting from changes in requirements or capability), which led to increased engineering and software staffing; extended manufacturing span times; and delayed delivery of aircraft to flight test, led to a further slip of the development and flight test program. The Independent Manufacturing Review Team (IMRT) recommended that the program adopt a somewhat flatter and smoother ramp. The JET II accepted this revised ramp and then moved it later in time in accordance with the delayed progress of the development program to balance manufacturing, schedule, and cost risk. Overall, no JSF reviews to-date (JET I from 2008, JET II , or the IMRT) have discovered any fundamental technological or manufacturing problems with the JSF program, or any change in the aircraft’s projected military capabilities.

Now, I know plenty of folks think Sweetman is rapidly anti-JSF, but here's his take on the 2010 SAR anyway:

 

F-35 Costs: A Bit of Reality (from Aviation Week's Ares blog)

 

If you can pick holes in what he's saying, I'd like to hear about it.

 

I'm interested in something rather elusive at times, the 'truth' (don't tell me I can't handle it. )