HG S2 (Intel Bot)

B-52H: flyin’ low, dyin’ slow… (click to view full) Officially, it’s the B-52H Stratofortress. Unofficially, it’s the BUFF (Big Ugly Fat F–cker). Either way, this subsonic heavy bomber remains the mainstay of the U.S. strategic fleet after more than 50 years of service. A total of 102 B-52H bombers were delivered from FY 1961-1963, and 94 were still on the books as of May 2009, flying mostly from Barksdale AFB, LA and Minot AFB, ND. Of these, 18 are slated for retirement, leaving a planned fleet of 76. By the time that fleet retires in the 2030s, many will be around 70 years old. The B-52H can’t be flown against heavy enemy air defenses, but a steady array of upgrades have kept the aircraft relevant to follow-on strikes and current wars, where its long time on station and precision weapons have made the BUFF beautiful. Those changes have included advanced communications, GPS guided weapons, advanced targeting pods, and more. The USAF isn’t done yet adding new features, and maintenance remains a challenge for an aircraft fleet that’s always older than its pilots. All of these things require contracts, and the B-52H fleet has several of them underway. So, how does 2010’s 8-year, $11.9 billion umbrella contract fit in…? CONECT, ESP, SWING: How Does This One Fit In? Contracts & Key Events Additional Readings CONECT, ESP, SWING: How Does This One Fit In? USAF bombers: B-52H, B-1B & B-2A (click to view full) At the moment, there are at least 3 major contracts underway for the B-52H fleet. The CONECT (Combat NEtwork Communications Technology) contract was issued in April 2005, and could be worth up to $500 million. CONECT offers a series of upgrades that tie the B-52s into the USAF’s current communications networks. Its most significant combat improvement is the ability to receive new missions in flight, and re-target weapons in the middle of a mission. Ultimately, however, CONECT is an interim contract en route to deeper modernizations. First flight of a refurbished B-52 took place in May 2009. The program accomplished its first test flight on Jan 17/10, and plans further tests in 2011. Execution of CONECT’s development would remain under the current contract until it’s done, but full production, or any future communications upgrades would apparently fall under the $11.9 billion September 2010 IDIQ. B-52H: choices, choices… (click to view full) The 12-year, $150 million SWING (Smart Weapons Integration Next Generation) contract came into force in June 2006. Under this contract, Boeing performs work to integrate new ordnance on the B-52 fleet, from MALD unmanned decoys, to Sniper ATP surveillance and targeting pods, to AGM-158 JASSM missiles and beyond. Most of this work is software related, and the most important aspect of SWING was adding the Universal Armament Interface as a sort of weapons Application Programming Interface, in order to make integration of future weapons much easier. Work under the SWING contract will continue in parallel with the new September 2010 contract. In June 2009, the US Air Force issued the latest B-52 Engineering Sustainment Program (ESP) contract for the fleet, with a 10-year, $750 million ceiling. There are some important things missing from ESP, however, such as spare parts, modernizations or fleet-wide changes outside of CONECT or SWING, etc. All of those things will fall under the September 2010 contract instead, and so will some previous ESP efforts. The Sept 2010 contract’s initial spending surprisingly modest – the $600,000 minimum order, as the 1st payment for a $2.3 million order of 16 Evolutionary Data Link (EDL) Phase III kits, plus some basic engineering support through the end of February 2012. As noted above, the $11.9 billion is really a ceiling amount for a lot of other efforts, which may or may not go forward. If they do go forward, however, there’s an umbrella contract ready with all the terms worked out. B-52H: gas guzzler (click to view full) Several well-known upgrades are under consideration for the B-52 fleet, but haven’t been approved and funded yet. USAF spokesman Lt. Col. Jack Miller has told DoD Buzz that it could cover things like: “Combat Networks Communication Technology (CONECT) production, Extremely High Frequency (EHF) engineering development and production, Strategic Radar Replacement development and production, Tactical Data Link engineering studies, MIL-STD-1760 Internal Weapons Bay production, trade studies, and other programs critical to maintaining B-52 mission capability out to the year 2040.” The Strategic Radar Replacement Program he mentions would install advanced new radars that could greatly improve the B-52’s ground and aerial surveillance capabilities, identifying targets at long ranges. New radar technologies could also assist with low-level flight, and reduce long-term maintenance costs. Another oft-discussed upgrade is the on-again, off-again Stand Off Jammer program, which would turn some B-52s into very powerful, very long range, very long endurance electronic warfare aircraft that could blind even sophisticated enemy air defenses; locate, classify, analyze, or jam radar or radio signals; or even prevent remote detonation of IED land mines in a given area. B-52 SOJ has been started twice, and suspended twice for lack of funding. While the USAF has done some necessary re-wiring work, a deep re-wiring akin to the C-5 AMP program is logical at some point, especially in conjunction with upgraded power generation on board to handle all of the new electronics. Any B-52 SOJ program would almost have to do this, and a radar improvement contract may require it as well, but it’s certain that the whole fleet will need this sooner or later. It’s very time-consuming work, but the good news is that some modern ultra-high capacity wiring has also become self-diagnosing, removing one of the biggest maintenance headaches in any airplane. In a similar vein, but with even more immediate benefits, there has long been talk of re-engining the B-52H fleet, swapping out the ancient and hard to maintain JT3D/TF33 engines with modern turbofans that would dramatically improve performance, fuel efficiency, strike range, and maintainability. The USAF has experience with the benefits and pitfalls of these conversions, having made these kinds of upgrades to its KC-135 tanker fleet to produce the KC-135R, moved forward with re-engining the related E-8C JSTARS fleet of land battle surveillance and control aircraft, and endured the challenges of the C-5M RERP Super Galaxy program for some of its huge aerial transports. Of course, before major steps like these can be taken, the USAF will need engineering studies. ESP doesn’t cover that, but as Lt. Col. Miller noted, the September 2010 contract does. It would also cover integration and installation of these upgrades into the B-52 fleet, as decisions are made to go forward with specific items. Contracts & Key Events B-52H and B-17: only as old as I feel… (click to view full) October 12/20: AESA A new active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar from Raytheon that will be installed on the B-52H bomber might allow the US Air Force to reduce the number of people operating the bomber from five to four. Maj. Gen. Andrew Gebara, director of strategic plans, programs, and requirements for Air Force Global Strike Command, said the decision in not “imminent.” Replacing the AN/APQ-166 radar will also lead to a new radome. And the new one might forgo the AN/ASQ-151 Electro-Optical Viewing System (EVS), which consisted of a low light level television (LLLTV) and a forward looking infrared (FLIR) system mounted in blisters under the nose. Its capability is currently surpass by Litening and Sniper pods carried on the bomber. September 10/20: Training Missions In Africa US Strategic Command started B-52 interoperability training missions in support of US Africa Command in North Africa on Monday. According to AFRICOM, the B-52s have participated in an initial mission with four Moroccan F-16s. AFRICOM’s B-52s will also intercept the USS Roosevelt as it simulates a hostile vessel in the southern Mediterranean. On Aug. 28, B-52 Stratofortress bombers flew over 30 NATO countries with allied aircraft, in a ceremonial statement of solidarity, and the next day two Russian Su-27 Flanker pilots intercepted a US Air Force B-52 bomber over international waters in the Black Sea, according to the Air Force. September 1/20: Unsafe Interception Two Russian Su-27 Flanker pilots intercepted a US Air Force B-52 bomber over international waters in the Black Sea Friday, according to the Air Force. In a press release, the US said Russian pilots flew in an unsafe and unprofessional manner while crossing within 100 feet of the nose of the B-52 multiple times, causing turbulence and restricting the B-52?s ability to maneuver. American B-52 Stratofortress bombers flew over all 30 NATO countries on Friday in an exercise the US military said was meant to demonstrate the alliance’s solidarity, amid growing signs of cracks. The single-day mission is part of regular flight missions that have been taking place in Europe since 2018, but is meant specifically to “demonstrate NATO solidarity, enhance readiness and provide training opportunities” by involving the airspace of every member nation, the US European Command said. August 24/20: Europe Deployment Six US Air Force B-52 bombers from the 5th Bomb Wing, Minot Air Force Base, North Dakota, arrived on August 22, 2020, at RAF Fairford, England for a long planned training mission, US Air Forces in Europe and Air Forces Africa Public Affairs has announced. “B-52s are back at RAF Fairford, and will be operating across the theater in what will be a very active deployment. Our ability to quickly respond and assure allies and partners rests upon the fact that we are able to deploy our B-52s at a moment’s notice,” said Gen. Jeff Harrigian, US Air Forces in Europe and Air Forces Africa commander. “Their presence here helps build trust with our NATO allies and partner nations and affords us new opportunities to train together through a variety of scenarios.” According to local spotters, the bombers landed at around 7:30 a.m. local time. August 14/20: M943 Capco won a $13.3 million contract for the manufacture of M943 impulse cartridges used on B-1B and B-52H aircraft during the ejection sequence. The deal includes a five-year ordering period with no options. The B-52H is the US Air Force’s long-range, large-payload multirole bomber and is known as the Stratofortress or the Buff. It is the USAF’s principal strategic nuclear and conventional weapons platform that supports the US Navy in anti-surface and submarine warfare missions. Work will take place in Colorado. Estimated completion will be by August 2025. July 17/20: Engine Nose Cowls Northrop Grumman won a $35.9 million deal for repair of 174 B-52 Engine Nose Cowls for the B-52 Stratofortress Bomber jet. The B-52H is the US Air Force’s (USAF) long-range, large-payload multirole bomber and is known as the Stratofortress or the Buff (big ugly fat fellow). It is the USAF’s principal strategic nuclear and conventional weapons platform that supports the US Navy in anti-surface and submarine warfare missions. Work will take place in Lake Charles, Louisiana. Expected completion date will be in July 2021. July 16/20: VR The Air Force hopes to adopt a virtual reality trainer to help B-52 Stratofortress student-pilots train for combat. The Virtual Reality Procedures Trainer, developed by Maj. Mark Budgeon of Air Force Global Strike Command, Maj. Brandon Wolf, 307th Operations Support Squadron, and Maj. Justin Stephenson, 11th Bomb Squadron chief pilot and chief of innovations, along with King Crow Studios was released earlier in July at StrikeWerx in Bossier City, La. A prototype is expected later this year. The VPRT is intended to reduce human bias in instruction, provide better access to training for student pilots and give students immediate feedback — reducing their chances of developing poor habits early in training. April 27/20: Contractor Logistics Support Aviation Training Consulting won a $7.3 million contract modification for B-52 training system contractor logistics support and training system support center sustainment. The contract modification is for the third increment of the seven year basic contract. The B-52 Stratofortress is capable of dropping or launching a significant array of weapons including gravity bombs, cluster bombs and precision guided missiles. It is a long-range, subsonic, jet-powered strategic bomber. It has been operated by the US Air Force since the 50s. Work under the contract modification will take place at Barksdale Air Force Base, Louisiana; and Minot AFB, North Dakota. Estimated completion date is October 31, 2020. December 26/19: Egnineering Services Boeing won a $4 million contract modification for B-1 and B-52 bomber engineering services. The modification is for recurring and non-recurring engineering services to B-1 and B-52 aircraft. The B-1 Lancer is a supersonic variable-sweep wing, heavy bomber. It is also called „Bone“. The B-52H is the US Air Force’s long-range, large-payload multirole bomber and is known as the Stratofortress or the Buff (big ugly fat fellow). It is the USAF’s principal strategic nuclear and conventional weapons platform, and supports the US Navy in anti-surface and submarine warfare missions. Work will take place in California, Louisiana, and Oklahoma. Estimated completion date is December 31, 2020 July 15/19: B-52 Radar Upgrade Boeing selected Raytheon as radar supplier for the B-52 bomber radar modernization program. According to a press release by Raytheon, the company will design, develop, produce and sustain active electronically scanned array radar systems for the entire US Air Force B-52 fleet. The B-52 Stratofortress is the Air Force’s principal strategic nuclear and conventional weapons platform, and supports the US Navy in anti-surface and submarine warfare missions. The aircraft has a length of 159ft 4in (48.5m) and a take-off weight of 488,000lb (220,000kg). The advanced radar upgrade will ensure the aircraft remains mission ready through 2050 and beyond. Low rate initial production is scheduled to begin in 2024. With an AESA radar on board, the B-52 will gain improved navigation reliability to support nuclear and conventional missions, Raytheon says. March 15/19: LRSO Cruise Missile The US Air Force contracted Boeing $250 million to integrate the Long Range Stand-Off (LRSO) Cruise Missile on the B-52H bomber platform. This contract provides for aircraft and missile carriage equipment development and modification, engineering, testing, software development, training, facilities, and support necessary to fully integrate the LRSO Cruise Missile on the B-52H bomber. The B-52H Stratofortress is a long-range, large-payload multirole bomber. It is the Air Force’s strategic nuclear and conventional weapons platform and supports the US Navy in anti-surface and submarine warfare missions. The US Air Force awarded a $750 million, ten-year engineering sustainment program contract to Boeing in June 2009 to provide engineering and technical support services for the B-52H and its components, as well as support and test equipment, and system integration laboratory. The LRSO is a nuclear-tipped air-launched cruise missile that is currently being developed to replace the subsonic air-launched cruise missile AGM-86 ALCM. It is being developed to penetrate and survive integrated air defense systems and strike its targets. Work under the contract will take place in Oklahoma City and is schedules to be completed by the end of December 31, 2024. February 28/19: AN/APG-83 Northrop Grumman offers to replace the obsolete radar on the US Air Force (USAF) Boeing B-52H Stratofortress strategic bombers with its AN/APG-83 active electronically scanned array (AESA) system. The USAF wants to upgrade the entire B-52 fleet with a new radar system. It is looking at several options to satisfy its Radar Modernization Program to replace the B-52’s now obsolete Northrop Grumman AN/APQ-166 mechanically-scanned radar. The AN/APG-83 system is also known as the Scalable Agile Beam Radar (SABR). A version of SABR has been developed for the B-1B fleet. According to Northrop Grumman, SABR provides a reliable, cost-effective, off-the-shelf, low-risk radar upgrade solution for multiple platforms. The Air Force launched the Radar Modernization Program for its 76 aircraft bomber fleet in February 2016. A competition is set to be launched this year. June 25/18: Deadly payload The current modernization program of the Air Force’s B-52H aims to make the platform even more lethal. According to a recently published RFI the Air Force plans to equip the B-52H wing pylon to carry a single weapon weighing up to the 20,000lb class, which potentially includes the GBU-43/B Massive Ordnance Air Blast (MOAB). The new pylon will essentially quadruple the weight of bombs that the Boeing B-52H Stratofortress is able to carry externally. The B-52H subsonic heavy bomber remains the mainstay of the US strategic fleet after more than 50 years of service. The Air Force originally envisioned replacing B-52s with a fleet of supersonic bombers, but the subsonic, long-range H-model has persisted since it entered the fleet in 1961. Instead of transitioning to retirement, the USAF now plans continue operating the fleet until they reach nearly the century-mark in 2060. The RFI provided no details as to planned costs and timelines for the pylon upgrade, except to say that the total effort from development to fielding should be accomplished between 36 and 72 months. March 19/18: Re-engine documents released A request for proposals to re-engine the US Air Force’s B-52 strategic bomber is expected for the first quarter of 2019, documents released by the service last week state. According to the document, the contract for re-engining the USAF’s 76 Boeing B-52H bombers would likely be granted some four to six months after final proposals are submitted, with the service looking to acquire at least 608 new, commercially available turbofan engines to replace the eight Pratt & Whitney TF33s each bomber carries. First produced 60 years ago, the TF33 engine was deemed unsustainable after 2030 due to to age, parts obsolescence and a shrinking supplier base. Pratt & Whitney, Rolls-Royce and GE Aviation are possible bidders for the engine replacement program. December 19/17: Milestone-Record The USAF’s B-52 Stratofortress stealth bomber has used its conventional rotary launcher in combat operations for the first time. The conventional rotary launcher, designed to allow the B-52 to carry more smart bombs, was first used during an operation on November 18 in support of Operation Inherent Resolve—the USA’s campaign against Islamic State (IS) militants operating in Iraq and Syria. Following this, its first use in a deliberately planned combat mission saw a B-52 target Taliban narcotics and IED facilities in Afghanistan’s Helmand province, as part of a new offensive to target the group’s revenue streams. During the sortie, the aircraft released 19 Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAMS)—a new record for the most amount of smart bombs dropped by the platform. The offensive also saw the F-22 Raptor employed against Taliban targets for the first time. December 5/17: Future Upgrades The US Air Force (USAF) will not have funding to re-engine its fleet of B-52 aircraft until 2020, Gen. Robin Rand, head of USAF Global Strike Command, told reporters at the Association of Old Crows conference in Washington. But the multi-year, multi-billion project to supply and integrate new engines to the service’s 76 1952-vintage B-52H bombers has already got industry interested, with Boeing and Rolls Royce already openly campaigning for the contract. However, some analysts are skeptical that the re-engine effort will ever happen, saying that while the “re-engining would save money from the O&M account (fuel and parts)” it “would cost money from the procurement account.” November 29/17: Milestone Conventional Rotary Launchers (CRL) for B-52 Stratofortress bomber aircraft have been flown out of Barksdale Air Force Base, LA., by a C-5M Super Galaxy on November 6, to be used for combat overseas. The CRLs allow the long-range strategic bombers to carry GPS guided conventional smart weapons inside its bomb bay, thus increasing the number of weapons it can carry in combat by eight. Speaking on the Milestone, Master Sgt. Adam Levandowski, Air Forces Strategic (AFSTRAT) Armament Systems manager, called the inclusion of the CRLs as “a big game changer for current and future warfare.” July 28/17: Testers from the USAF’s 419th Flight Test Squadron have validated that the B-52 Stratofortress bomber is capable of dropping the PDU-5/B leaflet bomb. The squadron recently ran two successful sorties where a B-52 released eight PDU-5/B leaflet bombs over the Point Mugu Sea Test Range and eight more over the Precision Impact Range Area at Edwards Air Base. During the sorties, the bombs were released from the aircraft’s external Heavy Stores Adapter Beam and the 419th now plan to drop the bomb from the internal weapons bay on future flights. Developed from the CBU-100 “Rockeye” Cluster Bomb, the PDU-5B was developed to drop leaflets in combat zones, either as psychological warfare or to inform the public. September 16/16: B-52s are set to be fitted with new ejector seats following a USAF contract award to AMI Industries. The $14 million deal will see the company install the Advanced Conception Ejection Seat (ACES) II ejection seat. Due for completion in December 2018, the ejection seat will be composed of a detachable seatback and bucket structure that does not require removal of the B-2 escape hatches for any maintenance task. August 15/16: A B-52H bomber equipped with the new Conventional Rotary Launcher (CRL) has successfully dropped three AGM-158 Joint Attack Surface Standoff Missiles (JASSM) from its internal weapons bay for the first time. While the bomber is capable of carrying 12 of the cruise missiles on its wing pylons, the inclusion of the Conventional Rotary Launcher now enables it to hold a further eight internally, a payload increase of 60%. Next in store for the launcher is more of the same testing but with the inclusion of live weapons followed by final validation of the CLR system’s full capability. July 22/16: A B-52 has dropped the Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM) precision-guided bomb from its internal bomb bay for the first time. The test was carried out to certify the new Conventional Rotary Launcher being developed for the legacy bomber. Following the successful drop, testers will now continue with dropping the Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile, Miniature Air Launched Decoy, and the MALD Jammer from the launcher. April 20/16: Pratt & Whitney has maintained that they can develop a TF33 upgrade package that will keep Boeing’s B-52 bomber flying until the 2040s. The eight engine bomber has kept the same TF33 engine since its induction in 1952, but high fuel consumption had the USAF looking at potential re-engine options. With oil prices dropping dramatically, the program was dropped; but P&W are still looking at improvements for the TF33 that will keep it on-wing, and allow the air force to reduce their maintenance costs. February 22/16: The USAF has earmarked $491 million over five years for the upgrade of B-52H radars. The modernization plan will replace the outdated Northrop Grumman AN/APQ-166 mechanically scanned array radar with further funds to be made available post-2021. The USAF strategy for the program has yet to be released, but it is likely that the plan will be to modify existing radar technologies and components to suit the B-52H, instead of developing something new, to increase reliability and durability of the radar. January 15/16: Six B-52s have now been equipped with JDAM capabilities after a series of modifications by Boeing for the USAF. Installation of upgraded internal weapons bay launchers will allow for the bomber to launch eight Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM) at one time from the internal bay. Furthermore, the launchers can be easily transferred between aircraft, and will allow the planes to also carry Joint Air-to-Surface Stand Off Missiles (JASSMs) and Miniature Air Launched Decoys (MALDs), increasing their operational capabilities. September 22/15: The US Air Force has begun removing nuclear weapons capability from 42 B-52H Stratofortresses, in line with regulations set out under the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), signed in April 2010. Thirty operational and a dozen mothballed Stratofortresses will be converted to solely conventional bombers, with work having already begun to this effect and due for completion by 2017. Both Russia and the US have until February 2018 to comply with the treaty’s terms. Despite the conversion, planned work to upgrade the fleet of B-52H bombers will form part of a modernization effort to keep nuclear-capable B-2 and B-52s flying into the 2030s and 2040s respectively, with this forecast by the GAO [p. 11] back in July to value $24.4 billion over the FY2015-2024 period. Sept 29/10: Boeing in Wichita, KS receives a sole-source indefinite-delivery/ indefinite-quantity contract to support the USAF’s B-52H fleet, including modernization work. It could be worth up to $11.9 billion over an 8-year period, but no funds have been committed yet by the ASC/WWVK at Wright Patterson Air Force Base, OH. “Individual delivery orders will be issued through three contracting activities” (FA8628-10-D-1000). See also: Boeing. Additional Readings USAF Factsheets – B-52H Stratofortress Air Force Technology – B-52H Stratofortress Long-Range Multirole Bomber, USA DoD Buzz (Oct 7/10) – Why the B-52 Got $11.9 Billion ARINC (March 31/10) – ARINC Will Deploy Its Airborne SMARRT System for Battlefield Awareness at JEFX 2010 Exercises . Good example of the types of ongoing improvements under consideration. DID – CONECT: B-52H Receiving a Communications Upgrade. DID (Jan 13/10) – Boeing Wins $750M to Support the B-52H Fleet. This is ESP. DID (July 10/06) – MUSTANG Aims to Check-Out B-52s Faster DID (June 29/06) – $150M to Integrate New Weapons on the USA’s B-52 Bombers (updated). This is SWING. Mechanical Engineering – CIME (Jan 1/90) – The B-52 – engineered to endure View the full article

Some FbF are so good ... you have to bring them back every few years. After a couple of week's FbF on other subjects, let's catch up with the Battle Off Samar. This time the USS HEERMANN (DD-532). HEERMANN screened transports and landing ships safely to the beaches of Leyte and then joined Rear Admiral Thomas L. Sprague's Escort Carrier Task Group 77.4 which was made up of three escort carrier task units, known as the three "Taffies" because of their radio call signs: "Taffy 1", "Taffy 2", and "Taffy 3". Destroyers HOEL and JOHNSTON joined her in screening Rear Admiral Clifton A. F. Sprague's unit, "Taffy 3" which also included his flagship FANSHAW BAY (CVE-70) and three other escort carriers. Dawn of October 25, 1944 found Taffy 3 east of Samar steaming north as the Northern Air Support Group. Taffy 2 was in the central position patrolling off the entrance to Leyte Gulf, and Taffy 1 covered the Southern approaches to the Gulf some 130 miles to the southeast of HEERMANN. At 0645 Taffy 3's lookouts observed antiaircraft fire to the northward and with 13 minutes later were under heavy fire from Vice Admiral Takeo Kurita's powerful Centre Force of four battleships, 6 heavy cruisers, 2 light cruisers, and 11 destroyers. The battle off Samar was thus joined. The only chance for survival of the little group of light American ships lay in slowing the advance of the enemy warships while withdrawing toward Leyte Gulf and hoped-for assistance. The carriers promptly launched their planes to attack the Japanese vessels, and the escorts promptly set to work generating smoke to hide the American ships. HEERMANN, in a position of comparative safety on the disengaged side of the carriers at the start of the fight, steamed into the action at flank speed through the formation of "baby flattops" who, after launching their last planes, formed a rough circle as they turned toward Leyte Gulf. Since smoke and intermittent rain squalls had reduced visibility to less than 100 yards, it took alert and skillful seamanship to avoid colliding with friendly ships during the dash to battle. She backed emergency full to avoid destroyer escort SAMUEL B. ROBERTS and repeated the maneuver to miss destroyer HOEL as HEERMANN formed column on the screen flagship in preparation for a torpedo attack. As she began the run, dye from enemy shells daubed the water nearby with circles of brilliant red, yellow, and green. HEERMANN replied to this challenge by pumping her 5-inch shells at one heavy cruiser, CHIKUMA, as she directed seven torpedoes at another, HAGURO. When these "fish" had left their tubes, HEERMANN changed course to engage a column of four battleships whose shells began churning the water nearby. She trained her guns on the battleship KONGO, the column's leader. Then she quickly closed HARUNA, the target of her of her last three torpedoes, which were launched from only 4,400 yards. Believing that one of the "fish" had hit the battleship, she nimbly dodged the salvoes which splashed in her wake as she retired. Japanese records claim that the battleship successfully evaded all of HEERMANN's torpedoes, but they were slowed down in their pursuit of the American carriers. The giant, YAMATO, with her monstrous 18.1-inch guns, was even force out of the action altogether when, caught between two spreads, she reversed course for almost 10 minutes to escape being hit. HEERMANN sped to the starboard quarter of the carrier formation to lay more concealing smoke and then charged back into the fight a few minutes later, placing herself boldly between the escort carriers and the column of four enemy heavy cruisers. Here she engaged Japanese cruiser CHIKUMA in a duel which seriously damaged both ships. A series of 8-inch hits flooded the forward part of the plucky destroyer, pulling her bow down so far that her anchors were dragging in the water. One of her guns was knocked out but the others continued to pour a deadly stream of 5-inch shells at the cruiser, which also came under heavy air attack during the engagement. The combined effect of HEERMANN's guns and the bombs, torpedoes, and strafing from carrier-based planes was too much for CHIKUMA who tried to withdraw but sank during her fight. As CHIKUMA turned away, heavy cruiser TONE turned her guns on HEERMANN who replied shell for shell until she reached a position suitable to resume laying smoke for the carriers. At this point planes from Admiral Stump's "Taffy 2" swooped in to sting TONE so severely that she too broke off action and fled. The courageous attacks of the destroyers and aircraft thus saved the outgunned Taffy 3. Temporary battle-damage repairs were applied at Kossol Passage. From there, she was sent to Mare Island, California for a much-needed overhaul. She would not return to the Western Pacific until January 1945. It's not the size of the ship in the fight ..... View the full article

There are some DivThu that simply write themselves … and there are some Thursdays that I simply don’t know what to post because there is so much … often from the same place. This DivThu let’s turn our attention to USNA. Some of you may think I’m going to get involved with the 1/C MIDN who got a bit over his skis on twitter, but RedState covered it in great detail. Read it all here - but focus on the comments and actions of uniformed leadership and the interplay of football. It speaks loudly how much USNA has brought inside its lifelines all the worst aspects of civilian universities from the warping effects of alumni sports fetishes to fear of the Woke Red Guards. I’m not going to cover that. No, I’ve got something better that has a connection to both as well. You don’t have to be a USNA graduate to know about the Tecumseh tradition. Well, once tradition. Behold! I have had multiple people reach out to me on this since mid-Summer, but now that football season is upon us – the issue is breaking above the background noise. I warned years ago that, as people are policy, that the USNA’s desire to compete on the US News and other college ranking self-licking ice cream cones, that they were going to hire people who are focused on the same things their colleague in civilian universities focus on and do … which may not fully align with what the US taxpayer thinks it has service academies for. Sure enough, when you dig through the public and private exchanges on the topic, it becomes clear what is going on. You have a group of civilian professors who are pushing this issue along with a select group of Woke Youth Brigades to give them cover. Professors using students as shield and sockpuppets is one of oldest radical tactical moves in the book. I won’t name them, because they are the scorpion to USNA’s frog; this is their nature. USNA invited them for the ride, they are only acting as to their nature. Heck, in one interview, one of the professors involved stated, “My initial interests were centered solely on questions of race and identity formation. But I realized that I had an opportunity to tell an important story about maritime communities in the Caribbean often forgotten in histories of the plantation complex and postemancipation labor struggles.” Of course, such a person would look for some way to manifest her interests in the bare and rocky soil of Annapolis. I don’t fault such a person. They are what they are. What I find most interesting is the utter and complete terror uniformed senior leaders have when faced with such a challenge. These are people who have faced the dangers of combat and a career in the military … and yet when faced by the Woke Brigades, they turn in to things we used to tut-tut about when we read about them in communist countries. You can see them trying to find a compromise, but they simply do not understand their opponent. You cannot make them happy. They demand that you agree with 100% of their opinion – and that is just that, and opinion – but they will be content with your submission. Sadly, many others have jumped on the bandwagon hoping that by doing so, they won't be denounced. Why sad? Many of these are historians. They know history and its patterns. They know what this is ... and yet they play along with the script. They will join the surrender, but don't want to believe the battle is not over. The Woke Brigades will take this hill you surrendered without much complaint, and then they will move to another. Then another. It will not stop. We have all seen this before. They can smell your weakness. Your attempt to compromise will simply be used as a lever against you. Again … BEHOLD! Colleagues, I am compelled to bring a matter to your attention and ask for your support. Please indulge me as I bring two email threads together on an important initiative and then make a case for your patient support. 1) An email thread and attachment from Prof XXXXXX regarding the misnaming of Tamanend to Tecumseh and an articulate basis for why it should be corrected. I fully support correctly identifying that man and great leader, as well as who and what he represents. In that email thread I make the case that rather than a unilateral decision by leadership our best case to accomplish our mission of developing leaders and provide a tangible example of change relative the the nation's unrest on racism here on the yard is to put this in the hands of the Brigade Midshipman leadership with coordinated support and guidance, and take the risk that they will choose to do the right thing. This is still a work in progress; I meet with the Commandant of Midshipmen today. It will be a topic of discussion with the SLT today as well. Work in progress. 2) An email thread below with attachments from Jodel on an exchange regarding "taking down" the statue of Tecumseh, including crass disparagement of faculty. A close reading indicates the ability to make a compelling argument to at least one respondent amidst messy discourse but also the challenge and reaction to change from the outside (in this case perceived as faculty vs Midshipmen). The continuing conversation on Jodel becomes more and more about pushback against it being a faculty initiative. My request. If you support the idea of having Tamanend correctly identified by his correct name, please do not take lead on this issue as faculty. You have a great role to play, a critical one, an essential one in asking the right questions and providing advice to Midshipmen to evaluate the issue with facts and then encouraging them to act with moral conscience. In the same way that as XXXXXX I am not the main effort and my role is to provide XXXXXX, yours is to support and develop these leaders. To make this your initiative is to invite a fight, opposition and reinforce the narrative that change of this type comes only from on high and at someone else's expense (School pride, traditions, revered symbols). It's not that you can't get it done, it's just that there is a way to potentially achieve a greater good. Instead I ask you to be informed (i.e. Read XXXXXX's article) and be ready to ask good questions if the issue is already broached or continues to come up. Please do not preach. Fact - No one wants to take the statue down. - Tamanend, misnamed Tecumseh @1940 by Midshipmen has become a term of endearment, but offends native Americans and misrepresents the renowned leader of the Delaware and an ally of early colonists. Questions- Shouldn't the Brigade know who Tamanend really was and decide for itself who they want to revere and refer to him as? The broader issue - In times like these, would not the Brigade like to figure out how to to (sic) correctly apply racial fairness for itself? Is it an insult to refer to him as Tecumseh? Would you knowingly offend a tribe of allies or insult their leader in a warfighting coalition environment? Is this completely destroying a school tradition? Do we have to rename T-Court? (No to both). Didn't the OG (original gangster if you'll permit the Boomer colloquialism) Midshipmen get it right? Is it wrong to get back to the original truth of why he was chosen and placed there? If you change a school tradition back to its original school tradition, have you really destroyed a school tradition? Can you not honor the man and leader Tamanend in conjunction with the tradition? For those of you who may be opposed to the change, I respect that for whatever the many reasons may be. A year ago this proposal was met with indifference, including my own. And I personally have not fully grasped the issue of warpaint as a Marine who appreciates and admires the great American Indian warriors and refers to putting on my own face camouflage as warpaint, as do many athletes in preparation for competition. But I am willing to go there, and listen as well as change when faced with the right circumstances. I and for your patience and trust that if we teach our Mids how to think, we will not need to tell them what to think or do their thinking for them. Most importantly, if we allow them to own the conversation and decision, then we have taught them what change (perhaps only incremental or even more) looks like by their own hand. I am pulling out all the names here as I have zero interest in shaming anyone in public. Those who know, know, and I have had people sending me a lot more than I am published here from civilians, to MIDN to uniformed members who received forwards of forwards of forwards. Good people are in tough jobs trying to address issues they are not trained to deal with, have experience dealing with, on socio-political seas that are foreign to them and their professional experience. As far as lessons being learned, from the feedback I’ve seen, I don’t think it is quite what senior uniformed leaders think. These MIDN are smart, and they grew up under the already existing commissariat. They see the fear. They see. I’m not an alumni of USNA, so I haven’t covered all the scraping and erasing of names and monuments that has been going on there the last half year – but this topic was worth the trouble. View the full article

Americas The US Army will suspend use of its new fitness test as a requirement for graduation from training programs because of COVID concerns. A new version of the six-event Army Combat Fitness Test went into effect last week. The Army will encourages taking and passing the strength and fitness test, but the requirement to successfully complete it will be delayed until at least September 2021, the end of the fiscal year. Suspension of the use of the test reportedly comes as the Army acknowledged constraints on training and testing due to the quarantining, social distancing and other protections required during COVID-19 pandemic. Boeing won a maximum $149.6 million delivery order for the KC-46 Commercial Common Program consumable parts. The KC-46 Pegasus is a military refueling and strategic military transport aircraft. The Air Force intends to procure 179 Pegasus aircraft by 2027. The first four KC-46 aircraft were delivered to McConnell AFB, KS, in January 2019. The KC-46A places the boom operator on the flight deck, viewing receivers through a camera-driven display called the Remote Vision System (RVS). Work will take place in Missouri. Estimated completion date is October 7, 2023. Middle East & Africa Qatar has submitted a formal request to the United States to buy stealthy F-35 fighter jets, three people familiar with the deal said, in a deal that if pursued could strain US ties with Saudi Arabia and Israel, Reuters reports. The request for the Lockheed Martin Co jets was submitted by the Persian Gulf state in recent weeks, the people said. A US State Department spokesman said, “As a matter of policy, the United States does not confirm or comment on proposed defense sales or transfers until they are formally notified to Congress.” Keen to counter Iran in the region, the US helps to arm allies including Qatar, host to the largest US military facility in the Middle East, and home to 8,000 US service members and Department of Defense civilian employees. Europe HMS Queen Elizabeth came under a simulated missile attack as part of a major exercise. Hawk jets and other aircraft, some operated by Cobham, have been simulating air attacks against the Carrier Battle Group. Typically, Hawk jets support Dassault Falcon 20DC aircraft acting as long-range anti-ship bombers. The Falcons are flown by Cobham Aviation Services. HMS Queen Elizabeth and her Strike Group are currently exercising alongside allied nations in the North Sea, as part of NATO’s largest annual exercise, Joint Warrior. Asia-Pacific PKL Services won a $13.8 million price modification to continue providing military aircraft F15 SG maintenance and operations training. The contract provides for the Republic of Singapore Air Force training on F15 aircraft, and includes both maintenance and operations on the F15 aircraft. The F-15 has a wingspan of 42 feet 9.75 inches (13.05 m) and a length of 63 feet 9 inches (19.43 m). The single-seat air-superiority version is armed with a 20-millimeter rotary cannon and an array of short-range and medium-range air-to-air missiles. The RSAF’s F-15SG is an all-weather multi-role fighter designed to achieve air superiority over the battlefield. It is one of the most advanced and technologically sophisticated variant of the F-15 aircraft built to date. Work will take place in Idaho and estimated completion date is September 30, 2022. The Indian Union Cabinet, chaired by Prime Minister Narendra Modi, has given its approval for signing a Memorandum of Cooperation (MoC) in the field of cybersecurity between India and Japan. The MoC will enhance cooperation in areas of mutual interest, which in­clude inter-alia, capacity building in the area of cyberspace; protection of critical infrastructure; cooperation in emerging technologies; sharing information on cybersecurity threats/incidents and malicious cyber activities, as well as best prac­tices to counter them; Developing joint mechanisms for practical cooperation to mitigate cyber threats to the security of Information Communication Technology (ICT) infrastructure etc. Today’s Video Watch: F-15 Eagle – the American hunter View the full article

F-15C over DC (click to view full) “Array of Aging American Aircraft Attracting Attention” discusses the issues that accompany an air force whose fighters have an average age of over 23.5 years – vs. an average of 8.5 years in 1967. One of the most obvious consequences is the potential for fleet groundings due to unforseen structural issues caused by time and fatigue. That very fear is responsible for the #1 priority placed on bringing new KC-X aerial tankers into the fleet to complement the USA’s 1960s-era KC-135 Stratotankers. It can also affect the fighter fleet more directly. Following the crash of a Missouri Air National Guard F-15C aircraft Nov 2/07 (see crash simulation), the US Air Force suspended non-mission critical F-15 flight operations on Nov 3/07. While the cause of that accident is still under investigation, preliminary findings indicate that a structural failure during flight may have been responsible. In response, Japan suspended its own F-15 flights, which left them in a bit of a bind – even as Israel’s F-15s joined them on the tarmac. As the effects continue to spread and the USAF and others continue to comment on this situation, DID continues to expand its coverage of this bellwether event. A conditional restoration of the American F-15A-D fleet to flight status was soon overturned by the re-grounding of that fleet as a result of the report’s conclusions – a status that remains only been partially lifted. Meanwhile, the accident report has been released (compete with video dramatization) and the status of the remaining aircraft will have significant implications for the USAF’s future F-15 fleet size. Not to mention its other procurement programs. Then, too, this is America. Now there’s a lawsuit. F-15E, Afghanistan (click to view full) The F-15A reached initial operational capability for the US Air Force in September 1975, and approximately 670 F-15s remain in the USAF’s inventory. Current F-15 flying locations include bases in the continental United States, Alaska, England, Hawaii, Japan and the Middle East, and the aircraft are active on the Iraqi and Afghan fronts. The Missouri Air National Guard F-15C that crashed was built in 1980. Lt. Gen. Gary L. North, US CENTCOM Combined Forces Air Component commander, is maintaining the newer F-15E Strike Eagles on ground alert, to be used if required. Otherwise, he says he will accomplish all assigned missions using a variety of fighter, attack and bomber aircraft, and unmanned aerial vehicles. Lt. Gen. North added that: “I worry about the health of our aging fleet and how sometimes it is not well understood by those our Airmen protect… The investigation will get to the cause of the accident.” USAF Chief of Staff Michael Moseley was even more specific in an Oct 30/07 interview with GovExec.com: “The F-15s and F-16s were designed and built in the late ’60s and ’70s. Some of them were produced up until the early ’80s. But they’ve led a pretty hard life of 17 years of combat. So you have to replace them with something, because we were continuing to restrict the airplanes. In the F-15 case, we’ve got the airplane restricted to 1.5 Mach. It was designed to be a 2.5 Mach airplane. We’ve got it limited on maneuvering restrictions because we’ve had tail cracks, fuselage cracks, cracks in the wings. The problem with that is – and Mike Wynne uses this analogy – it’s almost like going to the Indy 500 race practicing all the way up until Memorial Day at 60 miles an hour, and then on game day, accelerating the car out to 200 miles an hour. It’s not the time to be doing that on game day. So in our training models and in our scenarios, we’re limiting these airplanes because they’re restricted and getting old. So there’s two parts to the recapitalization of the fighter inventory. The first part is the existing stuff is old and it’s getting broke, and it’s getting harder to get it out of depot on time. And our availability rates and our in-commission rates are going down. The ability to generate the sorties on those old airplanes is in the wrong direction.” And Flight International: “A USAF F-15 crashed in the Gulf of Mexico in 2002 when it broke up after the leading edge of its left vertical stabiliser detached in a high-speed dive to Mach 1.97. The pilot was killed. The USAF says it began replacing the leading edge and upper aft portion of the vertical stabilisers during depot overhaul and has so far completed 463 of its 664 aircraft. The F-15 involved in the Missouri accident had its vertical stabilisers repaired in August 2003, the service says.” Further investigation focused on the plane’s longerons, which connect the aircraft’s metal ‘skin’ to the frame, and run along the length and side of the aircraft. Both the Accident Investigation Board and Boeing simulations have indicated them as a possible source of catastrophic failure; indeed, DID had wondered why structural failure was suspected immediately, and it with that revelation it began to make sense. As DID explained at the time, if one or more of those longerons had failed, the stresses on the airframe could have folded or broken the plane in half – a very unusual form of accident. Eventually, the publication of the formal report confirmed that hypothesis: “The one longeron, already not up to design specifications, cracked apart under the stress of a 7G turn, the colonel said. This led to the other longerons failing as well, which then caused the cockpit to separate from the rest of the fuselage. The pilot was able to eject, but suffered a broken arm when the canopy snapped off.” F-4EJ “Kai(zen)” (click to view full) Nor is this problem confined to the USA – or even to the here and now. The Chinese government’s Xinhua agency reports that Japan has also grounded its F-15 fleet. Japan’s F-15Js were built locally under license, on a more recent production schedule, but their oldest planes do date back to 1980. This is a precautionary measure until more is known. Since Japan’s F-16-derived F-2 fighters are also grounded in the wake of a recent crash at Nagoya, this leaves 1960s era F-4EJ ‘Kai’ Phantom IIs as Japan’s interceptor and fighter patrol fleet for the time being. Israel confirmed to Flight International that it had also grounded its 70 F-15A-D air superiority aircraft, which are undergoing multi-role conversions, and its F-15I Strike Eagles. The Strike Eagles were later removed from the USA’s concern list, but its F-15 A-D fleet is an important component of Israeli air defenses alongside its larger F-16 fleet. Gen. John D.W. Corley, the commander of US Air Combat Command, was not encouraged by the results of the report, and of the in-depth fleet inspections that led to 40% of the Eagle fleet remaining on the ground over 3 months after the investigation: “The difficulty is that issues have been found with F-15s built between 1978 and 1985, across A through D models at several bases, so no one source of the problem can be isolated… This isn’t just about one pilot in one aircraft with one bad part… I have a fleet that is 100 percent fatigued, and 40 percent of that has bad parts. The long-term future of the F-15 is in question… We don’t have a full and healthy fleet, so we’ve gotten behind on training missions, instructor certifications, classes and exercises… We’re going over each and every aircraft to make a determination. We will take some F-15s out of the inventory. It just doesn’t make sense to spend the time and money if it won’t be worth it for some aircraft.” Updates F-15E, P-51, F-22A (click to view full) October 9/20: Singapore PKL Services won a $13.8 million price modification to continue providing military aircraft F15 SG maintenance and operations training. The contract provides for the Republic of Singapore Air Force training on F15 aircraft, and includes both maintenance and operations on the F15 aircraft. The F-15 has a wingspan of 42 feet 9.75 inches (13.05 m) and a length of 63 feet 9 inches (19.43 m). The single-seat air-superiority version is armed with a 20-millimeter rotary cannon and an array of short-range and medium-range air-to-air missiles. The RSAF’s F-15SG is an all-weather multi-role fighter designed to achieve air superiority over the battlefield. It is one of the most advanced and technologically sophisticated variant of the F-15 aircraft built to date. Work will take place in Idaho and estimated completion date is September 30, 2022. August 27/20: Aerial Targets Program PAE Aviation and Technical Services won a $19.7 million contract modification for the Aerial Targets Program. The contract modification provides for the exercise of an option for an additional year of service under the multiple year contract which directly supports live-fire weapon system testing and enables the 53rd Weapons Evaluation Group to perform developmental and operational weapons testing for all air-to-air missiles for F-15, F-16, F-22, and F-35 aircraft. Work will take place at Tyndall Air Force Base, Florida; and Holloman Air Force Base, New Mexico. Expected completion date is September 30, 2021. August 24/20: Repair And Service Honeywell International won a $20.8 million deal for the repair of the advanced display core processor (ADCP) and digital mapping service (DMS) in F-15Es. The Boeing F-15E dual-role fighter is an advanced long-range interdiction fighter and tactical aircraft. The F-15E is the latest version of the Eagle, a Mach 2.5-class twin-engine fighter. More than 1,500 F-15s are in service worldwide with the US Air Force, US Air National Guard and the air forces of Israel, Japan and Saudi Arabia, including over 220 F-15E fighters. Work will take place in Phoenix, Arizona. Estimated completion date is August 19, 2025. August 4/20: Replacement? The US Air Force may replace its 218 F-15Es with F-15EXs, which could expand the new program to over 400 aircraft, according to service documents justifying the sole-source contract to Boeing. In its F-15EX Justification and Approval (J&A) document, which was dated March 2018 but only published this month, the flying branch said while the F-15EX acquisition program is “initially” intended to refresh the aging F-15C/D, a decision to similarly replace the F-15E Strike Eagle fleet with the EX “has not been made, but remains an option.” The documents also disclosed that Boeing will most likely build 144 F-15EX fighters to replace the 234 F-15C/Ds that are currently in USAF service. It also quoted the F-15 system program office as saying the EX will enjoy “90-95 percent commonality” with the F-15QA that Qatar has ordered. Deliveries of the F-15QA will commence soon. It further justified the purchase by stating that it takes approximately “six months or less to transition from the F-15C/D to the F-15EX.” And transitioning from “F-15s to the F-35 (or any other airframe) will take approximately 18 months for an Active-duty squadron and 36 months for an Air National Guard squadron.” July 15/20: F-15EX Boeing won a $22.9 billion deal for the F-15EX system. The delivery order provides for design, development, integration, manufacturing, test, verification, certification, delivery, sustainment and modification of F-15EX aircraft, as well as spares, support equipment, training materials, technical data and technical support. The contract award is a big win for Boeing and gives a second life for the F-15 production line in St. Louis, Mo. After years of urging the Air Force to consider an advanced version of the F-15 as a complementary capability to Lockheed Martin’s F-35, Boeing found an ally in the Defense Department’s Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation office, which in 2019 forced the service to purchase F-15EX planes in order to build capacity. Work will take place in St. Louis, Missouri and at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida. Expected completion date is December 31, 2023. April 17/20: EW Testing The US Air Force is progressing electronic warfare (EW) testing of the Eagle Passive/Active Warning and Survivability System upgrade for the Boeing F-15 combat aircraft. An F-15E Strike Eagle fitted with the BAE Systems EPAWSS electronic defensive aids system began the first phase of critical EW testing at the Benefield Anechoic Facility on Edwards Air Force Base, California, in May 2019. Testing is currently continuing at the same facility, the air force said. “The ongoing tests are required to collect the data to establish the integration of the EPAWSS radar and missile warning capabilities and the electronic countermeasures onto the F-15E platform,” Ed Sabat, Project Development Lead and Civilian Director of Operations with the 772nd Test Squadron was quoted as saying. April 16/20: Maiden Flight in Qatar Boeing announced that it has successfully completed the first flight of the F-15QA fighter during a 90-minute mission from the Lambert International Airport in St. Louis. The company developed the F-15QA for the Qatar Emiri Air Force. “This successful first flight is an important step in providing the QEAF an aircraft with best-in-class range and payload,” said Prat Kumar, Boeing vice president and F-15 program manager. The F-15QA includes fly-by-wire flight controls, a digital cockpit, modernized sensors, radar and a electronic warfare capabilities — and the world’s fastest mission computer. April 8/20: Qatar Boeing won a $68 million contract action for the F-15 Qatar program. The deal supports the Foreign Military Sales requirement for the Qatar Emiri Air Force. It also provides maintenance and logistics support for aircraft and training devices conducting pre-delivery training. In August 2019, Boeing was awarded a $500 million contract to provide aircrew and maintenance training for the Qatari Emiri Air Forces fleet of 36 F-15QAs. Qatar had signed a $12 billion deal with the US government for 36 F-15QAs in June 2017 in a deal widely seen to save the F-15 product line. The F-15QA is similar to Saudi Arabias F-15SA Advanced Eagle, which includes Raytheons APG-63(V)3 AESA radar, fly-by-wire control systems and 11 under-wing weapons stations. Work will take place in St. Louis, Missouri. Work its expected to be completed by December 21, 2021. April 7/20: Engine Emergency An F-15E on a combat mission over the Middle East encountered a rare emergency on both engines in January but the crew was able to fly the aircraft to an emergency divert location. Jonathan Kipp, weapons system officer, from the 494th Expeditionary Fighter Squadron led a two-ship of F-15Es on a close air support mission. Four hours into the flight, the crew experienced problems. The datalink and air-to-air distance measuring equipment that improve situational awareness on their wingman were both inoperative. Finally, coalition ground control radar was temporarily down, meaning they were not getting updates on where other aircraft were in the area. This left them with only one way to locate their wingman, their radar. April 3/20: MTC Services Boeing won an $11.1 million contract modification for F-15C and F-15E Mission Training Centers (MTC) services on contractor furnished, high-fidelity simulation equipment. Contractor will provide the simulation capability to train pilots and weapons system operators for F-15C and F-15E aircraft platforms. Air Force Life Cycle Management Center, Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio, is the contracting activity.The F-15 Eagle has been the US Air Force’s primary fighter jet aircraft and intercept platform for decades. The Eagle’s air superiority is achieved through a mixture of unprecedented maneuverability and acceleration, range, weapons and avionics. Work will take place at Seymour Johnson Air Force Base, North Carolina; Mountain Home, Idaho; Langley, Virginia; Kadena Air Base, Japan; and Royal Air Force, Lakenheath, England, and is expected to be completed by December 31 2020. April 2/20: Cartridge Actuated Devices/Propellant Actuated Devices The US Air Force Life Cycle awarded a $91 million contract to Universal Propulsion for multiple national stock numbers for Cartridge Actuated Devices/Propellant Actuated Devices. The deal provides for use in the egress systems of Air Force B-1, B-2, F-22, F-117, QF-16, and U-2 aircraft; Air Force, Navy, and Foreign Military Sales C-17, F-15, F-5, QF-4, T-37 and T-38 aircraft, and National Aeronautics and Space Administration aircraft. Universal Propulsion designs and manufactures aircraft ejection systems. The Company products include air crew escape systems, sequencing systems, ejection seats and related components. Aircraft Interior Products Propulsion Systems serves customers worldwide. The contract involves foreign military sales to Bahrain, Chile, Greece, Jordan, Mexico, Morocco, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, Tunisia and Turkey. Work will take place in Fairfield, California. Expected completion will be by March 1, 2027. February 27/20: Mission Planning Software Development Tapestry Solutions won a $29.4 million award for the F-15 mission planning software development and maintenance. The deal provides for the F15 software development of the v6.1 Mission Planning Environment and supports the F-15 Organizational Flight Program Suite 9.1 through sustainment of the previously-fielded v5.0 Mission Planning Environment for the Air Force and foreign country specific releases for the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) client nations as well as the in-test v6.0 Mission Planning Environment. The Foreign Military Sales effort allows continued support to incorporate requirements to provide country specific versions of Air Force Mission Planning Environment updates in accordance with each country specific FMS Letters of Acceptance between the US government and the foreign government. The Mission Planning Environment updates will be fielded outside the continental US to the FMS costumers with current Letters of Acceptance in place with the U.S. government. Work will take place in Missouri. Estimated completion date is July 31, 2023. February 3/20: ADCP II Boeing won a $84.1 million contract modification for the F-15 Advanced Display Core Processor (ADCP) II Low-Rate Initial Production 4. The modification exercises an option that provides the production and integration of the ADCP II boxes and related equipment into the F-15 platform. The ADCP II can process 87 billion instructions per second of computing throughput, Boeing said, creating faster and more reliable mission processing capability for pilots and crews. The increased processing capability is critical to new advanced capabilities such as Eagle Passive/Active Warning Survivability System, long range infrared search and track capability, high speed radar communications and future software suite upgrades. Work will take place in St. Louis, Missouri and estimated completion date is July 22, 2022. January 14/20 Saudi Arabia Advanced Electronics Co. won a $17 million contract modification for the Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF) F-15SA Cyber Protection System (CPS) and Related Facilities program. This modification provides for three years of in-Kingdom Contractor Logistics Support (CLS) for the CPS. The scope of this contract effort will include the extension of existing CLS support for three additional years, as well as related mobilization, de-mobilization, transportation and housing expenses for CLS personnel. The contract is a foreign military sales acquisition through the US and Saudi Arabia, authorized in 2015 as part of an agreement that also authorized the sale and upgrade of several F-15 variant aircraft to the kingdom. Advanced Electronics is a Riyadh-based electronics research and manufacturing firm, specialized in advanced electronics research for defense and communication. It was established in 1988 under the directives of the government of Saudi Arabia. The company will perform work at RSAF facilities in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Expected completion date is May 31, 2022. December 24/19: Saudi Arabia Advanced Electronics won a $13.7 million contract modification for the Royal Saudi Air Force F-15SA Cyber Protection System and related facilities program. The modification provides for Build 2 of the Cyber Protection System. The scope of the deal effort will include the deployment of a Cyber Security Operations Center at Prince Sultan Air Base, the establishment of End Point Security (data-at-rest encryption using MS BitLocker), and additional System Integration Lab Instances. FMS case SR-D-SAO is for the total package of acquisition and fielding of 84 F-15A aircraft; the upgrade of 70 F-15SA aircraft to the F-154SA configuration; the procurement of associated equipment, weapons, and spares; and the construction, refurbishment and infrastructure improvements of support facilities for the F-15SA in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The first of 152 Boeing F-15SA (Saudi Advanced) Eagle fighters arrived in the Kingdom on December 13, 2016. The F-15SA is equipped 11 wing weapon stations, two more than the F-15S, extending its 13 tonne weapon payload capability. Upgraded avionics include a digital glass cockpit, fly-by-wire controls, a BAE Systems Digital Electronic Warfare System (DEWS), Joint Helmet Mounted Cueing Systems, a Raytheon APG-63(V)3 Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar, Link-16 Multifunctional Information Distribution System and AN/AAS-42 Infrared Search and Track Systems. Work under the Foreign Military Sale will take place at Royal Saudi Arabian Air Force Facilities in Saudi Arabia. Estimated completion will be on December 31, 2020. November 7/19: Special Purpose Cable Assemblies Aptiv Services won a $28.4 million contract for F-15 aircraft electrical special purpose cable assemblies. Using military service is the US Air Force. The F-15 Eagle has been the US Air Force’s primary fighter jet aircraft and intercept platform for decades. The aircraft has electronic systems and weaponry to detect, acquire, track and attack enemy aircraft while operating in friendly or enemy-controlled airspace. The weapons and flight control systems are designed so one person can safely and effectively perform air-to-air combat. Aptiv Services US, LLC designs and engineers a variety of automotive systems and components. The Company manufactures fuel cells, entertainment systems, sensors, powertrain systems, driver interfaces, and security devices. The company will perform work in California. Estimated performance completion date is November 5, 2024. October 31/19: Japan The US State Department approved a possible Foreign Military Sale to Japan for the upgrade of up to ninety-eight F-15J aircraft to a Japanese Super Interceptor (JSI) configuration for an estimated cost of $4.5 billion. The F-15J is the Japanese version of the McDonnell Douglas F-15C and is manufactured under license by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries. McDonnell Douglas and the F-15 product line were purchased by Boeing in 1997. As part of the modernization package, the government of Japan is asking for 103 Raytheon APG-82(v)1 active electronically scanned array radars; 116 Boeing Advanced Display Core Processor II mission system computers; and 101 BAE Systems ALQ-239 digital electronic warfare systems to be installed in the F-15J fleet. Ocobter 16/19: Singapore’s Training Program Turns 10 Singapore’s F-15 fighter jet training program in USA’s Idaho turns 10 years old, Defense News reports. In May 2009, the Republic of Singapore Air Force (RSAF) took delivery of its first F-15SG and, shortly after, inaugurated a detachment based in Idaho, United States. Its aim was to build a critical mass of pilots and engineers capable of flying and maintaining the fourth-generation fighter jet. A decade later, the Peace Carvin Five detachment at Mountain Home Air Force Base has come a long way, validating the capabilities of a fully-fledged fleet and winning awards at high-level multilateral exercises. Singapore commemorated 10 years of its Boeing F-15 training program in the US during an October 11 ceremony, at which officials unveiled new artwork painted on one of the jets. The ceremony was held at Mountain Home Air Force Base in Idaho where the Republic of Singapore Air Force, or RSAF, maintains the Peace Carvin V F-15SG detachment. September 26/19: EPAWSS The US Air Force awarded Boeing a $22.7 million modification for F-15C and F-15E Mission Training Center. The contract modification is for the implementation of Suite 9.1/Eagle Passive Active Warning Survivability System (EPAWSS) into F-15C and F-15E MTCs in order to update F-15 MTCs with Suite 9.1 and add EPAWSS capabilities to the F-15E MTC simulators. The Eagle Passive Active Warning Survivability System provides the US Air Force F-15 fleet with advanced electronic warfare technology to maximize mission effectiveness and survivability. The F-15 is an all-weather, day and night, tactical fighter aircraft designed to gain and maintain control over the battlefield. The F-15C aircraft perform air-to-air missions and are part of the Air Superiority portfolio. The purpose of the Air Superiority portfolio is to gain and maintain air dominance across all military operations and threat environments. The F-15 electronic warfare system used 1970s technology which has limited capability to detect, locate, deny, degrade, and disrupt modern and advanced enemy threats. Using the F-15C aircraft without Eagle Passive Active Warning Survivability System will limit the warfighter’s ability to detect and identify air and ground threats, employ counter-measures, and jam enemy radar signals. Boeing will perform work at Seymour Johnson Air Force Base, Mountain Home Air Force Base and Nellis Air Force Base as well as Bases in the UK and Japan. Work will be finished by September 23, 2021. August 30/19: Qatar The US Air Force awarded Boeing a $500 million contract in support of Qatar’s F-15QA. The deal is for Qatar Emiri Air Force (QAEF) aircrew and maintenance training. In 2017, Qatar placed a $12 billion order for 36 of Boeing’s advanced F-15QA heavy strike fighters. These aircraft were designed as advanced derivatives of the F-15E Strike Eagle deployed by the US Air Force, which itself was derived from the F-15C air superiority fighter with a new emphasis on long range and air to ground capabilities. Boeing will perform work under the new contract in St. Louis, Missouri and will move work to Qatar in 2021. Estimated completion is in August 2026. July 5/19: F-15 off to University The University of Dayton Research Institute won a $28.5 million firm-fixed price contract for studies of the F-15 sustainment engineering. The contract includes systems/structural engineering field and programmed depot maintenance support, reliability and maintainability analysis and aircraft structural integrity program capability development and sustainment. The F-15 Eagle is the Air Force’s primary fighter jet aircraft and intercept platform. The F-15 has electronic systems and weaponry to detect, acquire, track and attack enemy aircraft while operating in friendly or enemy-controlled airspace. The weapons and flight control systems are designed so one person can safely and effectively perform air-to-air combat. Work, performed at Dayton, will approximately be completed by June 28, 2029. June 10/19: Retrofit The US Air Force awarded Raytheon a $15 million firm-fixed-price modification for retrofitting the F-15 jet fleet with Mode 5 capable Identify Friend or Foe units. Boeing’s F-15 Strike Eagle is a twin-engine, all-weather tactical fighter aircraft. Its proven design is unbeatable in air-to-air combat, with more than 100 aerial combat victories. Per the terms of the agreement, Raytheon will offer 196 F-15C/D APX-114 and 196 F-15 C/D APX-119 retrofit units, which provide National Security Agency approved cryptography as well as robust anti-jam interrogation and reply encryption capabilities. Raytheon will perform work in Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland and Largo, Florida and is expected to complete work in December 2021. May 24/19: Training Center Services The US Air Force awarded Boeing a $41 million contract modification to contractor-furnished, high-fidelity simulation equipment for F-15C and F-15E Mission Training Center Services to offer simulation capability to train pilots and weapons system operators. This modification includes four additional pilot/weapon systems officer crew stations devices and their associated equipment to support aircrew training requirements. Boeing’s F-15 Strike Eagle is a twin-engine, all-weather tactical fighter aircraft. It has more than 100 aerial combat victories. F-15C and F-15E are two variants of the F-15 Strike Eagle jet. Boeing will perform work at Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada, and is expected to be finished by February 15, 2021. May 17/19: Innovative Combat Support The US Air Force has successfully demonstrated a new Combat Support Wing concept during a recent deployment to Kinston Regional Jetport. F-15Es from the 4th Fighter Wing were refueled and rearmed by three teams of airmen who are from different career fields in the service. Weapons loaders showed that they could drive a refueling truck while security forces demonstrated they could refuel the aircraft. Avionics specialists were tasked with base security. The concept supports National Defense Strategy priorities to evolve innovative operational concepts and enhance lethality in contested environments. If fielded, it could give the Air Force the ability to quickly deploy in smaller, more efficient and agile teams to austere and potentially contested areas. May 14/19: Engineering Services The US Air Force awarded Boeing an $11.2 million contract in support of the F-15. The F-15 Eagle is the Air Force’s primary fighter jet. It has electronic systems and weaponry for detecting, acquiring, tracking and attacking enemy aircraft while operating in either friendly or enemy-controlled airspace. The contract provides for post-production support tasks/services unique to the original equipment manufacturer as required to maintain an adequate level of continuous sustaining engineering and logistics support for the Air Force and Foreign Military Sales. FMS include Saudi Arabia and Israel. Boeing is finishing a major 2009 F-15 order from Saudi Arabia. The Royal Saudi Air Force has the third largest number of F-15s in its fleet, behind Japan and the United States. The USAF has requested $7.8 billion for eight F-15s next year and 72 in the four years after that. Boeing will perform work in St. Louis and is expecting completion by November 9, 2027. April 10/19: EW Capability Improvement The Air Force awarded Boeing a $91.3 million contract modification for a super high-speed computer intended to improve the F-15’s electronics warfare capability. The modification provides for the production and integration of the Advanced Display Core Processor II (ADCPII) boxes into the F-15 platform. The ADCP II is also known as Suite 9. According to Boeing, it is the world’s fastest flight mission computer, capable of processing up to 87 billion instructions per second. In 2016, the F-15E tested the flight computer during a flight on July 8 at Florida’s Eglin Air Force Base. The ADCP II is part of a wider $12 billion modernization program taking place across the range of Eagle types being flown in the USAF inventory. The F-15 Eagle is a twin-engine, all-weather tactical fighter aircraft. It is the Air Force’s primary fighter jet aircraft and intercept platform. The Eagle’s air superiority is achieved through a mixture of unprecedented maneuverability and acceleration, range, weapons and avionics. March 15/19: Retrofit The Air Force Life Cycle Management Center awarded Raytheon $21.2 million to retrofit the F-15 fleet. The deal provides for retrofitting the F-15 fleets current Identity Friend of Foe Units. Identification Friend or Foe enables military and civilian air traffic control interrogation systems to identify aircraft, vehicles or forces as friendly and to determine their bearing and range from the interrogator. The Units offer Mode 5 capability for the APX-114 and APX-119 on the F-15 models C/D/E via a hardware retrofit and software upgrade. Per the terms of the deal, these units will provide National Security Agency approved cryptography and robust anti-jam interrogation and reply encryption capabilities. The F-15 is a twin-engine, all-weather tactical fighter aircraft designed to permit the Air Force to gain and maintain air supremacy over the battlefield. A multi-mission avionics system sets the F-15 apart from other fighter aircraft. It includes a head-up display, advanced radar, inertial navigation system, flight instruments, ultrahigh frequency communications, tactical navigation system and instrument landing system. March 14/19: Eight F-15EX The US Air Force on Tuesday unveiled a nearly $166 billion budget request for fiscal 2020. The Pentagon plans to buy eight Boeing F-15EX fighters FY 2020 as part of a purchase of 144 total aircraft over an undisclosed number of years. According to the budget request, it will cost $80 million per airframe. However, that cost will rise to approximately $125 million for each of the eight jets to set up the line and account for non-recurring engineering costs in the first year of procurement. The total deal will be priced at more than $1.1 billion and covers production of eight brand-new F-15EX fourth-plus generation fighters. The F-15EX is the latest version of the F-15 Eagle fighter jet. The Eagle is a twin-engine, all-weather tactical fighter aircraft that has an all-metal semimonocoque fuselage with a large-cantilever, shoulder-mounted wing. February 25/19: EPAWSS The US Air Force contracted Boeing with a $24.1 million modification for F-15 Eagle Passive Active Warning Survivability System (EPAWSS) engineering and manufacturing development. The EPAWSS is a program that upgrades F-15 aircraft electronic warfare capabilities to detect and identify air and ground threats, employ counter-measures, and jam enemy radar signals. It has fully integrated radar warning, geo-location, situational awareness, and self-protection solutions to detect and defeat surface and airborne threats in signal-dense contested and highly contested environments. The F-15 Eagle is a twin-engine, tactical fighter aircraft with speed capability of 1,875 miles per hour. The aircraft has an all-metal semimonocoque fuselage with a large-cantilever, shoulder-mounted wing. The contract modification also includes operational test and evaluation and provides for the procurement of hardware and systems engineering program management for the F-15E Operational Test and Evaluation jets. Work will take place in St. Louis, Missouri, and is expected to be finished by June 1, 2021. January 9/19: F-15 loses canopy during flight test Israel is looking into the loss of a canopy from a Boeing F-15 Eagle Combat aircraft during a training flight at 30,000 feet last week. A twin-seat F-15 ‘Baz’ (Falcon) suffered an explosive canopy separation. The pilots radioed the control tower, slowed their flight, began an orderly descent and landed safely at the Nevatim Airbase east of Beersheba. All training flights on the F-15 are currently on hold. The F-15 Eagle is a twin-engined, all-weather tactical fighter aircraft weighing up to 30 tons. The fighter is armed with air-to-air missiles that can be launched from beyond visual range, and has air-to-ground capability to penetrate hostile air and ground defenses to deliver up to 24,000lb of precision ordnance. December 6/18: Japan Japan’s planned upgrade of its Boeing F-15 Eagle fighter jets will likely be supported by the US government and Boeing under the Foreign Military Sales process. Japan’s Mitsubishi Heavy Industries delivered some 213 license-built F-15 variants the country’s air force between 1981 and 1999. Some 200 remain in service, of which about 88 were continuously upgraded over the past decade, gradually incorporating additional improvements like Link 16. Tokyo now plans to upgrade two of its F-15J/DJ interceptors at a cost of $89 million. According to Defense News, the upcoming upgrades include new electronic warfare equipment, and larger weapon load out – increasing the number of missiles the aircraft can carry – and the integration of the AGM-158 JASSM. Shigeyuki Uno, the principal deputy director of the defense planning and programming division of Japan’s Ministry of Defense, also told Defense News that the F-15s radar will also be upgraded, which will likely involve the AN/APG-63(V)3 or the AN/APG-63(V)1, both are AESA radars produced by Raytheon. Japan’s midterm defense program guidelines, to be released by the end of 2018, are expected to provide more details on this program, including the number of F-15s Japan plans to upgrade. November 28/18: Qatar The Qatar Emiri Air Force expects to receive its first batch of F-15QA fighter jets by March 2021. This will be the first batch of the 36 unit order, with the remainder to be delivered in batches of four every three months. Qatar’s new F-15s will come with a totally remodeled cockpit featuring large panel touch screen displays and a new HUD display. Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of State for Defense Affairs Dr. Khalid bin Mohamed al-Attiyah inaugurated the F-15QA production line at Boeing’s St. Louis factory in August 2018. Qatar’s $12 billion F-15 order is part of a general drive to strengthen the country’s air power, which also includes the purchase of 12 Dassault Rafales and 24 Eurofighter Typhoons. November 22/18: Israel The Israel Air Force (IAF) is set to acquire upgraded F-15s to supplement its fleet of F-35 ‘Adir’ fighter aircraft. The squadron of F-15IAs will include certain stealth capabilities, such as radar-absorbing paint and internal weapons carriage. The fighter jets will be capable of carrying 11 missiles, in addition to 28 heavy, smart bombs for ground targets. Other additions include Raytheon’s AN/APG-63(V)3 AESA radar, a long-range infrared search and track (IRST) sensor system, allowing for a “first sigh-first shot-first kill” capability and a helmet cueing system. With this upcoming purchase, Israel will be the third Middle-Eastern country to do so. Both Saudi Arabia and Qatar have ordered their respective SA and QA variants which are the most advanced Eagles in the world. However experts say that Israel’s Eagle will be even more capable and advanced than the others. The upcoming deal marks the first Boeing fighter jet acquisition by the Israeli Air Force in two decades, with the first F-15IA expected to arrive in Israel as soon as 2023. The IDF says the new F-15 will not completely replace the F-35 stealth fighter, but is intended to reinforce the systems currently in place to enhance the range of capabilities to an optimal position vis-à-vis its missions—from Iran to Gaza. November 5/18: Saudi maintenance Boeing is being tapped to continue maintenance support for the Royal Saudi Air Force’s fleet of F-15 fighter aircraft. The company is being awarded with a $14.6 million contract that sees for the sustainment of the Aircraft Maintenance Debrief System (AMDS). The F-15 is an all-weather, extremely maneuverable, tactical fighter designed to achieve aerial superiority in combat situations. The contract allows Boeing to provide trained personnel to use and maintain AMDS equipment at six locations throughout Saudi Arabia. The company’s staff also train RSAF members on how to operate and maintain the equipment. Work will be performed at multiple locations in Saudi Arabia and is expected to run through November 4, 2023. October 4/18: QEAF Pilot Training Boeing is being contracted to support the training of future Qatar Emiri Air Force pilots. The company will provide Qatar with F-15QA aircrew and maintenance courseware at a cost of $30 million. This includes syllabi, a student tracking system and the overall program management needed to train the country’s future F-15QA pilots. Production of the new F-15s started in August and will run through to at least 2022. Qatar ordered a total of 36 fighter jets at a cost of $12 billion. Work will be performed at Boeing’s location in St. Louis, Missouri, and is expected to be completed Dec. 28, 2020. September 27/18: Saudi Arabia General Electric is being contracted to keep the Royal Saudi Air Force’s Strike Eagles flying. The company will provide the RSAF with F110-129 engine consumables, spares, war-readiness spare kits, and support equipment. The deal falls under the US FMS program and is priced at $58.6 million. The F-15SAs are currently the most advanced F-15 Eagles on the planet. In 2015 Saudi Arabia ordered 84 new build F-15SAs and close to 70 kits to upgrade their existing F-15S fleet to the SA configuration. GE’s F110-129 two-spool afterburning turbofan engine delivers of to 29,000 pounds of thrust and powers more than 75% of US Air Force single-engine F-16s. Work will be performed at GE’s factory in Cincinnati, Ohio, and is expected to be completed by September, 2020. August 28/18: Legion Pod The US Air Force plans to integrate a new IRST system on its fleet of F-15C aircraft. Boeing will provide the Air Force with engineering, manufacturing, and development efforts of the F-15 Legion Pod. The contract has a value of $208.2 million and will run through November 2020. The Legion Pod is being developed in conjunction with Lockheed Martin. The pod features Lockheed’s IRST21 infrared sensor and advanced data processing capabilities. This multi-function sensor system has been designed to provide long-range detection and tracking of airborne threats in radar-denied environments. The common interface of the Legion pod allows it to be easily integrated onto any aircraft without affecting the aircraft’s operational flight programme. Work will bet performed at Boeing’s facilities on St. Louis, Missouri and Orlando, Florida. August 6/18: Qatari production line Boeing is currently in the process of manufacturing several F-15 fighter jets for Qatar. Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of State for Defense Affairs Dr. Khalid bin Mohamed al-Attiyah recently inaugurated the F-15QA production line at the company’s plant in Missouri. Qatar’s new F-15s will come with a totally remodeled cockpit featuring large panel touch screen displays and a new HUD display developed by BAE systems. The F-15QA, is identical to the F-15SA that Boeing is building for the Royal Saudi Air Force. It has a fly-by-wire flight control system, digital electronic warfare (EW) suite, an infrared search and track (IRST) system, and the Raytheon APG-63(v)3 active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar. In a typical escort configuration, the Advanced Eagle can carry 16 AIM-120 AMRAAM, four AIM-9X Sidewinder short-range missiles; and two High-Speed Anti-Radiation Missiles. Neither the Qatari MoD nor Boeing disclosed when deliveries of the F-15 (Qatar Advanced) Eagle will begin, but it has been disclosed that they will run through to the end of 2022. The Middle-Eastern nation ordered a total of 36 fighter jets at a cost of $12 billion. July 30/18: A squadron for Israel The Israeli Air Force is currently in negotiations with Boeing regarding a deal with a potential value of up to $11 billion. This deal would be the IAF’s largest-ever acquisition, considerably boosting its mobility and strike capabilities. Israel Hayom daily reports that the deal includes a squadron of F-15 jets with upgraded stealth features, a squadron of transport helicopters and KC-46 tanker aircraft. Israel’s outdated CH-53 Sea Stallions will likely be replaced by CH-47 Chinooks and V-22 Ospreys. The purchase will be funded from US military aid money, which comes to some $3.8 billion annually, over the next decade as the new planes and helicopters are delivered. If the deal goes through and Israel returns to purchasing F-15s, it would mark the first Boeing fighter jet acquisition by the Israeli Air Force in two decades. In the years since, Israel has bought 100 F-16s and another 50 F-35 stealth jets from Boeing’s chief competitor, Lockheed Martin. July 13/18: Saudi support The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is set to receive support for its F-15 Fleet Modernization program as part of a US foreign military sale. Titan LSC has been awarded a $68.4 million indefinite-delivery-requirements contract that provides for the acquisition of various different commercial vehicles and trailers in support of the RSAF program. Titan will facilitate delivery to the Dhahran Supply Depot at King Abdul Aziz Air Base and maintain operations in the Dammam Metropolitan Area in Saudi Arabia as a liaison for the operation. In October 2010 Saudi Arabia negotiated a $30-60 billion arms package with the USA including an order of 84 F-15 Strike Eagles. Work will be performed at Titan LSC, Amman, Jordan, and in the subcontractor’s facility in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The contract is expected to be completed by July 10, 2021. July 3/18: Vertical stabilizers The Air Force is contracting Boeing in support of its F-15 fleet. The firm-fixed-price contract provides for the production of F-15 vertical stabilizers and is valued at $23.6 million. The F-15A reached initial operational capability for the US Air Force in September 1975, and approximately 670 F-15s remain in the USAF’s inventory. Vertical stabilizers serve two basic purposes: flight stability and aircraft attitude alteration in yaw direction (i.e. yawing the aircraft left or right). In addition, they provide perfect mounting place for RWR and ECM antennae (located on the top of each stabilizers). Location of performance is at the company’s location in Missouri and is scheduled for completion by May 31, 2022. April 03/18: AESA orders for USAF Boeing has been awarded a modification to a previously awarded contract for the US Air Force’s F-15 Fighter Modernization Program (RMP) radar upgrades. The contract is valued at over $187 million. It provides for work on 29 Group A and Group B kits, spares, fuel tanks and other equipment and services. The F-15A reached initial operational capability for the US Air Force in September 1975, and approximately 670 F-15s remain in the USAF’s inventory. Current F-15 flying locations include bases in the continental United States, Alaska, England, Hawaii, Japan and the Middle East. The RMP development and testing began in January 2011. The RMP replaces the F-15 legacy APG-70 mechanically scanned radar with an AESA system designated APG-82(V) and is designed to retain functionality of the legacy radar system while providing expanded mission employment capabilities including longer air-to-air target selection and enhanced task capabilities and enhanced air-to-ground and air-to-air combat identification capabilities. Work will be performed in St. Louis, Missouri, and is scheduled for completion in April 2022. February 26/18: New wing for Qatar’s FMS F-15QA fighter aircraft being produced for Qatar will come with a newly designed wing, as manufacturer Boeing prepares to offer the design option for any future structural upgrades ordered for the US Air Force’s F-15Cs. Speaking to Flight Global, Steve Parker, Boeing’s vice-president of F-15 programs said the QA variant introduces a number of previously-announced features, including an advanced cockpit system with a large format display, and that the redesigned wing will strengthen the internal structure of the fighter without changing its aerodynamics. If the USAF decide to keep its F-15Cs flying for another two decades, the new features will be offered as part of any service life extension work ordered, and could also be offered to any other operators of F-15 aircraft, such as Japan. June 16/17: Despite a spat with its Arab neighbors amid claims they were funding terrorism, Qatar has completed negotiations with Boeing to move ahead with a purchase of 36 F-15QA fighter aircraft. Qatari Defense Minister Khalid Al-Attiyah was in Washington to sign the $12 billion Foreign Military Sale agreement with his counterpart Jim Mattis, and could be extended to cover a total of 72 planes at a cost of approximately $21 billion. The move may confuse Washington’s allies in the region, after President Trump has initially sent a series of tweets that appeared to take credit for and praise the decision when Saudi Arabia and several Arab countries cut off ties with Qatar. “The nation of Qatar, unfortunately, has historically been a funder of terrorism at a very high level,” Trump said in a speech at the White House last week. “We ask Qatar, and other nations in the region to do more and do it faster. March 19/17: The Israeli Air Force is considering a procurement of advanced F-15 jets from Boeing instead of purchasing additional F-35s. Tel Aviv will evaluate and consider this advanced version, capable of carrying more missiles and potentially in line with Boeing’s suggested 2040 configuration, and could order as many as 20-25 aircraft to augment its F-35 fleet. At present, the IAF has plans for a 50-strong F-35I fleet. December 12/16: Engineers from Boeing have been working on USAF F-15Es, replacing old APG-70 radars with the state-of-the-art APG-82 AESA radar. The work has been underway since September on planes located at Seymour Johnson Air Force Base, North Carolina. Dubbed as the RMP Eagle modernization program, more than 90 jets will receive the overhaul which is expected to be completed within the next seven to nine years. November 7/16: Boeing landed a $479 million USAF contract for engineering, manufacturing, and development of the Eagle Passive/Active Warning and Survivability System for the F-15 Eagle fighter jet. The system will provide advanced aircraft protection, significantly improved situational awareness and support for future F-15 mission requirements, replacing the jet’s Tactical Electronic Warfare Suite and keeping the aging aircraft in scheduled service through 2040. As 413 F-15Cs and F-15Es will be upgraded under the program, the expected costs may run to $7.6 billion. October 12/16: The USAF has tasked Boeing with selecting a supplier for a $198 million upgrade of the F-15C/D which will allow the fighter to detect at long range the heat generated by an aircraft engine. After selecting the infrared search and track (IRST) sensor supplier, Boeing will be tasked with integrating the pod with the F-15’s other systems, including the Raytheon-supplied active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar. By delegating such work, the USAF avoids giving losing bidders a chance to protest Boeing’s decision to the US Government Accountability Office (GAO). September 19/16: A recently released White House fact sheet on US military aid has revealed that Israel is to get ten F-15Ds under the excess defense articles program. Eight F-15s have been delivered so far, and are primarily used as a training aircraft but can also take part in air-to-air combat. Other excess articles given by the Obama administration to Israel include several Lockheed Martin C-130 cargo aircraft, AGM-114 Hellfire missiles and joint direct attack munitions. May 2/16: USAF’s fleet of more than 500 F-15s are to get a wheel and brake upgrade after successful flight testing. Once completed, F-15C/D/E fighters will be capable of undertaking 1,400 landings before having to swap out their brakes. The USAF stands to save over $194 million in F-15 maintenance costs once all of the aircraft are fitted with the upgrade, and this will be the first brake testing to be carried out on the jet since the 1980s. May 26/09: Aviation Week reports that the USAF is looking into the possibility of a Service Life Extension Program for its F-15A-D fleet, designed to increase their service lives from 8,000 flight hours to 12,000. The move is driven, in part, by the impending collapse of Air National Guard wings that can be used in domestic air sovereignty patrols, as older fighters retire and are not replaced. The USAF is accelerating the retirement of 250 F-16 and F-15 fighters in FY 2010, and current plans calls for 2 ANG air sovereignty mission units to get F-22s, 4 to get receive upgraded F-15A-Ds, and the remaining 12 are yet to be determined. March 22/08: Maj. Stephen Stilwell, a pilot for Southwest Airlines whose Missouri Air National Guard F-15C’s mid-air crackup began the fleet groundings, has filed suit in U.S. District Court against claiming Boeing Corp. His injuries left him with a 10-inch metal plate in the injured arm and shoulder, and he reports that he has suffered from chronic pain since the accident. Stilwell’s suit, filed by attorney Morry S. Cole, says that Boeing knew or should have know that the F-15 as manufactured allowed and permitted for catastrophic flight break-up, and adds that Boeing failed to notify the Air Force and Missouri Air National Guard of “the likelihood of excess stress concentrations, fatigue cracking, structural failure and in-flight aircraft break up as a result of the structural deficiencies.” St. Louis Post-Dispatch. February 2008: The largest effects of the F-15 fleet’s grounding may yet play out on the procurement front. If many of the USAF’s F-15s, which were supposed to serve until 2025 or so, must be retired, how should they be replaced? Read “Aging F-15s: Ripples Hitting the F-22, F-35 Programs.” Jan 21/08: This week’s edition of the “Today’s Air Force” show highlights how the Air Force carried on its mission while more than 700 of its F-15 Eagles were grounded. See “The Eagle flies once again!” on the Pentagon Channel, American Forces Radio and Television Service stations around the world, and video podcast [30 minutes]. Jan 14/08: Officials begin flight operations again as 39 of the 18th Wing F-15C/Ds at Kadena Air Base, Japan are cleared to fly again after remaining on the ground for more than 2 months as a result of a fleet-wide stand-down. See USAF story. Jan 10/08: According to the Air Combat Command Accident Investigation Board report released on this day. Their conclusion? The plane was simply too old: “…a technical analysis of the recovered F-15C wreckage determined that the longeron didn’t meet blueprint specifications. This defect led to a series of fatigue cracks in the right upper longeron. These cracks expanded under life cycle stress, causing the longeron to fail, which initiated a catastrophic failure of the remaining support structures and led to the aircraft breaking apart in flight… the pilot’s actions during the mishap sequence were focused, precise and appropriate. The pilot’s actions did not contribute to the mishap, said Colonel Wignall. In addition, a thorough review of local maintenance procedures revealed no problems or adverse trends which could have contributed to the accident.” Col. William Wignall, the head of the accident investigation added that: “We’ve had great involvement from Boeing during the investigation. In fact, they’re the ones who determined the longeron was the problem. This was then confirmed by the Air Force Research Laboratory.” See the USAF’s “F-15 Eagle accident report released,” and the accompanying video dramatization, as well as “Air Force leaders discuss F-15 accident, future.” Jan 9/08: Air Combat Command officials clear 60% of the F-15A-D fleet for flying status, and recommends a limited return to flight for those planes that have cleared all inspections. The decision follows detailed information briefed on Jan 4/08 to Air Combat Command from the Air Force’s F-15 systems program manager, senior engineers from Boeing and the Warner Robins Air Logistics Center; as well as a briefing received on Jan 9/08 from the Accident Investigation Board president. The USAF report describes inspections as “more than 90% complete,” with remaining inspections focusing primarily on the forward longerons. Thus far, 9 other F-15s have been found with longeron fatigue-cracks, and almost 40% of inspected aircraft have at least 1 longeron that is thinner than blueprint specifications. ACC believes each affected F-15 will have to be analyzed to determine if there is sufficient strength in the non-specification longeron, and this analysis will take place at the Warner-Robbins Air Logistics Center over the next 4 weeks. A number of F-15s are scheduled to be retired in 2009, and calculating the cost of fixes and airframe life of fixed aircraft could have a substantial bearing on the size of the USAF’s future F-15 fleet. Meanwhile, the 2-month grounding, which has been the longest of any USAF jet fighter, is a gift that keeps on giving. Fully 75% of US Air Force and Air National Guard F-15A-D pilots have lost their currency status for solo flight, and another week would have made it 100%. Instructor pilots have retained their currency and will begin flying F-15B/Ds with the other pilots, so the pilots can land the plane and regain their status. This will be followed by further pilot training, which is required to regain operational proficiency status. USAF report | Flight International. F-15C CAP(Combat Air Patrol) (click to view full) Dec 27/07: The Associated Press details some of the ripple effects created by the F-15 A-D grounding. With the F-15s in Massachusetts out of commission, the Vermont Air National Guard (ANG) is covering the whole Northeast. The Oregon ANG’s fighters are grounded, so the California Air National Guard is standing watch for the entire West Coast plus slices of Arizona and Nevada. To meet that need, the Fresno, CA based 144th Fighter Wing has had to borrow F-16s from bases in Indiana and Arizona and trim back training. The Minnesota ANG is manning sites in Hawaii, while the Illinois ANG covers Louisiana. In Alaska, the new F-22 Raptors are stepping in – and so are Canadian CF-18s, which have intercepted several Russian bombers near Alaska in recent weeks. Dec 10/07: The F-15 A-Ds remain grounded. A USAF update informs us that throughout the Air Force, maintainers have found cracks in the upper longerons of 8 F-15s so far: 4 from Air National Guard 173rd Fighter Wing, Kingsley Field, OR; 2 from USAF 18th Wing, Kadena Air Base, Japan; 1 from 325th Fighter Wing, Tyndall AFB, FL; and 1 from ANG 131st Fighter Wing, St. Louis, MO. Inspections are underway using previous methods, until the Warner Robins ALC develops new ones for the fleet. After the area’s paint is stripped and bare metal is exposed, Airmen apply chemicals that reveal cracks under a black light. “Other inspections in hard-to-see areas are done with a boar scope [sic… maybe they mean “borescope”?] – a tool that uses a tiny camera and fits in tight areas.” Inspection time per aircraft is 12.5 to over 20 hours, and the 2-seat B and D models are more time consuming because the rear seat must be removed to access the upper longerons. USAF story. UPDATE from USAF: “Yes, other readers pointed that out as well (although yours was the funniest). The story was corrected…” Dec 3/07: It’s now official. Gen. John D.W. Corley, the commander of Air Combat Command orders the stand-down of all ACC F-15 A-Ds until further notice, and recommends the same for all other branches of the USAF. The stand-down does not affect the F-15E Strike Eagle and its variants abroad. Technical experts with the Warner Robins Air Logistics Center at Robins Air Force Base, GA are developing a specific inspection technique for the suspect area, based on the recent findings. However, unlike previous inspections, the inspected aircraft will not be returned to flight until the F-15 A-D model findings and data have been analyzed, required inspections have been accomplished, and the necessary repair or mitigation actions have been completed. To date, longeron cracks have been discovered in an additional 4 aircraft. USAF release. F-15E: Mission executed. (click to view full) Nov 28/07: The accident investigation board (AIB) report leads to the recommended re-grounding of the USAF F-15 A-D fleet, and almost certainly those of other countries as well. The new AIB findings have drawn attention to the F-15’s upper longerons near the canopy of the aircraft, which appear to have cracked and failed. Longerons connect the aircraft’s metal ‘skin’ to the frame, and run along the length and side of the aircraft. In addition to the AIB’s conclusions, manufacturer simulations have indicated that a catastrophic failure could result from such cracks, which were also discovered along the same longeron area during 2 recent inspections of F-15C aircraft. The commander of Air Combat Command has recommended the stand-down of all F-15 A-D model aircraft across the US military, and ordered a renewed fleet-wide inspection of all ACC F-15 A-D model aircraft using a very specific inspection technique for the suspect area. The multi-role 2-seat F-15E Strike Eagles, which were manufactured later and had several design changes made, remain exempt from these cautions and exceptions. USAF article. Nov 21/07: All USAF’s F-15s are being returned to flight status, despite acknowledgment that the service is accepting a degree of risk in doing so. Gen. John D.W. Corley, commander, Air Combat Command: “The cause of the mishap remains under investigation… At the same time, structural engineers have conducted in-depth technical reviews of data from multiple sources… First, we focused on the F-15Es. They are… structurally different than the A-D models. Problems identified during years of A-D model usage were designed “out” of the E-model… Next, we concentrated on the remainder of the grounded fleet. The AIB(Accident Investigation Board) is now focused on the area just aft of the cockpit and slightly forward of the inlets. Warner Robins ALC mandated a thorough inspection and repair of all structural components in this area. I have directed each F-15 aircraft be inspected and cleared before returning to operational status. Today, ACC issued (a flight crew information file) and Warner Robins ALC issued an Operational Supplemental Tech Order to further direct and guide your pre-flight and post-flight actions.” There are 666 F-15s in the Air Force inventory. As of this day, 219 of the 224 E-models and 294 of the 442 A-D models in the USAF’s inventory have been inspected and re-cleared for flight. Nov 19/07: Shortly after becoming the first deployed F-15E unit in the Air Force to return to full operational capability following the Air Force’s fleet-wide grounding of the aircraft, the 455th Expeditionary Maintenance Squadron at Bagram AFB, Afghanistan, began the move from 5-7 day phase inspections every 200 flight hours, to a phase inspection every 400 flight hours. This change isn’t slated for implementation until 2008, but it’s being implemented early at Bagram AFB to keep more F-15Es in the air and meet mission demands. The USAF says that its engineers at the Warner-Robins Air Force Base Air Logistics Center, GA looked carefully at all the data after years of F-15E analysis and testing, before approving the change. USAF release. Nov 15/07: A USAF release says that an order issued by Air Combat Command’s Commander Gen. John Corley on Nov 11/07 mandates a 13-hour Time-Compliance Technical Order (TCTO) on location for each of the USAF’s F-15E Strike Eagles, to inspect hydraulic system lines, the fuselage structure, and structure-related panels. Aircraft that pass this inspection may return to flight status, and similar procedures are likely to be underway for Israel’s F-15Is. ACC Combat Aircraft Division chief Col. Frederick Jones said that this was possible because: “We were able to determine, based on initial reports from an engineering analysis, that the F-15E is not susceptible to the same potential cause of the Missouri mishap.” The TCTO inspection is designed to confirm the engineering analysis, and aircraft deployed the CENTCOM has apparently completed inspections and returned to flying status. This still leaves 2/3 of the USAF’s F-15 fleet grounded, however, as the F-15A-D models remain under suspicion. The F-15Es are about 15 years old on average, but the F-15A-D models were introduced earlier. Maj. Gen. David Gillett, ACC director of Logistics said that: “What we’ve got here is an example in the C model of what happens when you have an airplane that’s about 25 years old… What you find is that it becomes more and more expensive to modify [the F-15 airframe] over time… Our costs have gone up 87 percent in the last five years and continue to rise rapidly. Even when you invest in an old airframe – you still have an old airframe.” Additional Readings & Sources Gannett’s Military Times – F-15’s midair breakup. Hosts the Pentagon’s Crash Simulation. DID Spotlight article – Aging Array of American Aircraft Attracting Attention. The problem is not at all unique to America. Reuters (Oct 15/08) – US Air Force eyes fighter cuts to boost modernization. The force cuts would reduce the reserve fleets by about 137 F-15s, but it would also cut 177 F-16 fighters and 9 A-10s. The goal is to save $3.4 billion, to be applied to F-35 purchases. Investors Business Daily (Dec 7/07) – The Eagles are Grounded. Quotes ACC chief Maj. Gen. Ronald Keys re: the slippage of fighter fleet average age from 1967 to the present. Flight International (Nov 6/07) – VIDEO: Israel and Japan join US in grounding F-15s USAF (Nov 6/07) – Mission continues during grounding of F-15s. US DoD DefenseLINK (Nov 6/07) – Air Force Grounds F-15 Fleet Following Crash Xinhua, via Military.com – Now Japan Grounds F-15 Fighters USAF (Nov 4/07) – Air Force suspends some F-15 operations View the full article

Americas FlightSafety Services won a $13.9 million contract modification, which exercises an option to provide aircrew training services in support of the TH-57B/C community, including instruction, operation, and curriculum support. The TH-57 Sea Ranger is a derivative of the commercial Bell Jet Ranger 206. Although primarily used for training, these aircraft are also used for photo, chase and utility missions. The JetRanger was initially designed to compete in a US Army light observation helicopter competition. Bell lost that competition but the 206 was commercially successful. The TH-57 Sea Ranger provides advanced instrument flight rules (IFR) training to several hundred aviation students a year at Naval Air Station Whiting Field in Milton, Florida. TH-57 sundown will begin in fiscal 2022, and concludes in the fiscal 2024 timeframe. It’s replacement is the TH-73A. Work will take place in Florida. Estimated completion date is in October 2021. The crash of an F-35A at Florida’s Eglin Air Force base in May was caused by the pilot trying to land at an excessive speed, and a flight control logic glitch that left its tail unresponsive, according to a new report. According to the report the pilot was also fatigued, causing “cognitive degradation” and was distracted at a critical point in the flight and lacked key understanding of the flight-control logic. The pilot was safely ejected from the aircraft as it landed on the base and did not sustain serious injuries. Middle East & Africa The expeditionary sea base ship USS Hershel “Woody” Williams, recently homeported in Greece, conducted exercises with the Nigerian navy as part of its first deployment, the US Navy said. The 784-foot long USS Hershel “Woody” Williams performed maneuvering exercises with the Nigerian frigate NNS Okpabana and three other vessels in the Gulf of Guinea, at the equator off the West African coast, according to the Navy. The ships simulated interceptions and boardings, and worked with Nigeria’s Maritime Operations Center in Lagos. The U.S. ship, which typically carries helicopters, also demonstrated the use of a UAV in exercises which concluded on Oct. 3. Europe Ukraine is to sign a memorandum with the UK to secure $1.62 billion in funding to build new military vessels for the Ukrainian Navy, the first two ships will be constructed in the UK and the remaining 6 vessels will be built in Ukraine. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy was reported by local media as saying that the memorandum would be signed his state visit to the UK this week. “This is an important strategic document … we will sign this memorandum for the amount of 1.25 billion pounds“, Zelenskiy said. It has also been reported that the funds would be in the form of a 10-year loan. Asia-Pacific Saab Australia signed contracts worth up to $20 million to provide the Royal Australian Navy with the latest generation anti-submarine warfare (ASW) training system – the AUV62-AT – and five years’ in-service support. As prime contractor for the project, Saab Australia will deliver the system in 2022 and work with Australian industry, including Newcastle based BlueZone Group, to provide ongoing in-service operational and maintenance support through to 2027. The Indian government’s Press Information Bureau that the country has successfully flight-tested a land-attack version of the Brahmos supersonic cruise missile featuring an indigenously made airframe section and booster. The achievement is a major milestone in the country’s efforts to increase the content of locally made components in defence equipment used by the Indian military. The PIB noted that the missile was launched from the Integrated Test Range in Balasore in the eastern state of Odisha, reaching a cruising speed of Mach 2.8. The test missile also featured “many other ‘Made in India’ sub-systems”, which are expected to eventually enter production to meet the government’s long-standing goal of enhancing defense equipment self-reliance as opposed to foreign imports. Today’s Video Watch: Indian Defence Updates : 1st GHATAK Production,Kaveri Engine JV,Amogh Evaluation,Cyber Security Pact View the full article

PJ-10 BrahMos (click to view full) Back in November 2005, The Hindu newspaper reported that India’s government had given the go-ahead for exporting missiles, and that India’s Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) was looking to market several of its products internationally. The missile systems in question included several products from the decades-long Integrated Guided Missile Program (IGMP) set of development programs, and one new success that used a very different approach. DRDO has led the long, turbulent development histories of the Trishul (“trident”) short-range surface-air missile (SAM), the Akash (“sky”) medium-range SAM, and the Nag (“cobra”) vehicle-mounted anti-armor missile. In contrast, the Indo-Russian PJ-10 BrahMos medium-range supersonic cruise missile was developed very quickly, and performed as advertised. As of August 2010, India has not made an export sale, or even formally decided which countries would be eligible to receive these missiles. The programs themselves have also seen changes and developments, with Trishul canceled, Akash finally ordered, BrahMos expanded, and ongoing IGMP work in other areas. The Missiles: IGMP + BrahMos Agni II by Antonio Milena/ABr (click to view full) The IGMP program included a pair of ballistic missiles that will almost certainly not be exported, in addition to the missiles under discussion. Both ballistic missile programs have fielded operational weapons, ad have reportedly provided platforms for development and testing of ballistic missile interceptors as well. The Prithvi (“Earth”)/ Dhanush (“Bow”) short-range ballistic missile family is used to attack surface targets. It has a range of 150-300 km/ 90-180 miles, carrying a 500-1,000 kg/ 1,100-2,200 pound warhead between in weight (the shortest range Army version carries the large warhead), and accuracy estimated to be 10-50m CEP (50% of firings will be this close to the target). Dhanush refers to the naval versions. The Prithvi-I was inducted in 1994, and the extended range Prithvi-II was inducted in 2006. Prithvi was also the missile used in India’s recent anti-ballistic missile tests. A Prithvi-III is under development to deliver a nuclear warhead 350 km, or deliver lighter conventional warheads 500-750 km. The Agni (“fire”) Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile as a range of 700-800 km/ 420-560 miles, while the Agni-II as a range of 2,000-2,500 km/ 1,200-1,500 miles. Agni split from IGMP and became its own program. These missiles carry either a 1,000 kg conventional warhead, or a nuclear warhead. An Agni-III with a 3,500 km/ 2,100 mile range is in the final stages of development, but tests have exhibited problems; there are also rumors of an ICBM program. These missiles will not be discussed further in this article. Akash: Rajendra Radar Transparency in procurement, and clear program analysis and accountability, are in shorter supply in India than in the USA. Nevertheless, basic research reveals a few salient facts about the other weapons mentioned as export possibilities. None of them been been exported, so far: Trishul (“trident”) SHORAD: Failed. This short-range surface-air missile (SAM) that has been described as similar to the Russian SA-8 Gecko with more modern electronics. The Indian MoD finally confirmed its cancellation in 2008, for failure to meet performance specifications. Akash (“sky”): Semi-success and development catalyst. This medium-range SAM will replace some of India’s SA-3 batteries. Akash has been described as using a missile airframe similar to the Soviet SA-6, with upgraded seeker heads and a fully modern Rajendra fire-control radar similar to that of the Russian S-300. The ramjet-powered missile reportedly flies at Mach 2.5 (a normal speed for a surface-to-air missile) all the way to the end of its range, instead of accelerating and then coasting like rocket-powered SAMs. It uses a conventional warhead with semi-active radar homing guidance, and reported operating range is 25-30km/ 18 miles, to a maximum altitude of 18km/ 59,000 feet. The missile is supported by multi-target and multi-function phased array fire control radar called ‘Rajendra’ that has a reported range of about 60 km/ 36 miles. Each Akash flight consists of a Rajendra fire control radar, 4 launchers, and a Battery Command Post, all linked to a group command post with a 170 km Rohini (3D CAR variant) S-band search radar, and maintenance/ replenishment vehicles. Akash (click for video) The Akash’s long development period generated skepticism from India’s armed services, but the missile is now headed into full production and deployment. Reports center on India’s North-East, where terrain considerations block line of sight and limit useful SAM engagement range. There, a less expensive semi-active homing missile like Akash can be a worthwhile complement to short-range air defense (SHORAD) systems around key approaches, and in valleys. Reports indicate that it will protect locations like Tezpur, Chabua, Jorhat, and Mohanbari airfields, with some deployment near power plants and some regional cities. Within India, its MR-SAM and LR-SAM projects with IAI and RAFAEL will provide a complement of 60-120 km range SAMs, but Akash appears to have secured its niche. Beyond India, Akash could face rough going. A wide array of international competitors will be credible sales opponents, from China’s HQ-9 variant of the SA-10/ S-300, to systems like Russia’s SA-17/ 9K37M2 “Ural”, MBDA’s VL-MICA, ground-launched AMRAAM systems, and India’s own MR-SAM/ Barak 8 collaboration with Israel. Akash industrial partners include prime contractor Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL), plus Larsen & Toubro, Tata Power, Walchand Industries and ECIL. India’s state-run DRDL will oversee weapon system integration, and provide support throughout the expected 20-year lifecycle of the missile. The industrial side is where Akash has had the most success, though that may not translate much into exports. Rajendra in particular has had a special significance as it is an electronically scanned array, and its development helped the DRDO. Components of Rajendra has since found their way into artillery locating radars, and an argument can be made that the Rajendra’s lessons have helped India with Active Electronically Scanned Array projects in general, including its missile defense program. Nag & Namica by Aja Shukla (click to view full) The Nag (“cobra”) anti-armor fire and forget missile: semi-successful. The Nag reportedly uses an imaging infrared (IIR) seeker like America’s Javelin or Israel’s Spike family, rather than the laser guidance and/or millimeter-wave guidance of the American Hellfire and Russian AT-6 Spiral, the millimeter-wave guidance of the Hellfire Longbow or MBDA’s Brimstone, or the wire guided features of Raytheon’s TOW, MBDA’s HOT, Israel’s Spike, etc. Nag reportedly has a 4-7 km range, which is not very far. It’s designed to carry a dual warhead that will supposedly penetrate reactive armor add-ons or Chobham-like composite tank armors on tanks like the M1, Challenger, Leopard 2, etc., and has a top attack option. To date, however, its biggest technical challenge has been the seeker. Unlike competitors like Javelin, TOW, or Spike-ER/LR, Nag requires a carrying vehicle or helicopter (HELINA variant, still in development). Nag buys currently stand at 443 missiles, to be mounted on 13 of Larsen and Toubro’s 14.5t tracked “Namica” missile carriers (a modified BMP-2), and possibly on India’s Dhruv helicopters. Brahmos scenario (click to view full) PJ-10 BrahMos: success. This supersonic anti-ship/strike cruise missile began in 1998 as a joint project based on Russian SS-N-26 Oniks designs, and is already ready to enter service. It is a 2-stage vehicle whose solid propellant booster and a ramjet engine push it to sustained speeds of Mach 2.8 to 3.0. The kinetic energy of its Mach 3 speed, plus its 200 kg (ship & air launched) to 300 kg (land launched) warhead, give the missile a very strong terminal punch. The 6.9m cruise missile weighs about 6,000 pounds and has a range of 280 km/ 170 miles, which keeps it within the 300 km limit specified in the international Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). Since Russia is a signatory, the project fell within MTCR’s limitations. Brahmos was primarily designed to be ship launched, but a land-launched variant with a heavier warhead has been indicted into the Army for anti-ship and precision strike missions. Over time, it is likely to replace the Prithvi. An air-launched Brahmos-A is in testing for those planes large enough to carry the 5,000 pound payload. The IAF’s SU-30MKI heavy fighters are undergoing modifications to carry the missile, and its existing (TU-95/ IL-38SD) and future (Boeing P-8i) maritime patrol aircraft are also candidates. The air-launched version will have a range of 290 km/ 180 miles, and will use a smaller booster section, in order to reduce mass and ensure stability in flight after launch. Program Updates Milan ATGM, India (click to view full) Ocotber 8/20: India The Indian government’s Press Information Bureau that the country has successfully flight-tested a land-attack version of the Brahmos supersonic cruise missile featuring an indigenously made airframe section and booster. The achievement is a major milestone in the country’s efforts to increase the content of locally made components in defence equipment used by the Indian military. The PIB noted that the missile was launched from the Integrated Test Range in Balasore in the eastern state of Odisha, reaching a cruising speed of Mach 2.8. The test missile also featured “many other ‘Made in India’ sub-systems”, which are expected to eventually enter production to meet the government’s long-standing goal of enhancing defense equipment self-reliance as opposed to foreign imports. January 21/20: BrahMos According to media reports, India’s Strategic Forces Command has begun receiving 42 Su-30MKI air dominance fighters modified to carry air-launched BrahMos supersonic cruise missile. This will significantly enhance the striking power of the air leg of India’s nuclear triad. The Sukhoi Su-30 MKI is a twin-seater, highly maneuverable, fourth-generation multirole combat fighter aircraft built by Russia’s Sukhoi Design Bureau and licensed to India’s Hindustan Aeronautics Limited. The plane will serve as the backbone of India’s Air Force through 2020 and beyond. Delhi has already acquired around 200 jets, and eventually plans to acquire 282 of them. The Brahmos is jointly developed by India’s Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) and Russia’s NPO Mashinostroeyenia. Capable of traveling at speeds of Mach 3.0, the Brahmos is the fastest cruise missile in the world. As Russia and India Report explained, “The BrahMos’ 3000 km per second speed – literally faster than a bullet – means it hits the target with a huge amount of kinetic energy. In tests, the BrahMos has often cut warships in half and reduced ground targets to smithereens.” December 19/19: Philippines The Philippines will ink the contract for India’s BrahMos supersonic anti-ship missiles in the first or second quarter of 2020. Defense Secretary Delfin Lorenzana added that two batteries will be purchased and they are being bought under “government-to-government mode”. The missile, which can be fired from land, submarines, ships and fighter jets, will be acquired for the Philippine Army for coastal defense missions and for Air Force. BrahMos will become the nation’s first weaponry with deterrent capability. The BrahMos is a medium range ramjet supersonic cruise missile that can be launched from submarine, ships, aircraft, or land. It is the fastest supersonic cruise missile in the world. India on December 17 successfully conducted separate trials of two variants of supersonic cruise missile BrahMos to check its capability to hit targets with precision and accuracy. December 5/19: Prithvi-II Test Launch India’s Strategic Forces Command (SFC) test launched a short-range nuclear capable ballistic missiles at night as part of its annual training cycle to validate the combat readiness of the Indian Army’s missile forces. The Prithvi-II tactical surface-to-surface short-range ballistic missiles was test fired from the Integrated Test Range (ITR) on Dr. Abdul Kalam Island in the Bay of Bengal off the coast of Odisha at nighttime on December 3. It was the second test firing of a Prithvi-II ballistic missile at night in less than two weeks. March 18/11: India’s Cabinet Committee on Security has cleared the induction of the indigenous Akash surface to air missiles for the Army, which will join the Air Force in deploying the missile. Indian Express. March 6/11: The Deccan Chronicle reports that the air-launched BrahMos project is being held up by contract issues between Russian and India. The launcher has been made, and ground tested. The problem is the need for structural changes to strengthen the plane, so it can still perform high-g maneuvers safely while carrying the heavy missile. Like the missile, the SU-30MKI is a partnership between Russia and India, with India license-producing the airframe and adding a lot of their own specified technologies. The basic design is Russian, however, as are key systems like the radar and engines. NPO Mashinostroeyenia says that if India wants to modify the fighters, India needs to pay for it – reports are vague, but say “many, many hundreds of crores”. A crore is 10 million rupees, and Rs 100 crore at current exchange rates is $. India’s DRDO responded by comissioning a study from HAL to modify the fighters themselves. HAL says they can do it for much less, but the SU-30MKI agreement has transfer of technology and licensing clauses. Those clauses apparently prevent India from undertaking those kinds of unilateral modifications. Until this is resolved, the air-launched BrahMos program will be delayed. Dec 21/10: BrahMos Aerospace and Russia’s NPO Mashinostroyenia sign a protocol to ensure there are no price escalation issues during the duration of India’s contract, and pledged to continue working on the hypersonic (Mach 5+) variant. As BrahMos officials so drily put it: “This makes it a first of its kind in the relationship between India and Russia that there would be no price escalation issue during the duration of the contract.” The Russian side also committed full support of its specialists to Indian industries for manufacturing elements of missiles which are presently not produced in India. Brahmand, via BrahMos Aerospace. Dec 2/10: A Brahmos Block III + missile is test fired from a Mobile Autonomous Launcher, at the Integrated Test Range at Chandipur in Balasore, India. The BrahMos Block III adds improved guidance and software, allowing high manoeuvres at multiple points, steep dive from high altitude, and terrain following capabilities that even work in mountainous areas. BrahMos Aerospace. Sept 5/10: A Brahmos Block-II is successfully tested in a complex trajectory that includes large maneuvers, and steep supersonic dive. The BrahMos JV claims that this is the first time a supersonic dive has been realized by a cruise missile, anywhere in the world. The Brahmos Block II variant will also be able to hit a smaller target in “a cluster of larger targets.” A fleeing car within a set of buildings would fit that description, making BrahMos an interesting quick strike option within the irregular warfare India must fight on several fronts. Another possible use for such capabilities would be to target vertical-launch missile cells on an enemy ship, if the system can process and differentiate that. BrahMos Aerospace. Aug 27/10: RIA Novosti quotes BrahMos Aerospace Ltd. CEO Sivathanu Pillai, who says the joint venture will begin producing missile engines at the Kerala Brahmos plant in southeastern India. Pillai reportedly said that the decision stemmed from rising demand in India, implying that the Orenburg plant in Russia is finding it hard to keep up. He believes that within 2 years, production volumes at Kerala will exceed Orenburg’s. Brahmos uses a a solid-propellant booster rocket, followed by a liquid-fueled ramjet for sustained supersonic cruise. Aug 25/10: RIA Novosti quotes BrahMos Aerospace Ltd. CEO Sivathanu Pillai, who says the PJ-10 is successfully using Russian-built Glonass GPS receivers for aiming and target acquisition, and intends to continue. Glonass was always intended as a oint military/civilian system, but RIA Novosti points out that Glonass has just 16 functional satellites out of 22, let alone the 24 working satellites needed for global navgation services. Russia has stated its intent to launch replacement satellites, in order to bring the GLONASS constellation to full performance. During a December 2005 summit, India agreed to share some of the development costs of the more advanced GLONASS-K series and launch 2 of the new satellites from India, in return for access to the more precise military GLONASS HP signal. Export customers would have to make their own arrangements. Aug 9/10: Defence Minister Shri AK Antony updates the status of various missile programs, in a Parliamentary reply to Shri SB Wankhede and Shri AP Shivaji. Trishul and Akash aren’t mentioned at all; the former presumably owing to its cancelation, the latter because it may no longer be a development program. The Nag anti-tank missile has completed its validation trials, and is ready to enter production. The reply does not mention orders. The HELINA helicopter-fired variant has been cleared for captive carriage trials and handed over to HAL. On the ballistic missile front, the Agni-I with a range of 700 km and Agni-II with a range of “more than 2,000 km” have been developed and inducted. Agni-III with a stated range of 3,000 km is described as “ready for induction.” The PJ-10 BrahMos supersonic cruise missile has been bought and inducted in Indian Navy and Indian Army. The Air Version of the missile is under development. Antony adds that: “Except BrahMos, no offer has been received from any country for joint venture in missile development programmes. There is no plan to accept the conditions of Missile Technology Control Regime.” This means India is willing to export BrahMos without complying with the MTCR’s limitations, which includes a 300km/ 500kg range/payload limit. That could place Russia in an interesting position, as it signed the MTCR in 1995. A second response from Antony says that: “The Inter-Governmental Agreement… stipulates that the missile… also will be exported to friendly countries. Therefore, the Government of India in consultation with Government of Russia will export Brahmos cruise missile to friendly countries taking into account the security needs of the both countries. The Brahmos joint venture has participated in many International Exhibitions and some countries have shown interest to buy. But, no decision has been taken by the Government regarding the countries to whom the missile can be sold… Export will start only after meeting minimum requirements of India. There is an Inter-Governmental Agreement signed between India and Russia on export of Brahmos missile. This also has approval of the Indo-Russian Inter-Governmental Commission for Military Technical Cooperation for export.” April 20/10: Brahmand reports that the BrahMos missile is ready for launch from underwater platforms. Indian Defence Minister A K Antony adds that the air-launched version would be ready in 2012, fr use from SU-30MKI fighters, and DRDO has provided INR 500 million for expansion of the manufacturing complex: “Some parts of the missile components and the airborne launcher are currently being produced in Thiruvananthapuram complex of BrahMos Aerospace. It is planned to set up the integration complex in the adjacent land belonging to IAF, so that the manufacturing of the missile can be from the Thiruvananthapuram complex.” Feb 2/10: India increases its Akash buy to 1,000. The Indian Air Force issues an INR 42.79 billion (about $925 million) contract to buy 750 more Akash medium-range surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) from state-run Bharat Electronics Ltd (BEL). This follows an INR 12.21 billion order for 2 initial squadrons with 250 missiles total, back in January 2009 (q.v. Jan 12/09 entry). Defence minister AK Antony reportedly said that: “A decision to place this fresh order with BEL was taken after the IAF expressed satisfaction with the performance of the Akash missiles that are deployed in two squadrons… on a pilot basis. The IAF has decided to deploy the weapon in more squadrons for optimal use.” Specifically, the IAF has now ordered 8 total squadrons of 125 Akash missiles each. Delivery under this order is expected between 2012-2015. The Hindu | Indian Express | Times of India | Times Now | Bloomberg | India’s Business Times. March 30/09: An Indian media story carried by DNA alleges that a senior Indian Air Force officer was instrumental in reducing India’s buy of the DRDO’s long Akash missile project from 8 squadrons to 2, and is now doing work related to MR-SAM for Israeli firms following his retirement from service: “Without naming the officer, Defence Research & Development Organisation chief M Natarajan told a press conference in Bangalore during the Aero India show last month that the officer had slashed his predecessor’s commitment to induct eight squadrons of Akash missiles. The officer had brought the figure down to just two squadrons. Akash has a range of 27km, while MRSAM has a range of about 70km. A source in the defence ministry confirmed that even for the induction of these two Akash squadrons, the IAF put a condition that the DRDO must first agree to the MRSAM project… “[He] killed Akash, blackmailed us to agree to MRSAM, and is now working for them openly.” That range difference would appear to be rather significant, all by itself. This situation could reflect a classic bureaucratic strong-arm tactic, executed by a service that accepted the inevitability of some Akash buys, but was unenthusiastic about the system and sought to minimize them. It is also possible that these arrangements could reflect corruption, as they did in the USAF’s Darleen Druyun/ Boeing scandal. The “revolving door” problem is hardly unique to India, and a political investigation is likely to ensue. Much will depend on the timing of his private-sector employment discussions, and India’s conflict of interest rules for retired senior officers. The MR-SAM contract was reportedly signed on March 27/09. March 30/09: Tata Power Company Ltd. announces that its Strategic Electronics Division (SED) has bagged a Rs 182.46 Crore (INR 1.82 billion, $32.25 million equivalent) to manufacture 16 tracked Akash launchers, to be delivered over the next 33 months. Feb 10/09: Top Left Front leaders, Prakash Karat (General Secretary, Communist Party of India – Marxist) and A B Bardhan (General Secretary, Communist Party of India) send a letter to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh Opposing the MR-SAM contract to Israel Aircraft Industries (IAI), asking the government not to “subvert” india’s indigenous missile effort, which it characterizes as “superior.” The letter also cites the bribery allegations against IAI (see Oct 13/08 entry). See: Press Trust of India | DID’s full MR-SAM coverage. Jan 26/09: India’s Army places an urgent Rs 592-crore ($120 million equivalent) order for 4,100 of MBDA’s Milan-2T tandem warhead anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs), to be assembled under license by Bharat Dynamics, Ltd. The man-portable Milan-2T missiles will join existing Milan family missiles in India’s arsenal, and will be used alongside the 4,000 Russian AT-14 Konkurs and 443 Nag systems ordered in 2008. Unlike the Nag, the AT-14 and Milan-2T do not require a vehicle carrier like the tracked “Namica.” Milan is primarily a squad-portable missile, though it can be mounted on land vehicles if desired. The Indian Army is reportedly seeking about 7,000 more anti-armor missiles, “a gap that will be filled by producing Milan ER and buying foreign-made missiles,” according to an Indian Army official quoted by Defense News. India Defence | Defense News. Jan 20/09: Maitri – Revenge of DRDO? India Defence reports that neither MBDA nor India’s state-run DRDO have given up on their “SR-SAM” short range air defense proposal. Rumors peg it as a combination of DRDO’s Trishul and MBDA’s VL-MICA system, though Trishul’s failure and VL-MICA’s techologies mean that claims regarding Trishul technology are likely to be about saving face as much as anything else. The “Maitri” LLQRM proposal’s positioning would be directly competitive with RAFAEL’s SPYDER, and VL-MICA is deployable as a mobile system. That could affect SPYDER’s future expansion within the Indian military, and might even affect its prospects if program problems crop up. VL-MICA’s capabilities mean that an SR-SAM/Maitri using these missiles would also be directly competitive with India’s indigenous Akash, and might even impinge on the proposed medium range MR-SAM deal involving a longer-range Barak missile. Jan 12/09: The Indian Air Force has finally placed an INR 12.21 billion (about $250 million) order with Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL) for 2 squadrons of Akash surface to air missiles. The order was placed a full 14 months after the completion of field trials at Pokhran in Rajasthan, though the decision itself was made in May 2008 (see May 11/08 entry). The Hindu reports that: “Earlier, the IAF had reservations about placing the order as the missile, in its present version, does not meet a few of its operating requirements. The IAF wanted a smaller, lighter missile that had a longer range and was more manoeuvrable. The missile also does not have a seeker. However, batch-by-batch improvements in Akash are expected.” Jan 10/09: BrahMos Aerospace confirms that 2 Indian Air Force Sukhoi-30MKI fighter jets have been sent to Russia for a retrofit programme that would enable them to launch the Brahmos aerial version. the official added that in addition to work integrating the weapon into the plane’s electronics, the 9 m/ 29.5 foot long aerial missile will require modifications to the SU-30MKI’s fuselage. That length may be less of a problem for India’s forthcoming Boeing P-8i maritime patrol aircraft, but there has been no confirmation of plans to fit BrahMos to that platform yet. India’s domain-b business news. SPYDER MR vs. SR (click to view full) Dec 11/08: The Indian Ministry of Defence confirms that it has signed the Spyder contract – and canceled Trishul. Defence Minister Shri AK Antony, in a written reply to Shri Tarini Kanta Roy in Rajya Sabha: “Ministry of Defence has signed a contract with M/s Rafael, Israel to procure Spyder Low Level Quick Reaction Missile System (LLQRM) for the Indian Air Force. The proposal for Trishul system was foreclosed due to its inability to meet certain critical operational requirements. However, it served as a technology demonstrator and the expertise acquired with the technologies developed during design and development phase of Trishul Missile System are being utilized for developing state-of-the-art Short Range Surface to Air Missile System.” Dec 8/08: The Hindu reports that final user trials of the land version of Nag will be held in Chandan Air Force range, near Jaisalmer, from Dec 22 – 30/08. Nag project director S.S. Mishra says that up to 7 missiles will be fired during the Army trials, to be followed by summer Army trials in June 2009. Nag went on to complete the first phase of final user trials, while being fired against moving and stationary targets at different times during day and night. July 12/08: The Times of India reports that India’s Defence Research and Development Organisation planning the “final developmental flight trials” of Nag at Pokhran on July 27-28/08, to be followed by the “user-trials” in mid-September. “Over 60 developmental trials of Nag have been conducted over the years but recurring problems in the guidance systems, especially in the “imaging infra-red (IIR) sensor-based seeker”, has meant the missile is still to become fully operational. DRDO, however, is quite confident now…” June 22/08: Reports by the Press Trust of India indicate that France’s MBDA is looking to partner with the DRDO and Bharat Dynamics to offer a range of short-medium range anti-aircraft missiles. The proposed venture would offer these missiles to the Navy, Air force, and Army. It would compete directly with the Indo-Israeli MR-SAM proposal and the proposed purchase of Spyder short-range air defense, and could effectively sideline both Trishul and Akash. PTI. See also Jan 20/09 update. June 21/08: BrahMos Aerospace joint venture managing director, Dr Sivathanu Pillai says that they have finished development of the BrahMos-Airborne. Its booster size has been reduced compared to other variants, in order to lower its mass and maintain the requisite aerodynamic stability after launch. The BrahMos-A missiles will be mounted on the Su-30MKI, and may also see employment from future maritime patrol aircraft. Pillai added, however, that progress on the scheduled flight trials has been slow on account of Russia’s Sukhoi Design Bureau according priority to the fifth generation aircraft project. Deccan Herald. May 11/08: Sify.com reports that the Indian Air Force (IAF) has decided to induct 2 squadrons of Akash Surface-to-Air Missiles, each of which will have 18 batteries. The project is now being handed over to public and private sector industries for manufacturing, which may include Bharat Electronics Ltd (BEL), Bharat Dynamics Ltd (BDL) and Electronics Corporation of India (ECIL), along with the private sector Larsen and Toubro and Tata Power. Feb 27/08: Defence Minister Shri AK Antony offers a written Parliamentary reply to Shri S S Ahluwalia that itemized expenditures to date on each missile system, as of Jan 18/08. Note that these US dollar currency conversions given here will be inaccurate, because they use this day’s exchange rate – not the weighted rates over the 20+ year life of each program: Missile Reported Cost USD, Feb 28/08 Prithvi SRBM 2.99 billion rupees $75.2 million Agni IRBM (demonstrator) 743.4 million rupees $18.7 million Trishul SR-SAM 2.827 billion rupees $71.1 million Akash MR-SAM 5.169 billion rupees $130 million Nag anti-armor 2.123 billion rupees $53.4 million TOTAL INR 13.851 billion $348.4 million Feb 27/08: The Indian MoD once again denies that IGMP has been abandoned, while offering budgetary figures. The release does say that “Development of Trishul missile system has been completed as technology demonstration,” however, which tends to imply a low likelihood of fielding. MoD release. Jan 14/08: IANS, via India Defence: “After the Indian Air Force (IAF), the Indian Army too is hedging its bets on the indigenously developed Akash surface-to-air missile, saying it would test the weapon before deciding on its deployment… ‘Some of our requirements are still to be met. Only after that will we try out the system,’ [Indian Army chief Gen. Deepak Kapoor] said of the army version… taken 20 years to develop against a target of 12 years. At the same time, he did not deny media reports that the army had rejected the missile system. While the IAF has initiated steps to induct a squadron-strength… IAF chief Air Chief Marshal Fali Homi Major refused to commit himself to the eventual numbers of the missile the force would deploy… A senior IAF officer pointed out that this did not necessarily mean the IAF had accepted the missile. ‘What we witnessed were trials conducted in a DRDO environment. We will now conduct trials in our own environment. Let’s see what emerges from that,’ the officer told IANS, speaking on condition of anonymity. Now, with the army too seemingly unhappy with Akash, it is clear that there is a disconnect between the armed forces and the DRDO, which claims the missile is ready to go into serial production and that it expects orders worth Rs.5 billion ($120 million) from the IAF this year.” Jan 8/08: The IGMP program is reportedly terminated. Chennai Online: “India today announced scrapping of the country’s strategic integrated guided missile programme, and said the development and production of most of futuristic weapons systems would henceforth be undertaken with foreign collobration. However, longer range missiles, under-sea launched missiles and furturistic weapons systems like electronic counter-warfare measures would be “undertaken in-house”, said one of the country’s top defence scientists Dr S Prahlada. …New missile and weapons systems will be developed within a five-year time frame at low costs, with foreign partners and private industries” Prahalda, Chief Controller at DRDO headquarters, said.” Akash Exhibit (click to view full) Nov 26/07: Defence Minister Shri AK Antony sends a written reply to Shri Raghuveer Singh Koshal in Lok Sabha: “Brahmos Supersonic cruse missile has been successfully developed for Indian Navy and Indian Army as joint effort with Russia. Development of air version has also been sanctioned and is progressing for integration with SU-30 MKI for the Indian Air Force. The re-design and development of the air launched version of missile has been completed and missile is ready for testing. Suitable universal launcher for different types of aircraft has also been designed. The tests would be carried out in 2009.” Nov 26/07: Defence Minister Shri AK Antony refuses to answer questions re: negotiations with Israel under the MR-SAM program. See July 12/07 entry. Nov 21/07: India announces successful tests of the Akash missile in Rajasthan’s Thar desert near Pokhran, about 200km/ 120 miles from Pakistan’s borders and a previous site for nuclear testing, rather than at India’s National Missile Testing Range in the eastern state of Orissa. Samir Sinha, spokesman of India’s Defence Research and Development Organisation: “The test was a success and we hope Akash will be inducted very soon into the army.” The Akash system began test flights in 2000, and was expected to be inducted by the Indian Army and the Air Force by 2003; as of July 31/07, Rs 492.41 crore (about $121.4 million) has already been spent on Akash’s devedlopment. AFP report | India Defence report. July 12/07: The MR-SAM project may be about to take the Barak deal to a new level. If reports are correct, this Rs 10,000 crore (almost $2.5 billion) deal would see a long range version of the Barak enter service as India’s medium-range land-based surface-air-missile system – a move that would probably spell the de facto end of the Akash program, just as the Barak and Barak-NG have effectively killed Trishul. June 21/07: The land launched version of Brahmos is inducted into the Indian Army. India Defence reports that: “The Government had approved induction of three regiments of BrahMos Missile system in the Indian Army out of which the Army had initially placed the requirement for one regiment. The delivery of this system was to start from July 2008. However, for early operationalisation of the missile system, the delivery of one Mobile Command Post and two Mobile Autonomous Launchers has been advanced by one year.” See also RIA Novosti story. Dec 4/06: Brazil is inquiring about the PJ-10 BrahMos, in both the naval and land-launched versions. Nov 29/06: India Defence relays an official statement that “Akash, Nag and Trishul Missiles To Be Completed By December 2007.” Such promises have been made before. See the “Related Reports & News” section below for more skeptical assessments. Brahmos land test (click to view full) Oct 27/06: India and Russia intend to manufacture 1,000 BrahMos supersonic cruise missiles over the next 10 years through their joint venture company BrahMos Aerospace, selling nearly half of that production to third countries. The two countries have invested $300 million in the joint venture thus far. BrahMos has entered service with the Indian Navy, and the missile’s land-based version is expected to be inducted into the Army in 2007. Initial tests are also underway to modify the Indian Air Force’s SU-30MKI fighters for BrahMos carriage. Read the full article here. Oct 23/06: An MBDA release confirms that they have “agreed with India’s Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) to support a number of anti-tank and air defence programmes.” This could mean either a rescue for Akash and Nag, or the effective end of those programs. Oct 14/06: India Defence reports that research and development work on the Trishul short-range ship defense missile will be stopped in December 2006, according to official sources in New Delhi. Instead, the Defence Research & Development Organisation (DRDO) will focus on developing an advanced version of the Israeli Barak missile. Aug 17/06: Defence Minister Shri Pranab Mukherjee offers a written Parliamentary reply to Shri Asaduddin Owaisi in Lok Sabha re: the Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme, He noted that the Akash medium range surface-to-air missile and Nag “3rd Generation Anti-Tank Missile,” were entering the user trials phase and “are expected to be inducted after that.” Of the short range Trishul surface-to-air missile, he simply said that it “has also been developed as a technology demonstrator.” See release, which also covers the Agni and Prithvi ballistic missiles. July 28/06: According to India Daily, “Indian Defence Minister Pranab Mukherjee told the Parliament on Thursday that New Delhi was selling BrahMos missile systems to other countries, but declined to give details “due to the sensitivities involved with export of the missiles”.” See link at india-defence.com. July 23-24/06: Not so fast. India conducts test-firings of the Trishul missile on July 23rd and July 24th; it is also reportedly being developed for use by India’s Army. February 7/06: Trishul’s future may be history. India is deepening cooperation with Israel re: the Barak. Appendix A: DID Op/Ed Analysis – India’s Export Prospects (Dec 1/05) Trishul Test It is worthy of note that development of the Trishul, Akash, and Nag missile systems were all inaugurated under the Integrated Guided Missile Development Program (IGMDP) begun by the Defence Rasearch Development Organisation (DRDO) 22 years ago in 1983. Unlike the Agni and Prithvi ballistic missiles, these other three missiles have yet to become operational in substantial numbers, and can be fairly described as still in the testing stage based on the Indian Minitry of Defence’s 2004-2005 Annual Report. It wasn’t until November 2004, for instance, that Akash trials conducted with a live warhead and active terminal radar navigation achieved repeatable performance against test targets. Indeed, both the Trishul and Akash missile projects have been reported as cancelled several times. India’s Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) or politicians usually clarified these reports by noting that the projects had “been converted to research & development projects.” The general follow-up was that testing would continue, while foreign missiles (the Israeli Barak procured by India’s Navy to fill the Trishul’s role, and recent discussions with the USA re: the Patriot) were investigated and/or procured for immediate needs. India’s Nag project also dates back to 1983, and has followed a similar pattern. Like Trishul and Akash, it has recently made strides toward full operational status, but its IIR guidance has been a consistent problem and advanced versions with millimeter-wave guidance have remained entirely elusive. The Nag will be confined to vehicle-mounted use. Along the way, India has looked to foreign missiles to fill its niche (Russia’s AT-14 Kornet, the AT-5 Spandarel produced locally by Bharat Dynamics as the Konkurs-M, and the Euromissile MILAN/MILAN2). In 2008, the Indian Army ordered 4,000 Konkurs-M missiles plus 443 homegrown Nag anti-tank missiles and 13 Namica tracked missile carriers, for induction from 2009-2011. In January 2009, the Army ordered another 4,000 Milan 2T missiles, to be built under license by India’s state-owned Bharat Dynamics Ltd. In many ways, these missile programs are excellent case examples of the systemic modernization and procurement problems that face India’s defense ministry and industry. In contrast, the PJ-10 BrahMos supersonic anti-ship/strike cruise missile began in 1998 as a joint project based on Russian SS-N-26 Oniks designs, and is already ready to enter service. Many consider this program to be a model of Indian defense procurement success, as the missile and can claim equivalent or superior range and performance to the SS-N-22 Moskit/Sunburn that was developed by Raduga in Russia and sold to India’s rival China. The decision to export these missiles does offer India a broader base of potential sales, which might allow it to recoup some of its development costs over the last 22 years. The DRDO’s Chairman of the IGMDP program and Chief Controller (R&D) said, for instance, that: “even if we market about a thousand missiles, it will be a big thing and fetch something between Rs. 3,000 to 4,000 crores. (USD $66-88 million)” On the other hand, the missiles have to actually sell abroad in order to generate that benefit. India will assuredly have a number of clients for BrahMos; but it remains to be seen whether any of its other missile programs will gain traction on the global market. It is possible that Akash will find a niche as an “under the radar” SAM choice that sits between Russia’s SA-6 (generally considered to be unreliable against advanced threats), and advanced S-300 (whose export tends to provoke strong reactions from the USA). Trishul and Nag, on the other hand, will have to contend with a plethora of capable, modern competitors from Russia, France, Israel, Sweden, Europe, and the USA that exhibit superior performance and/or a more confidence-inspiring record. Neither France nor Russia make political or human rights considerations much of a factor in their arms sales, which would give these competitors an additional edge even if India’s standards end up being less restrictive than those of European or US firms. Unless India can drive sales based on cost and political support, therefore, export prospects for the latter two missile systems at least do not appear particularly strong. Appendix B: Additional Readings & Sources – Related Reports & News India’s DRDO (Defence Research & Development Organization) DID – MR-SAM India Gives Go-Ahead to Joint Israeli Program. This $2 billion project looks set to build on the naval Barak-NG, in order to provide India’s military with a medium-range land based SAM. India’s Frontline Magazine (Aug 16-29/08) – Arming India. Favorable coverage of DRDO, mentions the Rajendra radar’s industrial importance. DID (Nov 17/06) – India’s DRDO Rethinking the Way it Does Business. The rumbles of dissatisfaction are becoming quite loud. The Indian Express (Nov 12/06) – Armed Forces wait as showpiece missiles are unguided, way off mark. They do not give good odds of success for Trishul, Nag, or the Akash. Part of their “Showpiece Projects, Big Blots” article series linked in DID’s Nov 17 article. DID (Feb 7/06) – Israel, India to Cooperate on $350M Long-Range Barak SAM Project. The Barak was bought as a stopgap because Trishul wasn’t ready. This project indicates a serious future for the Barak in India, and may spell the end for Trishul. Foreign Policy Association (Dec 18/05) – Will the Indian Defense Industry Aim Globally? The Hindu (Nov 21/05) – DRDO to Export Missiles DID (Nov 18/05) – India’s MoD Releases 2004-2005 Annual Report Appendix C: Additional Readings & Sources – The Missiles Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies – [Indian] Missile Development, 2002-2003. Outstanding source for timelined reports over that period re: all of the IGMDP missiles, including India’s ballistic missile program. BrahMos – Official site. Reader warning: as of Nov/07, this site has a number of missing or broken elements. eDefense Online – Cruiser & Destroyer Killers: Soviet & Russian Anti-ship Missiles, Part 2 [Google cache] Global Security – PJ-10 Brahmos Express Computer (Feb 28/05) – The IT in India’s cruise missile DRDO Tech Focus (August 2004) – Launching Platforms for Brahmos GlobalSecurity.org – Moskit/ SS-N-22 Sunburn Bharat-Rakshak – Akash SAM India DRDO/DRDL – Official Akash missile site Aero India – Challenges in design, development, system integration, testing, evaluation and production of Surface to Air Tactical Missile system – Akash [PDF] GlobalSecurity.org – SA-6 Gainful Bharat-Rakshak – Trishul SAM GlobalSecurity – Trishul (Trident) air-defense missile. Clips a lot from Indian press releases, take with a grain of salt. Does describe some of the program’s difficulties, but only goes to about 2003. Israeli Weapons – Barak. Reports that India’s orders of the Barak missile have totalled $360 million. Israel Aircraft Industries – Barak Ship Point Defense System Bharat-Rakshak – Barak SAM. Lists ships on which these missiles are installed. Bharat-Rakshak – Nag ATGM Defense News – India’s BDL to Build Milan 2T Missiles. Order for 4,000. Also mentions the 2008 order for 443 Nags, plus 4,000 AT-14s from Russia. The Tribune of Chadigarh, India (Dec 26/00) – India to Buy Missiles from Russia. Refers to anti-armor missiles in light of Nag’s slow development. Army Technology – Kornet-M Anti-Armor Missile, Russia Army Technology – Milan Anti-Tank Missile System (Europe) Warfare.RU – AT-5 Spandrel / 9K111-1 Konkurs -M View the full article

Reviewed by CDR Brian Emory, USN Chief Warrant Officer Kevin P. Gilheany has done a wonderful job delivering a memoir of his service in the Coast Guard. His writing style is easy to read and always engaging in a book that’s can be completed in one sitting or over a weekend. His story begins in his youth where he developed two key goals that would stay him throughout his life. The first happens while watching the annual St. Patrick’s Day parade near Fifth Avenue in New York City. It was there that he fell in love with the sound of bag pipes and dreamed of being able to play them someday. The second event happened during the Bicentennial Celebration in 1976 when his mother took all three children to tour USCGC EAGLE at Pier 17 in the Seaport District of NYC. After waiting for hours to get onboard, it was on her decks that Kevin decided he wanted to join the Coast Guard when he grew up. It would be 7 years later that he would report to Coast Guard boot camp and begin his 20 year career. Kevin shares honest stories about his life in the Coast Guard beginning in the 1980’s when things were a lot different than today. All of these “sea stories” come across as honest and inviting as the reader has the chance to share is the many adventures experienced by a young Quartermaster growing up in the sea service. What makes this book better than just a collection of stories is how Kevin reveals his personal philosophy on determination and achieving his goals. Though a first time author, he is able to bring out principles and leadership lessons the same way an old high school friend would share how he got to be successful while at your twentieth high school reunion. There is a sense of friendship between the author and reader as Kevin imparts how he handled hardships and kept his eye on what he wanted most in life. The events aren’t sugar coated and during those times when Kevin made mistakes, he shares them as freely as the successes. The constant drive throughout the book is his desire to be the best Guardsman he can be in the Coast Guard. Instead of being upset at whatever circumstances he’s given, Kevin’s philosophy to do his best always comes out. And from that it becomes obvious to the reader how determination and hard work allowed him to quickly move up the enlisted ranks and retire as a Chief Warrant Officer at 20 years in 2003. But a year before that day, Kevin describes how he brought about accomplishing his second goal of learning to play bag pipes and founding the U.S. Coast Guard Pipe Band in 2002. After reading the book it’s hard to say what the author is most proud of accomplishing. The second part of the book’s title is “An Unlikely Career in the U.S. Coast Guard” and harkens back to what an outsider would have said when looking at recruit Gilheany heading to boot camp, but the message of the book and internal character of Kevin reveals the dichotomy of that title. Chief Warrant Officer Gilheany knew what he wanted to accomplish in life and shares with the reader how a poor, overweight, non-swimming and alcoholic kid can make a difference for himself and those around him by becoming the best Quartermaster, Chief and Warrant Officer in the Coast Guard. In addition, he is credited with founding an enduring tradition with the establishment of the USCG Pipe Band. This book is a great read for everyone from a Coast Guard veteran to anyone interested in funny stories and life of someone that made a difference. Minding the Helm: An Unlikely Career in the U.S. Coast Guard, by Kevin P. Gilheany. University of North Texas Press, 2019. 269 pp. CDR Brian L. Emory, USN (Military Faculty, Joint Forces Staff College) Purchase your copy of Minding the Helm today! The post Blog first appeared on Naval Historical Foundation. View the full article

Reviewed by Jon Middaugh, Ph.D. Donald Stoker, a Professor of Strategy and Policy for the U.S. Naval War College’s Monterey Program at the Naval Postgraduate School from 1999-2017, has written a tightly argued case for improving the approach American leaders use for fighting wars. The recommendations and insights in Why America Loses Wars deserve widespread circulation among strategists. But despite the author’s background, his focus falls on military and political considerations writ large and offers few insights tailored to the Navy. The work stems from a premise that American and Western leaders have, since World War II, failed to clarify when the country is at war or what victory looks like. As a result, they have struggled to apply an appropriate strategic approach and sufficient resources to win. Their misguided analysis of ends, ways, and means created confusion and produced unnecessary setbacks in Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria. According to Stoker, many leaders and theorists have become accustomed to losing and even suspicious of winning “limited wars.” Readers might question the title’s implication that the United States (and South Korea) lost in Korea or that the United States (and Iraq) lost in Iraq, but the analysis of how these and other wars were conceived and fought exposes a clear pattern of weak strategical thinking emanating from Washington. To find their way, national leaders must focus squarely upon the political objective(s) each war participant is pursuing. Then, after assessing constraints that usually affect combatants and their allies—time; national or political will; geography; and economic factors—a strategy can be determined and resourced appropriately. The dynamism and unpredictability of war, however, mean that the “value of the [political] object” must be reassessed whenever significant factors change. Regularly citing classic strategists such as Carl von Clausewitz and Sun Tzu, Stoker illustrates the importance of his own recommendations by also examining a host of international conflicts including the Russo-Japanese War and the ongoing India-Pakistan maneuvering over Kashmir. These examples and the theoretical framework they support appear quite helpful for explaining successes or failures in the past, but how might they apply currently to the tensions between the United States and Iran? Are missile exchanges, drone strikes, and the resulting casualties indicators of war? If so, then what would each side and its allies’ political objective(s) be? In addition, one of the few naval examples appears only in the last two pages, but it is quite relevant in 2020: Chinese leaders assess that “a limited military conflict in the maritime domain” constitutes their most likely military engagement. A bit more analysis of this point could broaden the appeal to a naval audience, but as written the book still offers many valuable insights for all. Review of Donald Stoker, Why America Loses Wars: Limited War and US Strategy form the Korean War to the Present (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2019) Jon Middaugh works full-time as a historian for the Naval History and Heritage Command in Washington, D.C., where he co-authored a pamphlet on the Navy’s role in Operation Torch (2018), and previously served as a historian at the U.S. Army Center of Military History. His most recent publication is “Integrating the Components: the Army National Guard within the Army,” in Jason Warren, ed., Landpower in the Long War (University of Kentucky Press, 2019). He holds a Ph.D. in history and is a graduate of the Army War College. Purchase your copy of Why America Loses Wars today! The post Blog first appeared on Naval Historical Foundation. View the full article

Using his own phrase, John L. McCrea was a fly on the wall at the White House during the first months of the War in the Pacific when naval affairs dominated Franklin Roosevelt’s interest. Working under Admiral Harold “Betty” Stark in the office of Chief of Naval Operations, McCrea had a front row seat as the U.S. entered the war. When Ernest J. King replaced Stark, he learned to adjust his behaviors to cope with the cold, hot-tempered, hardnosed, and pugnacious top admiral. Captain McCrea desperately wanted a cruiser command, but Stark and King both felt he would be of greater use as naval aide to the President; furthermore, they wanted a trusted aide that could keep them informed of Roosevelt’s mind and who was influencing him. The loyal sailor quietly put his own desires aside for the good of the country, and was offered an unparalleled view of the inner workings of the White House. FDR’s Chief of Staff, Major General Edwin (Pa) Watson instructed McCrea that he was to provide twice daily briefings of Naval Affairs, and quietly stand in the corner while discussions took place among the President, Secretary of Navy Frank Knox, Pa Watson, and others such as Harry Hopkins and the President’s wife, Eleanor. With speed and a modicum of trepidation the Captain found himself to be the only person with immediate access to the Oval Office that was not of Flag rank. He rapidly learned what was essential for presidential attention and what was of lesser importance; however, he also identified Roosevelt’s sharply keen interest in certain ships or personnel that warranted FDR’s awareness. He often retained these bits of information or gossip for Sunday mornings while the valet dressed the President. The Captain discovered an unused room and initiated the Map Room with large maps acquired from the Navy, Army and the National Geographic Society. This center, staffed daily, became one of the most crucial rooms during the war. FDR was tickled, and McCrea moved up a peg for his actions. Effective and conscientious, McCrea quickly gained a personal and affectionate friendship with FDR who became more and more dependent on the 4-striper. McCrea recognized Roosevelt’s partiality for viewing sundry maps of wartime theaters. When the President went on a two-week train ride around America, he insisted that McCrea accompany him, and used the strong arm of the sailor to hold himself erect when stopping for speeches. Roosevelt, understanding history and the Navy, recognized that despite his own dependency on McCrea, the Captain deserved a command. The President released him from duty and allowed him to be the first Commanding Officer of America’s biggest battleship, the USS Iowa upon which the former aide bombarded islands of Japan and eventually earned Task Force command in the North Pacific. While this book may lack historical significance, it is important in understanding FDR, the wartime White House, and the events surrounding significant leaders of the era. McCrea did not keep a diary during his war years for security reasons; but immediately after his retirement he commenced creating an oral history. His stepdaughter organized the several dozen tapes and started editing them for this book. The “yarns”, as McCrea called them, are fascinating and fun to read. One of his stories includes a meeting with notorious Admiral Ernest King. King told McCrea that he had the making of a good admiral but he wasn’t a son-of-a-bitch, and a good admiral had to be a SOB. The Captain, lying through his teeth and with a straight face, said that he had never heard anyone ever call King a SOB. King was so upset that he stormed out of the room slamming the door behind him. Julia C. Tobey edited these stories with a sharp eye for interesting tidbits. Assisted by the highly lauded historian, Craig Symonds, Tobey crafted a wonderful book. Readers with a perspective on print size and fonts will find that Skyhorse Publishing issued a quality edition that is easy on the eye. Anyone with an interest in World War II will find this book well worth the $25, if for no other reason than for the “yarns”. Captain McCrea’s War: The World War II Memoir of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Naval Aide and USS Iowa’s First Commanding Officer By John McCrea, edited by Julia C. Tobey, Skyhorse Publications, New York City, NY. (2016). Reviewed by Stephen D. Regan, Ed.D. Dr. Stephen D. Regan is a former professor and academic dean at Upper Iowa University. His passion is naval history and maritime affairs. He wrote the biography of Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher. Buy Captain McCrea’s War now! View the full article

By Rick Campbell, St. Martinâs Press, New York, NY (2017) Reviewed by William H. White Having read and reviewed one or two of his previous tales, Cdr. Rick Campbell’s latest, BLACKMAIL is in my opinion, his best by a long shot. And unfortunately, it is, in large part, the most credible. While Campbellâs background is in submarines, they are only a part of the action in this book, augmenting both the land-based and carrier portions of this action-packed thriller. The premise, without giving too much away, is essentially World War III set mainly in the Arabian Sea â at least for the ship and battle scenes. The action moves logically and fluidly ashore when necessary, aiding and augmenting the plot. Politics, behind-the-scenes guerilla warfare, and international intrigue all turn up and are well done. The story unfolds with an âaccidentalâ attack on a U.S. carrier patrolling in WestPac; the United States is not in a position to retaliate immediately due to the weakened state of our forces, the result of a prolonged war with China. Political unrest in Europe allows Russia to move troops into large portions of what used to be the Soviet Union, more or less unopposed. Then Russia announces they have sabotaged the worldâs major oil pipelines which, if their explosives are activated, will essentially shut down the industrial worldâs economies. The conundrum for the United States is what to do about it, and who to ask for help. Any obvious course of action seems to offer dire consequences. Of course, Russia is out there bribing those same nations NOT to help. Campbell brings back several of his earlier characters, including National Security Advisor Christine OâConnor, who readers met in his previous book, Ice Station Nautilus. Several of the presidentâs staff reappear as well. The story is clever, with credible dialogue, and without the overbearing professional knowledge the author possesses. I suspect Commander Campbell had fun writing this story; I know I certainly had fun reading it. As I was provided an advance proof, there were no maps or tables in it which will surely help future readers. I highly recommend Blackmail to any who fancy the action/political thriller genre; it will not disappoint. William H. White is a noted naval historical fiction writer who resides in Rumson, NJ. BOOK REVIEW – BLACKMAIL was published by the Naval Historical Foundation and originally appeared on Naval Historical Foundation on June 30, 2017. View the full article

The Russian supercavitating torpedo, the Shkval, has been with us for decades. Partly because it has not been used in combat and partially because we just don't think it is all that much of a threat because of our own biases and understanding of the technology, we have not given it all that much thought. We are very focused on defending against threats from the air, A2AD and all that jazz, and for those below, we have nifty little countermeasures and anti-torpedo defenses we are trying out - but those are focused on what we know and am comfortable with - traditional torpedoes. Via The Economist, I'm not quite sure we are that ready for this; WHEN introduced 40 years ago, the Soviet Shkval (“Squallâ€) torpedo was hailed as an “aircraft-carrier killer†because its speed, more than 370kph (200 knots), was four times that of any American rival. The claim was premature. Problems with its design meant Shkval turned out to be less threatening than hoped (or, from a NATO point of view, less dangerous than feared), even though it is still made and deployed. But supercavitation, the principle upon which its speed depends, has continued to intrigue torpedo designers. Now, noises coming out of the Soviet Union’s successor, Russia, are leading some in the West to worry that the country’s engineers have cracked it. ... In October 2016 plans emerged for a new supercavitating torpedo, Khishchnik (“Predatorâ€). Few details have been released, except that the work is being carried out by Elektropribor, a design bureau specialising in high-precision systems for submarines. Combining a General Dynamics-style sonar with a better motor could, however, result in a weapon that the world’s navies would truly have to fear. Such a motor is possible, according to Georgiy Savchenko of the Institute of Hydromechanics at Ukraine’s National Academy of Sciences. His supercavitation-research group estimates that with the right fuel (perhaps lithium, which packs more energy per kilogram than magnesium) a new torpedo could have ten times the range of Shkval. It would still be noisy, but, added to its speed, such a combination of range and tracking ability would make it hard to evade. Moreover, there is no theoretical reason why Khishchnik should not travel quite a lot faster than Shkval does. In laboratory tests, supercavitating projectiles have clocked more than 5,000kph. That means you need to kill the archer if you can't do anything against the arrow. Yea, about that ... View the full article

The Economist in the last six months published a series of interesting articles on the challenges of anti-submarine warfare. As long time readers may have figured out, I love - from a professional perspective - ASW. Neglected and unloved by most, but to me a passion. Though few really cared outside fellow fetishists, I was actually damn good at it - for an officer. It is all math and a little bit of instinct built by experience, but since I got too old to play tactical and was needed elsewhere - and then after leaving AD totally out of it - I've had to nibble what I can off of open source. For those of you who share this passion, one thing we are always looking for is where technology is going. ASW is hard and is always getting harder in the Darwinian measure/counter-measure hide-n-seek that defines this warfare area. You cannot sit still and expect to win. Though some 100# heads tell you they have "war winning" technology - even when briefed in you soon realize that, well, ... there are holes in the tactical applications. That being said, the more tools the better - and operational experience tells us that you need lots of different tools in order to successfully prosecute enemy submarines through search, localization, track, and attack. Not everything works everywhere against all targets - so bring a big toolbag. As such, this little bit had me reaching for the circular slide rule; ...modern submarines are very quiet, and neither side has gained a definitive upper hand. There are other options. Submarine-spotting aircraft carry “magnetic anomaly detectors†(MAD) which pick up disturbances in the Earth’s magnetic field caused by a submarine’s metal hull. Those disturbances are tiny, which means MAD is only useful at ranges of a few hundred metres. There may, though, be a better way. Thanks to something called the Debye effect, it might be possible to hunt submarines using the magnetic signatures of their wakes. Seawater is salty, full of ions of sodium and chlorine. Because those ions have different masses, any nudge—such as a passing submarine—moves some farther than others. Each ion carries an electric charge, and the movement of those charges produces a magnetic field. The Debye effect has been known since 1933, but its effects were thought to be tiny. The American navy set out to explore it nonetheless in 2009 , giving research grants to three firms to check whether it could be used for submarine detection. One, Cortana Corporation of Falls Church, Virginia, found a significant effect. Cortana was given a second grant in 2011 to continue the work, which was expected to produce a sensor which could be deployed from a ship. Since then the navy has continued to award Cortana grants for hush-hush jobs. Neither Cortana nor the navy will discuss exactly what they are up to. But it is likely that the technique can only detect certain submarine movements in some situations. Submarines produce many different types of wake. As well as the familiar V-shaped wake they leave underwater disturbances known as “internal wavesâ€, flat swirls called “pancake eddies†and miniature vortices which spin off from fins and control surfaces. These all depend not only on speed and depth but also on the submarine’s hydrodynamics (the underwater version of aerodynamics). Read it all. Exciting stuff. Add to it some of the things ... well ... things still locked away, and I like new ways to work the early part of the kill chain ... as long as those sneaky bastards keep moving ... As a side note, why does The Economist keep putting stuff out about ASW? One has to remember, the island nation was twice in the last hundred years almost starved to death by submarines. She knows. View the full article

GBU-12 Paveway II Paveway II kits convert standard Mk 80 family free-fall bombs into laser-guided weapons. Each guidance kit consists of a computer control group (CCG) guidance system with a semi-active laser seeker and pneumatically-controlled guidance canards for the front-end of the bomb, plus an air foil group (AFG) on the back end that provides lift and stability. Once a target is designated, laser guidance is more accurate than GPS, but it can be foiled by obscurants like fog, sandstorms, etc. At the beginning of August 2011, the US government issued a contract worth up to $475 million… “Paveway” is actually a US government designation for laser-guided bombs, but the term has been the subject of global legal battles between Raytheon and Lockheed Martin, with Raytheon claiming it as a trademark, and Lockheed Martin claiming it as a generic term. A number of courts have ruled in favor of the generic argument. Updates May 11/16: Lockheed Martin Missiles and Fire Control and Raytheon Missile Systems have been awarded a combined not-to-exceed $649.7 million modification contract for Paveway II production. The modification provides a five year extension for Paveway II missile production with work completion expected for July 27, 2023. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) of the munition in 2015 included a $1.29 billion sale of muntions to Saudi Arabia, which included 1,000 GBU-12 Paveway II laser guided bombs. Aug 1/11: Lockheed Martin Corp. in Archbold, PA (FA8213-11-D-0008), and Raytheon Missile Systems of Tucson, AZ (FA8213-11-D-0007) receive a $475 million contract for Paveway II laser-guided bomb computer control groups (seekers), and GBU-12 air foil groups (tail kits) for 500 pound bombs. Both elements are needed, in order to create a GBU-12 laser-guided bomb. The Ogden Air Logistics Center/GHGKA at Hill Air Force Base, UT manages the contract. Discussions with Hill AFB confirm that this is a single 5-year firm-fixed-price, multiple-award contract. The 2 firms will compete for purchase orders, as the USAF issues them. View the full article

My recent post on how to counter Chinese anti-shipping capabilities between the First and Second Island Chains was heavily influenced by CAPT William Toti’s seminal article in last June’s Naval Institute Proceedingson the need to tackle anti-submarine warfare from a theater-wide, threat-tailored, combined arms campaign construct. If you haven’t read his article (which is outside the paywall), do so. It is a foundational work. Toti observes that the dramatic sensor advantages that allowed the U.S. Navy to thoroughly dominate Soviet submarines throughout much of the Cold War no longer hold. Our ability to detect and attack an approaching adversary submarine before it can shoot first is uncertain at best. Yet, as Toti points out, “real ASW is not about detecting the submarine, it’s not about killing the submarine, it’s about defeating the submarine.â€The ability to win a close-in “knife fight†against a submarine, while important, represents just one of many opportunities to prevent the submarine from executing an effective attack. The submarine in wartime must, after all, have a safe haven in port for resupply, must break out of port, must transit through marginal seas or the open ocean to its patrol station, must be cued into patrol stations or intercept positions from which it would have the greatest opportunity for encountering prey, must detect and correctly classify a target (or receive targeting-quality cues from external surveillance and reconnaissance assets), must approach the target to weapons release range, and must land a blow with its weapon salvo. Most conceivable adversaries of the U.S. have the added geographical challenge of pushing their submarines through chokepoints such as straits in order to access the open ocean or return to port from patrol. Toti observes that there are exploitable vulnerabilities in each of these steps that can deny the submarine a chance to attack effectively and perhaps even lead to the submarine’s own destruction. Toti also notes that if a potential adversary’s leaders became convinced that the U.S. would be able to defang any submarine offensive, they might opt not to employ their submarines—or go to war—in the first place. In rereading Toti’s article the other week, it occurred to me that there are remarkable parallels between what he suggests could be done to wage a wartime theater anti-submarine campaign and what could be done to wage a campaign to defeat an adversary’s wartime use of theater-range conventionally-armed ballistic and cruise missiles. His recounting of the Navy’s “full-spectrum ASW†doctrine provides an excellent model for tying together a combined arms “full-spectrum anti-theater missile campaign†concept along the lines of what Deputy Secretary of Defense Bob Work dubbed “raid breaker†earlier this year.[ii] Just as ASW doesn’t depend entirely on destroying the submarine, theater missile defense doesn’t depend entirely on destroying the inbound theater missile. With this in mind, we see that each of Toti’s “ten threads of full-spectrum ASW†has an anti-theater missile analogue: Full Spectrum ASW Full Spectrum Anti-Theater Missile Warfare Defeat submarines in port Suppress missile-armed mobile platforms’ basing and logistical support infrastructure Defeat the submarines’ shore-based command and control capability Defeat the systems-of-systems that missile-armed mobile platforms rely upon to attack effectively Defeat submarines near port, in denied areas Defeat missile-armed mobile platforms as they break out of bases/garrisons towards their firing positions Defeat submarines in choke points Defeat missile-armed air and naval platforms in choke points Defeat submarines in open ocean Defeat missile-armed mobile platforms in their patrol or firing areas Draw enemy submarines into ASW “kill boxes,†to a time and place of our choosing Induce missile-armed mobile platforms to fire at false targets and perhaps expose themselves to attack Mask our forces from submarine detection or classification Mask our forces from the adversary’s local reconnaissance and targeting efforts Defeat the submarine in close battle Defeat missile-armed air and naval platforms in close battle Defeat the incoming torpedo Defeat the inbound missile Create conditions where an adversary chooses not to employ submarines Create conditions where an adversary chooses not to employ theater missiles Let’s go through the anti-theater missile “threads†in turn. As we proceed, note that I implicitly discard the option of engaging in war-opening preemptive attacks against an adversary’s theater missile forces. With the exception of certain types of electronic or cyber operations, I work under the assumption that most of the below types of attacks would only be authorized by a U.S. President after a war has already started. Suppress Missile-Armed Mobile Platforms’ Basing and Logistical Support Infrastructure Theater missile-firing platforms include aircraft, submarines, naval surface combatants, and Transporter Erector Launchers (TEL). All of these platforms require logistical support including rearmament, refueling (with the exception of SSNs, of course), replenishment of stores, corrective maintenance, and damage repair. In war, the bases in which they normally reside, receive servicing, and operate from can be attacked (assuming authorization from political leadership, which I’ll discuss in more detail below). Nevertheless, not all of these platforms need to always return to a permanently-fixed base for all forms of servicing. For example, many missile-firing platforms can operate from and be serviced to some extent in austere locations such as seaports, airports, “satellite†airbases or ad hocairstrips, or relocatable logistical depots. Some missile-firing platforms can have fuel, stores, repair parts, and even certain types of munitions brought to them in the field: replenishment ships can resupply surface combatants and sometimes submarines at sea, trucks or transport aircraft can resupply strike aircraft at austere airbases/airstrips, and trucks can resupply TEL units. All of these means for logistical support in the “field†can be directly attacked given sufficient intelligence, surveillance, or reconnaissance to know when and where to strike. Moreover, the depots and other fixed infrastructure that logistics forces inevitably pull from can also be identified and attacked. There’s an important caveat, though: the heavy wartime demands on U.S. strike-capable platforms and the finite size of their guided munitions inventories suggests that (politically authorized) targeting lists would have to be prioritized based on a particular logistical asset’s or site’s importance in the adversary’s combat logistics chain, plus the operational and tactical difficulties/risks in attacking that target. This leads to a key point: an intelligent adversary could employ many forms of deception and concealment to heavily complicate U.S. and allied targeting efforts against a logistical asset/site or the missile-armed platforms it was servicing. Nevertheless, many forms of concealment would require that the adversary reduce its missile forces’ operational tempos somewhat in order to reduce the risk of detection, classification, and attack. This might relieve some pressure on friendly air and missile defenses by suppressing the frequency and sizes of missile raids on the margins; this can have a significant effect on a given defense’s probability of annihilating a raid. In turn, this suppression might provide friendly forces increased temporary localized margins of operational freedom in a theater—not to mention possibly alleviate some margin of pressure on allied populations and their governments (and by extension on U.S political leaders). Attacking an adversary’s theater missile forces’ bases along with much of their supporting logistical infrastructure would require strikes against the adversary’s home soil. U.S. political leaders would undoubtedly weigh the escalatory risks of such strikes against the consequences of allowing the adversary to enjoy operational sanctuary for its missile forces. Some critics suggest these escalatory risks would—and should—bar the U.S. from ever attacking a nuclear-armed adversary’s soil. Such critiques however do not recognize the high probability that if the adversary valued certain political objectives highly enough to opt for major war, those objectives would force him to commit the escalatory precedent of conventionally striking a treaty ally’s territory—and perhaps also sovereign U.S. territories—first. This is of immense strategic significance. For one thing, an adversary’s conventional first strike against U.S. or allied territories would almost certainly ignite the popular passions of the victims’ citizens. The pressure on a U.S. President to retaliate in scope if not in kind would be intense. For another, the adversary’s first strike would allow the U.S. and its ally to invoke unassailable legal as well as moral justification for retaliation. These factors would not offset the nuclear risks of non-nuclear retaliation, but it should be noted that there is an enormous difference between selectively striking conventional forces that might carry theater nuclear weapons and striking distinct nuclear forces. In many cases, the bases and logistical infrastructure supporting conventional forces are distinct from those used by nuclear forces. For example, China’s theater nuclear forces (in the form of its DF-21 medium-range ballistic missile force) are distinct (and often geographically segregated) from its conventionally-armed short-range ballistic missile and long-range cruise missile forces. None of this is meant to minimize questions of escalation risk facing a U.S. President, but they most certainly do not present a “checkmating†barrier that prevents operations to deny the adversary’s theater missile forces sanctuary. It bears observing that potential adversaries wouldn’t be investing heavily in integrated territorial air defenses, base hardening, and deception and concealment technologies to protect their conventional theater missile forces if they didn’t accept the reality that those forces might be attacked in war.[iii] Defeat the systems-of-systems that missile-armed mobile platforms rely upon to attack effectively I’ve previously written about thesekindsofoperationsat length. Suffice to say, an adversary must be able to either provide correct targeting-quality tactical pictures to its firing units or be able to cue those “shooters†into positions from which they can use their own sensors to build local targeting pictures. The U.S. and its allies can use deception and concealment to prevent the adversary from being able to effectively attack protected mobile forces. This can also be done to some extent for fixed bases and military or civil infrastructure, as deception and concealment can be used to make unimportant sites look important and vice versa. Deception and concealment might additionally be used to induce the adversary to waste precious weapons (and expose firing platforms) in attacks against false or low-value targets. The U.S. might additionally attack the adversary’s surveillance and reconnaissance assets, precision navigation and time systems that allow the construction of an accurate situational picture, command and control sites where firing decisions are made, and data relay pathways that form the “backbone†of the entire apparatus. These attacks can be physical, but in many cases it might be more effective as well as carry less escalation risk to use electronic or (as technically plausible) cyber attacks. Nor do these attacks need to have permanent effects (though that would certainly be the ideal), as friendly forces could greatly capitalize on even temporary localized degradation of the adversary’s surveillance-reconnaissance-targeting infrastructure. This “thread†would not prevent an adversary from using its conventionally-armed theater missiles in terror bombardment campaign against an American ally’s cities. Even so, history suggests such a campaign would be far more likely to further ignite the ally’s popular passions and deepen its resolve to prevail—and retaliate—than it would to than it would to coerce the ally into submission. In other words, it would be a strategically self-defeating move by the adversary. Defeat missile-armed mobile platforms as they break out of bases/garrisons towards their firing positions As Toti observes, this “thread†would largely occur within “denied†areas such as the adversary’s own soil, any friendly or neutral territories occupied by the adversary’s forces, the airspace above or adjacent to these territories, or the waterspace adjoining these territories. This would accordingly complicate offensive anti-air, anti-submarine, anti-surface combatant, and anti-TEL operations. Nevertheless, friendly submarines could lurk offshore to intercept the adversary’s submarines and surface combatants. Offensive sweeps by theater-range fighters might be used when and where feasible to attack the adversary’s outbound aircraft. Standoff strike aircraft cued by penetrating scouts might be used to attack the adversary’s surface combatants. If adequate air superiority is present, maritime patrol aircraft might be used to search for and attack adversary submarines. Special forces might be used to cue attacks using penetrating aircraft or long-range guided munitions against TELs (though if the First Gulf War is any indication, probably without a great deal of success). Destroying missile-firing platforms would of course be ideal, but the real goal of this “thread†would be to make breakout more time-consuming and resource-intensive than it might otherwise be for the adversary. This might result in further suppression of his operational tempo. It might also prevent him from seizing or maintaining the operational initiative. Defeat missile-armed air and naval platforms in choke points I covered this with respect to aircraft and submarines lastweek; the threats facing an adversary’s surface combatants would be even steeper. This forms part of the argument for deploying land-based anti-ship missiles alongside straits. Land-based surveillance assets bordering a strait can also cue anti-ship strikes by friendly aircraft operating from more distant bases. Similarly, these surveillance assets can provide other friendly forces with tactically-actionable indications and warning of a strike aircraft raid transiting through a choke point towards its targets or back to its airbases. Lastly, defensive minefields could be laid as geographically practical to complicate transits by the adversary’s surface combatants or submarines. Defeat missile-armed mobile platforms in their patrol or firing areas I also covered this with respect to aircraft and submarines lastweek. In the absence of persistent tactical air cover, an adversary’s surface combatants would not be able to hold out for long against U.S or allied anti-ship onslaughts. TELs present the hardest target to engage in the adversary’s firing areas, bar none. They not only can hide within the broad expanse (and defense-in-depth) of the adversary’s territory, but can also blend into their surroundings on par with the quietest submarines at sea. They can shift quickly and frequently between prepared firing positions, or can hunker down heavily camouflaged for protracted periods. There is no existing or technically-plausible weapon system that could offer a high kill probability against TEL units that were smartly employing deception and concealment. Nor is there an existing or technically-plausible strike aircraft that could persistently perform TEL hunts deep within a capable adversary’s airspace unless the adversary’s territorial air defenses had been comprehensively rolled back. This does not mean that TEL hunting, if the tactical environment allows it, would be fruitless. The situation-dependent use of U.S. aircraft to hunt TELs using cheap weapons with low kill probabilities would still put TEL units on the defensive, which in turn might contribute to suppressing TEL firing rates and salvo sizes. The most effective means of defeating ground-launched missile forces is to physically occupy the territory they are operating within. This is a principle that has been proven time and time again, from the allies’ Second World War efforts to defeat the German V-1 and V-2 bombardment campaign, to the Israelis’ efforts to break up Hezbollah and Hamas rocket bombardment campaigns over the past decade. It’s also the most costly in treasure and blood, as it requires the use of sizable ground forces. This is plausible and probably necessary if the adversary is operating TELs on the overrun soil of a U.S. ally; liberation of the ally’s territory would normally be a U.S. war objective in any case. It may also be plausible, albeit possibly far more costly, if a relatively small adversary country is operating TELs on its own soil. It is not plausible at all, whether militarily or politically, against TELs operated on the soil of a regional or great power. However, if a regional or great power is operating TELs relatively close to its border or coastal areas, and especially if those areas are somewhat geographically isolated, it might be plausible to dispatch special forces on brief raids aimed at destroying them directly, flushing them for attack by other friendly forces, or temporarily suppressing them by inducing them to go into hiding. Expeditionary forces might also be used to raid a regional power’s TELs in these kinds of areas; this would not be possible politically or militarily against a great power. Induce missile-armed mobile platforms to fire at false targets and perhaps expose themselves to attack I’ve written about this one extensivelyin the past as well. Every theater missile wasted is one less in the adversary’s finite inventory, with concomitant impacts on his campaign plans. This is especially true if a wasted missile cannot be readily replaced off the production line during wartime. Similarly, an adversary platform or grouping that is seduced into attacking false targets will be incapable of attacking valid targets elsewhere at the same time. U.S. and allied forces can obviously exploit this operationally. At maximum, a submarine, surface combatant, or aircraft that shoots a theater missile gives away its general presence and sometimes even its approximate position. False targets might thus be used to set up reactive intercepts against the attackers, or perhaps even to lure them into prepared ambushes. It isn’t a stretch to imagine the kinds of enduring (and exploitable) psychological effects that might be imposed upon previously-overconfident adversary crews that wasted ordnance against decoys—or managed to survive an ambush. Mask our forces from the adversary’s local reconnaissance and targeting efforts This is another “thread†I’vecoveredpreviouslyelsewhere. It is just as crucial to the use of false target tactics in the previous “thread†as it is to defending actual U.S. and allied forces from attack. The adversary must not be allowed to properly classify, let alone detect if at all practical, actual U.S. and allied forces until it is too late to matter. Toti hits the nail on the head in his piece when he notes “…it is about increasing the fog of war by making the real targets look like anything but a real target†and that it “must be a continuous process.â€[iv] Defeat missile-armed air and naval platforms in close battle This is self-explanatory: destroy them or induce them to retreat before they can shoot at friendly forces. This demands either long-range weaponry that can be fired from the “inner zone†against the adversary’s inbound missile-armed platforms or the placement of persistent outer layer defenses in the adversary’s path. The latter is almost always preferable as the adversary can easily field strike missiles that outrange any weapon the defender might fire from the inner zone. As its title makes clear, this “thread†is not applicable to TELs. Defeat the inbound missile This is also self-explanatory. Missile defense sensors, kinetic weapons, and electronic warfare systems all factor here. So does damage recoverability (e.g. use of redundant systems, rapid repair of damaged runways, hardening of a base’s critical infrastructure, shipboard damage control, etc). No single measure offers a panacea: some combination of active and passive measures is necessary to maximize defensive effectiveness. A subtle variation of this “thread†involves the dispersal of forces not just to enhance their survivability, but also to force the adversary into an inventory management dilemma. The adversary could concentrate strikes over a specific period of time against a small number of force dispersal sites in order to overwhelm the missile defense systems protecting those sites, but that would leave the U.S. and allied forces positioned in other dispersal sites free to operate. The adversary could alternatively strike the maximum number of dispersal sites possible within a specific time period, but that would result in relatively few missiles attacking any single site—and thereby greatly simplify the jobs of each site’s missile defense systems. Also recall that theater missiles are not easily produced, especially in war. This means every missile fired would reduce the number available to the adversary for the duration of the conflict. As such, the adversary would probably have some threshold limit to the number of missiles he’d be willing to use in a concentrated or “spread†attack. U.S. and allied forces could adapt to capitalize on whichever attack type the adversary selected, and by doing so defeat the adversary’s theater missiles at the operational level of war. Create conditions where an adversary chooses not to employ theater missiles Full-spectrum anti-theater missile warfare signifies denying the adversary conventional escalation dominance in a crisis or war. The cumulative effect of convincing an opportunistic potential adversary that each of its “threads†are combat-credible—and that U.S. political leaders would be willing to deny the potential adversary’s forces operational sanctuary on their own soil if the adversary struck first—will generally be successful conventional deterrence. The ideal state of deterrence would obviously be prevention of war outright, and Cold War-era theories regarding how this can be achieved between two competing nuclear-armed powers remain applicable. But even if a conventional war did erupt, the credibility of full-spectrum anti-theater missile warfare might help induce an adversary with modest political objectives to keep the conflict limited to a brief localized clash along a land border or at sea involving only the shortest-range missiles in both sides’ inventories. While tragic and hardly desirable, it would still be vastly preferable to a ruinous general war. CAPT William J. Toti, USN (Retired). “The Hunt for Full-Spectrum ASW.†Naval Institute Proceedings 140, No. 6, June 2014, 39. [ii] I define “theater missile†to include short and medium range ballistic and cruise missiles that can strike targets on land or at sea. [iii]This point is made abundantly clear in Elbridge Colby. “Don’t Sweat Air Sea Battle.†The National Interest online, 13 July 2013, accessed 5/24/15, http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/dont-sweat-airsea-battle-8804?page=show [iv] Toti, 43. The views expressed herein are solely those of the author and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not reflect the official positions of Systems Planning and Analysis, and to the author’s knowledge do not reflect the policies or positions of the U.S. Department of Defense, any U.S. armed service, or any other U.S. Government agency. CAPT William J. Toti, USN (Retired). “The Hunt for Full-Spectrum ASW.†Naval Institute Proceedings 140, No. 6, June 2014, 39. [ii] I define “theater missile†to include short and medium range ballistic and cruise missiles that can strike targets on land or at sea. [iii]This point is made abundantly clear in Elbridge Colby. “Don’t Sweat Air Sea Battle.†The National Interest online, 13 July 2013, accessed 5/24/15, http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/dont-sweat-airsea-battle-8804?page=show [iv] Toti, 43. View the full article

A very neat poster. Very neat. (click for larger) Where is one for the surface forces? View the full article

What was that about not being able to fight once knocked down in plate armor again? View the full article

An F-22 Raptor takes to the sky during a demonstration of air dominance over Tyndall Air Force Base, Fla., April 11, 2015. The event featured members of the F-22 Raptor Demonstration Team, the Air Force aerial demonstration team, the Thunderbirds, and the U.S. Army Parachute Team, the Golden Knights. U.S. Air Force photo by Tech. Sgt. Javier Cruz View the full article

The Chinese navy has long been accused of not showing enough transparency. While that has certainly really improved in the recent year, there are still plenty of areas that's hard for a blogger like myself to follow. Certainly, most of the surface combatants are easy to track, since many photos are released of them. Most of the subsystems and weapon systems on these ships are also quite transparent with some version of them offered for exports. There are some many news reports giving even more information on various naval ships and their subsystems. So which programs are noticeably absent from all these photos and news releases? The most obvious answers would be their strategic platforms. Certainly, CV-16 is a strategic platform, but it also happens to be one of the more transparent programs due to how it has captured the imagination of the ordinary people. At this point, I don't see them introducing any significant secrecy to CV-16 or aircraft carriers in general due to the excitement it has generated. Certainly, the nuclear submarine programs are probably the most secretive platforms amongst all of the naval ships. We very rarely see pictures of under construction nuclear submarines, but we do get some pictures of them at the naval bases and out on patrols. Also, 093 was officially declassified a few years ago, which allowed for some more pictures to come out. As shown in my previous blog entry, we get enough information about 093 and 094 from China themselves and Google Earth photos in addition to ONI reports to make some educated guesses on where they are at. So, what else are really hard to get any kind of useful information on? The first would be the ASBM project. I've written numerous articles on it back in 2009. Such articles were written based on work already done by Chinese bloggers on the same topic. Even though numerous articles were written by people like myself, Andrew Erickson and numerous other PLA followers, much of what we gathered were based on our observations of various support systems that were developed. Certainly, we get more information on China's satellite programs, ELINT programs and UAV programs than DF-21D missile itself. We know that it is an active program, but the actual operational status is unknown at this point. It certainly makes sense that such secrecy is given to this program because of its strategic nature against US aircraft carriers. Due to the amount of attention I've seen USN given to this program, it seems like China would be wise to continue the secrecy here. Secondly, What caused me to write this blog is the secrecy in China's torpedo programs. First thing to note is the different levels of transparency given to light and heavy torpedoes. We have not only seen many photos of Yu-7 carried by helicopters and launched by naval ships, but we've also seen export versions (ET-52) of Yu-7 and pictures of the Yu-7 seeker. It would make sense for Yu-7 to be more transparent since it's unlikely to be very helpful against nuclear submarine and more likely to be used to counter conventional submarines. At the same time, its kinetic performance can be estimated based on that of MK-46 and A244-S. Basically, the Chinese navy don't have as much to loose by giving Yu-7 greater transparency. It will be interesting to see if the next generation of light torpedo will be given the same level of transparency. It certainly seems like they are not investing as much in them. Heavy torpedo on the other hand have been extremely secretive. In the past 5 years, we've seen photos of Yu-6 and Yu-3A loaded onto conventional submarines. There have been no export versions of 533 mm torpedoes anywhere. There have been little to no articles on the usage and test firings of 533 mm torpedoes. Even the status and performance of a rather old torpedo like Yu-3A is completely off limits. Since the wide introduction of Yu-6 is the past decade, there have apparently been 2 new heavy torpedoes in development that are either in service of close to service Yu-9 and Yu-10. In case you are wondering, I just read them off reasonably reliable Chinese bbs sources that these torpedo programs do exist and have gone through test firings. Considering that there have not been any photos of them anywhere, I certainly don't have any details on their kinetic performance. So, the question is why there are so much secrecy toward 533 mm torpedoes. I think China has correctly identified USN nuclear submarines as their biggest threat. After all, Chinese submarines cannot leave their naval bases without getting tracked by USN subs. Considering that the top speed and operating depth of USN subs are classified, China really needs something like MK-48 ADCAP that can sustain high speed over long range to chase down a modern nuclear submarine. The actual performance of something like the MK-48 mod 7 CBASS is classified (as is its advanced processing capability), but i would imagine it's capable of chasing down and destroying Russian and Chinese nuclear submarines that are within certain range. And considering that a USN aircraft carrier is extremely fast and well protected against strikes for anti-ship missiles, such heavy torpedo development would also have double strategic value in attacking carriers. Now, I'm not saying the Chinese nuclear submarines are quiet enough to get within torpedo launching distance of a USN carrier, but maybe an ambushing conventional submarine could get lucky. Either way, advanced torpedoes have high strategic value, so that's why there is so little information on them. Another torpedo system that we have very little information on is China's version of ASROC. There were so little information on them that I did not know the 054A VLS could launch it until one of the PLAN commanders mentioned 054A could launch such torpedoes (given possible designation Yu-8) in a TV interview. At this point, it seems like both 052D's new VLS and 054A's VLS could launch some type of ASROC. I have not seen any picture of such missile nor do I have any idea of its performance parameters, but just heard that it does exist. On top of the classified nature of torpedoes, information on the new sonar system that China has developed for its surface combatants and submarines are also classified, but we've at least seen their photos and export versions of towed array sonar. I think it's clear that the Chinese Navy sees ASW as its biggest weakness. They have spent a lot of money in developing sensors to track advanced submarines, but more resources is spent on the weapons against them. View the full article

Over to you. View the full article

Over the past two years, the debate over U.S. military options for defending East Asian allies from potential Chinese aggression has primarily been between proponents of the Air-Sea Battle operational concept and proponents of the Offshore Control strategic concept. The conventional wisdom appears to be that the two concepts are mutually exclusive. Such a view makes no sense. Simply put, there is no reason why key elements from both cannot be integrated within a single holistic strategic concept that provides circumstance-based flexibility in covering the entire spectrum of potential Sino-American conventional conflict. In order to see why this is so, let’s first examine how the two concepts are defined in their authoritative source materials and then summarize both sides’ main arguments (with a few linked representative examples). Air-Sea Battle Air-Sea Battle is a U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) operational conceptthat outlines the Joint combined arms capabilities, doctrinal tenets, and Command, Control, and Communications (C3) approaches necessary for maintaining U.S. forces’ access to and freedom of maneuver within opposed theaters. Air-Sea Battle’s present contents flow from the unclassified, clearly-articulated, and widely-overlooked January 2012 Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC). DoD leadership, senior service leaders, and Air-Sea Battle Office personnel have been consistently explicit in stating Air-Sea Battle is not a strategy in its own right (or even a campaign plan), and that it is not specifically targeted against any particular country. Nevertheless, manyAir-Sea Battle proponents outside DoDassertthat the concept is highly applicable to deterring—and if that fails, then waging—a Sino-American war. This school largely believes it would be impossible to prevent a major Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) fait accompli against a U.S. ally in East Asia, let alone have a chance at eventually inducing China to restore the geostrategic status quo ante should a major conflict erupt, if U.S. and allied militaries were incapable of (at minimum) quickly bogging down a PLA offensive and then rallying to restore key defensive ‘facts on the ground.’ Given the region’s geography, the most important of these ‘facts’ would arguably be the security of the trans-oceanic and intra-theater maritime lines of communication America’s allies depend upon for military reinforcement and economic sustenance. Air-Sea Battle proponents therefore argue that U.S. forces must be capable of performing conventional, cyber, and electronic attacks against PLA infrastructure and forces in order to protect friendly maritime lines of communication as well as arrest PLA offensive operations. While most such attacks would likely occur within the contested maritime zone, the proponents assert U.S. forces would also need to be capable of striking PLA infrastructure and non-nuclear forces on the Chinese mainland if strategically necessary. Lastly, while this school generally believes Air-Sea Battle would be incapable of winning a war on its own, they also believe the success of any grand strategy for deterring aggression against allies on China’s doorstep (and defending them if need be) would depend in large part upon the latent availability (and selective use) of the concept’s tools and methods. Many critics of Air-Sea Battle argue strikes against mainland China would carry unacceptable risks of triggering inadvertent or accidental escalation to the nuclear threshold. Some of the concept’s critics believe these strikes would be automaticallyexecuted regardless of the conflict scenario, or that they could only be practicably executed in the form of an escalation precedent-setting preemptive strike by the U.S. Other critics assert Air-Sea Battle’s allowance for land-attack strikes implies the concept embraces a strategy of coercively bombarding an opponent into submission. Additional critics declare that such strikes reflect a deterministicand techno-centricway of war in which the means employed are disconnected from the ends sought. Lastly, a number of critics point out that Air-Sea Battle is not directly applicable to countering China’s ongoing ‘salami tactics’ campaigns in the East and South China Seas. Offshore Control Unlike the official Air-Sea Battle concept’s adversary-agnostic focus on the operational level of war, Offshore Control is an unofficial strategic concept conceived by defense academiaspecifically to address the Sino-American military competition. Offshore Control consists of two main thrusts, both of which are intended to deter war through the latent threat of their credible implementation. The first would be a distant blockade of China’s sea lines of communication that would be primarily achieved by U.S. or allied militaries’ control over Indo-Pacific maritime chokepoints lying beyond the PLA’s effective reach. This blockade would be aimed at compelling conciliation through economic punishment, namely by reducing China’s access to oil and other vital raw materials (and possibly forcing it to pay higher prices on the margins for what it imports overland), as well as by reducing China’s ability to sell its wares in major overseas markets. Offshore Control’s other element would consist of traditional campaigns by the U.S. to prevent effective PLA control of the East and South China Seas, directly defend threatened allies’ territories, and secure control of the maritime lines of communication connecting these allies with the world—all without engaging in any kind of strikes into China. Offshore Control’s advocates assert that their concept would be more scalable in terms of intensity and controllable in terms of escalationthan Air-Sea Battle to match up to the nature of the Chinese acts of aggression that precipitated a given conflict. They also assert that Offshore Control is built around a coherent theory of victory: the raising of Chinese leaders’ costs to an intolerable level by preventing them from militarily attaining their political objectives, as well as by coercively—yet reversibly—economically punishing the Chinese people. While critics of Offshore Control typically agree that maritime blockades can play strategically useful supporting roles in a conflict, they caution that any embargo is inherently dependent upon the cooperation (or coercion) of neutralsincluding other great and regional powers, might be too permeable or insufficiently painful to effectively coercethe targeted nation’s leaders and citizens, and is not devoid of horizontal or vertical escalation risks. Other critics argue that the global economic repercussions of a blockade of China would risk catastrophic international political blowback against the U.S. Just about all critics of Offshore Control’s blockading element argue against the belief that the leaders of a great power as large and resourceful as China could be compelled to concede primarily through blockade or any other strategy of political-economic coercion. A few go further to cautionthat allocation of forces and their supporting infrastructure (e.g. surveillance, reconnaissance, logistics) to blockade enforcement would in many cases trade off against allocation of forces and infrastructure to the primary effort: direct defense of allied territories and lines of communication. Indeed, these critics note that the aforementioned defensive tasks would be made incredibly difficult by virtue of allied countries’ close proximities to mainland China; PLA forces’ ever-increasing reach in the form of theater ballistic missiles and standoff-range missile-armed aircraft; and the PLA’s unquestionable in-theater quantitative superiority. These critics conclude that allowing PLA forces to strike from mainland China with impunity against allied territories and lines of communication—and thus cause U.S. and allied defensive forces deployed on or operating from those territories (not to mention any allied populations) to wither on the vine—would be strategically ruinous. The same would be absolutely true in a conflict of any scale with respect to allowing the PLA’s mainland-located surveillance resources to observe the contested zone unhindered. It should be noted that a variation on Offshore Control exists that discards the concept’s coercive blockading element while retaining its maritime denial element and its foreswearing of strikes into China. However, the above critiques regarding the concept’s ability to handle scenarios in which the PLA employed mainland-based aerospace strike forces or mainland-located maritime surveillance resources still apply, and thus I do not assess it separately. Synthesis Several truisms can be derived from the preceding arguments. Regarding Air-Sea Battle, it would be illogical and ahistorical to assert that any kind of U.S. coercive strike campaign against Chinese economic or civil infrastructure could successfully defend embattled allies at an acceptable level of risk. It would also be illogical and ahistorical to assert that U.S. forces’ abilities to conduct wartime operations in the East Asian maritime would inherently depend upon them executing preemptive conventional strikes against PLA infrastructure and forces located in mainland China, or that ‘high-end’ operations in general would be appropriate for all conceivable scenarios. That said, it ought to be observed that no authoritative DoD source or credible Air-Sea Battle advocate has ever publicly made such assertions. Turning to Offshore Control, it would be unsound to assert that a notional U.S. campaign to defend an ally (or restore freedom of maneuver within East Asian waters) could succeed under all conceivable scenarios without ever having the need to conduct any form of strikes against the PLA inside China’s borders. It would also be quite deterministic to assert that an economic blockade would assuredly induce China to restore the status quo ante within a politically acceptable amount of time without hazarding Chinese escalation. Once we discard these problematic assertions, it becomes quite obvious that much of Air-Sea Battle and Offshore Control actually overlap to a remarkable degree. It is therefore impossible to escape the impression that there is no reason why specific elements from both concepts cannot be unified within a single coherent strategic concept. In fact, their integration where logical and appropriate creates a range of incrementally-intensifying options for responding to notional Chinese acts of aggression. This merger’s logic becomes readily apparent when we consider several variables that thus far have been largely overlooked in the debate: the belligerents’ characterization and valuation of their political objectives, and a confrontation’s unique political and strategic circumstances. As Clausewitz tells us, these variables combine to directly influence the means the belligerents choose to employ and the scale of their clash. This becomes evident when we examine plausible scenarios along the spectrum of Sino-American conflict. Tomorrow, addressing high-end salami tactics and limited war scenarios. View the full article

A few weeks ago I published aseriesofpostsanalyzing Maksim Tokarev’s outstanding Naval War College Review article that detailed the Soviet Navy’s 1980s-era doctrine for employing combined arms against U.S. Navy battleforces. At the end of my first post, I suggested that: With a finite number of bombers, missiles, and trained crews, it is reasonable to think Soviet commanders would have been somewhat hesitant to dispatch such irreplaceable forces into battle unless they had some degree of confidence in their situational picture’s accuracy; the operational-strategic penalties that would be incurred if they ‘got it wrong’ simply seem too high for this not to have been the case. Accordingly, it will be extremely interesting to someday learn the criteria that had to be satisfied for SNAF commanders to order a raid. In the comments section to my final post in that series, Maksim graciously shared many new observations to address multiple aspects of that very question. As before, I’m going to quote his key points and then add my commentary. I’ve lightly edited his remarks; the wording changes I made are in brackets. Maksim first notes that the Soviet Naval Air Force’s organizational ethos, much like that of most air forces and service air arms, was rooted in the ‘spirit of attack.’ Detailed mission planning was less important than seizing upon fortuitous opportunities to deal the enemy a severe blow: Courage, brisk battle, blaze of glory, fair uniform first – and at least moderate careful planning [only] then. The heroes, the warriors, don’t hesitate to fight and die, bird's souls in the human’s bodies. The staff work is always something neglected, too boring to be the good job… sometimes “the good enough decision now is better than the brilliant one tomorrow.†The consequence was that, as Maksim puts it: The commanders who share that ethos can send the strikes against [ambiguous or low-confidence] target, hoping to receive definite targeting enroute, or counting on the strike’s inherent recco and targeting abilities. This is a crucial (and quite obvious in hindsight) point that I’ve previously failed to consider. It is applicable not only within the context of the Cold War naval competition, but also to any attacker’s calculus. Attack opportunities against a highly capable opponent’s maneuvering forces are generally fleeting. A brief intercept of the opponent’s radio or active sensor emissions, or perhaps a scout’s brief (and perhaps sacrificial) direct contact with what seems to be an element of the opponent’s force, might be the only targeting cue the prospective attacker ever receives. The next detection of the opponent’s force might be when it is too late to derail or defeat the opponent’s operational plan. In fact, the next attack opportunity might not arise until after the opponent has already achieved his operation’s main objective(s). Maksim alludes to this dilemma from Soviet Navy commanders’ perspective: Look, they [examined] the Northern Weddings’ logs hard, every minute of evolutions, every launch and landing, every word on radio and so on. They understood that when the carriers came in the Norway fjords, it [would be] just too late to try to hit them [with] air assets. So the time slot to decide could have been very narrow. It’s better to make a wrong decision than suspend the good one. Individuals make opportunity cost decisions based upon how they subjectively value their available options. A prospective attacker must choose between withholding scarce strike assets in hopes of a future opportunity to attack with a higher degree of targeting confidence, or otherwise expending those assets in the present with low targeting confidence under the assumption that there may be no future opportunity. When an attack-embracing organizational ethos within belligerent “A’s†forces mixes with a paramount objective of preventing belligerent “B†from attacking first, there will likely be intense psychological pressures on belligerent “A’s†operational commander to order a strike. The implication is that a careless and perhaps overconfident “B†who does not employ effective concealment (with some supporting deception for good measure) risks falling victim to a bold “A†who capitalizes on the most limited of targeting cues. Conversely, an intelligent “B†who understands “A’s†opportunity cost calculus well enough might be able to craft a deception and concealment plan that lures “A†into expending precious ordnance (and perhaps platforms and crews) for naught. There is no way to determine the outcome of either of these two scenario types in advance; circumstances and chance during battle matter greatly. Maksim makes an additional point, though, in that the destruction of an opposing force may be far less important within a campaign context than its disruption or suppression: The key success is not the sinking of the carriers. Just stop [their] launch, recovery, any air activity; it’s enough to weaken the NATO ASW along the Norwegian coast and give the SSBNs the possibility to reach launching positions in [the] Atlantic, making nuclear war very costly for both parts, [and therefore] evaporating the political will to start it. At the same time the tank armies will be in Berlin, Paris, Brussels and so on. In other words, he is referring to one of the Soviets’ chief maritime strategic objectives for the early phases of a conventional European war: degradation of potential offensive ASW efforts by NATO navies against Soviet SSBNs. His assertion is consistent with the intelligence assessments that shaped the U.S. Navy’s development of the 1980s Maritime Strategy. The Soviets viewed the correlation of wartime-fielded nuclear forces as a key factor in deterring NATO’s escalation to the nuclear threshold. NATO would likely only have contemplated crossing that threshold, though, if the Red Army had routed NATO’s forward defenses along the inter-German front. From the Soviet perspective, then, any measures that increased the likelihood that mutual intra-war nuclear deterrence would hold also increased the likelihood that they could achieve their war objectives via conventional means. It was additionally recognized that if the Soviets had been able to effectively protect their SSBN force during a conventional war, they would have possessed a stronger position for war termination negotiations. Consequently, effective disruption or suppression of U.S. carrier battleforce operations along the Soviet maritime periphery could have prevented NATO navies from attaining the margin of local sea control necessary for combined arms prosecutions of older Soviet SSBNs, such as the Yankee-class, that had to break through the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom gap in order to reach their Western Atlantic patrol stations. Similar disruption/suppression efforts against U.S. carriers operating somewhat deeper within the Soviet maritime periphery could have delayed or prevented destruction of the Soviet surface combatants performing defensive ASW in support of the ‘boomer bastions’ used by later generation Soviet SSBNs such as the various Delta-classes and the Typhoon-class. All this would be in addition to—and possibly more important to the Soviets than—preventing U.S. carrier air wings’ conventional strikes against military targets in Soviet coastal areas. Another key observation by Maksim is that Soviet maritime strike capabilities should be viewed holistically, or rather that the Soviet Naval Air Force was not necessarily the primary combat arm for the anti-carrier mission: There were also surface and [submarine] components of the Anti-Carrier Doctrine, and it is extremely hard to say which one was main and which one [was] complementary. It depended on who, when, [and] how [the carriers were found] and where the [soviet maritime] forces [were] deployed at the moment. Naturally it does mean that [the entire] air component could have been used as the decoy, three whole air divisions of expendable planes and people – if the surface combatant or subs needed [that kind of support in order to be able to attack effectively], [whether they were]in better [attack] positions in the staff’s opinion or by chance. The idea that an entire combat arm could be used as an expendable decoy is quite incredible from a Western perspective, but in light of the aforementioned Soviet maritime strategic priorities it makes perfect sense. If the Soviets believed it was unlikely that a conventional conflict would be protracted, and that nuclear deterrence/bargaining therefore predominated, the opportunity cost of expending these platforms and crews in such a way could be quite acceptable. Coordination between two or more combat arms for a single near-simultaneous attack would have been incredibly difficult based on the issues Maksim identifies in his article and that I’ve addressed in some of my prior writings. Nevertheless, these issues would not have necessarily precluded Soviet Navy commanders from burning up one combat arm in an attempt to knock a U.S. battleforce off-balance in preparation for a later attack by another combat arm. When the implications of Maksim’s aforementioned observations are combined, we come to see what he means when he says: That is why my article is in general about kamikazes. It was one-way navy. No one expected to return, [had] the war been declared. Continental powers’ concepts regarding the combat employment of naval forces have historically been quite different than those of maritime powers. U.S. naval strategists and operational planners, not to mention those of us in the armchair analysis community, would be wise to bear in mind that courses of action that seem rash or potentially self-defeating from our perspectives could be quite rational from a potential adversary’s perspective. Jon’s sidenote: this refers to the U.S. Navy’s 1980s concept for creating carrier operations bastions in Norwegian fjords. For more details, see Commodore Jacob Børresen, Royal Norwegian Navy (Retired). “Alliance Naval Strategies and Norway in the Final Years of the Cold War.†Naval War College Review 64, No. 2 (Spring 2011): 97-115. View the full article

Note: I was originally planning on publishing a series of articles this week on the large-deck aircraft carrier's doctrinal roles, but I'm shifting that to next week as I need a little more time to make final edits. As a result, I'm moving up my series analyzing the DF-21 arsenal. Both series touch on my theme for the first part of this month: the implications of guided munitions inventory management and producibility. The Chinese People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) Medium Range Ballistic Missile (MRBM) arsenal’s traditional primary role is supporting theater nuclear deterrence. China’s first generation DF-3 series (NATO Designation CSS-2) MRBMs were tasked with holding Indian and Russian targets, as well as major U.S. military forward deployed force concentrations within East Asia, at nuclear risk. As such, they were neither produced in great numbers nor required the terminal accuracy necessary for conventional long-range strike tasks.[ii] Although some DF-3s remain in service, roughly twenty years ago the PLA began replacing them with the DF-21 (NATO Designation CSS-5) missile series. Unlike its liquid-fueled predecessor, the solid-fueled DF-21 series can be rapidly readied for launch and are therefore harder to interdict when deployed in the field on their Transporter Erector Launchers (TEL). More significantly, while the ‘original’ DF-21 (CSS-5 MOD 1) and its longer-range DF-21A (CSS-5 MOD 2) variant assumed the historical theater nuclear deterrence role, the more recent DF-21C (CSS-5 MOD 3) and DF-21D (CSS-5 MOD 5) variants were designed specifically to deliver conventional munitions against point targets on land and large ships at sea respectively.[iii] There are two hypothesized roles for conventionally-armed DF-21s. First, there is a general scholarly consensus that PLA doctrine allows for if not embraces the use of conventionally-armed theater-range ballistic missiles in war-opening/escalating strikes aimed at decisively neutralizing a superior adversary’s forward forces and military infrastructure. This doctrinal tenet is almost certainly independent of the military strategy, doctrine, or force structure and posture options the U.S. might employ for defending its East Asian allies and interests. Beijing’s paramount declared military-strategic objective—the prevention of effective American military intervention on the behalf of an embattled ally in a major East Asian contingency—simply cannot be accomplished with a high degree of confidence absent a PLA first strike. It is resultantly noteworthy (and generally overlooked) that the PLAdoctrinal works and professional journal articles advocating conventional first strikes predated the U.S. Air-Sea Battle operational concept’s 2010 introduction.[iv] Within this context, the conventionally-armed DF-21C’s and -21D’s advantages in range, speed, field-deployed survivability, and defense penetration capabilities relative to PLAstrike aircraft make them ideal for maximizing the damage that can be inflicted upon an opponent’s in-theater Command and Control (C2) nodes, military bases’ critical infrastructure and logistical stores, and highest campaign-valueforces while minimizing tactical warning of attack.[v] Further, these missiles’ abilities to distract, suppress, or damage the opponent’s most important theater air and missile defense nodes could help support other elements of a PLA first strike, as well as bash down the door for follow-on strikes by PLA assets that would otherwise be quite vulnerable to those defenses. If it is solely configured to perform these war-opening/escalating missions, the peacetime conventional-capable DF-21 inventory only needs to be as large as what would be necessary to create a high probability of successfully neutralizing the relatively small set of high-priority targets assigned to a first strike’s opening waves. This sizing would be possible because surviving and lower-priority targets would likely be assigned to other combat arms for follow-on attacks. DF-21C and 21D inventory sizing along these lines would be consistent with the PLA’s apparent sizing of its SRBM inventories for Taiwan contingencies.[vi]Additional margin might be built into the inventory to provide backup rounds in case some missiles were unavailable for maintenance reasons when a crisis erupted, failed to launch when ordered, or failed to successfully strike the highest priority targets. The operative force-sizing question would be whether the inventory would be earmarked specifically for Sino-American/Japanese contingencies, or whether Sino-Indian or Sino-Russian contingencies would also need to be covered. The second possible conventionally-armed DF-21 role is performing long range strikes throughout a protracted conflict. These could include preemptive or suppressive strikes against major force groupings as they assemble for an operation, opportunistic strikes against fleeting high campaign-value targets, or direct/indirect fires—including possible feint attacks—in support of PLA Joint combined arms operations. It has been suggested, in fact, that the DF-21D might be used in war for land-based ‘artillery support’ of PLA maritime operations.[vii] Much like shore-based heavy artillery prior to the mid-20th Century, this kind of fire support would be exceptionally difficult for an opposing Navy to counter directly. Whereas coastal guns could only cover localized waters, however, the DF-21D possesses a theater-wide coverage area that not only includes China’s immediate periphery but also the maritime approaches to East Asia—and U.S. treaty allies’ homelands. A conventional-capable DF-21 inventory sized for the campaign-waging role would need to be rather large given the modern historical evidence advanced ordnance expenditure rates would be quite high in a conflict.[viii] This would be accentuated if Chinese leaders believed any notional conventional war would be intense but short, and resultantly opted not to take the extremely cost-inefficient and expensive step of structuring the DF-21C and -21D industrial production and test infrastructures such that they could readily replenish the PLA’s arsenal under combat conditions. Additionally, the more effective the defender’s surviving active and passive missile defenses might be in combat—especially after the first strike’s shock and surprise fades—the more missiles the attacker must launch per salvo to achieve a desired probability of target neutralization. Not only would this probabilistic effect push the PLA’s peacetime inventory size requirements even further upward, but it would also influence PLA combined arms campaign-level contingency planning enormously.[ix] Tomorrow, unpacking the DF-21 inventory. In this article, a MRBM is defined as possessing a range between 1000-3000km. This conforms to the range niche presently filled by the DF-21 series within the PLA’s arsenal. PLA theater ballistic missiles roles beyond 3000km are filled by Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles, and those beneath 1000km are performed by Short Range Ballistic Missiles. [ii] “DongFeng 3 (CSS-2) Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile.†Sinodefense.com, 27 February 2009, accessed 8/21/14, http://web.archive.org/web/20131029184838/http://www.sinodefence.com/strategic/missile/df3.asp [iii]See 1. “Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat.†(National Air and Space Intelligence Center, 2013), 14, 17; 2. Mark Stokes. “China’s Evolving Conventional Strategic Strike Capability.†(Washington, D.C.: Project 2049 Institute, September 2009); 3. “DongFeng 21 (CSS-5) Medium-Range Ballistic Missile.†Sinodefense.com, 04 June 2010, accessed 8/21/14, http://web.archive.org/web/20131209000115/http://sinodefence.com/strategic/missile/df21.asp 4. “DongFeng 21C (CSS-5 Mod-3) Medium-Range Ballistic Missile.†Sinodefense.com, 03 October 2009, accessed 8/21/14, http://web.archive.org/web/20131029225158/http://www.sinodefence.com/strategic/missile/df21c.asp. Of note, authoritative publicly-released reports, Congressional testimony, and the like from the U.S. Department of Defense as well as the U.S. Intelligence Community do not call out a CSS-5 MOD 4 variant. This contrasts with the bulk of English-language open source materials on the DF-21 series, which associate DF-21D with CSS-5 MOD 4. This essay will defer to the authoritative U.S. Government products in associating DF-21D with CSS-5 MOD 5. That said, Western observers of the Chinese ballistic missile arsenal should take note of the apparent U.S. Government reporting jump from MOD 3 to a MOD 5 in terms of operational deployments of DF-21 variants. [iv]For detailed explanations of publicly-available PLA doctrine’s apparent advocacy of first strikes, see 1. Dean Cheng. “Chinese Views on Deterrence.†Joint Forces Quarterly, No. 60 (1st Quarter 2011), 92-101; 2. Ron Christman. “Conventional Missions for China’s Second Artillery Corps.†Comparative Strategy, Vol. 30, No. 3, 198-228; 3. Roger Cliff, et al. Entering the Dragon’s Lair: Chinese Antiaccess Strategies and Their Implications for the United States. (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2007), 13-15, 23, 28-43, 47-50; 4. James C. Mulvenon, et. al. “Chinese Responses to U.S. Military Transformation and Implications for the Department of Defense.†(Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2006), 46-47; and 5. Larry Wortzel. China’s Nuclear Forces: Operations, Training, Doctrine, Command, Control, and Campaign Planning. (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army Strategic Studies Institute, May 2007), 8-14, 36. For a compelling description of reasons why Chinese leaders might be willing to accept the escalatory risks inherent in unleashing conventional first strikes against core U.S. bases in Japan and Guam, see 1. David Shlapak. “Projecting Power in a China-Taiwan Contingency: Implications for USAF and USN Collaboration.†in “Coping with the Dragon: Essays on PLA Transformation and the U.S. Military.†(Washington D.C.: Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University, December 2007), 91-92; 2. Toshi Yoshihara. “Chinese Missile Strategy and the U.S. Naval Presence in Japan: The Operational View from Beijing.†Naval War College Review 63, No. 3 (Summer 2010): 52-57. [v]The term “campaign-value†is defined in Jonathan F. Solomon. “Maritime Deception and Concealment: Concepts for Defeating Wide-Area Oceanic Surveillance-Reconnaissance-Strike Networks.†Naval War College Review 66, No. 4 (Autumn 2013): 109. [vi] David A. Shlapak, et al. “A Question of Balance: Political Context and Military Aspects of the China-Taiwan Dispute.†(Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2009), 127-128. [vii] See James R. Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara. “Mao’s Active Defense is Turning Offensive.†U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 137, No. 4 (April 2011): 24-29. [viii]See for example 1. “Lessons of the Falklands.†(Washington, D.C.: Office of Program Appraisal, Department of the Navy, February 1983), 3, 11, 34, 36; 2. Barry Watts. “The Evolution of Precision Strike.†(Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2013), 14-17, 20-23. Note Watts’s observation of the dramatic tradeoff between a precision-guided munition’s combat range and procurement affordability, with obvious implications for inventory sizes. [ix]Solomon, “Maritime Deception and Concealment,†94-95. View the full article

Eric Lindsey of CSBA published an excellent monograph last month examining how the U.S. Army might field land-based anti-ship missiles and rockets, not to mention air and missile defense systems, to defend forward U.S. allies from aggression. I strongly agree with the concept in principle. Such capabilities would be extremely useful for constraining an adversary’s wartime use of the waters and airspace adjacent to a U.S. ally’s territory. They would definitely increase the adversary’s potential costs and risks of hazarding transits through maritime chokepoints controlled by the ally, conducting close blockades against the ally, or executing amphibious/airborne assaults against the ally. They would provide valuable layers for defense-in-depth against an adversary’s attempts to strike forces and infrastructure located on the ally’s territory or in nearby areas at sea. They could certainly help with carving out temporary ‘pockets’ that support friendly air and naval operations within a contested zone. There are a few key details, however, that I think require more analytical attention. First, the use of anti-ship missiles for over-the-horizon engagements depends upon scouting. Surveillance could be performed using land-based radiofrequency direction-finding systems or over-the-horizon radars, but neither can positively and confidently verify that a given contact is in fact something worth expending scarce missiles. Reconnaissance assets such as fishing boats, submarines, aircraft, or unmanned vehicles are better suited for the tasks of classifying contacts and cueing missile attacks, but this raises the question of whether their information would be processed through a fusion center that generates a shared situational picture for the entire defense or whether it would be provided directly to the missile units. There are advantages and drawbacks for each that ought to be weighed; my own preference is that missile units would be supported by dedicated scouts (example: light UAVs that are organic to those units) that can also provide their information to a shareable situational picture. All this says nothing of the challenges of preventing the adversary from detecting, interpreting, and exploiting the communications between scout and shooter. The bottom line is that looking at maximum missile ranges alone is insufficient; one must also consider maximum effective scouting range and networking architecture. Second, while land-based missile systems do have some on-station endurance advantages over warships and aircraft, they are entirely dependent upon the security of the sea and air lines of communication that provide sustenance for their crews, repair parts, and replacement rounds. Hardened, peacetime-prepositioned stockpiles of materiel near these units’ operating areas can help with this, but during wartime these supplies will likely be consumed at a fast rate and certainly will not hold out any longer than they were sized to. The lines of communications problem is less pressing for continental allies who, by virtue of territorial depth (or friendly neighbors), can access airfields and ports far from the adversary’s effective reach. However, this is a campaign-critical issue for defending allies who are not blessed with that strategic gift. As archipelagoes, Japanese and Filipino lines of communication are solely maritime. Given that they lie within a few hundred miles of continental Asia, their sea lines are inherently vulnerable to interdiction by submarines, and their airfields and ports are inherently vulnerable to aerospace bombardment. The situation is much the same with South Korea, a peninsular country whose hostile northern sibling denies it overland lines of communication. Taiwan’s circumstances should be self-explanatory. Whereas China’s military clout is not yet sufficient to heavily degrade logistical flows to and then amongst the main Japanese and Philippine islands, there should be no illusions that these flows will be unpressured in a major war. The imposed degree of pressure would likely be greater on the margins for flows from Japan to South Korea. Flows from Japan (or from across the Pacific) to and amongst the central and southern Ryukyus could conceivably be at grave risk. I strongly support emplacing land-based defensive missiles in the Ryukyus as a means of reinforcing conventional deterrence, but unless these weapons are intended to be a wasting asset much more thought needs to be dedicated towards how they would be sustained throughout a protracted conflict. Lines of communication protection would be a central role for naval and land-based air forces; in a Western Pacific contingency it might be their most strategically important task in the aftermath of war initiation. I’ll be writing about this issue again in a few weeks. Third, some thought needs to be dedicated towards when and how these missile forces would be deployed to the field. Using the Japanese example, let’s say the bulk of such forces were maintained in garrison in the main Japanese islands (or further to the rear in U.S. territories) for deployment to the Ryukyus only in a crisis. This would raise questions of whether crisis deployments could be done quickly and how the Chinese might interpret and react to such movements once they were detected. I would prefer permanent forward garrisoning of missile units on the islands they would be defending, but this would be not be inexpensive and would require significant political capital and resolve. Indeed, as is already evident with our existing forces in Okinawa, it might mean basing U.S. units in localities that may not be thrilled about serving as indefinite hosts. None of this should be interpreted as hits against what I believe to be a very important tool for strengthening our extended conventional deterrence, and if necessary for defending embattled allies. I do believe, though, that if Army maritime missile force concepts are to gain the traction they deserve the issues above will need to be addressed. View the full article

For previous installments, see Parts I, II, and III Ingredients of Counter-Deception How could a U.S. Navy battleforce then—or now—avoid defeats at the hands of a highly capable adversary's deceptions? The first necessary ingredient is distributing multi-phenomenology sensors in a defense’s outer layers. Continuing with the battleforce air defense example, many F-14s were equipped during the 1980s with the AN/AXX-1 Television Camera System (TCS), which enabled daytime visual classification of air contacts from a distance. The Navy’s F-14D inventory later received the AN/AAS-42 Infrared Search and Track system to provide a nighttime standoff-range classification capability that complemented AN/AXX-1. Cued by an AEW aircraft or an Aegis surface combatant, F-14s equipped with these sensors could silently examine bomber-sized radar contacts from 40-60 miles away as meteorologically possible. As it would be virtually impossible for a targeted aircraft to know it was being remotely observed unless it was supported by AEW of its own, and as the targeted aircraft’s only means for visually obscuring itself was to take advantage of weather phenomena as available, F-14s used in this outer layer visual identification role could help determine whether inbound radar contacts were decoys or actual aircraft. If the latter, the sensors could also help the F-14 crews determine whether the foe was carrying ordnance on external hardpoints. This information could then be used by a carrier group’s Air Warfare Commander to decide where and how to employ available CAP resources. It follows that future U.S. Navy outer layer air defenses would benefit greatly from having aircraft equipped with these kinds of sensors distributed to cover likely threat axes at extended ranges from a battleforce’s warships. Such aircraft could report their findings to their tactical controllers using highly-directional line-of-sight communications pathways in order to prevent disclosure of the battleforce’s location and disposition. Given that the future air threat will not only include maritime bombers but also strike fighters and small unmanned aircraft, it would be enormously useful if each manned aircraft performing the outer layer visual identification role could also control multiple unmanned aircraft in order to extend their collective sensing reach as well as covered volume. This way, the outer layer would be able to investigate widely-dispersed aircraft approaching on multiple axes well before the latter’s sensors and weapons could be employed against the battleforce. The same physics that would allow the U.S. Navy to disrupt or exploit an adversary’s multi-phenomenology maritime surveillance and reconnaissance sensors could be wielded by the adversary against a U.S. Navy battleforce’s outer layer sensors, however, so the side that found a way to scout effectively first would likely be the one to attack effectively first. A purely sensor-centric solution, though, is not enough. Recall Tokarev’s comment about making actual attack groups seem to be “easily recognizable decoys.†This could be implemented in many ways, one of which might be to launch readily-discriminated decoys towards a defended battleforce from one axis while vectoring a demonstration group to approach from another axis. Upon identifying the decoys, a defender might orient the bulk of his available fighters to confront the demonstration group. This would be a fatal mistake, though, if the main attack group was actually approaching on the first axis from some distance behind the decoys. If there was enough spatial and temporal separation between the two axes, and if fighter resources were firmly committed towards the demonstration group at the time it became apparent that the actual attack would come from the first axis, it might not be possible for the fighters to do much about it. An attacker might alternatively use advanced EW technologies to make the main attack group appear to be decoys, especially when meteorological conditions prevented the CAP’s effective use of electro-optical or infrared sensors. This leads to the second necessary ingredient: conditioning crews psychologically and tactically for the possibility of deception. During peacetime, tactical competence is often viewed as a ‘checklist’ skillset in that crews are expected to quickly execute various immediate actions by rote when they encounter certain tactical stimuli. There’s something to be said for standardized immediate actions, as some simply must be performed instinctively if a unit or group is to avoid taking a hit. Examples of this include setting General Quarters, adjusting a combat system’s configuration and authorized automaticity, launching alert aircraft, making quick situation reports to other units or higher command echelons, and employing evasive maneuvers or certain EW countermeasures. Yet, some discretion may be necessary lest a unit salvo too many defensive missiles against decoys or be enticed to prematurely reveal its location to an attacker. The line separating a fatal delay to act from a delayed yet effective action varies from circumstance to circumstance. A human’s ability to avoid the former is an art built upon his or her deep foundational understanding of naval science and the conditioning effects of regular, intense training. Only through routine exposure to the chaos of combat through training, and only when that training includes the simulated adversary’s use of deception, can crews gradually mentally harden themselves against the disorienting ambiguity or shock that would result from an actual adversary’s use of deception. Likewise, only from experience gained through realistic training can these crews develop tactics that help them and other friendly forces reduce their likelihoods of succumbing to deception, or otherwise increase the possibilities that even if they initially are deceived they can quickly mitigate the effects. It follows that our third ingredient is possessing deep defensive ordnance inventories. A battleforce needs to have enough ordnance available—and properly positioned—so that it can fall for a deception and still have some chance at recovering. It is important to point out this ordnance does not just include guns and missiles, but also EW systems and techniques. During the Cold War, a battleforce’s defensive reserves consisted of alert fighters waiting on carrier decks to augment the CAP as well as surface combatants’ own interceptor missiles and EW systems. These might be augmented in the future by high-energy lasers used as warship point defense weapon systems, though it is too early to say whether their main ‘kill’ mechanism would be causing an inbound threat’s structural failure or neutralizing its terminal homing sensors. If effective, lasers would be particularly useful for defense against unmanned aircraft swarms or perhaps anti-ship missile types that trade away advanced capabilities for sheer numbers. Regardless of its available defensive ordnance reserves, a battleforce’s ability to receive defensive support from other battleforces or even land-based Joint or Combined forces can also be quite helpful. The final ingredients for countering an adversary’s deception efforts are embracing tactical flexibility and seizing the tactical initiative. Using Tokarev’s observations as an example, this can be as simple as constantly changing CAP and AEW cycle durations, refueling periods, station positions, and tactical behaviors. A would-be deceiver needs to understand his target’s doctrine and tactics in order to create a ‘story’ that meshes with the latter’s predispositions while exploiting available vulnerabilities. By increasing the prospective deceiver’s uncertainty regarding what kinds of story elements are necessary to achieve the desired effects, or where vulnerabilities lie that are likely to be available at the time of the planned tactical action, it becomes less likely that a deception attempt will be ‘complete’ enough to work as intended. A more aggressive defensive measure might be to use offensive counterair sweeps well ahead of a battleforce to locate and neutralize the adversary’s scouts and inbound raiders, much as what was envisioned by the U.S. Navy’s 1980s Outer Air Battle concept. The method offering the greatest potential payoff, and not coincidentally the hardest to orchestrate, would be to entice the adversary to waste precious ordnance against a decoy group or expose his raiders to ambush by friendly fighters. All of these concepts force the adversary to react, with the latter two stealing the tactical initiative—and the first effective blow in a battle—from the adversary. Tomorrow, some concluding thoughts. View the full article