A topic which (unsurprisingly) is taking up a lot of bandwidth on Harpgamer IRC these days is the recent attack by an anti-ship missile(s) on the Israel Defence Force's Sa'ar V (Eilat) class corvette INS Hanit.

 

Here's a summary of what has been reported and some comments on the same. Please feel free to add your own thoughts. My hope is to make this into a little "case study" of sorts, and hopefully we can all learn something from it.

 

It has been said that tonne for tonne, the Sa'ar V corvettes are among the most heavily armed warships in the world. As a primer, the Naval Technology website has a helpful summary of the Sa'ar V and its various systems, sensors and weapons. You can find it here. The Israeli Weapons website is also helpful, found here.

 

The Federation of American Scientists (FAS) website has a description of the C-802 missile here.

 

Here's my own amalgamation of what the various media are reporting ...

 

The INS Hanit was hit Friday, 14 July 2006, at about 20:15 hrs, while shelling Beirut international airport. Four crewmen are reported lost. The warship was struck by an Iranian supplied (Chinese built) C-802 missile launched from Beirut. Shortly before 20:00 hrs, Hizballah had launched a pair of C-802 missiles against the Israeli ship. Iranian troops present in Lebanon are reported to have assisted in the missile launch. The first missile was programmed for a higher trajectory but missed and exploded in the water. The second took a sea skimming profile and struck the Hanit in the stern area, near the helicopter deck, starting a fire. This very serious fire was apparently aggravated by aviation fuel. The ship was saved by the intervention of its crew. The Israeli Navy had no warning or intelligence regarding a possible missile threat in the area where the Hanit was operating. The ship's own air defence system was turned off due to the presence of IDF/AF aircraft in the area. A third (or maybe the second) missile has apparently struck and sunk a Cambodian merchant vessel.

 

And my comments regarding same, taken in turn …

 

(1) If the Hanit was shelling shore targets at the time, then the ship must have been equipped with the OTO 76mm/62 gun rather than the Phalanx CIWS. Scratch one method of defending itself.

 

(2) The incident occurred at dusk, or at least in limited visibility. This would seem to lend credence to the use of a radar guided missile (like the C-802) rather than an electro-optically (TV or infrared) guided weapon. Keep in mind, as well, the Hanit's stealth features.

 

(3) The C-802 is a relatively sophisticated anti-ship missile, in many ways a Chinese copy of the French Exocet (remember the Falklands ?). In some ways it seems unlikely that Hizballah would have access to such a weapon, but the fact remains: they have struck a very capable Israeli warship and achieved a mission kill, and perhaps another commercial vessel has fallen victim to the same weapon. Iran has only had the C-802 since the early 1990s, and then in limited numbers until at least the mid to late 1990s. If indeed Iran supplied the C-802 to Hizballah, then either Iran has plenty of these missiles, has begun its own manufacture of them, or is simply willing to distribute them rather recklessly. In any event, proof of Iran's tacit or direct involvement could have serious political ramifications.

 

(4) I have yet to see credible photos of the damage sustained by the Hanit. But reports indicate that the damage was serious, enough to sustain a bad fire that continued for an extended period of time, cause the loss of at least four crew members, and require the Hanit to be knocked out of action at least temporarily or need towing. This in spite of the ship's seemingly decent damage control features. The Hanit has a steel hull and aluminum (… oy) superstructure, 11 watertight compartments, six fire zones, and a secondary operations room aft.

 

(5) The Hanit's hard kill air defence systems include a pair of 32 cell Barak I point defence SAM systems; the OTO 76mm or 20mm Phalanx CIWS (in this case, the 76mm seems likely); and a pair of manually aimed Sea Vulcan 25mm air defence guns. All of these (excepting the 76mm) were reportedly not active at the time.

 

(6) The ship's impressive sensors and soft kill defensive systems include an Elta EL/M-2218S AMDR advanced missile detection radar (oops !), Elisra NS-9003A/NS-9005 integrated ESM/ECM suite, Tadiran NATACS COMINT system, El-Op MSIS electro-optical surveillance and tracking system, and three DESEAVER decoy launchers. If the active radars and jammers were not energized, what happened with the passive systems ?

 

These are some points I thought might provoke further discussion.

Excellent, excellent, excellent post Brad.

 

Hope to participate in this discussion once I gain more SA.

If the Hanit was shelling shore targets at the time, then the ship must have been equipped with the OTO 76mm/62 gun rather than the Phalanx CIWS. Scratch one method of defending itself.

Is the Sa'ar modular in design like the"mission packages" of, dare I say it, the LCS Class?

Latest news from Jane's Defence Weekly

 

Hizbullah hits Israel's INS Hanit with anti-ship missile

By Alon Ben-David JDW Correspondent

on the Israeli-Lebanese border

 

Israel's INS Hanit, a Eilat (Sa'ar 5)-class missile corvette, was struck on 14 July by an Iranian-made C-802 Noor (Tondar) radar-guided anti-ship missile, fired by Hizbullah from Beirut.

 

"We were not aware that Hizbullah possessed this kind of missile," said Rear Admiral Noam Faig, Israel Navy (IN) head of operations, told Jane's.

 

"We are familiar with that missile from other areas but assumed that the threat was not present in Lebanon."

 

The Noor, based on the Chinese C-802, was reported to have a 200 km range during manoeuvres conducted by the Iranian Navy in April 2005.

 

An initial debrief of the incident suggested that the Hanit was sailing without fully activating its Barak-point defence system.

 

For other, undisclosed reasons, the Hanit's electronic countermeasures and electronic support measures, as well as the Vulcan Phalanx close-in weapon system failed to block or intercept the missile.

 

"It's a very painful blow to the IN," admitted an IN source, "but it could have been worse if they had hit another section of the ship."

If the Hanit was shelling shore targets at the time, then the ship must have been equipped with the OTO 76mm/62 gun rather than the Phalanx CIWS. Scratch one method of defending itself.

Is the Sa'ar modular in design like the"mission packages" of, dare I say it, the LCS Class?

Not modular in the same manner as LCS (or the MEKO frigates), afaik, but from what I understand, the OTO 76mm gun and the Phalanx CIWS systems are interchangeable on a mount on the forward deck.

 

Other weapons and sensors are fixed, I believe, but there was some talk during the trials of this class that some topweight problems might be solved by carrying a reduced load of Barak and Harpoon, and dropping the Gabriels except during wartime. But the recent references to the Sa'ar V class that I have seen make no mention of this reduction.

A new rumour is emerging ... Defense Update has more:

 

INS Hanit Suffers Iranian Missile Attack

Updated: July 17, 2006:

 

According to Israel Defense Forces (IDF) sources, the attack was conducted by Chinese C-802. Apparently, two missiles were launched toward the Israel Navy Ship (INS) Hanit (Spear), SAAR V class corvette patrolling the Lebanese coast 16 kilometers from the shore. The attack was a coordinated, simultaneous “high/low” attack - the first “high” missile passed over the Israeli ship. Missing the target, it continued flying, hitting and sinking a civilian Egyptian ship cruising 60 kilometers from the shore. The second missile followed a sea-skimming flight profile hitting the Israeli vessel at the stern, killing four sailors and setting the flight deck on fire and crippling the propulsion systems inside the hull. Surviving the potentially devastating attack INS Hanit returned to Ashdod naval base for repairs.

 

The simultaneous attack was probably using two techniques as well, ensuring maximum chances of success. The Israeli Navy believes the missiles used targeing data from Lebanese coastal radars, therefore maintaining low electro-magnetic signature throughout the attack prparation phase. The first missiles was apparently used as a radar-guided “bait”. seducing the ship to deploy its defensive systems against it, focusing all the attention on the “obvious” threat while the second sea-skimming missile closing below. A supporting fact for this assumption is the fact that the first missile locked on the unfortunate Egyptian ship 44 kilometers away, as it was the next visible target in its flightpath. The second, missile could have been guided by radar or, more probably, Electro-optically. This method would require the launch of two types of missiles, a C-801/802 for the “high” profile and a C-701 TV guided missile for the “low” profile.

 

According to an Associated Press report, based on an interview with an unnamed IDF official, the Israeli vessel didn’t use its electronic countermeasures systems as they did not anticipate such a threat in the area. Yet, this comment is questionable, as there were repeated intelligence reports about Iranian supplies of sophisticated equipment, missiles and drones to the Hizbollah. However, the naval or coastal defense missiles were not mentioned specifically, leading the Israelis to remain unaware of the imminent threat.

 

C-801 radar guided anti-ship missile weighs about 750 kg, it is powered by a rocket motor and has a range of 40 km and is equipped with 100 kg warhead. The upgraded C-802 uses a rocket booster for launch, and a turbojet cruise motor, giving it a range of up to 140. The warhead uses about 180 kg of shaped charge explosives, which makes it a most capable threat to major warships including U.S. aircraft carriers. The C-701, (also known as Iranian Kosar) is deployed with Iranian forces as a truck mounted coastal defense missile, it is much smaller than the C-801/802, weighing about 100 kg, its range is about 18-20 km and the warhead has 29 kg of explosives, set with a delayed activation fuze to maximize internal damage after hull penetration. It uses an Infrared/TV seeker or active millimeter terminal guidance.

Some comments on the Defense Update story above ...

 

The attack was a coordinated, simultaneous “high/low” attack - the first “high” missile passed over the Israeli ship. Missing the target, it continued flying, hitting and sinking a civilian Egyptian ship cruising 60 kilometers from the shore.

Apparently it was a Cambodian merchant with an Egyptian crew. Some or all of them survived, but the ship sunk. If this ship was indeed 60 km from shore, that would certainly lend credence to the missile having been a C-802 (or something with similar range and utilizing radar guidance). Secondly, the fact that it was sunk matches the relatively powerful warhead of the C-802. Just how big was this ship ?

 

The second missile followed a sea-skimming flight profile hitting the Israeli vessel at the stern, killing four sailors and setting the flight deck on fire and crippling the propulsion systems inside the hull. Surviving the potentially devastating attack INS Hanit returned to Ashdod naval base for repairs.

 

The C-802 carries a 165 kg warhead, enough to cause devastating damage to a ship the size of the Hanit (ca 1200 tonnes full load). If it was a C-802, then the Hanit is lucky indeed. Its possible that the missile failed to detonate, or passed completely through without detonating, or maybe struck the helo on deck. Its reported that one of the casualties was the helo pilot, suggesting the helo was on deck at the time.

 

The Israeli Navy believes the missiles used targeting data from Lebanese coastal radars, therefore maintaining low electro-magnetic signature throughout the attack preparation phase.

An active radar guided missile like the C-802 would certainly some degree of target cueing, even for a BOL launch. But wouldn't the Israelis have targeted these coastal radars for destruction from the beginning of their campaign ?

 

The first missiles was apparently used as a radar-guided “bait”. seducing the ship to deploy its defensive systems against it, focusing all the attention on the “obvious” threat while the second sea-skimming missile closing below.

 

Interesting tactics. Even a little disturbing, because it suggests a degree of coordination and sophistication that is in line with the possibility of Iranian troops having supported and assisted in the attack. In any event, Hizballah achieved total surprise, because the Hanit's defensive systems apparently weren't operating.

 

A supporting fact for this assumption is the fact that the first missile locked on the unfortunate Egyptian ship 44 kilometers away, as it was the next visible target in its flightpath.

That makes sense if it was a radar guided C-802 or similar missile.

 

The second, missile could have been guided by radar or, more probably, Electro-optically. This method would require the launch of two types of missiles, a C-801/802 for the “high” profile and a C-701 TV guided missile for the “low” profile.

 

This sounds credible. The C-802 is a pretty big system, and if launched on a high altitude profile, its possible the launcher was further inland and the missile didn't have an opportunity to lock its radar seeker on the Hanit so close to shore. The C-701 (and its variants), on the other hand, is a pretty small missile (with a semi-armor piercing warhead in the 50 kg range) with a limited range, launched from a relatively small truck. If an IR variant was employed, it may have locked onto the Hanit's diesel exhaust port, which is fairly fair aft (and near the helo deck) and low on the waterline. (Some of the pics circulating the Web that purport to show the missile damage are actually just showing the staining from this exhaust port).

 

According to an Associated Press report, based on an interview with an unnamed IDF official, the Israeli vessel didn’t use its electronic countermeasures systems as they did not anticipate such a threat in the area. Yet, this comment is questionable, as there were repeated intelligence reports about Iranian supplies of sophisticated equipment, missiles and drones to the Hizbollah.

 

I don't think its questionable. It makes sense that the Hanit would not be using its ECM jammers or have activated its Barak SAM system, because of the fear of interfering with or jeopardizing the IDF/AF aircraft operating in the same area. What I find questionable is why didn't the Hanit's passive systems (including an ESM suite, communications intercept (COMINT) system and EO/IR surveillance system) didn't detect the missile launch ? Even a spotter on deck might have been able to see the launch and perhaps the missile itself at such close range. It may have been simply a question of extremely short reaction time.

 

We continue to await pics of the damage sustained by the Hanit, which should tell us more.

QUOTE 

The Israeli Navy believes the missiles used targeting data from Lebanese coastal radars, therefore maintaining low electro-magnetic signature throughout the attack preparation phase.

 

 

 

An active radar guided missile like the C-802 would certainly some degree of target cueing, even for a BOL launch. But wouldn't the Israelis have targeted these coastal radars for destruction from the beginning of their campaign ?

 

Could those coastal radars have been non-military, navigational type radars - not that they would have likely escaped the wrath of the Israeli targeteers?

 

Is there much difference between a military SS and a commercial or civilian SS radar?

Could those coastal radars have been non-military, navigational type radars - not that they would have likely escaped the wrath of the Israeli targeteers? Is there much difference between a military SS and a commercial or civilian SS radar?

There are differences, no doubt, but probably only in terms of performance and features. The basic premise and the inherent dangers are the same.

 

This, from Defense Update:

 

Following the C-802 missile attack on the Israeli corvette, the Israeli Navy and Air Force attacked and destroyed all (3) coastal radar sites along the Lebanese coastline, to prevent repeated attacks. Another radar station at a-Nazariya was destroyed the following night.

 

Hmm, I think that was an oversight in the targeting plan, especially since they obviously had already planned on having their own warships offshore and they already had a long lived belief that Lebanon/Syria were supporting Hizballah.

Hmm, I think that was an oversight in the targeting plan, especially since they obviously had already planned on having their own warships offshore and they already had a long lived belief that Lebanon/Syria were supporting Hizballah.

All these RW examples/discussions are really beginning to get the wheels turning.

All these RW examples/discussions are really beginning to get the wheels turning.

Glad to hear it. It really "brings it home" when the platforms you have been playing Harpoon scenarios with, actually go to war.

Here's an interesting account from Situational Awareness, a "blog" from the former editors of the now (sadly) defunct eDefense Online website.

 

I don't ordinarily find any merit at all in "blogs" (the very word conjures images of what a dog might do if he had an upset stomach), but I suppose this topic is all about analyzing the rumour mill, so what the heck.

 

In any event, they have some interesting comments on the "surprise" aspect of the attack and draw some comparisons with the Styx attack on the Israeli "Eilat" (fate is cruel, huh) destroyer in 1967. I expect that eventually we'll hear an account very much like this one (found here):

 

Lieutenant Yitzhak Zoran, Israeli Navy, received a special commendation for bravery for his selfless and effective efforts to save crewmembers when the destroyer Eliat was hit by Egyptian Styx missiles in October 1967. The citation accompanying his medal for bravery reads in part: "... after the sinking of the Eliat, Lt. Zoran began to assemble survivors in the water into groups and help care for their wounds. He saw that survivors were widely scattered and he continued to swim in all directions to assist them in getting back to the relative safety of the life rafts. He put his own life jacket on a wounded crewmember and remained in the water without one for over six hours in terrible sea conditions. He continued to search for and assist other lone survivors who would not have made it on their own. He was finally recovered by a missile patrol boat, but only after making sure that all the others around him were safe. He saved many lives." Yitzhak, known affectionately by his friends as "Tze Tze," is currently the managing director of Marathon Venture Capital Fund LTD in Israel and the past president of Elisra.

 

"Forty-seven crewmembers of the destroyer Eliat paid the ultimate price when the enemy was underestimated and the COMINT system failed.

 

I happened to be on the bridge with the Captain and we both saw it go off. I thought that it was a harmless signaling rocket, but he knew better.

 

It was about 5:30 PM on a lazy Saturday afternoon in October 1967, about four months after the cease-fire agreement had stopped the shooting in the six-day war between Israel, Egypt, and other Arab nations. I was the electronics and electrical officer on the destroyer Eliat, on a routine patrol mission, 12 to 14 miles offshore in international waters off the coast of the Sinai Peninsula opposite Port Said, the Mediterranean entrance to the Suez Canal. Since the Egyptian navy had come away virtually unscathed in the war, we were there to prevent them from either re-supplying remaining forces in the Sinai or attempting an offshore bombardment of Israel.

 

The Eliat was a 25-year-old British WW II destroyer that had been taken out of mothballs and sold to Israel. One of a total three destroyers in our navy at the time, it displaced about 2,000 tons and carried a crew of about 150. As a 22-year-old navy lieutenant, this was my first assignment after getting my college degree in electrical engineering.

 

But back to that signaling rocket.

 

Visibility could not have been better. The Captain was pointing out the buildings in Port Said that we viewed through our binoculars when we saw the launch from the harbor. Earlier, he had witnessed test firings of our own Gabriel missiles, and so correctly decided that what we saw meant that a missile was headed our way. It turned out to be the first of four Styx radar-guided missiles launched at the Eliat . He immediately sounded the alarm, called for battle stations, and turned the ship in order to present the smallest target to the incoming missiles. In about a minute most of the crew were at their stations and I could hear the chatter of our machine guns firing at the inbound missiles. But it wasn't enough.

 

By the time I arrived at my battle station below decks at the electrical monitoring and distribution panels, both missiles had hit. The first, with its 200 pounds of high explosive warhead struck near the smokestack, about 30 feet away from where I was standing. By some miracle, I was unhurt - perhaps shielded by a bulkhead. I immediately saw that the lights were growing dim and realized that our motor-generators were hit and losing RPM. It was obvious that we were hurt badly.

 

All four generators were out, the ship was listing badly, and we were going down. The most horrifying realization was that no one else (except perhaps the Egyptians) knew of our predicament. Prior to the attack, we were under strict emission control. That meant we had not maintained radio contact with our Naval headquarters, or anyone else.

 

I had to get the word out. Before I could attempt to hook up the radios in the radio room to battery power, I had to find the radio operators who knew the codes needed to validate our distress calls. Back on deck, it took all my powers of persuasion to convince crewmembers to leave the comparative safety above-deck to return below in a sinking ship. They did, but to no avail. We got the radios working, but discovered that the antennas were gone, so no signal was getting out.

 

The good news was that someone remembered that we had a hand-held, battery operated radio used to communicate with Israeli land forces for training and special operations. It worked, and thus began the rescue operation about two hours after the first missile had hit. That was about the same time that the Eliat sank. The bad news was that the nearest Israeli vessel was four or five fast-steaming hours away.

 

The ships finally arrived about midnight. But our helicopters had gotten there earlier and airlifted the wounded from the water. Forty-seven men died that day, either killed in the initial blasts, or subsequently drowned. The hundred of us who survived were in the sea for many hours.

 

What went wrong? Did this tragedy have to happen?

 

A lot of thought went into answering these questions. Actually, we knew that the Egyptians had the SS-N-2 Styx missiles, but we didn't believe that these were either operational as yet, or that their forces knew how to use them.

 

Our operating procedures actually depended on both COMINT and ELINT to alert us to such dangers, but that time the systems broke down. For one thing, our COMINT operators (the ones who continually monitored radio traffic) were not aboard at the time. They had rotated ashore, and their replacements had yet to arrive. We later found out that our home based COMINT intercept operators had indeed monitored Egyptian radio traffic indicating an impending missile launch, but they (our INTEL assets) were not aware of any Israeli ships in the area that would be threatened, so no warning was issued.

 

We were equipped with a relatively capable and sophisticated ELINT system for its time, the tunable microwave APR-9 receiver of Korean War vintage. Using the system, we had seen an increased level of high PRF radar signals, which usually meant military rather than commercial applications, and increased activity. But the Styx was one of the first of the easy to employ fire-and-forget surface-to-surface missiles and its onboard targeting radar did not turn on until it was in mid-course to its target. That gave us less than a minute and a half to react. We probably had been painted by surveillance radars, but there were so many radars operating in the region of the Suez Canal, we were not aware of any particularly hostile ones. Unfortunately, I was there on the receiving end when the first radar-directed anti-ship missile was successfully employed in combat.

 

The event triggered a level of maximum awareness of the importance of EW in the Israeli Navy, and for me as well. For the next ten years, my sole preoccupation was to help us develop the EW systems we did not have when the Eliat went down; many of which are still in place today. As a result, our Navy was totally prepared for the Yom Kippur War. We now had missile patrol boats and we also had "smart" missiles. We also had the EW hardware and tactics that allowed us to win in every engagement where our much shorter range Gabriel missiles faced the Styx. We sunk over 10 enemy missile boats without sustaining a single hit."

Supposedly the first pic of the damaged INS Hanit in port. If this is a credible pic, then the tarp hanging over the hull aft supposedly covers the hole caused by the missile. If this is the case, then it was either a very small missile or one that passed through the ship. (Note also the Phalanx, which means the ship was not conducting shore bombardment).

 

More news, and more details, from Jane's Navy International:

 

A preliminary Israel Navy investigation into the circumstances surrounding the missile strike suffered by the Sa'ar 5 Eilat-class missile corvette IN Hanit has acknowledged that the incident was largely the result of an intelligence failure that led to operational gaps.

 

Early indications are that the warhead of the Iranian-supplied Noor anti-ship cruise missile (ASCM) that hit Hanit off Lebanon on 14 July did not detonate. Even so, the missile - fired by Hizbullah forces - killed four crew and inflicted severe damage to the ship's flight deck and steering systems.

 

According to Major General Gadi Eisenkott, the Israel Defence Force (IDF) Chief of Operations, Hizbullah operatives received targeting information from the Lebanese Navy's radar station in Beirut. "That is why we destroyed all the radar stations along the Lebanese shore immediately after the attack," he said.

 

Israel has accused Iran of deploying military advisers alongside Hizbullah to enable the deployment and operation of the Noor system - a clone of the Chinese C-802/YJ-2 'Saccade' radar-guided ASCM.

 

"From now on we have to assume that every weapon that exists in Iran has also been supplied to Hizbullah in Lebanon," a senior IDF source told Jane's. "We are prepared for more surprises," said Maj Gen Eisenkot.