Rebuilding the Iraq Air Force

From Aviation Week

Rebuilding IQAF Not Without Challenges

Nov 9, 2008

By Robert Wall

The Iraqi vision is grand: build one of the Middle East's premier air forces flying F-16s, attack helicopters and modern airlifters. But years of neglect, combat losses and domestic turmoil mean that attaining this goal will be an enormous challenge.

Trying to create a new air force in what's effectively still a war zone may be an unprecedented undertaking. Nevertheless, such efforts are gaining momentum as a new generation of systems, pilots, maintenance personnel and processes starts coming into its own.

Transitioning to a Western-style flying culture is proving to be an arduous task, since Iraq is hobbled by economic and security difficulties that continue to define daily life here. Although the U.S.-led Coalition Air Force Transition Team (CAFTT) - which is helping to build the Iraqi air force (IQAF) - is seeing signs of progress, the verdict is still out on whether lasting change can be achieved.

The Iraqi ambitions are significant and the shopping list is long. The government already has requested information related to buying a fleet of F-16s; purchase plans for C-130Js and attack helicopters are underway.

The IQAF also is considering buying an advanced jet trainer that could double as a counter-insurgency aircraft and also perform reconnaissance tasks. An often-mentioned option is the AT-6B, an armed derivative of the Raytheon T-6A Texan II trainer. "We'll need many aircraft to keep up with the capability of the Iraqi army to fight terrorists," says IQAF Col. Ahmed, a senior squadron commander in the service. (Some Iraqi officers use only their first names, for fear their families might be targeted if their identities become known.)

The goal is to rebuild the air force by 2020 to have around 18,000 personnel and 550 aircraft, far below the 50,000 troops and 1,000 fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft the IQAF fielded in 1990.

The pace of growth already is brisk. "About a year ago, there were 750 people. Now there are 1,900, and by year-end it will be 2,800. By next year there [should] be 6,000" in the IQAF, notes U.S. Air Force Lt. Col. Nathan Brauner, adviser to the Iraqi training squadron.

With regard to airpower, the CAFTT team has been stressing the importance of a using a Western-style approach but is nevertheless wary of taking that too far. "We have to be careful not to mirror-image," says USAF Col. Sean Frisbee, CAFTT's chief of staff. "We are not creating the U.S. Air Force; we are creating the best Iraqi air force we can," adds USAF Lt. Col. Mark Brunsworth, adviser to Iraq's C-130E squadron.

The rebuilding effort started in 2004 and gathered steam around two years ago when larger numbers of former IQAF pilots started rejoining the service, says Ahmed. Safety concerns early on kept pilots from returning, he adds. As the security situation improved in the past two years, more pilots returned. But that doesn't mean security isn't still a problem. Senior IQAF officers worry about a "hit list" that has some of their names on it. Also, many pilots still don't want to be identified with their service affiliation for fear of reprisals.

With the Iraqi public, the IQAF appears to be resonating well. The service has painted the Iraqi flag under its aircraft. It's the best self-protection system that can be fielded, quips one senior Iraqi officer. U.S. pilots also note that when they fly on Iraqi helicopters, they see civilians below waving - emotions not seen when the ubiquitous U.S. Army UH-60 Black Hawks are overhead.

That situation has helped draw former Iraqi pilots back to the service. The applicants undergo a two-step vetting process. The initial review is the same as performed for Iraqi army personnel - checking their backgrounds. But the air force then performs a more detailed investigation, which involves checking references and looking for information about the applicant in the local community to avoid opening the door to regime opponents.

Persuading potential candidates to sign up with IQAF was only one of several steps that had to be taken to start the rebuilding effort, says USAF Brig. Gen. Brooks L. Bash, commander of CAFTT.

First the allies had to recognize that building the air force was important - particularly to support the counter-insurgency fight - and that a well-trained IQAF would eventually allow a reduction in coalition forces. Recent progress is also related to the fact that the allied effort has been stepped up. Since early 2006, when it was recognized that not enough was being done, about 370 advisers have joined CAFTT.

However, several hurdles still need to be overcome, says Bash. For example, there's a need to boost expenditures. The 2007 and 2008 budgets both came in substantially below what was requested. This year alone, the shortfall was $712 million, with $588 million provided on a $1.3-billion request. In part, Bash says, securing more funding will be dependent on the air force's gaining a stronger voice within the defense ministry.

Furthermore, some basic planning skills need to be developed. Purchasing uniforms can still be difficult, and IQAF has not yet evolved sufficiently to do long-term planning.

Infrastructure development is an important area that could suffer from lack of funding, according to U.S. officials. Although the U.S. plans to hand over bases to the IQAF under a "shrink and share" policy spelled out by U.S. Army Gen. David Petraeus, the government should make some infrastructure investment in the meantime. Petraeus oversees U.S. military operations in Iraq.

Perhaps one of the biggest near-term challenges is the IQAF's age profile. Most of the returning pilots are relatively old, and some would likely remain in service only a few more years. In fact, a pending government pension law could precipitate retirements among senior pilots, warns one CAFFT adviser.

The situation poses "serious leadership challenges," says Frisbee. In 10 years, some of the young pilots now entering the force will be in senior positions as the older generation leaves. "We need to develop the right level of leadership," he adds.

Bringing on new pilots is at a relatively early stage. On Oct. 7, the IQAF issued wings to the first three to graduate from its own training program. The service also is taking advantage of overseas opportunities. Eventually, the Iraqi air force wants to produce around 100 pilots per year, says IQAF Col. Karim, commander of the aviation training squadron at Kirkuk.

Improving flying skills is not a simple task. The simulator infrastructure in Iraq is still very limited. Moreover, Iraqi government officials are reluctant to send personnel overseas. That's because, in the past, some didn't return. But CAFTT advisers believe access to simulators is important, particularly for improving instrument flying skills that are considered lacking among pilots from the former regime. One option being considered is sending some of them to neighboring countries.

Other hurdles loom as well - such as English language training. This is considered less of a problem for pilots, although there, too, language skills can be problematic; for maintenance personnel, that's more the case.

As for the core activity of building mission skills for the IQAF, latent tension exists between the service and the CAFTT advisers' long-term priorities. In particular, the U.S. and its partners are focused on "foundational" skills to provide rudimentary operational capabilities and to train the Iraqis to support counter-insurgency operations. In contrast, the IQAF is more interested in preparing quickly for high-end combat in which F-16s will eventually be used.

Some advisers worry that the push for new high-end equipment is outpacing the IQAF's ability to field such capabilities. They note that readying pilots for F-16s would be difficult without an advanced jet trainer.

But Bash is more optimistic about the pace of developments, despite the flurry of requests in recent months for new weapon systems. The F-16s are not scheduled to be fielded until the middle of the next decade, and pilots should be ready by then, he suggests. Given the lead times involved in a purchase, "it really is time for them to start thinking about these things," he adds.

As for maintenance, this will almost certainly involve reliance on contractor logistics support as C-130Js and other aircraft with advanced avionics are fielded.

One of the biggest operational challenges stems from the fact that Iraq is not a member of the coalition fighting in its own country. This means that certain information is not shared. For instance, flight plans for coalition air forces and intelligence data are closely guarded; radar coverage also is not passed back to the Iraqis.

And there are "cultural" problems being encountered during the rebuilding effort, particularly in dealing with some of the pilots from the former regime. Crew rest, for example, is a relatively new concept. During Saddam Hussein's rule, pilots would fly whatever mission was assigned, regardless of whether they had had enough crew rest, for fear of reprisal. However, adhering strictly to crew-rest principles is not universally accepted. One senior CAFTT representative notes that the younger generation is embracing those concepts (as well as the principle of accountability); but with some senior personnel, this remains a challenge. Moreover, mid-level officers weren't encouraged to make decisions in the former organization, so getting majors and even lieutenant colonels to show initiative has at times been difficult. "The older generation is just going to have to retire," he says.