Russian assault reveals weaknesses

From Aviation Week

Russian Assault Reveals Weaknesses

Aug 20, 2008

By David A. Fulghum

Russian military officials, in writings there that are catching U.S. analysts' attention, are concluding that Russia's offensive into Georgia was morally justified but poorly organized and executed in the opening phases due to surprise.

U.S. government officials and analysts have been poring over open-source literature to gather operational and technological clues to events in the Georgia-Russia conflict. The opinions are coming from current and recently retired senior military commanders, and appear in Russia's Independent Military Review, other defense related publications, as well as in Russian news agency reports.

For instance, Maj. Gen. Marat Kulakhmetov, commander of the Russian peacekeeping forces in South Ossetia, is being fingered as ignoring the massing of Georgian tanks, artillery and troops near Tskhinvali on Aug. 7, according to former Russian Defense Minister Gen. Paul Grachev.

Also deemed inexcusable by the retired general was the lack of an immediate counter-attack against Georgian forces that entered the zone occupied by Russian peacekeeping troops.

Lack of preparation also plagued the Russian air force, according to its former commander-in-chief, Gen. Peter Deinekin, who accused the service of handing the initiative to the Georgian air force. As with Russian artillery units, he excoriated the air force for not immediately launching an air attack to blind Georgia's radar and reconnaissance capability and then shatter command and control.

The resulting confusion in Russia's command and control was pointed to as the reason that Russia's air force took so many losses, including a number of Su-25 Frogfoot close-attack aircraft, possibly an Su-24 and a front-line, high-performance Tu-22M aircraft that may have been either a bombing or reconnaissance variant operated by the Black Sea Fleet.

More precisely, Russian intelligence failed to analyze the numbers, locations and capabilities of the Georgian air defenses, said a former air force commander and chief, Gen. Anatoly Kornukov. As a result, Russian pilots went into combat expecting no resistance. Secondly, there was no campaign to eliminate the Georgian air defense or air force. Finally, there was no reason to use a strategic bomber like the Tu-22, he says.

Radar-killing missiles were not used on the Georgian air defenses, despite their availability, which meant that Russian aircrews could not use their precision stand-off weapons without being in range of Georgia's SA-11 air defenses. Some observers pointed to the unavailability of Russian precision, long-range standoff weaponry.

Other Russian analysts contend the Russians made little or no use of its space-based surveillance, that the initial use of older T-62 tanks and lightly armored personnel carriers caused unnecessary casualties and that the rough terrain and heavy vegetation of Georgia foiled the long-range use of laser-guided weapons.

Singled out for praise by Gen. Mikhail Moiseyev, former chief of the Russian joint staff, was the 58th Army and its chief, Gen. Vladimir Boldyrev. Moiseyev voiced approval of the punitive air and artillery attacks on Georgian military airfields and naval bases and praised the application of lessons learned during Chechnya operations. The seeming heavy handedness of Russian counterattacks - including overwhelming firepower and great expenditure of ammunition - was assessed by Deinekin as necessary to break any resurgent Georgian offensive spirit.