HG S2 (Intel Bot)

What are the odds of this actually happening. Russian officials on Thursday said that the country will be completing the construction of a new class nuclear-powered destroyer by 2016. Russian Navy Admiral Vladimir Vysotsky told RIA Novosti that the prototype of the new class destroyer, which is designed to be used at sea, would be finished in around five years, adding that the warship had a 90 percent chance of being powered by nuclear energy. Vysotsky spoke at the 5th International Maritime Defense Show, IMDS-2011, in St. Petersburg, Russia, after Roman Trotsenko, President of United Shipbuilding Corporation, had previously stated that the company was beginning the design for a new nuclear-powered destroyer. Trotesenko said the design phase alone, which is expected to begin this fall, would last around two years, and that it would be constructed for the Russian Navy. I expect to see nuclear powered destroyers being built in Russia right after those aircraft carriers expected to start construction in 2015 get going. Unlikely. Russia does have the infrastructure to build nuclear powered ships, but those ships are icebreakers, not destroyers. I guess I am just very skeptical. I don't see this as mission impossible for Russia, rather mission "highly unlikely." View the full article

From the June 2011 issue of FORCE magazine, an Indian National Security and Defense magazine, comes this remarkable article. Pakistan’s efforts to have a sea-based minimum credible nuclear deterrent vis-a-vis India took a significant step forward last month when the state-owned, Wuhan-based China State Shipbuilding Industrial Corp (CSIC) ferried the first Qing-class conventional attack submarine (SSK) to Shanghai to begin a year-long series of sea trials, which is likely to include the test-firing of three CJ-10K submarine-launched, 1,500km-range land attack cruise missiles (LACM) capable of being armed with unitary tactical nuclear warheads. Called the Qing-class SSK, it is a variant of the Type 041A Improved Yuan-class SSK, which is also due to begin its sea trials later this month. It is now believed that the contract inked between CSIC and Pakistan early last April (see FORCE April 2011, pages 16-17) calls for the CSIC’s Wuhan-based Wuchang Shipyard to supply six Qing-class SSKs, all of which will be equipped with a Stirling-cycle AIP system and will be able to carry up to three nuclear warhead-carrying CJ-10K LACMs each. The double-hulled Qing-class SSK, with a submerged displacement close to 3,600 tonnes, bears a close resemblance to the Russian Type 636M SSK, and features hull-retractable foreplanes and hydrodynamically streamlined sail. The first such SSK was launched in Wuhan on September 9 last year, and a total of three such SSKs are on order from China’s PLA Navy as well. The AIP system for the Qing-class SSK was developed by the 711th Research Institute of CSIC. R&D work began in June 1996, with a 100-strong team of scientists and engineers led by Dr Jin Donghan being involved in developing the Stirling-cycle engine, while another team led Professor Ma Weiming of China’s Naval Engineering University began developing the all-electric AIP system. The two projects entered the production engineering stage in 2007, with the Shanghai Qiyao Propulsion Technology Ltd, a wholly owned subsidiary of the 711th Institute, becoming the principal industrial entity charged with producing the AIP system. Incidentally, the Qing-class SSK’s all-electric propulsion system is a derivative of a similar system that was developed about a decade ago for the PLA Navy’s six Type 093 Shang-class SSGNs and three Type 094 Jin-class SSBNs. For those who got lost in the trade speak, basically China is exporting submarines specifically designed to deliver nuclear weapons. The submarines will be armed with cruise missiles designed, built, and delivered by China to Pakistan intended to launch Pakistan nuclear warheads. The most troubling part of this article is that it is very probably accurate. The article is worth reading in full, as it also claims China is giving the Pakistan Navy two Jiangkai I-class Type 054 frigates. View the full article

Sigh. Her sporty older sister is in the background too. I still think we made a huge mistake not going with the F-14D new production. Range, range, range; payload, payload, payload. H/T B. View the full article

This is HMAS Sydney (FFG 03) firing a SM2 on June 18th test off Hawaii. This weapon system appears to be perfectly capable today. The United States Navy still operates many frigates that could, yet cannot, use this weapon system. I believe we may have been right to retire the missile when we did, but we have also been lucky we have not needed it. USS Halyburton (FFG 40) and now USS Carr (FFG 52) have been operating in the Mediterranean Sea near Libya, and Libya may indeed one day find a way to shoot ASMs at ships offshore if this war continues much longer. If they do, having a functional SM2 sure would be handy for protecting the ship... Just saying. View the full article

... I might have to shift my support from T-Paw to him. Why? Simple - we have similar tastes in toys. Perry ... carr(ies) his .380 Ruger - loaded with hollow-point bullets - when jogging on trails because he is afraid of snakes. He'd also seen coyotes in the undeveloped area. ... "I'm enjoying the run when something catches my eye and it's this coyote. I know he knows I'm there. He never looks at me, he is laser-locked on that dog," Perry said. "I holler and the coyote stopped. I holler again. By this time I had taken my weapon out and charged it. It is now staring dead at me. Either me or the dog are in imminent danger. I did the appropriate thing and sent it to where coyotes go," he said. Perry said the laser-pointer helped make a quick, clean kill. "It was not in a lot of pain," he said. "It pretty much went down at that particular juncture." ... The governor left the coyote where it fell. "He became mulch," Perry said. I'm sorry - how can I not vote for him? View the full article

The Royal Navy speaks so it can sleep at night. Adml Sir Mark Stanhope said the campaign would have been more effective without the Government's defence cuts. The aircraft carrier and the Harrier jump-jets scrapped under last year's strategic defence review would have made the mission more effective, faster and cheaper, he said. Sir Mark warned that the Navy would not be able to sustain its operations in Libya for another three months without making cuts elsewhere. ... "The pros would have been a much more reactive force," he said. "Rather than deploying from Gioia del Colle, we would deploy within 20 minutes as opposed to an hour and a half, so obviously there are some advantages. It's cheaper to fly an aircraft from an aircraft carrier than from the shore." Scrapping Ark Royal and its Harriers was perhaps the most controversial decision made in last year's Strategic Defence and Security Review. The Coalition has said it could not afford to maintain the ship or the planes. Military analysts and retired defence chiefs have said the cuts have limited Britain's military capabilities. The later exactly spells out what I discussed over at USNIBlog back in March and how this operation has played out. That is a very substantial argument - but it looks like the politicians over in the UK are a bit more interested in saving face than facing their error. Dr Liam Fox, the Defence Secretary, defended the defence review last night. He said: "We continue to have the resources necessary to carry out the operations we are undertaking." An MoD source said: "Unfortunately Harriers wouldn't have been able to carry the precision weapons needed for these operations." Did that get your targeteering senses a'ting'n? It did mine. Shall we fact check the Honorable Gentelman? Yes - let's. The Harrier GR9 is an avionics and weapons upgrade of the standard GR7. The £500m Joint Update and Maintenance Programme (JUMP) upgraded the Harrier fleet during normal maintenance periods, in a series of incremental capabilities.[14] These started with software upgrades to the communications, ground proximity warning and navigation systems, followed by the integration of the AGM-65 Maverick air-to-ground missile.[14] Capability C added the RAF's Rangeless Airborne Instrumentation Debriefing System (RAIDS), Raytheon's Successor Identification Friend or Foe (SIFF) system and the Paveway guided bombs . The Digital Joint Reconnaissance Pod (DJRP) was added as part of Capability D and handling trials of the MBDA Brimstone missile started on 14 February 2007. However the Brimstone was still not cleared for the GR9 as of November 2010. Sharkey Ward says it better. ... it was disgraceful for the MoD to contradict Sir Mark Stanhope in a most blatant manner by saying, “Unfortunately Harriers wouldn’t have been able to carry the precision weapons needed for these operations.†“Disgracefulâ€, because the MoD source responsible for this statement was not telling the truth (there appears to be a pattern here, does there not?). The Tornado is now delivering the Paveway Mk III 2000 lb bunker-busting bomb instead of the unreliable Storm Shadow missile. Harrier delivers Paveway Mk III and Paveway Mk IV with the same or better accuracy as Tornado. Harrier also delivers the Maverick anti-tank missile and the CRV7 rocket – neither of which is carried by Tornado. It is true that Harrier does not carry Brimstone – it was to be fitted with the same prior to SDSR 2010. But the Apache helicopter deploys Hellfire, the equivalent of Brimstone, as well as 30 mm cannon fire. Harrier and Apache are both maritime capable aircraft that have been designed specifically for the Close Air Support task. Both have supported our ground forces in Afghanistan extremely well – unlike the Tornado which is not fully suited to the Close Air Support task. Official MoD sources (RAF?) should be taken to task on the lies and obfuscation that they present to the press. What does Italy have to do with this? As the Harrier II Plus fighter rips down the runway and launches into the skies on a mission to Libya, chaplain Vincenzo Caiazzo is on deck in his dog collar to see it safely off. The amiable chaplain has been with the ITS Garibaldi — the flagship for NATO's embargo mission — since October, when he signed up to provide troops on the light aircraft carrier with psychological support. "It's a whole other world. There are exciting moments and others when some of the guys feel frustrated or homesick," said Don Vincenzo, who swapped his parish in southern Italy for masses held amidst acrid oil fumes in the bowels of the flattop. "He brings us a welcome oasis of calm," said one young officer as another fighter shot off down the 174 metre long runway with a shuddering roar, sending shock waves through the Garibaldi. Normality, for those manning the enormous carrier, is blaring sirens, blinking warning lights and sailors sprinting up ladders, down warren-like corridors and into crowded control rooms. Political spats about the cost and wisdom of taking on Libya are not an issue on board ship, where radars scan the sea for suspect vessels and helicopters and fighters engaged in civilian protection touch base. "I've just got back off a mission, we're going to have a quick debrief and then a much-needed wind down," said a tired-looking pilot after clambering out of his tiny cockpit and collapsing in a chair in the mess room. Though the details of his sortie were confidential, an official in the command centre who asked to remain anonymous said it had been "successful", though he would not confirm reports the jet had deployed one of its missiles. There should be a Royal Navy Carrier there right now. Instead - we have the Italians and the French using what little they have. Carriers cannot deploy forever. When they leave? One final note - listen to Admiral Lord West. View the full article

Wait .... let me put that in better context. From our buddy over at ELP. On another note, this from insidedefense.com (subscription). LCS - the gift that keeps giving. Roll in the fail. I guess putting Sailors in combat not knowing the ability of their "warship" to actually do that "overseas contingency operation" thingy is asking too much. Making sure you can explain to the family members of those killed in combat why their sons and daughters are at the bottom of the sea is "unreasonably expensive" and "impractical." I'll let you answer that question in front of a Senate investigation committee sometime later this decade or next. View the full article

I thought this was just a rumor, but maybe there is more to it? Saudi Arabia, which has long considered the purchase of American littoral combat ships (LCS) with a lightweight Aegis combat system, is contemplating the acquisition of new DDG 51 Arleigh Burke-class Aegis destroyers that could be fitted with ballistic missile defense (BMD) capability. The U.S. Navy briefed Saudi officials in late May on the capabilities of the destroyers, which would be far more powerful than any ship currently in the kingdom's service. The U.S. Navy would not confirm whether the brief included BMD options, but sources did not deny that it was part of the presentation. Saudi Arabia has been looking at Aegis-equipped LCS designs from both Lockheed Martin and Austal USA since mid-2008. Those designs, which range in size from 3,000 to about 4,000 tons, would be equipped with SPY-1F lightweight Aegis radars similar to those fitted on Norwegian frigates. But the SPY-1F lacks the fidelity and software to perform the BMD mission, and the ships probably wouldn't have the electrical capacity to power a BMD radar. The U.S. Navy's 9,100-ton DDG 51s are the heart of the fleet's BMD force. About 20 U.S. cruisers and destroyers have had their SPY-1D Aegis systems upgraded to perform the BMD mission, and more are being backfitted. Future DDG 51s will be built with the BMD capability. Read the rest at Defense News. Both versions of the Littoral Combat Ship version of the AEGIS surface combatant have been thoroughly criticized. I find that interesting, because I hear from both Austal and Lockheed Martin that the hull design for both variants of the AEGIS version is heavily modified, although no details are ever offered to explain exactly what about the hulls are heavily modified. The choice of DDG-51s instead of LCS would be a significant change, because it implies a much smaller purchase of naval vessels from the US than the 8-12 often cited for the AEGIS version of the LCS. The Defense News article mentions a potential mix that includes 2 DDG-51 Flight IIAs w/ BMD. From an industrial perspective, this would allow the US Navy to build 2 destroyers per year - one at each yard over the next several years - as the Navy moves toward the DDG-51 Flight III, which is having other issues we'll discuss later. The trade-offs here would apparently be quantity vs quality, as crew sizes and cost would ultimately run about the same. There will be other issues though, political concerns like selling top tier military equipment to Saudi Arabia. The sale would also ignore how survivability isn't so much a technical issue - rather a crewing issue in most cases - meaning the big Burkes are not likely to be more survivable with Saudi crews than the LCS AEGIS ships would be, not unless Saudi Navy crews have become a lot better in the last few years. The Saudi Navy surface warship deal is reportedly worth between $20-$25 billion, depending upon your source. Keep in mind a lot of that money is for infrastructure. Also worth noting a high-low BMD mix that uses the new DDG-51 Flight IIAs and smaller AEGIS LCS 'shooters' fits a distributed CEC model for BMD often discussed for the way the Navy should do BMD in the future. Under that model, there are radars of various types, both on ships and on shore, for tracking/targeting data that gets fed forward in the network of smaller vessel "shooters" which in this scenario would be the little LCS AEGIS ships. While those smaller AEGIS LCS with the SPY-F radar could not independently track and kill ballistic missiles, leveraging the data from the network and with the AEGIS combat system, those ships act as forward missile launchers with VLS. A similar model was once promoted as a way to field a high end AMDR from a modern ship hull like DDG-1000, before it was decided a smaller AMDR would be fielded on every DDG-51 Flight III destroyer. There is another possibility... some of the Flight I Burkes are in very poor condition, and it could be the US sells those to Saudi Arabia for much less and the money is used to repair/refit those ships. Most, if not all, of those older Flight I Burkes are BMD capable. Interesting stuff, but the Saudi's do not appear to be in a hurry to buy their new warships, so it is unclear if any of this will ever happen. View the full article

Shashank Joshi has a good rundown of the strategic implications of the Taliban attack on PNS Mehran. The only part I'm uncertain about is this: Thirdly, the attack's terrible human toll was accompanied by the highly visible, and militarily significant, destruction of at least one, perhaps two, P-3C Orion anti-submarine and maritime surveillance aircraft (one has been destroyed; two others appear damaged). These $35m US-supplied aircraft - advanced variants of the older P-3 aircraft - were inducted last summer, with the expectation that six more would follow by 2012. Their loss compounds an already lopsided naval balance with respect to India, which now possesses twice as many submarines, and five antisubmarine warfare squadrons. In the first place, this prompted some to ask, in conspiratorial tones, why the Pakistani Taliban would attack such a site, and whether 'foreign agents' might be the more likely perpetrators of an attack whose beneficiary would be India. Although increasing numbers of Pakistanis recognise internal militancy as a serious threat to the country, the peculiar nature of the target may reinforce the self-destructive narrative that violence in Pakistan is the product of external meddling rather than internal rot. But the longer-term military implications are also important. These may seem of little relevance in an age in which nuclear deterrence has tightly constrained the scope and intensity of Indo-Pakistani wars (see, for example, the enormous limits on escalation during the 1999 Kargil War). Does anyone really envisage a naval war, except as part of an all-out war in which third parties and their navies would be anyway engaged? But this perspective ignores that India might, in the aftermath of a future crisis, view a naval blockade as a suitably calibrated response that applies pressure on Pakistan without crossing nuclear thresholds. [3] Pakistan's now degraded anti-submarine warfare capabilities may prove to be of more than symbolic value. If I recall correctly, the P-3Cs were being used by Pakistan as COIN patrol craft, rather than in their ASW role. Thus, the destruction of the P-3s might have less to do with a symbolic attack on Pakistan's naval capability and more with a direct attack on Pakistan's COIN capability. View the full article

When Dr. Ashton Carter testifies in front of the Senate that your program is unaffordable in this fiscal climate, the only hope left is to find enough politicians that will sell out. Something drastically changes, or the Joint Strike Fighter is done. "Over the lifetime of this program, the decade or so, the per-aircraft cost of the 2,443 aircraft we want has doubled in real terms," said Ashton Carter, the under secretary of defense for acquisition, technology and logistics. "That's our forecast for how much the aircraft's going to cost. "Said differently, that's what it's going to cost if we keep doing what we're doing. And that's unacceptable. It's unaffordable at that rate." The cost of the plane has jumped to $385 billion, about $103 million per plane in constant dollars or $113 million in fiscal year 2011 dollars, said Christine Fox, the Defense Department's director of cost assessment and program evaluation. Republican Senator John McCain called the figure "truly troubling," considering the original price was $69 million per airplane. "The facts regarding this program are truly troubling," said McCain. "No program should expect to be continued with that kind of track record, especially in our current fiscal climate," said McCain. "It seems to me we have to start at least considering alternatives" CNA almost had it right. The tipping point wasn't the point at which the Navy fleet was unaffordable, it was the point where naval aviation became unaffordable. Most folks don't realize that the Navy consistently spends more budget money on aviation than the Air Force does, but they in fact have for many, many years. Here is the biggest problem facing the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps not to mention all the other nations invested in the Joint Strike Fighter program. The cost per aircraft is now so high that it doesn't justify the expenditure, meaning the combat capability of the less capable F-15, F-16, and F-18 alternatives exceeds the combat capability investment one gets with plowing ahead with the Joint Strike Fighter. Quite frankly, there simply isn't enough difference in the payload, range, speed, electronics, or stealth that separates the 5th generation JSF from it's 4th generation alternatives to move ahead. The UCAS, on the other hand, has game changing range and endurance, not to mention lower manpower costs so even if it runs at a higher cost that estimated per platform, the capability opportunity in the investment is so much more than lesser alternatives that the cost justification is there. The only thing left is for reality to set in among elected officials, not to mention entrenched interests in defense. The Joint Strike Fighter is the modern A-12, and only the F-35B VSTOL version (which is also the most expensive variant) is the capability that is unique and lacks a legitimate replacement. It is also the most likely version of the JSF to find international interest in continuing the program at very high cost even if the F-35A and F-35C is canceled. Perhaps there is another way ahead, but right about now the Air Force would be wise to propose a F-22 high and F-15/F-16 low mix of fighters just to streamline maintenance to three specific platforms. View the full article

AN/TPS-77 Radar May 9/11: Lockheed Martin Corp., Lockheed Martin MS2 Tactical Systems in Eagan, MN receives $26 million firm-fixed-price/cost-plus-fixed-fee contract to provide a turn-key “Long Range Radar 2” site for the Iraqi Air Force, as a Foreign Military Sales contract. At this point, $13 million has been committed by the Electronic Systems Center/HSGK at Hanscom AFB, MA (FA8707-11-C-0007). See also: FedBizOpps. The question is, what radar are they referring to? After some back-and-forth, Lockheed Martin consulted the USAF and replied that “We can’t provide any more details about this in theater project. Sorry.” Having said that, the likely options fall within a specific family of Lockheed Martin radars… (more…) View the full article

When I first saw these pictures of the new PLA Navy SSK, my first thoughts were of the old Golf class conventional ballistic submarines like the K-129 discussed in Norman Polmar's latest book Project Azorian. But as I look closer and think about it, I think what I am seeing is something of an evolution leveraging a similar design concept. You may have to open the third picture up and look closely to see what I'm talking about, but there appears to be some sort of large hatch built into the sail. If I was to guess based on what I am seeing, I think China has developed a special operations SSK to augment their Yuan class SSKs. I haven't seen this idea floated around anywhere except on an old Russian navy forum back in the late 90s, but the concept is very similar to what the US Ohio SSGNs do today with special operations, but instead of using a large SSBN type hull, one would accomplish the same thing on the cheap using a SSB type design similar to the old Golf class. Just as the old Golf class used to launch ballistic missiles out of the sail, the special operations SSK would require a larger sail to act as stores for a special operations capability. Another thought... look at the size of that submarine. For a SSK, it is flat out huge, and likely runs somewhere between 3000 - 3500 tons displacement when fully loaded (if not more). Is it even possible the Chinese are fielding SSBs for the purpose of taking their anti-ship ballistic missile like the DF-21 to sea as a way to make that capability mobile, or as a way to extend the range from the Chinese coast even further? From a naval tactical theory perspective, it would be very similar to old Soviet tactics where SSNs and SSKs functioned as US fleet hunters for Soviet SSGN shooters, and it might actually work if indeed the anti-ship ballistic missile homing system was effective enough to organically detect and strike at the largest target in a general area as is claimed. Like I said, I am guessing. It looks like a big ole fleet SSK with some extra features, but that is the analysis from my untrained eye. I'd appreciate the opinions of more experienced observers. PS: In the second photo, the submarine in the water is a new Yuan class. According to some sources, both submarines in the top two pictures (photos that are now several days old) are claimed to have recently moved to a naval base near Shanghai for sea trials, which may explain why we now see this latest photo of this new SSK in the water. HT Kursed View the full article

Were they ever? I will stick with my quote that they are the best friend about $5 B a year will buy, except you can't buy friends. We have some tough decisions to make and whether we keep paying a bunch of corruptocrat weasels who have never played straight with us is first and foremost. I don't have an answer yet, and I don't think there are any good ones. View the full article

Iran test launches Shahab 3 missiles in 2009 The German newspaper Die Welt reports that Iran is building intermediate- range missile launch pads in Venezuela. The Iranian Revolutionary Guards firm, Amir al-Hadschisadeh, is building the launch complex, including missile silos and bunkers on the Paraguaná Peninsula, on the north coast of Venezuela facing America. Miami is about two thousand miles north from the launch site. Iran's Shahab 3 IRBM has a range of a thousand miles, the Shahab 4 1200 miles, and the Shahab 5, under development, more than 4000 miles. Washington, DC and New York City are about 3000 miles from the launch site. The Shahab missiles were based on North Korean missile designs which were, in turn, based on Soviet designs. Cash-poor Iran is paying for initial construction costs itself, running into tens of millions of dollars. Die Welt claims there is a secret agreement between Iran and Venezuela in which Venezuela would launch its missiles should Iran come under attack. In other words, if America and its allies attack Iran's nuclear bomb facilities it wants Venezuela to attack America and its allies in the Western hemisphere. I suspect much of this is posturing for domestic constituencies of the mad mullahs and Hugo Chavez. The threat is more scarecrow than real. The Iranians are not a particularly competent culture. It seems unlikely that their missiles will be reliable, particularly when they have not been tested at their extreme range. Likewise, Hugo Chavez has not established a competent regime. The only competent professionals in Venezuela run the oil business there. The government is composed of corrupt cronies of Chavez who have made it their business to plunder their local oil units, bankrupting them and chasing their staff out of the country. It seems unlikely that Venezuela retains the technical and professional expertise to staff a missile complex. One is amused by the recklessness of Iran and Venezuela who would threaten the American mainland with missiles of dubious capability. It's hard to believe they think they would win a missile exchange with the US. And really, missile silos in ill-defended undeveloped countries are perfect targets for B-2 bombers. Our pilots could take these missile sites out and still be home in time to pick up the kids from school. Hat tip to Hot Air View the full article

A bit sensationalistic, but a very valid question under the circumstances. Jonn starts the discussion of the death of Jose Guerena and details the problems he saw at the start. Jose was a Marine, served two tours in Iraq, survived that, and came home to be killed by Sheriff Dupnik's (yes, that sheriff Dupnik) SWAT Team. The sheriff's office has changed it's stories multiple times since, finally admitting that he had not fired and that more than 70 rounds were fired by them in response to an accidental discharge by one of their own officers. Operator Dan follows up with yet more. Much more, and even more disturbing. Having warrants and records sealed after the fact, claims of conspiracy that -- frankly -- reek, and more. Let's not even get into keeping the ambulance at bay for more than an hour, despite eyewitness claims that Jose was still alive as his wife was dragged out. Given all, I would have to question any "evidence" found at the house at this point. I join those in the comments and elsewhere who are pointing out the extreme lack of professionalism displayed from the start. There is cause to question the intelligence (and lack of due dilligence in doing intelligence gathering) involved; the piss poor weapons handling by the doorframe shooter and the response to that shot that saw 70 plus rounds fired apparently without aim; and, the handling of the incident since. Frankly, given the multiple story changes and efforts to control the story by what appear to be increasingly draconian (and desperate) means by Sheriff Dupnik's office and the questions raised, I think that a huge spotlight needs to be shined on this. In point of fact, given the taint already on the Sheriff's office, I think an outside probe is needed. Both state and federal probes (law, law enforcement, civil rights) are absolutely required. Given all, I have no faith or confidence that an honest and accurate report will ever be obtained otherwise. I also agree with starting a fund for the family of this Marine. For more on why the raid and others like it are a very bad idea from the start, check out Jimbo's post from last year along with this report from Radley Balko. Radley routinely covers this type of story and his writings on them are something anyone interested in liberty and good police work should read. If outside investigations find that he was up to something with drugs, I will acknowledge that here in a post. My comments on the lack of professionalism, training, and related topics in regards the execution of the raid will stand, as the evidence to back those up is overwhelming. Bring on outside investigations, and let justice be done. LW View the full article

An F-35 Lightning II maneuvers overhead during its first flight at Eglin Air Force Base, April 23, 2009. The jet is a fifth generation, single engine, stealth capable strike fighter and can perform close air support, tactical bombing and air defense missions. If you've been paying attention to the battle for US air dominance, you might be, like me, a little wary of the comparisons and the rhetoric. Since there are numbers flying all over the place with regards to cost (mostly from PR firms), I thought we ought to take a look at what the REAL cost of an F-35 is...and we'll look at it in the same terms that the DoD/USAF use to evaluate the bids. First, we need to talk in terms of 2010 dollars. We’re talking about what is known as the Unit Recurring Fly Away cost (URF) for a conventional take-off and landing (CTOL) variant (the type the Air Force is buying). In 2010 terms, it will cost about $65 million dollars. Whoa, wait a minute, you say, I’ve seen costs as high as $110 million a copy! I’m sure you have. But they don’t reflect the URF. Instead they may reflect the Total Ownership Cost (TOC) - the cost of everything necessary to operate the aircraft over the span of its service life - or any of a number of other costs used in the project for various purposes, but it won’t reflect the one we should be most concerned with, the URF. Confused yet? Think of buying a new car. You go in, look at the sticker price and ask the sales person, “how much will it cost me to drive this car off the lot?†He or she is going to give you a cost at or near the sticker price. You’re going to negotiate it down and, if you strike a deal, you’ll drive it off the lot for that negotiated price. That’s the URF in a nutshell. With me so far? But does that cost reflect the TOC? Of course not. Gas and oil. Extra cost. Maintenance. Extra cost. Extended warranty. Extra cost. Parts. Extra cost. Labor. Extra cost. New tires. Extra cost. Etc. In fact, if you take all of those costs associated with owning, driving and maintaining the car over the years you own it you’ll find that TOC to be significantly higher than the cost to drive it off the lot (URF). Of course that’s the case for any fighter aircraft. However, in the media, the price you see applied to the F-35 may reflect the higher TOC and not the URF. When such a cost basis is used without identifying it, you end up comparing apples and pomegranates. The TOC is not what it will cost to fly the plane off the lot. As an example, imagine the original cost of the B-52. Now imagine – with the aircraft having been in constant service for 50 years or more – the total cost of ownership. The difference is going be huge. We could easily see a difference of several hundred million dollars per aircraft between URF and TOC as fuel, maintenance, upgrades, modifications, parts, labor, crew costs, and basing costs are all added to the aircraft’s original price, correct? Imagine seeing the TOC for a B-52 represented as the URF. You’d say “no way, we can’t afford itâ€. So, given that understanding, what will it cost us to fly the aircraft off the dealer’s lot (URF)? Again, in 2010 dollars, assuming all the aircraft originally contracted for are bought (2,443) and production can begin in a timely manner, a CTOL variant F-35 is going to cost $65 million to fly away. The Marine variant, the STOVL (Short Take Off Vertical Landing) will be in the $75 million range and the CV version (more robust frame/undercarriage built for carrier operations) for the Navy in the $70ish million range. I briefly talked about other versions of cost associated with this or any other defense project. They are only meaningful within the government/defense procurement community and are used in reporting and monitoring each program within that community. They have no real relevance to the URF but are sometimes quoted in the media as reflecting that price. They provide another example of the wildly divergent costs we see. As an example, one cost used is APUC or Average Process Unit Cost. Essentially they take the URF and add some other costs to it (see chart) to arrive at that cost. There’s another called PAUC or Program Acquisition Unit Cost. Again, in the case of PAUC, URF has some selected costs added to it to arrive atthe particular cost. They’re not costs we should be concerned with as they deal more with program costs over the life of the aircraft (as well as some R &D costs) than the eventual cost per plane to fly away. If you see a cost of $93 million per copy floating around out there, for instance, it is likely the PAUC cost as reflected in the chart. Again, that’s not the cost per plane to fly it away (URF). Finally, just because it is interesting, let’s talk about something else associated with cost and also not properly compared. So, I think we can agree that we can fly an Air Force F-35 CTOL away for about $65 million (2010 dollars). But I can fly a 4th generation fighter away for, say, $50 million – why not build a whole bunch of those for less money? Two reasons – they’re significantly inferior in technology and not very stealthy at all. And that $50 million really doesn’t reflect the true cost – not if you want to do anything with the aircraft other than just fly it around. The F-35 as delivered is mission capable. That means it comes with everything already on board to fly missions in combat. It’s combat ready. The 4th generation fighter? Extra cost is required to make it combat ready. You get a basic 4th generation fighter for the quoted price and then have to buy, at extra cost, what is necessary to configure it for combat. Once you pay to configure a 4th gen fighter to be mission capable, i.e., buy what it needs to do its mission in combat, its cost is pretty close to the same as a CTOL F-35 and it is still an inferior aircraft. Bottom Line: The actual cost to get a new Air Force F-35 into service is about $65 million (2010 dollars). Claims of higher costs for an Air Force F-35 are usually misleading attempts to include years of operating and maintenance costs (costs applicable to all aircraft across the board regardless of generation) in the purchase price. Just thought that you should be aware of that. Let's hear what you think about this in the Comments. Update 1: Just heard from the House Armed Services Committee on this post: Just to piggyback, the Committee is expected to pass an Amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act today that authorizes GE-Rolls Royce to self fund their F35 engine. Since the F35 contract will last 3 decades, the Pentagon originally planned for an annual competition for sustainment and procurement costs. The short term cost of developing the GE engine was deemed too high by the Defense Department, and they canceled the program, ignoring the hazards in handing a $1 billion engine contract to a monopoly. With the Pratt & Whitney engine is already $3.5 billion over budget and wrought with thrust and nozzle problems, the General Electric proposal to pay out of pocket couldn’t have come at a better time. So in the spirit of your post, today Congress is in a unique position to significantly mitigate the costs of the F-35 program, with no further financial obligation from the Pentagon. We get taxpayer free competition for JSF engine contracts, avoid the pitfalls of a $100 billion Pratt & Whitney monopoly that’s already taking Congress to the bank, keep thousands of employees working, and finally will start to reap the rewards of industry-led acquisition reform. In short, the precise type of reform that the Pentagon and Congress have been pleading with the defense industry to institute for years. John Noonan Speechwriter & Deputy Communications Director U.S. House Armed Services Committee Update 2: Got a question about how much the ball park cost for upgrading a 4th gen fighter to combat mission capable? $10-15,000,000 which makes it about the same cost as the F35. But you don't get the next gen technology, weapons, capabilities, etc. for that price. View the full article

Let's go back in the time machine and quote your humble blogg'r back in May 05 on an issue I have been writing about since '04. Taking out their tried and true smear template, the Hollywood Left and their fellow travelers are starting out to libel today's veterans just like they did Vietnam veterans. I don't think they can help themselves. For the sake of this post, it would be best if you have read B.G. Burkett's book Stolen Valor . If you have not read it; buy it , read it, and then donate it to your local library. He exposes the macro lies, smears, and half truths that the anti-war/anti-military/anti-veteran slathered over the Vietnam veterans. He exposed the methods, reasons, and styles of the victim/PTSD/homeless-dirty-vet-in-a-boonie-hat hucksters exceptionally well. The Vietnam Vet pushed by The Deer Hunter , Taxi Driver , Apocalypse Now , Platoon , and the rest of that ilk does not have anything to do with the facts, demographics, or social statistics of those vets. I see that at my micro level as well. They are 180 degree opposites of the folks I served with early in my career, my Uncle, my Dad's friends, and my neighbors. I saw this coming last year. The usual subjects and plot lines are coming out. True to form - the NYT & Luke Mogelson plays their part. Of course, while the murders in southern Afghanistan reflect most glaringly upon the men who committed them, the need to revisit these crimes goes beyond questions of culpability and motive in one platoon. As with Abu Ghraib and Haditha and My Lai, it’s hard not to consider how such acts also open a window onto the corroding conflicts themselves. This isn’t to suggest that military personnel are behaving similarly throughout Afghanistan as a result of the conditions there; it is only to say that 10 years into an unconventional war whose end does not appear imminent, the murder of civilians by troops that are supposed to be defending them might reveal more than the deviance of a few young soldiers in a combat zone. I read the article twice to find a direct answer to his question. Of course, I couldn't find it - but he implies it well enough. I hear it, the reader hears it - and the Vietnam generation hears it. We've heard this story before. Have they no shame? Luke; bite me. View the full article

Jerry Hendrix and Noel Williams are friends of mine. Both are accomplished thinkers and analysts, and I tend to agree with them more often than not on mostly everything. The two have penned an article in the latest Proceedings, and Tom Barnett's picked it up and run with it through the blogosphere. In it, they become the latest advocates in a long line of honorable thinkers who believe the "supercarrier" has reached the end of its useful life, driven to its demise by its cost and its vulnerability. There is a lot of really good thinking in their work, but in the end, I am unpersuaded. I don't disagree, I'm just not willing to walk away from the "supercarrier". Yet. Let's start with the concept of vulnerability. The team writes "Given very clear technology trends toward precision long-range strike and increasingly sophisticated anti-access and area-denial capabilities, high-signature, limited-range combatants like the current aircraft carrier will not meet the requirements of tomorrow’s Fleet." This raises a number of questions for me. First, how do they know the aircraft carrier will not meet the requirements of tomorrow's Fleet? How different is what they are saying about the vulnerability of the carrier than what was said about a panoply of Soviet threats, to include the AS-4, and a variety of high-speed maneuvering ASCM's--both of which were factored into the Navy's acquisition programs, giving us AEGIS, the SM family, and VLS? Where is the belief in our ability to effectively counter A2AD challenges? Is the Navy and Air Force "AirSea Battle" simply a PR effort? Next, they write, "In addition, a series of poor acquisition decisions, beginning with the mismanagement and ultimate cancellation of the A-12 Avenger as the replacement aircraft for the A-6 Intruder deep-strike aircraft, have exacerbated the challenge to carrier efficacy. The resulting reduction in the combat-effective range of the carrier air wing from 1,050 to 500 nautical miles forces the carrier to operate closer to enemy shores even as anti-access systems would logically force the carrier farther seaward." If Hendrix and Williams wish to impugn the effectiveness and capability of our current Air Wing--then I'm on-board without reservation. Read Bob Work's 2008 CSBA report on Carrier Based Unmanned Systems and understand the trade-offs made between striking range (which used to be greater) and sortie generation rate (which now is at all time highs). But the carrier is simply a delivery device for airpower--an incredibly mobile, flexible, and persistent delivery device. Hendrix and Williams go to great lengths in their work to advocate unmanned systems, but the natural case for unmanned systems from CVN's (and from a carrier designed from the keel up for unmanned strike) is ignored. Further to the subject of vulnerability is the following: " The U.S. National Command Authority would need to be facing a gravely extreme scenario to commit this sort of strategic asset, with a crew of 5,000 men and women." Why is it that we can deploy 130,000 ground troops in Iraq in 2003--with the (since disproved)--threat of chem-bio weapons, but 5000 Sailors are somehow too important to commit? If the issue is really cost alone, then I believe the amortized value of a CVN with a 40-50 year lifespan should receive a bit more emphasis than its acquisition cost. Hendrix and Williams make a good case for a renewed emphasis on sea control by the US writing: "we must rebalance our Fleet to meet new sea-control missions while maintaining reasonable power-projection capabilities for the range of global threats we will encounter." I couldn't agree more, but I am left wondering why this isn't once again an AIRWING problem and not a Carrier problem? Nobody forced us to walk away from long range strike, ASUW and ASW from our CVN's--that was a choice--and it is a choice we can un-make. In a bit of logic that I still can't get my arms around, they assert: "In such a new strategic environment, unmanned systems diminish the utility of the supercarrier, because her sea-control and power-projection missions can be performed more efficiently and effectively by other means." Unmanned systems diminish the utility of the supercarrier? I completely disagree. In fact, I believe unmanned systems should be the starting point of a whole new class of supercarrier, one built from the keep up to be a delivery platform for hundreds of unmanned surveillance and strike vehicles, launched recovered, re-armed, refueled and maintained through the use of an assembly line-like construct. Such a platform could could deliver a high-sortie rate of long range strike and surveillance platforms from outside the "keep out" zone. The most interesting argument Williams and Hendrix make in their paper is where they advocate ceasing to build additional supercarriers and instead, devoting some or all of the resources to building additional LHA's. Estimating that 3 LHA's can be purchased for the price of 1 CVN, the authors envision a time in which the CVN's are kept in "reserve" or "surge" , while a multitudinous fleet of LHA's--some of which would have no rotorcraft (instead, embarking two squadron's of F-35's), do the primary business of reactive expeditionary airpower. Which leads to further question: If the CVN's are such sitting ducks, what makes the LHA's so much more survivable? With a CVN, the opportunity exists to have striking power and sea control power operating off of one deck--it is hard to see the same opportunity from an LHA. If the LHA's are going to take advantage of this emerging unmanned sea control revolution that Williams and Hendrix allude to, why couldn't CVN's do so too--only with SIGNIFICANTLY more striking power? Additionally, Hendrix and Williams would have us stop building CVN's in part because of their airwing imposed "keep outs" (my words, not theirs). Yet the size and flexibility of the CVN gives it a MUCH better chance than the LHA of accommodating changes to an airwing that would mitigate that keep-out. Finally, what of the industrial base? The authors would have us walk away from the building of supercarriers in favor of LHA's, as in their view, a given pot of money goes farther when applied to many, less capable ships. But what if the industrial base goes away, and we lose the capability to build nuclear supercarriers? What if Hendrix and Williams aren't right, and ELIMINATING a reasonably successful delivery vehicle for airpower turns out to be a poor choice? What would be the cost of trying to reconstitute that industrial base? To conclude, it seems to me that we come around to this question of small carriers vs. big carriers every time money gets tight--and every time, big carriers win. I don't know why that is, but I'm willing to believe there is a ton of campaign analysis behind it. That said, the entire conversation is for me, emblematic of the ridiculous discussions ongoing these days about the defense budget, discussions that take it as a given that the Navy must spend less and get smaller. Reaching for my broken record player, I'm here to say that Seapower--with its land force (USMC) and its Air Force (Naval Air)--remains the most cost effective, powerful and flexible instrument of military force in the US inventory, and we ought to go down with an empty rhetorical magazine--fully advocating for growing Seapower at the expense of less useful elements of military power--before we start cannibalizing the Seapower we have. Bryan McGrath View the full article

There are those who study history and watch the present to look for the best path in to the future. There are those who are willfully ignorant of history, are not interested in the greater world around them, and instead like to focus on their own ideology and pedantic habits. In the late '70s the UK got rid of its strike carrier capability and just barely survived with their CVS and Harriers since ... until recently when the RAF and their easily debunked theories manages to get rid of the Harrier for good and the silly ships that carried them. Ahem. DEFENCE Secretary Liam Fox is expected to come under heavy pressure to reverse large parts of the government's strategic defence and security review (SDSR) when he appears before MPs tomorrow. ... They will focus in particular on the decision not to have an operational aircraft carrier for most of the next decade and there will be demands to reverse the mothballing of 90 Harrier jets for use in operations in Libya. Dr Fox is understood to want to bring the Harriers back into service. The Scotsman last week revealed the aircraft carrier HMS Illustrious, which is supposed to be turned into a helicopter carrier, has been prepared in its refit at Rosyth in a way that would allow Harriers to fly from it. ... Labour Dunfermline and West Fife MP Thomas Docherty said: "I think it is fair to say that we will stick to the subject of Libya, but there are a number of concerns about current operations and the way they are developing that mean much of the session will also look at the SDSR." He added: "I have made no secret of my concerns over the lack of an aircraft carrier and decision to mothball the Harriers. "The operations in Libya have underlined how ridiculous that decision is. "We should have a carrier parked off the North African coast, but instead we are trying to use Italian air bases and are even still flying operations from RAF Marham in Norfolk." The government has said it will not reverse decisions made in the SDSR, but that it is "being kept under review". Meanwhile, back on this side of the pond from a table at some Starbucks comes this chewable bit of myopia, The United States has 11 aircraft carriers in active duty, with two more under construction. Our enemy, the Taliban, doesn't have any ships or planes, or even an official army. We're pleased that our country's massive — and in some cases wasteful — military spending is getting more scrutiny as budget-cutting battles rage in Washington, D.C. There are plenty of questionable military expenditures. Aircraft carriers are perhaps the most visible. The flattops have plenty of historic appeal from World War II battles, but they're becoming increasingly obsolete. The U.S. used cruise missiles much more than carrier-based planes to attack Libya recently. The U.S. needs to take a hard look at reducing the number of aircraft carriers. No other country has more than one. China has none, though it has two under construction. I think I read almost the exact thing, with different numbers of course, some time in the mid-80s in The Nation or The Atlantic magazine. The one with Navy ships that looked like sitting ducks. Cycles. View the full article

Osama Bin Laden is dead. Pointless to link any single article to this fact, as it will be every single headline in the world. I have heard from serious folks it was Navy SEALS. SEAL TEAM SIX. Naturally. View the full article

General Dynamics Electric Boat receives $1.2 billion to begin construction of the 14th Virginia-class submarine, SSN-787, part of Block III with a revised bow design. Russia lays out its vision of European missile defense. Saab sees potential Gripen jet fighter orders in Brazil, Romania, Croatia, Denmark, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Bulgaria, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. Pentagon looks to place military payloads on commercial satellites in order to reduce costs. Wyle gets $14 million contract to provide IT services to support DARPA’s relocation in Arlington, VA. Atlas Air to begin providing passenger service for US military personnel in May, completing its existing military cargo service. View the full article

Back in 2008's Zhuhai airshow, a mysterious SAM called FL-3000N was shown and looked a lot like RIM-116 (aka RAM). You can see my commentary on this system at the bottom of my blog entry on Zhuhai 2008. At the time, I thought it was more of an export project, since Zhuhai airshow tend to display those more prominently. I was also under the impression that PLAN was going the route of using new air defense guns as the next generation CIWS. It turned out with the recent Varyag photos, that they have decided to field both this new SAM (domestic designation is supposedly HQ-10) and what looks to be Type 730 (commonly found on most recent PLAN warships) on Varyag. You can see them clearly on Varyag now that their tarp (at least 3 identified installations on Varyag) are finally uncovered. As with many new weapon systems in PLAN, they are tested on the 892 test ship. We can basically identify two variants of HQ-10. The first one is installed in the front of the ship with 24 launch tubes. You can see it clearly with the first 2 pictures. The second is installed on a platform on top of the helipad of the ship with 18 launch tubes. You can see it clearly with the last 2 pictures taken about 3 weeks apart. Now, it seems like the one in the back is the one installed on Varyag if we count up the number of launch tubes. It also seems like there is a storage compartment beneath the platform it was installed on, which would indicate that it is storing missiles for automatic reload. The one in the front is unlikely to require deck penetration, since it is installed directly on the deck of 892. I don't think they would do the extra work of modifying the front section of 892 just for testing this out. So, that would tell me that the version in front is used for installations that do not allow for deck space below and the version at back is used for installations that do allow for one level of penetration. It also would explain why the version in front carries 24 launch tubes instead of 18. View the full article

I was very surprised a couple of days ago when a friend of my sent me this NY Times Article and asked me if I contributed to it. Varyag has certainly come a long way from the day when it got dragged to Macau to be a floating casino. I've posted many photos of Varyag in the past, but its progress has finally even attracted the attention of major Western newspaper. Of course, there are also plenty of activities around other Chinese shipyards. First of all, we see some new photos showing three different 052Cs under different stage of construction at JN shipyard. To be frank, the first photo (third 052C) has not seemed to have made too much progress, but JN shipyard certainly has a lot of work going on. It is also apparently building a couple of Yuan class submarines that will be ready soon. At the same time, we are seeing the modules to the third Type 071 LPD under construction at HD shipyard. Of course, the second Type 071 LPD is still fitting out the different components at the dockside. I think it should be ready for sea trials soon. Finally, we have some more photos from the WuChang shipyard. We still see the same three submarines (one of the mysterious new type and two of the improved Yuan variant). It seems like one of them is ready to head to Shanghai for acceptance testing. We also, see the final 2 cutters (of this five year plan) getting fitted before been delivered to CMS. View the full article

From Mark Goldblatt at the Corner. Why do I have a sinking feeling that expecting the Libyan rebels to overthrow Qaddafi is like expecting the Coyote to catch the Road Runner . . . and that we’re about to become the Acme Corporation? I am still laughing since I read that. View the full article

Call me juvenile, but if they ever make a movie of the Libyan intervention, this has to be in it: A U.S. Navy P-3C Maritime Patrol aircraft, a U.S. Air Force A-10 Thunderbolt attack aircraft and guided-missile destroyer USS Barry (DDG-52) engaged Libyan Coast Guard vessel Vittoria and two smaller crafts after confirmed reports that Vittoria and accompanying craft were firing indiscriminately at merchant vessels in the port of Misrata, Libya, during the evening March 28, 2011. The P-3C fired at Vittoria with AGM-65F Maverick missiles after multiple explosions were observed in the vicinity of the port rendering the 12-meter patrol vessel ineffective and forcing it to be beached. Two small crafts were fired upon by an A-10 using its 30mm GAU-8/ Avenger gatling cannon, destroying one and forcing the other to be abandoned. Barry provided situational awareness for the aircraft by managing the airspace and maintaining the maritime picture. The P-3C, A-10 and Barry are currently supporting operations for Joint Task Force Odyssey Dawn. View the full article